

# Parmenides: Annotated bibliography of the studies in English

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## Parmenides of Elea. Annotated bibliography of the studies in English

### Contents

This part of the section [History of Ontology](#) includes of the following pages:

[On the website "Theory and History of Ontology"](#)

Bibliography on Parmenides in English:

[A - B](#)

[C - E](#)

[F - G](#)

[H - K](#)

[L - Mos](#)

[Mou - Q](#)

[R - Sta](#)

[Ste - Z](#)

Bibliographies on Parmenides in other languages:

[Selection annotée des études en français su Parmenides d'Elée](#)

[Parmenides: Ausgewählte Studien in Deutsch](#)

[Bibliografia degli studi Italiani su Parmenide](#)

[Bibliografía des estudios sobre Parménides en español](#)

### Bibliography

1. "Parmenides Studies Today." 1979. *The Monist* no. 62:3-106.  
Contents: Alexander P. D. Mourelatos: Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides 3; Joseph Owens: Knowledge and Katabasis in Parmenides 15; Karl Bormann: The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius 30; Leonardo Tarán: Perpetual Duration and Atemporal Eternity in Parmenides and Plato 43; T. M. Robinson: Parmenides on the Real in its Totality 54; David Gallop: 'Is' or 'Is Not'? 61; P. B. Manchester: Parmenides and the Need for Eternity 81-106.
2. Adluri, Vishwa. 2011. *Parmenides, Plato and Mortal Philosophy*. London: Continuum.  
Contents: Foreword by Luc Brisson XIII; Acknowledgments XVII; Introduction: Parmenides and Renewing the Beginning 1; Part I: Beginnings: *Arkhai*. Chapter 1: Radical Individuality: Time, Mortal Soul, and Journey 11; Chapter 2: Parmenides and His Importance as a Beginner 33; Part II: Parmenides. Chapter 3: The Mortal Journey: *Thumos* (The Mortal Soul) and Its Limits 45; Chapter 4: In the Realm of the Goddess: Logos and Its Limits 64; Chapter 5: At Home in the Kosmos: The Return 78; Part III: Plato the Pre-Socratic. Chapter 6: Reading Plato's *Phaedrus*: Socrates the Mortal 93; Part IV: Forewording. Conclusion: Returning to Parmenides 129; Appendix: Translation and Textual Notes of Parmenides' *Peri Phuseos* 137; Section I: The Journey 137; Section II: The Goddess 139; Section III: The Kosmos 148; Notes 157; Bibliography 186; Index 205-212.  
"Dr. Adluri argues for a "mortal philosophy," that is, a philosophy that is aware of and maintains the tension between the mortal desire for transcendence, whether understood as eternity or as the timeless truths of metaphysical propositions, and the irreducibly tragic "mortal condition" which implies a return from transcendence to our finitude. In my view, Dr. Adluri holds together these opposing elements admirably in his book and, in doing so, provides a thought-provoking and brilliantly original analysis of Parmenides' poem with extensive notes, written in a fresh and lucid style. His work, which is very interesting on the level of scholarly work, provides new insight into Parmenides' poem that goes well beyond the logical analyses to which one has attempted to reduce it over the most recent decades. Above all, he proposes a description of Parmenides' approach that does not reduce him to being the philosopher of Being and of Eternity. Parmenides speaks of the universe, and confronts not only immortality, but mortality as well. The importance of argumentation in the poem is considerable, and continues to be admitted by all, but the role played in it by myth is decisive in it." (From the Foreword by Luc Brisson, XIII)
3. Altman, William Henry Furness. 2015. "Parmenides' Fragment B3 Revisited." *Hypnos (São Paulo)* no. 35:197-230.  
"Abstract: The justification for placing Parmenides fr. 3 (DK 28 B3) in "Truth" is weak, and both its ambiguity and capacity to generate radically different interpretations suggest that it belongs to "Doxa." The paper analyzes the fragment's sources (Clement, Plotinus, and Proclus), the circumstances of its belated entry into any collection (1835), and argues that the ongoing debate between the reading of Diels and the reading of it introduced by Zeller arises from the presupposition—heretofore unquestioned—that it belongs in "Truth."  
The paper's principal purpose is not to settle this famous interpretive dilemma nor to reinterpret B3 within "Doxa," but rather to destabilize the currently unquestioned view that it belongs in "Truth," and to call into question any global interpretations of Parmenides that make B3 a central component."
4. Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret. 1968. "Parmenides, Mystery and Contradiction." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 69:125-132.  
Reprinted in: *The Collected Philosophical Papers*, vol. I: *From Parmenides to Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981, pp. 3-8.  
"Endeavors to elucidate Parmenides' seemingly enigmatic statements concerning the relationship between Being and thought. Formulates Parmenides' argument in terms of three propositions: (1) it is the same thing that can be thought and can be;

(2) what is not cannot be; (3) therefore what is not cannot be thought. Undertakes a detailed analysis of the logical structure of the argument, and contends that it is valid if the second premiss is taken *in sensu diviso*. But it has no credibility except *in sensu composito*. The conclusion is also incredible."

"If we take Parmenides as simply warning us off the path of thinking there are things that do not exist, then he seems no more than good sense. But when we combine this with the idea that *being* is an object, we get his wilder results.

However, we should not move slickly here: "being" might be an abstract noun, equivalent to the infinitive "to be". But Parmenides does not treat *to be* as an object, but rather *being*, i.e. something being or some being thing. It is difficult to use the participle in English in the required way, and we might get closer to the sense by saying "what is".

There is a similar difficulty about Parmenides' description of the two paths for thought: "is, and cannot not be", and "is not and needs must not be". In English the lack of a subject may be found disturbing. But the Greek does not need a subject-expression. The subject - he, she, it, or they - is built into the verb, which therefore does not seem incomplete without a separate word for a subject. Therefore it is often translated "It is". But there is no indication in the Greek that "it" is the right subject. Therefore I would rather not give a subject word. "These are the only ways of enquiry for thought: one 'is and cannot not be', . . . the other 'is not, and needs must not be'." That is: Whatever enquiry one is making, one's thoughts can only go two ways, saying 'is, and must be', or 'is not, and can't be'.

The noteworthy thing about this is not so much the ungiven subject, as the combination of "is" with "cannot not be" and of "is not" with "cannot be". This needs argument. We have seen what the argument is: what is not is nothing, and it is not possible for what is nothing to be; and so both whatever can be must be, and what can be thought of must be; for it is the same as what can be." (from the *Introduction* to the reprint, p. X)

(...)

"It was left to the moderns to deduce what could be from what could hold of thought, as we see Hume to have done. This trend is still strong. But the ancients had the better approach, arguing only that a thought was impossible because the thing was impossible, or, as the *Tractatus* puts it. "Was man nicht denken kann, das kann man nicht denken": an impossible thought is an impossible thought.

At the present day we are often perplexed with enquiries about what makes true, or what something's being thus or so consists in; and the answer to this is thought to be an explanation of meaning. If there is no external answer, we are apparently committed to a kind of idealism.

Whitehead's remark about Plato might, somewhat narrowly, be applied to his great predecessor:

Subsequent philosophy is footnotes on Parmenides." (from the *Introduction* to the reprint, pp.X-XI)

5. Austin, Scott. 1983. "Genesis and Motion in Parmenides: B8.12-13." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* no. 87:151-168.

"The emendation τοῦ for μῆ in Parmenides, fragment 8, line 12, proposed by Karsten, (1) has been adopted by (among others) Reinhardt, Tarán, Stokes, and, most recently, Barnes. (2) And yet, while there is no compelling reason to make the emendation, there are several good reasons why one should not make it. I want to claim that the unemended poem already does what the emendation is supposed to allow it to do. I also should like to venture some observations on Parmenidean method and on his use of the key concepts of change and motion." (p. 151)

(1) S. Karsten, *Parmenidis Eleatae Carminis Reliquiae* (Amsterdam 1835).

(2) K. Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (Bonn 1916) 40 ff. Leonardo Tarán, *Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays* (Princeton 1965) 95-102. Michael C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971). Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers, I, Thales to Zeno* 188-190 (London 1979).

6. ———. 1986. *Parmenides. Being, Bounds, and Logic*. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 Contents: Acknowledgments IX-XI; Introduction 1; Chapter 1. Why not "is not"? 11; Chapter 2. Terms 44; Chapter 3. Modals, the Other, and Method 96; Chapter 5. Context and contradiction 116; Chapter 6. The bounded and the unbounded 136; Appendix. Parmenides' *On Nature* 155; Notes 175; Bibliography 193; Index 199-203.  
 "In chapter 1, I attempt to describe what exactly the goddess requires and prohibits. One scholarly issue arises from the puzzling fact that, though the goddess prohibits discourse about what-is-not, her own discourse is full of negative words and expressions, thus seeming inconsistent. I try to arrive at an interpretation of her prohibition which does not make her rule out the language that she herself uses, which clears her of some inconsistencies by allowing her to mean what she says, negatively as well as positively. In the process I attempt to determine what Parmenides thought were the ultimate relationships among ontology, sentence structure, and logic. I also claim that Parmenides' attitude towards contextual relativity determines what is right about "Truth" and wrong about "Opinion." This claim, if correct, allows us to make connections between Parmenides, the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle, connections which are taken up again and historically amplified in chapter 5. This first chapter is the most controversial in its claims. Chapter 2, taking as its premise the goddess's use of different sorts of positive and negative language, tries to determine just how many sorts of language there are, how comprehensive the coverage of them is, and why certain sorts occur in specific places in the poem. (...) Chapters 3 and 4 make the same claim about comprehensiveness and determinacy for Parmenides' treatment of contraries, for his proof that there is nothing besides being, and for his use of metaphorical modal language. Here the method of elimination of alternatives has the same ontological outcome: a single, non contrary necessary being is rendered determinate and, to use Parmenides' own metaphor, is bounded by being the object of a discourse which operates by systematically examining the spectrum of possibilities. In chapters 2-4, then, logic and a comprehensive method of enumeration and variation appear intimately intertwined with ontology in a combination originated by Parmenides and (as chapters 5 and 6 try to show) decisive in subsequent philosophy and in its own right. Chapter 5 attempts to trace the history, from Thales through Parmenides to Aristotle, of the Parmenidean logic of contextual variability, of the method of variation, and of the theory of negative language attributed to Parmenides in the first four chapters, thus to situate his thought in its immediate historical context while showing that later developments can be predicated retroactively in his terms. The concluding chapter meditates on the philosophical and theological significance of the views attributed here to Parmenides, especially in light of his identification of the transcendent with the determinate or bounded rather than with the unbounded, and in connection with the methodology and theory associated with that identification in earlier chapters." (pp. 7-8)
7. ———. 2002. "Parmenides, double-negation, and dialectic." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 95-100. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
 "I claim in this paper that Parmenides chose to negate as part of the most basic skeleton of his proof-structure: each predicate true of Being is not only proved, but also has its contradictory denied modally. And all sorts of negations (privations, denials, double-negations) have a necessary place in these proofs. Thus Parmenides' speech - a monistic speech - was already meaningfully negative, and the pluralism in philosophy that begins later on and culminates in the argument against Parmenides in the *Sophist* is unnecessary, at least on those grounds. In particular, I wish to show that Parmenides, like Plato's *Parmenides*, domesticates negation in a way that Plato and the subsequent tradition do not positively give him credit for. For Plato articulated the line of criticism which has been dominant ever since:

Parmenides' discourse cannot be uttered without undercutting the goddess's own conditions for the intelligibility of meaningful speech; moreover, even if we could hear her speech and retain it for a moment, it would be useless to us. The criticism continues: a pure monism is, divorced from the needs of life, dialogue, or a path to goodness and beauty.

Parmenides' intention to speak negatively is visible from the beginning of the goddess' remarks about the canons for truth. Fragment 2 tells us that we are to say not only how or that being is, but also how it is not possible for it to be otherwise. This prescription in fragment 2 gets expanded into the list of signposts in fr. 8: 'how it is' in fr. 8.2, directly repeating the 'how it is' in fr. 2.3, is at once amplified into 'how it is ungenerable and unperishing, a whole of a single kind, unmoving, and perfect' - this amplification, along with the reading of Parmenides as an ironist, will remain one of Mourelatos' own most decisive contributions - and each signpost is then proved in fragment 8 in sequence by proving the impossibility of its contradictory in a manner I shall describe below. There is no such thing as a bare 'is' in Parmenides; the copula is always either explicitly predicationally or implicitly so (Austin, 1986, pp. 11-43). It is always a mistake to isolate the 'is' from the surrounding discourse and then attempt to guess at its significance." (p. 95)

8. ———. 2007. *Parmenides and the History of Dialectic. Three Essays*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

Contents: Introduction IX; Acknowledgements XIII; Essay one: Parmenidean dialectic 1; Essay two: Parmenidean metaphysics 29; Essay three: Parmenides and the history of dialectic 51; Bibliography 85; Index 91-98.

"In [the] second essay, I would like to attempt a reconstruction of Parmenides in philosophical terms, not in methodological terms, as was tried in the first essay. But the philosophical issues will, I hope, be not only central, but also perennial. I shall set these out partly on the basis of the conclusions of the first essay, and partly on the basis of conclusions for which I have argued elsewhere. The attempt in this essay will, however, necessarily be incomplete, for the ramifications of Parmenides extend even into our own day. I shall attempt a study of this extension in the third essay.

I urge to begin with, as I urged in the first essay, that we abandon the attempt to figure out the motivations of Parmenides' argument by looking to fragment 2 first and then making conjectures about what the Parmenidean *esti* in that fragment means or could mean. No amount of research, amplification, or surgery is going to make this fragment specific enough. Instead, we should look to fragment 8 as an example of the discourse which fragment 2 makes both possible and necessary, and reason backwards instead of forwards. This may fail, but it is high time that it was tried." (p. 31)

9. ———. 2011. "Existence and Essence in Parmenides." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 1-8. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

Summary: "Parmenides' absolute monism puts existence and essence into an absolutely monistic Being as it joins levels in an ontological hierarchy that other philosophers, from the Neoplatonists through Hegel, were later to separate. The result is a fusion of presentation and representation, a fusion not teased apart until the twentieth century."

10. ———. 2014. "Some Eleatic Features of Platonic and Neoplatonic Method." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 34:65-74.

"I have earlier tried to show that there is a determinate sequence of positives and negatives in the 'Truh' section of Parmenides' fragment 8, that the sequence correlates with elements in the structure of the second half of Plato's *Parmenides*, and that both sequences can be called 'dialectical' in the sense demanded by *Republic VI* (Austin, [Parmenides and the History of Dialectic. Three Essays] 2007). I shall here investigate the use of the notions of one and many in the poem and in the dialogue, and attempt to look forward to similar uses in the Plotinian



hypostases and in Proclus' commentary on the dialogue. My aim is to expand and make more precise our understanding of ancient dialectic. A cursory survey of Google will reveal dozens of results for the joint keywords 'Parmenides dialectic'. But it is never clear just what this 'dialectic' is to consist in, nor how it was interpreted by those who thought themselves to be Plato's successors in our Western tradition. Here I shall attempt to show that alternations and jugglings of one and many turn out to be as important as those of positive and negative in this tradition at its outset."

11. Barnes, Jonathan. 1979. "Parmenides and the Eleatic One." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 61:1-21.  
Reprinted in: J. Barnes, *Method and Metaphysics. Essays in Ancient Philosophy I*, edited by Maddalena Bonelli, New York: Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 262-287.  
" 'Exactly one thing exists'. That is the intoxicating thesis of 'real' monism. It is, of course, utterly distinct from its milksop homonym, 'material' monism, which maintains that everything is made of some single matter or stuff. As a philosophico-scientific thesis it is at best absurd and at worst unintelligible; yet beyond all doubt it was propounded by Melissus.  
Almost to a man, scholars deny Melissus any monistic originality: he inherited real monism, together with most of the rest of his philosophy, from father Parmenides; and it was the uncouth verses of the Way of Truth which placed *tò en* at the centre of Eleatic metaphysics. A few heterodox students have quarrelled with that ascription, doubting the presence - or at least questioning the importance - of The One in Parmenides' thought; but their scruples have been unconvincingly expressed, and they have failed to shake the orthodoxy. And indeed, the orthodoxy has reason for complacency: the history of fifth century thought is often seen to hinge on Parmenidean monism; a luxuriant doxography is pretty well unanimous in ascribing *tò en* to Parmenidean; and the thesis of real monism is apparently both stated and argued for in the surviving fragments of Parmenides' poem.  
In this paper, I shall argue that we have in reality no reason to make Parmenides a monist. My approach is negative and serial: I shall simply consider one by one the texts and suppositions which have been or might be adduced in the quest for monism, and I shall endeavour to show that their adduction is of no avail. My aim is to prick the hide of orthodoxy: even the most sagacious elephant may benefit from the occasional gad-fly's sting." (pp. 2-3, notes omitted)
12. ———. 1979. *The Presocratic Philosophers*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Two volumes; revised edition in one volume 1989.  
See Chapter IX: *Parmenides and the Objects of Inquiry*, pp. 122-138 and X: *Being and Becoming*, pp. 139-157.  
"Parmenides of Elea marks a turning-point in the history of philosophy: his investigations, supported and supplemented by those of his two followers [Zeno and Melissus], seemed to reveal deep logical flaws in the very foundations of earlier thought. Science, it appeared, was marred by subtle but profound contradictions; and the great enterprise undertaken by the Milesians, by Xenophanes and by Heraclitus, lacked all pith and moment. The age of innocence was ended, and when science was taken up again by the fifth-century philosophers, their first and most arduous task was to defend their discipline against the arguments of Elea. If their defense was often frail and unconvincing, and if it was Plato who first fully appreciated the strength and complexity of Parmenides' position, it remains true that Parmenides' influence on later Presocratic thought was all-pervasive. Historically, Parmenides is a giant figure; what is more, he introduced into Presocratic thought a number of issues belonging to the very heart of philosophy. Parmenides' thoughts were divulged in a single hexameter poem (Diogenes Laertius, 1.16 = 28 A 13) which survived intact to the time of Simplicius (A 21). Observing that copies of the poem were scarce, Simplicius transcribed extensive extracts; and thanks to his efforts we possess some [B 6] lines of the work, including two substantial passages." (p. 122)

13. Barrett, James. 2004. "Struggling with Parmenides." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 24:267-291.  
 "... Parmenides' poem contains syntactical puzzles of extraordinary difficulty. (3) And yet, in spite of the fact that every student of the poem has experienced a form of vertigo in coming to terms with this remarkable text, few have pursued this disorientation as anything other than a difficulty to be surmounted.  
 I argue, however, that the poem reaps benefits from the opacity we all confront and that our experience of vertigo is in fact consistent with the commentary of the fragments more broadly. I do not contend that the text presents unresolvable opacity as yet one more gesture toward inescapable aporia, or that none of the possible meanings necessarily have a greater or lesser claim to validity. Rather, I suggest that the poem offers its own difficulty—particularly in the 'Aletheia' (4) as a key part of its purpose and that the text's strong interest in epistemological method appears not only in the substance of its commentary, but also in its mode of expression." (p. 267)  
 (3) By 'poem' I mean the fragments as we know them.  
 (4) I follow convention in dividing the poem into three sections: proem (B1); 'Aletheia' B2-8; and Doxa' B9-19. For convenience I refer to the Aletheia' as the poem's 'first part' and to the 'Doxa' as the 'second'. I intend no judgments either by this terminology or by these divisions.
14. Basson, Anthony Henry. 1961. "The Way of Truth." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 61:73-86.  
 "More generally, almost all commentators assume (1) that there is just one premiss, (2) that the poem presents a single continuous chain of argument. If this were so, a single false step would suffice to destroy the whole. In fact, analysis does not support either of these assumptions.  
 The object of this paper is simply logical analysis, and this means ascertaining (1) which statements in fact function as premisses, and which as conclusions, (2) whether the conclusions are in fact validly deduced from the premisses. For this purpose I use Raven's (\*)excellent English rendering, referring to the Greek text only where this is essential. I shall assume that Fragments 2 and 8 contain the whole argument, the remainder being repetitious or rhetorical; and further, that propositions not proved in the extant fragments were not proved in those parts of the poem which have perished.  
 I first reproduce Fragments 2 and 8, arranged so as to show their logical structure. Thus Fragment 2 consists of five assertions, numbered 01-05, which form a single argument. But Fragment 8 consists of a sequence of forty-two assertions, and divides into no less than nine distinct arguments, numbered 11-13, 21-26, 31-36, 41-44, 51-55, 61-62, 71-74, 81-85, 91-97. Some preliminary observations are made on the articulation of each of these ten arguments, and their relations to one another. In Part III the principal conclusions are listed, which Parmenides seems to wish to draw. Then the various arguments for these are reconstructed, additional premisses being inserted where these are required for validity. It is found that two of these arguments (the proofs of assertions 22 and 72) are fundamental. In Part IV the argument of Fragment 2 (01-05) is examined in connexion with the proof of 22, and an interpretation of the former is offered. The outcome of this examination is that 71-74 is the fundamental argument, rather than 01-05." (pp. 74-75)  
 (\*) [Kirk, Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers. A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*, 1957]
15. Beaufret, Jean. 2006. "Heraclitus and Parmenides." In *Dialogue with Heidegger*, 21-31. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 First French edition: *Botteghe oscure*, 25, 1960, pp. 31-37; revised reprint in J. Beaufret, *Dialogue avec Heidegger. Philosophie grecque*, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1973.  
 "If the world that is said to be pre-Socratic is rich in original historical figures, Heraclitus and Parmenides are the most radiantly central figures of this world. With Heraclitus and Parmenides the very foundation of occidental thought is



accomplished. It is to them that what is still alive and vivacious at the bottom of our thinking goes back, as if to the secret of its source. It can be said that it is through them that we think, even if we do not think of them, for they are the light in which the depth of our world is originally revealed—a depth which we always and already are and which remains all the more enigmatic for us, and thus all the more concealed, in that we belong to it in the heart of the history that has come to us and that is still to come." (p. 21)

(...)

"If Parmenides is the thinker of being, we can understand now that this thinking of being overshadows change no more than a thinking of change, such as Heraclitus conceives it, destabilizes a fundamental permanence. Movement appears to Heraclitus only upon a background of permanence, and when Parmenides thinks the permanence of being against non-being, it is as an unmovable horizon of presence-absence that is the essence of all change. Far from rising from the dawn against each other like the champions of an inaugural polemic, Heraclitus and Parmenides are perhaps both, despite the difference of their words, listening to the same λόγος, to which they both lend the same ear at the origin of occidental thought. At bottom, there is perhaps no more immobilism in Parmenides' Poem than there is mobilism in the fragments of Heraclitus, or rather permanence and change are to be found to the same degree in both. In this way the two languages diverge without, however, contradicting each other. Both expose the Greek knowledge of being, a *knowing of being* that unfolds in the element of presence without forcing or tormenting anything, without shying away or becoming strained, without compromise or excess." (pp. 30-31)

16. ———. 2006. "Reading Parmenides." In *Dialogue with Heidegger*, 32-63.

Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

French edition: *Lecture de Parménide*, in J. Beaufret, *Dialogue avec Heidegger. Philosophie grecque*, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1973.

"But in 1916 Karl Reinhardt, who taught at Frankfurt and whom I once had the chance to meet on the shores of Lake Maggiore just after the Second World War, dismisses the interpretations of both Diels and Wilamowitz. This is neither a polemical refutation nor a concessive hypothesis; what Parmenides explains, after having opposed truth to error, is quite simply how it would be impossible for error not to seize the minds of men from the very beginning. The power of error over men responds, as Reinhardt says, "to a sort of original sin" of pre-history. (5) The site of this error, that is, opinion or δόξα, ceases to be, therefore, a mere adventitious juxtaposition to true knowledge, ἀλήθεια, in the Poem; it becomes an integral part of a whole to whose unity it belongs as that to which true knowledge is contrasted." (p. 33)

(...)

"The argument that there is a tripartition where a bimillenary tradition has only been able to see a bipartition, is, I believe, the veritable acquisition of Reinhardt's study. Yet whether this tripartition is exactly as Reinhardt determines it remains as questionable.

It falls to Heidegger to have raised such a question eleven years after the publication of Reinhardt's book, on page 223 of *Sein und Zeit* (1927), that is, four pages before the incomplete French translation published in 1964 by Gallimard as a supposed first volume of the text mysteriously comes to a halt. Heidegger says in a note: "Karl Reinhardt was the first to conceptualize and solve the hackneyed problem of how the two parts of Parmenides' poem are connected, though he did not explicitly point out the ontological foundation for the connection between ἀλήθεια and δόξα, or of the necessity of this connection." (p. 34)

(...)

"Is it a question, as Reinhardt thought, of the tripartition: truth, error, and truth of error as original sin? Is it a question of something other? But of what exactly? Can we draw it out from a simple translation? Yes, but on condition that this translation is not simply a movement of the text to us, but rather a movement on our part to

- Parmenides' words. Not, of course, in order to burden them with presuppositions that have come from elsewhere, but to attempt to hear in them the simplicity of what they say. And here philology, as erudite as it may be, remains insufficient. For it is above all philology that is far from being exempt from philosophical presuppositions." (p. 35)
17. Benardete, Seth. 1998. "«Night and day,...»: Parmenides." *Mètis. Anthropologie des mondes grecs anciens* no. 13:193-225.  
 "Three things are conspicuously absent from Parmenides' poem, and a fourth is just as surprising for its presence. The goddess never ascribes eternity (αἰεί) to being or falsehood (ψευδός) to nonbeing; nonbeing disappears as soon as the goddess turns to Opinion, even though 'to be not' is as much a mortal name as 'to be' (8. 40), and the goddess promises that Parmenides will know (εἶσθι, εἰδήσεις [10. 1, 5]) and learn (μαθήσεται [8.31]) mortal opinions, but she herself never uses such verbs about Truth.  
 Parmenides is, to be sure, fated to hear of everything (πάντα πυθέσθαι) (1.28), but only he says that he was on a road that carries the man who knows (εἰδότα φῶτα) (1. 3). The goddess says that mortals know nothing εἰδότες οὐδέν) (6. 4). That the goddess never speaks of the parts that should presumably constitute the whole of being might be thought a fifth cause of astonishment, but not if 'whole' means no more than 'one', and the likeness of being to a sphere does not grant it anything more than arbitrarily sliced homogeneous sections, and the difference between the surface and center of a sphere fails to apply to being. If being is also bereft of any magnitude, despite the equal measures the goddess assigns to it (8. 44, 49), being is no more than a point and as hypothetical as any other geometric entity. It is one thing for the goddess to speak of an articulated order (διάκοσμος) of opinions no less plausible (εἰκώς) than imagistic (εἰκότως) (8. 60); it is quite another for being to transgress its own boundaries through an image (3).  
 Deception (ἀπατηλός κόσμος) should be an exclusive property of Opinion (8. 32). Plato's Eleatic Stranger, in believing that Parmenides' whole case collapses if phantom speeches (εἰδῶλα λεγόμενα) and the arts that produce them can be shown to exist, seems to be unaware that Parmenides had anticipated his counter-proof in the phantom speech his own poem was, despite the fact that the lines he himself quotes from it lodged the image within the account of being (4). The patricide he is about to commit and for which he asks Theaetetus's pardon is itself a phantom." (p. 194)  
 (3) The double meaning of εἰκότως, which controls the account that Timaeus gives, first shows up in the *Odyssey*, where Nestor, in speaking of Telemachus, juxtaposes its two senses: ἦ τοι γάρ μῦθοί γε εἰκότες, οὐδέ κε φαίης/νεώτερον ὧδε εἰκότα μυθήσασθαι (*Odyssey*, 3. 124-5).  
 (4) *Sophist*, 241 d 10-e 6; 244 e 2-7.
18. Benzi, Nicolò. 2016. "Noos and Mortal Enquiry in the Poetry of Xenophanes and Parmenides." *Methodos. Savoirs et Textes* no. 16:1-18.  
 Abstract: "*Noos*, *noein* and their derivatives are of central importance to the development of epistemological conceptions in Presocratic philosophy. Already in Homer the terms indicate a special form of cognition, resembling sense perception in its non-inferential nature, which consists in discovering the truth beyond mere appearance. In this article, I focus on the role which *noos* and *noein* play in the poetry of Xenophanes and Parmenides, whose characterizations of noetic cognition, I argue, depend on their response to the problems stemming from the contrast between humans' epistemic limitations and divine omniscience, as traditionally depicted in Archaic Greek poetry. In particular, I consider Hesiod's poems and the implications of his claim to be able to "speak the mind (*noos*) of Zeus" (*Op.* 661), which hints at the universal truth he wants to convey through his poetry. However, Hesiod's dependence on the Muses, who can speak both false and true things (*Th.* 27-28), renders his poetry inevitably ambiguous, as he and his audience cannot know whether what they learn from the divinity is actually true.

Xenophanes appropriates the motif of humans' epistemic limitedness by describing mortals as inevitably confined to opinion, and contrasting their condition with the all-powerful noetic capacities of the greatest god. However, I argue, despite mortals' belief-formation ultimately relies on divine disclosure, humans are not condemned to complete ambiguity as in the past poetic tradition, since Xenophanes' very conception of god's *noos* provides a reliable basis for mortal enquiry which guarantees the actual improvement of humans' opinions over time.

Even in Parmenides' poem human *noos* is repeatedly described as wandering astray, but error is not conceived as an ineluctable human condition. In fact, by stipulating that the correct path of enquiry which mortals' *noos* ought to follow to attain truth consists in the logical deduction of the attributes of What-Is, Parmenides allows for the actual possibility that humans achieve that universal and absolute truth to which traditionally they could not have access.

Thus, by introducing innovations to the traditional notion of divine and mortal *noos*, Xenophanes and Parmenides respectively assigned to critical enquiry and logical argumentation that essential role which they maintained in the following development of philosophy."

19. Bicknell, Peter J. 1967. "Parmenides' Refutation of Motion and an Implication." *Phronesis* no. 12:1-5.

"It is commonly maintained that Melissus was the major forerunner of atomism. This has been argued on a number of grounds, one of these being that Leucippus reacted to a Melissean rather than a Parmenidean refutation of locomotion. In the following short paper I shall challenge this view and point out that not only is one other argument for Melissus' influence on atomism insecure, but that Theophrastus (\*), our most important witness, unequivocally states that Leucippus opposed a pre-Melissean eleaticism.

Discussion is preceded by quotation of the two relevant texts." [Parmenides DK 28 B8 and Melissus DK 30 B7.7] (p. 1)

"To return to motion and the void, it seems to me most likely that Leucippus in replying to *Parmenides* made explicit τὸ κενόν implicit in Parmenides' gaps of what is not in what is and that Melissus attempted to refute Leucippus using atomism's own physical terminology." (p. 5)

(\*) [The crucial passage is the following: Simplicius Phys. 28.4ff (a virtual transcript of Theophrastus, either direct or through Alexander of Aphrodisias), (p. 4)]

20. ———. 1968. "A new arrangement of some Parmenidean verses." *Symbolae Osloensis* no. 42:44-50.

"Preface. There have been two important attempts at setting the extant fragments of Parmenides' poem in order; that by H. Diels in his 'Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta' and in the earlier editions of 'Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker'; and that by W. Kranz in the later editions of the latter work. In many respects, the sequence proposed by Diels was followed by his successor, but the respective fragments 1 and 7 differ significantly. With the important exception of C. J. de Vogel, (1) scholars appear unanimous in their approval of the Kranzian ordering. In the present paper, I intend to review the difference between Diels' and Kranz' constructions of fragments 1 and 7, and to suggest a new combination of verses which involves adding a line to fragment 1 as Diels constructed it and uniting three other fragments, namely fragment 6 (Diels and Kranz), fragment 2 (Diels) = fragment 4 (Kranz), and fragment 8 (Diels and Kranz)." (p. 44)

(1) C. J. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy*, Vol. I, Leiden, 1957, pp. 37-38.

21. ———. 1979. "Parmenides DK 28 B5." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 13:9-11.

According to the common view, represented by Raven (1) and endorsed with little hesitation by Guthrie, (2) this fragment, whose context within Parmenides' poem is not evident from its only citation, (3) is to be interpreted in conjunction with B1.28—29. In

these lines from the prologue the goddess undertakes to reveal to the poet-seer Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλεος (4) or εὐγίεγγεος (5) or ενττειέθος (6) τ?τορ. Accepting the reading eUKiwXeoc, Raven explains that truth is described as well-rounded because wherever you pick up the chain of Parmenides' reasoning, you can follow it round in a circle, passing through each of the links in turn back to your starting point. At B5, Raven holds, the goddess spells out this feature of her subsequent argumentation. He translates "it is all one to me where I begin, for I shall come back there again in time".

Together with others this interpretation is rightly rejected in Tarán's (7) modern doxography. It is incompatible, Tarán claims, with the structure of B8. Only a brief scrutiny of the Way of Truth is required to appreciate that this is in fact the case. Five characteristics, ἀ·γένητον, ἀνωληθρον, οὐλον μουνιχτηγνές, ἀτρεμές, ἀτελεστον, (8) of its subject are established in that order. (9) Only in the demonstration of the fourth, in one of its senses, (10) is the proof of others invoked. (11) None of the theorems of B8 leads back into the primary argument which occupies B2, B3 and B6 1-2. It apparently did not occur to Tarán, however, to contemplate an alternative translation for B5. Rendering "It is indifferent to me where I make a beginning; for there I come back again", he declare himself agnostic as to the reason for, if not the authenticity of, (12) the goddess' observation." (p. 9)

1. See G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Cambridge 1954, pp. 268-269.

2. See W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. ii, Cambridge 1965, p. 97 note 1.

3. By Proclus (*in Parm.* 1. 708. 16-17) who almost certainly found the lines, which he mistakenly referred to Being, in an anthology.

4. So Simplicius at *de caelo* 557. 27 ff.

5. So Proclus, *in Tim.* 1. 345. 15-16.

6. Thus Clement, *Strom.* 2. 336. 16-17; Diogenes Laertius 9.22; Plutarch, *adv. Colot.* 1114 d-e; and Sextus Empiricus, *adv. math.* 7. III and 114.

7. See L. Tarán, *Parmenides*, Princeton 1965, pp. 51-53.

8. See B8.9-11.

9. ἀγένητου together with, conversely, ἀνωληθρον, B8. 5-21; ουλών μοννογενές, B8. 22— 25; ἀτρεμές, B8. 26-41; ἀτέλετον, B8. 42-49.1 leave elaboration for a future occasion.

10. I stand by my central contention at *Phronesis* 12 (1967) pp. 1-5 that Parmenides separately disposed of movement qua transformation, growth and diminution, and qualitative change (all ruled out proximately by the impossibility of genesis and olethros) on the one hand (B8.26-28) and qua change of position, i.e. locomotion, on the other (B8. 29-33).

11. See B8. 27-28.

12. Doubted by Jameson, for reference see note 16 below.

16. C.J. Jameson, "Well-rounded Truth" and Circular Thought in Parmenides", *Phronesis* 3 (1958), pp. 15-30.

22. Blank, David L. 1982. "Faith and Persuasion in Parmenides." *Classical Antiquity* no. 1:167-177.

"The debate between those who recognize a religious, mystical Parmenides and those who see Parmenides as a rationalist has had a long history, even when one begins its examination with Diels's shaman- and Reinhardt's logician Parmenides. (1)" (p. 167)

(...)

"This essay attempts to show not only that certain elements of the proem's imagery make sense in a religious light but that they go somewhat toward clarifying the purpose of the proem and its relation to the remainder of Parmenides' poem. The analysis centers on the motifs of faith and persuasion, πιστις and Πειθώ. I shall argue that these motifs are used to stress the importance of Parmenides' message to his disciples by putting forward a claim to urgency on the level of his competition, the mystery religions and Pythagorean teachings to which the disciples were



- constantly exposed in southern Italy. Establishment of this claim is the ultimate goal of Parmenides' poem." (p. 168)  
(...)  
"If Parmenides wanted his philosophical project to be taken seriously or even to be heard at all over the confused frenzy of the pious, he was well advised to borrow some of their techniques. Thus, Parmenides begins by making his set of alternatives, Truth and Seeming, as crucially important to the audience as the alternatives of the competing groups. Once he has gained the audience's attention and has got the audience to trust him, he demonstrates the method of persuasion by argument. "ἔστί, says Parmenides, is the Way of true faith; and although he argues for this logically, he begins by using the seductive power of persuasion and implies that those who hold the true faith will be happy, while those who do not are doomed to ignorance by their ἀπιστία." (p. 177)
23. Bodnár, István M. 1985. "Contrasting Images Notes on Parmenides B 5." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 19:52-59.  
"A fragment, deprived of its context and so short as B 5 is, can pose notorious difficulties to those trying to interpret it. Tarán's verdict (which he formulates while elucidating the basic" meaning of this fragment) that "... while some of these conjectures go beyond the evidence so that there is no good reason to support one against the others, other conjectures are based on premisses that may be proved wrong" seems to suggest that we do not possess any criterion so as to choose among the interpretations which cannot be rejected: after all a certain amount of uncertainty is inevitable or even inherent in this fragment.  
In the following sections I will try to show that in much the same way as in the case of, for example, Parmenides B 3 we are able to contrast and rank different interpretations of this fragment. This does not lead up to pure certainty in fact, and supposing we happen to find some longer quotations from Parmenides some day embedding B 5 in a continuous context, it is clear that such a development might be disastrous for the wealth of accumulated labours of scholastically on this fragment. But in principle this holds good in the case of the vast majority of the Presocratic authors, let alone some of the other fragments of Parmenides." (p. 52)
24. Bogaczyk-Vormayr, Małgorzata. 2016. "Parmenides' Poem: Riddle from B 5." *Ethics in Progress* no. 7:95-103.  
"In my interpretation of the poem I give special attention to fragment B5." (p. 95)  
(...)  
"It seems plausible that the correct interpretation of Parmenides' poem should be taken from the perspective provided by the thesis of fragment B 5, so we could intuitively capture "all things" announced in a presumed whole as referring to the circular, *inner* Way of Truth.(5) It is from this way that the reliable verification of discovery begins and so also begins the reflection upon any human experience." (p. 101)  
(5) Hermann Diels seems to present the interpretation which is the closest (cf. Bodnár, I. 1985. "Contrasting Image. Notes On Parmenides B5", *Apeiron* 19 (1985): 52-59.
25. Bollack, Jean. 2011. "From Being to the World and Vice Versa." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 9-20. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Summary: "The importance of the δόξα is accepted today by scholars; the problem is now the relation between the two parts of the poem. The most satisfactory solution is to consider the whole and to show that one part, the definition of Being, is made in reference to the other, as the projection of an organization of the world, and that both terms correspond perfectly to each other. This perspective allows us to reread the introduction as an initiation from a man who "already knows" better than anyone else, but lets himself be told everything by an honored authority: she discloses the truth of language and transmits, for the δόξα, the vision, in accord with Being, of a rigorous opposition."



26. Boodin, J. E. 1943. "The Vision of Parmenides." *The Philosophical Review* no. 52:578-589.  
 "The evidence is conclusive that Parmenides' contrast is that of fire and earth. That Parmenides means earth we need no more evidence than we have in the extant fragment: "The other is just opposite to it, dark night, a compact and heavy body. "That would be Anaximenes' way of characterizing the earth. But why did Parmenides choose earth to stand for the whole realm of what is not? We learn from Theophrastus that Parmenides "was the first to declare that the earth is spheroidal and situated in the middle of the universe".(19) The discovery of the spheroidal shape of the earth was capital. We find also that Parmenides observed that the moon shines with reflected light and revolves round the earth. Theophrastus does not seem to regard that observation as first "declared" by Parmenides, though it bears evidence of Parmenides being an observer and not merely a logician. If we can reconstruct Parmenides' discovery of the spheroidal shape of the earth, it would throw light upon his dualism of fire and earth.  
 I think that it is highly probable that Parmenides discovered the spheroidal shape of the earth from watching the shadow which the earth casts upon the heavens at twilight.  
 We can now conclude our argument, which we believe to be Parmenides' argument. The fire of heaven is the *It*, the truly existent, as it is also the truth of existence. At twilight we can see for ourselves how the earth darkens the sky, shuts off the fire of heaven. The earth which is the cause of the darkness -- and is in fact the darkness -- included for Parmenides, as it does for us who watch the same phenomenon, all that is part of the earth not only the solid core but water and mist. It is all the earth's shadow or darkness. We have here the key to Parmenides' dualism of fire and earth. The white, homogeneous light of heaven is *It*. Color and all other variety is excluded by Parmenides, because he requires the unity of *It* in order to think *It*, and unity for him must be physical continuum such as white light seems to be.  
 (Newton first discovered that white light is composite.)" (pp. 587-588)  
 (19) [Hermann Diels, *Doxographi graeci*, Berlin: G. Reimer 1879, Theophrastus] Fr. 6a, Fairbanks' translation, quoted by Nahm.  
 [References: Arthur Fairbanks, *The First Philosophers of Greece*, London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1898; Milton Charles Nahm (ed.), *Selections from Early Greek Philosophy*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1934.]
27. Bormann, Karl. 1979. "The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius." *The Monist* no. 62:30-42.  
 "The doctrines of Parmenides of the one being and of the world of seeming were -- as is well known -- interpreted in different ways in the course of the history of philosophy, and even in twentieth-century historic-philosophical research, there is no agreement on the meaning of the two parts of the poem.  
 Regarding the one being there are four attempts of explanation to be distinguished: (1) The being is material; (2) the being is immaterial; (3) it is the *esse copulae* or must be seen as a modal category; (4) it is the entity of being ("Sein des Seienden"). This latter interpretation, if we can call it an interpretation, is chiefly influenced by Heidegger. The *Doxa*-part, however, is seen as (1) a more or less critical doxography; (2) a second-best, hypothetic explanation of phenomena which is not truth but verisimilitude; (3) a systematic unit together with the first part, the *αληθβια*. We do not have to discuss the differences between the outlined explanations separately; (\*) in the following, we shall show that some modern interpretations were already expressed in a similar way in antiquity. With this, we shall concentrate especially on the Neoplatonist Simplicius who in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* expounds the first part of the Parmenidean poem completely and, in addition, the most important doctrines of the second part." (p. 30)  
 "The interpretation of the Parmenidean doctrines by Simplicius has the following result: Parmenides distinguished two large regions, the sensible and the non-sensible.(133) The sensible is the region of coming-to-be and perishing.(134) The

non-sensible is divided into the levels of soul, intellectual, and intelligible. The *ēv* is not discussed on the occasion of the Parmenides interpretation. The Parmenidean being is identical with the intelligible.

In view of the high esteem that Simplicius shows for Plato and Aristotle, we now have to ask how he interprets their criticism of Parmenides. The answer is: Plato and Aristotle want to prevent misunderstandings.(135)

Therefore, Plato's criticism aims at the level of the intellectual, in which a plurality of beings is found together with the otherness.(136) Aristotle, however, shows by his criticism of Parmenides that the Parmenidean being is not identical with the sensible.(137) Parmenides was not convinced — as we could read by mistake from Aristotle, *De Caelo* 298 b 21 — that the sensible and only the sensible would exist. (138) With all criticism of Parmenides given by Aristotle, we always have to consider that Parmenides in Aristotle's opinion "is obviously speaking with insight." (139)." (p. 38)

(\*) To this, see K. Bormann, *Parmenides*, Hamburg 1971, p. 1-22.

(133) See *In Phys.* 79, 29-80, 4.

(134) See *In Phys.* 80, 3— 4; *In De caelo* 556, 12— 14; 559, 14-27.

(135) Simplicius, *In Phys.* 148, 11-13; *In De caelo* 557, 19.

(136) Simplicius, *In Phys.* 147, 17 sqq.

(137) *Ibid.*, 148, 7 sqq.; 86, 19 sqq.; 107, 29.

(138) Simplicius, *In De caelo* 558, 12; 559, 14.

(139) Simplicius, *In De caelo* 560, 1-4; see Aristotle, *Met.* 986 b 27.

28. Bosley, Richard. 1976. "Monistic argumentation." In *New Essays on Plato and the Pre-Socratics*, edited by Shiner, Roger and King-Farlow, John, 23-44. Guelph: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy.

"I seek to give an interpretation which is rich enough to disclose the springs of monism. I am primarily concerned to show how we may understand those arguments which leave us with the conclusion that there is only one thing to know. We may be assured at the outset that to give an argument whose conclusion is as startling as is that of monism it is necessary either to forge or to use a certain way of arguing. Doing so, in turn, depends upon putting to philosophical or dialectical use words which were not before drawn into the service of philosophical argumentation. I shall argue that the Greek word translated as "way" is put to new service, its use making it possible to undertake an inquiry as to WHAT something is; I shall argue, in short, that Parmenides put the word "way" to the same kind of use to which Plato put "ousia" or "form", a use sustained by Aristotle in his use of "genos". These words help make it possible for a philosopher to put a What-question."

(...)

"My first task (section 1) is to give an interpretation; my second one (section 2) is to review some of what Simplicius says, my third one (section 3) is to reconstruct monistic argumentation; I do so to facilitate diagnosis and criticism. My final task (section 4) is to comment briefly on the responses of Plato and Aristotle. In their responses we find additional tests of the adequacy of my interpretation and reconstruction." (pp. 23-24)

29. Bossi, Beatriz. 2015. "What Heraclitus and Parmenides have in common on reality and deception." *Logos (Madrid)* no. 48:21-34.

Abstract: "It is usually assumed that Heraclitus is, exclusively, the philosopher of flux, diversity and opposition while Parmenides puts the case for unity and changelessness. However, there is a significant common understanding of things (though in differing contexts), not simply an accidental similarity of understanding. Both philosophers, critically, distinguish two realms: on the one hand, there is the one, common realm, identical for all, which is grasped by the 'logos that is common'(Heraclitus) or the steady *nous* (Parmenides) that follows a right method in order to interpret the real. On the other hand, the realm of multiplicity seen and heard by the senses, when interpreted by 'barbarian souls', is not understood in its

- common unity. Analogously, when grasped by the wandering weak nous it does not comprehend the real's basic unity. In this paper I attempt to defend the thesis that both thinkers claim that the common logos (to put it in Heraclitean terms) or the steady intellect (to say it with Parmenides) grasp and affirm the unity of the real."
30. Bowra, Cecil. 1937. "The Proem of Parmenides." *Classical Philology* no. 32:97-112.  
Reprinted in: C. Bowra, *Problems in Greek Poetry*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953 pp. 38-53.  
"The origins of his method have been studied, but a knowledge of them does not explain either what he meant to say or what his contemporaries would see in his words. If we can understand what the Proem meant in the thought of his time, we may perhaps understand better how Parmenides viewed his calling as a philosopher." (p. 97)  
"It may, then, be admitted that in his Proem Parmenides uses certain ideas and images which were familiar to his time, but he used them for a new purpose, and especially he narrowed their application to his own sphere of the search for knowledge. His Proem serves a purpose in making the reader feel that he is not embarking on something entirely outside his experience. But it also serves another purpose. It shows that Parmenides views his task in a religious or mystical spirit. His choice of imagery, his mention of a *daimon* and a *thea*, his use for new purposes of old elements in myths, his description of himself as an *eidota psota*, and, above all, his account of the celestial journey -- all give the impression that he writes not as a mere logician but as one who has had a very special experience like that of men who have consorted with the gods. His attitude to his subject is far from that of the *physiologos*, and we can understand why Plato, whose combination of gifts was not unlike his, held him in high reverence. Parmenides regarded the search for truth as something akin to the experience of mystics, and he wrote of it with symbols taken from religion because he felt that it was itself a religious activity." (p. 112)
31. Bredlow, Luis Andrés. 2011. "Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Parmenides' Theory of Cognition (B 16)." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 44:219-263.  
Abstract: "This paper proposes a new interpretation of Parmenides B 16. After a short review of the status quaestionis (section 1), I will proceed to a detailed examination of the context of quotation in Aristotle (section 2) and Theophrastus, whose report will be shown to disclose some new possibilities for our understanding of the fragment. I shall argue that B 16 is not a theory of sense-perception, but a fragment of a comprehensive theory of cognition (section 3). This theory is consistent with Parmenides' own claims to genuine knowledge of Being (section 4), once we recognize that neither a dualism of ontological domains ("intelligible" vs. "sensible") nor of cognitive faculties ("reason" vs. "the senses") can be consistently ascribed to Parmenides. Moreover, our discussion will provide some elements for a reappraisal of Aristotle and Theophrastus as interpreters of their predecessors."
32. ———. 2012. "Parmenides and the Grammar of Being." *Classical Philology* no. 106:283-298.  
"The aim of this paper is to explore some grammatical and logical aspects of the word "is" (ἔστιν) in the fragments of Parmenides. I will argue that Parmenides' "is" is to be taken most plausibly, in its first and most immediate sense, as a copula of definitional identity, expressing the essence or nature of something. This definitional use implies both the absolute and the veridical sense of "is." This account will permit us to overcome some central difficulties inherent in other predicative interpretations of Parmenides' "is," such as those proposed by Alexander Mourelatos, Richard Ketchum, and Patricia Curd." (p. 283)  
"So the two routes of inquiry of B2 ("It is, and cannot not be," and "It is not, and it is necessary for it not to be") form an exhaustive alternative, once we understand

the argument as concerned with essential or definitional predication alone (where “ $x$  is  $F$ ” is equivalent to “ $x$  is  $x$ ”): either  $x$  is  $x$ , or  $x$  is not  $x$ , which is absurd. The other two modal forms of predication (“ $x$  is  $F$ , but can be not- $F$ ”, and “ $x$  is not  $F$ , but can be  $F$ ”) are intentionally left aside as irrelevant to the issue of essential or definitional predication." (p. 295)

(...)

"In addition, this interpretation explains an apparent inconsistency of the goddess' wording. At B2.2 she presents the route of “is not” as one of the routes of inquiry that can be conceived (εἰσι νοῆσαι). Later on, however, she insists that “is not” cannot be conceived (B8.8–9), and the route of “is not” is explicitly marked as “inconceivable” (B8.16). This is easily explained if “is not” stands for self-contradiction and hence logical impossibility. We cannot conceive, of course, that  $x$  is not  $x$ ; but we surely can—and must—conceive the impossibility of  $x$  not being  $x$ . Evidently, the recognition that a statement is self-contradictory entails the certainty that this statement is false. Thus the route of “is not” is indeed in a certain sense a legitimate way of inquiry: in logical terms, it is the method of *reductio ad absurdum*. But it is a route that ends as soon as it begins: once it is recognized as such, there is nothing more to find out on this route. So there remains only one route to talk about, namely, that of “it is” (B8.1–2). (49)" (p. 295-296)

(49) Moreover, if this interpretation is right, another often-stated problem can be dispensed with as well: if Parmenides does not rule out negative predication as such, but only negations of definitional predications (i.e., self-contradictory statements), then there will be no need to seek for justifications for the abundance of negative predicates in his own arguments.

33. Brown, Lesley. 1994. "The Verb 'To Be' in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks." In *Language. Companions to Ancient Thought. Vol. 3*, edited by Everson, Stephen, 212-236. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
"I examine key uses of 'to be' in Parmenides, Plato (especially *Republic V* and *Sophist*) and Aristotle. I argue against imposing modern distinctions (into predicative, existential or identity uses) on to the texts, showing that while Greek uses of *einai* may be partitioned into syntactically complete and incomplete (noted by Aristotle and perhaps at *Sophist* 255cd) the distinction was neither clear-cut nor perceived as philosophically important. I examine how these authors treated the inference from 'X is F' to 'X is' (compare that from 'X teaches French' to 'X teaches') and, more problematically (as Plato *Sophist* saw, correcting Parmenides and *Republic V*) from 'X is not F' to 'X is not'."
34. Bryan, Jenny. 2012. *Likeness and Likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Contents: Acknowledgements VI; Abbreviations VIII; introduction 1; 1. Xenophanes' fallibilism 6; 2. Parmenides' allusive ambiguity 58; 3. Plato's *Timaeus* 114; 4. Imitation and limitation in *Timaeus' proemium* 161; Conclusion 192; Bibliography 196; Index locorum 205; General index 208.  
"Many interpretations have been offered for Parmenides' εἰκὼς. Some see it as a qualified endorsement, others as a warning that the cosmology to follow is specious. I will offer a summary of the four main types of interpretation and argue that the best reading is that which incorporates elements of each. I will go on to present two aspects of Parmenides' use of this term that deserve closer attention than they have previously been afforded. The first is the possibility that Parmenides' vocabulary is influenced by forensic terminology. Several of Parmenides' key terms (σήματα; κρίσις; ἔλεγχος; πίστις) carry forensic connotations. I will argue that this juridical background should inform our understanding of Parmenides' εἰκὼς. It is evidence in favour of taking one aspect of its meaning to be something like the notion of 'plausibility' widely employed in the second half of the fifth century BC. The second is the possibility that Parmenides B8.60 alludes to Xenophanes B35.  
There is good evidence, in both the doxography and the verbatim fragments, that Parmenides was familiar with Xenophanes' poetry."



I will argue that B8.60 is a conscious allusion to Xenophanes and that, as with Xenophanes' allusion to Homer and Hesiod at B35, the significance of the allusion lies in the way that Parmenides alters Xenophanes' formula.

Parmenides' use of εἰκὼς can be usefully compared to his choice of the term πίστις at B1.30 and B8.28. I will argue that, when the goddess claims that her cosmology is εἰκὼς, she is attributing to her account a kind of persuasiveness that is subjectively convincing but ultimately false. This is in opposition to the true, objective cogency attributed to the *Aletheia* via the term πίστις.

I will conclude with some suggestions as to how such a reading can inform our understanding of the relation between the *Aletheia* and the *Doxa*. Here, my conclusions are necessarily limited by the fact that I will not be offering a detailed interpretation of either part. My interest is primarily in the characterization of the *Doxa* as εἰκὼς and what this implies about its relation to the *Aletheia*.

The question of the precise import of, in particular, the *Aletheia* would take me far beyond the scope of this book. I will, so far as is possible, be attempting to sidestep many of the issues that have dominated recent scholarship on Parmenides. Most notably, I will not be engaging with the question whether or in what way Parmenides is a monist. I will, of course, be looking at some of the details of the *Aletheia* and offering interpretative suggestions but, in the end, my commitments here do not, I think, go far beyond reading it as an account of 'the unmoving heart of persuasive truth' (B1.29). (pp. 61-62)

35. Burkert, Walter. 2013. "Parmenides' Proem and Pythagoras' Descent." In *Philosophy and Salvation in Greek Religion*, edited by Adluri, Vishwa, 85-116. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.  
English translation by Joydeep Bagchee of: "Das Proömium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras", *Phronesis*, 15, 1969, pp. 1-30.  
"To summarize: Parmenides' journey is neither a transition from night to light nor an ascent; it is also not a collection of heterogeneous symbols, which would only be comprehensible in relation to the theoretical content, and still less a purely literary device without deeper meaning. Parmenides travels on the path of the Daimon to the edge of the world, where at the boundary between heaven and earth a towering gateway divides this world from the beyond. The Heliades approach him from the house of Night, they accompany him through the gate into the great "open," where the Goddess receives him. Everything falls into place as soon as one resolutely discards the path upward and the path to the light, those Platonic-Christian symbols. The journey might rather—with Morrison—be called a katabasis. More correct is to leave aside completely the vertical aspects, the above and below. The Beyond, in what is probably the oldest concept, is neither above nor below, but simply very, very far away. Odysseus too, in the *Neykia*, journeys neither skyward nor earthward, but simply into the distance. Something similar is true of Sumerian myth.(64)" (pp. 101-102)  
(64) Cf. S. N. Kramer, "Death and Nether World according to the Sumerian Literary Texts," *Iraq* 22 (1960): 67, on the myth of Enlil, Ninlil, and the Underworld: "the word 'descent' is not used in this myth, only such words as 'come,' 'follow,' 'enter.'"
36. Burnet, John. 1908. *Early Greek Philosophy*. London: A. & C. Black Ltd. Second edition (first edition 1892).  
Chapter 4: *Parmenides of Elea*, pp. 192-226.  
"In the First Part of his poem, we find Parmenides chiefly interested to prove that it is; but it is not quite obvious at first sight what it is precisely that is. He says simply, What is, is. There can be no real doubt that this is what we call body. It is certainly regarded as spatially extended; for it is quite seriously spoken of as a sphere (fr. 8, 43). Moreover, Aristotle tells us that Parmenides believed in none but a sensible reality. Parmenides does not say a word about "Being" anywhere, (29) and it is remarkable that he avoids the term "god," which was so freely used by earlier and later thinkers. The assertion that it is amounts just to this, that the universe is a plenum; and that there is no such thing as empty space, either inside or outside the world. From this it follows that there can be no such thing as motion.



Instead of endowing the One with an impulse to change, as Herakleitos had done, and thus making it capable of explaining the world, Parmenides dismissed change as an illusion. He showed once for all that if you take the One seriously you are bound to deny everything else. All previous solutions of the question, therefore, had missed the point. Anaximenes, who thought to save the unity of the primary substance by his theory of rarefaction and condensation, did not observe that, by assuming there was less of what is in one place than another, he virtually affirmed the existence of what is not (fr. 8, 45).

The Pythagorean explanation implied that empty space or air existed outside the world, and that it entered into it to separate the units (§ 53). It, too, assumes the existence of what is not. Nor is the theory of Herakleitos any more satisfactory; for it is based on the contradiction that fire both is and is not (fr. 6)."

(29) We must not render τὸ ἓν by "Being," das *Sein* or l'*être*. It is "what is," das Seiende, ce qui est. As to (τὸ) εἶναι it does not occur, and hardly could occur at this date.

37. Calvo, Martinez Tomas. 1977. "Truth and Doxa in Parmenides." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 59:245-260.  
"It has been widely held, both by ancient and by modern commentators on Parmenides, that the distinction between Truth (ἀλήθεια) and Opinion (δόξα) which dominates the structure of his poem, can be properly interpreted as an opposition between two forms of cognition: pure thought or conceptual knowledge, on the one hand, and sense-perception, on the other, where the latter is understood as including images as well as perceptions.  
(...)  
In the first part of this paper I will try to show that this traditional interpretation of Parmenides fundamentally misrepresents the language and intention of his poem. In the second section I will propose an alternative interpretation based upon an opposition not between two epistemic states or faculties (intellectual knowledge versus sense-perception) but between two contrasting forms of language, as represented in the poem by the contrast between λόγος and ἔπος (or ἔπεα). Finally, I will sketch some lines in the post-Parmenidean evolution of the two conceptual systems that oppose Aletheia to Doxa and Logos to Epos." (pp. 245-246)
38. Casertano, Giovanni. 2011. "Parmenides -- Scholar of Nature." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 21-58. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Summary: "Aristotle's influence on what we could name the philosophical historiography of pre-Aristotelian times and the one still felt up to present times is huge. We can safely argue that the work of freeing pre-Aristotelian thinkers from Aristotelian interpretation has only been developing since last century, and it is an ongoing process. I personally believe that this is the historiographic direction to be followed and that much has still to be made clear and explained in this very direction. This kind of research does not just better "historically contextualize" the thought of any pre-Aristotelian, Parmenides in our case, by setting its roots in a real world of debates, quarrels, and stand-takings on different philosophical and scientific questions, but it also better underlines its originality and speculative strengths. My paper will thus be divided into two parts. Since I just aim to discuss the special stand of Parmenides' thought in the history of scientific thought, I will try and show first of all Parmenides' complete belonging in the very lively world of scientific debates and discussions of the fifth century. Then I will try to show how Parmenides, like the other great Sicilian Magna Graecia native, Empedocles, has foreshadowed concepts and doctrines of contemporary science and physics, even if just in the shape of ingenious intuitions."
39. Cassin, Barbara. 2011. "Parmenides Lost in Translation." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 59-79. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

- Summary: "I would like to show in this text the successive difficulties to be overcome when one tries to translate Parmenides. Translation is the extreme degree of interpretation. For that purpose, one needs to triumph over the impossibility of confronting the original "venerable and awesome" as well as of confronting "historical" language such as Greek. Then, one must sort out the alternatives that make it possible to select and fix a fragmentary text. Finally it is necessary to explore all the connections permitted by semantics and syntax. My study is focused on the play of "θύμὸς ὁδοῖο / μῦθος ὁδοῖο," and on possible interpretations of the text traditionally retained since the 5th edition of Diels, between the heroism of being, described as Odysseus, and the storytelling of language."
40. Cerri, Giovanni. 2011. "The Astronomical Section in Parmenides' Poem." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 80-94. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Summary: "I have collected all the data (*testimonia* and *fragmenta*), which demonstrate that in Parmenides' poem *On Nature* there was a long section concerning astronomy, where he described the heavens and also illustrated recent, astonishing discoveries accomplished by astronomical research of his time. Such a section, which is very important in the history of ancient science, could not be a mere digression, not related to his general theory of nature. Therefore, every modern interpretation of his philosophical thought based on the removal of this aspect should certainly be considered inadequate to explain the whole doctrine in its very essence."
41. Chalmers, W. R. 1960. "Parmenides and the Beliefs of Mortals." *Phronesis* no. 5:5-22.  
"The three main parts of Parmenides' poem are apt to receive rather unequal treatment at the hands of many historians of Ancient Philosophy. From early times there has been a tendency to concentrate attention upon the Way of Truth and rather to neglect the Prologue and the Beliefs of Mortals. The Prologue is frequently explained as an interesting example of archaic imagination intruding into a philosophical work, while the last part has been interpreted in a variety of ways. Some scholars have suggested that in it Parmenides is merely representing the views of other thinkers, while others believe that it does in some way describe Parmenides' own thought. There is as yet no general agreement about what the relationship is between the Beliefs of Mortals and the Way of Truth. Both are however parts of the same poem, and it is reasonable to infer that a solution of this problem of their inter-relationship will throw light on the correct interpretation of the whole work. It is the purpose of this paper to consider in particular the last part of the poem and to try to establish what its status is in the context of the whole work." (p. 5)
42. Cherniss, Harold. 1935. *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.  
Volume I (only published). Reprint New York: Octagon Books, 1964.  
On Aristotle's criticism of Eleatic philosophy see in particular the First Chapter, *The Principles*, pp. 61-76.  
"The Eleatic thesis so far as the physicist is concerned is refuted by experience, and it is not the business of a treatise on any particular science to refute those who deny the principles or axioms of that science. (257) With this exposition and the remark that Parmenides and Melissus proceed from false premises to argue illogically Aristotle has really excluded a discussion of their doctrine from the *Physics*. Yet he immediately introduces a long refutation of the Eleatic thesis on the ground that, although it is not concerned with physics, it results in difficulties which are physical.(258)  
The criticism of the Eleatic unity of Being is highly instructive for the study of the method by which Aristotle built up his own doctrine of matter; and the very inclusion of the critique in the *Physics* shows that he was conscious of the logical character of the origin of his theory." (p. 62)

(...)

"The general critique of the Eleatics (273) is followed by a special refutation of Melissus and Parmenides." (p. 67)

(...)

"There is throughout this critique an apparent confusion of logical and physical concepts which is due to the dependence of Aristotle's physics upon his logic. At one time he said that the Eleatic error was due to the ignorance of the meaning of relative or *accidental* non-Being, (304) that is of logical privation which is the essence of the negative proposition; but such a concept, which in its Platonic origin is simply logical, is at once transformed into a physical doctrine by Aristotle, so that he can say shortly thereafter that an understanding of the nature of substrate would have solved the difficulties of the Eleatics. (305) Privation is, in effect, the immediate material of generation (306) and the logical subject of privation is transmuted by means of the concomitant potentiality into the physical substrate. (307) The notion that privation of a quality requires in the substrate the potential presence of that quality is a rule of logic (308) transferred to descriptive physics. It is this connection of the matter of generation and of thought, this equivalence of the proposition of logic and the description of physical change which makes Aristotle think the *Physics* an appropriate place to discuss the Eleatic doctrine which on his own reckoning falls outside the sphere of physics." (pp. 75-76)

(257) *Physics* 184 B 25-185 A 14.

(258) *Physics* 185 A 17-20. a. *De Caelo* 298 B 14-24 where the Eleatic doctrine is rejected as unphysical. But the origin is differently explained. The Eleatics were the first to see that knowledge requires the existence of immutable substances; but, thinking that sensible objects alone existed, they applied to them the arguments concerning objects of thought. Aristotle derives this account by a literal interpretation of Plato, *Parmenides* 135 B-C. But cf. *Sophist* 249 B-D.

(273) Ross in his note on *Metaphysics* 986 B 19 implies that "the One as continuous and indivisible" refers to Melissus, "the One as unity of definition" refers to Parmenides. The appearance of συνεχές and ον διαίρετόν in Parmenides, the argument of "the part and the whole" in Plato's *Sophist* directed against Parmenides, and the express words of *Physics* 185 B 17-18, as well as the αὐτοῖς of 185 B 21 and 24 show that no division of the arguments can be made between Parmenides and Melissus.

(304) *Physics* 191 B 13-16.

(305) *Physics* 191 B 33-34.

(306) *Physics* 191 B 15-16. Yet 191 B 35 ff. he reproaches the Platonists for making matter "non-Being" and claims himself to differentiate privation and matter.

(307) The transformation is carried so far that ἀτέρησις becomes, instead of simple negation of form, a positive reality, a kind of form itself (*Physics* 193 B 19-20). Cf. Clemens Baeumker, *Das problem der materie in der griechischen philosophie*, Münster, 1890, pp. 218-219.

(308) Cf. its use in *Topics* 148 A 3-9. It is a mistake to define a thing by privation of that which is not potentially predicable of it. The logical basis of the physical doctrine, as well as some of the difficulties involved in the development, is to be seen in *Metaphysics* 1055 A 33-B 29.

43. Cherubin, Rose Mathilde. 2001. "Λέγειν, Νοεῖν and Τὸ Ἐόν in Parmenides." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 21:277-303.

"What does Parmenides tell us about τὸ ἔόν? Commentators have understood Parmenides' fragments as attempting to provide an account of the nature of being, or of the nature of what is.

Recently, Parmenides and his goddess (θεά, B1.22) character have been interpreted as making a variety of conflicting claims: that being or what is is one; that it is dual; that it is identical to thought or to mind or to the contents of thought; that at least some of it is independent of our thought or awareness; and that all strictly human claims about what is rest on convention or agreement. In what follows, I will attempt to show that the fragments not only fail to support such views, but actually

subvert them. Rather than provide unconditional assertions about τὸ ἓόν, I will argue, the fragments explore the conditions of the possibility of inquiry itself, conditions whose acceptance poses paradoxes." (p. 277)

(...)

"I do not assert here that all is assumption. Rather, I have argued that on the θεά's account of what is, we do not seem to be able to know whether all is assumption. I do propose that to acknowledge the conditions of inquiry includes recognizing that such an acknowledgment, like the conditions themselves, is made within the framework given us by our θέμις (literally, that which is laid down).

Acknowledging the conditions of inquiry also includes recognizing (voεῖν) that the possibility of identification and the possibility of meaning appear to depend on contradictions or paradoxes." (p. 303)

44. ———. 2003. "Inquiry and What Is: Eleatics and Monisms." *Epoché* no. 8:1-26. Abstract: "While Melissus argues for a numerical monism, Parmenides and Zeno undermine claims to unconditional or transcendental knowledge. Yet the work of Parmenides and Zeno is not merely critical or eristic, and does not imply that philosophical inquiry is futile. Instead it shows the importance of reflection on the way the requisites of inquiry are represented in its results, and entrains an axiological investigation to every ontological one."  
"The earliest Greek philosophers sought understanding that went beyond what was given by the beliefs, customs, and ways of thinking familiar to their contemporaries. So Aristotle tells us, and since his time students of philosophy have generally agreed with this broad description.(1) But what were the earliest Greeks called philosophers trying to understand, and what kinds of understanding were they seeking? As we try to be more specific about the projects and nature of the earliest Greek philosophy, we encounter more difficulty and less agreement." (p. 1)  
(...)  
"The goddess in Parmenides' poem represents that which her pupil is not: she is female, and more crucially for purposes of this paper, she is immortal and as such does not need to inquire or seek. Our sense of lack, our mortality, is the spur and indeed the substance of inquiry. We must make choices and we must seek, in order to supply our needs and desires. This is why we require consistency, in some things at least. A Greek goddess does not have such limitations; she is self-sufficient. Such a symbol of what we conceive ourselves to lack is a most appropriate vehicle to convey to us the consequences of that lack, the fundamental conflicts in our conception of what is." (p. 16)  
(1) *Metaphysics* A 1-2.
45. ———. 2004. "Parmenides' Poetic Frame." *International Studies in Philosophy* no. 36:7-38.  
"Two difficulties confront the beginning of an interpretation of the fragments of Parmenides: how to understand the structure of the fragments taken together, and how to deal with the apparent contradictions and incongruities in the fragments. The first is the question of what to make of the structure of the extant parts of Parmenides' poem." (p. 7)  
(...)  
"The second difficulty is the problem of how to handle the many apparent contradictions and incongruities within the fragments." (p. 8)  
(...)  
"I propose to look at the Goddess's discussions of eon or to eon (what is, being, what is so) in the contexts in which they appear in the fragments. This means that I will first consider the significance of the fact that the remarks about what is appear within discussions of roads of inquiry (Sections I and II). In these discussions of roads of inquiry the Goddess supports her claims about the characteristics of what is (with respect to certain roads) not only with deductive reasoning but also with explanatory assertions about Dikē, Anankē, and Moira. Once we understand the basic sense of these assertions (Section III), we can turn to contemplate the meaning



- and the significance of the narrative frame, the tale of the journey (Section IV). The larger meaning of the fragments taken together, that which we can properly call the philosophy of Parmenides, will emerge from reflection on the juxtaposition of the narrative, mythic, and argumentative elements. By taking into due account the contexts in which the discussions of *eon* appear, we will find that both the seemingly incompatible implications of the claims about *eon* and also the mixture of narrative, mythic, and argumentative elements are philosophically meaningful and illuminating." (pp. 9-10)
46. ———. 2005. "Light, Night, and the Opinions of Mortals: Parmenides B8.51-61 and B9." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 25:1-23.  
 "Recent studies of this passage have focused largely on two issues: what the goddess or Parmenides thinks is erroneous in mortals' beliefs concerning Light and Night, and what if any merit Parmenides finds in a cosmology based on the account of Light and Night in the fragments.  
 My main concern will be instead with two questions that have seen less attention: First, what would be ἀπατηλός in what the κοῦρος is to learn?<sup>5</sup> Second, what could be εἰκώς in the Light-Night conceptual scheme that the goddess presents? Or, what would suggest that mortals do in fact find the scheme acceptable or useful?" (p. 3)
47. ———. 2009. "Aletheia from Poetry into Philosophy. Homer to Parmenides." In *Logos and Muthos. Philosophical Essays in Greek Literature*, edited by Wians, William, 51-72. Albany: State University of New York Press.  
 "The every features I have cited as Parmenides' best-known and most consequential contributions to philosophy—the central role of deductive argument and the thematic exploration of *to eon*—grow from his engagement with poetry. Specifically, they are intimately connected to his view of *alētheia* as the orientation of a road of inquiry. Poets in and before Parmenides' time saw the apprehension and promulgation of *alētheia* as a central duty of poetry. Parmenides, I will show, significantly extended and developed the notion of *alētheia*. It is precisely this development that issues in his thematic exploration of *to eon* and in his use (and, conceivably, introduction) of explicit deductive inference.  
 Let us begin by opening the questions of the meaning and the role of *alētheia* in the fragments of Parmenides. Asking these questions is crucial not only for our understanding of Parmenides, but also for our understanding of those ways of thinking today that claim him as a predecessor, and for our understanding of the possibilities of philosophy itself. In his references to *alētheia*, might Parmenides have intended something in addition to, or instead of, what has been attributed to him so far? If so, as I will argue here, then Parmenides will have shown us a road of inquiry to which we have been oblivious." (p. 52)
48. Clark, Raymond J. 1969. "Parmenides and Sense-perception." *Revue des Études Grecques* no. 82:14-32.  
 Abstract: "What did Parmenides understand by the terms ἀλήθεια, εἶν and νοεῖν, δοκοῦντα and δόξα ? After reviewing past interpretations of B 1.28-32 (Diels-Kranz), the author suggests that these lines are part of the revelation by the goddess who offers to differentiate between the levels of existence of εἶν and δοκοῦντα and to assess the status of their resultant states of knowledge ἀλήθεια and δόξα. The conclusion, tested against other fragments, is that ἀλήθεια arises from contemplation (νόος) about being (εἶν) : δοκοῦντα corresponds to οὐκ ἔστιν in B 8 but is « non-existent » only in the technical sense that this is not the object of thought. Δόξα is ἀπατηλὸν only in a technical sense, and there can be right δόξα (first « false » path) which is based exclusively on sensory reality, or wrong δόξα (second « false » path) if sensory objects are confused with being.  
 Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge is then summarised and his cosmology is found to be consistent with it."
49. Cordero, Néstor-Luis. 2004. *By Being, It Is. The Thesis of Parmenides*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.



Contents: Prologue IX; Acknowledgments XIII; 1. Introduction to Parmenides 3; 2. Prolegomena to Parmenides' Thesis 19; 3. Parmenides thesis and its negation 37; 4. The meaning of Parmenides's thesis (and of its negation) 59; 5. Parmenides' thesis, thinking, and speaking 83; 6. Presentation of the thesis and its negation in Fragment 6 and 7 97; 7. The negation of the thesis, "opinions" and the nonexistent third way 125; 8. The meaning of the "opinions of mortals" 151; 9. The foundation of the thesis: the Way of Truth 154; Epilogue 181; Appendix 1: Parmenides' Poem 185; Appendix 2: Note on the transliteration of the Greek alphabet 197; Bibliography 199; List of ancient authors cited 211; List of modern authors cited 213.

"Any new interpretation of Parmenides' philosophy, or any criticism of previous interpretations, must be based on a text that is as close as possible to the lost original. The titanic task carried out over centuries by philologists and codicologists offered us a firm starting point, but much still remained to be done. Passages of the Poem remained inexplicably obscure. (For example, why does the Goddess order withdrawal from a true way in line 6.3? How can it be said that thought is expressed in being, as line 8.35 appears to say?) For this reason, since my presence in Europe made it possible, I decided to check the manuscript tradition of citations (wrongly called "fragments") of the Poem, in order to propose a new version of it, purified of certain errors that had accumulated over the centuries. A first result of my search was presented in 1971 as a doctoral thesis. Some years later, my book, *Les deux chemins de Parménide* (1984, second edition, augmented and corrected, 1997) completed my work. New research on the manuscript sources of the first editions of the Poem, as well as a change of view in my assessment of "the two ways," allow me to present this new version of Parmenides' "thesis" today. In this work, I also take into account comments and criticism that my previous studies on Parmenides have raised, and when appropriate, (a) I defend myself, or (b) I accept and make certain corrections.

It is impossible to go into Parmenides' philosophy without being "bitten by the bug." I hope that readers of this book will feel the same." (pp. X-XI)

50. ———. 2010. "The 'Doxa of Parmenides' Dismantled." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 30:231-246.

"In most civilizations, fictional entities are the creations of anonymous popular imagination, or even of some special wise men. Greek civilization was not an exception: Centaurs, Sirens, Cyclops, and other such creatures can be found everywhere in Greek mythology. These imaginary creatures were put together out of elements that taken separately are real enough: human being and horse, as in the case of Centaur, woman and bird, in the case of the Siren. Philosophers, or rather, historians of philosophy, followed this creative example, and invented imaginary notions. 'The Doxa of Parmenides' is one of these imaginary notions.

It has never existed 'as such': for, even though it was constructed from elements that are real, the combination of these elements was illegitimate.

These mythological examples are useful as we seek to understand the capricious mixing that took place in the assemblage of 'Parmenides' Doxa'. It is true that the Doxa is present in Parmenides' poem, it is also true that Parmenides is a real entity and not an imaginary being; but 'the Doxa of Parmenides', the unification of these two terms (Doxa and Parmenides), is an invention of the historians of philosophy. That Parmenides presented some 'doxai' does not imply that these 'opinions', which comprise the Doxa, are his 'doxai', the 'doxai' of Parmenides.

This article aims to expose this combination as arbitrary and false." (p. 231)

51. ———, ed. 2011. *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
 Proceedings of the International Symposium (Buenos Aires, October 29 - November 2, 2007).  
 Contents: Foreword VII; About the Contributors XIII-XVI.  
 Part I: On Parmenides.  
 Scott Austin: Existence and Essence in Parmenides 1; Jean Bollack: From Being to the World and Vice Versa 9; Giovanni Casertano: Parmenides-Scholar of Nature 21;

Barbara Cossin: Parmenides Lost in Translation 59; Giovanni Cerri: The Astronomical Section in Parmenides' Poem 81; Nestor-Luis Cordero: Parmenidean "Physics" is not Part of what Parmenides calls "*doxa*" 95; Patricia Curd: Thought and Body in Parmenides 115; Jean Frère: Mortals (*Brotoi*) According to Parmenides 135; Arnold Hermann: Parricide or Heir? Plato's Uncertain Relationship to Parmenides 147; Alexander P. D. Mourelatos: Parmenides, Early Greek Astronomy, and Modern Scientific Realism 167; Massimo Pulpito: Parmenides and the Forms 191; Chiara Robbiano: What is Parmenides' Being? 213; Fernando Santoro: *Ta Semata*: On a Genealogy of the Idea of Ontological Categories 233; José Trindade Santos: The Role of "Thought" in the Argument of Parmenides' Poem 251; José Solana Dueso: Parmenides: Logic and Ontology 271; Panagiotis Thanassas: Parmenidean Dualisms 289-308.

Part II: Parmenides in the Tradition and Cognate Themes.

Esteban Bieda: Persuasion and Deception in Gorgias' *Encomium to Helen*. About the Powers and Limits of *doxa* 311; Maria Elena Diaz: Thought as Perception: Aristotle's Criticism of Parmenides in *Metaphysics* IV, 5 319; Gabriel Livov: The Father and the Sophist: Platonic Parricide in the *Statesman* 331; Ezequiel Ludueña: "Thinking That I Did Something . . .": Apollodorus and Diotima's Teaching 345; Claudia T. Marsico: Megaric Philosophy Between Socrates' Influence and Parmenides' Ghost 353; Fabián Mié: Plato's *Sophist* on Negation and Not-Being 363; Lucas Soares: Parmenides and His Precursors: A Borgesian Reading of Cordero's Parmenides 373; Pilar Spangenberg: Aristotle on the Semantic Unity of the Parmenidean Being 383; Index Locorum 393; General Index 403; Index of Greek Terms Discussed 413-414.

"Part I of the present volume gathers together the set of papers presented at the Symposium, whose topics were divided up based on the "traditional" structure of the Poem: one section dedicated to the exposition of the way of truth, and the other to the description of the "opinions (*δόξαι*) of mortals."

(...)

"Other papers went deeply into the part of the Poem concerning the "opinions of mortals."

(...)

"The organizers of the meeting, which was open to the public, offered eight young and high-level Argentine researchers (graduate students, professors, or advanced students) the opportunity to present a short paper in front of the prestigious assembly of foreign authors. The exchange of ideas between them and their "teachers" was a very enriching experience. These eight papers are included in Part II of the present volume." (From the *Foreword* by Néstor-Luis Cordero, pp. IX-XI)

52. ———. 2011. "Parmenidean "Physics" is not Part of what Parmenides calls "*δόξα*." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 95-113. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Summary: "Parmenides, as were all the philosophers of his time, was certainly interested in "physical" questions, even if the response to these questions was necessarily conditioned by his big "discovery": that there is being. But the only way to respect the value of his "physical" theories is by keeping them out of the so-called "*δόξα*" because, for Parmenides, opinions are deceitful and not true. The hazardous reconstruction of Parmenides' text invites the researcher to find the "*δόξαι*" between the end of fr. 8 and fr. 18. This prejudice, together with the anachronistic idea according to which Parmenides spoke of "appearances" (and the *δόξαι* would be their description), leads to the exaggerated place the *δόξαι* occupy in the present reconstruction of the Poem. Parmenides exposes—and criticizes—the *δόξαι* of "others." There are no Parmenidean *δόξαι*."
53. Cornford, Francis Macdonald. 1933. "Parmenides' Two Ways." *Classical Quarterly* no. 1933:97-111.  
"The object of this paper is to determine the relations between the two parts of Parmenides' poem: the Way of Truth, which deduces the necessary properties of a

One Being, and the False Way, which contains a cosmogony based on 'what seems to mortals, in which there is no true belief.'

The poem presents two problems. First, why does the appearance of the world belie its real nature? To Parmenides himself, as to any other mortal, diversity in time and space, change and motion, seem to exist; what is the source of error here?

This is a philosophical question; and it may be doubted whether Parmenides could have given an answer that would satisfy us. The second is an historical question: Whose is the cosmogony in the second part of the poem? Is it Parmenides' own construction or a list of errors that he rejects? To this there must be one right answer, which Parmenides, if we could summon him, could give us in a moment. This is the problem I propose to discuss. The solution may throw some light on the other problem." (p. 97)

54. ———. 1935. "A New Fragment of Parmenides." *Classical Review* no. 49:122-123.  
"Plato, *Theaet.* I80D: ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμεν, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τάναντία τούτοις ἀπεφάναντο,  
οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ' εἶναι  
If we punctuate (with Diels at Simplicius, *Phys.* 143, 10)  
οἷον, ἀκίνητον τελέθει. τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ' εἶναι  
it can be translated: 'It is sole, immovable. The All has the name " Being." So Plato, and so Simplicius after him, must have understood it. If they found this line in Parmenides, they might well accept it as a line that Parmenides might have written. It is no odder than several verses now accepted without question. The sense is good and relevant." (p. 122)
55. ———. 1939. *Plato and Parmenides. Parmenides' Way of truth and Plato's Parmenides. Translated, with an Introduction and a Running Commentary.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.  
Reprinted by Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.  
Chapter II: *Parmenides Way of Truth*, pp. 28-52. ("This chapter is partly based on an article, *Parmenides' Two Ways*, *Classical Quarterly*, xxvii (1933), 97-111, where some of the points are discussed at greater length.").  
"Parmenides' premiss states in a more abstract form the first assumption common to all his predecessors, Milesian or Pythagorean: ultimately there exists a One Being. His thought is really at work upon this abstract concept; he considers what further attributes can, or cannot, logically belong to a being that is one.  
At the same time, this One Being is not a mere abstraction; it proves to be a single continuous and homogeneous substance filling the whole of space. So far, as it seemed to him, reason will carry us, but no farther. Such a being cannot become or cease to be or change; such a unity cannot also be a plurality. There is no possible transition from the One Being to the manifold and changing world which our senses seem to reveal. His work is accordingly divided, after the proem, into two parts. The *Way of Truth* deduces the nature of the one reality from premisses asserted as irrefragably true. It ends with a clear warning that the *Way of Seeming*, which follows, is not true or consistent with the truth.  
This second part, accordingly, is not in the form of logical deduction, but gives a cosmogony in the traditional narrative manner. The starting-point is the false belief of mortals, who trust their senses and accept the appearance of two opposite powers contending in the world. Unfortunately very few fragments of the second part survive; but it is probable that we possess nearly the whole of the *Way of Truth*, thanks to Simplicius, who copied it out in his commentary on the *Physics* because the book had become very rare.  
And it is with the *Way of Truth* that we are chiefly concerned." (pp. 29-30)
56. Cosgrove, Matthew R. 1974. "The ΚΟΥΡΟΣ Motif in Parmenides: B 1.24." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 19:81-94.  
"Why does the goddess of Parmenides' poem address her mortal guest ω κουρέ (B 1.24)? The interpretations that have been proposed in answer to this question may be grouped generally under two opposed points of view. One finds in the goddess'

address an *autobiographical* statement from the poet and a means of dating the poem's composition; the other takes it in some sense *to contrast* the humanity and/or discipleship of the *κούρος* with the *divinity* and/or teaching role of the goddess. Several other more recent and less widely noted suggestions have also appeared, but I think no satisfactory explanation of why the recipient of the goddess' discourse is presented as a *κούρος* has yet been found. The interpretation which I shall offer through an examination of previous answers to this question seeks for the goddess' address a more intrinsic meaning and coherent place within the proem and the whole of Parmenides' work." (p. 81)

57. ———. 2011. "The Unknown 'Knowing Man' : Parmenides, B1.3." *Classical Quarterly* no. 61:28-47.  
 "Commentators on Parmenides' poem have long read the words of B1.3, *εἰδὸτα φῶτα*, with the secure assurance that this phrase must identify and praise the recipient of the divine discourse that is shortly to come. The journeying speaker of line 1, whom the goddess will greet in B1.24 as a *κούρος*, is assumed to be the 'knowing man'; or, more precisely, it is anticipated that the goddess is about to make him so by revealing to him the heart of truth (B1.29). This 'knowing man' (so the received view goes) is the goddess's initiate,<sup>2</sup> in contrast to whom are the 'know-nothings', the *βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν* (B6.4).  
 But I argue here that this is all a mistake, and one that undermines at every turn our ability to understand what is going on in the proem."  
 (...)  
 "I do not claim to break new ground on all or even any one of these details save by providing a consistent and coherent framework for choosing among answers to them. For I submit that only the correct identification of the *φῶς εἰδῶς* and of the two separate journeys, as proposed here, in which the speaker of line 1 becomes involved, ties those details together, makes sense of them, and unifies the opening of the poem. In what follows I first develop this interpretation without defensive interruptions, as though it were obvious, so that readers may envision from the outset the picture of the proem I have in mind. Of course, I am aware that my interpretation is very far from being incontrovertible.  
 Accordingly, after the initial exposition, I shall circle back into the eristic thicket."  
 (p. 28)
58. ———. 2014. "What are 'True' *Doxai* Worth to Parmenides? Essaying a Fresh Look at his Cosmology." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 46:1-31.  
 "In recent years the preserved portions of Parmenides' poem traditionally labelled 'Doxa' 1 have received more nuanced attention, focusing on their content and not just on their presumed role as some kind of foil or supplement to 'Aletheia', 'Truth'. While the age-old question of the relation between these two parts of the poem has been neither settled nor abandoned, some scholars have put this and related issues to one side and concentrated instead on assessing the sometimes startling scientific innovations introduced in the context of the *Doxa*." (p. 1)  
 (...)  
 "These approaches pose various problems, which this paper intends to explore.  
 (...)  
 As posed explicitly by Cordero, but bearing implicitly on Graham's, Kahn's, Mourelatos's, and Sedley's views, is the question in what sense, if any, these innovations in physical matters might be 'true', in Parmenidean terms. If they are 'true' for *brotoi*, possibly including us latter-day mortals, are they also 'true' for the goddess, but only in some 'lesser' sense, which she does not define? And what could that be? Or do they just simply and finally fail to follow her *semata* for what-is, as much as do any of the merest falsehoods of mortals' world? And if so, what are they then worth to her? And, perhaps more tantalizingly, what are they then worth to Parmenides? Could he really have been 'enthralled' by such fatally flawed 'truths'? And if so, to what end?  
 With this last query we are firmly back in the midst of the dilemma that has bedevilled commentators on Parmenides since antiquity, concerning not just



Parmenides' own attitude towards the possibly revolutionary and astronomically accurate, or 'true', portions of the *Doxa* but the overall question of the philosophical relation between Truth and *Doxa*. These are questions not just of historical/biographical psychology but, at least as posed here, they have another import, one related to and calling for explication of Parmenides' proper philosophical concerns. In effect, as I hope to show, asking 'What are true *doxai* worth to Parmenides?' is an especially useful and revealing way of posing anew the timeworn problem of the relation between the two parts of Parmenides' poem, and in particular that of the philosophical status of the cosmology propounded by the goddess." (p. 4, notes omitted)

59. Coxon, Allan H. 1934. "The Philosophy of Parmenides." *Classical Quarterly* no. 28:134-144.  
 "In the *Classical Quarterly* for April, 1933, Professor Cornford maintains that the Two Ways' of Parmenides are not meant as alternatives: "The Way of Truth and the Way of Seeming are no more parallel and alternative systems of cosmology, each complete in itself, than are Plato's accounts of the intellectual and sensible worlds. (1)  
 I wish here to try to support his general view, which seems to me to be indisputably correct, while differing from Professor Cornford in some important details." (p. 134)  
 (1) p. 102.  
 (...)  
 "The unity of the whole poem should now be clear. It opens with Parmenides realization of the difference between knowledge and belief, symbolized by his entry into the realm of Day. There he is welcomed by Justice, or Destiny,(1) who narrates to him, first the features of the world he has just entered, then the nature of the world he has left. The former narrative he has himself to test of λόγος, the possession of which has gained him admission. The latter, she warns him, is a myth. (2) True, even those to whom the door remains shut can produce such; the point is that anyone who knows that this dark world is not the real world is likely to produce a better myth about it than those who believe it to be the only reality and their myth to be truth.  
 The thesis of this paper has been that Parmenides was, and was conscious of being, the first genuine philosopher in the Greek world. It follows that he was the founder of European philosophy; that, while his predecessors discovered the main principle of what we know as science, Parmenides was the first metaphysician. If that is true, it is a splendid achievement; and he deserves considerably more recognition than he has usually, since Plato, been given." (p. 144)  
 (1) On this *vide* Fränkel, [*Parmenidesstudien*, Berlin, 1930] p. 158 sq.  
 (2) Just as Plato's *Timaeus* is a myth.
60. ———. 1969. "The Text of Parmenides fr. 1,3." *Classical Quarterly* no. 18:69.  
 "In all texts of the fragments of Parmenides printed in the last fifty years he begins his poem by speaking of "the way which" (or, according to some, "the goddess who") "carries through all towns the man who knows"  
 (...)  
 "In fact ἄσση, which is alleged to be the reading of the best manuscript of Sextus' books *Adversus Dogmaticos*, has no manuscript authority at all. ἄσση first appeared in the text of the third edition of *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* published in 1912, where it is attributed to the Ms. N (= Laur.85.19), so called by Mutschmann".  
 (...)  
 The "countless attempts at emendation" of [the readings of L and E et al., πάντα τε and πάντα τη respectively] did not include *aste*. Variants from N were first published in 1911 by A. Kochalsky in his dissertation,...but his professedly complete list of new readings from N for these books of Sextus includes no reference to Parmenides 1.3. It follows that *aste* can hardly have appeared among the variants which he says he had already communicated to Diels. The word *aste* appears, however, as the reading of N in vol. II of Mutschmann's text of Sextus,



which was published in 1914. It would seem, therefore, that Diels got the reading privately from Mutschmann, who collated N in 1909 and 1911. . . . In any case, the word is a simple misreading of the manuscript, which has *pant' ate*." (p. 69)

61. ———. 1969. "The Manuscript Tradition of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* I-IV." *Classical Quarterly* no. 18:70-75.  
Abstract: "The following discussion' of the manuscript tradition of Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* I-IV originated in an examination of the tradition of the fragments of Parmenides. It is therefore illustrated not only from Simplicius but particularly from the texts of Parmenides quoted by him. This will not be misleading, since, though many of these texts are quoted by Simplicius more than once, there is little or no sign in any manuscript of interpolation from one passage to another and it is not likely that any scribe could have interpolated the text from an independent manuscript of Parmenides."
  
62. ———. 2003. "Parmenides on Thinking and Being." *Mnemosyne* no. 56:210-212.  
"The incomplete verse which constitutes Fragment B3 of Parmenides τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι is of central importance for the interpretation of his argument. Since what may be called the traditional understanding of the phrase, as opposed to that proposed by Zeller,(2) has been recently revived in *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*(3) (CC) and elsewhere, it seems worthwhile to recapitulate the evidence on either side.  
The sentence is cited only by Clement, Plotinus and Proclus, by all isolation from its context, and by all as asserting the identity of thinking with being. The English translation, 'For it is the same to think and be', is said to be "the only natural reading of the Greek" (CC, 120). is at least questionable, since it postulates a substantival use with no article, which would be unparalleled in the first half of the fifth century, and even later, and which its assumption by Clement and the Neoplatonists does nothing to guarantee." (p. 211)  
(2) E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, I, i, ed. Nestle (Leipzig 1923), 678 1).  
(3) [A. A. Long ed.,] *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge 1999).
  
63. ———. 2009. *The Fragments of Parmenides. A Critical Text with Introduction and Translation, the Ancient Testimonia and a Commentary*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Revised and expanded edition edited with new translations by Richard McKirahan and a new Preface by Malcolm Schofield (First edition Gorcum: Van Assen 1986).  
"Parmenides' poem is dominated by his conviction that human beings can attain knowledge of reality or understanding (*nóos*). This faith is expressed in the apocalyptic form of the poem, which at the same time offers an analysis of its presuppositions, and which may be regarded as an attempt to answer the questions, 'what must reality be, if it is knowable by the human mind, and what is the nature of human experience?'  
The ontological part of the work comprises an account of two intellectually conceivable ways of discovering reality (*aletheín*), followed by a summary analysis of its character as revealed by pursuing the only way allowed to be genuine. The ways are defined respectively by the formulae 'is and is not for not being', and 'is not and must needs not be', and the recognition that they are mutually exclusive and exhaustive is represented (in opposition to the evidence of the senses) as itself constituting the only criterion (fr. 7, 5) for determining what is real: nothing is to be so considered, unless it either is intrinsically something, or of necessity is not anything. Since the second way is argued to be concerned with nothing and to lead nowhere, reality is to be identified by pursuing the first, i.e. by asking what can and must be made the subject of an unconditional 'is'.  
Although Parmenides defines his conception of philosophy in terms of the expressions 'is' and 'is not', he gives no explicit indication of the sense which he conceives these expressions to bear. Modern exegesis has in consequence saddled him with, most generally, an existential understanding of the verb, or else with an

archaic failure to distinguish between its existential and copulative uses. It is better to recognise that his approach is purely formal or dialectical, i.e. that, so far from positing any given sense of the verb, he is concerned to determine what sense attaches to it, given its essential role in 'asserting and thinking'. In the prologue and in the cosmological part of the poem he uses the verb 'to be' either with an adverbial qualification or with a further predicate (e.g. fr. 1, 32; 8, 39, 57; 20, 1), but in defining 'the only ways of enquiry which can be thought' (fr. 3, 2), he isolates the expressions 'is' and 'is not' deliberately both from any determinate subject and from any further completion. In so doing he assigns to them no restricted sense but treats them as the marks of 'asserting and thinking', with the possibility and presuppositions of which he is concerned throughout (cf. fr. 3, 8n.). His aim in defining the 'genuine way of enquiry' as the expression 'is' is to discover (i) what, if anything, can be said and thought 'to be' something without the possibility of denial that it is that thing, and (ii) what this subject can further be said 'to be', i.e. what further predicates can be asserted of it. He answers these questions by converting the verb 'is' to the noun-expression 'Being' (eon) and then arguing for the nature of what this name must denote. The 'is' which constitutes the definition of the way is thus reformulated as the copula with 'Being' as its subject: 'Being is ungenerated and imperishable, complete, unique, unvarying' etc. (fr. 8, 3-5). Initially the nature and number of 'Being', like the sense of 'is', remain wholly undetermined except as what 'is and is not for not being'. Its further determination, culminating in its characterisation as non-physical, is argued in the account in fr. 8 of the many landmarks or monuments on the authentic way of enquiry, i.e. of the terms which can be asserted of the subject, and the question arises, 'how does Parmenides envisage the relation between the subject, 'Being', and the terms joined with it by the copula?'

Among the landmarks on the authentic way are the unity or indivisibility of Being and its uniqueness. If what is is one and unique, Parmenides cannot well suppose that the terms which he predicates of it are the names of distinct attributes, which would have their own being and so be eonta. He must therefore regard them as alternative names of Being. This was Plato's understanding of his meaning (cf. Sections 7 and 8 below), which is confirmed by Eudemus' assertion that it was Plato himself who first introduced two senses of the verb 'to be' by discriminating between its substantial and attributive uses (cf. Sect. 8). It is confirmed also by the Megarian view of predication as identification (cf. Sect. 6 ad fin.), for the Megarians were regarded as latter days (tt. 102, 132). Aristotle likewise insists (tt. 19, 21, 27) that Parmenides ascribed to 'being' only a single sense, whence he was led to suppose that what is other than Being itself has no being at all. Thus both the text and the Platonic and Peripatetic exegesis of it indicate that Parmenides' copulative use of 'is' in his account of the authentic way signifies an identity which is the direct expression of the perfect identity of substantial Being." (pp. 19-21)

64. Crystal, Ian. 2002. "The Scope of Thought in Parmenides." *Classical Quarterly* no. 52:207-219.

"Much has been written recently about the relation between thinking and what is thought in Parmenides.(1) Long has recently argued that the relation between the cognitive act and its object is a weak form of identity in which thinking and being are coextensively related.(2) Curd in her recent study of Parmenides argued for a weaker relation in which being constituted a necessary condition for thinking.(3) In this paper, I want to argue that Parmenides offers a different account of the relation between thinking and what is thought. I shall argue that Parmenides puts forth a monistic thesis which entails the strict identification of the epistemic subject and object. I am not the first to posit the strict identity of thinking and being. Vlastos and, more recently, Sedley also attribute this view to Parmenides.(4) However, the argument of this paper will be that the identity relation, *pace* Vlastos and Sedley, does not emerge until Parmenides' account of qualitative homogeneity in Fragment 8. As a result, we cannot attribute this position to Parmenides prior to Fragment 8.

My argument will proceed in two main stages. First (Section I), I shall argue that Fragments 1-7 do not establish the strong identity thesis. I shall do this by canvassing two possible interpretations of how it is that thinking relates to what can be thought in Fragments 1-7. These readings I shall refer to as 'realist' and 'idealist' respectively. Secondly (Section II), I shall turn to the Parmenidean account of what 'is' in Fragment 8 in order to show (Section III) how this does establish the strict identity between the thinker and that which is thought." (p. 207)

(1) To cite just a few recent examples on this subject matter, see A. A. Long, 'Parmenides on thinking being', in J. Cleary (ed.), *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 12. (New York, 1996), 125-51; D. Sedley, 'Parmenides and Melissus', in A. A. Long (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1999), 113-33; P. Curd, *The Legacy of Parmenides* (Princeton, 1998), chs. 1 and 2.

(2) Long (n. 1), 140-6. See n. 38 below.

(38) Long (n. 1), 140-6, I think, wrongly attributes a weak identity-relation between thinking and being in which, although identical, they are coextensively related. He maintains that thinking and being do not connote the same thing or are different in semantic value just as the other attributes such as being ungenerated and everlasting are different in semantic value. However, even allowing for these differences in connotation or semantic value one nonetheless cannot avoid the problem that thinking cannot be treated like the other attributes in that it requires the differentiation outlined above; the sort of differentiation which Parmenides appears to rule out when he offers his complete account of being in Fragment 8. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, it would seem that Plato picked up on this point when setting out his account of mental faculties and their objects in Republic 5. That is, in the midst of a backdrop couched in allusions to Parmenides' Proem, Plato sets out an account of thinking and its objects which is based upon the sort of differentiation that Long talks about, namely as coextensive *relata*. But more to the point, it would seem that Plato is setting out his account in this manner in contrast to the Parmenidean account. See I. Crystal, 'Parmenidean allusions in Republic V', *Ancient Philosophy* 16 (1996), 351-63.

65. Curd, Patricia. 1991. "Parmenidean Monism." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 36:241-264.

"Is Parmenides indeed a monist? If so, what sort of monist is he? This paper undertakes a re-thinking of these issues." (p. 242)

(...)

"I shall argue that Parmenides adopts neither material nor numerical monism; but that his arguments about the only true account of being show him to be committed to predication monism. (10) Whatever is must be a predication unity; but this is consistent with there being many ones. I begin by considering the *esti* and its subject in B2, and by giving some attention to the setting and context of Parmenides' philosophical project. I next consider a number of the arguments of the *Alêtheia* section of the poem, and then turn to the relation to Parmenides of philosophers who came after him, especially the atomists and the pluralists." (p. 243)

(10) Barnes, for instance, is thus correct in denying that Parmenides adopts numerical monism (in "Eleatic One"). But because Barnes insists on an existential 'is' in Parmenides he does not give full weight to the metaphysical and methodological force of Parmenides' arguments; and so he does not see that Parmenides is indeed committed to a kind of monism. Parmenides himself speaks of the unity of being and argues that being is both *suneches* and *mounogenes*; my argument is that these claims are equivalent to predication monism. I do not mean that Parmenides formulated a theory to which he gave the name 'predication monism.' Rather, given that the three types of monism can be distinguished, it is crucial in understanding Parmenides to attribute this view to him.

66. ———. 1992. "Deception and Belief in Parmenides' "Doxa"." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 25:109-134.

"In this paper I examine the problem of the *Doxa*, and offer an account of it that is consistent with the claims of Aletheia and explains why Parmenides included it in the poem.(6) I shall argue that, while there is deception in the *Doxa* (though not in the goddess' account of it), nonetheless the *Doxa* does not in principle renounce all human belief. For, although Parmenides argues that the sensible world alone cannot be the source of knowledge of what is, he does not reject it completely. Moreover, I propose that, while Parmenides himself does not give such an account, a story about the sensible world that is consistent with the metaphysical and epistemological claims of Aletheia can be told. Thus, while I agree with those who argue that the particular account given in the *Doxa* fails, I also agree with those who see the *Doxa* as having something positive to say about mortal belief. But I go further, arguing that Parmenides supposes that a trustworthy cosmology may be possible and discloses what such a theory might be like and how it would be tested. I begin by considering some of the difficulties faced by interpretations of Parmenides' *Doxa*; I then consider the problems of deception and mortal belief." (pp. 110-111, two notes omitted)

(6) For a summary of views concerning the *Doxa* held earlier in the century, see W.J. Verdenius, *Parmenides: Some Comments on his Poem* (Groningen/Batavia 1942), 45-9.

67. ———. 1998. "Eleatic Arguments." In *Method in Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Jyl, Gentzler, 1-28. New York: Oxford University Press.  
"In this essay I shall limit my discussion of philosophical method to issues connected with presenting and arguing for philosophical theories or with appraising the adequacy of theories. I shall suggest that there are three stages in the development of pre-Socratic method. First, there is the mere assertion of one's theory; second, there is the giving of arguments for first principles or against other theories. Finally, in the third stage, there are the development and application of criteria for acceptable theories, combined with using these criteria to rule out whole classes of competing theories. I shall argue that the second stage appears in a rough form in Xenophanes and Heraclitus (for they reject, but do not actually argue against, the views of others), but that the full-blown philosophical method of the second and third stages together first appears in Parmenides; it is he who first uses arguments directly in support of his philosophical position (and against the positions of others) and who first stresses the criteria for the acceptability of arguments about nature. But, as I shall also argue, since in Parmenides there is also the reliance on assertion as opposed to argument that characterizes nearly all pre-Eleatic philosophy, Parmenides himself is a transitional figure. I begin with a survey of pre-Eleatic pre-Socratic theories. I then examine the various roles played by assertion, argument, and theory evaluation in Parmenides' thought. Finally, I discuss some of the argumentative strategies in Parmenides' Eleatic followers, Zeno and Melissus." (p. 2)
68. ———. 1998. *The Legacy of Parmenides. Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Second edition with a new *Introduction to the Paperback Version* (pp. XVII-XXIX), Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2004.  
Contents: Preface: IX; Acknowledgments XI; A note on texts and translations XIII; Abbreviations XV; Introduction 3; I. Parmenides and the inquiry into Nature 24; II. Parmenides' Monism and the argument of B8 64; III. *Doxa* and deception 98; IV. Pluralism after Parmenides 127; V. Atoms, void, and rearrangement 180, VI. Final remarks 217; Bibliography 243; Index locorum 257; Index nominum 264; General index 269-280.  
"This book offers an alternative account of the views of Parmenides and his influence on later Presocratic thought, especially Pluralism and Atomism, in the period immediately preceding Plato's Theory of Forms. It challenges what has become the standard account of the development of Pluralism (in the theories of Empedocles and Anaxagoras) and Atomism (adopted by Leucippus and Democritus). This alternative interpretation places Parmenides firmly in the



tradition of physical inquiry in Presocratic thought, arguing that Parmenides was concerned with the same problems that had occupied his predecessors (although his concern took a different form). Further, this account explains how Parmenides' metaphysical and cosmological doctrines had a positive influence on his successors, and how they were used and modified by the later Eleatics Zeno and Melissus. In the course of this book, I shall argue against both the prevailing interpretation of Parmenides' monism and the usual explanation of the "is" in Parmenides. Instead, I shall claim that Parmenides' subject is what it is to be the genuine nature of something, thus linking Parmenides with the inquiries into nature of his philosophical predecessors. On the view for which I shall argue, the "is" that concerns Parmenides is a predicational "is" of a particularly strong sort rather than an existential "is." I accept that Parmenides is a monist, but I deny that he is a numerical monist. Rather, I claim that Parmenides is committed to what I call predicational monism. (5)

Numerical monism asserts that there exists only one thing: a complete list of entities in the universe would have only one entry. This is the kind of monism that has traditionally been attributed to Parmenides and (rightly) to Melissus. Predicational monism is the claim that each thing that is can be only one thing; and must be that in a particularly strong way. To be a genuine entity, something that is metaphysically basic, a thing must be a predicational unity, a being of a single kind (*mounogenes*, as Parmenides says in B8.4), with a single account of what it is; but it need not be the case that there exists only one such thing. What must be the case is that the thing itself must be a unified whole. If it is, say F (whatever F turns out to be), it must be all, only, and completely F. On predicational monism, a numerical plurality of such one-beings (as we might call them) is possible. (6) The interpretation of Parmenides' "is" becomes relevant here, for I argue that to be for Parmenides is to be the nature of a thing, what a thing genuinely is, and thus metaphysically basic. The arguments of Parmenides' fragment B8 concern the criteria for what-is, that is, for being the nature of something, where such a nature is what a thing really is. Those arguments purport to show that what-is must be whole, complete, unchanging, and of a single kind. Each thing that is can have only one nature, but there may be many such things that satisfy Parmenides' criteria.' These issues are the subjects of Chapters I and II." (pp. 4-5)

(5) Mourelatos (in Route) and Barnes ("Eleatic One") have also questioned the predominant view that Parmenides is a numerical monist; Barnes denies any sort of monism to Parmenides, and Mourelatos emphasizes Parmenides' anti-dualism.

(6) Thus, the failure of later Presocratic thinkers to argue for their pluralistic theories, while working within a Parmenidean framework and stressing the reality and predicational unity of their basic entities, is evidence for my view that it is possible for there to be a numerical plurality of entities each of which is predicationally one.

(7) In later terminology we might say that Parmenides is searching for an account of what it is to be the essence of something, although I have avoided the word essence because it is an anachronistic term in Presocratic thought. There is, however, a connection between Parmenides' search for what-is and Aristotle's accounts of *ousia* and *to ti en einai*; the connection runs through Plato's Theory of Forms, which itself has Parmenidean roots.

69. ———. 2006. "Parmenides and After: Unity and Plurality." In *A Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Louise, Gill Mary and Pierre, Pellegrin, 34-55. Oxford: Blackwell.

"A helpful way to approach the question of Parmenides' importance for Greek philosophy is to examine questions of unity and plurality in pre-Socratic thought. seeing how these questions dovetail with those about the possibility of genuine knowledge and its object.(2) In this chapter, I shall argue that Parmenides' criticisms of his predecessors rest on the principle that what can be genuinely known must be a unity of a particular sort, which I call a predicational unity. On this view, anything that genuinely is (that truly can be said to be). and so can be known, must be of a

- single, wholly unified kind. Parmenides drew confusions from this that later philosophers took very seriously. One consequence is that what is genuinely real cannot come to be, pass away, or after, thus posing the problems of change and knowledge: How can we account for the appearance of change that we see in the world around us? And how can we have knowledge of such a changing world? An advantage of viewing Parmenides in this way is that it makes sense of the cosmological theorizing of post-Parmenidean figures such as Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus. All these philosophers were (in their different ways) pluralists, holding that there is a numerical plurality of metaphysically basic entities: and yet, I shall argue, all were working in the Parmenidean tradition because they all accepted Parmenides' criteria for what is genuinely real." (p. 34)
- (2) [Stokes (1971) provides a comprehensive treatment of unity and plurality in early Greek thought in English. [M. C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy*, Washington, DC: The Center for Hellenic Studies 1971]
70. ———. 2011. "Thought and Body in Parmenides." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 115-134. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Summary: "Parmenides' fragment B16 is a puzzle: it seems to be about thought, but Theophrastus uses it in his account of Parmenides' views on perception. Scholars have disagreed about its proper place in Parmenides' poem: does it belong to *Alêtheia* or to *Doxa*? I suggest that the fragment indeed belongs to *Doxa*, and in it Parmenides claims that mortals, who fail to use *noos* correctly, mistake the passive experiences of sense perception for genuine thought about what-is, and hence fail to understand the true nature of what-is. I argue that genuine thought (the correct use of *noos*) must go beyond sense experience and grasp what is truly intelligible; in doing so I explore the question of immateriality in Presocratic thinking."
71. ———. 2015. "Thinking, Supposing, and *Physis* in Parmenides." *Études platoniciennes* no. 12.  
Abstract: "What could justify the Presocratic conviction that human beings can have knowledge? The answer that I am exploring in a larger project is that most Presocratic thinkers share a commitment to the possibility of a "natural fit" between the world and human understanding. Two claims underlie this commitment: the first is the basic intelligibility of the cosmos. The second is that human beings can come to know things beyond their limited sensory experience, for in properly exercising their capacities for perception, thought, and understanding, they can come to have the knowledge that earlier Greeks thought was reserved for the gods. Here I explore a small part of one chapter of the story I want to tell: Parmenides' accounts of what-is and of thinking and the implications of these views for the possibility of human knowledge about the world around us. The paper concentrates on Parmenides, beginning with a few comments about Heraclitus."
72. de Rijk, Lambertus Marie. 1983. "Did Parmenides Reject the Sensible World?" In *Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens, CSSR on the Occasion of his Seventy-Fifth Birthday and the Fiftieth Anniversary of his Ordination*, edited by Lloyd, Gerson, 29-53. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.  
"Two camps of scholars interpreting Parmenides' poem have recently been distinguished and labeled as the Majority and the Minority. The former holds that, unlike the *Alêtheia* part, the *Doxa* part presents an altogether untrue account of things that properly speaking have no real existence. According to the Minority, however, the *Doxa* was put forward as possessing some kind or degree of cognitive validity. I shall try to show that both these two positions are ambiguous and accordingly fail in giving a clear insight into what Parmenides intends to tell us. They both seem to need correction to the extent that Parmenides does distinguish the *Alêtheia* route from the *Doxa route(s)*, but there is nothing in the text to tell us that he makes a distinction between two separate domains. one true and the other

untrue. As any genuine philosopher he was concerned about the sensible world, *our* world and it was *that* which he wanted to truly understand." (pp. 29-30)

(...)

One cannot deny that Heraclitus faced the primitive approach of the physicists in a radical way. So Parmenides in defending another steady inner nature ('Be-ing') sees in him his most dangerous rival. No wonder that his offences against Heraclitus are the most bitter. And indeed he tries to bring Heraclitus into the company of those who, two-headed as they are, are not able to make the great decision.

Subsequent thinkers had to take into account Parmenides' doctrine and in fact could not help digesting its rigidity. Plato was the first to take the big decision so seriously that he left the idea of one world as approached by mortals along two different Routes and settled on the assumption of two separate worlds, one of Unshakable Being, the other of Unreliable Becoming. Aristotle, for his part, thought it possible to dispose of Plato's *chorismos* and find the inner nature of things right in themselves. No doubt it is Parmenides, cited by Fr. Owens as 'one of the truly great philosophic geniuses in the history of Western thought,' (\*) who was the catalyst of all subsequent metaphysics." (p. 53)

(\*) Joseph Owens, *A History of Ancient Western Philosophy* (New York 1959) p. 76.

73. DeLong, Jeremy C. 2015. "Rearranging Parmenides: B1: 31-32 and a Case for an Entirely Negative Doxa (Opinion)." *Southwest Philosophy Review* no. 31:177-186. Abstract: "This essay explicates the primary interpretative import of B1: 31-32 in Parmenides poem (*On Nature*)—lines which have radical implications for the overall argument, and which the traditional arrangement forces into an irreconcilable dilemma. I argue that the "negative" reading of lines 31-32 is preferable, even on the traditional arrangement. This negative reading denies that a third thing is to be taught to the reader by the goddess—a positive account of how the apparent world is to be "acceptably" understood. I then suggest that a rearrangement of the fragments would make more sense overall, while further supporting the "negative" reading as more natural and coherent. In particular, the rearrangement dispels the objection that, "if mortal opinions were not true, why would Parmenides include such a lengthy false account of the apparent world—an account which explicitly denies the conclusions of the earlier section, Truth?"
74. Dilcher, Roman. 2006. "Parmenides on the Place of Mind." In *Common to Body and Soul. Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity*, edited by King, R. A. H., 31-48. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. "Parmenides seems to have no place in the history of the philosophical problems that are indicated by the phrase "common to body and soul". While in Heraclitus we do find for the very first time a concept of soul as something distinct from the body that is responsible for thought, action and feeling, there is a basic dichotomy in Parmenides' thought that also has a bearing on the question of a possible relation of "body" and "soul": on the one hand the account of Being which involves the exercise of mind; on the other hand a theory of the physical world on the basis of the two elements Light and Night. The coherence of these two parts of Parmenides' poem has been much debated in terms of the possible relation of Being to *Doxa*. Fr.16, however, provides an account of mind in relation to the two elements of the doxastic world, and so it might contribute in a different way to a better understanding of how the two parts cohere." (p. 31)
75. Dolin Jr., Edwin F. 1962. "Parmenides and Hesiod." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*:93-98. "It should be said at once, of course, that the power and brilliance are Parmenides' own and not borrowed from anyone. To assume, as this paper does, that the tradition from which Parmenides drew was the main poetic tradition of Homer and Hesiod is not to imply that hexameter poetry by itself somehow accounts for Parmenides. Rather, the assumption is that the tradition was there, pervasively and

ineluctably, in the cultural atmosphere, that Parmenides used its motifs and imagery as freely and naturally as he breathed, counting them as allies in his poetic communication with Hellas, and that he criticized this cultural *donnée* whenever he saw fit, which was not seldom, by the very manner in which he made use of what he liked of it." (p. 93)

(...)

"This article seeks to extend the comparison with the *Theogony* by suggesting a specific parallel between Parmenides' daughters of the sun and the Theogony's Muses and by commenting on the parallel between Parmenides' gates of night and day and those of the Theogony.(3)

Its hypothesis is that Parmenides was deliberately attacking the archaic thought processes represented by Hesiod and wished to present himself as the exponent of a new intellectual approach which would be associated in its spirit with the Homeric ideal of the heroic individual." (p. 94)

(3) *Theogony* 736-57; Parmenides B. 1.11.

76. Drozdek, Adam. 2001. "Eleatic being: finite or infinite?" *Hermes. Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* no. 129:306-313.

Abstract: "The extant fragments indicate that there is a fundamental agreement between the two Eleatic philosophers, Melissus and Parmenides concerning characteristics of Being. Like Parmenides Melissus asserts that Being is eternal (30B1, B2, B4), immovable (B7.7-10, B10). complete (82), and unique (B5, B6). The physical world is unreal because it is characterized by "change, multiplicity, temporal succession and imperfection" (B8). Being cannot be known through sensory perception because senses indicate that things are constantly changing, which directly contradicts the immutability of Being (B7). However, as commonly assumed, there is at least one fundamental difference between them. Melissus considers Being infinite, whereas for Parmenides Being is finite because it is held in limits (28B8.26,31,42) and is compared to a sphere (B8.42-43). Does the limited/unlimited difference signify the modification introduced by Melissus to the Eleatic philosophy?"

77. ———. 2001. "Parmenides' Theology." *Eranos. Acta Philologica Suecana* no. 99:4-15.

Reprinted as Chapter 4 in: A. Drozdek, *Greek Philosophers as Theologians. The Divine Arche*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. pp. 43-52.

Abstract: "Parmenides' system has always been an inexhaustible source of fascination because of the grandeur and, at the same time, paradoxical character of the ontological vision.

Even after centuries of interpretations, there is little agreement on the meaning of the system and its particular components. However, there seems to be a common slant in these interpretations, at least in the last hundred years, starting with the groundbreaking publication of Hermann Diels on Parmenides' poem,(1) which deemphasizes the religious and theological components of Parmenidean ontology and epistemology. These theological components are very often glossed over – sometimes they are barely mentioned, sometimes discounted as a mere metaphor (beginning with Diels), sometimes treated as mere embellishments.(2) One reason is that Parmenides nowhere calls Being, which he discusses in particular in fr. B8, God, and the Olympian personae he mentions are discounted as a bow toward traditional mythology with very little religious significance. It seems, however, that such an approach is unjustified, that the main concern of Parmenides in his poem is with theological issues, and that the poem is an attempt to show the way of truth, which is the way of acquiring true religious knowledge about God."

(1) Hermann Diels, *Parmenides Lehrgedicht* (Berlin: Reimer, 1897).

(2) It is said, for instance, that "the fact that the goddess remains anonymous shows that she represents no religious figure at all ... Parmenides could not have attributed any reality to the goddess because for him there exists only one thing, the unique and homogenous Being," Leonardo Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 31.



78. English, Robert B. 1912. "Parmenides' indebtedness to the Pythagoreans." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* no. 43:81-94.  
 "A close examination of all the "opinions" shows that they, even more than his statements of "truth," relate to the doctrines ascribed to the Pythagoreans. There is scarcely a tenet set forth in the "opinions" which may not be referred directly or indirectly to them as they are represented in Aristotle. Not more than ten different propositions exist in this part of his work. Of these, two deal with first principles, three deal with astronomical truths, three have an astrophysical significance, one deals with procreation, and one with the nature of thought. The six dealing with astronomical or astrophysical theories undoubtedly have reference to the Pythagoreans. Of the two referring to first principles one seems to have resemblance to Anaximander, and the other to the dual principle of the Pythagoreans. To the theory of right and left in pro-creation corresponds indirectly the Pythagorean idea of right and left as two first principles. To the postulate that "that which thinks is the nature of mingled parts in man and the excess is thought" there is no parallel in the Pythagorean doctrine. But Parmenides' own postulate on this point that "thinking will not be found without being, in which it is expressed" corresponds in substance to the belief of the Pythagoreans that soul and mind are properties of number (being), though Parmenides makes no mention of this Pythagorean symbol." (pp. 92-93)  
 (...)  
 "It seems evident, then, from this study (1) that the "opinions" of Parmenides refer in large part to the doctrines of the early Pythagoreans; (2) that his treatise on "truth" is largely concerned with a refutation of their arguments; (3) that not only his astronomical views but also his cosmological and ontological views generally were affected by the Pythagorean system; (4) that no violence to fact is done in setting the elementary metaphysical number theory of the Pythagoreans as early in time as the ascendancy of Parmenides." (p. 94)
79. Ferreira, Fernando. 1999. "On the Parmenidean Misconception." *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 2:37-49.  
 "This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I focus on the weaker gradation of an RTMS [*referential theory of the meaning of sentences*] and I argue that this gradation, while still unable to make sense of falsehoods, nevertheless enlarges greatly the scope of significant sentences (albeit at an ontological price) and is able to make sense of true negative predications. The relation between a weak RTMS and Plato's above mentioned double-theory is suggested in the text via what I call Plato's maneuver. However, this relation is not fully discussed in this article since I believe that a proper treatment of such an issue requires a discussion that is beyond the scope of the present paper. In my view, this discussion must include an account of the finale of the *Sophist* (after 259e), in which Plato tries to make sense of falsehoods. I plan such an undertaking at a latter date. In the third section, I discuss the first part of Parmenides' poem in light of a strong RTMS. In the course of this discussion, I propose a rather strong correlation between verses 3-4 and verses 40-41 of fragment 8 of the poem. This correlation is, to my knowledge, new in the literature. Finally, in the last section, I briefly consider an objection to the interpretation of the poem of Parmenides proposed in this article." (pp. 38-39)
80. Finkelberg, Aryeh. 1986. "The Cosmology of Parmenides." *American Journal of Philology* no. 107:303-317.  
 "Our main source of information about the cosmological component of Parmenides' doctrine of Opinion - apart from the first three and a half abstruse lines of fr. 12 - is Aëtius' account. This, however, is generally regarded as confused, garbled and incompatible with fr. 12.  
 The reconstruction of Parmenides' cosmology is thus considered a hopeless task, for "it must inevitably be based on many conjectures."  
 I, however, cannot accept this conclusion, for, as I argue below, it is possible to provide a reasonably intelligible account of Aëtius' report (except for the corrupt

sentence about the goddess) which is also compatible with fr. 12, provided, of course, that we are not bent upon proving our sources incompatible, but rather seek to reconcile them." (p. 303)

"Aëtius' report reads as follows:(2)

"Parmenides says that there are rings wound one around the other, one made of the rare, the other of the dense, and between them there are others mixed of light and darkness. What surrounds them all like a wall is solid, beneath which there is a fiery ring, and what is in the middle of all rings is <solid>: around which there is again a fiery [sc. ring]. The middlemost of the mixed rings is for them all the <origin> and <cause> of motion and coming into being which he calls steering goddess, and key-holder, and Justice, and Necessity. Air has been separated off from the earth vaporized because of the latter's stronger compression; the sun is an exhalation of fire and such is the Milky Way. The moon is a mixture of both air and fire. Aether is topmost, surrounding all; beneath it there is that fire-like part which we call sky; beneath it is what surrounds the earth." (p. 304, notes omitted)

(2) Aët. II 1, 7 (DK 28 A 37):

81. ———. 1986. "'Like by Like' and Two Reflections of Reality in Parmenides."

*Hermes. Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* no. 114:405-412.

"The main problem confronting the student of Parmenides' doctrine is the nature of the relation between the two pictures of reality posited in his poem: reality as Being and reality as a mixture of the two 'forms', light and night.

To characterize the Parmenidean doctrine as ontological dualism explains nothing - the question is, what is the motivation for this dualism? Moreover, the Parmenidean teaching is epistemological rather than ontological dualism, for what is described in the Way of Seeming is not a different reality from that described in the Way of Truth, but a different knowledge of the same reality - the universe(1) - a knowledge declared inferior. On the assumption that the Parmenidean dualism is epistemological, we must therefore examine how man cognizes reality, with a view to isolating the conditions which determine the cognition of reality as Being or as a mixture of the 'forms'." (p. 405)

(1) That Parmenides conceived of Being as the unity of all things is the view of Plato (e.g. *Parm.* 128 A, 152 E), Aristotle (e.g. *Met.* 986b 27), and Theophrastus (e.g. ap. *Hippol.* Ref. I 11).

82. ———. 1988. "Parmenides: Between Material and Logical Monism." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 70:1-14.

"To recapitulate. The problem of the monistic conception of reality, insoluble when approached on physical terms, was solved by Parmenides by inventing the notion of Being. When translated into terms of the doctrine of Being, monism became the logical necessity to conceive Being as the only thing that exists, while pluralism, that is, the assumption of the existence of something beside Being, revealed itself as the fallacy of admitting the existence of such a thing as not-Being. However, it was not the problem of Ionian monism to which Parmenides' thought was committed: the idea of cosmic Fire underlying the notion of Being shows that it was the failure of his own vision of reality as a material unity, a vision which he shared with the Ionians, to be truly monistic, that prompted Parmenides to a thorough examination of the pattern of current monism, resulting in a new idea of unity and a revision of the standing of cosmology in the monistic doctrine. In its genesis, the Parmenidean teaching is then a material monistic doctrine in which the material principle, Fire, is replaced by Being, while the cosmology is reinterpreted as a pluralistic misconception and demonstrated to be untenable on the application of true names as they are established in the ἀλήθεια.

However the underlying material monistic pattern still remains operative: Fire persists as a visualisation of Being, thus providing the rationale for the cosmology and determining its specific profile, while the cosmology remains - not a true but nevertheless to some degree a valid account. The Parmenidean system is thus not self-contained, for the formative conception of Fire, the vision which mediates the

transition from Being to the cosmology, thus making the teaching into a coherent whole, remains outside the formally posited doctrine." (pp. 12-13)

83. ———. 1988. "Parmenides' Foundation of the Way of Truth." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 6:39-67.  
"The problem of the subject of *estin* and *ouk estin* in B 2.3 and 5 is one of the most controversial issues in Parmenides scholarship. The usual approach is that *estin* and *ouk estin* have a subject, which, however, remains unexpressed. Now by unexpressed subject one may mean that (a) a given utterance has a logical subject which is not expressed grammatically but is supplied by the immediate context, or (b) a given utterance has a logical subject which is neither expressed by means of a grammatical subject nor supplied by the immediate context. The case (a) is an instance of an ordinary linguistic phenomenon called ellipsis; the case (b) is either grammatically nonsensical or an example of unintelligible speech." (p. 39)  
(...)  
"Below I argue that *einai* is the only subject that meets this requirement. Proceeding from this assumption, I argue that *einai* should be distinguished from *eon* and that the 'ways' of B 2 are not so much ontological statements as logical-linguistic patterns whose truth and falsehood are self-evident. These patterns serve in Parmenides as the basis of the subsequent deduction of true existential assertions about Being and not-Being, and I try to show that, if taken in this perspective, all the extant fragments preceding B 8, from B 2 to B 7, constitute a single argument whose detailed reconstruction I propose in the second section of the article. Finally, in the third section, I examine, proceeding from the conclusions arrived at, the question of truth and falsehood in Parmenides in a more general context, which helps to shed light on the respective logical standing of the two parts of Parmenides' poem, the *Aletheia* and the *Doxa*." (p. 42)
84. ———. 1997. "Xenophanes Physics Parmenides Doxa and Empedocles Theory of Cosmogonical Mixture." *Hermes. Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* no. 125:1-16.  
Abstract: "Although the resemblances between Empedocles' and Parmenides' physical theories are commonly recognized, in speaking of the former's philosophical debt to the latter commentators usually focus on the ἀλήθεια, paying much less attention, if any, to the δόξα (1). To me, this approach suggests that the role of the δόξαι in fashioning Empedocles' physical doctrine is not sufficiently appreciated and calls for further discussion; consequently I propose a brief survey of Parmenides' δόξα with a view to elucidating systematic correlations between his and Empedocles' physical theories. Further, I intend to argue that Empedocles' physical doctrine is the final stage of a development which can be traced through Parmenides' δόξα back to Xenophanes' 'physics'. I believe that the novelty of Xenophanes' 'physics' has not been duly appraised and its role as a forerunner of Parmenides' δόξα largely overlooked."  
(1) Thus, for example, in speaking of Parmenides' influence in the 'Conclusion' to his investigation of Empedocles' thought, D. O'Brien, *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle*, Cambridge 1969, 237-249, does not even mention the δόξα; similarly, B. Inwood, *The Poem of Empedocles*, Toronto 1992, 22-28, addresses only the ἀλήθεια.
85. ———. 1999. "Being, Truth and Opinion in Parmenides." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 81:233-248.  
"The traditional premise of Parmenidean scholarship is that the theory of Being renders the phenomenal world merely apparent and the account of this world in the *Doxa* fallacious. Accordingly, commentators find themselves reckoning with the tantalizing question of the rationale of Parmenides' supplementing a true theory with a false one. In what follows, I propose to consider the thesis that Parmenides' Being is consistent with material heterogeneity and that, accordingly, the two parts of the poem combine to yield an exhaustive account of reality." (p. 233)  
(...)  
"This construal of Parmenides' thought enables an understanding of his poem as a unified philosophical project in which the *Doxa* has its rightful place, and extricates

- us from the hopeless dilemma that either Parmenides' acceptance of his own conclusions was qualified for the upheld their truth unqualifiedly and was mad. (37)" (p. 248)
- (37) As stated by M. Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology," in A. P. D. Mourelatos (ed.), *The Pre-Socratics*, Princeton, 1993, 268; cf. C. H. Kahn, "The Thesis of Parmenides," *Review of Metaphysics* 22, 1969, 715.
86. Floyd, Edwin. 1992. "Why Parmenides Wrote in Verse." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 12:251-265.
- "Parmenides chose verse (instead of prose) for its many resonances highlighting deception. *Prophron* at 1.22, for example, has an apparently straightforward meaning "kindly", but in Homer it is used in contexts of divine disguise. Later on in Parmenides' poem, the focus on the immobility of Being (8.37-38) recalls Athena's fateful deception of Hektor in *Iliad*, book 22. Even more clearly, *Doxa* shows the pattern too, since the transition from *Aletheia* at 8.52 parallels a context (Solon, fr 1.2, ed. West) in which feigned madness brings about the Athenians's regaining Salamis."
87. Fränkel, Hermann Ferdinand. 1962. *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy. A history of Greek epic, lyric, and prose to the middle of the fifth century*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovic.
- Translated from the German *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (second revised edition 1962) by Moses Hadas and James Willis.
- Chapter VII *Philosophy and Empirical Science at the end of the Archaic Period: (c) Parmenides*, pp. 349-370.
- "The core of Parmenides' philosophy is metaphysical in its nature. To come face to face with that reality beyond the senses which had disclosed to him, the poet had to mount in spirit beyond this world in which we live. Whenever he reflected upon his lofty ideas, he felt himself' carried away into a realm of light beyond all earthly things. In the introduction to his poem he describes this experience, and since ordinary words are incapable of conveying anything so far beyond the ordinary, he conveys it in images and symbols.(2) (pp. 350-351) (...)
- "We have now in all essential points come to the end of our information about the philosophy of Parmenides. It unites grandeur of intuition with strictness of logic. He had gazed upon Being in all its plenitude and glory, but also in all its austerity and exclusiveness.
- Just as Xenophanes had chosen to believe in god as god and as nothing else, so Parmenides worked out his notion of Being as pure Being and nothing else; and he used his razor-edged dialectic to defend it against all common-sense doubts as the unique and perfect actuality, The metaphysical spirit here rules supreme.
- This metaphysical spirit (cf. 1, 1 θυμός) is most completely expressed in the opening, in which the philosopher describes his own ascent into pure and inerrant reason in dramatic and vigorous images. There is a sequence of three scenes: the furious journey from night into day; the passing of a gate that opens to one man only; the gracious reception on the other side. The autobiographical 'I' at first appears quite openly; then it is latent and implied in the horses, chariot, maidens, etc.; then directly again in the address (1, 22ff.), where it is ennobled by the goddess' hand-clasp, to be replaced by 'you' on the lips of the divine speaker. This 'you' has a personal character as long as it is denoting (as in 24-32) the recipient of an exclusive favour, one who has raised himself above the fluctuations of humanity. But when the 'you' recurs later, as it sometimes does, it denotes only the audience of the lecture-in one instance Parmenides particularly (8, 61), elsewhere anyone who through his intermediacy will hear or read the poem." (p. 365)
- (2) Probably this was why Parmenides chose verse: fr. 1 could not have been expressed in the Greek prose of his time.
88. ———. 1975. "Studies in Parmenides." In *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy. Vol. II: The Eleatics and Pluralists*, edited by Furley, David J. and Allen, R. E., 1-47.



London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Partial English translation of *Parmenidesstudien* (*Nachrichten der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften* 1930, 153-192).

"My intention in the following studies is to correct and extend certain essential aspects of our present knowledge of the system of Parmenides by criticism and interpretation of original fragments and *testimonia*. In so doing, I shall take particular care to keep close to the wording of the original text, as is done as a matter of course in the interpretation of 'pure' literature, but is easily neglected in the case of a strictly philosophical text, where the content appears to speak for itself, quite independently of the words which happen to be used. And yet much will be radically misunderstood, and many of the best, liveliest and most characteristic features of the doctrine will be missed, if one fails to read the work as an epic poem which belongs to its own period, and to approach it as a historical document, through its language.

These studies are presented in such a way that only Diels-Kranz is required as a companion." (p. 1)

"As Parmenides himself says (B 3), his thought runs in a circle; it proves itself by itself, just as Being rests in itself: For equal to itself symmetrically on all sides, symmetrically it meets its *πείρατα* (104) to translate more exactly the vividly empirical *ἐγκύρπει*: 'it happens everywhere upon its final forms.' Being has reached its formation symmetrically in every direction.

So has the theory of Reality; and with these words it is concluded." (p. 36)

89. Frère, Jean. 2011. "Mortals (βροτοί) According to Parmenides." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 135-146. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

Summary: "It is a common opinion that when Parmenides refers to "mortals," he is referring to all human beings. But in fact, when he talks of "mortals," he implies only a limited fraction of humanity: those thinkers who have elaborated clever but nevertheless insufficient or misleading theories about the origin of things and the cosmos. This can be observed in fragment 6, where the formula "mortals who know nothing," far from implying all humanity, refers only to Heraclitus and his disciples. In the same way, in fragment 8.53–61, "mortals" who acknowledge two separate types of light and night to apprehend the structure of the cosmos are only the Pythagoreans, not all humans."

90. Frings, Manfred. 1988. "Parmenides: Heidegger's 1942-1943 Lecture Held at Freiburg University." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 19:15-33.

"In what follows, I wish to present a number of essentials of Heidegger's lecture, originally entitled, "Heraclitus and Parmenides," which he delivered at Freiburg University in the Winter Semester of 1942/1943. This was at a time when the odds of World War II had turned sharply against the Nazi regime in Germany. Stalingrad held out and the Germans failed to cross the Volga that winter. Talk of an impending "invasion" kept people in suspense. Cities were open to rapidly increasing and intensifying air raids. There wasn't much food left.

It is amazing that any thinker could have been able to concentrate on pre-Socratic thought at that time. In the lecture, there are no remarks made against the allies; nor are there any to be found that would even remotely support the then German cause. But Communism is hit hard once by Heidegger, who says that it represents an awesome organization-mind in our time.

There are two factors that somewhat impeded my endeavor of presenting the contents of this lecture:

1. Heidegger had originally entitled the lecture "Heraclitus and Parmenides." The 1942/43 lecture was followed in 1943 and 1944 by two more lectures on Heraclitus.
- 2 When I read the manuscripts of the 1942/43 lecture for the first time, I was stunned that Heraclitus was mentioned just five times, and, even then, in more or less loose contexts. I decided that the title of the lecture should be reduced to just

"Parmenides" in order to accommodate the initial expectations of the reader and his own thought pursuant to having read and studied it.

2. While reading the lecture-manuscripts for the first time, another troubling technicality came to my attention: long stretches of the lecture hardly even deal with Parmenides himself, and Heidegger seems to get lost in a number of areas that do, *prima facie*, appear to be irrelevant to Parmenides. And Heidegger was rather strongly criticized for this in the prestigious literary section of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* to the effect that it was suggested that I could have done even better had I given the lecture an altogether different title and omitted the name Parmenides." (p. 15, notes omitted).

91. ———. 1991. "Heidegger's Lectures on Parmenides and Heraclitus (1942-1944)." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 22:197-199.  
"This is a discussion of the coverage of three Lectures Heidegger held on Parmenides and Heraclitus from 1942 to 1944. It is designed on the background of his personal experience during the trip he made to Greece in 1962 as recorded in his diary. The question is raised whether his 1943 arrangement of 10 Heraclitus fragments could be extended by "refitting transformations" of other fragments. The three Lectures are seen as tethered to Heidegger's 1966/67 Heraclitus Seminar. Central to his trip was the island of Delos where he seemingly experienced the free region of Aletheia. A "fragment" in his diary is suggested as a motto for all three Lectures."
92. Fritz, Kurt von. 1945. "*Nous, noein* and Their Derivatives in the Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras). Part I. From the Beginnings to Parmenides." *Classical Philology* no. 40:223-242.  
Reprinted (with the second part) in: Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays*, New York: Anchor Press, 1974; second revised edition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 23-52 (on Parmenides see pp. 43-52).  
"In an earlier article (1) I tried to analyze the meaning or meanings of the words *noos* and *noein* in the Homeric poems, in preparation for an analysis of the importance of these terms in early Greek philosophy. The present article will attempt to cope with this second and somewhat more difficult problem, but to the exclusion of the *nous* of Anaxagoras, since this very complicated concept requires a separate investigation." p. 23 of the reprint.  
So far it might seem as if Parmenides' concept of *noos* is still essentially the same as that of his predecessors, including his contemporary Heraclitus. In fact, however, Parmenides brings in an entirely new and heterogeneous element. It is a rather remarkable fact that Heraclitus uses the particle *gar* only where he explains the ignorance of the common crowd. There is absolutely no *gar* or any other particle of the same sense in any of the passages in which he explains his own view of the truth. He or his *noos* sees or grasps the truth and sets it forth. There is neither need nor room for arguments. Homer and Hesiod, likewise, when using the term *noos*, never imply that someone comes to a conclusion concerning a situation so that the statement could be followed up with a sentence beginning with "for" or "because." A person realizes the situation. That is all. In contrast to this, Parmenides in the central part of his poem has a *gar*; an *épei*, *oun*, *eineka*, *ouneka* in almost every sentence. He argues, deduces, tries to prove the truth of his statements by logical reasoning. What is the relation of this reasoning to the *noos*?  
The answer is given by those passages in which the goddess tells Parmenides which "road of inquiry" he should follow with his *noos* and from which roads he must keep away his *noema*.  
These roads, as the majority of the fragments clearly show, are roads or lines of discursive thinking, expressing itself in judgments, arguments, and conclusions. Since the *noos* is to follow one of the three possible roads of inquiry and to stay away from the others, there can be no doubt that discursive thinking is part of the function of the *noos*. Yet -- and this is just as important -- *noein* is not identical with a process of logical deduction pure and simple in the sense of formal logic, a

process which through a syllogistic mechanism leads from any set of related premises to conclusions which follow with necessity from those premises, but also a process which in itself is completely unconcerned with, and indifferent to, the truth or untruth of the original premises. It is still the primary function of the *noos* to be in direct touch with ultimate reality. It reaches this ultimate reality not only at the end and as a result of the logical process, but in a way is in touch with it from the very beginning, since, as Parmenides again and again points out, there is no *noos* without the *eon*, in which it unfolds itself. In so far as Parmenides' difficult thought can be explained, the logical process seems to have merely the function of clarifying and confirming what, in a way, has been in the *noos* from the very beginning and of cleansing it of all foreign elements.

So for Parmenides himself, what, for lack of a better word, may be called the intuitional element in the *noos* is still most important. Yet it was not through his "vision" but through the truly or seemingly compelling force of his logical reasoning that he acquired the dominating position in the philosophy of the following century. At the same time, his work marks the most decisive turning-point in the history of the terms *noos*, *noein*, etc.; for he was the first consciously to include logical reasoning in the functions of the *noos*. The notion of *noos* underwent many other changes in the further history of Greek philosophy, but none as decisive as this. The intuitional element is still present in Plato's and Aristotle's concepts of *noos* and later again in that of the Neoplatonists. But the term never returned completely to its pre-Parmenidean meaning." (pp. 51-52 notes omitted)  
(1) "*Noos* and *Noein* in the Homeric Poems," *Classical Philology*, 38 (1943), 79-93.

93. ———. 1946. "*Nous*, *noein* and Their Derivatives in the Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras). Part II. The Post-Parmenidean period." *Classical Philology* no. 40:12-34.  
Reprinted (with the first part) in: Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays*, New York: Anchor Press, 1974; second revised edition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 52-85.
94. Fronterotta, Francesco. 2007. "Some Remarks on *Noein* in Parmenides." In *Reading Ancient Texts. Volume I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien*, edited by Stern-Gillet, Suzanne and Corrigan, Kevin, 3-19. Leiden: Brill.  
"In this paper I will confine myself to O'Brien's works on Parmenides. I refer in particular to the two volumes of *Études sur Parménide*, to which he contributed so substantially. In the first volume we find his magisterial version of Parmenides's fragments, with French and English translations and commentary, and a critical examination of the main interpretative and philosophical questions that they pose. The second volume includes two Essays by him. One of these looks at a number of textual problems, and it aims to elucidate the "ideological" background which often conditions the study of texts because of a pre-existing historico-philosophical understanding of their contents.(1) O'Brien shows that many variants of the texts of fr. 1 and 8 DK reveal a Neoplatonic origin — very likely because Neoplatonic commentators felt the need to establish a convergence between the meaning and the spirit of the Parmenidean text and their own doctrinal positions. O'Brien's essay is a model of its kind, both as a reading of and commentary on the Parmenidean fragments (and on pre-Platonic thinkers in general) and for my more modest objective here, that of reflecting upon the significance of *voeiv*.  
I shall look at translations of the verb *voeiv*, and, more especially, the species of activity to which this verb, according to Parmenides, refers us." (p. 3)  
(1) See P. Aubenque (ed.), vols. 1 (*Le poème de Parménide*) and 2 (*Problèmes d'interprétation*).  
The essay I am now referring to is in vol. 2: *Problèmes d'établissement du texte*, pp. 314–50.
95. Furley, David J. 1967. "Parmenides of Elea." In *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edwards, Paul, 47-51. New York: Macmillan.

Reprinted in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Second Edition*, edited by Donald M. Borchert, New York: Thomson-Gale, 2006, pp. 122-127, with an *Addendum* by Patricia Curd, pp. 127-129.

"David Furley's original entry remains an exemplary introduction to Parmenides' thought. Since its publication, philosophers have focused on the character of the routes of inquiry that the goddess lays out in the poem, suggesting different interpretations of the subjectless is (or esti), and of the nature of to eon, the subject of inquiry. In addition, scholars have continued to study the Proem (the opening lines of the poem) and the Doxa (the goddesses' statement of mortal opinion), but there is no consensus about either." (p. 127)

96. ———. 1973. "Notes on Parmenides." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy*: 1-15.  
Supplementary vol. I: E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty (eds.), *Exegesis and Argument. Studies in Greek Philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos*, Assen: Van Gorcum.  
Reprinted in: D. J. Furley, *Cosmic Problems: Essays on Greek and Roman Philosophy of Nature*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 pp. 27-37.  
"There is a set of problems, much discussed in the literature, concerning the nature of the journey described in B1 of Parmenides, its destination, the revelation made to him by the goddess, and the connection between the symbolism of B1 and the two forms, Light and Night, which are the principles of the cosmology of the Way of Doxa. Some of these problems, I believe, have now been solved. The solution, which is mainly the work of scholars writing in German, (1) has been either overlooked or rejected by the English-speaking community, (2) and it seems worthwhile drawing attention to it and developing it." (p. 27)  
(1) The essential suggestion was made, without much argument, by Morrison [Parmenides and Er] (1955). For detailed arguments, see Mansfeld [Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt] (1964) 222-61, and Burkert [Das Proömium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras] (1969).  
(2) For example, by Guthrie [A History of Greek Philosophy] (1965) II, Tarán [Parmenides] (1965), myself [Parmenides of Elea] (1967), Kahn [The Thesis of Parmenides] (1969), and Mourelatos [The Route of Parmenides] (1970), 15 and n. 19.
97. ———. 1989. "Truth as What survives the elenchos. An idea in Parmenides." In *The Criterion of Truth. Essays Written in Honour of George Kerferd, together with a Text and Translation (With Annotations) of Ptolemy's on the Kriterion and Hegemonikon*, edited by Huby, Pamela and Neal. Stephen, 1-12. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.  
Reprinted in D. J. Furley, *Cosmic Problems: Essays on Greek and Roman Philosophy of Nature*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989, pp. 38-46.  
"My starting point in this paper is a couple of lines from Parmenides' poem. There is some reason to claim that they are the most remarkable lines in that astonishing document:  
κρίνοι δε λόγφ πολύδηριν ελεγχον ἐξ ἐμεθεν ρηθεντα, μόνος δ' ἐτι μύθος οδοιο  
λειπεται ὡς εατιν.  
Judge by logos the hard-hitting refutation ( *elenchos* ) that I have uttered. Only one single account of a way is left: that it is. (DK 2SB7.5-8.2)  
The paradox of Parmenides is presented in the strongest outline here.  
It is a goddess who speaks these lines, revealing the way of Truth to the initiate. Instead of standing on authority or using the persuasive power of religious ritual, she tells him to take away her message and subject it to criticism: judge by logos. Moreover, the revelation itself takes the form of a criticism: what she first offers Parmenides on his arrival, when he has passed through the gates of which Justice holds the key, is described as an ἐλεγχος (*elenchos*). This is the aspect of Parmenides' vision that I want to elaborate on this occasion. I am aiming to do two things: to improve the case for thinking that ἐλεγχος does indeed mean 'refutation'



here, rather than 'proof'; (1) and to see what this tells us about the underlying conception of truth." (p. 1)

(1) I argued briefly for this thesis in 'Notes on Parmenides' in *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos*, ed. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty, Phronesis suppl. vol. I ( Assen 1973), 1-15. I was stimulated to more about it by some contrary arguments in a paper by Mr. James Lesher, which he was kind enough to send me in typescript.

A year or so later I was invited to present a paper at a conference on "Truth" at Brown University, and without again looking at Mr. Lesher's paper I wrote the present article. Shortly afterwards I sent it to the Editors of this volume, being very happy to have the opportunity to join in honouring my old and admired friend, George Kerferd.

Some time later, Mr. Lesher published his article ("Parmenides' Critique of Thinking: the *poluderis elenchos* of Fragment 7", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984), 1-30.

On re-reading it, I see that although we come to different conclusions, we cover much of the same ground. To take proper notice of Mr. Lesher's arguments now would mean rewriting my paper and expanding it quite a lot. But since we worked independently of each other, I think it best to leave the reader to make the comparisons.

98. Furth, Montgomery. 1968. "Elements of Eleatic Ontology." *Journal of the History of Philosophy*:111-132.

Reprinted in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.), *The Pre-Socratics. A Collection of Critical Essays*, Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974; second revised edition: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 241-270.

"The task of an interpreter of Parmenides is to find the simplest, historically most plausible, and philosophically most comprehensible set of assumptions that imply (in a suitably loose sense) the doctrine of 'being' set out in Parmenides' poem.' In what follows I offer an interpretation that certainly is simple and that I think should be found comprehensible. Historically, only more cautious claims are possible, for several portions of the general view from which I 'deduce the poem' are not clearly stated in the poem itself; my explanation of this is that they are operating as *tacit* assumptions, and indeed that the poem is best thought of as an attempt to force these very assumptions to the surface for formulation and criticism-that the poem is a challenge. To be sure, there are dangers in pretending, as for dramatic purposes I shall, that ideas are definite and explicit which for Parmenides himself must have been tacit or vague-that Parmenides knew what he was doing as clearly as I represent him; I try to avoid them, but the risk must be taken. I even believe that not to take it, in the name of preserving his thought pure from anachronous contamination, actually prevents us from seeing the extent to which he, pioneer, was ahead of his time-the argument works both ways. So let me hedge my historical claim in this way: the view I shall discuss could have been an active- indeed a controlling-element of Eleaticism; to suppose that Parmenides held it not only explains the poem, but also helps explain the subsequent reactions to Eleaticism of Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Plato (though there is not space to elaborate this here). In addition, it brings his thought astonishingly close to some contemporary philosophical preoccupations.

In the first of the following sections, I lay down some sketchy but necessary groundwork concerning the early Greek concept of 'being.' Then in Section 2 an interpretation is given of what I take to be the central Parmenidean doctrine, that 'it cannot be said that anything is not.' This section is the lengthiest and most involved, but it also contains all the moves that appear to be important. Of the remaining sections, Section 3 explains the principle: 'of what is, all that can be said is: *it is*,' Section 4 deals briefly with the remaining cosmology of "The Way of Truth," and Section 5 considers the question whether Parmenides himself believed the fantastic conclusions of his argument. There is a short postscript on a point of methodology." (pp. 111-112)

99. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1998. *The Beginning of Philosophy*. New York: Continuum. See chapter 9: *Parmenides and the Opinions of Mortals* pp. 94-106 and chapter 10: *Parmenides on Being*, pp. 107-125.  
 "The last line of the second fragment says that it is not possible to formulate that which is not (7) (*me eon*), for this can neither be investigated nor communicated. It is possible that the third fragment forms the continuation of this text: *to gar auto noein estin to kai einai*. (8) In the meantime, Agostino Marsoner has convinced me that fragment 3 is not a Parmenides quotation at all but a formulation stemming from Plato himself, which I believe I have correctly interpreted and which Clement of Alexandria has ascribed to Parmenides. In order to interpret this fragment, we must confirm that *estin* does not serve here as a copula but instead means existence (9) and, in fact, not just in the sense that something is there but also in the characteristic classical Greek sense that it is possible, that it has the power to be. Here, of course, "that it is possible" includes that it is. Secondly, we must be clear about what is meant by "the same" (*to auto*). Since this expression stands at the beginning of the text, it is generally understood as the main point and therefore as the subject. On the contrary, in Parmenides "the same" is always a predicate, hence that which is stated of something. Admittedly, it can also stand as the main point of a sentence, but not in the function of the subject, about which something is stated, but in the function of the predicate that is stated of something. This something in the sentence analyzed here is the relationship between "*estin noein*" and "*estin einai*," between "[is] perceiving/thinking" and "[is] being." These two are the same, or, better yet: the two are bound together by an indissoluble unity. (Furthermore, it should be added that the article "*to*" does not refer to "*einai*" but to "*auto*." In the sixth century, an article was not yet placed in front of a verb. In Parmenides' didactic poem, where the necessity arises of expressing what we render with the infinitive of a verb together with a preceding article, a different construction is used. This interpretation, the one I am proposing for the third fragment, was, as I recall, the object of a dispute with Heidegger. He disagreed altogether with my view of the evident meaning of the poem. I can well understand why Heidegger wanted to hold onto the idea that Parmenides' main theme was identity (*to auto*). In Heidegger's eyes, this would have meant that Parmenides himself would have gone beyond every metaphysical way of seeing and would thereby have anticipated a thesis that is later interpreted metaphysically in Western philosophy and has only come into its own in Heidegger's philosophy. Nevertheless, in his last Essays Heidegger himself realized that this was an error and that his thesis that Parmenides had to some extent anticipated his own philosophy could not be maintained." (pp. 110-111)  
 (7) *das Nichtseiende*.  
 (8) 'For the same thing exists [or, is there] for thinking and for being' (Gadamer will argue against this reading; see below); alternatively, "For thinking and being are the same."  
 (9) *Existenz*.
100. Galgano, Nicola Stefano. 2016. "Amēkhanīē in Parmenides DK 28 B 6.5." *Journal of Ancient Philosophy* no. 10:1-12.  
 Abstract: "The paper examines closer the notion expressed by the word *amēkhanīē* in DK 6.5. In his analysis of problematic of knowledge Parmenides alerts about *amekhanīē* of mortals, a word generally translated with 'lack of resources' or 'perplexity', a kind of problem that drives the thinking astray. Scholars point out in many passages of the poem the opposition between imperfect mortals and the *eidóta phōta* of DK 1.3, the wise man. However, as much as I know, nobody noticed that, if mortals have a lack of resources, the goddess is teaching exactly how to fix it with a kind of method given through her precepts, which are an authentic *mēchané*. The paper shows that this is the genuine didactic aim of Parmenides, as he says in 1.28-30, i.e., to point out where is the error of mortals and how the wise man fixes it. Starting from a reinterpretation of 1.29 and following with the analysis of fr. 6, the paper shows that the method of fr. 2 is indeed the *mēchané* that can do that. Although the word is not present in the poem, it is one of

- its main topics. It seems (by the extant fragments) Parmenides had no clear word to call his *mēchané*, a psychological cognitive tool we call today principle of non-contradiction."
101. ———. 2017. "Parmenides as Psychologist - Part One: Fragment DK 1 and 2." *Archai. Revista de Estudos sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental* no. 19:167-205.  
 "The aim of this essay is to examine an aspect of Parmenides' poem which is often overlooked: the psychological grounds Parmenides uses to construct his view. While it is widely recognized by scholars that following Parmenides' view requires addressing mental activity, i.e. both the possibility of thinking the truth, as well as thinking along the wrong path that mortals follow, a closer examination of the psychological assumptions involved have, to my knowledge, not yet been attempted.  
 I argue that by identifying and analyzing the psychological vocabulary in his poem, it is revealed that Parmenides was a keen observer of human mental behavior. Through these psychological (perhaps "cognitivist," following some recent categories) observations of thought processes, Parmenides gains insight into the structure of thought itself. The outcome of this inquiry reveals three notable conclusions: First, the poem contains a remarkably extensive use of strictly psychological vocabulary.  
 Second, the presence of this psychological material and the lack of scholarly attention to it means there is a significant aspect of Parmenides intellectual legacy that remains unexplored — Parmenides as psychologist, keen observer of human mental behavior. Furthermore, the recognition of this material helps shed important light on Parmenides' philosophical message.  
 Ultimately, I intend to provide an exhaustive treatment of Parmenides' psychological language, which requires close examination of DK B 1, 2, 6, and 7. Due to spatial constraints, I have divided the inquiry into two parts, and will only address DK 1-2 below." (pp. 167-168)
  102. ———. 2017. "Parmenides as Psychologist - Part Two: Fragment DK 6 and 7." *Archai. Revista de Estudos sobre as Origens do Pensamento Ocidental* no. 20:39-76.  
 For the abstract, see part One.
  103. Gallop, David. 1979. "'Is or 'Is Not'?" *The Monist* no. 62:61-80.  
 "In this article I reopen some basic problems in the interpretation of Parmenides' 'Way of Truth' familiar to anyone who has wrestled with his poem. The hub of my discussion is fr. B2, in which the goddess formulates two 'routes of inquiry', an affirmative one — 'is', and a negative one — 'is not'. The former she commends, while the latter she rejects as 'wholly unlearnable', on the ground that 'thou couldst not know what is not, nor couldst thou point it out' (B2.7-8). What is the meaning of 'is' and 'is not' in these two routes? Is it existential, predicative, or veridical? Or should we suppose a fused notion of 'being', in which various uses of the verb εἶναι are somehow combined? These questions are clearly fundamental for determining the nature of the two routes, upon which everything else in the Way of Truth depends. The answer that I wish to defend is the classical interpretation of 'is' as existential. This reading of it, adopted by Professor G. E. L. Owen in his influential study, 'Eleatic Questions', (2) remains preferable, in my view, to various alternatives that have been canvassed before and since his article appeared. I shall therefore first review and criticize those alternatives. I shall then reconstruct the argument of B2-3 and B6.1-2, putting forward a modified version of Owen's account. Finally, I shall defend this version against its rivals by considering Parmenides' disproof of coming-to-be and perishing in B8.6-21." (p. 61)  
 (2) *Classical Quarterly* N.S. 10 (1960), 84-102.
  104. Gemelli Marciano, Maria Laura. 2008. "Images and Experience: at the Roots of Parmenides' *Aletheia*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 28:21-48.

"Another argument against the thesis that the proem is to be interpreted as an ecstatic journey lies in its connection with the rest of the poem. Kingsley 2003 has recently solved this problem, too, by linking the ecstatic experience of the proem with the goddess' teaching in the central Aletheia section of the poem so as to produce a single, coherent picture (see Gemelli Marciano 2006b [Review of Kingsley 2003 in *Gnomon* 78: 657-671]). Parmenides' poem is, for Kingsley, neither a purely literary 'didactic' text nor a purely philosophical one. It is an esoteric poem that describes a mystical experience and above all aims through the power of language to induce this same experience in its listeners.

In what follows I develop this approach further and show that if Parmenides' poem is interpreted in this way his enigmatic language, his curious images, and also his so-called logical arguments take on a new meaning. (14) Parmenides' language is performative (it accomplishes what it says). 'Alienation' and 'binding, are the most powerful means to remove listeners from the ordinary, everyday dimension and way of thinking and put them into a different state of consciousness.

Images, repetitions, sequences of words and sounds, supposedly 'logical' arguments all contribute to this end and have a particular meaning and function that surpass conventional human language and ordinary syntactical and semantic relationships. Here I will draw attention especially to the proem and to fragments 2 and 8. I refer to Kingsley 2002 and 2003 for treatment of the other fragments and the problems relating to them." (pp. 26-27; note 15 omitted)

(14) I formulated some of the observations contained in this article, concerning the divine epiphanies in the proem and the images in fr. DK 28B8, some years ago independently of Kingsley 1999 and 2003, while preparing my forthcoming edition of the Presocratics (Gemelli Marciano 2008 [*Die Vorsokratiker*. Band II: *Parmenides, Zenon, Empedokles*. Düsseldorf: Artemis & Winkler.]). However, in Kingsley's books I have found the answers to questions and textual problems that have enabled me to organize my earlier unsystematic intuitions into a coherent picture.

105. Gershenson, Daniel E., and Greeberg, Daniel A. 1962. "Aristotle confronts the Eleatics: two arguments on 'the One'." *Phronesis* no. 7:137-151.  
"In our review of Aristotle's two arguments against the Eleatics we have pointed out several features which mark off one from the other. The two sections are different primarily in the point of view from which each proceeds, and in the terminology each employs. Further evidence for the independence of the two passages is the following: [*Physics*] lines 186A34- 186B1 repeat in Eleatic jargon what lines 185A27-32 say in common Aristotelian parlance, namely, that if being is an attribute, then the subject will not be; lines 186B1 2-13 repeat the argument in lines 185A32-185B5, that if being is a magnitude, it will no longer be one, because all magnitudes are continua, and all continua by definition are divisible; lines 185B25-1 86A3 present a historical survey of Eleatic thought similar to that in lines 187A1-10, although the two passages accentuate different aspects of its later development. The evidence taken together makes it clear that we are dealing here with two independent written accounts of two separate Aristotelian attacks against Parmenides and the Eleatics. One need only compare the second argument, where the competence of the Eleatics as philosophers is not denied, and where, indeed, the fact that Aristotle carries on a dialogue with them lends them a certain respectability, with the first argument, where he spares the Eleatics no abuse and evinces contempt for their reputation as physicists and logicians, to see that this is so. Each account displays within itself a coherent organization and a consistent point of view. The two together make up Aristotle's main case against Eleatic philosophy." (pp. 150-151; notes omitted)
106. Giancola, Donna. 2001. "Towards a Radical Reinterpretation of Parmenides' B3." *Journal of Philosophical Research* no. 26:635-653.  
Abstract: "It is generally agreed that Parmenides' fragment B3 posits some type of relation between "thinking" and "Being." I critically examine the modern interpretations of this relation. Beginning with the ancient sources and proceeding



- into modern times, I try to show that the modern rationalist reading of fragment B3 conflicts with its grammatical syntax and the context of the poem as a whole. In my critique, I suggest that rather than a statement about epistemological relations, it is, as it was originally understood, a religious assertion of metaphysical identity."
107. Girle, Roderic A. 2007. "Parmenides Demythologised." *Logique et Analyse* no. 199:253-268.  
 "The impression is often given that the metaphysics of Parmenides is absurd. This impression is often reinforced with a warning that if philosophers resort to an "extreme" view then they are bound to finish with an absurd view, "like Parmenides". But all this is far too swift. I will argue that there is a way of looking at Parmenides which brings his views very much into line with the views of a substantial number of modern philosophers who are not taken to be putting forward absurd views. They might be somewhat discomforted to be grouped with Parmenides, but if they are, then that in itself should give cause to pause and consider both the issue of Parmenides' alleged absurdity and to what extent they have inherited Parmenides' problems.  
 So let us first reprise the views of Parmenides. Then we consider some modern doctrines which have consequences of a quite Parmenidean kind.  
 This will lead us to considering a contrast in the Philosophy of Time of considerable interest to Prior." (p. 253)
108. Glowienka, Emerine. 1988. "Exorcising the Ghost of Parmenides." *Southwest Philosophical Studies* no. 10:37-47.  
 "Yet this paper is not an attempt to offer a scholarly .analysis of Parmenides' own metaphysics; rather, it is a chronology and analysis of the subsequent history of some metaphysicians in dealing with this legacy bequeathed to them by Parmenides. This legacy, which I am calling the "ghost of Parmenides," is the confusion of our concept of "absolute being" ("abstract being") with, and/or the disengagement of this concept from, the objects of our experience. You doubtless recognize this confusion as a move from the mental to the extra-mental, which has been also named the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" according to Whitehead.  
 (3) For to equate being with unity is really only to describe what a concept of being must be in order for it to be intelligible to human understanding; it does not describe being as found outside that concept." (p. 37)  
 (3) Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1967) 51.
109. Goldin, Owen. 1993. "Parmenides on Possibility and Thought." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 26:19-35.  
 "Given the evidence and the nature of Parmenides' writing, it seems that Mourelatos (1979,5) is right in his suggestion that it is time for a 'tolerant pluralism' in Parmenidean scholarship. But if a definitive interpretation is beyond our reach, we may yet make progress in understanding what is to be gained or lost in the depth, cogency, and clarity of our interpretation of the whole poem when we interpret a line or an argument in one manner rather than another.  
 For this reason, I do not here defend a complete interpretation of what remains of Parmenides' poem. In most important respects I pursue the interpretive path taken by G.E.L. Owen ([*Eleatic Questions*, reprinted in] 1987a) in his highly influential interpretation of the poem. But I take issue with Owen's claim that Parmenides' argument for the existence of any object of reference or thought rests on fallacious modal logic. I also take issue with the view of Tugwell (1964) that Parmenides' argument rests on a naive and philosophically unsatisfactory blurring of the distinction between the potential and existential uses of εἶναι. I suggest that Parmenides' argument for the being of the object of thought and speech takes a different course. On my view, Parmenides explicitly denies that there are unreal but possible things or states of affairs, on the grounds that possible beings can be understood only as beings and hence as real. Since any object of thought or speech is a possible thing or state of affairs, any object of thought or speech is. On my

- view, Parmenides thus draws attention to what has come to be a perennial metaphysical problem: what status is to be given to possible beings?" (p. 19)
110. Graeser, Andreas. 2000. "Parmenides in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* no. 5:1-14.  
Abstract: "This essay examines the role of Parmenides in Plato's dialogue of the same name.  
Over against the widely held view that this literary figure exemplifies the philosopher par excellence of an all-encompassing systematic of Eleatic provenience, it is maintained that Parmenides represents a particular frame of mind about certain philosophical matters, namely one which regards forms in a reified manner. It is suggested that by means of the literary figure of Parmenides, Plato is addressing in his dialogue inner-Academic debates about the theory of forms, especially Speusippus' conception of Unity, which betrays a kind of naive metaphysics of things, as can be seen especially in the first three deductions of the second half of the dialogue."
111. Graham, Daniel W. 1999. "Empedocles and Anaxagoras: Responses to Parmenides." In *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*, edited by Long, Anthony Arthur, 159-180. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
"There is no question that Parmenides' poem was a watershed in the history of early Greek philosophy. No serious thinker could ignore his work. And yet it seems to pose insuperable problems for cosmology and scientific inquiry. The first generation to follow Parmenides includes thinkers who wished to continue the tradition of Ionian speculation. But how would they confront Parmenides? What would they make of him and what effect would his arguments have on their work? The first neo-Ionians(1), as they have been called, were Empedocles and Anaxagoras.(2) Despite some salient differences, the two philosophers have much in common in their approach. They are near contemporaries,<sup>3</sup> and as we shall see, they make similar moves in their approach to scientific speculation. Let us first examine the systems of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and then discuss their responses to Parmenides." (p. 159)  
(1) 1 The term is from Barnes [*The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2nd ed. [1st ed. 1979 in 2 vols.] (London, 1982)] ch. 15, who stresses the continuity of their project with that of early Ionian philosophers. The term aptly allows us to class philosophers of Italy and Sicily, such as Philolaus and Empedocles, with later philosophers from Ionia such as Anaxagoras.  
(2) These two philosophers seem to have been active about a generation earlier than Philolaus, Archelaus, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Leucippus, and perhaps a couple of generations earlier than Democritus.
112. ———. 2002. "Heraclitus and Parmenides." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 27-44. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
"The two most philosophical Presocratics propound the two most radically different philosophies: Heraclitus the philosopher of flux and Parmenides the philosopher of changelessness. Clearly they occupy opposite extremes of the philosophical spectrum. But what is their historical relation? For systematic reasons, Hegel held that Parmenides preceded Heraclitus. But in a footnote of an article published in 1850, Jacob Bernays noticed that in the passage we now know as DK 28 B 6 Parmenides could be seen as criticizing Heraclitus.(\*). Bernays' insight had already been widely recognized as the key to the historical relationship between the two philosophers when Alois Patin strongly advocated the Bernays view in a monograph published in 1899. But in 1916 Karl Reinhardt reasserted the view that Heraclitus was reacting to Parmenides. Others argued that no connection. was provable. The Reinhardt view was never popular, while the Bernays-Patin view gradually came to be widely accepted. Twenty-five years ago Michael C. Stokes (*One and many in Presocratic philosophy*, 1971) launched a devastating attack on

the view that Parmenides was replying to Heraclitus. That attack has never been answered and the Bernays-Patin thesis at present remains undefended.

In this chapter I wish to argue that the Bernays-Patin thesis is true after all. And in the process of defending it, I hope to show that accepting the thesis has some value for understanding Parmenides beyond the external question of his relation to Heraclitus. Minimally, appreciating Heraclitus' influence on Parmenides will help us understand Parmenides' argument better; but beyond that, it may help us put the whole course of early Greek philosophy in perspective. I shall first review the evidence for a connection between the philosophers (section I), then analyze the evidence for a connection (II), consider the role of historical influences in philosophical exegesis (III), and finally try to reconstruct Parmenides' dialectical opponent from his argument (IV)." (p. 27 notes omitted)

(\*) In his *Kleine Schriften* (1885), vol. 1, pp. 62-3, n. 1.

113. ———. 2006. *Explaining the Cosmos. The Ionian Tradition of Scientific Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Chapter 6: *Parmenides' Criticism of Ionian Philosophy*, pp. 148-185.  
"What connection, if any, there is between Heraclitus and Parmenides has long been disputed(1). Of the four a priori possibilities: (a) that Parmenides influenced Heraclitus, (b) that Heraclitus influenced Parmenides, (c) that the two did not know or acknowledge each other, and (d) that they are influenced by a common source, only (b) and (c) seem likely. For, contra (a), Heraclitus likes to abuse his predecessors(2), and, contra (d), he tends to radically rework the material he inherits(3). There have been, and continue to be, proponents of both (b) and (c).(4) While it seems attractive in some ways to dodge the question and thus deal only with textual certainties rather than historical contingencies, I believe that textual evidence is adequate to decide the question in favor of (b), and, moreover, to help determine the philosophical relationship between the two most philosophical Presocratics—and the two most ideologically opposed." (p. 148)  
(1) The argument in this section is drawn from a longer study (Graham 2002a). The results are disputed by Nehamas 2002.  
(2) Heraclitus B40, B42, B57, B81a, B106, B129. "Dieses bleiben die Ecksteine der Geschichte der Vorsokratiker: Heraklit zitiert und bekämpft Pythagoras, Xenophanes und Hekataios, nicht Parmenides; dieser zitiert und bekämpft Heraklit" (Kranz 1916, 1174).  
(3) E.g., he is at pains to deny the possibility of cosmogony at B30, the one doctrine common to all his philosophical forebears.  
(4) Arguments for (a) start with Hegel 1971, 319ff., followed by Zeller, and revived by Reinhardt 1916; this view has mostly been abandoned, but see Hölscher 1968, 161–65. The argument for (b) was first made by Bernays 1885, 1: 2.62, n. 1, and defended vigorously by Patin 1899; this view was accepted by Baeumker 1890, 54; Windelband 1894, 39, n. 2; Diels 1897, 68ff.; Ueberweg 1920, 1st Part: 95, 97, 99; Kranz 1916, 1934; Burnet 1930, 179-80, 183-84; Calogero 1977, 44-45; Cherniss 1935, 382–83; Vlastos 1955a, 341, n. 11, KR (tentatively) 183, 264, 272, Guthrie 1962-1981, 2.23–24; Tarán 1965; Coxon 1986; Giannantoni 1988, 218-20, and others. Diels 1897, 68, says of Bernays: "[S]eine Ansicht ist fast allgemein durchgedrungen," noting that only Zeller has resisted the interpretation; but in his revised edition of Zeller, 1919–1920, 684, n. 1, and 687, n. 1, Nestle abandons Zeller's view as obsolete. For (c) are Gigon 1935, 31-34; Verdenius 1942; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1959, 2.208-9; Mansfeld 1964, ch. 11; Marcovich 1965, col. 249; Stokes 1971, 111-27.  
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114. ———. 2013. *Science before Socrates: Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and the New Astronomy*. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Chapter 3: *Borrowed Light: The Insights of Parmenides*, pp. 85–108.  
"We began by asking a series of questions about early Greek astronomy:  
1. Who discovered the theories in question first?  
2. What led him to this discovery?"



3. Did the two philosophers (Anaxagoras and Empedocles) have good evidence for the theories?

4. Did the community of philosophers accept the theories?

5. Did they develop the theory on their own, or did they borrow it from another source (Thales, Pythagoras, the Babylonians)?

We have at present provided at least a partial answer to two of these questions. The remarkable chain of events that began theoretical astronomy as we know probably started with the recognition of heliophotism.

This theory, or insight, derives, as far as we can tell, from Parmenides of Elea, who, writing in the early fifth century, saw that the moon's phases could be explained on the basis of the moon's position relative to the sun, supposing that the sun was the moon's source of light—just as, perhaps, it is for clouds. It is plausible to suppose that Parmenides came to this insight by himself, unaided by earlier speculations on the moon, which were unhelpful, or Babylonian data and theories, which were most likely unknown to him, and which did not, in any case, derive the moon's light from the sun. The supposition that he had a Pythagorean informant seems gratuitous. Thus in answer to question (2): Parmenides paved the way. In partial answer to question (5): Parmenides seems to be original in his contribution to the beginnings of astronomy. As to the further development of the theory of eclipses, there is no record that Parmenides had anything to say about eclipses, even if both his predecessors and his successors did. The students of astronomy and doxographers who canvassed early studies for new theories seem to have found nothing on this topic from Parmenides. We can say in answer to (1) that Parmenides (and not either Anaxagoras or Empedocles) discovered the source of the moon's light; as to the explanation of eclipses, question (1) must remain open, as well as questions (3) and (4). Moreover, we will have to see what role Parmenides' insights played in the further development of early Greek astronomy. What difference does it make to know that the moon gets its light from the sun?" (pp. 107-108)

115. Granger, Herbert. 2002. "The Cosmology of Mortals." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 101-116. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"But why could not Parmenides take up a position of the sort his successors among the pluralists adopt(49) and introduce Light and Night as primal, eternal entities, each fully real, different and underived from one another, without their being just a denser or more rarefied version of something more fundamental? This is impossible for Parmenides and the goddess as long as they take the word 'being' to be a univocal predicate and to be what expresses the very nature of its subject.

Parmenides' successors can conceive of Being as coming in a variety of forms, but not because they take 'being' to be equivocal or believe it to be something other than a qualitative term. On these points they would be in fundamental agreement with Parmenides and the goddess. Plausibly it may be argued that the pluralists who follow Parmenides are in a position to recognize the possibility of a qualitative heterogeneity within an existential homogeneity, because they take 'being' to be more like a generic than a specific term in its descriptive role, and thus they may take Being to be more like a determinable than a determinate in its nature. This would then put them in a position to maintain that Being may come in a variety of different sorts within a single conception of what it is to be.

The pathway to a cosmology of the post-Parmenidean sort is closed to the goddess and her disciple Parmenides. The goddess holds out no hope for any sort of cosmology, and she is in no position to appreciate or to anticipate the pluralism of the successors of Parmenides. The goddess should be taken, then, at her word when she warns that the order of her words on mortal opinions is deceptive. The cosmology of mortals is nothing more than a deception, which deceives by giving the appearance of reality without yielding its substance, and there is no reason to search for something more than mere deception in the deceptive words of the goddess upon the cosmos." (pp. 114-115)

- (49) For example, Anaxagoras (B 5, B 17); Empedocles (B 17.27-35, B 6, B 8, B 9). On both of them, see Aristotle, *Ph.* 1.4, 187a22-b7. It is commonly held that Parmenides' successors presume a plurality without any argument. For example, Malcolm observes this of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, ["On avoiding the void", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 9, 75-94] 1991, pp. 92-3, and Curd of the atomists as well, [*Parmenidean monism*] 1991, p. 261, and Curd [*The Legacy of Parmenides*], 1998, pp. 64-5, 129-31. Curd takes their lack of an argument to indicate that none was needed because Parmenides did not deny a plurality, since he was not a 'numerical monist' who held that a single entity constitutes reality. Curd charges that Parmenides' successors would have been remiss in their philosophical duty if they had presumed a plurality in the face of any argument by Parmenides against it. Yet even if the successors of Parmenides offered no argument for plurality, this need not indicate that Parmenides did not argue against plurality and that his successors in their presumption of plurality were not philosophically responsible. Parmenides' successors may have understood their charge to be the development of a compromise between the demands of his argument and those of common sense, in which the demands of these two extremes must be satisfied as much as possible without any hope that all of them would receive satisfaction.
116. ———. 2008. "The Proem of Parmenides' Poem." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 28:1-20. "The paper defends the view that the Proem of Parmenides' poem is a secular allegory. At the allegory's center is the unnamed goddess who in the body of the poem instructs the unnamed youth, through her use of a priori argumentation, about the nature of reality. The goddess provides the very symbol for a priori reason, and a central feature of Parmenides' expression of this symbolic value for the goddess is his confused presentation of her in the Proem. His presentation is intentionally vague, and it defies any definitive interpretation that clearly identifies the classification of the goddess and her circumstances within traditional or unconventional Greek religious belief. Instead, she recalls in an confusing fashion traditional revelatory goddesses, of whom the Muses and cult goddesses provide paradigm instances. Hence the youth's journey in the Proem to the unnamed goddess leads to no clearly identifiable circumstances, yet what it arrives at is still bound up within the medium of the standard epic style. Parmenides uses the old idea of the revelatory goddess in this unexpected way to try to show how it harbors something like the exercise of a priori reason. The reflection of the a priori does not reside merely in the similarity that the Muses bestow knowledge, which lies beyond the limited powers of human observation, about past, present, and future. The similarity is stronger and more significant when the Muses grant knowledge that lies beyond their own powers of observation in the form of insights into events they could not have possibly witnessed, such as the birth of the gods. Parmenides picks his unnamed goddess for his symbol for a priori reason because he takes himself to be demythologizing the philosophical truth reflected in a distorted fashion within the tradition of divine revelation. By placing a priori reason in the garb of the revelatory goddess who appears in a puzzling form, Parmenides indicates to his audience that this use of the power of reason has its antecedents in traditional practices that did not recognize this power for its true nature. There is a value in the tradition of divine revelation, which transcends the fictions of the poets in their story-telling, but revelatory deities must now step aside for the clear expression of the power of a priori reason. Hence the goddess abdicates her authority when she demands that the youth judge her words by his logos. Parmenides' verse conforms with his symbolic use of the goddess. It helps him mark his difference from his competitors among the new intellectuals, the so-called 'natural philosophers', who generally favor prose over verse. These intellectuals abandoned the Muses and their gift of verse, and they aspire to cosmologies that depend for their justification upon observation and inductive arguments that appeal to analogies and inferences to the best explanation. Verse as the medium of the Muses allows Parmenides to stress in a literary fashion how he adheres to a mode of thinking that does not rely upon the power of observation for the truth." (p. 1)

117. ———. 2010. "Parmenides of Elea: rationalist or dogmatist?" *Ancient Philosophy* no. 30:15-38.  
 "Parmenides of Elea is often lauded as a major figure of Western philosophy because he is the first to give an extensive role in his speculation to a priori argumentation.  
 In his poem we find for the first time in history sustained rational argumentation for the establishment of a complex metaphysical doctrine. Parmenides does not merely dictate to his audience a set of doctrines about reality, but, instead, undertakes to support his doctrines by means of logical inferences based on premises that have some claim to plausibility or self-evidence or a priori justification. This evaluation of PParmenides' accomplishment is not without its detractors, however. Kingsley has mounted a vigorous challenge to the presumption that Parmenides relies on argument for his opinions about reality, and recently Gemelli Marciano has significantly buttressed Kingsley's case by furthering his ideas in her detailed comments on Parmenides' poem. Kingsley and Gemelli Marciano maintain that Parmenides is a dogmatic mystic who depends for his dogmas entirely upon what he learns from divine revelation and that he makes no serious effort to defend his mystical beliefs by genuine argumentation.  
 In fact, reasoned argument not only cannot discover the truth, it provides an impediment that must be transcended or suppressed." (p. 15; notes omitted)
118. Gregory, Andrew. 2014. "Parmenides, Cosmology and Sufficient Reason." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 47:16-47.  
 Abstract: Why Parmenides had a cosmology is a perennial puzzle, if, as the 'truth' part of his poem appears to claim, what exists is one, undifferentiated, timeless and unchanging.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, not only does the cosmological part of the poem tell us how the cosmos is arranged, it also tells us how the cosmos, humans and animals all came into being. Although more of the truth has survived, the cosmology originally made up some 2/3 to 3/4 of the poem. The poem claims it will give the 'complete ordering' and Parmenides is perceived to have 'completed all the phenomena'.<sup>3</sup> Parmenides also seems to have made some important original contributions to cosmology. These I take to be important facts which any explanation of the nature of this cosmology must account for. The aim of this paper is to explore a new suggestion for the status of the cosmology, that it may be equalled but not surpassed by other cosmologies which are capable of accounting for all of the phenomena. Its function, I argue, is to raise sufficient reason issues about some fundamental questions in cosmogony and cosmology. I will also argue that we can find sufficient reason considerations relating to cosmogony and cosmology in the truth part of the poem. This opens the possibility that it is at least in part issues of sufficient reason that link the two parts of the poem. Finally I will argue that by paying close attention to what Parmenides has to say about signs, *σήματα*, we can see how he leaves open the possibility of making positive contributions to cosmology. I believe this gives us a richer account of Parmenides, places him more firmly in the debates of presocratic cosmology and cosmogony and gives him interesting relations to his predecessors and successors. These sufficient reason considerations may work both as a critique of contemporary cosmogony and cosmology and a challenge to any future cosmogony and cosmology. (pp. 16-17; notes omitted)
119. Groarke, Leo. 1985. "Parmenides' Timeless Universe." *Dialogue* no. 24:535-541.  
 "In his recent collection of Parmenides' fragments,(1) David Gallop joins a number of commentators ( among them, Tarán(2) and Stokes(3) ) who argue against the view that fragment 8 contains a commitment to a reality which is "timeless" or "atemporal". His arguments seem to me convincing if one adopts Owen's view(4) that timelessness is a result of indistinguishable phases of existence. Gallop's arguments could decide the issue if this was, as Tarán suggests, "the only reason to maintain that Being is a non-temporal entity".(5) There is, however, an alternative way to defend the atemporal interpretation, though it has not been elaborated in any detail.(6) If I am not mistaken, it can elude Gallop's criticisms and provide a more plausible account of Parmenides' philosophy.(7)"

- (1) Parmenides of Elea, *Fragments*, a Text and Translation with an Introduction by David Gallop (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 13-16. For good reason, the book is sure to become the standard reference for years to come.
  - (2) Leonardo Tarán, *Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 175-181.
  - (3) Michael C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies, 1971), 127-137.
  - (4) See G. E. L. Owen, "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present", in A. P. D. Mourelatos. ed. *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City, NY: Anchor/Doubleday, 1974). I cannot discuss Owen's views in detail here.
  - (5) Tarán, *Parmenides*. 181.
  - (6) For interpretations of Parmenides' similar to the one that I suggest, see the following: W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 29; Felix M. Cleve, *The Giants of Pre-Sophistic Greek Philosophy: An Attempt to Reconstruct their Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1965), 531; and Peter Geach, *Providence and Evil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 53-54. None of these authors develops a detailed interpretation.
  - (7) The question of Parmenides' view of time (exemplified by disputes over fragment 8.5) is a thorny one. In G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (2nd ed.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), Schofield writes, for example, that "Probably what Parmenides means to ascribe to what is is existence in an eternal present not subject to temporal distinctions of any sort. It is very unclear how he hoped to ground this conclusion in the arguments of [fragment 8]... ." If the account I suggest is correct, this conclusion is neither surprising nor difficult to understand.
120. ———. 1987. "Parmenides' Timeless Universe, Again." *Dialogue* no. 26:549-552. "In a recent discussion note,(1) Mohan Matthen criticizes my claim that Parmenides is committed to an atemporal reality. I shall argue that his critique misrepresents by views , misunderstands Parmenides , and is founded on a capricious view of h1stoncal interpretation."  
(...)  
"The key to my account is the suggestion that Parmenides rejection of what does not exist entails the rejection of the past and future, for they do not exist (because the past no longer exists and the future does not yet exist). This is, I think, the most plausible interpretation of Parmenides claim that what is "neither was ... once nor will be, since it is now" (8.5, cf. my previous discussion of 8.19-20). It follows that sentences cannot meaningfully refer to the past and future, for we cannot refer to what is not (8.8)."  
(1) Mohan Matthen, "A Note on Parmenides' Denial of Past and Future ", *Dialogue* 25/3 (1986), 553-557.
121. Guthrie, William Keith Chambers. 1965. *A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. II: The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
See the First Chapter: *The Eleatics. Parmenides* - pp. 1-79.  
"Presocratic philosophy is divided into two halves by the name of Parmenides. His exceptional powers of reasoning brought speculation about the origin and constitution of the universe to a halt, and caused it to make a fresh start on different lines. Consequently his chronological position relative to other early philosophers is comparatively easy to determine. Whether or not he directly attacked Heraclitus, (1) had Heraclitus known of Parmenides it is incredible that he would not have denounced him along with Xenophanes and others. Even if ignorance of an Elean on the part of an Ephesian is no sure evidence of date, philosophically Heraclitus must be regarded as pre-Parmenidean, whereas Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus and Democritus are equally certainly post-Parmenidean." (p. 1)  
(1) See vol. 1, 408 n. 2 and pp. 23 ff., 32 below.



"The poem of Parmenides raises peculiar problems, and it will be as well to approach the text with the chief of these already in mind. In the prologue he receives from a goddess the promise that she will reveal to him two sorts of information: first the truth about reality, then the opinions of mortals, which are unambiguously said to be false. 'Nevertheless these too shall thou learn' (fr. 1.31). In conformity with this, the first part of the poem deduces the nature of reality from premises asserted to be wholly true, and leads among other things to the conclusion that the world as perceived by the senses is unreal. At this point (fr. 8.50) the goddess solemnly declares that she ceases to speak the truth, and the remainder of the instruction will be 'deceitful'; yet she will impart it all 'that no judgment of men may outstrip thee'. Then follows the second part of the poem consisting of a cosmology on traditional lines. Starting from the assumption of a pair of opposites, 'fire' and 'night' or light and darkness, it proceeds as a narrative of an evolutionary process in time. The 'true way', on the other hand, had asserted that reality was, and must be, a unity in the strictest sense and that any change in it was impossible: there is no before or after, and the exposition unfolds as a timeless series of logical deductions.

Here is the crux. Why should Parmenides take the trouble to narrate a detailed cosmogony when he has already proved that opposites cannot exist and there can be no cosmogony because plurality and change are inadmissible conceptions? Has it in his eyes no merit or validity whatsoever, so that his purpose in composing it is only to show it up, together with all such attempts at cosmogony, for the hollow shams that they are? If so, the further question arises: what is it? Some have thought it to be based on a particular cosmic system of which he disapproved, for instance that of Heraclitus or the Pythagoreans. Others have suggested, following up the goddess's own words about the 'opinions of mortals' in general, that it is partly or wholly intended as a synthesis of what the ordinary man believed about the world; others again that it is an original production, indeed the best that Parmenides could devise, but still intended to show that even the most plausible account of the origin and nature of the sensible world is utterly false. These critics point to the motive expressed by the goddess, 'that no judgment of mortals may outstrip (or get the better of) thee'.

An alternative is to suppose that Parmenides is doing his best for the sensible world, perhaps on practical grounds, by giving as coherent an account of it as he can, saying in effect: I have told you the truth, so that if I go on to speak about the world in which we apparently live you will know it is unreal and not be taken in. But after all, this is how it does appear to us; however misleading our senses may be, we must eat and drink and talk, avoid putting our hand in the fire or falling over a precipice, live in short as if their information were genuine. Being ourselves mortals we must come to terms with this deceitful show, and I can at least help you to understand it better than other people.

These are the most baffling problems which Parmenides presents: the nature of the 'Way of Seeming' and the relation between it and the 'Way of Truth'. Yet the essence of his remarkable achievement lies, as might be expected, within the Way of Truth itself. " (pp. 4-6)

122. Hankinson, R. Jim. 2002. "Parmenides and the Metaphysics of Changelessness." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 65-80. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
"Conclusions.

Parmenides seeks to demonstrate the impossibility of generation (and hence change) dilemmatically: on the one hand the notion of caused generation turns out to be incoherent, while the supposition of uncaused generation, on the other, makes it inexplicable. Neither arm of the dilemma is successful. One cannot simply invoke PSR [Principle of Sufficient Reason] in order to rule out uncaused change, since PSR is at best an empirical hypothesis and not some Leibnizian *a priori* law of thought; (53) and a suitably sophisticated analysis of the logical form of change,

- one which recognizes the ambiguity of 'from' in propositions such as 'x comes to be from y,' will dispose of Parmenides' bomb. But it needed an Aristotle to disarm it. The basic principle involved, namely:  
 P1 Nothing comes to be from nothing,  
 is not original to Parmenides (it first occurs in a fragment of the sixth-century lyric poet Alcaeus, although we do not know in what context; (54) its early history has been ably traced by Alex Mourelatos (55) but its use in destructive argument certainly is. P1 is ambiguous between the causal principle  
 P1a Nothing comes to be causelessly,  
 and the conservation principle  
 P1b Nothing comes to be except from pre-existing matter;  
 and that ambiguity is not always patent. Indeed, distinguishing (P1a) from (P1b) is the first step towards solving the Eleatic puzzle, as Aristotle (certainly: *Ph. I.7*, 190a14-31; cf. *Metaph. V.24*; *GA* 1.18, 724a20-34) and Plato (possibly: *Phd.* 103b) realized. Moreover, as Hume was to show, neither version can be accepted as an *a priori* truth: both the causal principle and the conservation principle (at any rate crudely interpreted as asserting the conservation of matter) are rejected by the standard interpretation of quantum physics; and whatever else may be true of quantum physics, it is not logically incoherent." (p. 80)  
 (53) Cf. Leibniz, *Monadology* §32; on the status of the principle, see Kant, *Prolegomena* §4.  
 (54) Alcaeus, fr. 76 Bergk; Mourelatos 1981 [*Pre-socratics Origins of the Principle that there are No Origins of Nothing*, (*Journal of Philosophy*, 78, 1981, pp. 649-665] pp. 132-3 discusses this text.  
 (55) Mourelatos, 1981.
123. Havelock, Eric A. 1958. "Parmenides and Odysseus." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* no. 63:133-143.  
 "It is commonly supposed that Parmenides' statement of his philosophical principles is preceded by a "proem" of an allegorical nature (the precise symbolism of the allegory being in dispute) which describes the philosopher's inspired journey from darkness to light.  
 (...)  
 The first question to ask is whether it is proper to identify such a "proem" at all, as a separate entity in the poem. Would the author himself have recognized it as such?  
 (...)  
 If, however, the motive in Sextus for first identifying and then explaining this allegory in Parmenides was itself unhistorical, modern criticism has two resources with which to correct him. It can supply a better interpretation of the "proem"; or it can conclude that the original identification of the "proem" as such was a mistake. It is in part to this more radical view that the present article addresses itself." (p. 133)  
 (...)  
 "The foreground of Parmenides' imagination is occupied by Circe on Aea and the nymphs on Thrinacia all of them daughters of the sun. The latter he has converted from herdsmen into outriders, perhaps assisted therein by the common image of the sun's chariot. Both Teiresias and Circe forewarned him concerning Thrinacia, the sun's island. But Circe's warning held also a hint of promise: "You will come to the isle Thrinacia where feed many herds of the sun; and there is no birth of them nor do they pass away. Their herdsmen are nymphs . . . daughters of the sun."(56) In short, the island is involved with some implication of immortality; it holds a mystery which can be approached but not violated. The centrality of this episode in the memory of the philosopher and his audience was guaranteed by the fact that Homer had selected it from among all others for dramatization in the preface(57) to his epic as central to Odysseus' experience in the *nostos*. So Parmenides remembered how on that island coming to be and perishing had been banished. This provided his climatic poetic excuse for linking the daughters of the sun with the marvels of a mental journey which had taken the traveller into an absolute, where

there is no coming to be and no passing away.(58) For the philosopher, this was where the *nostos* ended. The journey of his mind and thought had reached the mansions of home.(59)" (p. 140)

(56) *Od.* 12. 130.

(57) *Od.* 1. 7-9.

(58) *Frag.* 8. 21.

(59) The Odysseus theme may persist even into the "second part" of Parmenides' poem. The Homeric hero, so Circe had told him, while his ship "bypassed" the Sirens, was to be allowed the pleasure of hearing their song (*Od.* 12. 47 and 52; cf. also 10. 109). When they sing, they admonish him that to "bypass" without listening is impossible and that to listen is to learn of all things that happened at Troy and of "all that is born on the earth" (12. 186-190). So Odysseus listens, while the ship "bypasses" them (12. 197).

Correspondingly, Parmenides comes to the end of his "reliable discourse and thought" (*Frag.* 8, line 50, equivalent to the "true" directives of Teiresias and Circe) and then allows his listener to hear a "deceitful composition of my epic tale" (*Frag.* 8, line 52), a story of how all things "are born and end" (*Frag.* 19).

This story is told so that his audience may not be "bypassed" by any mortal type of intelligence (*Frag.* 8, sub fin.). Is the verb *παρέλασση* which he here uses a reminiscence of the corresponding verb which Homer had used four times? If so, the philosopher's poetic memory has transposed it in application.

124. Heidegger, Martin. 1975. "'Moirai' (Parmenides, fr. 8,34-41)." In *Early Greek Thinking*, edited by Krell, David Farrell and Capuzzi, Frank A., 79-101. New York: Harper & Row.

"The topic under discussion is the relation between thinking and Being. In the first place we ought to observe that the text (VIII, 34-41) which ponders this relation more thoroughly speaks of *eon* and not -- as in Fragment III -- about *einai*.

Immediately, and with some justification, one concludes from this that Fragment VIII concerns beings rather than Being. But in saying *eon* Parmenides is in no way thinking "beings in themselves," understood as the whole to which thinking, insofar as it is some kind of entity, also belongs. Just as little does *eon* mean *einai* in the sense of "Being for itself," as though it were incumbent upon the thinker to set the non sensible essential nature of Being apart from, and in opposition to, beings which are sensible. Rather *eon*, being, is thought here in its duality as Being and beings, and is participially expressed -- although the grammatical concept has not yet come explicitly into the grasp of linguistic science. This duality is at least intimated by such nuances of phrasing as "the Being of beings" and "beings in Being." In its essence, however, what unfolds is obscured more than clarified through the "in" and the "of." These expressions are far from thinking the duality as such, or from seriously questioning its unfolding.

"Being itself," so frequently invoked, is held to be true so long as it is experienced as Being, consistently understood as the Being of beings. Meanwhile the beginning of Western thinking was fated to catch an appropriate glimpse of what the word *einai*, to be, says -- in *Physis*, *Logos*, *En*. Since the gathering that reigns within Being unites all beings, an inevitable and continually more stubborn semblance arises from the contemplation of this gathering, namely, the illusion that Being (of beings) is not only identical with the totality of beings, but that, as identical, it is at the same time that which unifies and is even most in being [*das Seiendste*]. For representational thinking everything comes to be a being.

The duality of Being and beings, as something twofold, seems to melt away into nonexistence, albeit thinking, from its Greek beginnings onward, has moved within the unfolding of this duality, though without considering its situation or at all taking note of the unfolding of the twofold. What takes place at the beginning of Western thought is the unobserved decline of the duality. But this decline is not nothing. Indeed it imparts to Greek thinking the character of a beginning, in that the lighting of the Being of beings, as a lighting, is concealed. The hiddenness of this decline of the duality reigns in essentially the same way as that into which the duality itself

falls. Into what does it fall? Into oblivion, whose lasting dominance conceals itself as *Lethe* to which *Aletheia* belongs so immediately that the former can withdraw in its favor and can relinquish to it pure disclosure in the modes of *Physis*, *Logos*, and *En* as though this had no need of concealment.

But the apparently futile lighting is riddled with darkness. In it the unfolding of the twofold remains as concealed as its decline for beginning thought. However, we must be alert to the duality of Being and beings in the *eon* in order to follow the discussion Parmenides devotes to the relation between thinking and Being." (pp. 86-87)

125. ———. 1992. *Parmenides (Lecture course 1942-43)*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
*Gesamtausgabe* Vol. 54. Lecture course from the winter semester 1942-43, first published in 1982; translated by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz.  
"We are attempting to follow the path of thought of two thinkers, Parmenides and Heraclitus. Both belong, historiographically calculated, to the early period of Western thought. With regard to this early thinking in the Occident, among the Greeks, we are distinguishing between *outset* and *beginning*. Outset refers to the coming forth of this thinking at a definite "time." Thinking does not mean here the course of psychologically represented acts of thought but the historical process in which a thinker arises, says his word, and so provides to truth a place within a historical humanity. As for time, it signifies here less the point of time calculated according to year and day than it means "age," the situation of human things and man's dwelling place therein. "Outset" has to do with the debut and the emergence of thinking. But we are using "beginning" in a quite different sense. The "beginning" is what, in his early thinking, is to be thought and what is thought. Here we are still leaving unclarified the essence of this thought. But supposing that the thinking of a thinker is distinct from the knowledge of the "sciences" and from every kind of practical cognition in all respects, shall we have to say that the relation of thinking to its thought is essentially other than the relation of ordinary "technical-practical" and "moral-practical" thinking to what it thinks. Ordinary thinking, whether scientific or prescientific or unscientific, thinks beings, and does so in every case according to their individual regions, separate strata, and circumscribed aspects. This thinking is an acquaintance with beings, a knowledge that masters and dominates beings in various ways. In distinction from the mastering of beings, the thinking of thinkers is the *thinking of Being*. Their thinking is a *retreating in face of Being*. We name what is thought in the thinking of the thinkers the beginning. Which hence now means: Being is the beginning. Nevertheless, not every thinker, who has to think Being, thinks the beginning. Not every thinker, not even every one at the outset of Western thought, is a primordial thinker, i.e., a thinker who expressly thinks the beginning. Anaximander, Parmenides, and Heraclitus are the only primordial thinkers. They are this, however, not because they open up Western thought and initiate it. Already before them there were thinkers. They are primordial thinkers because they think the beginning. The beginning is what is thought in their thinking. This sounds as if "the beginning" were something like an "object" the thinkers take up for themselves in order to think it through. But we have already said in general about the thinking of thinkers that it is a retreating in face of Being. If, within truly thoughtful thinking, the primordial thinking is the highest one, then there must occur here a retreating of a special kind. For these thinkers do not "take up" the beginning in the way a scientist "attacks" something. Neither do these thinkers come up with the beginning as a self-produced construction of thought. The beginning is not something dependent on the favor of these thinkers, where they are active in such and such a way, but, rather, the reverse: the beginning is that which begins something with these thinkers -- by laying a claim on them in such a way that from them is demanded an extreme retreating in the face of Being. The thinkers are begun by the beginning, "in-cepted" [*An-gefangenen*] by the in-ception [*An-fang*]; they are taken up by it and are gathered into it.



- It is already a wrong-headed idea that leads us to speak of the "work" of these thinkers. But if for the moment, and for the lack of a better expression, we do talk that way, then we must note that their "work," even if it had been preserved for us intact, would be quite small in "bulk" compared with the "work" of Plato or Aristotle and especially in comparison with the "work" of a modern thinker. Plato and Aristotle and subsequent thinkers have thought far "more," have traversed more regions and strata of thinking, and have questioned out of a richer knowledge of things and man. And yet all these thinkers think "less" than the primordial thinkers." (pp. 7-8)
126. ———. 2003. "Seminar in Zähringen 1973." In *Four Seminars*, 64-84. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 "In the silence that follows, Jean Beaufret notes: The text we just heard completes, as it were, the long meditation in which you have turned first towards Parmenides and then Heraclitus. One could even say that your thinking has engaged differently with Heraclitus and Parmenides. Indeed, in *Vorträge and Aufsätze*, the primacy seemed to be given to Heraclitus. Today what place would Heraclitus take with respect to Parmenides?  
*Heidegger*: From a mere historical perspective, Heraclitus signified the first step towards dialectic. From this perspective, then, Parmenides is more profound and essential (if it is the case that dialectic, as is said in *Being and Time*, is "a genuine philosophic embarrassment") In this regard, we must thoroughly recognize that tautology is the only possibility for thinking what dialectic can only veil. However, if one is able to read Heraclitus on the basis of the Parmenidean tautology, he himself then appears in the closest vicinity to that same tautology, he himself then appears in the course of an exclusive approach presenting access to being." (p. 81)
127. ———. 2015. *The Beginning of Western Philosophy: Interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 Translated by Richard Rojcewicz; this is a translation of a lecture course Martin Heidegger offered in the summer semester of 1932 at the University of Freiburg. The German original appeared posthumously in 2012 as volume 35 of the philosopher's *Gesamtausgabe* ("Complete Works").  
 Contents: Part One: The dictum of Anaximander of Miletus, 6th–5th century 1-26; Part Two: Interposed considerations 27-77; Part Three: The "didactic poem" of Parmenides of Elea, 6th–5th century 79; §18. Introduction 79; §19. Interpretation of fragment 1. Preparation for the question of Being 81; §20. Interpretation of fragments 4 and 5 86; §21. Interpretation of fragments 6 and 7 92; §22. Interpretation of fragment 8 103; §23. The δόξα-fragments 9, 12, 13, 10, 11, 14, 16, 19 (in the order of their interpretation) 144< Conclusion. §24. The inceptual question of Being; the law of philosophy 152.  
 "We will start at once with the interpretation of Parmenides's didactic poem. What the previous endeavors at interpreting Parmenides have accomplished will be mentioned when discussing the respective issues. For the rest, however, those works will not be presented in more detail. Not because they are insignificant but because they are so unavoidable that one cannot speak about them at first. Our concern is primarily with securing a philosophical understanding of the beginning of Western philosophy and only secondarily with initiating ourselves into the procedure of appropriating an earlier philosophy, i.e., into the method of interpretation. With respect to all previous interpretive attempts, even Hegel's, it should be said that they made their work philosophically too easy, in part by invoking as a highest explanatory principle the view that the beginning is precisely the primitive and therefore is crude and raw—the illusion of progress! (In this regard, nothing further to say about the previous attempts.)  
 The interpretation of Parmenides is closely coupled to the question of his relation to Heraclitus, who presupposed Parmenides and contests against him. The notion that in essentials they are in the sharpest opposition is thereby presupposed as valid. In the end, however, this presupposition is precisely an error. In the end, Parmenides

- and Heraclitus are in the utmost agreement—as are all actual philosophers—not because they renounce battling, but precisely on account of their own respective ultimate originality.
- For nonphilosophers, who adhere only to works, opinions, schools, names, and claims, the history of philosophy and of philosophers does of course present the appearance of a madhouse. But that can quietly remain as it is." (p. 77)
128. Hermann, Arnold. 2004. *To Think Like God: Pythagoras and Parmenides, the Origins of Philosophy*. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Contents: Preface XIII; Acknowledgments XXI; A Note on References, translations, Citations, Notes, Bibliography, and Some Idiosyncrasies XXV; Abbreviations XXIX;  
Introduction 1; I. Pythagoras 15; II. The Pythagoreans 31; III. In Want of a Mathematics for the Soul 93; IV. Pythagorizing versus Philosophizing 115; V. Parmenides 127; VI. The Poem of Parmenides 151; VII. The Poem's Most Difficult Points Explained 163; VIII. Guidelines for an Evidential Account 211; IX. Methods of Proof and Disproof 225; X. Irrationals and the Perfect Premise 251; XI. Mind and Universe: Two Realms, Two Separate Approaches 267; Appendix 279; Subdivided Bibliography 297; Index Locorum 341; General Index 353-374.  
"What is the Poem about? As I have indicated—and contrary to out-of-date interpretations and the cursory definitions which typify the average works of reference—the Poem is not about the universe, existence, or the oneness-of-it-all. All of these rather lofty objectives are later inventions, even if they have been repeated ad nauseam for the last 2,500 years. Yet the verses themselves bear no evidence that such matters belong to Parmenides' actual concerns. They show, rather, that Parmenides' inquiries were  
less esoteric, without being less exciting, considering their fundamental ramifications for the integrity of human knowledge and communication, which indeed may also *include* our *knowledge* of the universe, existence, and so forth, and the mode we choose to explain them. Thus Parmenides focused on reasoning and speaking, and how to make both dependable, regardless of what in the end their object may be (as long as it is an expressible object). I like A. A. Long's comment on this issue: "What Parmenides says is a continuous provocation to our own thinking about thinking." (450)  
There is a fine but very crucial difference to be made between the advancement of a cosmological theory and the demonstration of techniques of how to make an account reliable. Naturally, such an account may also be used to express a variety of things, including the universe and everything in it, but it is only reliable when such matters are addressed in their capacity as objects of thought (see frs. 4 and 7.3–6), and in a form that does not lead to self-contradiction (see fr. 8). In a nutshell, Parmenides' central problem was *how to ensure the reliability of discourse*. Statements had to be defended against self-contradiction as well as against the misleading plausibility of vagueness—regardless, ultimately, of what said statements were about. For both of these vulnerabilities, Parmenides introduces examples and methods to extricate the truth." (pp. 151-152)  
(450) Long ['Parmenides on Thinking Being'] expands on Heidegger's remark about Parmenides' Poem that it "continually deserves more thought." p. 127.
129. ———. 2008. "Negative Proof and Circular Reasoning." In *Eleatica 2006: Parmenide scienziato?*, edited by Rossetti, Livio and Marcacci, Flavia, 103-112. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.  
"In Cordero's work *By Being It Is*, chapter VI, p. 123, parallels are drawn between Parmenides' Poem and Plato's *Parmenides*. Cordero focuses on the use of 'I begin' [*arxomai*] by the Eleatic thinker - found in B5 and also B8, when the Goddess announces a new beginning before commencing with the *Doxa* (8.50) - comparing it to how the argumentative exercises are introduced in the second part of the *Parmenides* (137a-b). Plato, in this latter work, is having his own Parmenides - the dialogues' protagonist - also state that he will 'begin' the demonstration that will follow, the one that addresses his hypothesis 'that one is'. Cordero speculates that

this allusion is not coincidental in Plato, suggesting that Plato was not only aware of the Parmenidean principle of circularity in argumentative proving, but that he used it deliberately in the *Parmenides*.

While working on the *Parmenides*, particularly on its translation, I had come to similar conclusions. The idea of returning to one's initial premise by way of a challenge or test is at the heart of the Parmenidean method, an approach also used exhaustively by Plato in his Parmenidean dialogue. However, in Cordero's presentation of this approach, one particular point has remained somewhat unclear or unaddressed, namely whether the circulatory proving has to be taken as Germane to the whole account, or only to specific parts. That is, must the whole account of the Goddess return to its beginning, or is this only required of the individual arguments that compose it? Personally, I hold the latter view, as this can be fairly easily demonstrated both by the Poem and the Platonic dialogue." (p. 103)

130. ———. 2009. "Parmenides versus Heraclitus?" In *Nuevos Ensayos sobre Heráclito. Actas del Segundo Symposium Heracliteum*, edited by Hülsz Piccone, Enrique, 261-284. México: U.N.A.M.

"Five years ago, at the annual Arizona Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Daniel Graham gave a first draft of a paper titled 'Heraclitus and Parmenides.' He was investigating the possibility of a Parmenidean response to the Ephesian, and he defended the idea quite vigorously.

Graham's paper was a response to Michael Stokes, who, years ago, in his work *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy*, had debunked this theory rather convincingly. I, of course, was very much in Stokes' camp, and as an avid and sometimes excessive student of Parmenides, had strong reservations. But Graham, very graciously, entrusted me with a copy of this early draft. Years passed and although I investigated other things, Graham's paper, and in a way his challenge, was always at the back of my mind. So it is only fitting that now, after all these years, I've thought to complete the circle, in a truly Parmenidean fashion, and devote this paper to Graham's observations.

A few brief remarks about Daniel Graham's study: the paper has remained the last word on the subject of a Parmenidean response. The work is well-researched and detailed, each argument meticulously worked out; particularly the final or published version which has some substantial improvements on the original draft.(1) Graham has dug up parallels between Parmenides and Heraclitus that, to my knowledge, have remained largely unnoticed, and I have benefited greatly from this thoughtful study. All in all, Daniel has offered us an excellent defense of the "Parmenides answers to Heraclitus" theory (subsequently acronymed to "PATH theory"). Nevertheless, I have remained unconvinced.

To establish a link between the two thinkers, certain criteria have to be met:

1. The question of chronology.
2. The textual correspondence, parallels or similarities of both works.
3. The question of an equivalent subject-matter: is there a shared object of inquiry or discourse in the teachings of both thinkers?
4. The testimonia of subsequent commentators, their criticisms, interpretations of teachings, and general opinions on Heraclitus and Parmenides.
5. And finally, if the chronological question cannot be resolved, and if no thinker mentions the other by name, and if the testimonia let us down, but if nonetheless textual agreement or parallels can be found, we must find some other means of determining who influenced whom. Perhaps, in this case, we should also consider the possibility that neither thinker influenced the other, but that they both were responding to a third party. My modest survey indicates that this may indeed be the case, a possibility that took me quite by surprise, considering that in the beginning I was aiming to show that Parmenides was an entirely original thinker, and if in fact he answered to anyone, then only to Xenophanes' epistemological challenge (B 34), (but certainly not to his theology).(2)" (pp. 261-262)

- (1) Graham, "Heraclitus and Parmenides", *Presocratic Philosophy*. Ed. Caston and Graham, Ashgate, 27–44.
- (2) I am aware of the Homeric, Hesiodic and Orphic echoes in the Proem, but I don't consider this a response in the same vein as Parmenides is said to have answered to Heraclitus. It is rather a utilization of familiar or popular themes, which allowed him to evoke a mythical atmosphere.
131. ———. 2011. "Parricide or Heir? Plato's Uncertain Relationship to Parmenides." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 147-165. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Summary: "Most scholars view Plato's critique of Parmenides in the *Sophist*, particularly the observations surrounding the "parricide" remark, as quite apt and justified. The theory is that Parmenides deserves to be rebuked for failing to recognize that "What Is Not" can be understood in more ways than one, namely, not only in an existential sense, but also predicatively or, in the language of the *Sophist*, as indicating "difference." I aim to show, nevertheless, that Plato's indictment of Parmenides misses the mark in significant ways, allowing Parmenides to escape the so-called threat of parricide not once but twice.  
For example, Parmenides' abundant use of alpha-privatives (e.g., ἀγένητον)—as well as the negative οὐ (or οὐκ) when there is no a-privative form available—indicates that he was well aware of the difference between indicating "is not" predicatively versus existentially. Moreover, the Poem nowhere suggests that his strictures regarding the use of What Is Not are to be taken in the broadest possible sense, disallowing, in effect, the discrimination between the existential and the predicative case. Only when sought after as a "way of inquiry" does What Is Not—in contrast to the Way of What Is—fail to provide us with a graspable, expressible object. After all, the "Way of What Is Not," lacks any sort of *sēmata*, or signs, that can be used to navigate it. As a "way of inquiry for thinking" (B2), it leads nowhere, lacking any sort of expressible or knowable object or goal. The complete absence of an object or result, however, does not hinder us from making statements to this effect, nor from uttering the words "What Is Not" or "Not Being." Yet this fine distinction is lost to many who have criticized Parmenides for being inconsistent, careless, or simply ignorant. The move from the intellectual unavailability of an object that marks a defunct way of inquiry, to the claim that to even speak of such a "way" is both illegitimate and impossible—all the while insisting that Parmenides himself is to be blamed for such a monstrous fallacy—seems an egregious gloss-over, even if the perpetrator is someone of Plato's stature. If my arguments prove sound, then Parmenides should be absolved of the charges leveled against him."
132. Hershbell, Jackson P. 1970. "Parmenides' Way of Truth and B16." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 4:1-23.  
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton, A. Preus (eds.), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*. Vol. Two, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983, pp. 41-58.  
"At least three interpretations have been given to B16 of Parmenides' poem. It has been taken for a fragment of his theory of knowledge, of his doctrine of sense perception, and of his views on sensing and knowing.(1) Evidence for these interpretations is taken from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and Theophrastus' *De Sensibus*. The fragment is usually assigned to the second part of the poem, the Way of Seeming or Opinion.  
In this study it will be argued that B16 comes from the first part of the poem, the Way of Truth, and that it is a statement neither of a theory of knowledge nor of sense perception, but an affirmation of the close relationship between thought and Being:(2) there can be no thought without that which is, or in Parmenides' words, ". . . neither can you recognize that which is not (that is impossible) nor can you speak about it" (B2, 78).(3)" (p. 1)  
(1) According to Burnet, "this fragment of the theory of knowledge which was expounded in the second part of the poem of Parmenides must be taken in connection with what we are told by Theophrastus in the 'Fragment on Sensation.' "



J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (reprint, New York, 1957) p. 178, note 1. Many interpreters of Parmenides' poem follow Burnet in assigning B16 to the second part. See also W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1965), p. 67; L. Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton, 1965), pp. 253-63; J. Mansfeld, *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt* (Assen, 1964), p. 175 ff.; and U. Hölscher, *Anfängliches Fragen* (Göttingen, 1968), p. 112 f.; G. Vlastos, "Parmenides" Theory of Knowledge," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 77 (1949): 66-77, argued that B 16 is part of Parmenides' doctrine of sense perception, not of his theory of knowledge.

Finally, an interpretation of this fragment as Parmenides' views on sensing and knowing has been offered by H. Fränkel, "Parmenidesstudien," *Göttinger Nachrichten* (1930): 153-92, especially 170 and 174. See also H. Fränkel, *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens* (Munich, 1955): 173-79.

In *Anfängliches Fragen*, Hölscher also maintains (p. 113) that Parmenides' teaching in B16 concerns ". . . Erkenntnis im allgemeinsten Sinne . . . , ohne zwischen Wahrnehmung und Denken, zwischen Trug und Wahrheit zu unterscheiden."

(2) This thesis is not wholly new. It is proposed, for example, by J. H. M. Loenen in *Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias* (Assen, 1959). He writes (p. 58): "As to the place of fr. 16 we can by no means be sure that this really formed part of the doxa. On the contrary, there are good reasons for holding that fr. 16 belonged to the first part."

My reasons for assigning B16 to the first part are, however, different. Moreover, we do not agree concerning particular details or the interpretation of Parmenides' poem as a whole.

(3) The expressions "that which is," "Being," and "existence" are used interchangeably in this study without any attempt to give them a more precise meaning. "That which is" is a translation of the substantive participle used occasionally in the fragments, e.g., B4, 2 and B8, 35. The most convincing interpretation of Parmenides' thought is that of G. E. L. Owen, "Eleatic Questions," *CQ* 54 (1960): 84-102.

According to him, the subject of Parmenides' poem is "what can be talked or thought about" (pp. 94-95).

I have accepted Owen's general interpretation for the purpose of this study.

133. ———. 1972. "Plutarch and Parmenides." *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* no. 13:193-208.

"Although Plutarch is not a major source for interpretation of Parmenides' poem, he preserves several fragments: B1.29-30; B8.4; B13, B14 and B15, the last two of which would otherwise be lost.(1) He also makes observations on Parmenides' style and thought, and relates one biographical incident.(2) Scholars of Plutarch and Parmenides are divided, however, on at least two problems: (I) What was the extent of Plutarch's knowledge of Parmenides, e.g. did he possess a copy of the complete poem, or was he working with second-hand sources such as compendia?(3) (II) How reliable and worthwhile is his interpretation of Parmenides?" (p. 193) (...)

"A summation of Plutarch's treatment of Parmenides is now in order. First, Plutarch shows interest in Parmenides' biography, relating one incident possibly derived from Speusippus' Περὶ φιλοσόφων.

Secondly, he shows interest in Parmenides' poem, and his observations are probably based on first-hand acquaintance with it. This seems especially so since Parmenides is mentioned with other ancient authors whom Plutarch knew well, and in his travels and study at some major cities of the ancient world, e.g. Athens, Plutarch could easily have had access to a copy of the poem. Further support for attributing to Plutarch direct knowledge of Parmenides' text is found in his discussion of B13 at *Amat.* 756E-F and his quotation of B14 and B15, not found in other sources.

Thirdly, Plutarch seems familiar with both parts of Parmenides' poem. Although his discussion is Platonic in emphasis, his interpretation is not wholly unwarranted by the evidence.

Parmenides does seem to have been the first thinker to make some kind of distinction between the 'sensible' and 'intelligible' worlds, even though the terminology is not his. At least the things perceived by mortals do not have the characteristics Parmenides ascribed to *τό εὖν*. Fourthly, there are no clear indications that Plutarch's quotations are inaccurate. Some difficulties, especially in connection with B8.4, can be explained by a copyist's carelessness or Plutarch's tendency to paraphrase Parmenides, possibly from memory. In any case, rather than positing a use of compendia by Plutarch (for which there is no evidence), it seems more plausible to maintain Plutarch's reliance on notebooks based on his direct acquaintance with the poem.

Last, and perhaps most important, it would be erroneous to presume that Plutarch's quotations from and references to Parmenides are wholly disinterested. Several are found in anti-Epicurean and anti-Stoic contexts, a phenomenon which suggests, if nothing more, that Plutarch considered Parmenides an ally of the Academy." (pp. 207-208)

(1) The list of quotations in W. C. Helmbold and E. N. O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations* (Baltimore 1959) 53-54, is incomplete: B1.29-30 at 1114D-E and B8.4 at 1114c are not included.

(2) The *Adv. Colot.* has extended discussion of Parmenides' philosophy, and the biographical note is at 1126B. Remarks on Parmenides' style are at *Quomodo adul.* 16c-D, *De rect. rat. aud.* 45A-B, and *De Pyth. or.* 402F.

(3) Discussing the doxography on the moon in *De fac. orb. lun.* 929A-F which includes Parmenides, A. Fairbanks wrote: "it is quite possible that Plutarch was using some Stoic compendium which quoted freely from the earlier philosophers." See "On Plutarch's Quotations from the Early Greek Philosophers," *TAPA* 28 (1897) 82.

134. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1980. "Parmenides' *Cogito* Argument." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 1:5-16.

"Parmenides held that the only thing we can truly say in philosophy is "is" or, in a more idiomatic but also more misleading English, "it is," *éstin*. Even though this main thesis of Parmenides turns out to have more consequences and more interesting consequences than it might at first seem to promise, our first reaction to it is likely to be one of puzzlement. How can a major philosopher hold such an incredible, paradoxical view? The purpose of this paper is to make Parmenides' thesis understandable. I shall argue that, notwithstanding the paradoxical appearance of Parmenides' thesis, it is in reality an eminently natural consequence of certain assumptions which are all understandable and which can all be shown to have been actually subscribed to by Parmenides. Furthermore, Parmenides' assumptions are arguably not incorrect, either, with one exception. They are all of considerable historical and systematic interest."

(...)

"Parmenides' first and foremost assumption is easier to formulate in terms of conceptual models or paradigms than in the form of an explicit premise. This model amounts to conceiving of thinking as a goal-directed process that "comes off" or "realizes itself" in its objects.

I shall first show how this conceptual model explains Parmenides' conclusion, and only afterwards return to my grounds for ascribing it to Parmenides and also return to its background and its corollaries in his work." (p. 5)

135. Hoy, Ronald. 1994. "Parmenides' Complete Rejection of Time." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 9:573-598.

"Parmenides is often credited with discovering the category of timeless truths, and he is sometimes praised or blamed (along with Plato) for asserting that what is real can transcend time.(1)

But besides positing a timeless reality for eternal truths to be about, Parmenides finds fault with beliefs about time and argues that time is not real: if temporal thoughts are inherently contradictory then reality cannot be temporal. In claiming time to be contradictory,

Parmenides stands first in a line of philosophers (including Plato, Kant, and J.M. McTaggart) who find something unreal about time.

(...)

In this paper, I shall suggest it is wrong to interpret Parmenides' position as hinging mainly on semantic issues centered on reference.

I shall show how commentators who do so fail to do justice to his complaints about time. Instead, I shall reconstruct Parmenides' worries in terms of the recent conflict between "tensed" and "tenseless" views of time. From this perspective, Parmenides offers an early proscription on the contradictory beliefs that dog any metaphysics based on temporal becoming. It will also become clear how complete Parmenides' rejection of time was: why, for other reasons, he could not accept even the tenseless view, and why he should be suspicious of attempts to read him as discovering a new kind of "eternity." (pp. 573-574)

(1) See, for example, G.E.L. Owen, "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present," in A. Mourelatos, ed., *The Pre-Socratics*, Garden City: Anchor/Doubleday, (1974), pp. 271-92.

136. Husain, Martha. 1983. "The Hybris of Parmenides." *Dialogue* no. 22:451-460.  
"To speak of *hybris* in the case of Parmenides seems hardly justified. He is addressed by the unnamed goddess to whose abode he journeys as Koupe, "youth" or "initiate", hardly a term of great respect in Greek usage. He is guided on his path, i.e., he has not found it by himself, and he receives a truth he never claims as his own. Could a mortal show greater awareness of his limitations? Yet, in an oddly disturbing way the distinction between the divine and the human is obliterated—the worst kind of *hybris* for Greek thought and feeling.  
To charge Parmenides with *hybris* is paradoxical, to say the least, and yet perhaps illuminating. The philosopher's *hybris* has none of the traditional connotations of doing violence or injury to somebody out of wanton insolence and overreaching. On the contrary. His quest for enlightenment is sanctioned by divine power, by righteousness (θέμις) and justice δική(), and marked by almost complete self-effacement. And yet it contains features that would be clearly recognizable as *hybris* to traditional Greek thinking, and some of its results may well be seen as destructive. The Greek notion of *hybris*, overweening pride, connotes above all a failure of man to maintain its opposite, proper pride, i.e., to understand and occupy his proper and rightful place in the cosmos. That place is defined for man most significantly in terms of his relationship with the divine, and therefore the Greek awareness of *hybris* points to the ever-present danger of a disturbance in this relationship. To charge Parmenides with *hybris* is then to charge philosophy with being double edged, a new source of enlightenment but also a new source of danger. Transposing this notion from traditional Greek culture to philosophy may illumine how all ways of being human are perilous." (p. 451)
137. Hussey, Edward. 1972. *The Presocratics*. London: Duckworth.  
Contents: Preface VIII; 1 Introduction 1; 2 The Milesians 11; 3 Heraclitus 32; 4 Pythagoras and the Greek West 60; 5 Parmenides and Zeno 78; 6 The Age of the Sophists 107; 7 Cosmology from Parmenides to Democritus 127; 8 Conclusion: the Study of the Presocratics 149; Notes 156; Maps: Black Sea, Aegean, Levant VI; Ionia 12; Magna Graecia 62; Index 165-168.  
On Parmenides see pp. 78-99 and 128-130.  
"Parmenides is the first Presocratic of whose thought we still have a nearly complete and continuous exposition in his own words. That this is so is due entirely to one man, the Neoplatonist scholar Simplicius. In his commentary on the Physics of Aristotle, written early in the sixth century A.D., Simplicius quotes large extracts from the poem of Parmenides, in illustration of Aristotle's remarks on it, expressly because, as he says, the book had become scarce. It is therefore almost possible to approach Parmenides in the way intended by Parmenides himself; this chapter will follow that way as far as it can be established.  
It is worth noticing that Parmenides expressed his thought in hexameter verses. This was not an odd or ridiculous thing to do, as it would be if a modern philosopher

- wrote in verse. Verse was still appropriate, and felt to be appropriate, for any pronouncement intended to be particularly memorable. Written books existed, and many states displayed their laws and decrees publicly in writing; yet the habit of relying on the written word was not widespread or of long standing. An educated man was one who had things by heart, and verse is more easily memorised than prose." (p. 78)
138. ———. 2006. "Parmenides on Thinking." In *Common to Body and Soul. Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity*, edited by King, R. A. H., 13-30. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.  
 "Parmenides fr. 16 Diels-Kranz, notoriously, presents a tangle of textual and syntactic problems. This paper starts by by-passing these problems (though it eventually returns to them). The aim is to explore the possibility of a certain kind of reading of Parmenides' account of "mind" and "thinking" (νοός, νόημα, φρονέειν) here.  
 In the rest of section 1, I consider the archaic (principally Homeric) usage of the words for "thinking" and "mind". Section 2 outlines the proposed reading of Parmenides' theory in the light of these linguistic considerations.  
 Section 3 grapples with the greatest problem for that reading: the apparently contradictory testimony of Aristotle. Here it is necessary to use the rather different testimony of Theophrastus, and a general hypothesis about Aristotle's reading of the "materialistic" psychology of his predecessors.  
 Section 4 considers the earlier theories of "perception of like by like", of which Parmenides' is one. I aim to show that these can be understood as involving an "inner model". Finally, section 5 returns to Parmenides fr. 16, and shows how it may be read as an example of an "inner model" theory of mental activity." (p. 13)
139. Hyland, Drew A. 1998. "Reiner Schürmann's Parmenides: Of Unbroken Non-Hegemonies " *Research in Phenomenology* no. 28:243-258.  
 "Shortly before his death, Reiner Schurmann [1941-1993] brought to completion his remarkable magnum opus, *Des Hégémonies brisées*,<sup>(1)</sup> "Broken Hegemonies." (...)  
 "Because the book is only recently published, as yet only in French, and because it is almost 800 pages long, I shall take rather more time than usual in setting out as accurately as I can the fundamentals of Schurmann's interpretation of Parmenides before turning to some remarks on the philosophic issues raised by that interpretation. Accordingly, the structure of this article will be as follows: after some introductory remarks, I shall, in part I, set out as best I can Schurmann's interpretation of Parmenides. I shall from time to time make comments on very specific textual issues as they arise, but I shall limit my comments to the specifics of those texts. Then, in part II, I shall raise and discuss some of the broader philosophic issues raised by Schurmann's thought-provoking interpretation. I might best prepare the reader for the striking originality of Schurmann's interpretation of Parmenides by beginning with a word of clarification about my title. If we were to take as our standard some version of the orthodox interpretation of Parmenides (Parmenides as advocating a changeless, eternal, perfect, one Being and that alone, thereby denying all change, becoming, motion, or time; thus the father of the notion of a changeless, eternal Being of some sort), then indeed, Parmenides may have established a hegemony which has been, or perhaps still needs to be, broken. Or perhaps, Schurmann himself breaks that hegemony through his radical deconstruction of that orthodox interpretation. For in any case, the Parmenides that Schurmann reads is certainly no broken hegemony, because it is not a hegemony at all, at least not in the sense of establishing a single, exclusive, dominant and domineering law. As a final prefatory remark, let me indicate in advance how much I appreciate the originality of Schurmann's interpretation. Unorthodox interpretations of a thinker that leave that thinker far behind by straying again and again from the text or by focusing only on a few lines of the text, those that suit one's interpretation, are easy; unorthodox interpretations such as Schurmann's that are accomplished by the most faithful adherence to the text as a



- whole and its spirit are always the most thought-provoking and challenging." (pp. 243-244)
- (1) Reiner Schurmann, *Des Hégémonies Brisées* (Mauvezin: Trans-Europ-Repress, 1996) [English translation: *Broken Hegemonies*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003].
140. Jameson, G. 1958. "'Well-Rounded Truth' and Circular Thought in Parmenides." *Phronesis* no. 3:15-30.  
 "Sufficient remains of Parmenides' poem for its general pattern to be evident. It falls into four sections:  
 1. The Proem (DK6 28 B 1).  
 2. A discussion of principles, which lays down certain axioms and traces their implications (B 2, 3, 6, 7).  
 3. A delineation of the properties of reality, from the starting-point dictated by Section 2 and according to the principles there stated (B 8. 1 -49).  
 4. A cosmogony (B 8.50-61, 9 ff.).  
 There are two fragments whose position is uncertain: B 4 and 5. I shall be discussing frg. 5 at length in a moment. Frg. 4 has no implications disruptive of any conclusions that can be drawn from the other fragments, nor is its presence inconsistent with the general scheme of the poem. Its location is a problem, but one which, for the present, can be left on one side." (p. 15)  
 (...)
 "It is my purpose to discuss two passages in the fragments from which conclusions are usually drawn which conflict with the general pattern of Parmenides' thought and argument. They appear in DK as:  
 B 1. 29: Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμέξ ἦτορ  
 and B 5: Ξυνὸν δὲ μοί ἐστιν, ὀππόθεν ἄρξωμαι· τόθι γὰρ πάλιν ἵζομαι αὔθις.  
 These passages have received various interpretations, sometimes separately, sometimes in combination. I shall suggest that frg. 5 should be treated as a doubtful fragment and that at 1.29 the correct reading is εὐπειθεὸς not εὐκυκλεὼς." (p. 16)
141. Johansen, Thomas Kjeller 2016. "Parmenides' likely story." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 50:1-29.  
 Abstract: "A reading of Parmenides fragments B1-B4 shows that Being and the Cosmos are related as model to likeness in a way that allows the Cosmos to have some degree of being and intelligibility. The cosmology that Parmenides defends reads as a precursor to the « likely story » of Plato's « Timaeus » and, indeed, Proclus in his Commentary on Plato's Parmenides had already argued for a similar reading of Parmenides' poem."
142. Jones, Barrington. 1973. "Parmenides 'The Way of Truth'." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 11:287-298.  
 "Recent years have produced a number of distinct interpretations of Parmenides' philosophical poem. Of these, one of the most interesting is that of Montgomery Furth's "Elements of Eleatic Ontology,"(1) and I shall use his treatment of the poem as the basis for the development of a different interpretation, an interpretation which, hopefully, can preserve the explanatory power of Furth's exposition while avoiding certain of its difficulties.  
 Furth suggests that, at the start of his argument, Parmenides is concerned to show the meaninglessness of negative "is" statements, whether "is" be taken in an existential or a predicative sense. One cannot say "Unicorns do not exist" meaningfully; for, in order for the word "unicorns" to be meaningful, there must be unicorns for the word to refer to. Therefore, negative existential statements are self-defeating, because they purport to deny a necessary condition of their own meaningfulness. Parallel considerations apply to the predicative sense of "is".  
 If "John is tall" is meaningful only if John *is* tall, or the fact of John's being tall exists, or the like, then the statement "John is not tall" would be meaningful only if, for instance, the fact of John's being tall did not exist, but if it did not exist, then,

- again, there is nothing for the sentence to refer to, and therefore the sentence must be meaningless." (p. 287)
- (1) *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, VI (1968), 111-132.
- "To summarize the course of the discussion, then. We have seen that, if we do not take Parmenides as postulating monism, the argument proceeds with considerable force to the conclusions that Parmenides claims, and does so without involving him in any direct fallacy, such as a failure to distinguish between an 'existential' and a 'predicative' sense of "is." For just as I can think of something, so I can think of something's being the case, and the same considerations will apply. Nor does he impose impossibly stringent restrictions on meaningfulness; if anything, he is over-liberal in his admissions of existence and being. Given acceptance of the claim that what can be thought of must be, his argument has force.(26)" (p. 298)
- (26) Throughout I have assumed that νόειν is to be taken in its customary sense of "to think." C. H. Kahn ["The Thesis of Parmenides," *The Review of Metaphysics*, XXII (1969)], (pp. 703-711), however, has maintained that it is to be taken in the stronger sense of "to know." This can hardly be so in view of the fact that Parmenides does ascribe νόος to deluded mankind, who, he claims, are *totally* enmeshed in δόξα, opinion (B 6.6; 16.2). Furthermore, he uses the expression "wandering νόον," and, had he meant "knowledge," this would be a striking 'contradictio in adiecto' (B 6.6)."
143. Kahn, Charles H. 1966. "The Greek Verb 'To Be' and the Concept of Being." *Foundations of Language* no. 2:245-265.  
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, *Essays on Being*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 16-40.  
"I am concerned in this paper with the philological basis for Greek ontology; that is to say, with the raw material which was provided for philosophical analysis by the ordinary use and meaning of the verb *einai*, 'to be'. Roughly stated, my question is: How were the Greek philosophers guided, or influenced, in their formulation of doctrines of Being, by the prephilosophical use of this verb which (together with its nominal derivatives *on* and *ousia*) serves to express the concept of Being in Greek?" (p. 16)
144. ———. 1969. "The Thesis of Parmenides." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 22:700-724.  
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, *Essays on Being*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 143-166.  
"If we except Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, Parmenides is perhaps the most important and influential of all the Greek philosophers. And considered as a metaphysician, he is perhaps the most original figure in the western tradition. At any rate, if ontology is the study of Being, or what there is, and metaphysics the study of ultimate Reality, or what there is in the most fundamental way, then Parmenides may reasonably be regarded as the founder of ontology and metaphysics at once. For he is the first to have articulated the concept of Being or Reality as a distinct topic for philosophic discussion.  
The poem of Parmenides is the earliest philosophic text which is preserved with sufficient completeness and continuity to permit us to follow a sustained line of argument. It is surely one of the most interesting arguments in the history of philosophy, and we are lucky to have this early text, perhaps a whole century older than the first dialogues of Plato. But the price we must pay for our good fortune is to face up to a vipers' nest of problems, concerning details of the text and the archaic language but also concerning major questions of philosophic interpretation. These problems are so fundamental that, unless we solve them correctly, we cannot even be clear as to what Parmenides is arguing for, or why. And they are so knotted that we can scarcely unravel a single problem without finding the whole nest on our hands.  
I am primarily concerned here to elucidate Parmenides' thesis: to see what he meant by the philosophic claim which is compressed into the one-word sentence "it is." I take this to be the premiss (or one of them), from which he derives his famous denial of all change and plurality. I shall thus consider the nature of this premiss,

- and why he thought it plausible or self-evident. I shall also look briefly at the structure of his argument which concludes that change is impossible, in order to see a bit more clearly how such a paradoxical conclusion might also seem plausible to Parmenides, and how it could be taken seriously by his successors. Finally, I shall say a word about the Parmenidean identification of Thinking and Being." (pp. 700-701)
145. ———. 1969. "More on Parmenides. A Response to Stein and Mourelatos." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 23:333-340.  
A Reply to Stein (1969) and Mourelatos (1969).  
"For Burnet and for many scholars of his generation, Parmenides was essentially a critic of earlier physical theories and the author of a challenge which provoked the atomist theory of matter as a response. Commentators today are more inclined to see him either as a philosopher of language in the style of Frege or Wittgenstein or, in the Continental tradition, as a metaphysician of Being in the manner of Hegel or Heidegger. It seems to me that Burnet was closer to the truth (even if his interpretation in detail is absurdly narrow) , and that he and Meyerson were faithful to the deeper spirit of Eleatic philosophy in insisting upon a close connection between Parmenides' argument and the physical science of his day and ours. At all events, any interpretation must. take account of the fact that his doctrine seems permanently relevant not only to speculative metaphysics and abstract ontology but also to critical reflection on the structure of natural science.  
Hence I am happy that Howard Stein was willing to publish his comments on the poem, since his unusual command of modern physical theory makes it possible for him to formulate a plausible reinterpretation of Eleatic doctrine within the framework of post-Newtonian or Einsteinian physics. I fully agree with him as to the historical and philosophical value of such a reconstruction, even if it cannot square with every facet of the archaic text under discussion. Simply as a commentary on the text, however, a one-sided interpretation fully worked out will often be more illuminating than a carefully balanced synthesis of different points of view.  
Once such an interpretation has been presented, it is the ungrateful task of the interlocutor to insist upon the appropriate qualifications. Stein's reconstruction gains in coherence by taking Parmenides' Being as "truth" rather than "thing," as "discernible structure in the world" or *alles, was der Fall ist*: the unique *Sachverhalt* but not the unique *Gegenstand*. But Parmenides himself is not so coherent, and part of the creative influence of his theory was due precisely to the fact that it can also be understood-and was presumably also intended-as an account of the only thing or entity or object that can be rationally understood. Hence it was that, the atomists could define the concept of indestructible solid body as their new version of Being (*on*), and empty space as the new form of Non-being (*ouk on* or *oudén*). In general, the Greek philosophers never succeeded in formulating a systematic distinction between thing and fact, between individual object and structure (although Plato's self-criticism and later development of the theory of Forms may involve a conscious shift, from one category to the, other)." (pp. 333-334)  
"I am grateful to Alexander Mourelatos for having tried to formulate my interpretation more precisely, and if he has not entirely succeeded that no doubt. shows that my own exposition was not clear enough. I confess that. 1 do not recognize my view in the complicated reduction sentences which he offers as a semi-formalization of my version of thesis and antithesis in fragment 2. I agree with him that any reading of the first and second Ways must construe them as contradictory, so that "the reason which compels rejection of the second route is the reason which enjoins strict and faithful adherence to the first route" (p. 736). I think my view can be shown to satisfy this condition, and to this end I shall indulge in a hit of rudimentary formalization." (p. 335)
146. ———. 1970. "Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt by Jaap Mansfeld (Review)." *Gnomon*:113-119.

Review of Jaap Mansfeld, *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt*, Assen: Van Gorcum 1964.

"Mansfeld has given us one of the most penetrating and original discussions of Parmenides' poem since Frankel's *Parmenidesstudien* in 1930. The book consists of four chapters, each one of which might stand alone as an independent essay, but which together aim at a unified view of Parmenides' thought. Mansfeld develops his interpretation with a wealth of detail, a careful, nearly complete, and on the whole judicious discussion of other views, which makes his book at once a commentary on the poem and a valuable survey of earlier scholarship." (p. 113)

"Thus Maansfeld does justice to the positive side of the *Doxa*, in the analogies with Being, and also to the negative side, in the original sin of positing two forms instead of rejecting the other as the non-existent. He goes farther than other interpreters in suggesting an epistemic or pedagogic function of the *Doxa* as a theory which permits the initiate (i. e. the philosopher) to find his way back to the origins of the manifold of experience in the positing of two basic forms." (p. 118)

147. ———. 1973. *The Verb 'Be' in ancient Greek*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Volume 6 of: John W. M. Verhhar (ed.), *The Verb 'Be' and its Synonyms: Philosophical and Grammatical Studies*, Dordrecht: Reidel.

Reprinted by Hackett Publishing, 2003 with new introduction and discussion of relation between predicative and existential uses of the verb *einai*.

"First of all, a word of clarification on the nature of the enterprise. My original aim was to provide a kind of grammatical prolegomenon to Greek ontology. First of all, a word of clarification on the nature of the enterprise. My original aim was to provide a kind of grammatical prolegomenon to Greek ontology.

The notion of Being, as formulated by Parmenides, seems to come from nowhere, like a philosophical meteor with no historical antecedents but profound historical consequences. It would be difficult to overstate the influence of this new conception. On the one hand, Plato's doctrine of the eternal being of the Forms as well as his struggle with Not-Being both clearly derive from Parmenides' account of to on. On the other hand, not only Aristotle's doctrine of categories as "the many ways that things are said to be" but also his definition of metaphysics as the study of "being qua being" provide deliberate alternatives to Parmenides' monolithic conception of what is." (*Introduction* (2003), p. VII)

148. ———. 1988. "Being in Parmenides and Plato." *La Parola del passato* no. 43:237-261.

Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, *Essays on Being*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 167-191.

"Despite the silence of Aristotle, there can be little doubt of the importance of Parmenides as an influence on Plato's thought. If it was the encounter with Socrates that made Plato a philosopher, it was the poem of Parmenides that made him a metaphysician. In the first place it was Parmenides' distinction between Being and Becoming that provided Plato with the ontological basis for his theory of Forms. When he decided to submit this theory to searching criticism, he chose as critic no other than Parmenides himself. And when the time came for Socrates to be replaced as principal speaker in the dialogues, Plato introduced as his new spokesman a visitor from Elea. Even in the *Timaeus*, where the chief speaker is neither Socrates nor the Eleatic Stranger, the exposition takes as its starting-point the Parmenidean dichotomy. (1) From the *Symposium* and *Phaedo* to the *Sophist* and *Timaeus*, the language of Platonic metaphysics is largely the language of Parmenides.

One imagines that Plato had studied the poem of Parmenides with considerable care. He had the advantage of a complete text, an immediate knowledge of the language, and perhaps even an Eleatic tradition of oral commentary. So he was in a better position than we are to understand what Parmenides had in mind. Since Plato has given us a much fuller and more explicit statement of his own conception of Being, this conception, if used with care, may help us interpret the more lapidary and puzzling utterances of Parmenides himself."



- (1) *Timaeus* 27D 5: 'The first distinction to be made is this: what is the Being that is forever and has no becoming, and what is that which is always becoming but never being?'. (p. 237)
149. ———. 2002. "Parmenides and Plato." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 81-94. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, *Essays on Being*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 192-206.  
"This seems a happy occasion to return to Parmenides, in order both to clarify my own interpretation of Parmenidean Being and also to emphasize the affinity between what I have called the veridical reading and the account in terms of predication that Alex Mourelatos gave in his monumental *The Route of Parmenides*.) It is good to have this opportunity to acknowledge how much our views have in common, even if they do not coincide. And perhaps I may indulge here in a moment of nostalgia, since Alex and I are both old Parmenideans. My article '*The Thesis of Parmenides*' was published in 1969, just a year before Alex's book appeared. That was nearly thirty years ago, and it was not the beginning of the story for either of us. My own Eleatic obsession had taken hold even earlier, with an unpublished Master's dissertation on Parmenides, just as Alex had begun with a doctoral dissertation on the same subject. So, for both of us, returning to Parmenides may have some of the charm of returning to the days of our youth." (p. 81)  
"I want to defend Parmenides' positive account of Being as a coherent, unified vision.  
And I think his refutation of coming-to-be if formally impeccable, once one accepts the premise (which Plato will deny) that *esti* and *ouk esti* are mutually exclusive, like p and not-p. And it is precisely this assimilation of the '*is* or *is-not*' dichotomy to the law of non-contradiction -- to p or not-p' - that accounts for the extraordinary effectiveness of Parmenides' argument, its acceptance by the fifth-century cosmologists, and the difficulty that Plato encountered in answering it.  
However, if the rich, positive account of Being that results from Parmenides' amalgamation of the entire range of uses and meanings of *einai* turns out to be a long-term success (as the fruitful ancestor of ancient atomism, Platonic Forms, and the metaphysics of eternal Being in western theology), the corresponding negation in Not-Being is a conceptual nightmare. Depending on which function of *einai* is being denied, *to mê on* can represent either negative predication, falsehood, non-identity, non-existence, or non-entity, that is to say, nothing at all. The fallacy in Parmenides' argument lies not in the cumulation of positive attributes for Being but in the confused union of these various modes of negation in the single conception of 'what-is-not.' That is why Plato saw fit to criticize his great predecessor in respect to the notion of Not-Being, while making positive use of the Parmenidean notion of Being." (pp. 89-90)
150. ———. 2005. "Parmenides and Being." In *Frühgriechisches Denken*, edited by Rechenauer, Georg, 217-226. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
151. ———. 2009. "Postscript on Parmenides." In *Essays on Being*, 207-217. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Postscript on Parmenides (2008): 1. *Parmenides and physics*; 2. *The direction of the chariot ride in the proem*; 3. *The epistemic preference for Fire*.  
"Parmenides was my first love in philosophy. I had once thought to write a book on Parmenides, but there always seemed to be too many unsolved problems. I conclude these Essays by returning to three problems that do seem soluble, and that do not involve the concept of Being: Parmenides' relation to natural philosophy, the direction of the chariot ride in his proem, and the epistemic preference for Fire." (p. 207)
152. Kember, Owen. 1971. "Right and Left in the Sexual Theories of Parmenides." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 91:92-106.

Abstract: "G. E. R. Lloyd (1) has argued that Parmenides 'probably held that the sex of the child is determined by its place on the right or left of the mother's womb (right for males, left for females)'. It is the purpose of this paper to challenge this assertion by re-examining the primary evidence of fragments 17 and r8 of Parmenides as well as the tangled mass of testimony of the doxographers, Censorinus, Aetius and Lactantius. In so doing I shall consciously observe a sharp distinction between theories of sex differentiation and theories of heredity since I shall argue that the confusion of the two subjects has led to distortion of Parmenides' doctrines."

(1) G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* (Cambridge, 1966) 17 and 50. It is interesting to note the change in wording from Lloyd's article in JHS lxxxii (1962) 60 where he uses the word 'apparently' instead of 'probably'. Other discussions on the problem of Parmenides' sexual theories within the last ten years include that of W. K. C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. ii (Cambridge, 1965) 78 ff. and L. Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton, 1965) 263-6.

Tarán indeed asserts (264, note 98) 'sex, according to Parmenides, was determined by the female and not by the male'. Earlier work of importance in this field has been done by E. Lesky, "Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehren der Antike und ihr Nachwirken", *Akademie*

*der Wissenschaften und der Literatur*, Mainz, *Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse*, Jahrgang 1950, Nr. 19, 1272 ff.

153. Kerferd, George. 1991. "Aristotle's Treatment of the Doctrine of Parmenides." In *Aristotle and the Later Tradition*, edited by Blumenthal, Henry and Robinson, Howard, 1-7. New York: Oxford University Press.  
"In his *De caelo* (3. 1, 298b4~24 = 28 A 25 DK) Aristotle makes a strange and puzzling statement about Parmenides and the Eleatics." [follow the translation of the passage] (p. 1)  
(...)  
"What I want rather to do is to suggest a way in which we can make sense both of Aristotle's remark in the *De caelo* and of Simplicius' comments.  
This can be done, I would argue, in the following way. Let us begin by assuming that all we have is the world of seeming. This, however, is seen to be defective in that it combines 'is' and 'is not', and we can know on the basis of the logical insight developed with devastating effect by Parmenides that only that which is can exist. We must accordingly proceed to a fresh analysis of the world of seeming. If we take this world at its own level, which is that of seeming, we can see that it contains, and so can be analysed into, combinations that change between two shapes or principles, light and darkness (Parmenides 28 B 8. 41, 53-9 DK). Thus, any physical object can be found both in the daytime and at night, and further it can be seen at any one time as combining what we might call reflectivity and light-absorption. We have thus the first step in a reductionist analysis. These two principles, however, can next be reduced to one—darkness is what is not light, and on the principles of Parmenidean logic what is not cannot exist. We need not ask whether the negative in 'is not light' is negating a copula or negating an existential sense of the verb 'to be'—in either case it is plausible enough to treat darkness as a negative principle. We are left then with the one principle only, that which is. This principle can be regarded as something which is itself inside or within the world of seeming. But it will be better understood, I would suggest, as being not within the world of seeming but rather in a sense the world of seeming as such when this world is correctly understood and is stripped by the application of Parmenidean logic and cleansed of the plurality of names which mortals assign to it. For Simplicius this whole approach is to be seen as a mistake because it involves a denial of the dualism essential to Platonism, the dualism between the intelligible world and the (derived) world of appearances. But it may well have seemed to him to be a mistake which Parmenides was actually making." (pp. 6-7)

154. Ketchum, Richard. 1990. "Parmenides on What There Is." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 20:167-190.

Abstract: "There is an interpretation of Parmenides' poem which has not yet had, but deserves, a hearing. It reconciles two of the most prominent views of the meaning of the verb 'to be' ('εἶναι') as it occurs in the poem. It agrees with the spirit of those who interpret 'εἶναι' as 'existence.' It agrees with the letter of those who interpret 'εἶναι' as the copula. The basic idea is to treat relevant syntactically incomplete occurrences of the verb 'to be' as meaning 'to be something or other.'(1) In section I, I will explain and clarify the interpretation. In section II, I will dialectically support the interpretation by comparing it with other major interpretations.

Weaknesses will also appear." (p. 167)

(1) To my knowledge the idea that such uses of the verb εἶναι' in Greek philosophy might be profitably interpreted in this way was introduced by G.E.L. Owen ('A Metaphysical Paradox' in Rendord Bambrough, ed., *New Essays On Plato and Aristotle* New York: Humanities Press 1965 71, n. 1). He originally suggested that for Plato to be is to be something or other but later ('Plato on Not-Being') in Gregory Vlastos, ed., *Plato, I* Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1971 266) he recants. As for the equation "to be is to be something," the negation of "to be something" is "not to be anything" or "to be nothing," which Plato holds to be unintelligible; and then it would follow from the equation that "not to be" makes no sense. But Plato recognizes no use of the verb in which it cannot be directly negated.

The fact that Parmenides not only recognizes but demands a use of the verb 'to be' which cannot be meaningfully negated is a reason to attempt to understand his use of 'to be' as 'to be something other.'

As is well known, Owen himself interprets Parmenides' syntactically incomplete uses of 'eivai' as 'to exist?' ('Eleatic Questions',) *Classical Quarterly* 10 1960, 94).

155. ———. 1993. "A Note on Barnes' Parmenides." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 38:95-97.  
"In *The Presocratic Philosophers* Vol. I: *Thales to Zeno* (London, 1979, pp. 155-175) Jonathan Barnes presents a formalization of an argument he finds in Fragments B2, B3 and B6 (148, 149 and 150 in Barnes' numbering). I am sympathetic to the enterprise but I think the execution is confused. After explaining the confusion, I present an alternative which I think preserves most of Barnes' interpretation." (p. 95)
156. Kingsley, Peter. 1999. *In the Dark Places of Wisdom*. Inverness: Golden Sufi Center.  
"What is to be done when the scholarly author of a book is also a believer and writes in a style that seeks to convert the reader in two different senses of that word?  
Firstly, to convert the academic reader to the argument expressed, and secondly to convert the reader more generally to the belief system expressed in the book – in this case a wider mystical approach to life. Whilst doing this, Kingsley also suggests that the current point-of-view of the scholar may be nothing more than a dogmatic and faith-tinged position anyway – so how should we read all this? These questions should be at the forefront of any reader's response to *In the Dark Places of Wisdom*.  
Kingsley is a lauded academic and also a self-admitted mystic and this book is framed as a journey into a new take on reality." p. 118 (Christopher Hartney, *Book Review of Peter Kingsley: In the Dark Places of Wisdom*, "Alternative Spirituality and Religion", 9, 2018, pp. 118-121)  
"And that's the purpose of this book: to awaken something we've forgotten, something we've been made to forget by the passing of time and by those who've misunderstood or—for reasons of their own—have wanted us to forget.  
It could be said that this process of awakening is profoundly healing. It is. The only trouble with saying this is that we've come to have such a superficial idea of healing. For most of us, healing is what makes us comfortable and eases the pain. It's what softens, protects us. And yet what we want to be healed of is often what will heal us if we can stand the discomfort and the pain." (p. 4)

"You might be tempted to describe the way that Parmenides and the people close to him have been treated in the last two thousand years as a conspiracy, a conspiracy of silence. And in a very basic sense you'd be right.

But at the same time all these dramas of misrepresentation, of misuse and abuse, are nothing compared with what's been done to the central part of his teachings- or the writings of his successors. And the dramas fade away almost into insignificance compared with the extraordinary power of those teachings as they still survive: a power that's waiting to be understood again and used, not just talked about or pushed aside. This is what we ll need to explore next, and start rediscovering step by step.

So everything that's been mentioned so far Parmenides' opening account of his journey to another world, the traditions about him, the finds at Velia—may seem a story in itself or even a story within a story. But the story is far from finished, and this book that you've come to the end of is only the beginning: the first chapter." (p. 231)

157. ———. 2003. *Reality*. Inverness: Golden Sufi Center.

"The writings of Parmenides, and other people like him, survive in fragments.

Scholars have played all sorts of games with them. For centuries they have experimented with distorting them and torturing them until they seem to yield a sense exactly the opposite of their original meaning. Then they argue about their significance and put them on show like exhibits in a museum.

And no one understands quite how important they are. Even though they only survive in bits and pieces, they are far less fragmentary than we are. And they are much more than dead words. They are like the mythological treasure—the invaluable object that has been lost and misused and has to be rediscovered at all costs.

But this is not mythology, or fiction. It's reality. Fiction is like sitting on a goldmine and dreaming about gold; it's everything that happens when you forget this.

There is absolutely nothing mystical in what I am saying. It's very simple, completely down-to-earth and practical. We tend to imagine we have our feet on the ground when we are dealing with facts. And yet facts are of absolutely no significance in themselves: it's just as easy to get lost in facts as it is to get lost in fictions.

They have their value, and we have to use them—but use them to go beyond them. Facts on their own are like sitting on top of a goldmine and scratching at the dust around our feet with a little stick." (p. 21)

158. Kirk, Geoffrey S. , and Stokes, Michael C. 1960. "Parmenides' refutation of motion." *Phronesis* no. 5:1-4.

"Since Burnet at least (*Early Greek Philosophy* [third edition], 1920) pp. 179 and 181) it has been common to attribute to Parmenides the argument against motion described by Melissus in his fragment 7.

(...)

It had occurred independently to the authors of this short paper that the matter deserved further clarification, and, having discovered in conversation that their views were closely similar, they submit them jointly." (p. 1)

"Thus the fragments of Parmenides contain not the slightest hint of the physical argument that motion is impossible because it entails the existence of a void to move in. But this physical argument is stated in Melissus fr. 7 § 7, after the assertion that void, as not-being, does not exist: 'Nor does it [sc. Being] move; for it has nowhere to withdraw to, but is full. For if there had been void, it would have withdrawn into the void; but since there is no void it does not have anywhere to withdraw to'. If it had not been for Plato *Theaetetus* 180 E 3-4, the attribution of this kind of argument to Parmenides, not merely to Melissus, would presumably never have been made." (p. 2)

"This whole field of possibilities deserves further exploration, but is shut off by the unjustified interpretation of those who attribute to Parmenides an argument invented probably by Melissus." (p. 4)



159. Knight, Thomas S. 1959. "Parmenides and the Void." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*:524-528.  
 "Unless Parmenides' One Being is considered a corporeal unit, he cannot be said to have denied the existence of a void. And whether or not his monism can be regarded as materialistic is a matter of dispute." (p. 524)  
 "Descartes rejected the proposition that there can be a space in which there is no body only *after* he had demonstrated "The grounds on which the existence of material things may be known with certainty."(10) The Pythagoreans, *after* viewing their numbers as discontinuous, postulated a void to separate them."(11) Void appears then to be posterior to: some kind of phenomenism, some kind of materialism, and some kind of pluralism.  
 The point here is that Parmenides' One Being excludes all of these.  
 It seems, therefore, purely arbitrary to say that Parmenides denied the existence of void. The only way to answer Parmenides is to find some reasonable relation between Being and non-Being. Taking body as "what is" and void as "what is not" merely rejects the more original and more fundamental problem, How can non-Being be?" (pp. 527-528)
160. Kohlschitter, Silke. 1991. "Parmenides and Empedocles in Porphyry's *History of Philosophy*." *Hermatena* no. 150:43-53.  
 "In a kind of history of philosophy Shahrastani(1) draws up a list of seven philosophers(2) - Empedocles among them - whom he calls the "pillars of wisdom". (3) He approaches them with an unambiguous concern regarding the creator, namely to show his unity, and clearly formulated questions with regard to the creation of the world, namely "what and how many the primary principles are, and what the ἐσκατα are and when they come to happen".(4) As Franz Altheim and Ruth Stiehl convincingly show, Shahrastani took over the canon of the seven philosophers, as well as the problems he brings to them, from Porphyry.(5) The work that is to be considered in this context is his "φίλοσοφος ιστορία, of which fragments are preserved.(6)"  
 (...)  
 "Parmenides is the thinker who exclusively argues on the basis of the conditions of thinking itself." (p. 43)  
 "The central term in the Parmenidean philosophy of history is *Dike*.  
 All, by being unchangeable and motionless only as a whole, is actually unified and held together by her. One must therefore conceive of Dike as the supreme deity in Parmenides. Here the question arises, in what relationship to each other she and history, or rather eternal being and the world of seeming have to be seen." (p. 44)  
 (1) Muhammad B. 'Abd al-Karim Shahrastani was the principal historian in the oriental Middle Ages (1076-1153). The work that is relevant for the present paper is his *Kitab al-Mital wa'l-Nihal*, a treatise on religions and sects.  
 (2) Thales, Anaxagoras (= Anaximander), Anaximenes, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato.  
 (3) Shahrastani; 253, 13.  
 (4) F. Altheim and R. Stiehl, *Porphyrios und Empedokles*, Tübingen, 1954, p. 9.  
 (5) Cf. Altheim/Stiehl, pp. 8-19.  
 (6) See *Porphyrii philosophi Platonici opuscula tria*, recog. A. Nauck, Lipsiae 1860.  
 Shahrastani, *Kitab al-Mital wan Nihal*, ed. Cureton, London 1846, transl. by Haarbrücker, Halle 1850-51 (=Shahrastani). [See also the French translation: *Livre des religions et des sectes*, translated by Daniel Gimaret, Guy Monnot, Jean Jolivet, Louvain, Peeters, 1986-1993 (two volumes)]
161. Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian. 2017. *The Presocratics in the Thought of Martin Heidegger*. Bern: Peter Lang.  
 Contents: Preface 11; Abbreviations 13; Introduction 15; Chapter One: Philosophy, History and the Presocratics 23; Chapter Two: The Anaximander Fragment 63; Chapter Three: Heraclitus: Physis and the Logos 109; Chapter Four: Being and

- Thinking in Parmenides 119; Chapter Five: The Presocratics and the History of Being 219; Bibliography 247.
- "Chapter Four is a consideration of Parmenides' fragments 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8 in Heidegger's interpretation, which comes from different works of the middle and later period of his thought. Since for Heidegger all primordial thinkers speak essentially the same, in his reading of Parmenides, I encounter the same issues with which we are already familiar from earlier chapters. He does not set up any opposition between Heraclitus and Parmenides.
- Nevertheless, if in the study of Heraclitus his focus was on λόγος, and φύσις, now the foremost attention is given to Ἀλήθεια. In Heidegger's view, ἀλήθεια is a basic character of beings, as well as the horizon within which the manifestation of what is present occurs. He claims that in the tradition of Western philosophy, the original Greek experience of ἀλήθεια has been misinterpreted and forced into oblivion. Consequently, for Heidegger, ἀλήθεια is what is most worthy of thought. Its question is, for him, inseparably bound up with the question of being. Heidegger's inquiry into ἀλήθεια in the Parmenidean poem takes us beyond the Greek experience of being, namely, to ἀλήθεια in the no longer Greek but Heideggerian sense as the openness of being. Further, since the openness of being refers to a situation with in history, the context of his interpretation of Parmenides becomes the history of being. Only in this context, I conclude, can we fully understand and appreciate the interpretation of Presocratic thinkers in his later works." (p. 21)
162. Kurfess, Christopher. 2014. "Verity's Intrepid Heart: The Variants in Parmenides, DK B 1.29 (and 8.4)." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 47:81-93.
- Abstract: "Abstract: This paper argues that the widespread impression of Parmenides as a poor poet has led to consequential errors in the reconstruction of his poem. A reconsideration of the sources behind two of the more disputed lines in the standard arrangement of the fragments leads to the suggestion that modern editors have mistakenly treated what were similar but separate lines in the original poem as variants of a single verse. Seeing through that confusion allows us to see Parmenides in a better poetic light, and gives potential insight into how his manner of exposition relates to his philosophic message."
163. ———. 2016. "The Truth about Parmenides' *Doxa*." *Ancient Philosophy*:13-45.
- "In a recent article in this journal, Néstor-Luis Cordero has offered an interesting account of how scholars may have been misreading Parmenides' poem for centuries, as well as some provocative suggestions on how to correct that misreading.(1) (...)
- Cordero's essay is a valuable reminder that the arrangements of the fragments that we encounter today are reconstructions by modern editors, a fact too easily and too frequently overlooked. However, his account of the history of scholarship on the *Doxa* calls for correction on some points, and his own proposed rearrangement of the fragments strikes me as at least as chimerical a production as the more familiar presentation that Cordero likens to the fantastic creatures of Greek myth. Thus, while I share with him a conviction that the orthodoxy about the *Doxa* is incorrect, my own view of where it goes wrong is rather different. In what follows, I begin by discussing several matters raised by Cordero that, though often neglected, are necessary preliminaries for a responsible reconstruction of Parmenides' poem. As we proceed, attending more closely to the ancient sources for the fragments and venturing into what might seem like alien terrain, a different way of viewing the *Doxa*, including a 'new' fragment, will emerge."
- (1) 'The "Doxa of Parmenides" Dismantled', hereafter 'Cordero 2010'. See also Cordero 2008, [*Eleatica 2006: Parmenide scienziato?* Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag] 78-80 and Cordero 2011b [*Parmenidean "Physics" is not Part of what Parmenides calls "δόξα"*]. References to Cordero 2010 in the main body of the text are by page number(s) alone, given in parentheses. The abbreviation 'DK' refers to Diels and Kranz 1951. Items such as 'DK 10' or 'DK 7.5' are shorthand for referring

- to the 'B' fragments (and line numbers, if given) in the chapter in DK on Parmenides.
164. Laks, André. 1990. "'The More' and 'The Full': on the reconstruction of Parmenides' theory of sensation in Theophrastus' *De sensibus*, 3-4." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*:1-18.  
Already published in French as: "Parménide dans Théophraste", in "La Parola del passato. Rivista di studi antichi", 43, 1988, pp. 262-280.  
"Under the aegis of this physicist, and pre-Empedoclean, Parmenides of the second part of the poem, I propose to analyse here the context of the quotation of fr. 16 DK in Theophrastus' *Treatise on Sensations*.(9) My aim is to show how Theophrastus, by the use which he makes of the term *συμμετρία* in his critical summary of Parmenides' theory of sensations, would have authorized the doxographical tradition (of which he is one of the primary sources) to rank Parmenides, no less than Empedocles and Epicurus, under the banner of a physics which respected the integrity of being, that is, in the terms of Aetius' report, of a physics of quantity and of aggregates. This demonstration analyses the way in which Theophrastus interprets fr. 16 and rereads closely the first part of Theophrastus' report, which presents itself in part as its exegesis." (p. 3-4)  
(9) J. P. Hershbelle, 'Parmenides' Way of Truth and B 16', *Apeiron*, 4 (1970), 1-23, has suggested that the fragment ought rather to belong to the first part of the poem; but it is hard to see how, if it is true that the duality of the elements, which the fragment certainly presupposes (cf. the beginning of Theophrastus' report: *δυοῖν οὐτοῖν στοιχείοι*) has no place there.
165. Latona, Max J. 2008. "Reining in the Passions: the Allegorical Interpretation of Parmenides B Fragment 1." *American Journal of Philology* no. 129:199-230.  
"Abstract. This article attempts to determine whether Parmenides intended the chariot imagery of his poem to be construed allegorically, as argued by Sextus Empiricus. Modern interpreters have rejected the allegorical reading, arguing that Sextus was biased by Plato, the allegory's true author. There are, however, reasons to believe that a tradition (either native or imported) of employing the chariot image allegorically preexisted Plato and Parmenides. This article argues that Parmenides was drawing upon such a tradition and did portray mind as a charioteer upon a path of knowledge, and impulse as the horses, requiring guidance in order to reach the destination." (p. 199)
166. Lebedev, Andrei V. 2017. "Parmenides, ANHP ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΕΙΟΣ. Monistic Idealism (Mentalism) in Archaic Greek Metaphysics." *Indo-European Linguistics and Classical Philology* no. 21:495-536.  
Proceedings of the 21st Conference in Memory of Professor Joseph M. Tronsky.  
"In our view there is only one possibility to make philosophical sense of Parmenides' poem: to take seriously the ancient tradition on his Pythagorean background and to interpret his metaphysics as monistic idealism or immaterialism. The sphere of Being described in the Aletheia is not a lump of dead matter, but the divine *Sphairos* of the Western Greek philosophical theology known from Xenophanes and Empedocles, conceived as pure *Nous* (Mind) which is the only true reality. The identity of Being and Mind is explicitly stated by Parmenides in fr. B 3, Zeller's and Burnet's interpretation is grammatically impossible and never occurred to any ancient reader. «What-is», conceived as a sphere of divine light endowed with consciousness, is also the invisible «Sun of Justice» (the Sun that «never sets»), an archaic idea known to Heraclitus and imitated by Plato in the allegory of the Sun in the Republic. Night (the symbol of body and corporeal matter) does not exist, it is an empty name resulting from a linguistic mistake of mortals who misnamed the absence of light as a separate substance. The Kouros of the Proem is not Parmenides himself, but an Apollonian image of his venerated teacher Pythagoras whose soul ascended to the celestial temple (oracle) of gods in a winged chariot and received there an oracular revelation from Aletheia herself, a great gift to humanity that liberated men from the veil of ignorance and fear of

- death. The first part of Parmenides' poem was not just an exercise in speculative metaphysics concerned with problems of motion and plurality, but a handbook of philosophical theology and practical psychology with ethical and political implications: the attributes of the divine absolute are paradigmatic for the personality of an ideal citizen abiding to law (Dike) and a warrior who has no fear of death and pain, since he knows that his soul is immortal and his body is just a «shadow of smoke» (σκιὰ καπνοῦ). The immobility of the divine Sphere is not a physical theory, but an image for meditation, a psychological paradigm of the ataraxia and tranquility (*hesychia*) of the wise who has eradicated all passions and has assimilated his psyche to god following Pythagoras' command ἔπου θεῶι." (pp. 497-498)
167. Leshner, James H. 1984. "Parmenides' Critique of Thinking: the *poludêris elenchos* of Fragment 7." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 2:1-30.  
 "It is reasonable to suppose that Parmenides' primary objective in writing his famous poem was to provide a correct account of what exists. Much of the long argument of Fragment 8 is aimed at establishing the attributes of 'the real' (*to eon*), and it is the teaching of Fragment 6 that all thinking and speaking must be about the real. Yet we should remember that the goddess who delivers Parmenides' message announces in Fragment 1 that we will learn also about 'mortal beliefs' (*brotôn doxas*) and 'the things believed' (*ta dokounta*). The argument of Fragment 2 begins by listing the ways of enquiry that are 'available for thinking' (*noesai*). Parmenides' poem is therefore both an enquiry into being and an enquiry into thinking, and his positive theory is both about being and about thinking. In what follows, I offer an account of Parmenides' critique of human thinking, focusing on the crucial, but largely misunderstood, idea of the *poludêris elenchos* mentioned briefly at the end of Fragment 7. I shall argue that in the motif of the *deris* Parmenides expressed a view of the human capacities for independent thinking that departed from an older and derogatory view, and that by adapting the older idea of the *elenchos* to a new, philosophical, use, he introduced an influential decision procedure into philosophical enquiry." (p. 1)
168. ———. 1994. "The Significance of κατὰ πάντ' ἄσ<σ>τη in Parmenides Fr. 1.3." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 14:1-20.  
 "Few of the problematic aspects of Parmenides' poem have proven more resistant to solution than the famous crux contained in the first sentence of his Fr. 1 (following our best MS, N= Laur. 85.19, of Sextus' *adversus Mathematicos* vii 111)" (...)  
 "For more than fifty years, from the publication in 1912 of the third edition of DK [Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*] until 1968, it was widely supposed that N actually contained the phrase κατὰ πάντ' ἄστη -- 'down to, along, on, or among all cities', but A.H. Coxon disposed of that idea when he reported that DK's ἄστη was actually a misreading of the MS, caused perhaps by a passing glance at the ἀστυ in the πολύφραστοι in the adjacent line. Coxon's claim that N contained ἀτη and not ἄστη was subsequently corroborated by Tarán 1977; a photocopy of Laur. 85.19. f. 124v. clearly showing the ἀτη has since been published in Coxon's 1986. (pp. 1-2)  
 "Nevertheless, I believe, and will proceed to argue, that a good case can be made for restoring ἄστη by emendation as the original text of Parmenides' Fr. 1.3. The case will consist of showing how, when viewed in the larger context of early Greek poetry, κατὰ πάντ' ἄστη can be seen to possess an entirely natural meaning and, in concert with virtually every other feature in the opening lines of Fr. 1, contribute to a single, appropriate objective for the poem as a whole. The immediate question, then, is essentially a philological matter, but to answer it we must consider how Parmenides' views, aims, and methods might have been shaped by the artistic and intellectual traditions of his time and place." (p. 2)
169. ———. 1994. "The Emergence of Philosophical Interest in Cognition." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 12:1-34.



See § 4: *Parmenides' way of knowing*, pp. 24-34.

"To the list of Parmenides' contributions to Greek philosophy we should, therefore, add what might best be described as an adaptation of a familiar 'peirastic' paradigm of knowledge for use in the context of philosophical enquiry and reflection. But, having recognized this, we might also want to view Socrates' denial of any involvement with Presocratic ideas about knowledge with some scepticism. At least when the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues sets out to discover the nature of the virtues by putting a series of rival definitions to the test-hoping to find a λόγος that will remain steadfast throughout the entire process of examination his approach represents not a repudiation of earlier views of knowledge, but rather a continuation and extension of them." (p. 34, notes omitted)

170. ———. 2002. "Parmenidean *elenchos*." In *Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and Beyond*, edited by Scott, Gary Alan, 19-35. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.  
This paper is a revised version of Lesher 1984.  
"The present account differs from the 1984 paper in (1) omitting any discussion of the novelty of Parmenides' view of thought as subject to the control of the individual and (2) offering a different analysis of the structure of Parmenides' main argument. My view of the development of the meaning of *elenchos* from Homer to the fourth century and its meaning in Parmenides' poem remains unchanged. In the sixteen years since to *Oxford Studies* paper appeared, there has been relatively little discussion of the meaning of *elenchos* in Parmenides' poem (and a great deal about the Socratic *elenchus*), but the view of *elenchos* as a "test" or "examination" has been endorsed in several accounts: A. H. Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1986); David J. Furley, *Cosmic Problems: Essays in Greek and Roman Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Patricia Curd, *The Legacy of Parmenides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998)." (p. 19)  
"The upshot of the present analysis is that Parmenides' *polude̐ris elenchos* was a "controversial but forceful testing" of the possible ways of thinking and speaking about what is. By adapting the older idea of an *elenchos* or *dokimasia* of a person's qualifications or a thing's true nature to consider the merits of alternative conceptions of the nature of what is, Parmenides succeeded in mounting an effective presentation of his view in the face of competing accounts and a well-entrenched common sense." (p. 34)
171. Lewis, Frank A. 2009. "Parmenides' Modal Fallacy." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 54:1-8.  
Abstract: "In his great poem, Parmenides uses an argument by elimination to select the correct "way of inquiry" from a pool of two, the ways of is and of is not, joined later by a third, "mixed" way of is and is not. Parmenides' first two ways are soon given modal upgrades - is becomes cannot not be, and is not becomes necessarily is not (B2, 3-6) - and these are no longer contradictories of one another. And is the common view right, that Parmenides rejects the "mixed" way because it is a contradiction? I argue that the modal upgrades are the product of an illicit modal shift. This same shift, built into two Exclusion Arguments, gives Parmenides a novel argument to show that the "mixed" way fails. Given the independent failure of the way of is not, Parmenides' argument by elimination is complete." (p. 1)
172. Lloyd, Geoffrey Ernest Richard. 1962. "Right and Left in Greek Philosophy." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 82:56-66.  
"The purpose of this article is to consider how the symbolic associations which right and left had for the ancient Greeks influenced various theories and explanations in Greek philosophy of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. The fact that certain manifest natural oppositions (e.g. right and left, male and female, light and darkness, up and down) often acquire powerful symbolic associations, standing for religious categories such as pure and impure, blessed and accursed, is well attested by anthropologists for many present-day societies. Robert Hertz, in particular, has

- considered the significance of the widespread belief in the superiority of the right hand, in his essay 'La prééminence de la main droite: étude sur la polarité religieuse' [*Revue Philosophique* lxxviii (1909), 553 ff., recently translated into English by R. and C. Needham in *Death and the Right Hand* (London, 1960) 89 ff.). It is, of course, well known that the ancient Greeks shared some similar beliefs, associating right and left with lucky and unlucky, respectively, and light and darkness with safety, for example, and death. Yet the survival of certain such associations in Greek philosophy has not, I think, received the attention it deserves. I wish to document this aspect of the use of opposites in Greek philosophy in this paper, concentrating in the main upon the most interesting pair of opposites, right and left. Before I turn to the evidence in the philosophers themselves, two introductory notes are necessary. In the first, I shall consider briefly some of the evidence in anthropology which indicates how certain pairs of opposites are associated with, and symbolise, religious categories in many present-day societies. The second contains a general summary of the evidence for similar associations and beliefs in prephilosophical Greek thought." (p. 56)
173. ———. 1964. "The Hot and the Cold, the Dry and the Wet in Greek Philosophy." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 84:92-106.  
 "In a previous article ([*Right and Left in Greek Philosophy*] JHS lxxxii (1962) 56 ff.) I examined some of the theories and explanations which appear in Greek philosophy and medicine in the period down to Aristotle, in which reference is made to right and left or certain other pairs of opposites (light and darkness, male and female, up and down, front and back), and I argued that several of these theories are influenced by the symbolic associations which these opposites possessed for the ancient Greeks. In the present paper I wish to consider the use of the two pairs of opposites which are most prominent of all in early Greek speculative thought, the hot and the cold, and the dry and the wet. My discussion is divided into two parts.  
 In the first I shall examine the question of the origin of the use of these opposites in Greek philosophy. How far back can we trace their use in various fields of speculative thought, and what was the significance of their introduction into cosmology in particular? And then in the second part of my paper I shall consider to what extent theories based on these opposites may have been influenced by assumptions concerning the values of the opposed terms. Are these opposites, too, like right and left, or male and female, sometimes conceived as consisting of on the one hand a positive, or superior pole, and on the other a negative, or inferior one? How far do we find that arbitrary correlations were made between these and other pairs of terms, that is to say correlations that correspond to preconceived notions of value, rather than to any empirically verifiable data?" (p. 92)
174. ———. 1966. *Polarity and Analogy, Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 "The aims of this study are to describe and analyse two main types of argument and methods of explanation as they are used in early Greek thought from the earliest times down to and including Aristotle, and to consider them, in particular, in relation to the larger problem of the development of logic and scientific method in this period." (p. 1)  
 "In Fr. 2 Parmenides puts a choice between two alternatives as if these were the only alternatives conceivable.  
 But even if we disregard the vagueness or ambiguity of ἐστὶ, the 'propositions' which Parmenides expresses are not contradictories (of which one must be true and the other false), but contraries, both of which it is possible to deny simultaneously, and it is clear that from the point of view of strict logic they are not exhaustive alternatives.  
 Fr. 8 throws more light on Parmenides' conception of the choice between 'it is' and 'it is not'. The addition of the word πάντων in Fr. 8 11 should be noted. What he

means by the word 'wholly' in the sentence 'thus it needs must be *either* that it is wholly or that it is not' becomes clear when we consider the remainder of Fr. 8 where he argues that 'what is' is ungenerated and indestructible (vv. 6-21), immovable and unchangeable.(1) 'What is not', conversely, is said to be inconceivable (8 f., 17, 34 ff.), and we are told that nothing can ever come to be from what is not (7 ff., 12 f.). The two alternatives between which Parmenides wishes a choice to be made might, then, be expressed, in this context, as *unalterable existence* on the one hand, and *unalterable non-existence* on the other. But if this is so, Parmenides' alternatives, stated in the form of propositions, are again a pair of contrary, not contradictory, assertions, for the contradictory of 'it exists unalterably' is 'it does not exist unalterably' *and not* 'it is unalterably non-existent'. By taking 'it is' and 'it is not' in *this* sense(2) as exhaustive alternatives in Fr. 8 11 and again in 16 ('it is or it is not'), Parmenides *forces an issue*. Physical objects, subject to change, cannot be said to 'be' in the sense of 'exist unalterably' which Parmenides evidently demands: but since he allows no other alternative besides unalterable existence and unalterable non-existence, then, according to this argument, physical objects must be said not to exist at all, indeed to be quite inconceivable." (pp. 104-105)

(1) See ἀκίνητον at Fr. 8 26, and the denial of all sorts of change at 38 ff.

(2) Even if we take ἔστι in a predicative, rather than an existential, sense, Parmenides' choice again seems to lie between a pair of contrary assertions, i.e. between 'it is wholly so-and-so' (e.g. black) and 'it is wholly not-so-and-so' (not black), rather than between contradictories ('it is wholly so-and-so' and 'it is not wholly so-and-so').

175. ———. 1972. "Parmenides' Sexual Theories. A Reply to Mr Kember." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 92:178-179.

Abstract: "In an article entitled 'Right and left in the sexual theories of Parmenides' (*Journal of Hellenic Studies* XCI [1971] 70–79) Mr. Owen Kember challenges my statement (*Polarity and Analogy* [1966] 17) that 'Parmenides probably held that the sex of the child is determined by its place on the right or left of the mother's womb (right for males, left for females)'. In his article Kember draws attention, usefully, to the confusions and contradictions of the doxographic tradition. He has, however, in my view, misinterpreted one crucial piece of evidence. This is the testimony of Galen, who quotes Parmenides Fragment 17 (δεξιτεροῖσιν μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δὲ κόρας) in the course of his commentary on [Hippocrates] *Epidemics* vi ch. 48. Kember notes, correctly, that the meaning of the fragment by itself is quite unclear: 'the only deduction which can be safely made from the actual fragment is that Parmenides thought right and left were somehow connected with sex, and even here we must rely on Galen's judgement that the passage did in fact refer to sex in the first place' (op. cit. 76)."

176. Loenen, Johannes Hubertus. 1959. *Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias. A Reinterpretation of Eleatic Philosophy*. Assen: Van Gorcum.  
Reprint New York: Humanities Press, 1961.

"Presents a comprehensive review of Eleatic philosophy as developed by Parmenides and Melissus, and as interpreted by Gorgias. identifies the ideas which are common in Parmenides' and Melissus' philosophical positions, as well as the themes (which are deemed substantial) that separate them. Observes that Gorgias' attack of Eleatic ideas must be understood from the point of view given to those ideas by Melissus. Speaks of Eleatic philosophy as a metaphysics of absolute reality, in which dualism (rather than monism) and epistemological rationalism are the fundamental ideas. Observes that Parmenides "must not be looked upon as the father either of materialism or of idealism, but that he may indeed be considered the first representative of dualistic metaphysics and a realistic form of epistemological realism" (p. 5)." [N.]

Reviewed by: Rosamund Kent Sprague, *Classical Philology*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Oct., 1961), pp. 267-269; M. C. Scholar, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Volume 3, Number 2, October 1965, pp. 255-260; Jean Bollack, *Mnemosyne*, Vol. 19, 1, 1966, pp. 65-70. (in French).

177. Long, Anthony Arthur. 1963. "The Principles of Parmenides' Cosmogony." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 8:90-107.  
Reprinted in: D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen (eds.), *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy*. Vol. II: *The Eleatic and the Pluralists*, London,: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, pp. 82-101.  
"The significance claimed by Parmenides for the cosmogony which forms the second half of his poem continues to be highly controversial. The interpretations offered by Owen and Chalmers, to name two recent criticisms, are so widely divergent that one might despair of arriving at any measure of agreement. (2) But since the significance of The Way of Truth must itself remain in some doubt until the status of the cosmogony is determined, further examinations of the evidence are justified. The purpose of this article is to discuss the passages throughout the poem which are concerned with mortal beliefs, and to suggest an interpretation of the fundamental lines 50-61 of B 8. (3) In this way the function of the cosmogony may, I believe, become clearer.  
Of the solutions to the problem suggested by ancient and modern critics, four main trends can be discerned:  
I. The cosmogony is not Parmenides' own but a systematized account of contemporary beliefs.  
2. The cosmogony is an extension of The Way of Truth.  
3. The cosmogony has relative validity as a second-best explanation of the world.  
4. Parmenides claims no truth for the cosmogony.  
The first view, canvassed by Zeller and modified by Burnet to a 'sketch of contemporary Pythagorean cosmology', finds few adherents among modern scholars. (4) It has never been explained, on this interpretation, why the goddess should be made to expound in detail a critique of fallacious theories. Bowra (5) has taught us to see the poem as demonstrably apocalyptic, and Parmenides needed no goddess's patronage to set forth his contemporaries' cosmological systems. Moreover, there is nothing in the later part of the poem which can be explicitly attributed to any attested philosopher. The doxographers in general, from Aristotle, assign the cosmogony to Parmenides himself.  
The second and third views above have received much support. It is argued, following Aristotle, (6) that Parmenides cannot have countenanced absolute denial of phenomena. Such an explanation, however, fails entirely to account for the later activity of the Eleatics, and is quite at variance with the evidence of the poem. It belittles the achievement of Parmenides, and fails to take into account the evidence in favour of 4., even when this is equivocal. I shall argue that the cosmogony gives a totally false picture of reality; that it is the detailed exposition of the false way mentioned in The Way of Truth (B 6.4-9) and promised by the goddess in the proem (B 1. 30-32); that it takes its starting point from the premise of that false way, the admission of Not-being alongside Being, not from the introduction of two opposites, Fire and Night; and finally, that its function is entirely ancillary to the Way of Truth, in the sense of offering the exemplar, par excellence, of all erroneous systems, as a criterion for future measurement."  
(2) G. E. L. Owen, 'Eleatic Questions', *Classical Quarterly* NS X (1960), pp. 84-102, above, pp. 48-81; W. R. Chalmers, 'Parmenides and the Beliefs of Mortals', *Phronesis* V (1960), pp. 5-22.  
(3) All fragments of Parmenides are quoted from Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin 1951).  
(4) J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (London 1930), p. 185.  
(5) C. M. Bowra, 'The Proem of Parmenides', *Classical Philology* XXXII, 2 (1937), pp. 97-112.  
(6) Cf. Aristotle, *Met.* A5 986 b 18.
178. ———. 1996. "Parmenides on Thinking Being." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 12:125-151.  
With a commentary by Stanley Rosen, pp. 152-162.



Reprinted in: G. Reschnauer (ed.), *Frü griechisches Denken*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005, pp. 227-251.

"At the end of one of his studies of Parmenides Heidegger wrote: "The dialogue with Parmenides never comes to an end, not only because so much in the preserved fragments of his 'Didactic Poem' still remains obscure, but also because what is said there continually deserves more thought." (1) Heidegger's diagnosis of the reasons for "this unending dialogue" is instructive-Parmenides' obscurity, on the one hand, and secondly, the merit of his words as a provocation of thought." (p. 125)

(...)

"In this paper I want to elucidate Parmenides' project on the assumption that we should approach him as a philosopher whose primary concern was to explore the activity of veridical thinking, and to identify its subject and object." (p. 126)

(...)

"Drawing upon his own philosophy, Heidegger offered a number of suggestions—some of them challenging, others perverse—about the way Parmenides took thinking to relate to Being. If I understand Heidegger, he tried to get inside the mind at work in Parmenides' poem, with a view to showing what it is like to think Being with Parmenides. My paper, though it is totally different from Heidegger's in method and findings, has that much in common with his.(5) I propose that Parmenides' first call on us is not to think about Being but to think about thinking Being (6). In modern jargon, Parmenides' project is a second-order inquiry. He is not purely or primarily a metaphysician. He is investigating mind, from the starting point that something is there—Being or truth—for mind to think." (p. 127)

179. Loux, Michael J. 1992. "Aristotle and Parmenides: An Interpretation of *Physics* A.8." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 8:281-319.

With a commentary by Arthur Madigan, pp. 320-326.

"Parmenides' argument for the impossibility of change so dominated Greek thinking that we can expect it to loom large in Aristotle's discussion of coming to be in *Physics* A, and we are not disappointed. After presenting his own analysis of coming to be in *Physics* A.7, Aristotle devotes all of A.8 to the argument.(1)" (p. 281)

(1) In attempting to understand Aristotle's response to the Parmenidean argument, one is struck by the fact that recent literature on A.8 seldom attempts to work through the difficult text of A.8. Those writing on the chapter typically provide inferential reconstructions of Aristotle's reply to Parmenides. As philosophically interesting as those reconstructions are, they tend to leave large chunks of the text unexplained. This paper is an attempt to identify the line of argument Aristotle actually employs in A.8. Its method is unabashedly that of extended philosophical commentary. I do not claim to have explanations of every line of the chapter, but I hope the paper goes some distance towards delineating the main contours of the argument of A.8. I make no apologies for my somewhat tedious attention to the details of Aristotle's response to Parmenides since I believe that clarity on the text of A.8 is a prerequisite to more general philosophical reflection of the sort that has typified recent literature on this chapter.

180. Mackenzie, Mary Margaret. 1982. "Parmenides' Dilemma." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 27:1-12.

Abstract: "Parmenides the Eleatic wrote a treatise which intrigued, puzzled and confounded the later philosophical tradition.(2) In it, he argued for a strong monism: what there is, is eternal, complete, immovable and unvarying, one and homogeneous (DK 28B 8.3-6).(3) All the rest, the world of perceptible things, is contradictory - or an illusion.

Strong monism is frighteningly radical. So Parmenides left a series of problems in his wake, some of which have proved so recalcitrant as to be dismissed with that counsel of despair 'it's a dialectical device'.(4) This paper addresses two of those problems, and recasts the dialectical device in a mood of optimism."

- (2) The secondary literature on Parmenides is extensive: cf. bibliographies in J. Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Vol.1 (London: 1979) (PP) and A.P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven: 1970). Like many students of ancient philosophy, I have benefited most of all from the work of G.E.L. Owen; see, for example, his classic 'Eleatic Questions' (EQ) in R.E. Allen and D.J. Furley eds. *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy*, Vol.II (London: 1975), 48-81: or 'Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present' in A.P.D. Mourelatos, ed, *The Presocratics* (New York: 1974). 271-292.
- (3) All references to H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Zurich: 1968) (DK).
- (4) Cf. Owen, EQ, 54.
181. Makin, Stephen. 2014. "Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus." In *The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Warren, James and Sheffield, Frisbee, 126-158. New York: Routledge.
- Abstract: "Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus, philosophers of the fifth century BC, are often grouped together by scholars. They are sometimes referred to collectively as the Eleatics, after Elea in southern Italy, the home city of both Parmenides and Zeno (Melissus came from the Greek island of Samos). The connection between them is generally taken to turn on an opaque set of views enunciated by the earliest of the three, Parmenides. Each of the three can be taken as representative of a distinct philosophical strategy. Parmenides was an innovator, in that he offered positive arguments for a novel and provocative set of views about the nature of reality. Zeno was a defender, in that he attacked those who thought Parmenides' ideas sufficiently absurd that they could be rejected out of hand. Melissus developed Parmenides' thought by arguing, often in fresh ways, for views which, while fundamentally Parmenidean, differed in some details from those originally set out by Parmenides. I will accept this framework in what follows, although this account of the relation between Parmenides, Zeno and Melissus is not universally accepted. (See Plato's *Parmenides* 126b–129a for the source of the view of Zeno as a defender of Parmenides; for critical discussion see Solmsen 1971, Vlastos 1975, Barnes 1982: 234–237; on Parmenides and Melissus see Palmer 2004; for a treatment of all three see Palmer 2009: Chapter 5.)" (p. 34)
- Bibliography  
 Barnes, J. (1982), *The Presocratic Philosophers* (revised single volume edition), London: Routledge  
 Solmsen, F. (1971), "The Tradition about Zeno of Elea Re-examined", *Phronesis* 16: 116–141  
 Palmer, J. (2004), "Melissus and Parmenides", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 26: 19–54  
 Palmer, J. (2009), *Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 Vlastos, G. (1975), "Plato's Testimony Concerning Zeno of Elea", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 95: 136–163
182. Malcolm, John. 1991. "On Avoiding the Void." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 19:75-94.
- "Several prominent scholars have maintained that a denial of empty space, or the void, is crucial to Parmenides' rejection of plurality and locomotion.' Plurality, for example, implies divisibility but there is no *what is not* (or void) to separate one supposed portion of *what is* from another. Hence *what is* is one. Locomotion, also, might well appear to need some (empty) room for manoeuvre, but such is precluded by the proclaimed 'fullness' of *what is*.
- Recently, however, interpreters of Parmenides have not been convinced that an appeal to the non-existence of a void plays a role in his denial of locomotion and plurality. The void is in fact never explicitly mentioned in his poem. More importantly, to introduce the void weakens Parmenides' position, for a *plenum* may be regarded as permitting both locomotion and plurality -- a situation adopted by his successors Empedocles and Anaxagoras. Moreover, at B 8. 22 Parmenides

- asserts that there cannot be any distinctions within *what is* and this principle is strong enough to preclude *any* locomotion or plurality. This renders an appeal to the absence of the void unnecessary as well as insufficient.
- Let me expand on this latter point with regard to both locomotion and plurality. In so doing I shall accept certain assumptions which shall require (and receive) subsequent identification and defence." (pp. 75-76, notes omitted)
183. ———. 2006. "Some Cautionary Remarks on the 'Is'/'Teaches' Analogy." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 31:281-296.
- "Parmenides says that 'what is not' cannot be thought of or expressed (fragments 2, 3, 6). Though there is no explicit filling after the forms of *einai*, let us not read them as 'exists', but let us see how far we can get without committing Parmenides to the view that we cannot think of, or refer in speech to, what does not exist.(10) If we understand an ellipsis and take the traditional alternative, the copula, Parmenides' dictum seems obviously true. If we cannot ascribe attributes to something, we cannot conceive of it (but see n. 7 above).
- By excluding not being Parmenides (fragment 8) derives an impressive(11) series of characteristics of Being. Most of these, i.e. one, unchanging, continuous, indivisible, and homogeneous, follow directly from the denial of differentiation. I shall urge that this key move is best read as taking being as incomplete, not as *existence*." (p. 284)
- (7) Kahn, 'Return', 386, quotes Plotinus as denying being to the One. He reads this as removing all predicative being, but not existence, from that sublime entity. It is unclear to me how this interpretation harmonizes with the view, which he champions, that the ancients did not (implicitly) distinguish existence from predication.
- (10) As against e.g. D. Gallop, *Parmenides of Elea: Fragments* (Toronto, 1984), 8. Brown (217–18) clearly presents the paradoxical results of limiting *esti* to 'exists'.
- (11) For Brown, 'startling' (216).
- Works cited:
- Brown, L., 'Being in the Sophist: A Syntactical Enquiry' ['Enquiry'], *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 4 (1986), 49–70.
- 'The Verb "to be" in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks' ['Verb'], in S. Everson (ed.), *Language* (Companions to Ancient Thought, 3; Cambridge, 1994), 212–236.
- Kahn, C., 'A Return to the Theory of the Verb be and the Concept of Being' ['Return'], *Ancient Philosophy*, 24 (2004), 381–405.
184. Maly, Kenneth. 1985. "Parmenides: Circle of Disclosure, Circle of Possibility." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 1:5-23.
- "This essay attempts to present Heidegger's reading of Parmenides, focusing on the lecture course of 1942-43, the lecture *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking* (1966), and the Zahringen Seminar (1973). It shows (a) Heidegger's dealing seriously with the texts of Greek philosophy, (b) his grappling with the issue of metaphysics, (c) the new possibility for philosophical thinking that his reading of the Greeks offers, and (d) his engagement in the difficult task of dismantling the history of Western thought (i.e., metaphysics) towards a new possibility for thinking. In dismantling the philosophy of Parmenides, Heidegger's work takes Parmenides' text deeper than the simplistic issue of "static being" over against "becoming"."
185. Manchester, Peter B. 1979. "Parmenides and the Need for Eternity." *The Monist* no. 62:81-106.
- "Greek ontology eventually developed a notion variously described as 'timeless', 'atemporal', or 'non-durational' eternity. In Proclus and Simplicius it is already a school-commonplace, with a stable vocabulary in which *aion* (eternity) is sharply distinguished from what is merely *aidios* (everlasting, occupying all times). Plotinus had perfected this notion beforehand, believing not only that he found it in Plato, but that Plato had developed it on Parmenidean grounds.

Until the last twenty years or so historians generally shared that view, on the ground of verbal agreement among familiar texts from Parmenides, Plato and the Neoplatonists.

(...)

But the criticism which distrusts the retrojection, via verbal agreement, of later conceptions into earlier argumentation has had this whole 'tradition' under intense scrutiny lately, and it has not held up uniformly well. It is no longer always conceded that the *aion* of Timaeus or the *aei on* of more common Platonic usage are nondurational, and there is increasingly frequent unwillingness to read an argument against duration in the Parmenides of our fragments.(1)" (P. 81)

"Parmenides contrived a discourse that had a different means of surviving verbatim than that of Heraclitan epigram, but survive it has. The proposal of this paper is that its treatment of time stabilizes it, provides the 'negative feedback' that holds the text homeostatic against millennia of emenders.

But what about eternity? Not the theological eternity, connected with divine omniscience and with theodicy, but the Greek ontological notion. Eternity, the Now of the All One, is not 'non-time' but the paradigm for the timeliness of numbered time." (pp. 99-100)

(1) W. Kneale, "Time and Eternity in Theology," *Aristotelian Society, Proceedings* (NS) 61 (1960-61), pp. 87-108.

186. Mansfeld, Jaap. 1981. "Hesiod and Parmenides in Nag Hammadi." *Vigiliae Christianae* no. 35:174-182.

"We have noticed that, in Plutarch, Parmenides' cosmogonic Eros plays an important part and that he also says that Parmenides spoke of a cosmogonic Aphrodite. This is Plutarch's name for the anonymous goddess who in Parmenides creates Eros (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B13, quoted *Amat.* 756 F29). The activities of this goddess are described in some detail in a fragment of Parmenides preserved by Simplicius only (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B12), and in a non-verbal quotation by the same Simplicius (*In Phys.*, p. 39, 20-1, cf. *Vorsokr.* ad Fr. 28B13).

Surprisingly, a substantial portion of the hymnic description of Eros in NHC 11, 5, is strikingly parallel to these Parmenidean passages:

NHC II [Nag Hammadi Codex II], 5, 109, 16ff. - Parmenides B12, 1-3; 4-5." (p. 179, notes omitted)

"Yet I am not going to argue that the author of NHC 11, 5 had read Parmenides, any more than he had read Hesiod. Above, I have suggested that the person responsible for the Gnostic treatise in the form in which it has come down to us was influenced by Greek literature

comparable as to its contents to passages in Plutarch." (p. 180)

187. ———. 1994. "The Rhetoric in the Poem of Parmenides." In *Filosofia, politica, retorica. Intersezioni possibili*, edited by Bertelli, Lucio and Donini, Pierluigi, 1-11. Milano: Franco Angeli.

"In the present paper, I wish to argue that Parmenides not only uses means we may call logical, but also avails himself of means we may call rhetorical. His logic is not a formal logic or *logica docens*, but a *logica utens*. In the same way, his rhetoric is not a *rhetorica docens* (not yet a τέχνη, as Aristotle would say) but a *rhetorica utens*. Aristotle, at the beginning of his *Rhetoric*, actually uses the concept of a *rhetorica utens*, for he points out that rhetoric and dialectic are very closely related and that all men, more or less, make use of both, either at random or from practice or acquired habit. It is this natural endowment which forms the basis of the art (1)." (p. 1)

(...)

"We may safely conclude that Parmenides wanted to convince his audience in every way possible not only by means of argument, but also by using every possible rhetorical effect. This explains why the concept of 'conviction' (and a number of words relating to this concept) occupies a key position in the poem (epanodos again); actually, the word for conviction and its relatives are even used as a means of conviction (41).



The maidens «knowingly persuade» the watcher at the Gate by using «blandishing arguments» (B1. 15-6): they know how to argue and to get their way (42). Truth is most persuasive (εὐπειθεός), whereas there is no true πίστις (43) in the views of men (B1.29-30). The way of 'what there is' is the way of conviction (πετθους B2.4). It is the power of norig which prevents something to come to be from what is not there (B8.12 ff.). True πίστις has driven away coming to be and passing away (B8.28-9). What mortals believe (πεποιθοτες) to be true is not so (B8.39b ff., cf. B1.30). The account of truth provided by the goddess and its comprehension is πιστος (B8.50-1).

This πίστις, one should point out, is brought about by rigorous argument; it is caused by proof. True. It does make a difference whether one is convinced by rhetorical means, or is so by logical means. But, as Aristotle says, a rhetorical proof (νιοTu;) is a kind of proof, and we are most fully persuaded when we assume that something has been proved (44). Often enough, the proofs in the poem involving πίστις are addressed ad hominem, that is to say are expressed in contexts containing the personal pronouns you and me (45), or verbs in the second or first person. The goddess is addressing her one-man public; the greater part of the poem is a formal logos (in verse) pronounced by her. What we would call logical proof is her most important instrument of conviction in the Way of Truth, but it is again and again presented as precisely such an instrument. In Parmenides' day, *logica* and *rhetorica* were still in their pre-technical stage of development and, in Aristotle's words, existed only as interrelated natural endowments. Parmenides of course knows what he is doing. Yet I would argue that for him the difference between rhetoric and logic was not as important as it would become in later times. Today, rhetorical and informal means of argument and of bringing about conviction have again become the object of serious study. But this is not my subject.\*

(1) Arist, *Rhet.* A 1,1354a1 ff.

(41) I have learned much from A.P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven and London 1970), 136 ff., but prefer an interpretation that is a bit more superficial.

(42) Cf. my paper cited above, n. 17, 274. [Cf. J. Mansfeld, "Bad World and Demiurge: A 'gnostic' Motif from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo", in M. J. Vermaseren and Roel B. Broek (eds.), *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions Presented to Gilles Quispel on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday*, Leiden 1981, repr. as Study XIV in Id., *Studies in Later Greek Philosophy and Gnosticism*, CS 292, London 1989), 273 n. 29.]

(43) Although I am as a rule opposed to *Wortphilologie*, I wish to remind the reader of the importance of this term in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

(44) *Rhet.* 1.1.1355a4-6, Since it is evident that artistic method is concerned with *pisteis* and since *pistis* is a sort of demonstration [apodeixis] (\*)

(45) See above, n. 27.

(\*) Translation by George A. Kennedy; Mansfeld cite the Greek text.

188. ———. 2005. "Minima Parmenidea." *Mnemosyne* no. 58:554-560.

Reprinted in J. Mansfeld, *Studies in Early Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Papers and One Review*, Leiden: Brill 2018, pp. 177-184.

Critical and exegetical notes on the following Fragments from Hermann Diels, Walther Kranz (eds.), *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*:

1. *A Handicap* Fr. B1.22-3a; 2. *A Subject* Fr. B2 1-5; 3. *A Way* B6.3; 4. *Changing Place and Colour* B 8.38-41.

189. ———. 2008. "A crux in Parmenides fr. B 1.3 DK." In *In pursuit of "Wissenschaft". Festschrift für William M. Calder III zum 75. Geburtstag*, edited by Heilen, Stephan [et al.], 299-301. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.  
Jaap Mansfeld proposes to read διὰ παντός in the fragment 1.3 DK instead of πάντ' ᾧστη.

190. ———. 2015. "Parmenides from Right to Left." *Études platoniciennes* no. 12:1-14.

Reprinted in J. Mansfeld, *Studies in Early Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Papers and One Review*, Leiden: Brill 2018, pp. 185-202.

Abstract: "Parmenides devotes considerable attention to human physiology in an entirely original way, by appealing to the behaviour and effects of his two physical elements when explaining subjects such as sex differentiation in the womb, aspects of heredity, and sleep and old age. Unlike his general cosmology and account of the origin of mankind, this topos, or part of philosophy, is not anticipated in his Presocratic predecessors. What follows is that the second part of the Poem, whatever its relation to the first part may be believed to be, is meant as a serious account of the world and man from a physicist point of view."

"The first to place the relation between the two parts of the Poem explicitly on the agenda was Aristotle, who says that Parmenides on the one hand placed himself beyond physics by postulating that there is only one immobile Being — but that, on the other hand,

constrained to follow the phenomena, he introduced two physical elements, the hot and the cold or fire and earth in order to construct the world, and in this way designed a theory of nature. A remarkable divergence, but not, it appears, a fatal one. Aristotle even provides a link between the two parts of the Poem by adding that Parmenides classified the hot as Being and the cold as non-Being.<sup>(4)</sup> That this particular link is most unlikely matters much less than that he endeavoured to find one.

(...)

In the present paper I shall be concerned with a substantial part of the history of this reception, and use it to try and draw some conclusions. Though for the sake of simplicity the evidence will not always actually be discussed from right to left, a fair amount of

backshadowing underlies most of the following inquiry." (pp. 1-2)

(4) Arist. *Met.* A.5 986b14–987a2 (= 28A24, in part). Cf. *Phys.* 1.2 184b26–185a1.

191. ———. 2018. "Parmenides on Sense Perception in Theophrastus and Elsewhere." In *Studies in Early Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Papers and One Review*, 2013-217. Leiden: Brill.

Abstract: "Theophrastus' account at *De sensibus* 3–4 shows (1) that he did not find evidence for a detailed theory of sense perception in Parmenides and (2) that he did not include our fr. 28B7 in his overview. The tradition followed by Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius concluded from 28B7 that Parmenides rejected the evidence of the senses in favour of that of reason (*logos*). But *logos* in Parmenides means 'argument', and *glōssa* is not the organ of taste but of speech. If Theophrastus had interpreted the evidence of 28B7 in the manner of Sextus and Diogenes he would have been obliged to discuss Parmenides' triad of purported senses between Plato's two and Empedocles' five."

192. Martin, Stuart B. 2016. *Parmenides' Vision: A Study of Parmenides' Poem*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- "Sifting through the various interpretations of Parmenides' poem from ancient times to the present-day, one might easily get the impression that there were two philosophers who went by the name "Parmenides." The first and much the older "Parmenides" was a religious seer warning about the danger of settling for a superficial reading of human experience. His visionary poem proclaims that Reality, although it may appear multiple, is as the mystics disclose, an all-comprehending One.<sup>1</sup> This Parmenides is credited with insights into the nature and meaning of the universe beyond that which reason alone can discover. This view of Parmenides might well be called, the "religious-mystical" view. However, for many if not most 20th century Western scholars, Parmenides was a protomodern philosopher weighing in against the naive religiosity of his time with a series of brilliant but flawed arguments which perhaps led him to conclude that being is one, but whose method in later, more skillful hands, has come to underpin the scientific (and naturalistic) outlook of the modern world. In short, many modern philosophers relying primarily on analytical procedures would claim Parmenides for themselves.

- Their interpretation of Parmenides, for want of a better name, could be called the "rationalist" view. The "religious-mystical" interpretation is firmly grounded in the belief that Parmenides' poem is precisely what it presents itself to be in its opening verses: a vision in which God appears to Parmenides and proclaims to him the way to that one-whole Truth which lies hidden behind the veil of appearances. However, the modern student of philosophy may never encounter any serious consideration of this view, for the pervasive opinion of modern specialists, usually followed uncritically by the textbook expositors, is that Parmenides is first and foremost a rationalist, and the opening scenario is merely a literary device." (p. 1)
193. Mason, Richard. 1988. "Parmenides and Language." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 8:149-166.  
Abstract: "Parmenides says very little about language. Yet what he says is important, both in the interpretation of his philosophy and more widely. This paper will aim to fit together a coherent understanding and to explain why his views have a wider interest. Four themes will be considered: the nature and extent of his critique of the use of language by mortals; his alleged position as a primordial philosopher of reference; the status of the utterances he puts into the mouth of his Goddess; and his apparent identification of speaking with existing or being."
194. Matson, Wallace I. 1980. "Parmenides unbound." *Philosophical Inquiry* no. 2:345-360.  
Abstract: "One may doubt whether any two scholars interpret Parmenides in exactly the same way. Nevertheless on one fundamental point they divide naturally and sharply into two camps, which I shall call the Majority and the Minority. The Majority hold that Parmenides intended the Aletheia part of his poem to be taken as expounding the absolute truth about τὸ εἶναι, in complete contrast to the Doxa part which presents an altogether untrue account of things that have no real existence. According to the Minority view, on the other hand, the Doxa was put forward as possessing some kind or degree of cognitive validity. In this paper I shall argue in advocacy of the Minority position."
195. Matthen, Mohan. 1983. "Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 28:113-135.  
Abstract: "This is an essay about the ontological presuppositions of a certain use of 'is' in Greek philosophy - I shall describe it in the first part and present a hypothesis about its semantics in the second. I believe that my study has more than esoteric interest. First, it provides an alternative semantic account of what Charles Kahn has called the 'is' of truth, thereby shedding light on a number of issues in Greek ontology, including an Eleatic paradox of change and Aristotle's response to it. Second, it finds in the semantics of Greek a basis for admitting what have been called 'non-substantial individuals' or 'immanent characters' into accounts of Greek ontology. Third, it yields an interpretation of Aristotle's talk of 'unities' which is crucial to his treatment of substance in the central books of the *Metaphysics*."
196. ———. 1986. "A Note on Parmenides' Denial of Past and Future." *Dialogue* no. 25:553-557.  
"In a recent issue of *Dialogue*, Leo Groarke attempts to defend the claim that Parmenides was committed to an atemporal reality.(\*)  
He argues like this:  
(1) In the Parmenidean dictum "[It] is and cannot not be" (B2.4), "is" means "exists", and is in the present tense (536).  
(2) (According to Parmenides) there is nothing that fails to exist (536).  
(3) It follows from (1) and (2) that "the past is not" and "the future is not" (537).  
(4) If the past and future are not, then the present is not. "All three tenses go down the drain together" (538), and so reality is atemporal." (p. 553)  
"The point that I have tried to make in this short discussion note is that one cannot be careless about the ontology that one attributes to Parmenides in order to make his ban on non-existence yield other results such as the ban on change, or the abolition of time. Groarke is not the only person to have done this: there are others who have

- thought that an ontology of facts is adequate to explaining Parmenides' denial of change.(6) Groarke, however, is in special trouble because his account demands, and does not just permit, facts." (p. 557)
- (6) For example, Montgomery Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology", in Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, ed., *The Pre-Socratics* (New York: Anchor Press, 1974), 260.
- (\*) Leo Groarke, "Parmenides' Timeless Universe", *Dialogue* 24/3 (Autumn 1985), 535-541.
197. McKirahan, Richard. 2008. "Signs and Arguments in Parmenides B8." In *The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy*, edited by Curd, Patricia and Graham, Daniel W., 189-229. New York: Oxford University Press.
- "David Sedley recently complained (1) that despite the enormous amount of work on Parmenides in the past generation, the details of Parmenides' arguments have received insufficient attention. (2) It is universally recognized that Parmenides' introduction of argument into philosophy was a move of paramount importance. It is also recognized that the arguments of fragment B8 are closely related. At the beginning of B8, Parmenides asserts that what-is (3) has several attributes; he offers a series of proofs that what-is indeed has those attributes. Some (4) hold that the proofs form a deductive chain in which the conclusion of one argument or series of arguments forms a premise of the next. Others (5) hold that the series of inferences is so tightly connected that their conclusions are logically equivalent, a feature supposedly announced in B5: "For me it is the same where I am to begin from: for that is where I will arrive back again." In act, close study of the fragments reveals that neither claim is correct. Here I offer a new translation of B8, lines 2-51, with an analysis of the arguments, their structure, their success, and their importance.(6) I begin with a caution. Many of Parmenides' arguments are hard to make out: even on the best arrangement of the available sentences and clauses they are incomplete. Since Parmenides lived before canons of deductive inference had been formalized, he may not have thought that there is need to supply what we regard as missing premises. The interpreter's job is not to aim for formal validity, but to attempt a reconstruction of Parmenides' train of thought, showing how he might have supposed that the conclusion follows from premises he gives. This is a matter of sensitivity and sympathy as much as of logic, depending on how we understand other arguments of his as well, and requires willingness to give him the benefit of the doubt -- up to a certain point." (p. 189)
- (1) Sedley, "Parmenides and Melissus," 113. Sedley's complaint applies to antiquity as well.
- (2) Jonathan Barnes is a notable exception to this tendency. I am indebted to his analysis in *Presocratic Philosophers*, chaps. 9-11.
- (3) So far as possible, I translate to eon by "what-is"; I avoid "being." The expression denotes anything that is (see note 18 here).
- (4) Notably Kirk & Raven 268
- (5) Owen, "Eleatic Questions."
- (6) In some places my discussion depends on interpretations of B2, B6, and B7 that are not presented here for want of space. I sketch my justification for controversial views in the notes.
- (18) Parmenides argues here that the second road of investigation, "is not," cannot be pursued, on the grounds that you cannot succeed in knowing or declaring what-is-not. The minimal complete thought characteristic of the first road is *eon* (or *to eon*) *estin* ("what-is is"), with "what-is" being a blank subject with no definite reference: anything that is, whatever it may turn out to be and however it may be appropriate to describe it or refer to it. Likewise for the second road: the blank subject of *ouk estin* ("is not") is *to me eon* (or *mé eon*) ("what-is-not"), and the minimal complete thought characteristic of the second road is *to me eon ouk estin* ("what-is-not is not"). The argument is not a refutation of "is not" as such. Nor is it a refutation of "what-is-not is not" in the sense of proving that that claim or thought is false. Instead Parmenides undermines "what-is-not is not" as a possible claim or thought. Since what-is-not cannot be known or declared, then a fortiori no claim



about what-is-not can be known or declared (for instance, that it is not). Therefore, not even the theoretically minimum thought or assertion about the second road is coherent; no one can manage to think (much less know) it or declare it. On Owen's view ("Eleatic Questions"), the second road is eliminated not at 2.7-8 but at 6.1-2, which establishes the subject of "is" to be not the blank subject I am proposing but whatever can be spoken and thought of. In my view, the second part of 6.1 (*esti gar einai*: "for it is the case that it is," which Owen translates "for it is possible for it to be") repeats the content of the first road (2.3), while the first part of 6.2 (*meden d' ouk estin*: "but nothing is not," which Owen translates "but it is not possible for nothing to be") repeats the content of the second road (2.5). with the appropriate "minimal" subjects supplied. Given these premises, it follows that it is false (and therefore not right) to think that what-is-not is or that what-is is not, but true (right) to do what the first part of line 6.1 says: "it is right both to say and to think that it [namely, the subject of "is"] is what-is." The importance of 6.1-2 thus consists in the introduction of minimal subjects for "is" and "is not" together with the associated truisms that what-is is and what-is-not (namely, nothing) is not. This prepares the way for the discussion of the first road in B8, exploring the nature of what-is. (p. 222)

198. ———. 2010. "Parmenides B8.38 and Cornford's Fragment." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 30:1-14.  
"Having established the attributes of τὸ εἶναι in a series of arguments that end at B8.33, in the following eight lines Parmenides goes on to explore implications of his earlier claim that 'you cannot know what is not ... nor can you declare it' (B2.7-8) in the light of the results obtained so far in B8.  
(...)  
One of the principal issues in dispute is the relation between a line quoted in two ancient sources (Plato's *Theaetetus* and a commentary on that work by an unknown author) and B8.38. Do those sources contain the true version of B8.38, an incorrect version of that line -- a misquotation of the true version, or an altogether different line? B8.38 is a pivotal line in the passage B8.34-41; as indicated above, I believe that it contains the end of the first part of the passage and the beginning of the second, although it is commonly understood differently." (p. 1)
199. Meijer, Pieter Ane. 1997. *Parmenides Beyond the Gates: the Divine Revelation on Being, Thinking and the Doxa*. Amsterdam: Gieben.  
Contents: Part I: Being and Thinking; Chapter I. The relation of Being and Thinking 3; Chapter II. Being and temporality 15; Chapter III. Being and spatiality 29; Chapter IV. Being and Matter 44; Chapter V. Tensions of a spatial and material Being and of Thinking within the identity of Being and Thinking 47; Chapter IV. Fragment 4 of the identity of Being and Thinking 54; Appendix: Parmenides and the previous history of the concept of Being 85; Part II. Being and Logic; Chapter I. The logical circle:98; Chapter II. The subject of *estin* 114; Chapter III. The logical procedure again 123; Part III. Doxa and Mortals; Chapter I. Ways and 'Doxa' 144; Chapter II. Scholarly views of the 'Doxa' 166; Chapter III. The basic error of fr. 8, 53,54 190; Chapter IV. Negative qualifications of the Doxa 208; Chapter V. A plea for the existence of the Doxa 217; Part IV. A panoramic survey of results 234; Bibliography 252-257; Indices 258-274.  
"Crucial will also be the discussion of the ways of inquiry Parmenides offers. Their detailed examination and delineation will appear to be of vital importance for the understanding of both Being and the Doxa. Anticipating my results, I would like to present as my view that the Doxa is not at all a way of inquiry, but that it must be seen as an optimized description of Parmenides' view on this world. It embeds many theorems of predecessors to give an accomplished, overall and insuperable picture of this world, which is radically separated from "the world" of Being. In Part I of this book the problems which arise from the identification of Being and thinking are examined. In Part II it is the issue of the relation of logic and Being that comes to the fore. In Part III I attempt to catalogue and assess the scholarly explanations given of the Doxa so far in order to clarify the problems and arrive at a

- view of my own. Many publications in this field are lacking in confrontation with other already existing opinions. In presenting my own views I confront the views of other scholars. Therefore, a panoramic survey of my results may facilitate the reading of this book. This is the reason why I added Part IV to provide a summary of my views and conclusions."
200. Miller, Fred Dycus. 1977. "Parmenides on Mortal Belief." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 15:253-265.  
 "I shall argue here that we, also, ought to accept Plato's judgment as to the philosophical merit of Parmenides' work. At the core of Parmenides' logic, I believe, we find neither a crude equivocation on the Greek word "to be" nor a crude confusion between meaning and reference or between meaning and truth, nor a bundle of modal fallacies. What we do discover is an important insight concerning the nature of thought and discourse, expressed in such a subtly (but disastrously) confused way that the valuable was not completely disentangled from the nonsensical until Plato wrote the *Sophist*.  
 The repudiation of the beliefs of mortals at the outset of "The Way of Seeming" is founded upon the "strife-encompassed proof" which is developed in "The Way of Truth." I will endeavor to clarify his reasoning, considering Parmenides' attack on naming and the repudiation of mortals' beliefs (Section I) and later his principle or dictum that "you cannot think or say what is not" (Section III). In trying to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Parmenides' reasoning, I will also make use of two arguments that were intentionally directed against Eleatic teachings: Leucippus's defense of the void (Section II) and Plato's defense of falsity (Section IV)." (p. 253)
201. Miller, Mitchell H. 1979. "Parmenides and the Disclosure of Being." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 13:12-35.  
 "The aim of this discussion is to offer an interpretation of the sense and intent of Parmenides' ἔστι. As the plethora and variety of excellent analysis attests, the problem is a perplexing one. The interpreter is faced with an intentionally fragmentary utterance - the ἔστι appears to stand alone, with its subject (and, possibly, predicate) ellipted - embedded in a collection of fragments from a lost whole poem which, in turn, is itself one of the few pieces of philosophical writing to survive from the sixth century B.C. I will argue in this essay, nonetheless, that the original context of the *ton* can be recovered and that, once this context is established, its sense can be fixed.  
 The key to my interpretation is a close reading of the proem. As it is, this passage is generally ignored in analyses of the argumentative substance of the poem." (p. 12)  
 "If this interpretation is correct, then Parmenides did not regard the contraries as mere illusion. 53 It is true that he does not provide any explicit ontological characterization of their secondary status or domain. That will be the work of Plato and Aristotle.  
 Nonetheless, in their accounts they are not overcoming a one-sided monism but, rather, completing a task for which Parmenides has established the starting-point and direction." (p. 28, note omitted)
202. ———. 2006. "Ambiguity and Transport: Reflections on the Proem to Parmenides' Poem." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 30:1-47.  
 "Let me begin by distinguishing an ultimate and a proximate task for these reflections. The ultimate task, a perennial one for students of Greek philosophy, is to understand just what Parmenides lays open for thinking and speaking when, in the so-called Truth section of his poem, fragments 2 through 8. 49, he isolates the 'is' (ἔστι) that is 'the steadfast heart of . . . truth' (1. 29). The proximate task is to explore the context Parmenides gives us for this ultimate task, the proem's account of the transformative journey to and through 'the gates of the paths of Night and Day' that brings the traveller into the presence of the truth-speaking goddess.' We modern-day philosophers have generally been reluctant to pursue this exploration too closely, not only because we are accustomed to draw a sharp distinction between poetry and philosophy, a distinction that, arguably, did not take hold in the

- Greek world until Aristotle, but also, more to the point at present, because Parmenides' proem seems riddled with ambiguity. This is not wrong; indeed, as I shall try to show, its ambiguity is both more extensive and more central than has been recognized heretofore. But I shall also try to show that it is a resource, not a liability; by the close of these reflections I hope to have made compelling that and why bringing the ambiguity of the proem into good focus is key to a well-oriented turn to our ultimate task, understanding the 'is'." (p. 1)
203. Minar Jr, Edwin L. 1949. "Parmenides and the World of Seeming." *American Journal of Philology* no. 70:41-55.  
 "In summary, the legislative activity of Parmenides and his association with the politically-minded Pythagoreans show him to be capable of taking interest in practical affairs. The very fact of his writing a didactic poem, the rhetorical warmth of its style, the elaboration of the second part as a socially valuable doctrine, all show that his philosophy is not alien to this interest.  
 And the appropriateness of his intellectual position to his position in life and the correlation of his views with those of other thinkers, opposing and agreeing, which are sometimes expressed in social terms, make it seem not unlikely that he was influenced in their formation by his reaction to the problems of the " world of seeming."  
 In so far as he had an immediate aim of conviction and conversion, it is questionable how successful he can have been in it.  
 Certainly he attracted a number of brilliant and devoted disciples, but it was naive to expect many to follow the severe, logical development of his thoughts, and a type of theory which almost everyone must regard as absurd-or to expect many to be influenced strongly by a system frankly presented as truly false and only second-best. Yet his greatness, as was said at the outset, is as a thinker, not as a statesman, and his important influence was not upon his contemporaries but upon later philosophers." (p. 55)
204. Mogyoródi, Emese. 2006. "Xenophanes' Epistemology and Parmenides' Quest for Knowledge." In *La costruzione del discorso filosofico nell'età dei Presocratici = The construction of philosophical discourse in the age of the Presocratics*, edited by Sassi, Maria Michela, 123-160. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale.  
 Abstract: "The purpose of this essay is to explore the role Xenophanes' theory of knowledge might have played in the formation of Parmenides' central metaphysical concerns. It provides a detailed study of Xenophanes' epistemic tenets clarified within the context of his theology and cosmology. It argues that although Xenophanes' epistemic ideas were formulated within the intellectual historical context of traditional 'poetic pessimism', an examination of his theology and cosmology indicates that inasmuch as he radically departed from the traditional notion of the divine and the divine-human relationship, his epistemology created an ambiguous epistemic setting that proved provoking for the new paradigm of knowledge philosophical speculation introduced in early Greece. Parmenides responded to this crisis by a metaphysical inquiry into the rationale of 'the quest' and the nature of reality in a way by which he brought about a fundamental breakthrough toward a new methodology to attain scientific certainty.  
 Since Xenophanes' epistemology was essentially related to his theology, Parmenides' response necessarily entailed a new conception of the divine-human relationship."
205. Montemayor Romo de Vivar, Carlos. 2006. *Time and Necessity in Parmenides*. Long Island City NY Seabum.
206. Morgan, Kathryn. 2000. *Myth and Philosophy from Presocratics to Plato*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 On Parmenides see pp. 67-86.  
 "A study of the fragments of Parmenides' philosophical poem concerning the possible types of human enquiry provides an opportunity for an in-depth analysis of

one suggestive use of myth in Presocratic philosophy. We have argued that Xenophanes defined his philosophical aspirations by excluding poetic/mythological practice. Herakleitos appropriated and transformed mythological elements in order to draw attention to the failings of traditional myth as an adequate system of signification. Both philosophers are concerned with the problematic relationship of language and reality. Yet in both cases poetry and mythology, although important, even crucial targets, are not *structuring* principles in their philosophy. When one moves to the fragments of Parmenides, one is in a different world. Although Parmenides' mythology is non-traditional, his search for knowledge is communicated to the reader through familiar motifs of quest and revelation and is attended by divine mythological beings. His wisdom is expressed in epic hexameters, which, although commonly stigmatised as clumsy and pedestrian, transport us back to the poetic and mythological realm of Homer and Hesiod. (1) What on earth was Parmenides about?

In this section, I shall characterise the ways in which Parmenides chooses to talk about his insight into the problems of being. Treatments of Parmenides sometimes imply that the mythological framework of the poem is a veneer that can be stripped away to reveal pure philosophical argument. On the contrary, mythological elements are integrated into the argument, and interpreting their status is one of the crucial philosophical problems in the poem. Separating Parmenides' *mythos* from *logos* he speaks the same tendency we saw in the interpretation of Xenophanes' literary ethics and theology: the desire to tidy up philosophy (separate *mythos* from *logos*) so that it conforms to modern perceptions of its subject matter and method. The idea that literary presentation might have philosophical import is ignored. There is, however, no dichotomy between logic on the one hand, and metaphor and myth on the other. This is to argue in terms which would have been foreign to Parmenides. Problems of mythological style and philosophical content are not only parallel, they are expressions of the same difficulty, the relationship between thought and its expression. Here Parmenides follows in the footsteps of his predecessors as he focuses on the problems of myth as a way of symbolising the difficulties inherent in all language.

Parmenides wishes to make his audience aware of the non-referentiality of what-is-not. He does this through logical argument and by developing mythological figures of presentation that transgress the conclusions of his argument. Both argument and literary presentation problematise the status of the audience; there is a paradoxical incoherence between the world in which we live and the uniqueness and homogeneity of what-is. These difficulties are mirrored in the uncertain relationship of the narrator of the poem (the *kouros*), Parmenides the author, and the goddess who reveals the truth. The goddess replaces the Muse, but the source of inspiration is uncertain. Let us first survey the main features of the revelation, emphasising the close connection between thought and being, along with the key themes of narrative persuasion and conviction. We will then engage in a close reading of the mythological framework of the poem to show how it structures and elaborates the key themes of the rest of the poem. Finally we shall consider the poem as a series of nested fictions that draw attention to problems in the relationship of language and reality, problems of which the mythological framework is paradigmatic." (pp. 67-68)

(1) Parmenides may also have included Orphic elements, which would again contribute to a sense of comfortable orientation in a tradition (Mourelatos 1970: 42). For a recent, but unconvincing, attempt to find Orphism in Parmenides, see Böhme 1986.

207. Morrison, J.S. 1955. "Parmenides and Er." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 75:59-68.

Abstract: "The aim of this paper is to explore the suggestion that Parmenides's poem, or at any rate some of it, has light to throw on the difficulties of the myth of Er in the *Republic*. Parmenides descends to the underworld as a shaman-poet in search of knowledge, Er goes there by the fortuitous circumstance of his death-like



trance; but both *katabaseis* share a common setting, and in both the hero is shown a glimpse of the real shape and mechanism of the universe. In the case of Parmenides the exhibit is two-fold, both 'the unshakeable heart of rounded truth' and 'the opinions of men in which there is no true belief'. Interest has been mainly concentrated on the former, metaphysical, section, from which the greater part of our fragments derive; but the latter contained, in the system of *stephanai* (\*), an account of the appearance of the universe, which is interesting, both on its own account and in view of the light it throws on the difficulties of Er's myth. I shall consider first (I) the setting of Parmenides's poem as it appears in the opening lines, then (II) propose an interpretation of the system of *stephanai*, and (III) seek support for some of its main features in the general tradition of cosmological speculation from Homer downwards. Finally (IV), I shall proceed to examine the myth of Er and offer an interpretation of some of its difficulties which will take account of this body of earlier thought."

[(\*) "Parmenides, on the other hand, in fact [proposes] a fabrication. He makes up something like a wreath—he calls it a *stephanē*—a continuous blazing circle of light which encircles the heaven, and he calls it god." Cicero *On the Nature of the Gods* i, 11, 28 (*Dox.* 534, 14–535, 8) cited by A. H. Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides*, Revised and Expanded Edition, Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing 2009, *Testimonia* 54, p. 144.]

208. Mosimann, Robert. 2001. "Parmenides. An Ontological Interpretation." *Philosophical Inquiry* no. 23:87-101.  
 "Presocratic scholarship is a rare phenomenon and even when it occurs, often commences from misguided tenets. Anglo-American philosophy has been much preoccupied by linguistic analysis and logical concerns. Regretfully these concerns of the day have been foisted upon Parmenides as if he too were a shadow of today's illusions in philosophy.  
 This paper has several objectives, however, the principal one will be to provide an Ontological interpretation of Parmenides in replacement of the Logical Ones which have come to dominate Anglo American scholarship.  
 The second concern of this paper will be to correctly interpret "estai" and "that which is" in Parmenides as well as to determine the existential status of the objects of everyday experience.  
 Finally, we will discuss Parmenides conception of time and whether "that which is" is atemporal, eternal or neither." (p. 87)
209. Mourelatos, Alexander. 2014. "The conception of *eoikōs/eikōs* as epistemic standard in Xenophanes, Parmenides, and in Plato's « Timaeus »." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 34:169-191.  
 "There are books on the pre-Socratics, and there are books on Plato.[\*] Except in general histories of ancient Greek philosophy, the border that marks off Plato's philosophy of the cosmos and of nature from the thematic domain of corresponding accounts offered by the pre-Socratics is not crossed very often. Among exceptions to this pattern, one that is both well known and distinguished is Gregory Vlastos' 1975 book, *Plato's Universe*. And now Jenny Bryan's *Likeness and likelihood in the Presocratics and in Plato* is a welcome addition to the genre, and indeed a specially worthy complement to *Plato's Universe* inasmuch as Bryan deals with topics that had not been central in Vlastos' account.  
 The book's project is announced by Bryan ('JB' henceforth) as one of developing 'an intertextual reading of [Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Plato's] use of *eoikōs/eikōs*. Her narrative of intertextuality is engaging, and it is elegantly told in well-organized sections and sub-sections. It comprises careful and sensitive analyses of the target Greek texts; and it reflects wide and searching reading of the relevant studies in the secondary literature. She shows herself well-trained and adroit in the deployment of the twin methods her topic calls for: the conscientious philologist's scrupulous examination of words in their context and in their history; the analytic philosopher's probing of concepts and the dialectical canvassing of issues and of

- candidates for solutions. The entire narrative involves four stages. which I summarize in what immediately follows." (p. 169 notes omitted)  
[\* Discussion of Jenny Bryan, *Likeness and Likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato*]
210. Mourelatos, Alexander P. D. 1965. "φράζω and Its Derivatives in Parmenides." *Classical Philology* no. 60:261-262.  
"Ever since Vilhoison's 1788 (\*) publication of the Venetus scholia to Homer, classical philologists have been alert to the fact that φράζω may not (and usually does not) carry the meaning *dico* in early Greek poetry. It has rather a concrete sense, the core or root of which is "to point out," "to show," "to indicate with a gesture," "to appoint," "to instruct."  
(...)  
I would like to suggest here that the early, concrete sense of φράζω will improve the translation of 2. 6-8 and will also give us the key to the translation of that puzzling adjective πολύφραστοι applied to the horses in 1. 4." (p. 261)  
[\*] Jean-Baptiste-Gaspard d'Ansse de Vilhoison, *Homeri Ilias ad veteris codicis Veneti fidem recensita. Scholia in eam antiquissima*, Venetiis, 1788.
211. ———. 1969. "Comments on 'The thesis of Parmenides'." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 22:735-744.  
About the paper by Charles Kahn (1969).  
"The first of the two routes outlined by the Parmenidean goddess in fr. 2 is given this interpretive formulation in Kahn's paper: "It (whatever we can know, or whatever there is to be known) is a definite fact, an actual state of affairs." (1) Kahn explains that Parmenides intends to assert "not only the reality but the determinate being-so of the knowable object," in other words, that he posits existence both "for the subject entity" and "for the fact or situation which characterizes this entity in a determinate way" (pp. 712-713).  
As indicated by Kahn's use of the pronoun "whatever," the thesis has the force of universality. (2) Let me condense the formulation into a single proposition:  
(1) For all p, if p is known, then p is true iff (3) there actually exists a certain F and a certain x such that Fx.  
What should count as the denial of (1) P Presumably either:  
(2) It is not the case that for all p, etc. [as in (1)];  
or, more explicitly,  
(3) There is a p such that: p is known, and p is true even though a certain x does not exist, or a certain F does not obtain.  
If (1) is an adequate formulation of Parmenides' first route (which according to Kahn it is), then (3) ought to be the correct formulation of the second route. But Kahn's own formulation is significantly different. The first of the two "partial aspects" he distinguishes, the aspect of nonexistence of the subject, he formulates as the claim "that an object for cognition does not exist, that there is no real entity for us to know, describe, or refer to." The second aspect, nonexistence of a certain state of affairs, he expresses as the claim "that there is . . . no fact given as object for knowledge and true statement: whatever we might wish to cognize or describe is simply not the case" (p. 713). Either aspect could be condensed in either of the following formulations:  
(4) There is no p such that: p is known, and p is true iff there actually exists a certain F and a certain x such that Fx.  
(5) For all p, if p is known, then p is true if a certain x does not exist or a certain F does not obtain.  
It should be noticed immediately that (4) and (5) are alternative formulations not of the contradictory of (1) but of its contrary. If anything is clear about the argument in Parmenides' poem, it is that he intends the two routes as exclusive alternatives, the one a contradiction of the other.' Kahn's analysis thus appears to involve an imprecise formulation of the opposition between the two Parmenidean routes."  
(1) Charles H. Kahn, "The Thesis of Parmenides," pp. 711-712. References to the paper will hereafter be given mostly in the text and by page number only.

- (2) The formulation of p. 714 has similar scope: "*esti*" claims only that something must be the case in the world for there to be any knowledge or any truth." The deflating expressions "only" and "something" should not mislead; the governing universal quantifier is in the pronoun "any."
- (3) The usual abbreviation for "if and only if."
- (4) But Kahn says (p. 713) that Parmenides' second route "would deny both assertions" (i.e., both the ascription of existence to *x* and the ascription of actuality to *F*). The "both" seems to be an over-statement not required by Kahn's interpretation.
- (5) Kahn recognizes this (p. 706). The point I am making has nothing to do with the fact. that. the modal clauses in the two routes of fr. 2 are related as contraries. Propositions (1)-(5) are formulations of the nonmodal clauses of the routes.
212. ———. 1970. *The Route of Parmenides: a Study of Word, Image, and Argument in the Fragments*. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
New, revised edition including a new introduction, three additional Essays and a previously unpublished paper by Gregory Vlastos, *Names of Being in Parmenides*, Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2008.  
Reprint of the pages 222-263 (abridged and slightly revised) with the title: "The Deceptive Words of Parmenides' 'Doxa' " in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.), *The Pre-Socratics. A Collection of Critical Essays*, Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974; second revised edition: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 312-349.  
Contents: Returning to Elea: Preface and Afterword to the revised and expanded edition (2008) XI-L; Part I. The route of Parmenides: a study of word, image, and argument in the Fragments: Use of Greek and treatment of philological and specialized topics LIII; Abbreviations used in Part I LVII-LIX; 1. Epic form 1; 2. Cognitive quest and the Route 47; 3. The vagueness of What-is-not 74; 4. Signposts 94; 5. The bound of reality 115; 6. Persuasion and fidelity 136; 7. Mind's commitment to reality 164; 8. Doxa as acceptance 194; 9. Deceptive words 222; Appendix I. Parmenides' hexameter 264; Appendix II. Interpretations of the Subjectless *esti* 269; Appendix III. The meaning of *kré* and cognates 277; Appendix IV. Text of the Fragments 279; Supplementary list of works cited in Part I. 285; Part II. Three supplemental Essays; Abbreviations used in Part II 297; 10. Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the naive metaphysics of things 299; 11. Determinacy and indeterminacy, Being and Non-Being in the Fragments of Parmenides 333; 12. Some alternatives in interpreting Parmenides 350; Part III. The scope of naming: Gregory Vlastos (1907-1991) on B.38 and related issues (Essay not previously published: "Names" of being in Parmenides, by Gregory Vlastos 367; Indexes to Parts I-III 391-408.  
"My own aim has been to steer a middle course, keeping three points in sight: (a) Parmenides' relation to the epic tradition; (b) the deep and central involvement of his thought in the sequence of Greek philosophy from Thales to Plato; (c) the supra-historical dimension of the concepts, problems, and arguments in the poem.  
The book is not intended as a commentary on the fragments. For this one must still turn to Hermann Diels' *Parmenides' L.ehrgedicht* (Berlin, 1897) and to the two more recent commentaries: Mario Untersteiner's *Parmenide: testimonianze e frammenti* (Florence, 1958) and Leonardo Taran's *Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary and Critical Essays* (Princeton, 1965). The most up-to-date, comprehensive account of the various interpretations of individual lines and passages will be found in the Italian revision of Zeller's history of Greek philosophy: E. Zeller-R. Mondolfo, *La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico*, Part I, 3, "Eleati," ed. G. Reale (Florence, 1967), pp. 165-335.  
As the subtitle of the present study indicates, I have concentrated on the actual language of the fragments: on analyzing the meaning of key words, on articulating arguments, and on exploring the context and morphology of images in the poem. These three aspects I see as congruent. The study of Parmenides' vocabulary reveals that the key terms are embedded in certain paradigms involving analyzable logical structures. They provide trace lines for the argumentation—the logical grammar of

the words channels the course of the argument. A similar point can be made with reference to the second aspect mentioned in the subtitle. The imagery introduced in the narrative prelude (B1) is preserved, to an important extent, through verbal echoes in the rest of the poem. But the images do not function evocatively, to suggest a mood, or to point to a symbolic value. Rather, they come in certain configurations of motifs or themes, familiar from Homer (especially the *Odyssey*) and from Hesiod. The imagery can thus provide a sort of logical calculus for the argument, as well as paradigms or-models for the radically new concepts of knowledge and reality which Parmenides strives to formulate.

I might best summarize all this in saying that I have tried to do justice to the fact that Parmenides composed a philosophical argument in the form of an epic poem. In accordance with this approach, I have also tried to show in the concluding chapter that the poem's dramatic setting, rudimentary as it is (an all-knowing goddess in a double relation to "ignorant mortals" and to a privileged youth, who is entrusted with a revelation to be subsequently communicated to his fellow men), interacts in important ways with the rhetoric and the argument of the poem as a whole. (The comparison with Plato is, once again, apposite.)" (from the *Preface* to the first edition, 1970, pp. XIV-XV)

"In the nearly four decades that have passed since the Yale University Press edition, the volume of literature on Parmenides, both books and Essays, has exploded. Accordingly, a thorough and fully updated revision is out of the question. It could only be a total re-writing of the book.

Let me, then, clarify at the outset the scope of "revised and expanded." On its subject, *The Route of Parmenides* inevitably reflects the *status quaestionis* of the mid- and late- 1960s. The revisions in the present reissue of the Yale Press book (Part I of this volume) are modest: mostly corrections of misprints; altering or adjusting some misleading formulations; editing some egregiously dated phrases, such as "X has recently argued," or "in this [twentieth] century"; and the like. All this was done with care not to change the arabic-number pagination (except for the Indexes) of the Yale Press edition; for it was my concern not only to keep costs of production low but also to ward off the emergence of inconsistencies in citations of the book in the literature.

(...)

If the revisions are delicate and unobtrusive, the expansion is substantial and obvious. Part II reprints three Essays of mine, composed in the mid- and late-1970s, in which I sought to supplement, to strengthen, and in some respects also to modify theses that were advanced in the original edition of the book (theses that are still represented here in Part I). As in the case of the text in Part I, slight adjustments and corrections have been made for the reprinting of the three Essays. But the type-setting and pagination in Part II are, of course, new. Part III consists of a previously unpublished essay by Gregory Vlastos. The rationale of publishing posthumously this essay by Vlastos, as well as that of reprinting my own three previously published Essays, is perhaps best given in the course of a narrative, which immediately follows here, of my engagement with the thought of Parmenides over the years. Additional comments and afterthoughts, ones that reflect my present views on crucial points of interpretation, will be presented in the course of the narrative and in the closing sections of this Preface." (from the Preface to the Revised and Expanded Edition, 2008, pp. XI-XIII)

213. ———. 1971. "Mind's Commitment to the Real: Parmenides B8 34-41." In *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, edited by Anton, John P. and L., Kostas George, 59-80. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"An expanded version of this paper appears as chapter 7 of my book, *The Route of Parmenides*" (p. 59)

"In proposing to undertake here yet another argument on the analysis of the passage, I do not aim for anything like certainty or finality of exegesis. This would be too much to hope for, when we are working at such small scale, and all the more so in the case of pre-Socratic



- studies, where the evidence itself is limited and fragmentary and our controls over language and background only too imperfect. Rather it is through an analysis of this passage that I can explain most clearly and directly a certain conception of the relation of mind to reality for which I also find evidence in other texts, in some of the characteristic aspects and themes of Parmenides' poem, and which I consider philosophically and historically important. So let me proceed directly to the analysis, not pausing to review or to formulate the status quaestionis, but taking up points of controversy as they arise." (pp. 59-60)
214. ———. 1973. "Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Naive Metaphysics of Being." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy*:16-48.  
Supplementary vol. I: E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty (eds.), *Exegesis and Argument. Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos*, Assen: Van Gorcum.  
Already published as chapter 10 of *The Route of Parmenides: a Study of Word, Image, and Argument in the Fragments*.
215. ———. 1976. "Determinacy and Indeterminacy: Being and non-Being in the Fragments of Parmenides." In *New Essays on Plato and the Pre-Socratics*, edited by Shiner, Roger and King-Farlow, John, 45-60. Guelph: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy.  
"The main argument in Parmenides' didactic poem begins with these remarks by the unnamed goddess who delivers the revelation (B2 in Diels-Kranz *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*): [follow a translation of B2-B8, here omitted]  
Modern students of Parmenides have agonized over the question as to how precisely we are to construe the first *esti* and the *einai* of the positive "route," and the *ouk esti* and *me einai* of the negative "route". The older solution was to attempt to guess the identity of the suppressed subject from the context, and then to supply it in the translation (e.g., "Being exists . . . or "Something exists," or "Truth exists...," or "The route (*hodos*) exists...," and the like). In more recent years a certain consensus has developed, at least in English-language literature, that Parmenides' argument depends on suppressing the subject initially; that it is his intention to allow the subject to become gradually specified as one ponders the logic and implications of the two routes. Within that wider consensus, my own argument has been (2) that Parmenides' subjectless *esti* in B2 is best understood as {syntactically} a bare copula, with both its subject and its predicate complement deliberately suppressed. The route *esti* would thus represent not a proposition or premise but the mere form or frame of propositions that characterize their subject in positive terms, "\_\_\_ is \_\_\_" or "x is F" r for variable x and F; the route *ouk esti*, correspondingly, would represent the form of propositions that characterize their subject in negative terms, "\_\_\_ is not \_\_\_" or "(x is not-F)," for variable x and F.  
Of the arguments which, I believe, justify this construction, I shall restate here only those that can be presented most briefly; I shall also present some fresh considerations and additional evidence; and, on certain points, I shall qualify or attempt to elucidate my earlier account." (pp. 46-47 some notes omitted)  
(2) *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven and London. 1970.1. pp. 51-55. 70. 269-76; "Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Naive Metaphysics of Things" in *Exegesis and Argument*, pp. 40-46; "Comments on 'The Thesis of Parmenides.'" *The Review of Metaphysics*, 22 (1969), 742-44.
216. ———. 1979. "Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides." *The Monist* no. 62:3-14.  
"In the work of interpreting Parmenides we have witnessed in the 'sixties and 'seventies, in English language scholarship, that rarest of phenomena in the study of ancient philosophy, the emergence of a consensus. Four interpretive theses now seem quite widely shared: (a) Parmenides deliberately suppresses the subject of *esti*, "is," or *einai*, "to be," in his statement of the two "routes" in B2, his intention being to allow the subject to become gradually specified as the argument unfolds. (b) The

negative route, *ouk esti*, "is not," or *me einai*, "not to be," is banned because sentences that adhere to it fail to refer (semantically speaking) to actual entities - the latter to be understood broadly, as will shortly be stated in thesis (d). (c) The argument does not depend on a confusion between the "is" of predication and the "is" of existence. (d) In the relevant contexts, *esti* and *einai* involve a "fused" or "veridical" use of the verb "to be"; in other words, *esti* or *einai* have the force of "is actual" or "obtains," or "is the case," envisaging a variable subject x that ranges over states-of-affairs. (1)

I formulate the four theses as abstractly and schematically as I can to do justice to the considerable variation of scholarly opinion that obtains within the consensus. It is clear, nevertheless, that the four theses concern fundamental points, and so one may even speak of the emergence of a standard Anglo-American interpretation of Parmenides-let me refer to it as "SI," for short." (p. 3)

"In several respects, which correspond to the criteria of adequacy just cited, SI falls short. I detail these shortfalls in the next five paragraphs. The considerations I offer do not amount-I hasten to emphasize - to a refutation of SI. But they do provide pointers of the directions in which Feyerabendian alternatives might be sought." (p. 5)

(1) See G.E.L. Owen, "Eleatic Questions," (1960), W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy: Vol. II, The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus*, pp. 6-57; Montgomery Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology," (1968) Charles H. Kahn, "The Thesis of Parmenides" (1969); Michael C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (1971), pp. 127-148; David J. Furley, "Notes on Parmenides" (1973); Edward Hussey, *The Presocratics* (1972), pp. 78-99; T. M. Robinson, "Parmenides on Ascertainment of the Real" (1975) [references abbreviated].

My formulation both of the consensus and of alternatives fails, unfortunately, to take into account a major new interpretation of Parmenides: Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 155-230, which appeared after the present paper had already gone to print.

217. ———. 1979. "'Nothing' as 'not-Being': some literary contexts that bear to Plato." In *Arktouros. Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday*, edited by W., Bowersock Glen, Walter, Burkert and C.J., Putnam Michael, 319-329. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.  
Reprinted in: John P. Anton, Anthony Preus (eds.), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy. Vol. II: Plato*, Albany: State University of New York Press 1983, pp. 59-69.

"It has often been noticed that Plato, and before him Parmenides, assimilates "what is not" (μηδέν or οὐδέν). (1) Given that the central use of "nothing" has important ties with the existential quantifier ("Nothing is here" = "It is not the case that there is anything here"), it has widely been assumed that contexts that document this assimilation also count as evidence that both within them and in cognate ontological contexts the relevant sense of "being" or "to be" is that of existence. That this assumption is not to be granted easily, has been compellingly argued by G. E. L. Owen. (2) His main concern was to show that the assumption is particularly mischievous in the interpretation of the *Sophist*, where he found it totally unwarranted. My own concern is to attack the assumption on a broader plane. "Nothing" in English has uses that do not depend on a tie with the existential quantifier. So too in Greek: *meden* or *ouden* can be glossed as "what does not exist," but it can also be glossed as "not a something," or in Owen's formulation, "what is not anything, what not in anyway is": a subject with all the being knocked out of it and so unidentifiable, no subject." (3) In effect, the assimilation of "what is not" to "nothing" may—in certain contexts—work in the opposite direction: not from "nothing" to "non-being" in the sense of non-existence; rather from "non-being" as negative specification or negative determination to "nothing" as the extreme of negativity or indeterminacy. To convey the sense involved in this reverse assimilation I borrow Owen's suggestive translation "not-being" for μέ ov, a

- rendering which makes use of an incomplete participle, rather than the complete gerund, of the verb "to be."
- (1) See Parmenides B 6.2, cf. B 7.1, B 8.7-13, B 9.4; Plato *Rep.* 478 B 12-C 1, *Th.* 189 A 10, *Soph.* 237 C7-E 2. Cf. G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in *Plato, I, Metaphysics and Epistemology*, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, N.Y., 1971), pp. 225-227.
- (2) Owen, "Plato on NotBeing," pp. 241-248 and passim. For use of this assumption in interpreting Parmenides, see D. J. Furley, "Notes on Parmenides," in *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos*, Phronesis, suppl. vol. 1 (Assen and New York, 1973) 12.
218. ———. 1981. "Pre-Socratic Origins of the Principle that There are No Origins from Nothing." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 78:649-665.  
 "Even those who might question the truth of the *ex nihilo nihil* principle would readily concede that this principle itself could not have sprung from nothing. The origins are in pre-Socratic philosophy.  
 (...)
 But the earliest text with a recognizable version of the *ex nihilo nihil* (henceforth ENN) is Parmenides B8.7-10." (p. 649)  
 "This will not be a complete story of the origins of ENN, but I hope enough will be said to clear the way for renewed appreciation of the tenor of Aristotle's thesis.(\*)  
 My concern is not to vindicate Aristotle but to bring out conceptual connections and implications in pre-Socratic fragments." (p. 651)  
 (\*) "from what-is-not nothing could have come to be, because something must be present as a substratum" (*Phys.* I.8.191a30-31).
219. ———. 1999. "Parmenides and the Pluralists." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 32:117-129.  
 The article discusses Patricia Curd's *The Legacy of Parmenides* (1998).  
 "Curd does not read Parmenides as a philosopher of the One. Her view is that Parmenides sought to establish formal criteria for what should properly count as 'what-is' or 'the real' (the physis or 'nature' of things) in a rationally constructed cosmology. Such an entity - or such entities - should indeed be unborn, imperishable, unchanging, and inherently complete." (pp. 117-118)  
 (,,,)
 "In offering my own critical comments on the book, let me start by posing this question: Given that the basis for Curd's larger narrative is her interpretation of Parmenides, what exactly is that basis and how secure is it? Since half of the book is devoted to Parmenides, let me take up separately and at some length four salient theses in Curd's interpretation of Parmenides." (p. 120)
220. ———. 2011. "Parmenides, Early Greek Astronomy, and Modern Scientific Realism." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 167-189. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing. Reprinted in Joe McCoy (ed.), *Early Greek Philosophy. The Presocratics and the Emergence of Reason*, Washington: The Catholic University Press 2013, pp. 91-112.  
 Summary: " "Doxa," the second part of Parmenides' poem, is expressly disparaged by Parmenides himself as "off-track," "deceptive," and "lacking genuincredence." Nonetheless, there is good evidence that "Doxa" included some astronomical breakthroughs. The study presented here dwells on fragments B10, B14, and B15 from the "Doxa," and especially on the term *aidēla*, interpreted as "causing disappearance," in B10.3. The aim is to bring out the full astronomical import of Parmenides' realization of four related and conceptually fundamental facts: (i) that it is the sun's reflected light on the moon that explains lunar phases; (ii) that it is the sun's glare which, as the sun moves in its annual circuit, causes the gradual seasonal disappearance of stars and constellations, and that the absence of such glare explains their seasonal reappearance; (iii) that it is likewise the sun's glare which causes the periodic disappearance, alternately, of the Morning Star and the Evening

- Star, and it is the absence of such glare that allows, alternately and respectively, for the reappearance of each of these stars; and (iv), a ready inference from (iii), the realization that the latter supposedly two stars are an identical planet.
- In seeking to make sense of the paradoxical antithesis of "Truth" vs. a disparaged yet scientifically informed "Doxa," the present study explores two modern analogues: Kant's doctrine of the antithesis of "things-in-themselves" (or "noumena") vs. "appearances" (*Erscheinungen* or "phaenomena"); and the twentieth-century doctrine of scientific realism, notably propounded by Wilfrid Sellars. The latter model is judged as more apt and conceptually more fruitful in providing an analogue for the relation between "Truth" and "Doxa." "
221. ———. 2012. "'The Light of Day by Night': *nukti phaos*, Said of the Moon in Parmenides B14." In *Presocratics and Plato. Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn*, edited by Patterson, Richard, Karasmanis, Vassilis and Hermann, Arnold, 25-58. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
- "The earliest securely attested record of the discovery that the moon gets its light from the sun is in the second part of Parmenides' poem, the "Doxa": in the one-line fragments B14 and B15.(1) In an earlier study, I have used the term "heliophotism" as a succinct reference to the correct explanation of lunar light;(2) and for convenience I shall use the neologism again here. Daniel W. Graham has made a strong case in favor of the claim that the two fragments present heliophotism as a discovery made by Parmenides himself.(3)
- (...)
- My concern in this study is not with the issue of attribution of the discovery but quite narrowly with the correct reading of the text in B14. Nonetheless, as I hope to establish, once the correct reading is determined, the deflationary position will be decisively undercut. Moreover, the correct reading will give us a statement that is semantically more nuanced, superior in astronomical accuracy, and rhetorically and poetically more expressive.
- B15 will come up for supporting quotation later in the present essay. But the important amplification it provides for B14 needs to be kept in mind throughout." (pp. 25-27)
- (1) See Daniel W. Graham, "La Lumière de la lune dans la pensée grecque archaïque," in *Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie Présocratique*, eds. André Laks and Claire Louguet (Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 2002), 351–380, esp. 363–378; see also Graham's *Explaining the Cosmos: The Ionian Tradition of Scientific Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 179–182.
- (2) "Xenophanes' Contribution to the Explanation of the Moon's Light," *Philosophia* (Athens), 32 (2002), 47–59. In that publication, as well as in *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. 2nd ed. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2008), 224–225, I had uncritically accepted the emendation *nuktiphæas*, which is what I dispute in the present essay.
- (3) See references to Graham in note 1 above.
222. Nehamas, Alexander. 1981. "On Parmenides Three Ways of Inquiry." *Deucalion* no. 33/34:97-111.
- Reprinted in: A. Nehamas, *Virtues of Authenticity. Essays on Plato and Socrates*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 125-137.
- "We often take Parmenides to distinguish three "ways of inquiry" in his poem: the way of being, that of not being, and the way which combines being and not being; and to hold that of these only the first is to be followed.
- This approach, originating in Reinhardt, (1) is now canonical (2). G.E.L. Owen, for example, writes that Parmenides aims to rule out two wrong roads which, together with the remaining right road, make up an exhaustive set of possible answers to the question *estin e ouk estin*;... The right path is an unqualified yes. The first wrong path is an equally unqualified no... There is no suggestion that anyone ever takes the first wrong road... It is the second, the blind alley described in... B6, that is



followed by 'mortals'. . To take this well-trodden path... is to say, very naturally, that the question *estin e ouk estin*; can be answered either yes or no (3).

The text of B6. 1-5 (...) can be translated as:

What is for saying and for thinking must be; (4) for it can be,  
while nothing cannot; I ask you to consider this.

For, first, I hold you back from this way of inquiry,  
and then again from that, on which mortals, knowing nothing, wander aimlessly,  
two headed...

Simplicius' manuscript, where this fragment is found, contains a lacuna after *dizesis* in line 3. Diels supplied *eirgo* and took lines 4ff. to follow directly afterwards. (5) Thus, the goddess scents to proscribe two ways of inquiring into being. This text, however, exhibits certain peculiarities which suggest that this view awes serious difficulties. The purpose of this paper is to present these peculiarities, discuss the difficulties, and to suggest, if cautiously, an alternative to the text and to the view it engenders." (pp. 97-98)

(1) Karl Reinhardt, *Parmenides and die Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie*, (reps. Frankfurt A.M., 1959) pp. 18-32.

(2) David J. Furley, "Notes on Parmenides", in E.M. Lee et al., *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos* (Assen, 1973), pp. 1 - 15; W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. II (Cambridge, 1965); G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1957); A.P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven, 1970); G.E.L. Owen, "Eleatic Oiteslions", *Classical Quarterly*, N.S. vol. 10 (1960), pp. 85 - 102; Michael C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).

(3) Owen, pp. 90-91.

(4) For this construction, see Furley, p. 11.

(5) See Diels' comment in his apparatus to the Prussian Academy edition of Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (Berlin, 1882), p. 117.

223. ———. 2002. "Parmenidean Being / Heraclitean Fire." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 45-64. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"The facts are these.

Parmenides and Heraclitus lived at about the same time, at opposite ends of the Greek- speaking world. Parmenides constructed a rigorously abstract logical argument in vivid verse. Heraclitus composed a series of striking paradoxes in obscure prose. They are both difficult to understand. They are both arrogantly contemptuous of their predecessors as well as their contemporaries, to whom they usually refer as 'the many' or 'mortals.(1) They have been taken to stand at opposite philosophical extremes: Parmenides is the philosopher of unchanging stability; Heraclitus, the philosopher of unceasing change.

The rest is speculation.

That is not a criticism. Most of the speculation is not idle: it is interpretation, based partly on the texts and partly on a general sense of the development of early Greek philosophy. But interpretation it is and, as such, each of its aspects affects and is, in turn, affected by every other. One of these is the idea that, though close contemporaries, Heraclitus and Parmenides wrote successively and that whoever wrote later criticizes the other: either Heraclitus denounces Parmenides (2) or Parmenides attacks Heraclitus.(3) Testimony to the continuing influence of the ancient diadoche-writers, that assumption bears directly on the interpretation of both philosophers. In particular, if, as most people today believe, Parmenides is answering Heraclitus, we need to find in Heraclitus views that Parmenides, in turn, explicitly rejects in his poem.(4)

I want to question this assumption - not necessarily to reject it, but to show exactly how it affects our interpretation of both Parmenides and Heraclitus.(5) I would also like to outline, in barest form, an alternative understanding of their thought which takes them to write in parallel and not in reaction to one another. (6)" (pp. 45-46)

- (1) Heraclitus also names some of the targets of his criticisms (for example, B 40, B 42, B 56, B 57, B 81, B 106, B 129).
- (2) That is the view of Reinhardt, [*Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*] 1916.
- (3) A notable exception is Stokes [*One and Many in the Presocratic Philosophy*], 1971, pp. 109-23, who believes that each can be understood quite independently of the other. For full references to the debate, see Daniel W. Graham, '*Heraclitus and Parmenides*' (in this volume, pp. 27-44). Graham offers a strong defense of Patin's thesis to the effect that Parmenides is directly concerned with criticizing Heraclitus in his poem.
- (4) More cautiously, we need to assume that Heraclitus must at least have appeared to have held views which Parmenides rejects in his poem.
- (5) It is an assumption that is important to two of the best recent studies of Parmenides and Heraclitus: Curd [*The Legacy of Parmenides*], 1998 and Graham [*Heraclitus' Criticism of Ionian Philosophy*], 1997, as well as to the latter's '*Heraclitus and Parmenides*.' Both, not incidentally, are as deeply indebted to A. P. D. Mourelatos as I am in my own inadequate celebration of his work, which this essay constitutes.
- 6 My view of the relationship between Parmenides and Heraclitus is similar to that of Stokes 1971, though the implication I draw from it for my interpretation of their views differ from his in many ways.
224. Northrup, Mark D. 1980. "Hesiodic personifications in Parmenides A 37." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* no. 110:223-232.  
 "At *De Natura Deorum* 1.11.28 (= DK 28 A 37), Cicero's speaker Velleius first describes that deity who presides over, then identifies several other divine inhabitants of, Parmenides' World of Seeming"  
 (...)
 "Developing an idea of Karl Reinhardt, Karl Deichgraber took these words as evidence that Parmenides populated his world of doxa with personified abstracts arranged in antithetical pairs. (2)"  
 (...)  
 "In his book on Parmenides, Leonardo Tarán rejected this theory of contrary potencies, asserting that ultimately there was "no evidence" to support it.(7) That such evidence does, however, exist (although considered by neither Reinhardt nor Deichgraber) I hope to show in what follows. I hope to do so, moreover, in a way which will shed a measure of new light not only on Parmenides' poem but also on an important aspect of the Theogony, viz., Hesiod's use of personification. (pp. 223-225)  
 (7) L. Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton 1965) 250. The Reinhardt-Deichgraber position is supported by H. Schwabl, "Zur Theogonie bei Parmenides und Empedokles," *WS [Wiener Studien]* 70 (1957) 278-289.
225. O'Brien, Denis. 1993. "Non-Being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus: a Prospectus for the Study of Ancient Greek Philosophy." In *Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers*, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 1-26. London: University College London Press.  
 English version of "Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon, Plotin", in Pierre Aubenque (ed.), *Études sur le Sophiste de Platon*, Napoli: Bibliopolis 1991, pp. 317-364.
226. ———. 2000. "Parmenides and Plato on What is Not." In *The Winged Chariot: Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk*, edited by Kardaun, Maria and Spruyt, Joke, 19-104. Leiden: Brill.  
 "Plato, in writing the *Sophist*, "did not consider it beneath his dignity to return to the great Parmenides". Any reader of Plato's dialogue must therefore do likewise. But whose Parmenides should we return to? If modern interpretations of the *Sophist* are legion, so too are the reconstructions that are currently on offer, from modern scholars, of the fragments of Parmenides.

Which one should we take on board?

Two names in particular stand out. Miss G. E. M. Anscombe was a close associate of Wittgenstein, and is generally acknowledged as one of the leading philosophers of her day. Professor W. K. C. Guthrie was a pupil of F. M. Cornford, and is the only historian of ancient philosophy who has had both the knowledge and the ambition to undertake a history of Greek philosophy that would rival the great work of Eduard Zeller.<sup>(2)</sup> Both scholars therefore have impeccable credentials. Both have written on Parmenides.<sup>(3)</sup>

One or other or both, one might surely think, will have been able to recover from the extant fragments ideas that will make sense of the criticisms of Parmenides that loom so large in Plato's *Sophist*." (p. 19)

(2) See Guthrie (1962-1981). Sadly, Guthrie did not live to complete his majestic enterprise; the last volume takes us only as far as Aristotle. Cf. Zeller (1844) and (1919-1920). Gomperz (1896-1909) is too chatty to be a serious rival.

(3) Guthrie (1965) 1-80. Anscombe (1969), reprinted in Anscombe (1981) 3-8. Cf. O'Brien (1987) 206 n. 25. Miss Anscombe goes so far as to entitle the first volume of her *Collected papers* (1981) *From Parmenides to Wittgenstein*. Obviously therefore she does not consider her contribution on Parmenides to be a mere *πάρπεργον*."

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O'Brien, D. (1987) *Études sur Parménide*, sous la direction de Pierre Aubenque, tome I, *Le Poème de Parménide, Texte, Traduction, Essai Critique "en collaboration avec Jean Frère pour la traduction française"* (Paris).

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-- (1919-1920) *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, ed. W. Nestle, 3 Teile, 6 Abteilungen (Leipzig).

227. ———. 2013. "Does Plato refute Parmenides?" In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 117-155. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. "I have a couple of times ventured to suggest that in the *Sophist* Plato does not refute Parmenides.<sup>(2)</sup> The reaction has been, to say the least, hostile.<sup>(3)</sup> Hostile, with more than a touch of disapproval. You might have thought I had suggested that the Queen of England was a man. The suggestion was not only false, but foolish. A mere eye-catcher. Absurd, and unseemly." (p. 117)
- (...)

"Both Empedocles and Parmenides are understandably chary, though for different reasons, of the 'names' commonly applied to the phenomena of the visible world by those who know no better. Names commonly in use do not at all match what Empedocles believes to be the true explanation of such phenomena, the explanation inspired by his 'white-armed Muse' (cf. fr. 3.3). Still less do they match the message of Parmenides' goddess, dwelling beyond the Gates of Night and Day (fr. 1.11) and claiming to disprove the very possibility of anything whatever coming-into-being or passing-away (fr. 8.26 –28). All the many things that we mortals think to see, 'coming into being and passing away, being and not being, changing place and altering their bright colour', so Parmenides would have us believe, are 'no more than a name' (cf. fr. 8.38 –41)." (p. 155)

- (2) O'Brien (*Le Non-Être, Deux études sur le 'Sophiste' de Platon*, Sankt Augustin 1995) 87 – 88, ('Parmenides and Plato on What is Not', in M. Kardaun and J. Spruyt (eds.), *The Winged Chariot, Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in honour of L. M. de Rijk*, Leiden, Boston, Köln 2000) 94-98.
- (3) Monique Dixsaut, *Platon et la question de la pensée*, Paris (2000) 269 n. 2.
- Notomi, N., "Plato against Parmenides: *Sophist* 236D-242B", in S. Stern-Gillet and K. Corrigan (eds.), *Reading Ancient Texts*, vol. I: *Presocratics and Plato, Essays in honour of Denis O'Brien*, Leiden-Boston (2007) 167-187.
228. Osborne, Catherine. 2006. "Was there an Eleatic revolution in philosophy?" In *Rethinking Revolutions Through Ancient Greece*, edited by Goldhill, Simon and Osborne, Robin, 218-245. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- "My concern in this chapter is with Parmenides' effect on the immediately subsequent generation of philosophers, the fifth-century Presocratics. Of course, there is no question that Parmenides was important for Plato. He figures prominently in the late dialogues, and arguably instigated, through Plato, a metaphysical trend that was indeed revolutionary, at least from the perspective of modern philosophy. But such delayed responses are not my focus here.(5) I am simply asking whether we should detect a radical change in the way cosmology was pursued and defended immediately after Parmenides' poem hit the public domain." (p. 219)
- "On the orthodox story, Parmenides was targeting the group of sixth-century predecessors whom we classify as the first philosophers, particularly the Ionian cosmologists, Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes. Each of these, so we are told, tried to derive a plural world - the world as we know it now - from a single stuff (water for Thales, air for Anaximenes and so on). They thought that the many could be explained in terms of the one from which it was ultimately derived. By contrast, so the story goes, Parmenides was succeeded by a generation of pluralists, in particular Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the atomists (Leucippus and Democritus). Their choice of plural principles was motivated, so we are told, by their recognition of the force of Parmenides' criticisms.
- Scholars differ as to whether these so-called pluralists were attacking Parmenides' conclusions or endorsing and incorporating them. Some read them as rejecting the Eleatic doctrines, both monism and the prohibition on change: hence the pluralists aimed to refute Parmenides or at least to reduce the significance of his claims, Others read the pluralists as warm towards Parmenides' outlook. On this view the 'Eleatic pluralists'<sup>6</sup> adjusted their cosmology to meet Parmenidean criteria; they appealed to fundamental principles, atoms for instance, that were indeed indivisible and unchanging, as Parmenides' arguments had demanded.
- Nothing hangs on which variant we prefer, The pattern is the same: anti-cosmological motives for Parmenides' intervention, and a subsequent attempt to rehabilitate cosmology in dialogue with Parmenidean principles.
- \Xlwhether the later thinkers were pro- or anti- Parmenides is insignificant to the structure of this reconstruction." (p. 220)
- (5) For a full treatment of Plato's reading of Parmenides see Palmer (1999).
- (6) This title (originally applied to the atomists by Wardy (1988)) is adopted by Graham (1999) 176, to apply to Empedocles and Anaxagoras. Wardy challenges the reader, at page 129, to choose between ditching the traditional account of a post-Parmenidean response by the atomists, or improving on the traditional version of how atomism is a response. My chapter (unlike his) favours the former solution, though my target is not actually atomism (for which there is good evidence of a post-Parmenidean motivation).
229. Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane. 1960. "Eleatic Questions." *Classical Quarterly*:84-102. Reprinted with additions in: D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen, *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy*. Vol. II: *The Eleatics and Pluralists*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975 pp. 48-81 and in: G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science, and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986 pp. 3-26.



"The following suggestions for the interpretation of Parmenides and Melissus can be grouped for convenience about one problem. This is the problem whether, as Aristotle thought and as most commentators still assume, Parmenides wrote his poem in the broad tradition of Ionian and Italian cosmology. The details of Aristotle's interpretation have been challenged over and over again, but those who agree with his general assumptions take comfort from some or all of the following major arguments. First, the cosmogony which formed the last part of Parmenides' poem is expressly claimed by the goddess who expounds it to have some measure of truth or reliability in its own right, and indeed the very greatest measure possible for such an attempt. Second, the earlier arguments of the goddess prepare the ground for such a cosmogony in two ways. For in the first place these arguments themselves start from assumptions derived from earlier cosmologists, and are concerned merely to work out the implications of this traditional material. And, in the second place, they end by establishing the existence of a spherical universe: the framework of the physical world can be secured by logic even if the subsequent introduction of sensible qualities or 'powers' into this world marks some decline in logical rigour. These views seem to me demonstrably false. As long as they are allowed to stand they obscure the structure and the originality of Parmenides' argument." (p. 84)

230. ———. 1966. "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present." *The Monist*:317-340.

Reprinted in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.), *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974 and in: G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science, and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986 pp. 27-44.

Some statements couched in the present tense have no reference to time. They are, if you like, grammatically tensed but logically tenseless. Mathematical statements such as "twice two is four" or "there is a prime number between 125 and 128" are of this sort. So is the statement I have just made. To ask in good faith whether there is still the prime number there used to be between 125 and 128 would be to show that one did not understand the use of such statements, and so would any attempt to answer the question. It is tempting to take another step and talk of such timeless statements as statements about timeless entities. If the number 4 neither continues nor ceases to be twice two, this is, surely, because the number 4 has no history of any kind, not even the being a day older today than yesterday. Other timeless statements might shake our confidence in this inference: "Clocks are devices for measuring time" is a timeless statement, but it is not about a class of timeless clocks. But, given a preoccupation with a favored set of examples and a stage of thought at which men did not distinguish the properties of statements from the properties of the things they are about, we can expect timeless entities to appear as the natural proxies of timeless statements.

Now the fact that a grammatical tense can be detached from its tense-affiliations and put to a tenseless use is something that must be discovered at some time by somebody or some set of people. So far as I know it was discovered by the Greeks. It is commonly credited to one Greek in particular, a pioneer from whose arguments most subsequent Greek troubles over time were to flow: Parmenides the Eleatic. Sometimes it is suggested that Parmenides took a hint from his alleged mentors, the Pythagoreans. "We may assume" says one writer "that he knew of the timeless present in mathematical statements." 2 But what Aristotle tells us of Pythagorean mathematics is enough to undermine this assumption. According to him (esp. *Metaph.* 1091a12-22) they confused the construction of the series of natural numbers with the generation of the world. So Parmenides is our earliest candidate. His claim too has been disputed, and I shall try to clear up this dispute as I go, but not before I have done what I can to sharpen it and widen the issues at stake." (pp. 317-318)

231. Owens, Joseph. 1974. "The Physical World of Parmenides." In *Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Pegis*, edited by O'Donnell, Reginald J., 378-395. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

232. ———. 1975. "Naming in Parmenides." In *Kephalaion. Studies in Greek Philosophy and Its Continuation Offered to Professor C. J. de Vogel*, edited by Mansfeld, Jaap and Rijk, Lambertus Marie de, 16-25. Assen: Van Gorcum.
- "Naming for Parmenides, the texts show, is basically the conventional process by which a word or expression is established to designate a thing. Metaphorically it is extended, in one reading of Fr. B 8,38, to cover the conventional establishing of perceptible things as expressions or names for the unique immobile being. It may be either right or wrong. It is right when, either by words or by perceptible constructs it designates being, the only thing positively there to be named. Accordingly the thinking out and writing and reciting of Parmenides' poem is perfectly legitimate. Naming, however, has always to be based on a positive characteristic or distinguishing mark. It is therefore illegitimate when conventionally applied to not-being. Not-being, having no characteristics at all, cannot be known and cannot be expressed in speech. But mortals do in fact mistakenly name not-being, on the basis of the characteristics of night, darkness, ignorance, earth, thickness, heaviness. They obtain these distinguishing marks by dividing bodily appearance -- for the corporeal is the only kind of being recognized by Parmenides -- into these characteristics and their opposites. This whole process is wrong, for there is no not-being to be named, and the characteristics assigned to it, though appearing positive, are in reality negations. But with the second basic form so named and its characteristics so established, and with equal force given to both, the differentiations and changes in the perceptible universe may be explained. To understand them and treat of them as in this way human conventions, is truth. To believe that the differentiations and changes are the true situation, is the *doxa*. Naming is accordingly for Parmenides a conventional process throughout which being remains sole and sovereign both in the perceptible world and in human thought and speech. Every sensible thing and every human thought and word is being. To understand that, is to be on the road of the goddess while thinking and speaking. Recognized clearly as naming the one immobile being, human thought and language and living are thoroughly legitimate. Parmenides may legitimately continue in them, even though according to *doxa* they and all perceptible things are differentiated and are engendered and perish, and "for they inert have established a name distinctive of each" (Fr. B 19,3). The important philosophical consequence is that for Parmenides perceptible things can retain all the reality and beauty they have in ordinary estimation, and still function as names for the one whole and unchangeable being." (pp. 23-24)
233. ———. 1979. "Knowledge and 'Katabasis' in Parmenides." *The Monist* no. 62:15-29.
- "The relation between imagery and philosophy in the poem of Parmenides has occasioned much discussion in recent years. One item of particular import has been the direction taken by the journey that was so inspiringly pictured in the opening section. Is the travel upwards? Or is it downwards? Or is it rather cross-country, either aloft, or on the earth's surface, or in the depths of the nether world? Further, if there is cross travel on any of these three levels, is the direction from east to west, or from west to east?
- Readily acceptable is the stand that the text itself does not explicitly specify either upward or downward direction.(1)" (p. 15)
- "Yet one guiding principle seems obligatory from the start. If correct historical and literary exegesis of the poem should run counter to any particular interpretation of the philosophy, the interpretation can hardly be considered acceptable. Parmenides' introduction, if even ordinary literary skill is accredited to him, has to be in harmony with what it is meant to introduce.
- The effects of a *katabasis* norm in assessing Parmenides' conception of human knowledge could be especially devastating. A study of the problem in the global context of the various directions found in the poem by commentators is accordingly indicated. The reasons for the ascent, the descent, and the surface journey need to be probed from the viewpoints of their weight and their reciprocal

exclusiveness. In a panoramic survey of this kind the salient thrusts that bear upon the philosophic interpretation of the poem should become manifest." (p. 17)

(1) For critiques of alleged indications of an ascent, see *infra*, nn. 11-12. Towards the end of the nineteenth century Hermann Diels, *Parmenides: Lehrgedicht* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1897), p. 8, had observed: [Nor does the way to God become us vividly described. We do not even hear if it goes down or up.] This warning was approved by Walter Burkert, "Das Proomium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras," *Phronesis*, 14 (1969), p. 2, n. 3, maintaining "[It is more correct, however, to omit the vertical, the top and the bottom at all]" (p.15). Burkert, however, defends a *katabasis* rather than an *Auffahrt*. A bibliography on the topic may be found in Maja E. Pellikaan-Engel, *Hesiod and Parmenides: A New View on Their Cosmologies and on Parmenides' Proem* (Amsterdam: Adolph M. Hakkert, 1974), pp. 104-109.

Note: I give the English translation of the texts by Diels and Burkert, cited in the original German by Owens.

234. Palmer, John. 2004. "Melissus and Parmenides." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:19-54.

"Detailed consideration of Plato's representations and uses of Parmenides shows that he would not have subscribed to the contemporary view of Parmenides that makes it possible to see Melissus as faithfully replicating the essential features of his thought. In fact, the view

of Parmenides as a strict monist seems to have been something of a minority interpretation in antiquity."

(...)

"... I shall try to avoid presuming at the outset any particular interpretation of Parmenides. Although I do want to argue that Melissus is more original than he has previously been taken to be, it would be improper to do so by simply adopting an understanding of Parmenides that differs from those presumed by previous assessments. Instead, I shall begin by focusing on the unquestionable adaptations of Parmenides and the equally unquestionable departures from him in Melissus' conception of what is and in his argumentation for the various attributes of what is. While the majority of these departures have been recognized by others, I believe that the full impact of their collective weight has yet to be realized.

The differences between Parmenides' and Melissus' conceptions of what is and the structures of their argument are extensive enough to prompt reconsideration of the view that the 'overall structure' and the 'general intellectual nucleus' of Parmenides' and Melissus' philosophy 'are one and the same'." (pp. 21-22)

235. ———. 2009. *Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: 1. Parmenides' place in Histories of Presocratic Philosophy 1; 2. Parmenides' Three Ways 51; 3. The way of the Goddess and the Way of Mortals 106; 4. What Must Be and What Is and Is Not 137; 5. Zeno, Melissus and Parmenides 189; 6. Anaxagoras and Parmenides 225; 7. Empedocles' Element Theory and Parmenides 260; 8. Parmenides' Place in Presocratic Philosophy 318; Appendix: The Fragments of Parmenides' Poem 350; Bibliography 388; Index locorum 405; General index 422-428.

"Parmenides of Elea is the most brilliant and controversial of the Presocratic philosophers.

This book aims to achieve a better understanding of his thought and of his place in the history of early Greek philosophy. To this end, I here develop and defend a modal interpretation of the ways of inquiry that define Parmenides' philosophical outlook. He was, on this view, the first to have distinguished in a rigorous manner the modalities of necessary being, necessary nonbeing or impossibility, and contingent being. He himself specifies these modalities as what is and cannot not be, what is not and must not be, and what is and is not. Accompanying this fundamental ontological distinction is a set of epistemological distinctions that associates a distinct form of cognition with each mode of being. With this

- framework in place, Parmenides proceeds to consider what what must be will have to be like just in virtue of its mode of being and then to present an account of the origins and operation of the world's mutable population." (*Preface*, VI)
236. Papadis, Dimitris. 2005. "The Concept of Truth in Parmenides." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 23:77-96.  
 "In this paper I shall endeavor to define the concept of truth, which is very closely related to the βροτων δοξαι, and to the so-called δοκούντα. Truth in Parmenides manifests itself as divine revelation bestowed upon a chosen individual, namely Parmenides himself. No doubt, this revelation is no more than a poetic-mythical-religious model of teaching, which does not substantially affect the content thereof." (p. 77)  
 "The word ἀλήθεια occurs in three fragments, namely B 1.29, B 2.3, and B 8 .51. Its meaning is not defined in any of them. This is to say that Parmenides has not attempted a systematic theoretical approach to the problem(6)." (p. 78)  
 "In conclusion, we have in Parmenides a tripartite scheme, as far as the cognitive approach to things is concerned: a) *doxa*, true or false, b) *ta dokounta* = true *doxai*, mainly of universal reference, and c) *aletheia*. *Doxa* and *dokounta* refer to the perceptible aspect of the world, whereas *aletheia* refers to the inner Being of the world. Access to the truth is, according to the poem, a preserve of Parmenides. Still, it is understood that this is also possible for everyone possessed of his exceptional spirituality." (p. 95)
237. Pelletier, Francis. 1990. *Parmenides, Plato and the Semantics of Not-Being*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction XI-XXI; 1. Methodological preliminaries 1; 2. Parmenides' problem 8; 3. Plato's problems 22; 4. Some interpretations of the *symploke eidon* 45; 5. The Philosopher's language 94; Works cited 149; Index locorum 155; Name index 159; Subject index 163-166.  
 "As the title indicates, this is a book about Plato's response to Parmenides, as put forward in Plato's dialogue, the *Sophist*. But it would be a mistake to think that the difficulties raised by Parmenides and Plato's response are merely of antiquarian interest, for many of the same problems emerge in modern discussions of predication and (especially) of mental representation of natural-language statements. The intricacies and difficulties involved in giving a coherent account of Plato's position will be familiar to scholars in the field of ancient Greek philosophy, as will be the general philosophic difficulty to which Plato is responding- the Parmenidean problem of not-being.  
 This introduction is written to show to philosophers interested more in natural-language understanding and knowledge-representation than in ancient philosophy that the issues being grappled with by Plato remain crucial to these modern enterprises, and to show classical philosophers that many of the interpretive choices they face have modern analogues in the choices that researchers in cognitive science make in giving an adequate account of the relations that must hold among language, the mind, and reality." (from the Introduction).
238. Pelliccia, Hayden. 1988. "The Text of Parmenides B 1,3 (D-K)." *American Journal of Philology* no. 109:513-522.  
 "With the removal (1) of all manuscript authority from ἄστη, [from the Fragment B 1.3] editors may resort to defense of the transmitted text or to conjectural restoration based upon "palaeographical likelihood." I believe they should do neither." (p. 507)  
 (...)  
 "By way of conclusion, some general remarks on το ἓν will be in order. Parmenides' use throughout the poem of the singular (το ἓν) is an innovation the purpose of which is not far to seek. In earlier writers there is found only the plural (τα ἕντα), used, usually τα τ' εἰσομένα προ τ' εόντα, to describe reality in terms of its constituent elements.(24) This tendency to use the plural to designate reality is evident in Heraclitus (whom some have thought to be a special target of



Parmenides' argument (25) ), both in the famous πάντα ῥεῖ and especially B7 D-K εἰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καπνὸς γένοιτο, ῥῖνες ἂν διαγνοῖεν: as clear an assertion of the enduring multiplicity of real entities as can be found anywhere. Parmenides, in denying multiplicity, would have been required, for the sake of logical consistency, to shun the established use of the plural πάντα τὰ ὄντα and to adopt the singular παντὸς ἔον. (26)" (p. 512)

(1) The results of Coxon's re-examination of N have been corroborated by L. Tarán, *Gnomon* 49 (1977) 656, n. 15, [review article of Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides*] who has himself inspected the Ms.

(24) In most of these passages (for example, in all the instances of the formula listed by West on Hes. *Th.* 32) the plural participles designate the objects of knowledge; this point should be of interest to those who maintain that the subject of ἐστὶ throughout Parmenides is "the objects of discourse or inquiry" (e.g., J. Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers* [London 1982] 163; G. E. L. Owen, "Eleatic Questions," *CQ* n.s. 10 [1960] 84-102 = D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen, *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy II* [London 1975] 48-8 I). If my restoration of παντὸς ἔον is accepted at B 1.3, it can be resupplied as object of εἰδότης: 'the road which bears the man who knows [all that exists] over all that exists'.

(25) See Guthrie, *Hist. Gk. Phil.* I, 408, n. 2, and II, 23f.

(26) I wish to thank Professors A. T. Cole, R. L. Fowler, D. R. Shackleton Bailey, and R. J. Tarrant for their criticisms and suggestions.

239. Pellikaan-Engel, Maja. 1974. *Hesiod and Parmenides. A New View of Their Cosmologies and on Parmenides Proem*. Amsterdam: Adolf Hakkert.  
Contents: Chapter I: Why an approach to Parmenides from Hesiod 1; Chapter II: Hesiod's cosmology, *Theogony* 116-33 11; Chapter III: Hesiod, *Theogony* 736-66 19; Chapter IV: Hesiod's Truth 39; Chapter V: Some substitutions of certain Hesiodic concepts in the proem of Parmenides. The route of Parmenides 51; Chapter VI: Excursus of the other interpretations of the route of Parmenides 63; Chapter VII: Parmenides's Truth 79; Chapter VIII: Parmenides' cosmology 87; Summary 101; Bibliography 104; Curriculum vitae 110.  
"Summary. Research is made into the texts of Parmenides and Hesiod. Points of comparison between the proem of Parmenides and Hesiod *Theogony* 736-66 lead to attach similar meanings to the similar terms "chaos" and "house of Night" (Chapt. I). An analysis of the contents of the texts leads to the conclusion that the image in Parmenides' proem with regard to the Heliades, who have left the house of Night, taking with them the poet as a chosen person, is parallel to the alternate cyclic journey of the goddesses Day and Night c.s. from the subterranean house of Night, via the East to the region above the earth and via the West down and back again to the point of departure, as is written in Hesiod *Theogony* 746-66; in this the taking with them of the chosen person from the earth is parallel to *Theogony* 765, 6, where Death, son and companion of Night, takes with him his victims of men (Chapt. III and V).  
An analysis of Hesiod's cosmological views leads to the conclusion, that Hesiod imagined the sky to be a metallic and revolving sphere, the earth at its centre (Chapt. II) and that he imagined *chaos* in its first phase to be of unbounded extension, presumably consisting of air at rest, and later on to be the region above as well as beneath the earth, limited by the spherical sky, consisting of air in motion (Chapt. IV).  
The result of Chapt. V and an analysis of Parmenides' cosmological views leads to the conclusion that Parmenides imagined the earth to be a hollow sphere (Chapt. VII) and that the problem concerning what was in the midst in his cosmological system, either the goddess or the earth, can be solved by supposing the goddess to be in the midst in the absolute sense, i.e. at the centre of his cosmos and the earth to be in the midst in the relative sense, i.e. as a hollow sphere in the midst between the centre of his cosmos, viz. the goddess, and the outer limitation of his cosmos, viz. the spherical sky (Chapt. VIII)." (p. 101)

240. Perry, Bruce Millard. 1983. *Simplicius as a Source for and an Interpreter of Parmenides*, Washington University.  
Ph.D thesis available at ProQuest Dissertation Express, order number: 8319442.  
Contents: Acknowledgments IV; Special Abbreviations V; Introduction 1; Chapter I. Plato and Parmenides 11; Chapter II. Aristotle and Parmenides 33; Chapter III. Parmenides in the Later Tradition 52; Chapter IV. Simplicius on Parmenides 87; Conclusion 257; Bibliography 271; Appendix A. translations 278; Appendix B. Quotations from Parmenides 409; Appendix C. Verses, Variant Readings 416; Appendix D. Index Locorum 440-442.  
"A systematic study of Simplicius's interpretations of all the Presocratics is not feasible here.  
(...)  
I have chosen to study his interpretation of Parmenides because he is perhaps the most important, if also the most problematic, of the Presocratics. Simplicius quotes 101 out of the 154 extant Greek verses of Parmenides, and devotes considerable space in his commentary on *Physics I*, augmented by several passages from his *De Caelo* commentary, to interpreting Parmenides.  
There is thus considerable material for study.  
Because Simplicius's interpretation does not arise *ex nihilo*, some consideration must be taken of the formative influences on and the possible sources for his interpretation. More specifically, Simplicius rejects the criticisms of Parmenides by Plato in the *Sophist* and by Aristotle in the *Physics* and argues that his own interpretation silences both criticisms. Chapter I comprises a sketch of Parmenides's influence on Plato (Republic V 476e6-480a13), and an examination of Plato's criticism in the *Sophist* (244b6-245e2). Similarly, Chapter II considers Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides in *Metaphysics A* (986b27-987a2) and *Physics I* (184b15-187a11). The other possible influences or sources are considered in Chapter III: the doxographical tradition, Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, and the Neoplatonists.  
The large amount of material on Parmenides in Simplicius necessitates a division into manageable topics or sections. While such a division is by nature arbitrary, the nine sections I have decided upon in Chapter IV represent reasonably discrete subjects: I. Biographical Information; II. Obscurity of Doctrine, Poetry; III. Overall Discussions of Parmenides; IV. The *Aletheia*; V. The *Doxa*; VI. Parmenides's Argument for the Unity of Being; VII. Plato on Parmenides; VIII. Aristotle on Parmenides; IX. Others on Parmenides.  
Each section contains at least two parts: a detailed list of the relevant passages (A), and a summary of their contents (B). For the first five sections commentary is provided (C); particularly detailed commentary is devoted to the *Aletheia* (IV) and the *Doxa* (V). A summary of Simplicius's interpretation is found at the beginning of Chapter IV, and a set of conclusions follows Chapter IV.  
Appendix A contains English translations of all the passages which bear on Parmenides in Simplicius. A detailed list of Simplicius's quotations from Parmenides forms Appendix B. The verses with variant readings from CAG [*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*] VII and IX are collected in Appendix C. Appendix D is a skeletal *Index Locorum*." (pp. 6-8)
241. ———. 1989. "On the Cornford-fragment (28 B 8,38)." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 71:1-9.  
"In "A New Fragment of Parmenides" CR 49 (1935) 122—123, F. M. Cornford argued for the authenticity of the verse found at *Theaetetus* 180e1 and in Simplicius in *Ph.* 29.18, 143.10:  
οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ ὄνομα\* εἶναι.  
Though editors from Diels onward have rejected the verse as a misquotation of B 8.38, Cornford has persuaded some scholars to accept it as a genuine fragment. The cogency of some of these arguments will be challenged in this article. While the fragment does not stand or fall solely with Cornford's arguments, fresh doubts as to its authenticity will be raised incidentally." (p. 1, notes omitted)

- "Cornford's argument for the accuracy of Simplicius's quotation of the verse rests on the claims that he quotes the verse directly from his MS of Parmenides and that he does not explicitly mention the *Theaetetus* when he quotes it. Both claims are open to objection. Simplicius does not invariably quote Parmenides from his MS; in fact, he often quotes him from Plato. There is also good reason to believe that Simplicius has the *Theaetetus* in mind when he quotes the verse at *in Phys.* 143.10." (p. 5)
- "It is reasonable to conclude that Simplicius did quote the verse from Plato, and not from his MS of Parmenides." (p. 9)
242. Perzanowski, Jerzy. 1996. "The Way of Truth." In *Formal Ontology*, edited by Poli, Roberto and Simons, Peter, 61-130. Dordrecht: Kluwer.  
Contents: Index 61; 1. Introduction 62; 2. Beings, the Being and Being 64; 3. Ontological connection 65; 4. Towards a theory of ontological connection 67; 5. Some classical ontological questions 73; 6. A linguistic intemzzo 76; 7. An outline of a Primitive Theory of Being - PTB 86; 8. Towards a Extended Theory of Being - ETB 102; 9. Parmenidean statements reconsidered and classical questions answered 122; 10. Summary 127; Acknowledgements 128; References 128-130.  
"1.8 In what follows a very general theory of ontological connection is provided. In spite of its generality this theory enables us, as we shall see, to reconsider the classical ontological claims of Parmenides and to refute an anti-ontological claim that the notion of being is syncategorematic.  
Also certain ontological theorems will be proved, including: *Being is and Nonbeing is* (sic!). *A being is, whereas a nonbeing is not.* Also: *Whatever is, is* - which is shown to be equivalent to *Whatever is not, is not.*  
1.9 The paper is organized as follows: I start with general remarks concerning ontology and different approaches to the notion of being. Next, several classical questions of traditional ontology are discussed. After making our problems clear, I will introduce a formalism enabling us to study them in their full generality. Finally, the results of the paper are discussed in a manner introducing perspectives for a subsequent theory of qualities." (p. 63)
243. Philip, J. A. 1958. "Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge." *Phoenix. Journal of the Classical Association of Canada* no. 12:63-66.  
"But Parmenides is only incidentally concerned with any theory of knowledge. He is telling the tale of his journey, in search of both knowledge and true opinion. It takes him away from the paths of men, beyond the gates of day and night, into the light. There the goddess reveals to him the secrets of true being which alone is the object of knowledge; but she also reveals true opinion concerning our physical world. In his poem Parmenides is passing on that revelation, but he nowhere suggests that that revelation is accessible to intellectual effort without revelation. For that reason it seems to me that no interpretation which makes *Nous* a product of physical constitution can be acceptable, and that in spite of its difficulties it is preferable to understand *Nous* as a harmony, in the Universe and in the mind of man." (pp. 65-66 a note omitted)
244. Phillips, E.D. 1955. "Parmenides on Thought and Being." *Philosophical Review* no. 64:546-560.  
"Professor Erwin Schrödinger, in the second chapter of his recent book, *Nature and the Greeks* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1954) discusses for a few pages (ibid. 24-28) the Parmenidean doctrine of Being. The whole book is of peculiar interest because it is the work, not of a professional Hellenist or even philosopher, but of a famous physicist, who has his own reasons for studying Greek thought; and this chapter has the added piquancy of presenting a view of Parmenides which was once respectable but is now widely reprobated. I propose first to examine this view, as Schrödinger puts it, and then, having necessarily reached some conclusions of my own about Parmenides, to examine the Parmenidean doctrine itself, so determined, from the point of view of modern

- philosophy, at any rate in the matter of logic. The precise nature of this amalgam of logical, illogical, and nonlogical thinking may then become clearer for those who are interested in the history of philosophy and the temperaments of philosophers." (p. 546)
245. Popper, Karl Raimund. 1992. "How the Moon Might Throw Some of Her Light Upon the Two Ways of Parmenides." *Classical Quarterly* no. 86:12-19.  
An improved and expanded version in: K. R. Popper, *The World of Parmenides. Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment*, Essay 3, pp. 68-78.  
"Parmenides was an important philosopher of nature (in the sense of Newton's *philosophia naturalis*). A whole series of important astronomical discoveries is credited to him: that the morning star and the evening star are one and the same; that the earth has the shape of a sphere (rather than of a column, as Anaximander thought). About equally important is his discovery that the phases of the moon are due to the changing way in which the illuminated half-sphere of the moon is seen from the earth." (p. 14)  
"But a great discoverer is bound to try to generalize his discovery. Selene does not truly possess those movements that she exhibits to us. Perhaps we can generalize this?  
And then came the great intellectual illumination, the revelation: in one flash Parmenides saw not only that reality was a dark sphere of dense matter (like the moon), but that he could prove it! And that movement was, indeed, impossible. The proof was (more or less simplified):  
(1) Only Being is (Only what is, is).  
(2) The Nothing, the Non-Being, cannot be.  
(3) The Non-Being would be Absence of Being, or Void.  
(4) There can be no Void.  
(5) The World is Full: a Block.  
(6) Movement is impossible." (pp. 14-15)
246. ———. 1998. *The World of Parmenides. Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment*. New York: Routledge.  
Contents: Preface VIII; List of abbreviations X; Introduction: Aristotle's invention of induction and the eclipse of Presocratic cosmology 1; Essay 1. Back to the Presocratics 7; Addendum 1: A historical note on verisimilitude; Addendum 2: Some further hints on verisimilitude;  
Essay 2. The unknown Xenophanes: an attempt to establish his greatness 33; Essay 3. How the Moon might shed some of her light upon the Two Ways of Parmenides (I) 68; Essay 4. How the Moon might throw some of her light upon the Two Ways of Parmenides (1989) 79; Addendum with a note on a possible emendation affecting the relation between the two parts of Parmenides' poem; Essay 5. Can the Moon throw light on Parmenides' Ways? (1988); Essay 6. The world of Parmenides: notes on Parmenides' poem and its origin in early Greek cosmology 105; Essay 7. Beyond the search for invariants 146; Essay 8. Comments on the prehistoric discovery of the self and on the mind-body problem in ancient Greek philosophy 223; Essay 9. Plato and geometry 251; Essay 10. Concluding remarks on support and countersupport: how induction becomes counterinduction, and the *epagoge* returns to the *elenchus* 271; Appendix: Popper's late fragments on Greek philosophy 280; Index 307-328.  
"When as a 16-year-old student I first read Parmenides' wonderful poem. I learnt to look at Selene (the Moon) and Helios (the Sun) with new eyes - with eyes enlightened by his poetry, Parmenides opened my eyes to the poetic beauty of the Earth and the starry heavens, and he taught me to look at them with a new searching look: searching to determine, as does Selene herself, the position of Helios below the Earth's horizon, by following the direction of her 'eager look'. None of my friends whom I told about my rediscovery of Parmenides' discovery had looked for this before, and I hoped that some of them liked it as much as I did. It was, however, only some seventy years later that I realized the full significance of Parmenides' discovery, and this made me realize what it must have meant for him,



the original discoverer. I have tried since to understand and explain the importance of this discovery for the world of Parmenides, for his Two Ways, and its great role in the history of science, and especially of epistemology and of theoretical physics." (Preface, VIII-IX)

247. Prier, Raymond. 1976. *Archaic Logic. Symbol and Structure in Heraclitus, Parmenides and Empedocles*. The Hague: Mouton & Co.  
 Contents: Preface VII; I The Archaic Configuration of Mind 1; II The Homeric Hymns and Hesiod 27; III Heraclitus 57; IV Parmenides 90; V Empedocles 120; VI Language, Time, and Form 149; Bibliography 154; Index of Ancient Passages 159-163.  
 "The following study represents an attempt not only to explicate in some small way a mode of thought significantly different from much of our own, but also to suggest a new criterion of judgment for Classical Philology. These two purposes merge into one insofar as both come about from my own sharp disagreement with certain prevailing critical attitudes towards the so-called pre-Socratics. These essentially ungrounded attitudes are characterized, as I see them, by strong relativistic and materialistic premises which, although hidden for the most part, result in awkward misunderstandings of the pre-Platonic corpus in general and an uneven, if not castrating, criticism of specific authors in particular. These modern critical stances did not exist in the pre-Aristotelian Greek world in any predominant form, but Classical Philology in the later half of the twentieth century maintains otherwise and has, consequently, severely limited itself and very probably its future by adopting a narrow and unnecessarily rigid criterion of judgment that largely misrepresents the literary evidence at hand. Beyond the by no means unanimous acknowledgment that Aristotle revealed little of the real worth of the pre-Socratics, modern Classical Philology has not even suggested the need of a method — let alone the method itself - that might grasp the period between Homer and the Platonic revolution. I offer this study as an attempt to supply this critical tool." (*Preface*, VII)  
 "Three men, Carl Jung, Claude Levi-Strauss, and Ernst Cassirer have contributed greatly to the elucidation of the mode of thought whose influences we shall trace in the ensuing pages. Each, working from a different professional point of view and actually for very different purposes, has opened the serious investigation of the archaic configuration of mind." (p. 2)  
 "I substantially agree with the basic comparative approach of Reinhardt, Frankel, Mansfeld, and Mourelatos, although I should not place as much emphasis on the innovative quality of Parmenides' insight as does the last. My own particular method, however, is symbolic and structural, and in these respects little has been done with the text of Parmenides with the partial exception of the vocabulary and motif study of Mourelatos. Tarán, for instance, denies a recourse to symbolism in Parmenides.(32) Havelock points to definite symbols in the proem of the work but does not develop their meaning *qua* symbols.(33) It was left to Jung to detect the psychological and cultural symbolism inherent in the work of Parmenides. He indicated that the στεφάνη Cicero discusses in his *De Natura Deorum* is in fact an archetypal representation of the divine.(34) Cicero's "unbroken ring of glowing lights encircling the sky which he [Parmenides] entitles god" is surely the phenomenon described in fragment 12. Jung also connects it with the "circular motion of the mind which everywhere returns into itself" (5).(35) The symbolic nature of Parmenidian thought represents an observable phenomenon that in my opinion should be examined thoroughly. It is in the proem to his work that this nature is most easily detected." (p. 95)  
 (32) Tarán, *op. cit.* [*Parmenides* (Princeton 1965)] p. 30.  
 (33) E.A. Havelock, "Parmenides and Odysseus", HSCP [*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*] 63 (1958), p. 133. Cf. fn. 49 of the present chapter.  
 (34) C.G. Jung, *Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, p. 325-326.  
 (35) *Ibid.* p. 325.

248. Priou, Alex. 2018. "Parmenides on Reason and Revelation." *Epoché* no. 22:177-202.  
Abstract: "In this paper, the author argues that the revelatory form Parmenides gives his poem poses considerable problems for the account of being contained therein. The poem moves through a series of problems, each building on the last: the problem of particularity, the cause of human wandering that the goddess would have us ascend beyond (B1); the problem of speech, whose heterogeneity evinces its tie to experience's particularity (B2–B7); the problem of justice, which motivates man's ascent from his "insecure" place in being, only ultimately to undermine it (B8.1–49); and finally the question of the good, the necessary consequence of man's place in being as being out of place in being (B8.50–B19). What emerges is a Socratic reading of Parmenides's poem, a view that Plato appears to have shared by using Parmenides and his Eleatic stranger to frame the bulk of Socrates's philosophic activity."
249. Pulpito, Massimo. 2011. "Parmenides and the Forms." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 191-210. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Summary: "Historians of Greek thought have often described the Parmenidean doctrine as a sort of philosophical exception, hostile to the prevalent naturalist interests of earlier philosophers. The structure of the Parmenidean poem itself, juxtaposing a section on Truth, concerned with an entity displaying characteristics incompatible with those of Nature, to a section on Opinion, concerned with physical theories, seems to support that interpretation. A re-examination of the relationship between these two sections, however, and their authentic internal articulation, can help to understand the Parmenidean position on physics, thus restoring him to his historical-philosophical context. The alleged tension between the two sections is contained mainly in verse B8.53. The verse is traditionally understood as referring to the decision of mortals to name two forms (μορφάς) corresponding to Fire and Night. However, a more careful reading of the verse (as proposed by some scholars) leads us to the conclusion that the "two" are not the forms but the mortal points of view (γνώμας). So what are the forms then? A reading of verse B9.1 allows us to stipulate that, for Parmenides, the forms are all the visible things and thus the physical objects. If we identify these exterior forms with τὰ δοκοῦντα from verse B1.31 (translated as "the objects of opinion") it becomes possible to recompose the poem's structure. We can recognize three sections: the first, on Truth, dedicated to existence in oneness and homogeneity; the third, on physical forms, providing a description of the world from a morphological standpoint. Between these two lies the second section, dedicated to mortal Opinions which, like the cosmogonies, confuse the ontological status of Everything with the morphological and mereological status of particular objects. Nonetheless, in the section on correct physical theories (the third one) Parmenides attempts to recuperate the two principles recognized by mortals, accepting their δυνάμεις (most likely identified with Hot and Cold) as elements of which the cosmos consists. This reading allows us to place Parmenides inside the development of Pre-Socratic thought, connecting him to earlier thinkers and, more importantly, to the later ones. The idea that the physical world consists of forms both visible and mutable, as manifestations of a reality fundamentally invisible and immutable, perceivable only through reason, will become a cliché of natural philosophy after Parmenides; at least until Plato, who will go on to recognize in the invisible and immutable forms the paradigm of the world."
250. Pulpito, Massimo, and Spangenberg, Pilar, eds. 2019. *ὁδοὶ νοῆσαι. Ways to Think. Essays in Honour of Néstor-Luis Cordero*. Bologna: Diogene Multimedia.  
Contents of the First Section "Parmenides":  
1. Enrique Hülsz – Bernardo Berruecos: Parménides B1.3: una nueva enmienda 31;  
2. Serge Mouraviev: Ersatz de vérité et de réalité? ou Comment Parménide (B 1, 28-32) a sauvé les apparences (avec la collaboration épistolaire de Scott Austin †2014) 61; 3. José Solana Dueso: Mito y logos en Parménides 87; 4. Nicola Stefano

- Galgano: Parmenide B 2.3: dall'esperienza immediata del non essere alla doppia negazione 101; 5. Michel Fattal: Raison critique et crise chez Parménide d'Élée 113; 6. Alexander P. D. Mourelatos – Massimo Pulpito: Parmenides and the Principle of Sufficient Reason 121; 7. Livio Rossetti: Mondo vero e mondo falso in Parmenide 143; 8. Fernando Santoro: A Lua, Vênus e as Estrelas de Parmênides 155; 9. Chiara Robbiano: Just being: un-individualized. An interpretation of Parmenides DKB16 and a glance at empirical research 167; 10. Jaap Mansfeld: Parmenides on Sense Perception in Theophrastus and Elsewhere 177; 11. Lambros Couloubaritsis: Réinterprétation de l'*eon* de Parménide dans l'éclairage du Papyrus de Derveni 193; 12. Giovanni Cerri: Parmenide in Lucrezio (*Parm.* B 12, 3-6 - *Lucr.* 1, 19-21) 207; 13. Manfred Kraus: William of Moerbeke's Translation of Simplicius' *On De Caelo* and the Constitution of the Text of Parmenides 213-231.
251. Quarantotto, Diana. 2016. "Aristotle's way away from Parmenides' way. A case of scientific controversy and ancient humor." *Elenchos* no. 37:209-228.  
Abstract: "In *Physics A*, Aristotle introduces his science of nature and devotes a substantial part of the investigation to refuting the Eleatics' theses, and to resolving their arguments, against plurality and change. In so doing, Aristotle also dusts off Parmenides' metaphor of the routes of inquiry and uses it as one of the main schemes of his book. Aristotle's goal, I argue, is to present his own physical investigation as the only correct route, and to show that Parmenides' "way of truth" is instead both wrong and a sidetrack. By revisiting Parmenides' metaphor of the route, Aristotle twists it against him, distorts it and uses this distortion as a source of fun and of some mockery of Parmenides himself. Thereby, *Physics A* gives us a taste of Aristotle's biting humour and of his practice of the "virtue" of wit (*eutrapelia*)."
252. Raven, John Earle. 1948. *Pythagoreans and Eleatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
*An Account of the Interaction Between the Two Opposed Schools During the Fifth and Early Fourth Centuries B.C.*  
Contents: Preface VII-VIII; Part I. I. Introduction 1; II. Aristotle's evidence 9; III. Parmenides 21; IV: Pythagoreanism before Parmenides 43; V. Zeno of Elea 66; VI. Melissus 78; Part II. VII. Post-Zenonian Pythagoreanism 93; VIII. The nature of matter 101; IX. The One 112; X: The One and numbers 126; XI. Cosmology (a) Analysis 146; (b) Synthesis 164; XII: Conclusion 175; Appendix 188; Index 195-196.  
"As Dr C. M. Bowra has pointed out in a paper in *Classical Philology* (XXXII [1937], p. 106), 'it is clear that this Proem is intended to have the importance and seriousness of a religious revelation'. Not only the passage from darkness into light but many minor details throughout the poem suggest that Parmenides desired, particularly in the Proem, to arm himself in advance, by stressing the religious and ethical nature of his revelation, with an answer to his potential critics. There seems no reason to doubt Dr Bowra's assumption (loc. cit. p. 108) that these potential critics were 'his fellow-Pythagoreans'.  
Parmenides is indeed, in Cornford's phrase, 'a curious blend of prophet and logician'. The Proem, though its details are of no importance to our present inquiry, at least serves the useful purpose of stressing the prophetic strain. The Way of Truth, on the other hand, is an entirely unprecedented exercise of the logical faculty, and as such it is usually and naturally taken to be devoid of any emotion. In its outward form it certainly is so; but it must be remembered that the concept on which Parmenides' logic is at work is that of unity, and there is no reason to suppose that the concept of unity is incapable of arousing emotion. If two of the conclusions that I have already reached are justified, that Parmenides was a dissident Pythagorean, and that in the Pythagoreanism from which he was seceding there was a fundamental dualism between the principle of unity and goodness and another and eternally opposed principle, then is it not permissible to imagine that Parmenides, swayed perhaps by a deeper respect for the good principle than his 'fellow-Pythagoreans' revealed, may have been driven along the road from darkness into

light by a basically religious desire to vindicate the good principle against the bad? Such a supposition would help to explain the fervour that almost succeeds in illuminating the uninspired poetry of the Proem; and the ultimate triumph of his logical faculty over his emotion should not blind us to the possibility that an emotional impulse underlay his unemotional reasoning.

But the only convincing test of such a hypothesis must obviously be sought in the poem itself. I propose to examine the Way of Truth in considerable detail, adopting for the purpose the method employed by Cornford in his chapter on the same subject. Indeed, on occasions I shall be merely paraphrasing that chapter; but a measure of such repetition is inevitable for the sake of continuity." (pp. 23-24). "We are now at last, therefore, in a position to counter the only apparently grave objection that might be brought against the contention that Parmenides wrote his poem with an eye especially upon the Pythagoreanism from which he had seceded. If that contention is indeed true, then why is it, it might reasonably be asked, that neither of the two ways from which the goddess sees fit to debar Parmenides represents Pythagoreanism? Our examination of the purpose of the poem should by now have suggested a complete answer to such an apparently damaging objection. The first forbidden way, that it is NOT or NOTHING IS, is to this extent, as Parmenides claimed, ἀνόητον ἀνόνημον, that at any rate nobody had attempted to tread it. It is introduced into the poem partly for the sake of logical completeness but especially because it was combined with the true way to form the way which foolish two-headed mortals tread, the way of custom. So far as we are entitled to judge, therefore, from our reading of the Way of Truth alone, the third way, namely that it is and it is not, will include any combination whatever of the true way and the way of falsehood, or in other words any known cosmology whatever. But Pythagoreanism, with its ultimate dualism and its consequent employment, not of the characteristics of Being only nor of those of Not-being only, but of the two simultaneously, is undeniably a particularly glaring example of such a combination — more glaring, indeed, than any other early system simply because, as Aristotle suggests in his own way, it admits more of those νοητά which Parmenides accepted as the only truth. It might, therefore, be not unreasonably expected, until we actually pass to it, that the Way of Seeming will at least bear a closer resemblance to the Pythagorean than to any other way. But fortunately, almost as soon as we come to the Way of Seeming, Parmenides himself gives us the explanation of why that need not necessarily be so. The Way of Seeming presents the best cosmology that Parmenides was capable of inventing, ὥς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσει; and in consequence, so far from imitating the Pythagorean cosmology, it is, at some points at least, in direct conflict with it. This part of the poem too, and for much the same reason as the earlier part, is in fact especially damaging to the Pythagorean system; for that system was undeniably more guilty than any other of confusing the illusory objects of perception with the eternally existent objects of thought. To look, in short, for an explicit representation of any known system whatever in either of the two forbidden ways is to demand that the poem should be rewritten in quite another form and with quite another object. But that is no valid argument against my contention that throughout the poem we can repeatedly detect a special (even if, as I have all along admitted, a secondary) anti-Pythagorean validity." (pp. 41-42)

253. Reilly, Thomas J. 1976. "Parmenides Fragment 8,4: a Correction." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 58:57.  
 Malcolm Schofield in *Did Parmenides Discover Eternity?* read in the fragment B8.4 ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐλομελές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἢ δ' ἀτάλαντον (instead of ἀτέλεστον): an emendation proposed by M. F. Burnyeat who in an unpublished paper recommends the conjecture of G. M. Hopkins (see *Notebook and Papers of Gerald Manley Hopkins*, Oxford: 1937, p. 99; Reilly notes that the emendation was already proposed by Ludwig Preller in his *Historia philosophiae Graecae et Romanae ex fontium locis contexta*, (co-author Heinrich Ritter), Hamburg 1838 p. 92.



254. Reinhardt, Karl. 1974. "The Relation between the Two Parts of Parmenides' Poem." In *The Pre-Socratics. A Collection of Critical Essays*, edited by Mourelatos, Alexander P. D., 293-311. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Partial translation of *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1916 (the following pages are translated: 18-23, 29-32, 64-71, 74-82, 88 with omissions as indicated. (Translation by Matthew E. Cosgrove with A. P. D. Mourelatos).
- "Whoever takes the trouble to understand Parmenides in all his boldness as well as in his restraint, and at the same time in terms of his historical situation, must first of all realize that the one great defect from which the "Doxa" suffers in our eyes-namely, that it is unable to take hold of the knowing subject and must turn for help to the things themselves-was not very perceptible to Parmenides, and was perhaps not perceived by him at all. He understood the proposition that like can only be known by like so literally, so close to the level of visual imagery, that he could not but think that the organ of perception and its object were made up of the same constituents, and were even subject to the same forms and laws. Thought processes in the soul appeared to him not as corresponding with, but as exactly repeating the external world. What was a law for thought had to have unqualified validity for things also. If nature were shown contradicting the principle of non-contradiction itself, then nature was ipso facto false and precisely not existent: "For you could not come to know that which is not (for it is not feasible), nor could you declare it; for it is the same to think and to be" (B2.7-8, B3). Conversely, every character of the external world led directly to a conclusion concerning human knowledge. No matter how hard one looks, one will not find the slightest hint of a separation between thinking and being (or representation and appearance) in the fragments. Parmenides begins the "Doxa" by relating (B8.53) that men have agreed to designate a twofold form with names, but he does not elaborate, as one would expect, on how they fashioned their world-picture from both forms. Instead, the object of their thought straightaway achieves an independent life: Dark and light unite and produce the world; and to our surprise a cosmogony springs from the epistemology. What had been no more than a name, a convention, an onoma, enters into physical combinations, and finally generates even man himself and his cognitive states. To our way of thinking, that is certainly hard to take. Our only recourse, if we are to grasp it, is to recite to ourselves once again the rule that was the lifeblood of Parmenidean conviction: "For it is the same to think and to be" (B3). Because this world is composed throughout of light and darkness, and is pervasively the same and then again not the same (B8.58, B6.8), because contradiction is the essence of all doxa, this entire world must be false, that is to say, subjective, or as the Greeks would have said, it can only exist *nomoi*, "by convention," and not *physei*, "in reality."
- To be sure, this conclusion is not repeated in every sentence. Now and then it even seems as though the critic and nay-sayer had let himself be carried along for a while on the broad stream of human opinions; indeed, as though his critique were itself the repository of discoveries in which he took pride. For since appearance by no means lacks all reason and consistency, it can actually be explored. Yet its character as appearance does not mitigate its contradicting the highest law of thought, the sole guarantee of truth. This is said twice, briefly but sharply, at decisive points: the beginning and the end of the second part. Whether between these passages there were originally additional reminders of the same fundamental idea, we do not know. The two that we do know are sufficiently complete. As though separated from the rest by a thick tallying stroke, at the conclusion of the whole stand the words that give the sum of all that has been said (B19):
- And so, according to appearances (*kata doxan*) these things came to be, and now are, and later than now will come to an end, having matured; and to these things did men attach a name, a mark to each." (pp. 295-297)
255. Rickert, Thomas. 2014. "Parmenides, Ontological Enaction, and the Prehistory of Rhetoric." *Philosophy & Rhetoric* no. 47:472-493.

- Abstract: "The Presocratic thinker Parmenides is portrayed in philosophy and rhetoric as a philosopher of static monism anticipating reason's triumph over myth. Such a portrayal is narrow and ill fits the evidence. Parmenides was associated with a cult of priest-healers (*iatromantis*) of Apollo who practiced incubation, usually in caves, in order to receive wisdom and truth. Parmenides's famous poem "On Being" ("Peri Phuseōs") reflects these practices. The poem directly invokes altered states of consciousness, revelations from the gods, and an underworld descent (*katabasis*). Further, the poem is of strong rhetorical interest because it directly discusses rhetorical themes of persuasion, truth, and knowledge. Additionally, the poem suggests that rationality alone cannot suffice to liberate human beings from worldly illusions; rather, reason must be accompanied by a combination of divine inspiration and *mētis* (cunning wisdom)."
256. ———. 2017. "Parmenides: Philosopher, Rhetorician, Skywalker." In *Logos without Rhetoric. The Arts of Language before Plato*, edited by Reames, Robin, 47-62. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.  
 "Currently, Parmenides is peripheral at best in rhetorical studies, but I claim that he merits a significant place in rhetorical history—or, better, prehistory, since he predates the group we call the sophists, and, further, it is likely that *rhētorikē* is a coinage of Plato's, and hence, not quite applicable to Parmenides.(3)" (p. 49)  
 "It is only recently that a different picture of Parmenides has begun to emerge that allows us to see that he does not fit the narrow frame philosophy has created for him. To see this, it is necessary to take the introductory proem seriously. While the proem has frequently been dismissed as a literary device introducing the poem's philosophical core, a variety of evidence indicates that the proem frames all that follows, performing acts of initiation and revelation in line with other ritualistic practices in the ancient Greek world. Further, taking the proem seriously resonates with the above evidence concerning Zeno's death and Parmenides' bust. In short, Parmenides should now be understood as someone with wide-ranging interests, including teachings that involve not just cosmology but theurgy, healing, life-training, and rhetoric. Our understanding of Parmenides' use of reason should be thought within this broader scope. Instead of being a precursor to Plato's escape from the cave of ignorance to the light of reason, on the traditional philosophical read, Parmenides is engaged in *katabasis*, a descent into the cave, to receive knowledge." (p. 52)  
 (3) Edward Schiappa ("Did Plato Coin *Rhētorikē*?" *American Journal of Philology* 111 (4): 457–470, 1990, 457; *Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric*. 2nd ed. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003, 40–41) argues compellingly that the term *rhētorikē* is Plato's, or at the least a fourth-century and not fifth-century b.c.e. usage (although the root term, in various formulations, is older). The term "sophist" is also contested, but I cannot delve into that issue here.
257. Robbiano, Chiara. 2006. *Becoming Being. On Parmenides' Transformative Philosophy*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.  
 Text and translation of the Poem, pp. 212-223.  
 "The aim of this study is the investigation of Parmenides' method in guiding a human being towards understanding. Parmenides' words operate as a travel guide that leads the audience on a journey that will educate them, transform them, and make them philosophically mature. I will analyse various literary, rhetorical, polemical, and argumentative features of Parmenides' Poem which, I submit, bring the audience a step further towards the kind(s) of knowledge that Parmenides has in store for them.  
 Many scholars have concentrated on the arguments of fragment B8,3 and on their conclusions -- that Being is without birth, undifferentiated, changeless and complete.  
 In general, one may be inclined to think that, once a goal has been reached, the journey that brought one there is not relevant anymore. Accordingly, the student of

Parmenides' Poem may be tempted to concentrate his or her interpretative energy on Being: the goal of the journey made under the guidance of the goddess of whom the Poem tells us. The scholar who is looking for the philosophical message of the Poem may try to reduce all the questions, pieces of advice and encouragements of the speech of the goddess (B1,24 onwards) to a *description* of Being: the true and knowable reality.

But it may be asked whether this approach, which looks only for a description of Being in the fragments, does not neglect the complex journey that the mind has to make through myths, images, encouragements and warnings, before it will be able to grasp Being: the philosophical itinerary through which Parmenides guides his audience throughout the Poem. The question *how*, according to Parmenides, we can achieve insight into Being seems no less important for a better understanding of the Poem than the content of this insight. The doubt about traditional certainties, the rejection of certain mental behaviours and the process of building new perspectives significantly *precede* the search for the characteristics of Being.

Once we resist the temptation of detaching a description of Being from the conditions for the achievement of understanding that the goddess sets out, and from the human being who attempts to understand Being, we will become sensitive to the fact that the Poem works upon its audience and helps them to achieve understanding. I will try to analyse the progress towards understanding from the very beginning. The study of this progress, which, I believe, constitutes the main subject matter of Parmenides' Poem, will turn out to be fundamental to the study of Parmenides' philosophy.

A study of a philosopher's method will have to concentrate not only on the words and phrases that the philosopher uses to *describe* the right method, but also on the words and phrases that the philosopher *uses* in order to transform his or her audience: i.e. to persuade them to adopt a new way of looking that will change them.

This will be a systematic study of the rhetorical and linguistic features of Parmenides' Poem that hopes to shed light on his philosophy. Such a study will have to pay attention to the *effect* of such features on the audience who is gradually guided towards insight. Only by looking at the transformative effect of such features of our Poem on the audience will we be able to give a *coherent* interpretation of the fragments.

We will find their coherence by studying the goal they have in common: to help the audience to acquire insight into Being.

What happens when one's journey towards Being is accomplished? Is there room for a differentiation between oneself and one's goal in a monistic reality? In order to answer these questions, we will look at the hints the goddess gives about the effects of the journey on the way of Truth, i.e. the hints about the transformation of the knowing subject when the journey has reached its goal. We will also be able to find out more about Parmenides' monism by investigating the place of the knowing subject in a monistic reality. I will argue that there are hints throughout the Poem that it is possible for the knowing subject to leave one's status of mortal who can have only opinions, and become one with Being." (pp. 9-10, notes omitted)

258. ———. 2011. "What is Parmenides' Being?" In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 231-231. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

Summary: "Nobody could know what *εἶναι* meant before listening to the Poem: even native speakers of Ancient Greek needed to acquire new mental categories and form this new concept, *εἶναι*, which is usually translated as "Being." Throughout his Poem, Parmenides teaches his audience to form this concept. One of the means he uses are the signs (*σήματα*) given by the goddess to the traveler in fr. B8. I focus here on the fourth *σημα*, where Parmenides gives hints about the special relation between Being and those who understand Being. I will show that Being is the fundamental unity of what-is (what is stable, without differences, development, needs) and what-

understands. This perfect unity is what the audience is encouraged to understand. This unity is also the condition of the possibility of human understanding. Human beings can, in fact, understand this unity, directly, with an act of νοεῖν, since νοεῖν and Being are not separate but are one."

259. ———. 2016. "Parmenides' and Śaṅkara's Nondual Being without Not-being." *Philosophy East and West* no. 66:290-327.  
 "In the first section I will sketch what I call 'the fashionable Parmenides interpretations,' which regard being as the result of laws of logic or of predication. I will mention the common practice of scholars of trying to understand Parmenides' meaning of 'is' and 'being' by looking for the subject of the verb 'is,' that is, the alleged entity or object that 'is.' An alternative to this practice is to try and understand both the omission of a subject of the verb 'is' and the journey metaphors in fragment DK B2 as suggestions that being is not a thing but rather the activity, state, or fact of being. By means of a comparison with Śaṅkara, I will use the category of nondual experience to understand being, which is not a thing. In section 2, I will present a short overview of the existing comparisons between Parmenides and Śaṅkara. I will then (section 3) look at pointers in Śaṅkara's work that might help us grasp what is meant by nondual experience, which is knowing that is not different from being (and Self/Ātman, which is reality/Brahman), which might well be regarded as the goal that both philosophers want to help their audience reach. In section 4, I will show how both philosophers express the need on the part of human beings not only to become aware of the nondual essence of reality but also to make sense of reality by means of concepts and words that help them see order in reality. However, Parmenides and Śaṅkara regard "opinions" and "lower level of knowledge," respectively, as only acceptable if they are not used as instruments to understand reality as it is. Both philosophers offer a method for testing what mortals (i.e., we) believe to be real.  
 In section 5, we will look at the first step of this method, taken by Parmenides in DK B2 and by Śaṅkara in *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* I, 1, 1.  
 (...)
 In section 6, I will mention the second step their methods have in common: the application of a test of what, according to common sense, are the fundamental characteristics of reality: birth, movement, differentiation, development, and relations of cause and effect. I will concentrate on the passage in DK B8 where Parmenides tests the reality of birth (which does not pass the test and is proved to be unreal). We will then look (section 7) at Śaṅkara's use of negative dialectic in *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* II, 1, 18, where he refutes the reality of two distinct entities called cause and effect." (pp. 290-291)
260. ———. 2016. "Being is not an object: an interpretation of Parmenides' fragment DK B2 and a reflection on assumptions." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 36:263-301.  
 "Is Parmenides' *being* a thing, discovered by reason and expressible in well-formed sentences? Or is it rather the same as knowing, which is the trustworthy aspect of our experience, pointed at by Parmenides by means of coherent reasoning?  
 In this introduction, I make explicit the main assumptions that the majority of scholars apply to the interpretation of DK B2 and of the rest of Parmenides' poem. In sections 1 and 2, I show what role these assumptions play in the interpretation of Parmenides' poem. Then, I show what other assumptions could be used to interpret Parmenides. In section 3, I argue that Parmenides' *being* (το ἓόν, εἶναι) could be something other than a special 'object'. By 'object' I mean some entity distinct from a subject observing it. I suggest what question *being* could be an answer to and review some answers given by philosophers of various backgrounds to that question. In section 4, I look at what being could be, by focussing on the role played by the notion of trust throughout the poem. In section 5, I analyse fragment B2 and delve into the category of experience. In the conclusion, I compare the repercussions, for the interpretation of B2 and Parmenides' philosophy at large, of applying the two different sets of assumptions" (p. 263)



261. Robinson, Thomas M. 1975. "Parmenides on the Ascertainment of the Real." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 4:623-633.  
 "In this paper I want to suggest that, while the argued philosophical distinction between logic, epistemology and ontology is one of the many achievements of Aristotle, his predecessor Parmenides was in fact already operating with a theory of knowledge and an elementary propositional logic that are of abiding philosophical interest. As part of the thesis I shall be obliged to reject a number of interpretations of particular passages in his poem, including one or two currently fashionable ones. Since so much turns on points of translation, I note for purposes of comparison what seem to be significant alternatives to my own in any particular instance." (p. 623)
262. ———. 1979. "Parmenides on the Real in Its Totality." *The Monist* no. 62:54-60. Reprinted in Thomas M. Robinson, *Logos and Cosmos: Studies in Greek Philosophy*, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2010, pp. 53-60.  
 "In the long term Parmenides' doctrine has two further major implications for logical and linguistic theory: (a) by extrapolation it can be argued that the logic of wholes and the logic of parts are different from one another whatever the philosophical topic under discussion, and knowledge of this fact will prove to be one of the greatest safeguards against two of the commonest fallacies in philosophy, namely those of Composition and Division; and (b) "what is the case" can no more be said to have a temporal mode of existence than can "what is real". In suggesting that genuine ascertainment is of what will later be called the eternally existent Parmenides has come to the very verge of the understanding that a true existential proposition is atemporally such. A hint of this, it seems to me, can be found at 8.34-36: the present tense of the participial phrase "the real (= apparently "the true": see above, note 1), like the present tense used of the phrase "the real" in the sense of "the unique entity", is the best that grammar can do to convey the notion of that which is, in Owen's phrase ([2] 271), logically tenseless. It is, as need hardly be pointed out, at best a hint and very possibly not something sensed by Parmenides himself; but with such inspired gropings does serious philosophical progress begin." (p. 59 of the reprint)  
 note 1: "Parmenides on Ascertainment of the Real", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 4.4 (1975) 623-633.  
 [2] "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present", in *The Pre-Socratics*, ed. A. P. D. Mourelatos (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1974) 271-292 (= *The Monist* 50 [1966] 317-340).
263. ———. 1989. "Heraclitus and Parmenides on What Can Be Known." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 7:157-167.  
 Reprinted in Thomas M. Robinson, *Logos and Cosmos: Studies in Greek Philosophy*, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2010, pp. 32-40.  
 "In this paper I wish to argue that Parmenides and Heraclitus, despite significant differences in other respects, agreed on the following fundamentals:  
 1) Knowledge in the strictest sense is possible, but it is always of the general or universal. As a consequence the only true object of knowledge can be the real as a whole.  
 2) This real-as-a-whole is co-extensive with what is normally referred to as the world, in the sense of all that exists and/or all that is the case.  
 3) The real as a whole is eternal (Parmenides) or everlasting (Heraclitus), and unchanging; in respect of its parts it is subject to temporal process and change.  
 4) What the senses can tell us about the real in respect of its parts is not always reliable; but their role can still be a valuable one.  
 5) Reality, knowledge and a rational account (logos) go hand in hand; this is true both for our own account of the real and for the real's account of itself.  
 6) The relationship between knowledge and the real, and between a number of supposedly opposing features of the real, is one of necessary interconnectedness, boldly described by both philosophers in terms of identity." (p. 32 of the reprint)

264. ———. 2010. "Parmenides on Coming-to-Know the Real." In *Logos and Cosmos*, edited by Robinson, Thomas M., 61-72. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. Originally published in Japanese in *Academic Proceedings of the St. Andrew's University Press*, Osaka, 1996, pp. 27–36.
- "By common consent, Parmenides is the key philosophical figure in Greece antecedent to Socrates. Yet the exact nature of his claims continues to be a matter of great dispute and puzzlement. To survey the vast literature on the matter would be the subject of a book in itself.
- For the moment I shall simply offer the thoughts that I myself have had on his poem over the past two decades. Appended to the paper are set of my translations of various sections of Parmenides' poem. These I shall examine in turn. During the examination it will become clear where I stand on what I think Parmenides is trying to say. After that I shall attempt to draw some conclusions on the effect, as I see it, of Parmenides' thought on the development of western philosophical thinking in the realms of logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of science. (p. 61)
265. Roecklein, Robert J. 2011. *Plato versus Parmenides. The Debate over Coming-into-Being in Greek Philosophy*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Contents: Acknowledgments IX-X; Introduction 1; 1. Parmenides' Argument 13; 2. Parmenides and the Milesian Philosophies: "Nothing Comes from Nothing" --- Physics or Logic? 37; 3. Parmenides' Influence of Empedocles and Anaxagoras 57; 4. Plato's Socrates and His Theory of Causation 83; 5. The *Parmenides*: Plato's Proof of Coming to Be 121; 6. The *Theaetetus*: Plato's Proof That the Objects of Knowledge Are Indivisible 159; Bibliography 187; Index 195-199.
- "The estimation of Parmenides' argument has risen to such high levels in our scholarship, that Plato's very reputation as a thinker has begun to fade into somewhat of a derivative status. Plato, it is held by more than a few influential scholars, could not even have arrived at his theory of forms if he had not had the good fortune to be influenced by Parmenides' doctrine about motionless, eternal "Being." In the view of recent commentators, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that Parmenides is now often portrayed as *the* seminal thinker of classical Greek philosophy.(10) It is increasingly a standard view among commentators, that Plato's Socrates himself is overcome by the power of the Eleatic legacy, which, they say, he willingly embraces.
- The most spectacular evidence of this movement in the status of Plato in our scholarship can be seen in the commentary on the dialogue *Parmenides* itself. A large number of scholars are now convinced that in this dialogue, Plato has commissioned the character of Parmenides to deliver a telling, if not a fatal blow against Plato's own theory of forms.(11) We will investigate this matter in some depth in chapter 5; for the moment, it must suffice to indicate the following points. In fact, it is Parmenides' argument which is put to the test in the dialogue that Plato named after the great Eleatic; so far from treating Parmenides with reverence or deference, Plato actually assigns a very humbling role to Parmenides in the dialogue named for him. The role assigned to Parmenides there is nothing other than to utter the effectual refutation of his own entire argument. In the fifth chapter, a case will be made that Plato refutes Parmenides' indictment of the reality of coming-into being, and so concludes, rather than sustains, the legacy of Parmenides' argument.
- We will also be challenged, in this study, to rebut a claim that has by now been very powerfully established in the scholarly literature: this claim is that Parmenides created a philosophical interpretation of the notion of Being which even Plato's Socrates has in some measure been shaped by, or come to adopt. Plato's theory of forms, as those forms are hypothesized to be eternal and ungenerated, is linked by a number of scholars to the theory of being that Parmenides developed.
- This view is confused. In the first place, the forms are originally known to human beings in those very perishable objects which the Eleatics wish to wholly exclude from all evidentiary matters concerning truth of fact. Plato's Socrates, it can be noted, arrived at his famous profession of ignorance precisely as a rhetorical

method for summoning forth from interlocutors a base of knowledge which all hold in common: namely recognition of the various forms in perishable bodies. This common intelligence on display in the ordinary individual's effortless assignment of name to object is certainly not science, in Plato's view; however, the theory of scientific definition which Plato advances does indeed depend on this recognition-knowledge as the ultimate *evidence* for its own investigations. The ordinary and spontaneous ability of unphilosophic human beings to assign name to object is, in Plato's view, itself evidence of a distinct *intelligence* operative in the ordinary opinions. One could hardly formulate a proposition more at loggerheads with the Eleatic philosophy.

That which the memory recognizes in the patterns that recur (and all of the patterns, as Plato argues throughout his work, appear innumerable times in the perishable objects), is not a knowledge that has the power of full consciousness and comprehension such as the power possessed by logos or more deliberate investigation. Yet Plato insists that these opinions are nevertheless the port from which philosophy must embark. When argument finally reaches for an intellectual comprehension in speech-as opposed to *an* inarticulate recognition of the individual forms-Plato's philosophy will attach a scientific hypothesis to the ordinary views. Yet this hypothesis itself, that the forms exist separately in nature for the sake of intellectual investigation, remains dependent on the common familiarity with the forms as they recur in the common objects. "And in respect of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and all the ideas or forms, the same statement holds, that in itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communion with actions and bodies and with one another they present themselves everywhere, each as a multiplicity of aspects" (*Republic* 476a). Yet it is the building block upon which Plato's entire science of definition rests, and he never fails to fight for the integrity of this recognition-knowledge in his major debates with rival philosophers such as Protagoras and Parmenides." (pp. 10-11)

(10) Charles Kahn, "Being in Parmenides and Plato," *La Parola del Passato* 43 (1988): "If it was the encounter with Socrates that made Plato a philosopher, it was the poem of Parmenides that made him a metaphysician. In the first place it was Parmenides' distinction between being and becoming that provided Plato with an ontological basis for his theory of forms. When he decides to submit this theory to searching criticism, he chose as critic no other than Parmenides himself" (237). Cf. Taran, *Parmenides*, vii; Patricia Curd, *The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought* (Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2004), 231-32, 238.

(11) Gregory Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides*," *Philosophical Review* 63 (1954): 329, 342. Kenneth M. Sayre, *Parmenides' Lesson* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 60, 62, 95. Robert Turnbull, *The Parmenides and Plato's Late Philosophy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 19, 23, 39. Kelsey Wood, *Troubling Play: Meaning and Entity in Plato's Parmenides* (Albany: SUNY, 2005), 1-2, 74, 85.

266. Rohatyn, Dennis Anthony. 1971. "A Note on Parmenides B 19." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 5:20-23.
- "Hershbell (1) presents compelling evidence combined with sound reasoning for his contention that Fr. 16 does not belong in 'The Way of Opinion (or Seeming)' but rather in 'The Way of Truth' portion of Parmenides' poem. With as much justice I think it is possible to reassign Fr. 19 to the first part of the poem as well. For it is here that Parmenides introduces the concept of name (*onoma*, B19 1.3), and utilizes it to explain mortal belief (*doxa*, B19 1.1) in coming-to-be and in passing-away. (2) It seems natural to place this after the concluding words of Fr. 8, 11. 60-61, in which Parmenides advises or promises a full account (3) so that no "mortal wisdom may ever outstrip" that of the reader or initiate. It is only proper to regard Parmenides' theory of names, if it is as full-blown as all that, as belonging to his metaphysical apparatus and thus as having nothing to do, in and of itself, with the erroneous picture of the world which it is expressly designed to account for." (p. 20)

- (1) J.P. Hershbell, "Parmenides' way of Truth and B16" , *Apeiron* 4, No. 2 (August 1970), 1-23.
- (2) The source is Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle, *de Caelo* 558.9-11.
- (3) Of "appearances", "phenomena" and "empirical data", all *pace* Aristotle, *Metaphysica* A 986b31.
267. Romero, Gustavo E. 2012. "Parmenides Reloaded." *Foundations of Science* no. 17:291-299.  
Abstract: "I argue for a four dimensional, non-dynamical view of space-time, where becoming is not an intrinsic property of reality. This view has many features in common with the Parmenidean conception of the universe. I discuss some recent objections to this position and I offer a comparison of the Parmenidean space-time with an interpretation of Heraclitus' thought that presents no major antagonism."
268. Rosen, Stanley. 1996. "Commentary on Long [*Parmenides on Thinking Being*]." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 12:152-160.  
"As a result of reading Long's excellent paper and reviewing some of the scholarship, it occurs to me that Parmenides is something of a Hegelian. I do not need to emphasize that Hegel would not have approved of this assertion without elaborate qualification. But that is not decisive. To begin with, Hegel did believe that the end is somehow contained, even prefigured within, the beginning. In this connection, the spherical character of Parmenides' being is a striking prototype of the circularity of the Hegelian concept and even of Nietzsche's eternal return of the same. And Long's excellent emphasis on the fact that Parmenides is inquiring into the thinking of being, not into being as independent of thought, is also quite Hegelian. The lynch-pin of this somewhat but not entirely playful Hegelian reading is the translation and interpretation of fragment 3 offered in various contexts by Heidegger, Couloubaritsis, Long, and myself. What is "the same" that serves as the subject of the two infinitives "to think" and "to be?" It must be the same as each yet other than either. If it is not the same as each, then obviously neither will be the same as the other. But if it is not other than each, then the two will not only be "the same" but will be one and the same or a homogeneous unit. The only remaining possibility is that the two are both same and other, or as Hegel would say, that "the same" stands here for "the identity" in the expression "the identity of identity and difference."  
(...)  
"I do not need to emphasize too strongly that it was not my intention to present a new and comprehensive interpretation of Parmenides in a short commentary on someone else's paper. My main purpose was to signal my partial adherence to Long's central thesis and to make one or two suggestions for strengthening it." (pp. 157-159)
269. Sanders, Kirk R. 2002. "Much Ado About 'Nothing': μηδέν and τὸ μὴ εἶν in Parmenides." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 35:87-104.  
"It is, to my knowledge, a universally accepted assumption among contemporary commentators that μὲν το ἐν αἰῶν, 'nothing', and 'τομ~ Μν, 'what-is-not', function as synonyms in Parmenides' poem.(1) In this paper, I focus primarily on the central role this supposed semantic equivalence plays in arguments supporting an emendation in line 12 of fragment B8.  
Despite this scholarly unanimity regarding the synonymy of these two Greek terms and the popularity of the emendation, I contend that we can make the best sense of Parmenides' argument in this and the surrounding lines precisely by retaining the manuscript reading and recognizing the difference in meaning between 'nothing' and 'what-is-not'. This claim, of course, also has broader implications for the interpretation of Parmenides' poem generally." (p. 87)  
Cf. Karl Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (second edition) Frankfurt 1959), 39-42; Leonardo Taran, *Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays* (Princeton 1965), 95-7; Montgomery Furth, 'Elements of Eleatic Ontology', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 6



- (1968), 119; A.P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides* (New Haven 1970), 100-2; G.E.L. Owen, 'Plato on Not-Being', in Gregory Vlastos, ed., *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays I, Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Garden City, NY 1971), 225-6; Michael C. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (Washington 1971), 131; David Furley, 'Notes on Parmenides', in E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos, and R.M. Rorty, eds., *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos* (New York 1973), 12-14; Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (London 1982), 166; David Gallop, *Parmenides of Elea: Fragments* (Toronto 1984), 23-8; Scott Austin, *Parmenides: Being, Bounds, and Logic* (New Haven 1986), 97; A.H. Coxon, *The Fragments of Parmenides* (Assen 1986), 198-200; Richard J. Ketchum, 'Parmenides on What There Is', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 20 (1990), 171-3 and 184-6; Richard D. McKirahan, Jr., *Philosophy Before Socrates* (Indianapolis 1994), 167; and Patricia Curd, *The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought* (Princeton 1998), 76-7.
270. Santillana, Giorgio de. 1970. "Prologue to Parmenides." In *Reflections of Men and Ideas*, 82-119. Cambridge: M.I.T. University Press.  
Originally published in *Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple, First Series 1961-1965*, Princeton University Press, 1967.  
"Proposes a new interpretation of Parmenides' philosophy, an interpretation which is free from the misconceptions and superimpositions of ancient commentators and modern scholars, and which avoids the error of seeing in his philosophical system an ontological or metaphysical construction, or a logico-linguistic exercise. Insists on integrating the details of Parmenides' cosmology and astronomy with the principles developed in the first section of his poem. Concludes that the originality of Parmenides' thought, as well as his most significant contribution to the development of ideas, should be recognized in the fact that he "made of geometry the core of reality in an entirely different way from his predecessors" (p. 119): Parmenidean Being reveals itself as "three-dimensional extension pure and absolute" (ibid.), which was conceived as the ultimate substratum of all things." [N.]
271. Santoro, Fernando. 2011. "Ta Sēmata: On a Genealogy of the Idea of Ontological Categories." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 233-250. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Summary: "My hypothesis is that some figures of speech, like catalogs, present in the sapient epics of Hesiod and Homer, as well as figures emerging from a discursive field of veracity belonging to the newborn fifth century forensic rhetoric, helped build the originality of Parmenides' categorical ontological language. Especially for the characteristics of Being, presented in fragment B8 as signals: σήματα. I would also like to add to these elements of language, the early physicists' (φυσικῶν) interest in limits (περάτων). With these genealogical views, we can speculate about some important parameters of ontological categories such as subordination, attribution, and opposition."
272. Santos, José Gabriel Trindade. 2011. "The Role of "Thought" in the Argument of Parmenides' Poem." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 251-270. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Summary: "It is my aim in this paper to analyze the role played by "thought" in the argument of Parmenides' Poem. The relevance of the "thought" theme in Greek philosophical tradition has long been recognized. In Parmenides it implies approaching the study of reality through the experience of thought in language. As knowledge is to the known, thought is to being. Their identity dominates Parmenides' argument in the Way of Truth, persisting in later relevant conceptions as Platonic ἐπιστήμη and Aristotelian "active intellect." "
273. ———. 2013. "For a non-predicative reading of « esti » in Parmenides, the Sophists and Plato." *Méthexis. International Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:39-50.

Abstract: "The absence of grammatical subject and object in Parmenides' "it is/it is not" allows the reading of the verbal forms not as copulas but as names, with no implicit subject nor elided predicate. Once there are two only alternatives, contrary and excluding each other, sustaining that a 'no-name' does not grant knowledge implies identifying its opposite – "it is" – as the only name conducive to knowledge in itself, denouncing the 'inconceivability of a knowledge that does not know. If "it is" is the only [name] "which can be thought/known", and "what is" is the way in which 'thought/knowledge' can be accomplished, there is no need to postulate the existence of 'anything' that is, nor of anything that can be said of "what is". Being the only name which "can be thought of/known", the unifying synthesis of "knowledge, knowing and known" in one infallible cognitive state, it is unthinkable that "what is" does not exist."

274. Sattler, Barbara M. 2012. "Parmenides' System: The Logical Origins of his Monism." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:25-90.

Abstract: "This paper aims to demonstrate that it is Parmenides' criteria for philosophy in conjunction with his understanding of the available logical operators and their holistic connection that lead to what we can call a logical monism—only the one Being can be conceived and hence known. Being the first to explicate criteria for philosophy, Parmenides will be shown to establish not only consistency as a criterion for philosophy, but also what I call rational admissibility, i.e., giving an account of some x that is based on rational analysis and can thus withstand rational scrutiny. As for logical operators, Parmenides employs a basic operator for connection, identity, and one for separation, negation. His negation operator, expressing an extreme negation that negates the argument completely, corresponds to his identity operator, expressing identification with no exception. But not only are these two basic operators tailored to each other, also Parmenides' basic notion of Being is such that it fits these operators as well as his criteria for philosophy. Accordingly, a kind of holism, a systematic character, underlies Parmenides' philosophy such that that any changes in one concept would necessitate changes in the others. Given the restrictions of Parmenides' criteria for philosophy and the logical operators available to him, what can be a possible object of philosophical investigation is nothing but something absolutely simple, the one Being as the logical content of a thought."

275. Schick, Thomas. 1965. "Check and Spur: Parmenides' Concept of (What) Is." *Classical Journal*:170-173.

"So far Parmenides has told us that (what) is not does not exist, and we cannot know it: (what) is exists; and now we seek to know its characteristics, its nature. How is (what) is described? What can we know of it? It is generally agreed that all the predicates attributed by Parmenides to (what) is are contained in Fr. 8; but how are they contained there? Are they proved there? One opinion says "yes": "It [Fr. 8] opens (like a theorem in geometry) with an enunciation of the attributes, positive and negative, that will be proved to belong to the Real. ... These attributes are then established by a series of astonishingly brief and penetrating arguments."(16) But a heavy and well-founded "no" is sounded by Loenen. [\*] He argues that *de facto* many of the predicates are not proved; and he thus supports one of his main theses, that a lacuna in the text contained analytic proofs of most of the predicates.

"Fr. 8 thus contains the deduction of a small number of additional attributes, viz. those which could not be arrived at by an analytical description of the idea of being."(17) This seems most plausible; and, though I am slow to accept many of Loenen's conclusions and interpretations, I use his divisions for the following description.

I identify and explain the attributes merely mentioned; I then discuss the deduced attributes and give their arguments and proofs; and finally I discuss briefly a characteristic which is not explicitly mentioned in the fragment, but which must be predicated of (what) is." (pp. 171-172)

- [\*] J. H. M. M. Loenen, *Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias; a reinterpretation of Eleatic philosophy* (Assen 1959),  
 (16) F. M. Cornford, "Parmenides' two ways" *Classical quarterly* 27 (1933) 103.  
 (17) 17 Loenen, p. 99.
276. Schofield, Malcolm. 1970. "Did Parmenides Discover Eternity?" *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*:113-135.  
 "Mr. J. E. Raven ascribes to Parmenides the-doctrine that 'past and future are alike meaningless, the only time is a perpetual present time'(1). And this is the orthodox view(2).  
 (...)  
 But in recent years a dissenting point of view has been expressed.  
 First Professor Hermann Fränkel (6), then Professor Taran (7) has maintained (I quote Taran's expression of the point):  
 There is nothing in the text to substantiate the claim of those who assert that Parmenides maintains that past and future cannot be predicated of Being to which only the present 'is' truly belongs. Parmenides is only denying that Being ever perished or ever will come to be(8).  
 The arguments adduced by Fränkel and Taran in support of this opinion have met with vigorous opposition, deservedly so for the most part(9). But I believe that their case is a stronger one than they have been able to establish, and that the majority opinion rests on rather flimsier supports than has yet been generally appreciated.  
 These claims I attempt to substantiate in this paper.  
 The lines of Parmenides' poem which are chiefly responsible the controversy are B 8.5-6a." (pp. 113-114, a note omitted)  
 (1) G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1960: corrected Impression of the first edition), p. 274.  
 (2) L. Taran, *Parmenides*. (Princeton, 1965), p. 175, n. 1, gives a list of some who have held this view of Parmenides. They include Diels, Calogero, Mondolfo, Cornford, Gigon, Deichgräber, Owen. One may now add the names of W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* Vol. II (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 27-31, and C. H. Kahn, in a review of Taran's book in *Gnomon* 40 (1968), pp. 127-129.  
 (6) H. Fränkel, *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens*, second edition (Munich, 1960), p. 191, n. 1.  
 (7) Taran, *Parmenides*, pp. 175-188.  
 (8) Op. cit., p. 177. Zeller, in *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, Vol. I, Pt. I, ed. by W. Nestle (Leipzig, 1923), pp. 689-692, seems to give the same Interpretation as Fränkel and Taran in his text, but in a note (p. 690, n. 1) he mentions what appears to him to be a possible ground for adopting the view which has become traditional.  
 (9) Fränkel's arguments have been effectively rebutted by G. E. L. Owen, *The Monist* 60 (1966), pp. 320-322, and Taran's by C. H. Kahn, *Gnomon* 40 (1968), pp. 127-129.
277. ———. 1987. "Coxon's Parmenides." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 32:349-359.  
 "A.H. Coxon has a remarkable record of publications on ancient philosophy. In CQ [=Classical Quarterly] 1934 there appeared the early and much respected article "The Philosophy of Parmenides". Then in CQ 1968 came a brief note reporting Coxon's shaming discovery that the puzzling ἀσση usually printed in Fr. 1, 3 has no manuscript authority, coupled with a report on his re-examination of those portions of the manuscripts of Simplicius which bear on the establishment of Parmenides' text. Now in 1986 we have a full critical edition of the fragments, with introduction, translation, a much fuller selection of the ancient testimonia than in Diels-Kranz, and a commentary(1). So far as I know these are Coxon's only published writings on our subject." (p. 349)  
 "Perhaps the most interesting and important general conclusion Coxon draws from his study of the manuscript tradition of Parmenides is the proposition (*contra* Diels) that Parmenides' diction is uniformly epic and Ionic." (P. 350)

- (1) A.H. Coxon: *The Fragments of Parmenides*, Van Gorcum: Assen/Maastricht, 1986 (Phronesis Supplementary Volume III). Pp. viii + 277.
278. Schürmann, Reiner. 1988. "Tragic Differing: The Law of the One and the Law of Contraries in Parmenides." *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* no. 13:3-20.  
 "There is probably no greater beginner in the history of philosophy than Parmenides. If it is true that in their compactness beginnings already contain the essential insights that the subsequent tradition only spins out in ever new threads, then coming to terms with Parmenides is a task that has to be undertaken ever again. Most of his sayings are hapax legomena which yield clear answers only to clearly put questions. But the questions we bring to him remain ours, dictated by the preponderances of the day. The question I put to him concerns ultimate foundations. In a sense, it is the very issue for which he has been granted the status of fatherhood ever since antiquity. Common opinion holds that he drafted once and for all, as it were, the job description of the philosopher: namely, to secure principles—reference points on which every thinking agent can rely both in his thinking and in his acting. Husserl still echoes and accepts that assignment when he counts himself among "the functionaries of mankind". From the time Parmenides wrote that being is one, and perhaps until Wittgenstein taught that grammars are many, this public function invested in philosophers has on the whole gone unchallenged. Their foundational expertise has made them the civil servants par excellence in as much as they felt called upon, and in many quarters still feel called upon today, to secure a ground guaranteeing knowledge its truth and life, its meaning. As professionals, philosophers must point out—not set—reliable standards. They provide evidential moorage for the sake of consoling the soul and consolidating the city: some single first law governing all regional laws, be they cognitive, practical, or even positive. Parmenides calls that law the One (capitalized for mere conventional purposes). For an age that has grown more aware than any other of fragmentations and dispersals in the order of things, can the One as Parmenides argues it assure a non-fractured foundation? If it turned out that his originative, compact insight also contains a conceptual strategy that counters his foundational gesture from within, it might follow that in and after Parmenides philosophy has had a more humble mission to fulfill than satisfying man's quest for ultimacy. Accustomed to the Many, our century may then not amount to the mere barbarism bent on destroying the entire noble tradition devoted to the One. Philosophy may have consisted all along in the attempt to think explicitly and with some rigor about matters that everyone knows, ad though rather implicitly and poorly. And what is it that we all know firsthand, yet poorly? Of our own coming-into-being, our birth, we know only indirectly; just as we know only indirectly of our own ceasing-to-be, our death. We know, but dimly, that we stand in the double-bind of life and its contrary. The clear knowledge of that double-bind in which the law of contraries places us is tragic knowledge." (pp. 3-4)  
 (1) Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, transl. David Carr (Evanston, 1970) p. 17.
279. ———. 2003. *Broken Hegemonies*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Translated by Reginald Lilly from the French: *Des Hégémonies brisées*, Mauvenzin, Trans Europe Repress, 1996.  
 See Part One: *In the Name of the One. The Greek Hegemonic Fantasm. I: Its Institution: The One That Holds Together (Parmenides)* pp. 51-135.  
 "The pages that follow are meant to be read as a contribution to the age old "doctrine of principles." Philosophers have never stopped speculating about this principal Greek legacy. Today the business of principal principles seems to have been robbed of its heritage. What can be learned from its loss? May it actually represent a gain for us? These are good enough reasons to examine the operations that have been carried out on this legacy." (p. 3)  
 "In what way is being one? As cumulative and "re-cumulative," as constantly recurring. The one that being is, is thinkable only as the crystallization of beings



(which has nothing to do with atomism), a crystallization thought not in terms of beings, but as an occurrence, hence in terms of time. The one is what occurs through an aggregation. Beings and being are articulated in the *henological difference*.

How does this difference make law? Our analysis of contraries has shown that they essentially conjoin and disjoin with one another. There fore we cannot think of being as arrival without also thinking of it as leaving. There is no centripetal aggregation without a centrifugal disaggregation. To use Heidegger's words once again: no appropriation without expropriation.(119) In the idiom of an analytic of ultimates—no universalization without singularization. In terms of the law—no legislation with out transgression immanent within it. In one fell swoop, and necessarily, the henological difference makes the law by binding us both to the dissolution of the phenomena of the world and to their consolidation that is underway. As soon as he understands the one as a process, Parmenides has to establish both at traction and withdrawal as equally normative. This double bind is embedded in our condition as mortals. We can call it the *henological differend*." (P. 134)

(119 M. Heidegger, "Protocole," [Martin Heidegger, "Protocole d'un séminaire," trans. Jean Lauxerois and Claude Roël, in *Questions IV*, Paris, 1976], p. 77.

280. Sedley, David. 1999. "Parmenides and Melissus." In *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*, edited by Long, Anthony Arthur, 113-133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Abstract: "Parmenides and Melissus were bracketed in antiquity as the two great exponents of the Eleatic world-view which denies change and plurality. (1) In modern times their treatment has been curiously unequal.  
Too much has been written on Parmenides - albeit the greater thinker of the two - too little on Melissus. Too much has been said about Parmenides' use of the verb "be," while too little has been said about his detailed arguments for the individual characteristics of what-is. However, neither these nor other anomalies should disguise the immense wealth of scholarship that has furthered the reconstruction of their Eleaticism." (p. 113)  
"How, then, does the cosmology complement the Way of Truth?  
Above all by showing how to bridge the gap between truth and cosmic appearance. The entire range of cosmic phenomena can be generated by allowing the intrusion of just one additional item - by starting out with two instead of one. This makes immediate sense of the frequently noticed fact that the detailed descriptions of the cosmos mimic the language of the Way of Truth. For example, in B10 the "encircling heaven" is "bound down by Necessity to hold the limits of the stars," immediately recalling the description of what-is as held motionless by Necessity in the bonds of a limit (B8.30-31). This tends to confirm that the very same sphere is being first correctly described, then, in the cosmology, incorrectly redescribed." (p. 124)  
(1) Most of the interpretations proposed in this chapter can also be found in my two articles, "Melissus" and "Parmenides," in Craig, E. General editor *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (London, 1998).
281. Sider, David. 1979. "Confirmation of Two "Conjectures" in the Presocratics: Parmenides B 12 and Anaxagoras B 15." *Phoenix.Journal of the Classical Association of Canada* no. 33:67-69.  
"In each of the two passages discussed below, the indisputably correct reading is given by Diels as editorial conjecture, when in fact for each there is manuscript authority." (p. 33)  
[The text of Parmenides is B12.4]
282. ———. 1985. "Textual Notes on Parmenides' Poem." *Hermes.Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* no. 113:362-366.  
Philological remarks on the following fragments: 1,10, 1,24, 1,30, 2,3f; 6,4f; 6,5-6; 8,1, 8,28, 8,38, 12,2, 12,3.

283. Siegel, Rudolph E. 1962. "Parmenides and the Void. Some Comments on the Paper of Thomas S. Knight " *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 22:264-266.  
 "In his paper, T. S. Knight came to the conclusion that Parmenides did not simply deny the existence of a void, a physical vacuum, but also questioned the existence, the reality of the sensible world.  
 It might be open for discussion if the poem of Parmenides can be considered as a treatise on such highly abstract thinking as discussed by T. S. Knight.(1) One may rather assume, as others have done, that Parmenides and other pre-Socratic philosophers expressed with the Greek word 'To Hen,' the 'one,' a more concrete astronomical idea, the cosmos. In a paper on 'The Paradoxes of Zeno' (2) I tried to explain that the word 'one' might express: the mathematical point, the atom, and even the cosmos.  
 Its respective meaning should be taken from the entire context."  
 (1) Thomas S. Knight, "Parmenides and the Void," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (June 1959), pp. 524-528.  
 (2) Rudolph E. Siegel, "The Paradoxes of Zeno; Some Similarities to Modern Thought," *Janus*, XLVIII 1-2, 1959, pp. 24-47.
284. Sisko, John E. 2014. "Anaxagoras and Empedocles in the shadow of Elea." In *The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Warren, James and Sheffield, Frisbee, 49-64. New York: Routledge.  
 "If Anaxagoras and Empedocles advance their theories in response to Parmenides, then it is quite unlikely that they consider Parmenides to be a predicational monist.  
 (...) Whether Parmenides is a numerical monist or a generous monist, his alleged monad is motionless and phenomenally homogeneous. Also, on either interpretation, it is reasonable to consider Parmenides' monad both to be either a finite sphere or an infinitely extended expanse and to be either predicationally simple or predicationally saturated.  
 (...) In light of their shared supposition that the cosmos develops from Parmenides' monad, it is unlikely that Anaxagoras and Empedocles consider Parmenides to be a generous monist.  
 (...) It is not implausible to suppose that Anaxagoras and Empedocles consider Parmenides to be a numerical monist.  
 (...) Thus, it is possible that Anaxagoras and Empedocles consider Parmenides to be a numerical monist, concerning the initial state of the universe, and a numerical pluralist, concerning subsequent states. This interpretation constitutes a fourth alternative for assessing Parmenides' philosophy. Nevertheless, the interpretation does not appear to be consistent with specific claims offered in the Way of Truth (as those claims are commonly understood). So, it remains credible to affirm that Parmenides is a numerical monist and both Anaxagoras and Empedocles understand him to be a numerical monist." (pp. 62-63)
285. Sisko, John E., and Weiss, Yale. 2015. "A Fourth Alternative in Interpreting Parmenides." *Phronesis* no. 60:40-59.  
 Abstract: "According to current interpretations of Parmenides, he either embraces a token-monism of things, or a type-monism of the nature of each kind of thing, or a generous monism, accepting a token-monism of things of a specific type, necessary being. These interpretations share a common flaw: they fail to secure commensurability between Parmenides' *alētheia* and *doxa*. We effect this by arguing that Parmenides champions a metaphysically refined form of material monism, a type-monism of things; that light and night are allomorphs of what-is (*to eon*); and that the key features of what-is are entailed by the theory of material monism."

286. Skirry, Justin. 2001. "The Numerical Monist Interpretation of Parmenides." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 39:403-417.  
 Abstract: "The doctrine of numerical monism, as it is traditionally attributed to Parmenides, is the claim that there is only one thing that is genuinely or truly real - that is, is not generated, not perishable, immutable, indivisible, whole, complete, and continuous.(1) In this paper I argue that this interpretation is mistaken because it entails a claim that Parmenides does not accept, namely that Being and not-Being are both the same and not the same. This paper begins with a discussion of the central thesis of the Numerical Monist Interpretation of Parmenides (NMIP). (2) Next, I argue that any consistent version of this interpretation must also hold that Parmenides is committed to the identification of thinking with Being. In the following section, I argue that if Parmenides is committed to this identification, then he must also think that Being and not-Being are both the same and not the same. However, fragment B6 provides evidence for the claim that Parmenides would not accept this conclusion. Finally, these considerations provide the three main premises of an argument, which concludes that Parmenides does not accept numerical monism as traditionally attributed to him by commentators. We now turn to a discussion of NMIP's central thesis."  
 (1) Other commentators use different terms to refer to what I call "numerical monism." For example, Jonathan Barnes uses "real monism" (Jonathan Barnes, "Parmenides and the Eleatic One" *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 61 [1979]: 1-21), and Mary Margaret MacKenzie uses the term "strong monism" (Mary Margaret MacKenzie, "Parmenides' Dilemma," *Phronesis* 27 [1982]: 1-12).  
 (2) Numerical monism is one of at least three varieties of monism found in early Greek philosophy. The other two types are material and predication monism. The former asserts that all reality is made of the same stuff: For example, on the traditional interpretation, Anaximenes believed that all things are really air in different stages of condensation and rarefaction. Notice that material monism does not designate a number of existents. "Predication Monism" is the term used by Patricia Curd to describe her position. According to Curd a real thing for Parmenides is a predication unity holding only one predicate, which indicates what it is. Notice that this does not preclude the existence of a plurality of predicates (see Patricia Curd *The Legacy of Parmenides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1998, 65-66). This paper is concerned with the attribution of numerical monism to Parmenides. Whether or not Parmenides is committed to one of these other sorts of monism is not at issue here.
287. Slaveva-Griffin, Svetla. 2003. "Of Gods, Philosophers, and Charioteers: Content and Form in Parmenides' Proem and Plato's *Phaedrus*." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* no. 133:227-253.  
 Summary: "This article examines the ways in which Parmenides and Plato avail themselves of the literary motif of the charioteer's journey for philosophical discourse. I argue that the *Phaedrus*' myth of the soul as a charioteer exemplifies Plato's literary and philosophic appropriation of the charioteer allegory in Parmenides' proem and of Parmenides' concept of being, showing how the literary study of intertexts can be applied to questions of both content and form in philosophy."  
 "The allegory of the charioteer's journey in Parmenides' proem and Plato's *Phaedrus* deserves the attention of both philosophers and literary critics. Regarding content, Plato bases his concept of the immortality of the soul upon Parmenides' concept of true being: the soul is a self-moving first principle that cannot be destroyed or come into being (*Phdr.* 245c5-e1) and is therefore kindred to Parmenides' ungenerated, imperishable, whole, steadfast, and complete being (B8.3-4).<sup>1</sup> Regarding form, Plato employs the allegory of the charioteer's journey to illustrate the immortal nature of the soul (*Phdr.* 246a6-b4), alluding thereby to Parmenides' account of the chariot journey of a young philosopher beyond sense-perceptible reality to the realm of eternal existence (B1.1-5). I shall examine the

- close relationship between Plato's myth of the soul as a charioteer in the *Phaedrus* and the charioteer's journey in *Parmenides*. I shall also draw attention to the literary tradition of the theme prior to *Parmenides*, and particularly to its presence in Homer, in order to situate the interconnection of the two philosophical texts in the context of their generic differences and similarities. The current examination entails the study of (a) *Parmenides*' adoption and adaptation of the Homeric theme of a charioteer's journey in the allegory of a philosopher's search for true knowledge; and (b) Plato's literary and philosophical use of *Parmenides*' allegory in the account of the immortality of the soul (*Phdr.* 245c5–47a2)." (p. 227)
288. Solana, José Dueso. 2011. "Parmenides: Logic and Ontology." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 271-288. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Summary: "Many scholars (especially Calogero) affirm that in the age of *Parmenides*, a theoretical treatment of logic and ontology was not clearly differentiated. Accepting this thesis, valid as well for Plato and Aristotle to some extent, this paper provides arguments for a primarily logical and only secondarily ontological interpretation of the ἀλήθεια of *Parmenides* (fr. 2–fr. 8.50). An interpretation of this type allows us to solve the arduous problem of the relationship between both parts of the poem, the ἀλήθεια and the δόξα, in a satisfactory way. Besides the internal arguments from *Parmenides*' own text, there are two external references that support the proposed interpretation: firstly, some data of the philosophical-poetic context, and secondly, an insistent thesis of Aristotle according to which some Presocratic philosophers (*Parmenides* among them) supposed that reality is confined to sensible things."
289. Solmsen, Friedrich. 1977. "Light from Aristotle's *Physics* on the Text of *Parmenides* B 8 D-K." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 22:10-12.  
"Students of *Parmenides* are familiar with a problem regarding his text and thought in the beginning of the passage where Being is elevated to an unheard-of grandeur and sublimity. Does *Parmenides* in B 8.6-15 disprove only genesis from not-Being or does his refutation dispose of genesis from Being as well as from not-Being?  
(...)  
Exegetes who consider a dilemmatic structure of the argument necessary have not failed to avail themselves of the strong support afforded them by Simplicius' comments on vv. 3-14  
(...)  
What seems to have gone unnoticed is that Aristotle too bears witness to the truth of their position. For although he does not name him, he must have *Parmenides* in mind at *Physics* I 8, 191 a 23-33." (pp. 10-11)  
"Throughout a large part of *Physics I*, *Parmenides*' (and *Melissus*') position presents the great obstacle to Aristotle's efforts at treating genesis as a reality.(6) The monolithic, unchanging *on* deprives physics of the principles (*archai*) without which it cannot build. Aristotle launches attack after attack against the fortress that had so long been considered impregnable.  
Having conquered it he constructs his own theory of *genesis*." (p. 12)  
(6) See esp. I 1-3 (184 b 15 ff., 25 ff. etc.). Cf. my *Aristotle's System of the Physical World* (Ithaca, 1961) 74 ff.
290. Sorabji, Richard. 1983. *Time, Creation and the Continuum: theories in antiquity and the early middle ages*. London: Duckworth.  
Chapter 8: Is Eternity Timelessness?; *Parmenides*, pp. 99-107.  
"The concept of eternity appears very early in Western thought in one of the first Presocratic philosophers, *Parmenides* of Elea (born c. 515 B.C). It is taken up by Plato and the Platonists and this is the route by which it comes to influence Christian thought. Eternity is standardly contrasted with time and is said by the Christians I shall be discussing to be a characteristic of God. To the question raised in the chapter heading, whether eternity is timelessness, I shall answer with a qualified 'yes', after explaining what I mean. But the case will need arguing, for



- there are plenty of rival interpretations which have been ably supported." (pp. 98-99)
- "In his poem *The Way of Truth*, Parmenides discusses an unspecified subject 'it'. I favour the suggestion that the subject is whatever can be spoken and thought of, or alternatively whatever we inquire into. (3) The crucial sentence for our purposes comes in fr. 8 DK, 1. 5 and the first half of 6:  
Nor was it ever (*pot'*), nor will it be, since it now is, all together, one, continuous. It is the denial of 'was' and 'will be' which expresses some concept of eternity - but what concept?  
I shall distinguish eight main interpretations." (p. 99)
- "I conclude provisionally that the 'timeless' interpretation fits Parmenides best, and I should now like to see what happened to the concept of eternity after Parmenides. To put it briefly, my suggestion will be that Plato clouded the issue by placing alongside the implications of timelessness more phrases implying everlasting duration than can conveniently be explained away. This made it necessary for Plotinus to make a decision and his decision was in favour of timelessness." (p. 108)
- (3) The first is the suggestion of G.E.L. Owen, the second that of Jonathan Barnes. G.E.L. Owen, 'Eleatic questions', *CQn.s.* 10, 1960, 84-102 (repr. in D.J. Furley and R.E. Allen, *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy* vol.2, London, 1975), and 'Plato and Parmenides on the timeless present', *Monist* 50, 1966, 317-40 (repr. in A.P.D. Mourelatos (ed.) *The Pre-Socratics*, Garden City N.Y., 1974 ). Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, London 1979, vol. 1, 163.
291. Spangler, G.A. 1979. "Aristotle's Criticism of Parmenides in *Physics* I." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 13:92-103.  
"Aristotle's aim in the *Physics* is to discover those principles which make it possible to have systematic knowledge of nature. He does not say that this is his aim, however, but only implies that it is. The text of the *Physics* opens with the following remarks:  
In all disciplines in which there is systematic knowledge of things with principles, causes, or elements, it arises from a grasp of those: we think we have knowledge of a thing when we have found its primary causes and principles, and followed it back to its elements. Clearly, then, systematic knowledge of nature must start with an attempt to settle questions about principles (184a 10-15).  
These remarks put Aristotle's *Physics* squarely into the tradition of "natural philosophy," which is usually said to have originated with Thales. But just as one is rightly wary of saying that natural philosophy was originated by any one man, so it is incautious to suppose that one could easily label what Aristotle is doing in a work so complex as his *Physics*. His own words suggest that he is writing with a scientific interest at stake, but even so one must remember that the lover of truth was then little concerned with marking out territories on the intellectual landscape. In any event, Aristotle quickly moves on to a discussion of Parmenides and Melissus, a discussion which, as he says, offers scope for philosophy." (P. 92)
292. Sprague, Rosamond Kent. 1955. "Parmenides: A Suggested Rearrangement of Fragments in the 'Way of Truth'." *Classical Philology* no. 50:124-126.  
"The proposed alteration of Diels's ordering of the fragments of Parmenides will, I believe, eliminate from the poem two difficulties in thought which result from the present sequence. (1) The fragments with which I am concerned are the following: 6. 1-9; 7. 1-5; 8.1-2 [Greek text omitted]" (p. 123)  
"My rearrangement of the fragments would be as follows: (1) I should detach the first two lines of Fragment 6, thus leaving a gap between lines 2 and 3 in the present sequence. (2) I should then place 7. 1-2 in the gap created between 6. 2 and 6. 3." (p. 124)  
"The entire rearrangement may be summarized as follows: ( 1) 7. 1 follows 6. 2; (2) 7. 2 is dropped on the assumption that it is really another version of 6. 3; (3) 6. 3-9 are as before, but, with the removal of 7. 1-2, 7. 3 follows 6. 9. The rest of the ordering remains the same." (p. 125)

- (1) All textual references are to Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1951), Vol. I.
293. Stannard, Jerry. 1960. "Parmenidean Logic." *The Philosophical Review* no. 69:526-533.  
 "That Parmenides introduced a significant change in the method of Greek philosophic thinking is admitted on all hands, though there is, naturally, considerable disagreement about the nature of that change as well as its significance." (p. 526)  
 "I am not at all convinced that the famous dictum "It is impossible that Being and Not-Being are and are not the same" (B6 D-K) is evidence that Parmenides recognized that the formal structure of his argument was a special case of the more general principle of contradiction. Exactly what method Parmenides used in cataloguing the characteristics of Being doubtless remains a problem. My own feeling is that he was simply and intuitively following the syntactical structure of the only language known to him. Thus I would suggest that the principal criterion followed by Parmenides in this process was essentially a negative one: avoidance of any open violation of the rules of Greek syntax.(18)" (pp. 530-531)  
 (18) For this reason, I am inclined to agree with von Fritz (loc. cit., ["NOYZ, NOEIN, and their Derivates in Pre-Socratic Philosophy," *Classical Philology*, XL, 1945] p. 241) that Parmenides' method was largely an "intuitive" one. Whether or not, in addition to this, Parmenides' exposition of the Way of Truth was akin to a religious or mystical revelation, as Bowra (op. cit. [*Problems in Greek Poetry*, Oxford, 1953]) convincingly argues, is a matter that does not affect the present paper.
294. Steele, Laura D. 2002. "Mesopotamian Elements in the Proem of Parmenides? Correspondences between the Sun-Gods Helios and Shamash." *Classical Quarterly* no. 52:583-588.  
 "This paper will examine the striking similarities between the journey of Parmenides' narrator and that of the Babylonian sun-god Shamash (Sumerian UTU),(3) similarities that confirm previous scholarly attempts to discern attributes of Helios and/or Apollo in the proem.(4) While the metaphors of a horse-drawn chariot and 'daughters of the sun' are attested Greek associations with the sun-god Helios, three elements of Parmenides' proem are explained more readily with reference to Shamash: the downward passage(5) through gates that are described in great structural detail; the association between these gates and the figure of Justice; and the identification of Parmenides' narrator as Greek κούρος, a word that covers the semantic range of a common epithet of Shamash (and of his disciple Gilgamesh), Akkadian *etlu*.  
 Whether or not Parmenides invoked Babylonian antecedents intentionally, his choice of images indicates a certain degree of Babylonian influence on Greek deities and literary culture more generally." (p. 584)  
 (3) For general information, see 'Utu' in J. Black and A. Green, *Gods, Demons, and Symbols of Ancient Mesopotamia* (Austin, 1992), 182-4.  
 (4) For arguments in favour of the solar trajectory of Parmenides' journey, see W Burkert, 'Das Proomium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras', *Phronesis* 14 (1969), 1-30, following W. Kranz, 'Über Aufbau und Bedeutung des Parmenideischen Gedichtes', *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 47 (1916), 1158-76. For a semantic rebuttal of Kranz's hypothesis, see Tarán, *Parmenides* (Princeton, 1965), 23.  
 (5) Or *katabasis*; see the thorough discussions in Burkert (n. 4) and in P. Kingsley, *In the Dark Places of Wisdom* (Shaftesbury, 1999), 58ff.
295. Stein, Howard. 1969. "Comments on 'The thesis of Parmenides'." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 22:725-734.  
 About the paper by Charles Kahn (1969).

"I want to suggest that the conclusions of your beautiful paper on the Greek verb "to be," which you apply in what seems to me a very convincing way to the analysis of Parmenides, can be exploited further than you have done, with a gain of coherence for the doctrine. I offer my suggestions diffidently: they are rather speculative, and I have no scholarship in the language and little in the period.

The principal question I want to raise is that of the interpretation of what you call Parmenides' "wildly paradoxical conclusions about the impossibility of plurality and change." An argument that leads to a truly paradoxical conclusion is always open (if it escapes conviction for fallacy) to construction as a *reductio ad absurdum*. And the (meager) biographical tradition represents Parmenides - quite unlike Heraclitus, Heraclitus, for instance - as a reasonable and even practically effective man, not at all a fanatic. It therefore seems natural to ask, if he maintained a paradoxical doctrine, whether it did not possess for him (and perhaps for his successors who took him seriously) an interpretation that made some sense. Further, setting aside this not very weighty *prima facie* argument, I think the search for plausible interpretations is worthwhile in any case: for (1) to make a rational assessment of the historical evidence one needs the widest possible survey of hypotheses to choose among; (2) since conclusions in such matters are always uncertain, a list of possibilities may retain a kind of permanent (not just heuristic) value, as the best we can do; and (3) readings which are even dismissed as unsound on adequate critical grounds may still be of interest, both for the understanding of historical influence - I have in mind in the present case especially Parmenides' influence on Plato-and for our own philosophical edification." (p. 725)

These remarks are a revised version of comments made in correspondence concerning an earlier redaction of Kahn's paper. It has seemed, on the whole, least stilted to retain the informality of second person address. I wish to record my gratitude to Kahn for suggesting that these comments be published with his paper.

296. Stekeler-Weithofer, Pirmin. 2001. "The Way of Truth. Parmenides' Seminal Reflections on Logic, Semantics and Methodology of Science." In *Auditor vox sapientiae. A Festschrift for Arnim von Stechow*, edited by Féry, Caroline and Sternefeld, Wolfgang, 450-472. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.  
"In the following, I try to present a new perspective on Parmenides, the father of Plato's logical semantics, or rather, on his famous and difficult poem. I do so without presenting sufficient philological arguments for the proposed reading. I just claim that the poem is a most influential text in the history of logic, semantics and methodology of science. Usually, some kind of metaphysical ontology stands in the focus of attention. I believe, instead, that later shifts of interest and understanding lost the original context and project out of sight.  
Parmenides asks what truth and reliable knowledge is. He seems to be the first philosopher who did not just tell allegedly true stories about the structure of the world as, for example, the Ionians did. Parmenides begins with a metalevel reflection on method, on the right road (*hodos*) to knowledge and truth. He presents an ideal explanation of what absolute truth and knowledge is. Only after this does he give a presentation of best possible knowledge. This main part of the poem is almost totally lost. It consisted of a collections of claims about the real causes of some phenomena. Therefore, the book had the title *On Nature* in antiquity." (p. 450)
297. ———. 2003. "Plato and Parmenides on Ideal Truth, Invariant Meaning, and Participation." In *Ideal and Culture of Knowledge in Plato. Akten der IV. Tagung der Karl-und-Gertrud-Abel-Stiftung vom 1-3 September 2000 in Frankfurt*, edited by Wolfgang, Detel, Becker, Alexander and Scholz, Peter, 115-132. Stuttgart: F. Steiner.  
"For Parmenides, representation 'by the mind', by memory, or 'to the mind', by words, is the basic method of overcoming the cognitive limits of sheer presence.(3) Parmenides defends the peculiar role of presence and claims that it is conceptually the same to say that something is real and that it can be known: Existing (*einaí*) and being the object of possible knowledge (*noein*) are the same. But he seems to work

with a double meaning of "noiein": The core meaning is to notice or to realise something in a present situation.

Hence, there is an obvious need to 'enlarge' the concept of knowing from the narrow sense of immediate 'realisation' to general knowledge and, by the same token, of the parochial concept of actual being here to universal reality. By this move, the concept of immediate knowledge, i. e. perception, widens to possible knowledge. Truth and reality is what can be known. It is not defined by what actually is known or, even worse, what only seems to be known. But how do we conceptually proceed from what can be realised here and now to what can or could be known?" (p. 116)

(3) It is not clear how Parmenides, fragment 4,1 must be translated, perhaps both readings are right.

298. Stewart, Donald. 1980. "Contradiction and the Ways of Truth and Seeming." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 14:1-14.  
 "The central problem concerning Parmenides' poem is to provide the rationale for the relationship between the two major parts of the poem, The Way of Truth and The Way of Seeming." (p. 1)  
 "Very briefly my argument is this; though the Greeks individuated objects on the basis of sensation just as we do, they had, at the time of Heraclitus, no satisfactory way of grounding this sensory individuation in ontology.  
 (...) This, in turn, led Heraclitus to a belief in, if not a formulation of, what we may call the principle of contradiction, for it was evident that all things were One and yet still different things at the same time, and thus that paradox was the only true method of thought.  
 Parmenides, in a reference seemingly clearly to Heraclitus,(4) formulates this principle for the first time when he refers to those by whom "To be and Not To be are regarded as the same and not the same, and (for whom) in everything there is a way of opposing stress." (fr.6) It is this principle which is the key, I believe, to the relation of the Way of Seeming to the Way of Truth. If we take "To be" as a description of the One and "Not to be" as its negation then it is relatively easy to discern the relation between the two Ways. The Way of Truth gives us a description of the One from the point of view of the One while allowing, at the same time, for a description of the many, but only from the point of view of the many. Each is totally different from the other, and yet if we take Heraclitus seriously, as I think Parmenides did, they are the same as well as not the same. It is this sameness of the two opposites, the One and all the things that are the One, which provides the link between the two Ways. The Way of Seeming, though it is the Way of Truth, is that Way only from the point of view of Seeming. Similarly, the Way of Truth, though it is the Way of Seeming, is so only from the point of view of the truth, the One." (p. 2)  
 (4) Stokes disagrees and claims that there is no compelling reason to believe that Parmenides was aware of Heraclitus' writings at all.
299. Stokes, Michael C. 1960. "Parmenides Fr. 6." *Classical Review* no. 10:193-194.  
 I give the text and punctuation of Diels-Kranz for lines 3 ff.:  
 Πρώτης γάρ σ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>,  
 αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν  
 πλάττονται, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν  
 στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον· οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται  
 κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα,  
 οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτὸν νενόμισται  
 κού ταῦτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.  
 "There has been much controversy over the question whether or not this fragment refers to the philosophy of Heraclitus; much less discussion of the construction and meaning of these singularly difficult lines. The crucial point concerns the gender of πάντων in I. 9. Kirk-Raven, p. 271, translate as if it were neuter, while admitting, p.



- 272 n. 1, that it is possible that it is masculine. This is fair enough; but the word 'possible' is perhaps an understatement." (p. 193)
- "I suggest that the most satisfactory way out of the problem is to punctuate with a colon after *κοὺ ταῦτόν*, taking *πάντων δὲ...* as syntactically parallel to *οἱ δὲ...* in I. 6 of this fragment. The last clause of the fragment would then be a separate statement of the goddess, introduced by an explanatory *δὲ*. (1) It would follow, of course, that *πάντων* should be taken as masculine, since the goddess could hardly say that the way of all things was backward-turning. The conclusion is that in all probability the phrase *πάντων ... κέλευθος* and the path of all (mortals) is backward-turning'. The abruptness resulting from this punctuation need arouse no suspicion; for abruptness is not uncharacteristic of Parmenides." (p. 194)
- (1) See Denniston, *Greek Particles* [second edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1954], p. 169.
300. ———. 1971. *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy*. Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies.  
Reprint: Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986.  
Preface V-VI; Contents: I. Aristotle and the Analysis of Unity and Plurality 1; II. The Milesians 24; III. Xenophanes 66; IV. Heraclitus 86; V. Parmenides and Melissus 109; VI. Empedocles 153; VII: Zeno of Elea 175; VIII. One-Many Problem in Atomism 218; IX. Miscellaneous Presocratic Contexts 237; X. Conclusion 249; Appendix: Parmenides *B8.7-12* 253; Abbreviations 258; Bibliography 259; Notes 267; Index of Passages 341; General Index 347-355.  
"Having decided to treat of Parmenides separately from Heraclitus, we must turn to consider the role of unity, and of the one-many antithesis, in Parmenides' thought, and the kind(s) of unity and plurality that he had in mind. We must also consider whether a question of "what is one" being or becoming many arises in Parmenides' argument. It seems clear that the function of the one-many antithesis in this, the first extant European piece of consecutive metaphysical reasoning, has been greatly exaggerated in some quarters; though the exaggeration has been somewhat diminished in successive works of recent years,(65) it still remains an obstacle to the understanding and appreciation of a great philosopher and needs therefore still to be pointed out and criticized.  
If any single antithesis occupied a high place in Parmenides' thought, it was that between Being and not-Being. The word "one" appears in only two extant places in Parmenides' poem, and the phrase "the one" appears in Melissus apparently for the first time, in conscious reference back to that Being which has been proved to be one; the phrase "the One Being," beloved alike of Cornford and of the Neoplatonist Simplicius, is not to be found in the extant remains of Presocratic Eleaticism. Once more the questions at issue can be decided only on the basis of close textual analysis; and again we have to deal with a thinker recognized even by the ancients as obscure. (66)" (p. 127)  
(65) Untersteiner's thesis (*Parmenide*, [Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1958] *passim*) eliminating the One altogether from Parmenides is adequately dealt with by Schwabl, *Anzeiger für Altertumswissenschaft* 9 (1956) 150f. F. Solmsen's important analysis, reducing the significance of unity in Eleatic thought perhaps too drastically, came into my hands as this book was going to press, too late for detailed criticism: see "The 'Eleatic One' in Melissus," *Mededelingen der koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen*, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 32, No. 8 (1969) 221-233.  
(66) See Proclus *in Tim.* 1.345.12f (Diehl) and *Simpl. in Phys.*, e.g., 7.1ff, 21.16ff.
301. Stough, Charlotte. 1968. "Parmenides' "Way of Truth", B 8. 12-13." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 13:91-107.  
"The consistency with which fragment 8 of the Way of Truth has occupied the attention of commentators is evidence of its importance for an understanding of Parmenides' thought. Yet the many efforts to elucidate this passage have issued in diverse and mutually incompatible conclusions, with the result that the meaning of significant portions of the text remains in doubt. Lines 12-13, in particular, have

been the subject of protracted but inconclusive debate and are still interpreted variously in the context of the fragment.(2)

οὐδὲ ποτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος (3) ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς  
γίγνεσθαι τι παρ' αὐτό.

The chief difficulty in interpreting these lines, and the source of the divergency of opinion as to their meaning, concerns the reference of αὐτό in line 13. The pronoun seems to point most naturally to μὴ ἐόντος in the preceding line as its grammatical antecedent. If the Greek is construed in this way, the lines can be rendered, "Nor will the force of conviction allow anything to arise out of what is not besides itself" (viz., what is not). Reading the passage accordingly, a number of scholars have translated it in some such fashion as the above.(4)" (p. 91)

"The main concern of this paper is to defend the meaningfulness of lines 12-13 as translated above and to clarify the function of that assertion in the context of Parmenides' argument. The first section deals with the claim that the lines so rendered are meaningless or inappropriate in their content; the second section concerns the structure of the argument in which the statement occurs; and the third section discusses very briefly variant interpretations of the text." (p. 92)

(2) For three different interpretations in the recent literature see Kirk and Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (1963), pp. 273-275; W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. II (1965), pp. 27-29; L. Tarán, *Parmenides* (1965), pp. 85, 95ff.

(3) Reading along with Diels and others ἐόντος for ὄντως in the MSS of Simplicius. (49 Among them Diels (*Parmenides Lehrgedicht*, p. 37), Burnet (*Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 175), and most recently Guthrie (op. cit., p. 26).

302. Swindler, James Kenneth. 1980. "Parmenides' Paradox. Negative Reference and Negative Existentials." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 33:727-744.  
"In the beginning Parmenides sought to deny the void. But he found himself trapped by his language and his thought into admitting what he sought to deny. Wisely, he counseled others to avoid the whole region in which the problem arises, lest they too be unwarily ensnared. Plato, being less easily intimidated and grasping for the first time the urgency of the paradox, unearthed each snare in turn until he felt he had found a safe path through the forbidden terrain in a new conception of being and the derivation of its linguistic consequences in the Sophist. Aristotle evidently took Parmenides' advice; and save for a few groping scholastics, perhaps Leibniz, Brentano, and Meinong, and Frege only in passing, no one else attempted the crossing before Russell made his spectacular dash through the posted ground from the completely new direction of linguistic reference. Again the problem lay dormant for half a century until Strawson constructed a new low road through ordinary language and Quine improved Russell's high algebraic pass. Refinements of these routes have been forthcoming, especially from Searle and Kripke, until today it might appear that there are two super highways through Parmenides' forbidden country of nonbeing. In this essay I will first argue that these new linguistic highways are no more than flimsy camouflage hiding but not resolving the old paradoxes. I will then show how Plato's ontological way out, though more difficult, is the straight and narrow path." (p. 727)
303. Tallis, Raymond. 2007. *The Enduring Significance of Parmenides. Unthinkable Thought*. New York: Continuum.  
Contents: Autobiographical Prelude IX; Preface: The once and future philosopher XII-XVI; Chapter 1. The strange dawn of Western thought 1; Chapter 2. The existence of What-Is-Not 27; Chapter 3. Propositional awareness encounters itself 50; Chapter 4. Why Parmenides happened 88; Chapter 5. Parmenides' footnotes: Plato and Aristotle 130; Chapter 6. Parmenides today 158; Works cited 189; Notes 195; Index 230-240.  
"In Chapter 2, I shall examine Parmenides' central claim - that what-is-not is not - and discuss how what-is-not comes to have such a pervasive presence in the human world. The key to this, I shall argue, is possibility - which may or may not be

actualized, as a result of which what-is exists explicitly and corresponds to 'truth', and what-is-not can be individuated and be an explicit falsehood. Chapter 3 looks further into the origin of negation and possibility, finding it in the Propositional Awareness (knowledge, thought and discourse) that characterizes distinctively human consciousness. Parmenides' poem, I shall argue, is the first fully fledged encounter of Propositional Awareness with itself. Chapter 4 examines in what sense Parmenides was unique among the Presocratic thinkers and then why he and, indeed, Presocratic thought arose when they did. It is obvious that philosophy must have had non-philosophical origins. I try to dig deeper than the usual explanations and in doing so examine many factors - politics, trade, exile, the alphabet, different linguistic codes - that made seventh-century Greeks conscious of their consciousness in a way that had no precedent in the hundreds of thousands of years of human consciousness prior to this. Parmenides may be seen as the resultant of the factors that led to Presocratic thought plus his reaction to his predecessors. Chapter 5 examines the most important response to Parmenides - Plato's Parmenides - which did more than any other post-Parmenidean event to amplify Parmenides' influence kind, at the same time, to conceal him behind the Platonic ideas he is supposed to have provoked. I examine not only Plato's response to Parmenides but also Aristotle's response to Plato.

In the final chapter, I look at the possible meaning that Parmenides might have today. His present relevance resides in the fact that we may have reached the end of the cognitive road upon which he, pre-eminent amongst the early Greek philosophers, set mankind. Parmenides dismissed ordinary wakefulness as if it were a kind of sleep, in the hope of goading us to another kind of wakefulness. While the present book cannot match that ambition, I would very much hope that, by returning to the philosophical and historical hinterland of Parmenides' cataclysmic idea, I might start the process by which we return to the place from which Parmenides set out and journey in another direction in a world unimaginably different from his." (pp. 25-26)

304. Tarán, Leonardo. 1967. "Proclus *In Parm.* 1152.33 (Cousin) and Parmenides 28 B 3 (Diels-Kranz)." *Classical Philology* no. 62:194-195.  
Reprinted in L. Tarán, *Collected Papers (1962-1999)*, Leiden: Brill, 2001, pp. 623-624.

In a recent study on Parmenides, Dr. Mansfeld takes Proclus *in Parm.* 1152. 33, ταύτόν δ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ νοεῖν τε καὶ εἶναι to be a quotation of Parmenides 28 B 3; and he maintains that, however imperfect that quotation may be, there is no justification for the failure on the part of Diels and Kranz to mention that this fragment was known to Proclus.(1)" (p. 623)

"In short, although absolute certainty is impossible, Proclus *in Parm.* 1152. 33 is more likely to be a paraphrase of 28 B 8.34 than of 28 B 3 and, whether this was the reason that decided Diels and Kranz to exclude Proclus as a source of 28 B 3 or not, Dr. Mansfeld should have considered this possibility before blaming Diels and Kranz for what he takes to be their failure to mention an important source." (p. 624)  
(1) J. Mansfeld, *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt* (Assen 1964), pp. 69, 73, and esp. 79 f.

305. ———. 1979. "Perpetual Duration and Atemporal Eternity in Parmenides and Plato." *The Monist* no. 62:43-53.  
Reprinted in L. Tarán, *Collected Papers (1962-1999)*, Leiden: Brill, 2001, pp. 204-217.

"The purpose of this paper is less ambitious than its title might suggest, since it does not deal with everything that Plato has said on time and on eternity. Rather, it attempts to clarify some issues which have arisen in the controversy as to whether Parmenides or Plato was the first Western philosopher to grasp the notion of atemporal eternity. It is particularly concerned with some publications on the subject that have appeared within the last twelve years or so. G.E.L. Owen, in a paper published in this journal, has defended his earlier interpretation that Parmenides discovered the notion of atemporal eternity. (1) J. Whittaker for his part

has contended that both Parmenides and Plato failed to grasp it, and would ascribe its discovery to some later thinker. (2) Yet another scholar, G. Reale, (3) believes that there is no essential difference between the position of Parmenides as reconstructed by Owen and others and that of Melissus. For Reale maintains that Melissus' formula "it is and always was and always will be" does not exclude atemporality, that it means the same thing as the alleged tenseless "is" predicated of Parmenides' Being.

Most scholars, however, do agree -- and rightly so, I believe -- that in the *Timaeus* Plato has clearly grasped the notion of atemporal eternity. It is therefore best to begin the discussion with him, since it will then become apparent what an ancient philosopher meant by atemporal eternity and by the tenseless "is" that expresses it." (pp. 43-44)

(1) "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present," *The Monist* 50 (1966), pp. 317-40. For references to earlier scholars who have defended this interpretation cf. my *Parmenides* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), p. 175, n. 1.

(2) "The 'Eternity' of the Platonic Forms," *Phronesis* 13, (1968), 131-44 and *God Time Being* (Oslo 1970, Symbolae Osloenses. Fasc. Supplet. 23).

(3) Melisso, *Testimonianze e frammenti* (Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1970), PP. 45-59, esp. 56-57 and 58-59.

(4) Cf. Melissus 30 B 2. The fragments of the presocratics are cited from H. Diels-W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1951-52).

306. Tarrant, Harold. 1976. "Parmenides B1.3: Text, Context and Interpretation." *Antichthon* no. 10:1-7.

Abstract: "It is an almost universal principle that texts should not receive emendation until the reading of the MSS. has received careful consideration. An initial awkwardness may, after reflection, prove to be a poet's sacrifice of style to achieve some higher end -- an allusion to traditional literature, a word-order reflecting the structure of his ideas, or the accurate expression of ideas which are not easily put into verse. The last reason is usually held responsible for the shortcomings of Parmenides' poetry, while in his prologue, with which I am here concerned, sacrifices of the first kind may also be expected, as literary allusions have been proved plentiful and significant. In a previous publication I have also argued for a carefully contrived word-order at B8.53, hinting that this may also be the case at B1.3. If my hunch were correct, then it would involve restoring the manuscript reading in that line."

307. ———. 1983. "The Conclusion of Parmenides' Poem." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 17:73-84.

"In *Apeiron* 13 (1979) p. 115 P. J. Bicknell assigns Parmenides B4 to the closing lines of the work, following the illusory account of the physical world; he relates its references to processes of separation and combination (lines 3-4) to some kind of 'cosmic cycle' which allegedly featured in the *Doxa*. Since I have long supposed that the *Doxa* did make use of opposite, if not cyclical, cosmic processes,(1) I am attracted by Bicknell's attempt to relocate this fragment." (p. 73)

"But placing B4 at the conclusion of the poem must be dependent upon one's overall view of the conclusion. If one regards B19 as the conclusion (and Simplicius' words make it quite clear that B19 closed the account of the physical world) (9) then B4 must be squeezed into the *Way of Truth* in spite the difficulty in finding a context for it and in spite of the fact that it refers to a cosmos (B4.3). To me it seems fairly clear that B19 did not conclude the poem, and that there was a short final section which commented further on the relation of Being to the world of phenomena. The considerations which bring me to this conclusion are independent of the attempt to place B4 there." (p. 74)

(1) See my "Parmenides and the Narrative of Not-Being", *Proceedings and Papers of AULLA XVI* (Adelaide, 1974) 90-109, particularly p. 103.



308. Tegtmeier, Erwin. 1999. "Parmenides' Problem of Becoming and Its Solution." *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 2:51-65.  
Abstract: "Parmenides advances four arguments against becoming. Two of these are sound. Plato's and Aristotle's attempt to refute them fail. They react to Parmenides' challenge by differentiating and grading being and existence. Thus they deviate from Parmenides' strict concept of existence which is the only reasonable one. What's wrong with Parmenides' train of thought is a decisive premise: that becoming is a transition from non-existence to existence. The reality of becoming can be maintained if (and only if) this premise is given up. One has to see that becoming is a purely temporal affair not involving existence and that existence is timeless. Time and existence are independent of each other."
309. Tejera, Victorino. 1997. *Rewriting the History of Ancient Greek Philosophy*. Westport: Greenwood Press.  
Contents: Preface VII; 1. Aristotle versus the Peripatos: Consequences of the Conditions under Which the Aristotelian Corpus Came into Being1; 2. A New Look at the Sources19; 3. Parmenides 37; 4. The Poetic Presocratics: From Solon to the Dialogue Form 63; 5. The Academy Pythagorized: What We Can Know about the Intellectual Activities of the Pythagoreans 83; 6. What We Don't Know about Plato and Socrates 105; Selected bibliography 121; Index 139-145.  
"The interpretations of Parmenides' "Being" which have perpetuated the distinction between the objects of reason and the objects of sense as an epistemological one are just those that keep "Being" from being the appropriate subject of the cluster of predications that the Goddess makes about it in the poem. These interpretations turn the reader's problem into one of reconciling his own (or his times') notions about Being with the attributes Parmenides assigned to it. But the real problem is to find a subject to which the attributes can all be seen to attach without difficulty. The project, then, is to make coherent sense out of Parmenides' text in accordance with the kinds of sense it would have made to Parmenides' time and peers. The solution which we will come to here will also make literary sense out of the relationship between the different parts of the poem." (p. 37)  
"One paradox about Parmenides' insight is that, while it is implied that discourse about "Being" must be strictly consistent when understood to be making truth-claims, the language in which he has enacted this lesson is not itself assertive or propositional, but exhibitiv or poetic. But the logically two-valued strict discourse that the Goddess recommends is compelling, because it is the only guide we have to rightly conceptualizing the "All." Whether the characterization of Being that she has offered is itself strictly consistent is another matter. Is the "All," for instance, in fact one, or only because, to be spoken of at all, it must have the unity of a grammatical subject? The "All," we can agree, is certainly distributively exhaustive and innumerable. But we may ask, with Buchler, is it a unity in the sense of having a collective existential integrity? There certainly cannot be two Alls; but, in the Goddess's own terms, it could not be completely observed even if it did have such a unity. Conceptually, the "All" can be all there is, was, and will be without having any other than a nominal or grammatical unity; like Buchler's "the world," it has no collective integrity. And this is why nature philosophy must ever be an incomplete (*endeês*) and merely probable (*hôs eikós*) account, as Plato's Timaios will be willing to admit when he rehearses for Socrates his *eikóta mûthon* in the *Timaeus*. This, in turn, reassures us that Plato -- unlike the neoplatonist forgers of the Lokrian Timaios -- has quite understood and taken to heart Parmenides' admonitions about nature-inquiry." (pp. 59-60)
310. Teloh, Henry. 1976. "Parmenides and Plato's *Parmenides* 131a-132c." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 14:125-130.
311. Thanassas, Panagiotis. 2006. "How Many *Doxai* Are There in Parmenides?" *Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 3:199-218.  
"The paucity of surviving fragments of the *Doxa* section certainly reinforces the tendency to overlook its importance. But how did it happen that, at least according

to Diels (1897 [Parmenides, *Lehrgedicht*, Reimer, Berlin (2nd ed.: Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 2003)], 25-26), about 9/10ths of the material on *Aletheia* has survived, but only about 1/10th of the material on *Doxa*? I would recommend viewing the scant attention paid to *Doxa* as a case of helplessness without any parallel in the history of philosophy. From Plato to Heidegger (or if one prefers, to Guthrie), the history of philosophy has consistently been confronted with the above-mentioned duality of *Doxa* and has not known how to deal with it. The loss of so much material on *Doxa* has less to do with its lack of philosophical content than with the tradition's intuitive strategy of resolving the aporia by eliminating that duality. After the detailed passages of Parmenides' cosmogony and cosmology had been lost, *Doxa* could be restricted to a region of 'lies and deception' (5) and then completely dismissed as philosophically uninteresting." (p. 200)

"We are not in a position to revoke retroactively the traditional oversight and to remedy the substantial loss of essential passages from Parmenides' cosmogony and cosmology. But we can and must set the record straight: the fact, the *factum brutum* that there really were such passages, should not remain ignored. A 'correction' of this oversight does not take its bearings by the criterion of historical fidelity; we do not 'correct' the oversight because it discredits just a part of Parmenides' philosophy, but because it distorts what is the heart of that philosophy: Parmenidean *Aletheia*." (p. 201)

(5) 'Lug und Trug': Reinhardt (1916) [*Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, Klostermann, Frankfurt (5th ed.1985)], 6.

312. ———. 2008. *Parmenides, Cosmos, and Being. A Philosophical Interpretation*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.  
Contents: Acknowledgments 6; 1. The Poem and its legacy 9; 2. The Heart of Truth 23; 3. *Esti*, Being and Thinking 31; 4. The signs of Being 43; 5. *Doxa*: mixture vs. partition 61; 6. *Aletheia* and *Doxa*: the human and the divine 77; Appendix: translation of the Fragments 89; Selected bibliography 99; Index of names 107; Index of topics 109.  
"Indeed, given the plurality of themes and intentions effective in the second part of the poem, the simple, unqualified use of the *Doxa* seems altogether misleading. In view of this, the presentation undertaken above discerned four distinctive perspectives on *Doxa*:  
(1) Understanding the deceptive human conjectures and demonstrating their error (8.53-9).  
(2) Presenting an appropriate positive *Doxa* that rests on a mixture of both forms instead of their separation, thus counteracting the deception (8.60 ff.).  
(3) Portraying the genesis of the deceptive opinions, the divergences of which are traced back to differences in the perceptual apparatus (16).  
(4) Giving (in the *Aletheia*) an ontological evaluation and rejecting the deceptive opinions by demonstrating their path to be the "third (non-) way" (6, 7). (pp.79-80)
313. ———. 2011. "Parmenidean Dualisms." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 289-308. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Summary: "The poem of Parmenides is systematically composed of dual structures. The part of *Aletheia* establishes an opposition between Being and Non-Being, but also an "identity" between Being and Thinking; the part of *Doxa* attempts to give an account of the relation between the two forms of Light and Night; finally, it is the duality of the two parts of the poem themselves that poses the question of their own relation. I attempt to explore the character and role of these dualisms, and especially their impact on the traditional perception of Parmenides as a rigorous "monist." "
314. Thom, Paul. 1986. "A Lesniewskian Reading of Ancient Ontology: Parmenides to Democritus." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 7:155-166.  
Abstract: "Parmenides formulated a formal ontology, to which various additions and alternatives were proposed by Melissus, Gorgias, Leucippus and Democritus.

These systems are here interpreted as modifications of a minimal Lesniewskian Ontology."

"There is a tradition of ontological theorising which commences with Parmenides and whose central arguments can be given a purely formal interpretation. This, of course, is not their only possible interpretation. It is, nonetheless, worthy of consideration, as a means of articulating the continuities and discontinuities within that tradition, and of investigating the prehistory of logic.

The main thesis of this paper is that such a purely formal interpretation of Parmenides, his followers and critics, is best expressed in the language (or, if you wish, in some of the languages) of Leśniewski's Ontology." (p. 155)

315. ———. 1999. "The Principle of Non-Contradiction in Early Greek Philosophy." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 32:153-170.  
Abstract: "The principle of non-contradiction received ontological formulations (in terms of 'being' and 'non-being') as well as logical formulations (in terms of affirmation and denial) in early Greek philosophy. The history of these formulations is traced in the writings of Parmenides, Gorgias, Plato and Aristotle. Gorgias noticed that the principle — in Parmenides' formulation NC: 'Not (what-is-not is)' — is inconsistent with the thesis G that what-is-not is what-is-not, given a principle P whereby we can infer from 'a is b' to 'a is'. Parmenides, Gorgias, Plato and Aristotle all address the inconsistent triad {NC, G, P} in different ways."
316. ———. 2002. "On the Pervasiveness of Being." In *Presocratic Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*, edited by Caston, Victor and Graham, Daniel W., 293-301. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Abstract: "The pervasiveness of Being is the doctrine that everything is. This doctrine would be false if something was not. That being is pervasive is not a trivial claim. An ontology might be motivated by the desire to quantify over non-beings in such a way that we can say that something is a flying man without implying that some being is a flying man. If such a distinction is allowed, then it might be thought that something is not, even though no being is not. Pervasiveness then would be true for beings but not for 'something's'.  
This chapter explores the different positions that philosophers from Parmenides to Aristotle take on the question of the pervasiveness of Being, and traces some of the relations linking those positions to one another."  
"Note the thesis's modal import. Parmenides is asserting that everything is, not just as a matter of fact, but necessarily. And this is fitting, given that the premiss of his reasoning is the modal claim that 'a is not' cannot be said.  
Is Parmenides' position internally consistent? It depends. If we suppose that his philosophy is intended as a description of language in general, then it will appear to be self-refuting. He tells us that various things can not be spoken, or thought, or singled out, or consummated, at the same time forbidding us to make negative statements. Consistency can, however, be rescued by distinguishing an object-language about which Parmenides is speaking, and a meta-language in which he is speaking. We can then represent him as saying, in the meta-language, that there are no negative statements in the object-language. In this case, Parmenides' project will be a prescriptive one - to delineate the conditions that govern a certain 'higher' language that is not subject to the contradictions inherent in the language of mortals.  
This is a noble conception, but not one that will be universally shared. Faced with these Parmenidean prescriptions, there will always be anarchic spirits who will dare to speak of what is alleged to be unspeakable." (p. 294)
317. Tor, Shaul. 2015. "Parmenides' Epistemology and the Two Parts of His Poem." *Phronesis* no. 60:3-39.  
Abstract: "This paper pursues a new approach to the problem of the relation between *Aletheia* and *Doxa*. It investigates as interrelated matters Parmenides' impetus for developing and including *Doxa*, his conception of the mortal epistemic agent in relation both to *Doxa*'s

- investigations and to those in *Aletheia*, and the relation between mortal and divine in his poem. Parmenides, it is argued, maintained that Doxastic cognition is an ineluctable and even appropriate aspect of mortal life. The mortal agent, however, is nonetheless capable of sustaining the cognition of Alêtheia by momentarily coming to think with — or as — his divine (fiery, aethereal) soul."
318. ———. 2017. *Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology. A Study of Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Contents: Preface and Acknowledgements page IX; List of Abbreviations XII; Introduction 1; 1 Rationality and Irrationality, Philosophy and Religion 10; 2 Hesiodic Epistemology 61; 3 Xenophanes on Divine Disclosure and Mortal Inquiry 104; Introduction to the Chapters on Parmenides 155; 4 Why Did Parmenides Write Doxa? 163; 5 How Could Parmenides Have Written Alêtheia? 222; 6 Retrospect and Prospect 309; Appendix 347; Bibliography 360; Index Locorum 387; General Index 399-406.  
"On the assumption, which I share, that the goddess represents Doxa as the best possible account of Doxastic things, she indeed implies that even the best cosmology could never constitute an account of the unshaken heart of ultimate reality. Nonetheless, the scope and nature of Parmenides' cosmological investigations undermine these dialectical responses to the aetiological question. The goddess had concluded in Alêtheia her critical demonstrations that processes like coming-to-be and change do not typify what-is. Both direct and indirect evidence indicates that what followed in Doxa was an extended and detailed exposition, thoroughly positive in tone, of diverse scientific theories, spanning, among other things, universal cosmology (DK28 B9, B12; A37), cosmogony (B10–11), astronomy (B10–11; B14–15; A40a), geography (A44a; B15a), theogony (B13), anthropogony (Diogenes Laertius, 9.22, A53), embryology (B18; A53–4) and human physiology and cognition (A46 = B16, A46a-b, A52)." (pp. 163-164)
319. Torgerson, Tobias Peter. 2006. "The εἰδὼς φῶς and the traditional dichotomy of divine and mortal epistemology." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 24:25-43.  
Abstract: "That Parmenides drew upon previous poets' dichotomy between divine knowledge and mortals' opinions is obvious. In his poem, the word βροτός, "mortal," always carries a connotation of ignorance or opinion. Nevertheless, Parmenides credits one type of human being - the εἰδὼτα φῶτα of line 1.3 - with true knowledge. This man receives a divine revelation of the truth about being, yet it seems that he possesses some knowledge even before the goddess' revelation. What sets him apart from other mortals and grants him access to divine knowledge? Homer, Hesiod, and other poets had previously spoken of the false notions of mortals, the inscrutable truth accessible only to the gods, and the conditions of revelation. By comparing and contrasting Parmenides with his predecessors, we can perceive an original element in his adaptation of the dichotomy of mortal and divine epistemology: there is a type of human being, the εἰδὼς φῶς whose mental perception νοός not only liberates him from the deceptive opinions of mortals but also renders him able to verify the words of the gods themselves."
320. Trindade Santos, José. 2013. "For a Non-Predicative Reading of *esti* in Parmenides, the Sophists and Plato." *Méthexis* no. 26:39-50.  
Abstract: "the absence of grammatical subject and object in Parmenides' "it is/it is not" allows the reading of the verbal forms not as copulas but as names, with no implicit subject nor elided predicate. Once there are two only alternatives, contrary and excluding each other, sustaining that a 'no-name' does not grant knowledge implies identifying its opposite – "it is" – as the only name conducive to knowledge in itself, denouncing the 'inconceivability of a knowledge that does not know. If "it is" is the only [name] "which can be thought/known", and "what is" is the way in which 'thought/knowledge' can be accomplished, there is no need to postulate the existence of 'anything' that is, nor of anything that can be said of "what is". Being the only name which "can be thought of/known", the unifying synthesis of



- "knowledge, knowing and known" in one infallible cognitive state, it is unthinkable that "what is" does not exist."
321. Tugwell, Simon. 1964. "The Way of Truth." *Classical Quarterly* no. 14:36-41. "Professor G.E.L. Owen has demonstrated (C. Q. [*Classical Quarterly*]. N.s. X (1960), 84 ff.) that Parmenides' Way of Truth is to be taken as a self-contained logical argument. The basis for this argument is a proof that whatever we may choose to think about εὖν. The first stage of this proof is contained in B 2. According to Owen's reconstruction of the argument, Parmenides' method is to take the three possible answers to the question εστιν ἢ οὐκ εστιν; (i.e. an unqualified yes; an unqualified no; and a noncommittal answer that sometimes we must say yes, sometimes no) and rule out two of them. This view involves giving equal status to each of the two wrong answers; but Parmenides appears not to do this." (p. 36)
322. Verdenius, Willem Jacob. 1942. *Parmenides. Some Comments on his Poem*. Groningen: J. B. Wolters. Reprinted with a new Preface: Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1964. Contents: Preface (to the reprint) III-IV; Introduction 1; Chapter I. The doctrine of knowing 5; Chapter II. The doctrine of being 31; Chapter I. The doctrine of opinion 45; Appendices 64; Bibliography 79; English index 81; Greek index 82; Index of quotations 83-88. "The present study was submitted as a doctoral dissertation to the Faculty of Arts of Utrecht University in 1942. Since its publication, so many books and articles have been written on the same problems that it might seem presumptuous to reprint a comparatively old work. I do not want to suggest that everything published after my thesis has little or no value. On the other hand, a critical evaluation of these works would not affect the substance of my original comments. As the book continued to be in demand and I could not find time to carry out my intention of writing a full commentary, an unrevised reprint seemed to be the only solution. There are three points on which I have altered my opinion. I no longer believe, as I did in my dissertation (p. 73 f.) and in *Mnemosyne* III 13 (1947), pp. 272 ff., that Περί φύσεως may have been the original title of Parmenides' work and of the works of a number of other Pre-Socratics. I now take the subject of εστιν in frags 2,3 and 8,2 to be Ἀληδείη in the sense of 'the true nature of things' (cf. *Mnemos.* IV 15, 1962, p. 237), and not Reality in the sense of the total of things (as suggested in my dissertation, p. 32). The μέλεα in frag. 16 I no longer take to be 'something between the two universal Forms and the parts of the human frame' (p. 7), but the human frame itself (cf. *Mnemosyne* IV 2, 1949, p. 126 n. 5fn)." (Preface III) "Expounding an ancient philosophy is only possible with the aid of modern notions, which have a more limited sense than the material to which they are to be applied. Hence the difficulty of ascertaining the differences between ancient and modern abstractions and the danger of misconceiving an idea through attaching a too specific meaning to one or other particular expression. It will now be understood how in the course of time Parmenides has come to be classed with the most divergent philosophical systems. An attempt might be made to classify and analyse all these various interpretations. This would, however, not be the most expedient way to arrive at the real meaning of the poem. It stands to reason that our conclusions should be constantly reviewed and tested in the light of current opinion, but the more our considerations are bound up with the criticism of other interpreters, the greater will be the difficulty in evolving a coherent system of interpretation. So I will attempt to follow a more positive method by considering in detail three fundamental problems of Parmenides' philosophy, viz. 'Knowing', 'Being', and 'Opinion'. If it proves to be possible to arrive at definite conclusions in this respect, the road will probably be clear for a better understanding of the thoughts associated with these principles. With regard to the method adopted in my interpretation I may conclude with the following remark. I have pointed out already that Parmenides stands out from his

predecessors by the application of a deductive method and the building up of a coherent argument. The methodical way of reasoning characterizes his work so much that even in ancient times he was classed by some critics among the dialecticians. In fact, his syllogisms, the distinction made between the three 'ways of inquiring', and also his way of putting questions foreshadow dialectical methods. This is not surprising since the whole trend of his thought aims at valid arguments, cogent conclusions, and complete evidence'. It seems advisable, then, to give more attention to the logical form in which Parmenides exposes his views than has been done hitherto. When the goddess of Truth counsels him not to trust to the senses but to judge by reasoning, we might accept her words as a suggestion to base our interpretation on the logical context of the argument in accordance with Parmenides' own intention.

It may be objected that a criterium for such a logical context is hard to find since in a pre-Aristotelian philosopher we cannot expect a method of reasoning which may be formulated in syllogisms. From the logical point of view Parmenides' argument undeniably does not always comply with scientific standards, but this does not imply that the form of the syllogism is not applicable to his thought. This form is not an invention of Aristotle kept alive by convention, but it is at the root of all reasoning. Parmenides may not have been aware of the syllogistic form as a general mode of arguing, but he uses it, it may be unconsciously and not always accurately, yet, generally speaking, 'guided by truth itself'.

I have undertaken the following inquiries in the belief that such a 'truth' exists, and that the principles of logic are no mere arbitrary grammatical phenomena as moderns would have us believe, but the universal foundation which underlies all science, including the science of interpretation." (pp. 3-4, notes omitted).

323. ———. 1947. "Notes on the Presocratics." *Mnemosyne* no. 13:271-289.  
 "The term πίστης is used in the sense of 'religious faith' in the New Testament (e.g. I Cor. 13, 13), but it has not got this meaning in early Greek literature. In the works of the Pre-Socratics πίστης means 'evidence, both in the subjective sense of confidence that one's belief is true and in the objective sense of reliable signs which justify such confidence' (15). Parmenides used it to denote the logical stringency of his argument (frag. 8, 12 and 28); his Way of Truth is at the same time Πειθοῦς κέλευθος (frag. 2, 4)." (p. 1)  
 (15) G. Vlastos, *Philos. Rev.* 55 (1946), 590 n. 60. ["Ethics and Physics in Democritus", *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 54, No. 6 (Nov., 1945), pp. 578-592]  
 The text by Gregory Vlastos:  
 "Unlike Platonic being which, immaterial by definition, is never given in sensation, Democritean being is the material stuff of nature as we see, touch, and taste it.) The "assurance" (πίστης) (60) of its existence must, therefore, be given in the phenomenon " (p. 590, two notes omitted)  
 (60) πίστης in [Diels-Kranz] B. 125: φρήν gets its πίστεις from the senses. This is confirmed by Sextus (*Adv. Math.* 7.136; B. 9 in Diels-Kranz), who tells us that in his essay entitled κρατυντήρια Democritus "promised to assign to the senses the power of evidence (το κράτος της πίστεως)." This last should be compared with πίστιος ισχύς in Parmenides, B. 8, 12. Πίστης in the pre-socratics is not an inferior form of knowledge as in Plato, *Rep.* VI 511e, but evidence, both in the subjective sense of confidence that one's belief is true and in the objective sense of reliable signs which justify such confidence.
324. ———. 1949. "Parmenides Conception of Light." *Mnemosyne* no. 2:116-131.  
 "In this paper I shall deal with a problem in the philosophy of Parmenides which has been rather neglected, because it did not seem to be a problem at all. Parmenides based his cosmology on the dualism of two primary substances, Fire or Light and Night." (p. 116)  
 "Perhaps another aspect of his mind may bring us nearer to the solution of our problem. In the proem of his work Parmenides describes his discovery of the truth as a journey from the realm of Darkness to the realm of Light Driving a car and guided by Sun-maidens he passes through the gates of Night and Day and is kindly

- welcomed by a goddess who discloses to him the principles of reality. There is much in this description that may be regarded as mere poetical imagery, but there are also many details which have a serious meaning. I shall only mention those points which have some bearing upon the present question." (p. 119)
- "It may be suggested that Parmenides in a similar manner distinguished between a supreme kind of light as the cognitive aspect of Being and Truth, and an inferior kind of light restricted to the world of change and opinion. This interpretation would fit in very well with the general trend of his philosophy, which tries to attribute the various aspects of the world to a higher and a lower plane of reality. It might only be asked how Parmenides managed to get from the lower plane of empirical reality up to the higher plane of Being, or in other words: how the ordinary light which formed one of the elements of his mental constitution could pass into the divine light which enabled him to grasp the ultimate principle of reality. This criticism is justified; it could only be met by putting another question: is there anyone who has succeeded in finding a satisfactory transition from psychology to metaphysics?" (pp. 130-131, a note omitted)
325. ———. 1962. "Parmenides B2, 3." *Mnemosyne* no. 15:237.  
 "Much ingenuity has been spent on the question as to what is the subject of ἔστιν in Parmenides B 2,3 (and 8,2), but even the most recent attempts, such as that made by G. E. L. Owen in C.Q. 10 (1960), 95, are far from convincing.  
 My own suggestion (*Parmenides*, 32), that the subject is reality in the sense of the total of things, has not met with much approval. I now believe that the clue to the solution of this problem is to be found in B 8, 51 ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης. If Truth is the subject of the goddess' discourse, it is by implication the subject of ἔστιν." (p.237)
326. ———. 1977. "Opening Doors (Parm. B 1, 17-18) " *Mnemosyne* no. 30:287-288.  
 "After Dike has removed the bar (5), the doors open spontaneously at the approach of the divine maidens." (pp. 287-288)  
 (5) Wiersma, [*Notes on Gree Philosophy*] *Mnemosyne* IV 20 (1967), 405 rightly points out that this idea has to be supplied from the context.
327. ———. 1980. "Opening Doors Again." *Mnemosyne* no. 33:175.  
 In my note on Parmenides B 1, 17-8 in this journal, IV 30 (1977), 287-8, I forgot to refer to K. J. McKay, *Door Magic Epiphany Hymn*, CQ [*Classical Quarterly*] 17 (1967), 184-94, who discusses Callim. *H.* 2, 6 in connection with Hom. *Epigr.* XV 3-5 and other texts." (p. 175)
328. Vick, George R. 1971. "Heidegger's Linguistic Rehabilitation of Parmenides' 'Being'." *American Philosophical Quarterly* no. 8:139-150.  
 Reprinted in: Michael Murray (ed.), *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978 pp. 204-221.  
 "It is a fairly well-known fact that Martin Heidegger has defended Parmenides' account of Being, (1) but the strategy of his complex semantic and etymological arguments for the meaningfulness of Parmenides' type of discourse on Being is unknown to the great majority of philosophers in Britain and America(2) - indeed is virtually unnoted even within the phenomenological-existential school (in part, perhaps, because of the abstruse character of both his thought and language). Furthermore, the fact that Heidegger has corrected what is ordinarily taken as an essential part of Parmenides' theory has not, so far as I know, been pointed out, even by Heidegger.(4) Nor has anyone taken note of the way in which Heidegger's correction makes what remains of Parmenides' theory more defensible. In the following pages I shall attempt to set forth and explain Heidegger's strategy (including a reason why it has been useful for him to couch his argument in language that is so abstruse). I will then go on to show the way in which his correction of Parmenides' theory strengthens its claim to being true." (p. 139)  
 1 This defense is to be found primarily in the most extensive work of Heidegger's later period, his *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (1953) in which his summer lectures at Freiburg in 1935 were revised and published. All page references will be to the

- English translation by Ralph Mannheim, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven, 1959).
- (2) For this strategy, see especially *ibid.*, ch. II and III, pp. 52-92. (p 139, a note omitted)
- (4) See fn. 44.
- (44) Heidegger has, indeed, distinguished his own view of the meaning of "Being" from that which he maintains has been current since antiquity (cf. Heidegger, *op. cit.*, [*Introduction to Metaphysics*] pp. 203-204). And the view which Heidegger regards as having been current since antiquity is that in which Being is regarded as excluding our saying that becoming, appearing, thinking, and the ought are, and this is a view which is, except with respect to the third of these four factors, usually attributed to Parmenides. But, on the other hand, he has continually distinguished between the authentic pre-Socratic, or Parmenidean, view of Being, and the defective view which has come down to us since (*Ibid.*, pp. 179-196). And he has, furthermore, given an exegesis of Parmenides in which he interprets him as allowing to thinking a certain distinction from Being (in that he interprets Parmenides as saying that thinking is one with Being only in a "contending sense," i.e., in a unity through opposition).
- Hence, it is not clear whether Heidegger identifies the teaching of Parmenides with the view of Being from which he distinguishes his own (a position with which exegesis of Parmenides' treatment of the relation between Being and thinking would make difficult), or whether he interprets Parmenides in such a way as to allow "is" to be predicated of becoming, etc., without being thereby identified with them (a position directly challenging the usual monistic interpretation of Parmenides, and challenging it in such an essential way that we should expect Heidegger to have made some explicit mention of the fact that he was correcting the usual interpretation of Parmenides on the very point which since Plato has probably been given most attention, i.e., his supposed monism.)
329. Vlastos, Gregory. 1946. "Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* no. 77:66-77.  
Reprinted in: G. Vlastos, *Studies in Greek Philosophy, Volume I: The Presocratics*, edited by Daniel W. Graham, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 153-163.  
Abstract: "Parmenides' frag. 16 has been taken for a general statement of his theory of knowledge. I argue that it is no more than his doctrine of sense-perception, since it views thought as a passive record of the "much-wandering" ratio of light to darkness in the frame. Theophrastus' report that Parmenides explains "better and purer" thinking by the preponderance of light must refer to the active phases of thought, memory and judgment. When these are perfect the ratio of light to darkness must be one to zero, and the knowledge of Being must represent a state of unmixed light." (p. 66)
330. ———. 2008. "'Names' of Being in Parmenides." In *The Route of Parmenides*, edited by Mourelatos, Alexander, 367-390. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.  
Previously unpublished essay (1961).  
Editing note by A.P.D. Mourelatos.: The importance and continuing value of this essay is, in my judgment, fourfold. (1) Beyond what was already accomplished by Woodbury's essay of 1958 [*Parmenides on Names*] Vlastos here provides the best and most sustained argument in favor of the reading *onomastai* at B8. 38. (2) There is an assumption many have made (doubtless, as Vlastos points out at n. 20, because of the influence of Diels, who first voiced it in 1887) [\*] that Parmenides employs "naming" terms (*onoma*, *onomastin*) only with reference to the false beliefs posited by "mortals." Vlastos' essay provides a decisive refutation of this quite unwarranted and misleading assumption. (3) Vlastos also shows that we gain a more coherent account of Parmenides' critique of the language of "mortals" if we read that critique as charging that mortals make statements that are false rather than meaningless.



- (4) Finally, Vlastos offers in this essay a philosophically incisive and engaging argument in support of the thesis that Parmenides' rationale for the rejection of "not-being" as a subject of thinking and speaking is quite different from that advanced by the Eleatic Stranger in Plato, *Sophist* (237B-C)." (p. 367)  
 [\*] "Ueber die ältester Philosophenschulen der Griechen," in *Philosophische Aufsätze, Eduard Zeller zu seinem fünfzigjährigen Doctor-Jubiläum gewidmet* [no editors listed] (Leipzig, 1887), pp. 239-60.
331. Wedin, Michael. 2011. "Parmenides' Three Ways and the Failure of the Ionian Interpretation." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 41:1-65.  
 "The middle part of Parmenides' great philosophical poem, the section known as the *Way of Truth* (WT), opens with the divine declaration that only two paths of enquiry present themselves to the mind—the path of what is and the path of what is not. I regard these as Parmenides' 'canonical' paths and shall refer to them as Path I and Path II, respectively. Fragment 2 emphatically warns against pursuing Path II, and fragment 6 is no less direct in advancing Path I as a necessary path of enquiry. According to some, Parmenides is merely expressing his preferences in these early fragments of WT. Of course he is doing so, but not just this. Rather, fragments 2 and 3 contain a deduction whose aim is to exclude what is not as a fit target for investigation because such a thing is flatly impossible, and fragment 6 certifies Path I, again deductively, on the grounds that what it investigates is nothing less than what is necessary. Her opening declaration notwithstanding, in fragment 6 the goddess goes on to warn against a third path, the path of what is and is not. This too is excluded on the basis of a crisp, but tricky, Eleatic deduction. This paper offers reconstructions of these three opening deductions." (p. 1)
332. ———. 2014. *Parmenides' Grand Deduction: A Logical Reconstruction of the Way of Truth*. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 "When I examined the arguments of the leading *nouveaux* interpreters, none of the contenders lived up to expectations. Each was flawed in logically telling ways. The results of this examination surface in the monograph in two ways. On the one hand, a contending view is sometimes discussed in the course of advancing or clarifying my own argument. On the other hand, I address them in their own right in Part III of the monograph, where the views are subjected to more systematic scrutiny. The view argued in this monograph, *outré* or not, favors an austere reading of Fr. 8's 'signs' or deductive consequences of what is." (p. 2)  
 "A general study of Parmenides' poem would address many issues, from the influence of the epic tradition, and the significance of the Proem with its divine invocation, to the relation between the two substantive parts of the poem—the Way of Truth (WT) and the Way of Opinion. This monograph is less ambitious. First, I am interested almost exclusively in WT; in particular, I am interested in the logical form of Parmenides' arguments in WT. Second, I pursue this interest by offering reconstructions of WT's deductions, in their entirety, and only rarely do I introduce material that does not serve this project. Nonetheless, the reconstructions have global reach because the deductions of WT are the core of Parmenides' philosophical position." (pp. 4-5, a note omitted)
333. White, Harvey. 2005. *What is What-is? A Study of Parmenides' Poem*. New York: Peter Lang.  
 "The interpretation of the poem which follows takes issue with what has long been the standard view, and which, only recently, has begun to be challenged. Because my interpretation ascribes many of the fragments which have been taken as the mortal view to the goddess' position, my arrangement of the fragments differs somewhat from the standard one provided by Diels and Kranz. Thus the numbers assigned to the fragments differs from theirs." (p. 2)  
 "It has long been fashionable to take the ontology (and attendant epistemology) that Parmenides set forth in his poem to be characterized by "the one", or "Being", as the all encompassing single reality, which is to be distinguished from mere sensible and pluralistic being." (p. 5, notes two notes omitted)

"Against this understanding of the Poem I will argue that:

1. "is" is used predicationally rather than purely existentially, and as a result the text is best understood as being consistent with a pluralistic ontology rather than a monistic one; i.e., Parmenides did not claim that all reality is a single ideal universal and non-sensible "Being";
2. Parmenides affirms the positive role of sense perception in apprehending reality, accepting as real what appears sensibly; most of what is traditionally termed the Doxa section of the poem is an elucidation of his own position;
3. the poem's major point is that each individual object is a unity rather than a plurality constituted of opposites, even though it may come to be out of a mixture of opposites. The erroneous position held by the mortals is that an individual object is a plurality, a view that results from a confusion of what something is with the conditions out of which it is generated;
4. the poem is critically concerned with judgement rather than perception: the error of the mortals consists of misjudgements concerning perceived reality.

The overall perspective is that historically Parmenides does not present as radical and revolutionary an ontology and epistemology as he is commonly portrayed to advocate. His importance lies within the intellectual transition occurring in the Greek world, in that his poem is an attempt to move from the past mythos (as in Homer and Hesiod) into the emerging scientific view of the world." (p. 6)

334. Whittaker, John. 1971. "God, Time, Being. Two Studies in the Transcendental Tradition in Greek Philosophy." *Symbolae Osloenses* no. 23:16-32.

First study: 'Parmenides, Fr. 8, 5'.

Parmenides, fr. 8, 5 as quoted by Simplicius seems to proclaim the doctrine of the Eternal Now clearly and succinctly:

οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ παν.

Simplicius is our main authority for the surviving fragments of Parmenides and his general reliability is beyond question. Yet if we accept Parmenides as the author of the above verse and as the originator of the conception there contained, many difficulties arise, as the following considerations will indicate.

(1) The conception of non-durational eternity is not of the sort that presents itself spontaneously to the mind. Bearing in mind the abstrusity of the notion, it would seem hardly conceivable that, Stated in this bald manner, it would have been at all comprehensible to Parmenides' contemporaries. No doubt there was much in Parmenides' poem that his contemporaries found obscure. Yet it cannot have been Parmenides' aim merely to mystify. If Parmenides had really formulated the notion of non-durational eternity and was teaching it in his poem, a certain degree of elaboration would have been essential. But the relevant section of the poem contains no such elaboration.

(2) The notion in question is not accepted by Melissus; cf., e.g., fr. 1 ἀεί ἦν δ τι ἦν καὶ ἀεί ἔσται. Yet there is nothing in the doxographical evidence to suggest that Parmenides and Melissus were at variance on this point.

(3) The only reason Parmenides might have had for introducing the notion into the Way of Truth is that he felt that passage from past to present to future involves coming-to-be and passing-away, i.e., that duration as such entails change. But if Parmenides had stressed this aspect of duration, then he would have raised a problem which all subsequent philosophers would have had to face. Parmenides' Presocratic successors accepted the validity of the Eleatic denial of change and were painfully aware of the predicament in which it placed them. If Parmenides had argued that duration is a process and therefore a form of change, then they would have had to tackle this problem too. Yet no post-Parmenidean Presocratic seems to have been aware that bare duration could be held to involve change. Empedocles' philosophy, for example, is a conscientious attempt to solve the difficulties raised by Parmenides. Yet there is nothing to suggest that Empedocles was acquainted with this particular problem. The same is true of other post-Parmenidean philosophers - including, as I shall argue, Plato and Aristotle.

Such considerations as these render it obvious that, in spite of fr. 8, 5 as cited by Simplicius, Parmenides cannot possibly have propounded the doctrine of non-durational eternity. Once this point has been established there are two courses open to the student of Parmenides: (a) he may search for another and more plausible interpretation of the text quoted by Simplicius, or (b) he may call into question the reliability of the text which Simplicius has preserved." (pp. 16-17)

(...)

"Because of their faith in the text presented by Simplicius, students of Parmenides have not usually considered it necessary to devote attention to a rival version of fr. 8,533 preserved by Ammonius (*In Interpr.* 136, 24 f. Busse), Asclepius' (*In Metaph.* 42, 30 f. Hayduck), Philoponus (*In Phys.* 65, 9 Vitelli), and Olympiodorus (*In Phd.* 75, 9 Norvin).

I do not believe that this alternative version is necessarily correct as it stands, but must draw attention to one fact which speaks strongly in its favour. In Simplicius' version fr. 8, 6 opens with the words ἐν, συνεχές syntactically linked to v. 5 but nevertheless left somewhat in the air, whilst Asclepius (loc. cit.) quotes the opening of v. 6 in conjunction with v. 5 as follows:

οὐ γάρ ἦν οὐκ ἔσται ὁμοῦ παν ἔστι δέ μοῦνον οὐλοφνές.

It can, in my opinion, hardly be doubted that Simplicius' ἐν, συνεχές was originally a gloss on οὐλοφνές and has supplanted that reading in Simplicius' exemplar. Since the latter term was used by Empedocles there is no reason why it should not also have been employed by Parmenides. However, it was not current in Neoplatonic terminology and might well have provoked a textual gloss." (p. 21)

(...)

"However, my own conviction is that one cannot feel assured that either version is close enough to the original text of Parmenides to permit of more than highly conjectural interpretation. We have already seen that fr. 8, 4 was universally corrupt by the time of Plutarch" (p. 24).

(...)

"I would conclude that no knowledge of the teaching of the historical Parmenides can be safely derived from the versions of fr. 8, 5 which have survived. One can, however, assert with complete conviction, as was shown at the outset, that the doctrine of non-durational eternity, which Neoplatonists associated with both versions of the line, was not taught by the historical Parmenides." (p. 24, notes omitted)

335. Wilkinson, Lisa Atwood. 2009. *Parmenides and To Eon. Reconsidering Muthos and Logos*. London: Continuum.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; 1 A Route to Homer 10; 2 Homeric or "Sung Speech" 27; 3 Reconsidering Xenophanes 40; 4 Reconsidering Speech 56; 5 Parmenides' Poem 69; 6 The Way It Seems . . . 104; Notes 118; Bibliography 147; Index 153-156.

"I suggest that we might be able to begin to "hear" anew the wisdom of our first philosophical texts. Hence, I take a historical-philosophical route to Parmenides. This route begins with an analysis of the significance of "Homer" in ancient Greek culture that challenges some of our common knowledge about "Homer" and how oral poetry works (Chapter 1). These challenges are supplemented by an overview of Homeric or "sung speech" (Chapter 2) that is brought to bear on assumptions about Xenophanes' fragments (Chapter 3) and contemporary accounts of speech (Chapter 4). Having reconsidered Homer, Xenophanes, and basic assumptions about speech, the final chapters offer an interpretation of Parmenides' poem (Chapter 5) that differs from some of our general accounts (Chapter 6)." (p. 7)

336. Wolfe, C. J. 2012. "Plato's and Aristotle's answers to the Parmenides problem." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 65:747-764.

"The questions raised by the great pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides were perhaps the main challenge for Plato and Aristotle, two of the greatest post-Socratic philosophers." (p. 747)

- "No philosopher was able to accurately interpret and refute the Parmenides problem until Plato and Aristotle. Plato answered it in an important way in his dialogue the *Sophist*, and Aristotle followed this up with the complete answer in *Physics* book 1, chapter 8. My thesis is that Plato's answer would have been good enough to defeat Protagoras in extended argument, thereby remedying the political aspects of the Parmenides problem. However, Aristotle's answer is required to answer some additional philosophical and scientific aspects.
- The first section of this paper will summarize the history of pre-Socratic philosophy and explain why Parmenides was a turning-point.
- The second section will explain the sophist Protagoras' relation to the Parmenides problem. The third part will present Aristotle's complete answer to the Parmenides problem, and in the fourth part I will compare that approach with Plato's solution in the *Sophist*. Lastly, I will sum up by characterizing how I think Plato and Aristotle would have responded to Protagoras' Parmenidean sophistry in political life." (p. 748)
337. Woodbury, Leonard. 1958. "Parmenides on Names." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*:145-160.
- Reprinted in: J. P. Anton and George L. Kustas (eds.), *Essays in Ancient Greek philosophy*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1972, pp. 145-162 and in: C. Brown, R. Fowler, E. I. Robbins, P. M. Matheson Wallace (eds.), *Collected Writings of Leonard E. Woodbury*, Atlanta: Scholars Press, pp. 80-95.
- [The essay is a discussion of the fr. B8 34-41]
- "voẽiv has been until now translated, for convenience' sake, as "mean" or "think", but these renderings will no longer suffice, since it now appears what is implied when voẽiv is used, as by Parmenides, not of a word or a thought, but of the name of the world. The object of voẽiv is that-in-being, and in consequence voẽiv can here stand only for that knowledge which perceives the world as it is. Knowledge of being can be found only in the meaning of the name, "being". Parmenides' philosophy of names leads directly into his ontology. But we have no text that asserts the identity of knowledge with its object, of voẽiv with το έov. The text that has so often been thought to make this assertion says in fact something quite different. It says that voẽiv is the same as είνvai, and this must mean that knowledge, like the right thought and meaning, can be found only in the use of the name. The only way is a μυθος όδοιο, ώς έστίν.
- Werner Jaeger has taught us to take seriously the theological significance of Parmenides' proem and to see at the heart of his philosophy a "Mystery of Being".
- (39) What I should venture to propose to him is that the meaning of the goddess's revelation is that the world is expressed in "being", and that Parmenides' holy mystery is the reality of a name." (p. 157)
- (39) Cf. W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), 107.
338. ———. 1986. "Parmenides on Naming by Mortal Men: fr. B8.53-56." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 6:1-13.
- Reprinted in: C. Brown, R. Fowler, E. I. Robbins, P. M. Matheson Wallace (eds.), *Collected Writings of Leonard E. Woodbury*, Atlanta: Scholars Press, pp. 439-453.
- "Concerning the text and syntax of the passage there appears to be a wide, though not a universal, agreement. But in regard to interpretation it is agreed only that severe problems proliferate and defy clear solutions." (p. 1)
- "The proper choice is the one figured in the proem, the entrance upon a road that passes beyond the paths of Night and Day into light, under the guidance of the Daughters of the Sun, who quit the House of Night for this purpose, throwing back there at the veils that cover their faces.(24) The journey is one that is directed by Justice and has the effect of persuading the Necessity that controls the goings of mortal men under the direction of a bad dispensation. The choice of the road, it is plain, entails the choice of the guidance of light." (p. 12)
- (24) On the allegory of Parmenides' journey and the vicissitudes of the sun in this world, see my "Equinox at Acragas: Pindar *Ol.* 2 . 61 - 62" TAPA [*Transactions and*



- Proceedings of the American Philological Association*] 97 (1966) 597 - 616 , especially 609 ff . and E . Robbins in *Greek Poetry and Philosophy* (Ed. D.E. Gerber (Chico , California 1984), note 20) 224 . "
339. Wyatt, William F.Jr. 1992. "The Root of Parmenides." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* no. 94:113-120.  
 "Parmenides, in looking for the roots of things and for essence, examined and pondered as well on the roots of words and their essential meaning. In so doing he found linguistic support for his notions, or for some of them. He wrote at a time and in a style which allowed root meanings to appear clearly and which saw in nouns the verbal notion underlying them, and in verbs the nominal cognates. In this he is rather in the style of the choral poets such as Pindar and Aeschylus who, it would seem, at times cared little for parts of speech but very much for the meanings conveyed in roots. I close with a Parmenidean example.  
 In 7.3 he characterizes ἔθος as πολύπειρον.(19) There can be much discussion about the precise meaning of the word, but it appears to me that it contains (for Parmenides) the meaning or meanings inherent in the verb πειρασθαι "attempt," and in the noun πειρασ "limit" with its adjective ἄπειρον.(20) It will therefore have to do with mankind's tentative and uncertain steps toward truth, steps which lead to no conclusion or end. In this man is like the ἀνθρώποι of Heracleitus' Fr. 1." (p. 120)  
 (19) For so I take it. Coxon (58 & 191) construes the adjective with τούτο. Little hinges on this, I suspect, but the Greek works better my way, which is the usual translation.  
 20 Parmenides seems to have played as well with prefixes, particularly the negative prefix (ἀ- and the prefix "many" (πολυ-). They correspond to the way of non-being on the one hand, and of mortal uncertainty and searching on the other. Of the three words τροπος, ἄτροπος, πολύτροπος only the first has any real existence.
340. Young, Tyler. 2006. "Perceiving Parmenides: A Reading of Parmenides of Elea's Philosophy by Way of the Proem." *Dionysius* no. 24:21-44.  
 Abstract: "Parmenides' poem must be read as a whole, beginning with the proem and seeing it as a basis for approaching the entirety of the work. Analysis of Homer's *Odyssey* and Hesiod's *Theogony* shows that Parmenides' poem is a masterpiece of allusion, and that the proem establishes a method and imagery by which the following two sections can be read both independently and in relation to each other. Examination of the Way of Doxa in the second part of the poem provides the opportunity for an explication of Parmenides' cosmology and theology and demonstrates that the Doxa is necessary to his philosophy. The heart of his thesis lies in the juxtaposition of the two ways. The Way of Truth in the third part stands as a succinct statement of the nature of Reality and its relation to human experience."
341. Zeller, Eduard. 1881. *A History of Greek Philosophy from the earliest Period to the time of Socrates*. London: Longman, Green and Co.  
 With a General Introduction (pp. 1-183),  
 Translated by S. F. Alleyne in two volumes from the German fourth edition of: *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, Leipzig: R. Reisland, 1876-1882.  
 On Parmenides: vol. I, pp. 580-608.  
 "The great advance made by the Eleatic philosophy in Parmenides ultimately consists in this, that the unity of all Being, the fundamental idea of the Eleatics, was apprehended by him in a much more definite manner than by Xenophanes, and that it was based upon the concept of Being. Xenophanes, together with the unity of the world-forming force or deity, had also maintained the unity of the world; but he had not therefore denied either the plurality or the variability of particular existences. Parmenides shows that the All in itself can only be conceived as One, because all that exists is in its essence the same. But for this reason he will admit nothing besides this One to be a reality. Only Being is: non-Being can as little exist as it can be expressed or conceived; and it is the greatest mistake, the most incomprehensible

error, to treat Being and non-Being, in spite of their undeniable difference, as the same. This once recognised, everything else follows by simple inference." (pp. 580-585, notes omitted)