Aristotle's Categories: A bibliography of recent studies (A

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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES

Ackrill John. Aristole on "Good" and the Categories. In Islamic philosophy and the classical tradition. Essays presented by his friends and pupils to Richard Walzer on his seventieth birthday. Edited by Stern S.M., Hourani Albert, and Brown Vivian. London: Bruno Cassirer 1972. pp. 17-25

Allen Reginald E., "Individual properties in Aristotle's Categories," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 14: 31-39 (1969).

Allen Reginald E., "Substance and predication in Aristotle's Categories," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 1: 362-373 (1973).
Supplementary vol. I: Exegesis and argument. Studies in Greek philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos - Edited by E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty - Assen, Van Gorcum

Annas Julia, "Individuals in Aristotle's Categories: two queries," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 19: 146-152 (1974).
"This article criticizes the attempt by Barrington Jones (Phronesis 1972) to apply Aristotle's analysis of 'One' in Metaphysics I to the problem of non-substantial individuals in the Categories, to use his account to explain the role of paronymy in the Categories. Doubts are raised about interpreting Aristotle to support either claim."

Anton John Peter. Aristotle's theory of Contrariety. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1957.
Reprinted 1987 and 2000.

Anton John Peter, "The Aristotelian doctrine of 'homonyma' in the Categories and its Platonic antecedents," Journal of the History of Philosophy 6: 315-326 (1968).
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton - Categories and experience. Essays on Aristotelian themes - Oakdale, N.Y., Dowling College Press, 1996, pp. 87-114.

"The doctrine of 'homonyma' formulated in the Categories and found in other early works was seriously debated in ancient times. The earliest detection of 'homonyma' as a source of ambiguity goes back to Plato. Although he made use of the concepts that figure in later formulations, there is no evidence that he offered a technical view of 'homonyma,' based on their logical properties. The main portion of this article is given to an examination of the sources in Plato's, Speusippus's, and Aristotle's interpretations of the use and nature of 'homonyma,' and the place of this doctrine in their philosophies. The author defends the first chapter of the Categories as having theoretical relevance and significance as a counter-Speusippean thesis. This is the first of two related articles; in its sequel the author discusses the diverse ancient interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine as found in the writings of the Commentators." [see: J. P. Anton - Ancient interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine of homonyma - Journal of the History of Philosophy, 7, 1969, pp. 1-18]

Anton John Peter, "The meaning of 'O Logos tes Ousias' in Categories 1a," Monist 52: 252-267 (1968).
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton - Categories and experience. Essays on Aristotelian themes - Oakdale, N.Y., Dowling College Press, 1996, pp. 61-85.

Anton John Peter, "Observations on Aristotle's theory of Categories," Diotima.Epitheoresis Philosophikes Ereunes 3: 66-81 (1975).
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton - Categories and experience. Essays on Aristotelian themes - Oakdale, N.Y., Dowling College Press, 1996, pp. 153-174.

Anton John Peter. On the meaning of Kategoria in Aristotle's Categories. In Aristotle's ontology. Edited by Preus Anthony and Anton John Peter. Albany: State University of New York Press 1992. pp. 3-18
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton - Categories and experience. Essays on Aristotelian themes - Oakdale, N.Y., Dowling College Press, 1996, pp. 175-201.

"In a paper written in 1974 and subsequently published in 1975, (1) I argued that the Aristotelian texts, particularly that of the Categories, allow for a parallel yet distinct interpretation to the traditional and prevalent one that takes the categories to be terms, ultimate classes, types, and concepts. (2) My position there was that the primary use of kategoria refers to well-formed statements made according to canons and, to be more precise, to fundamental types of predication conforming to rules sustained by the ways of beings.
In trying to decide how Aristotle uses the term kathegoria in the treatise that bears the same name, Categories, (3)provision must be made for the fact that there is nothing in the text to justify the meanings that ancient commentators and also modern writers assigned to it and that found their way both into translations of Aristotle's works and into the corpus of established terminology. (4) The present article is written in the hope that it will contribute in some small measure to understanding why certain distinctions in the treatise Categories should have prevented interpreters from assigning the traditional meaning of "genera of being" to the term category, hence giving it the meaning of "highest predicate" rather than "fundamental type of predication"."
(1) Anton 1975, 67-81.
(2) The paper published here was presented at the December 28, 1983, meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, Boston, MA.
(3) The title of the treatise was a subject of considerable dispute in antiquity. For a recent survey on this problem see M. Frede 1987b, 11- 28. According to Frede "the question of authenticity is crucially linked to the question of unity" (12). The problem of the unity covers the relation of the early part of the treatise to the part that discusses the postpredicamenta.
(4) There are many surveys of interpretations concerning the categories. I do not plan to offer another survey, for my main interest lies in the investigation into what we can learn about the theory of categories in the Categories. Nor am I concerned with reproducing and commenting on the table of enumeration of the "categories" in Aristotle's works. The list can be readily found in Apelt 1891, conveniently reproduced in Elders 1961, 194-96. One can still raise the question about the intent of the list or lists. If a defense of objections can be made to the reading that makes the list of "categories" refer to classes of being, then we have an alternative before us, which has not been adequately explored, namely whether the list refers not to classes of being or classes of predicates, but to the types of statements that pertain to the attribution of genuine features present in the entity named in the subject position. It is the existence of the concrete individual qua subject that sets the context for the selective lists of relevant types of attribution.

Anton John Peter. Categories and experience. Essays on Aristotelian themes. Oakdale: Dowling College Press 1996.

Apelt Otto. Die Kategorienlehre des Aristoteles. In Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie. Leipzig: Teubner 1891. pp. 101-216
Reprint of the book: Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1975

Aubel Madeleine van, "Accident, catégories et prédicables dans l'oeuvre d'Aristote," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 61: 361-401 (1963).

Aubenque Pierre. Le problème de l'être chez Aristote. Éssai sur la problématique aristotélicienne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1962.

Aubenque Pierre, "Aristote et le langage," Annales de la Faculté des Lettres d'Aix 43: 85-105 (1967).
Avec une "Note annexe sur les Catégories d'Aristote. Á propos d'une article de M. Benveniste" (pp.103-105) - Émile Benveniste - Catègories de pensée et catégories de langage - Études Philosophiques, 4, 1958).
Réimprimé dans: P. Aubenque - Problèmes aristotéliciens. I. Philosophie théorique - Paris, Vrin 2009 pp. 11-30

Barnes Jonathan, "Homonymy in Aristotle and Speusippus," Classical Quarterly 21: 65-80 (1971).
"1. 'There are important differences between Aristotle's account of homonymy and synonymy on the one hand, and Speusippus' on the other; in particular, Aristotle treated homonymy and synonymy as properties of things, whereas Speusippus treated them as properties of words. Despite this difference, in certain significant passages Aristotle fell under the influence of Speusippus and used the words "homonymous" and "synonymous" in their Speusippean senses.'
These sentences are a rough expression of what I shall call the Hambruch thesis. The thesis was advanced by Ernst Hambruch in 1904 in his remarkable monograph on the relation between Academic and early Aristotelian logic. (*)
Hambruch singled out Topics A 15 as peculiarly Speusippean, and he conjectured that it was based on some written work of Speusippus." p. 65

Ernst Hambruch - Logische Regeln der platonischen Schule in der aristotelischen Topik - Berin, 1904, pp.28-29. [Reprinted, with Curt Arpe - Das ti en einai bei Aristoteles (1938), New York, Arno Press, 1976 ]

Barnes Jonathan. Les Catégories et les Catégories. In Les Catégories et leur histoire. Paris: Vrin 2005. pp. 11-80

Barthlein Karl, "Zur Aristotelischen Kategorienlehre," Philosophische Rundschau 33: 281-291 (1986).

Baumer Michael R., "Chasing Aristotle's categories down the tree of grammar," Journal of Philosophical Research 18: 341-349 (1993).
"This paper addresses the problem of the origin and principle of Aristotle's distinctions among the categories. It explores the possibilities of reformulating and reviving the 'grammatical' theory, generally ascribed first to Trendelenburg. the paper brings two new perspectives to the grammatical theory: that of Aristotle's own theory of syntax and that of contemporary linguistic syntax and semantics. I put forth a provisional theory of Aristotle's categories in which 1) I propose that the categories sets forth a theory of lexical structure, with the ten categories emerging as lexical or semantic categories, and 2) I suggest conceptual links, both in Aristotle's writings and in actuality, between these semantic categories and certain grammatical inflections."

Bäck Allan. Aristotle's theory of predication. Leyden: Brill 2000.

Belardi Walter. Le categorie aristoteliche tra grammatica e linguaggio. In Filosofia grammatica e retorica nel pensiero antico. Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo 1985. pp. 147-165
Versione riveduta di: Le categorie aristoteliche e la cultura linguistica dell'epoca, De Homine, 57, 1976 pp. 3-24.

Benveniste Émile, "Catégories de pensée et catégories de langue," Les Études Philosophiques 13: 419-429 (1958).
Reprinted in: É. Benveniste - Problèmes de linguistique générale - Paris, Gallimard, 1966, pp. 63-74; Translated in English by Mary E. Meek as: Problems in general linguistics, Coral Gables, University of Miami Press, 1971.

Blackwell Richard J., "The methodological function of the categories in Aristotle," New Scholasticism 31: 526-537 (1957).

Block Irving, "Predication in Aristotle," Philosophical Inquiry 1: 53-57 (1978).
"This article traces briefly the development of Aristotle's thoughts on predication as this progressed from the Categories to the Posterior Analytics with the Topics coming somewhere in between. In the Categories predication is only of essential attributes and the subject of a predicating statement need not be a substance. In the Posterior Analytics, predication is the attribution of either essential or accidental attributes and the subject must be a substance, otherwise it is not predication in the true sense. The Topics represents a half-way house in between as it makes no mention of the predication-inherence distinction of the Categories on the one hand, and on the other gives no predominance to the notion of substance when discussing the subject of predication, as we find in Posterior Analytics."

Bodéüs Richard, "Aux origines de la doctrine aristotélicienne des Catégories," Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 2: 121-137 (1984).

Bodéüs Richard. Sur l'unité stylistique du texte des Catégories. In Aristotelica Secunda. Mélanges offerts a Christian Rutten. Edited by Motte André and Denooz Joseph. Liège: Université de Liège. Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres 1995. pp. 141-154

Bodéüs Richard, "En relisant le début des Catégories. L'expression logos tés ousias," Revue des Études Grecques 109: 709-718 (1996).

Bodéüs Richard, "Le texte grec des "Catégories" d'Aristote et le témoignage du Commentaire de Porphyre," Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 8: 121-142 (1997).

Bodéüs Richard. La substance première des Catégories à Métaphysique. In La Métaphysique d'Aristote. Perspectives contemporaines. Edited by Narcy Michel and Tordesillas Alonso. Paris: Vrin 2005. pp. 131-144

Bonitz Hermann, "Über die Kategorien des Aristoteles," Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften 10: 591-645 (1853).
Reprinted Darmstadt, Wissenchaftliche Buch-Gesellschaft, 1967.

Translated in Italian: H. Bonitz - Sulle categorie di Aristotele - Prefazione, introduzione, progettazione e impostazione editoriale di Giovanni Reale. Traduzione del testo tedesco e indici di Vincenzo Cicero - Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1995.

Bos Egber Peter. John Buridan on Substance in his Commentary (Summulae) on Aristotle's Categories. In Signs and signification. Vol. I. Edited by Gill Harjeet Singh and Manetti Giovanni. New Delhi: Bahri Publications 1999. pp. 85-99
"As a master of arts John Buridan commented on Aristotle's logic. The quaestiones, in which specific problems are discussed in the traditional medieval form, are more elaborate and detailed commentaries.
One of Aristotle's text to be commented are the Categories (Praedicamenta). The Quaestiones in Praedicamenta have been edited recently by J. Schneider (München, 1983); I have prepared a critical edition of Buridan's commentary (summulae) on the same work, which is due to appear soon. This edition is part of an intemational project, of which it is the intention to issue the first complete edition of Buridan's Summulae, which contains eight treatises, supplemented with a new edition of his Sophismata.
In the present contribution I shall give an analysis of Buridan's commentary on the category of substance. Before entering this subject, I shall make some remarks on the general nature of the work. This contribution is practically the same as a part of the introduction to my forthcoming edition." p. 85
"4. A SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTS
Buridan starts with a discussion on aequivocatio, univocatio and denominatio. Sometimes, he says, aequivocatio is attributed to a word having signification, sometimes to things signified. Here (3.1.1.) Buridan attributes aequivocatio to things as far as they are signified equivocally by one and the same word. This signification is not matched by one concept (ratio, 3.1.2), but by two, or more, one for each thing. E.g. a dog, a star and a fish are signified by the word canis ('dog') that may have supposition for them under different concepts.
There is univocation when the several things signified are united, not only by a common designation, but also by a common definition. Buridan emphasizes (3.1.2) that both equivocatio and univocatio are on the level of conventional terms and propositions, and are not properties of mental terms and propositions.
Equivocation and univocation are mutually opposed in an exhaustive division. The third item of the Antepraedicamenta, denomination (denominatio), is different. For a term to be denominative it must satisfy both a morphological-cum-semantical criterion and a purely semantical one. First, (1.a) it must be a concrete term (a term signifying concrete entities), and (1.b) it must be morphologically related to the corresponding abstract term; album ('white [thing]') satisfies (1.a-b), having albedo ('whiteness') as its abstract counterpart. Second, (2) the term must have appellation. This, Buridan explains, means that it must 'evoke' or 'connote' some disposition which is extrinsic to the nature of that for which the term supposits. Album (' white [thing]') satisfies this condition; it may supposit, say, for a man, but it also connotes something which is extrinsic (nonessential) to man, namely whiteness. By contrast, homo ('man') only satisfies criteria (1.a-b); it is a concrete noun with a morphologically related abstract counterpart, viz. humanitas. Criterion (2) remains unsatisfied because humanity is essential to all supposits of homo and thus cannot fulfil the role of an extrinsic disposition connoted by the term." p. 91 (notes omitted).

Brakas George. Aristotle's concept of the Universal. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1988.

Brentano Franz. Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles. Freiburg im Bresgau: Herder 1862.
Reprinted by Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1960, 1963, 1984.
English translation: F. Brentano - On the several senses of Being in Aristotle - Edited and translated by Rolf George - Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975.

Butler Travis. The homonymy of signification in Aristotle. In Aristotle and after. Edited by Sorabji Richard. London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London 1997. pp. 117-126

Calogero Guido. I fondamenti della logica aristotelica. Firenze: Le Monnier 1927.
Second edition with appendixes by Gabriele Giannantoni and Giovanna Sillitti - Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1968.

Carson Scott, "Aristotle on existential import and nonreferring subjects," Synthese 124: 343-360 (2000).

Caujolle-Zaslawsky Françoise. Les relatifs dans les Catégories. In Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Paris: Vrin 1980. pp. 167-195

Chen Chun-Hwan, "On Aristotle's two expressions: kath' hypokeimenou leghesthai and en hypokoimeno einai," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 2: 148-159 (1957).

Cicero Vincenzo. L'interpretazione linguistica delle categorie aristoteliche in E. Benveniste. In La dottrina delle categorie in Aristotele. Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1994. pp. 285-353

Cohen S.Marc, "Kooky objects revisited: Aristotle's ontology," Metaphilosophy 39: 3-19 (2008).
"This is an investigation of Aristotle's conception of accidental compounds (or ''kooky objects,'' as Gareth Matthews has called them) -- entities such as the pale man and the musical man. I begin with Matthews's pioneering work into kooky objects, and argue that they are not so far removed from our ordinary thinking as is commonly supposed. I go on to assess their utility in solving some
familiar puzzles involving substitutivity in epistemic contexts, and compare the kooky object approach to more modern approaches involving the notion of referential opacity. I conclude by proposing that Aristotle provides an implicit role for kooky objects in such metaphysical contexts as the Categories and Metaphysics."

Colin Bernard and Rutten Christian. Aristote. Categoriae. Index verborum. Liste de fréquence. Liège: Centre Informatique de Philosophie et Lettres 1993.

Courtine Jean-François. Note complémentaire pour l'histoire du vocabulaire de l'être. Les traductions latines d' ousía et la compréhension romano-stoïcienne de l'être. In Concepts et Catégories de la pensée antique. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Paris: Vrin 1980. pp. 33-87
Reprinted and updated in: J-F. Courtine - Les catégories de l'être. Études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale - Paris, Press Universitaires de France, 2003, pp. 11-77.

Courtine Jean-François. La question des catégories: le débat entre Trendelenburg et Bonitz. In Aristote au XIX siècle. Edited by Thouard Denis. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Unversitaires du Septentrion 2004. pp. 63-80

de Rijk Lambertus Marie, "The authenticity of Aristotle's Categories," Mnemosyne 4: 129-159 (1951).
"Most scholars either deny Aristotle's authorship of the first treatise of the Organon, or else consider the problem of authorship to be insoluble. I maintain, however, that such judgements are wrong and that the treatise is of genuine Aristotelian authorship, and of considerable importance for our knowledge both of Aristotle's own development, and also that of later Platonism. I shall try to show the authenticity of the treatise in the following study, and shall divide my investigation into the following main divisions:
A. The view of the ancient commentators concerning the authenticity of Categories Chs. 1-9;
B. Modern criticism of the authenticity of Categories Chs. 1-9;
C. The authenticity of Categories Chs. 10-15."

[See also the following note to Ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics (Second part) - Vivarium, November, 1978, p. 85: "Unlike some 30 years ago (see my papers published in Mnemosyne 1951), the present author has his serious doubts, now, on the authenticity of the first treatise of the Organon" ]

de Rijk Lambertus Marie. The place of the categories of Being in Aristotle's philosophy. Assen: Van Gorcum 1952.
Ph.D. thesis, Utrecht University.
From the Introduction: "It seems to be the fatal mistake of philology that it always failed to get rid of Kantian influences as to the question of the relation of logic and ontology. Many modern mathematical logicians have shown that the logical and the ontological aspect not only are inseparable but also that in many cases it either lacks good sense or is even impossible to distinguish them. Accordingly, the distinction of logical and ontological truth (especially of propositional truth and term-truth), that of logical and ontological accident and that of logical and ontological categories, has not the same meaning for modem logic as it seems to have for 'traditional' logic (for instance the logic of most Schoolmen).
I hope to show in this study that the distinction of a logical and an ontological aspect (especially that of logical and ontological categories) can be applied to the Aristotelian doctrine only with the greatest reserve. A sharp distinction carried through rigorously turns out to be unsuitable when being applied to Aristotelian logic. For both aspects are, for Aristotle, not only mutually connected but even interwoven, and this in such a way that the ontological aspect seems to prevail, the logical being only an aspect emerging more or less in Aristotle's generally ontological way of thinking." pp. 6-7.
Contents: Bibliography I-III; Introduction 1-7; Chapter I. Aristotle's doctrine of truth 8-35; Chapter II. The distinction of essential and accidental being pp. 31-43; Chapter III. Logical and ontological accident 44-52; Chapter IV. The nature of the categories in the Metaphysics 53-66; Chapter V. The doctrine of the categories in the first treatise of the Organon 67-75; Chapter VI. The use of the categories in the work of Aristotle 76-88; Appendix. The names of the categories 89-92; Index locorum 93-96.

de Rijk Lambertus Marie, "On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part II. The multiplication of Being in Aristotle's Categories," Vivarium 16: 81-117 (1978).
"3. The multiplication of being in Aristotle's Categories;
3.1. Introduction. One of the results of the preceding section may be that Lloyd (1956, p. 59) seems to be wrong in asserting that in Plato's view the rôle of the universal is played by the Idea exclusively, and that only by the time of the Middle Academy, that is, for the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., the performers of this rôle have been multiplied. As a matter of fact the distinction between Plato and his followers of the Middle Academy on this score would seem to be a different one. The ontological problems of participation were felt as early as in the Platonic dialogues (see our section 2), as well as the logical ones concerning predication (which will be discussed in a later section). Well, the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., introduced explicitly a threefold distinction of the Platonic Form or rather of its status which was (only) implied with Plato. I think, Lloyd is hardly more fortunate in ascribing (ibid.) this introduction chiefly to the influence of Aristotelian logic on Platonic interpretation. It is true, in stating the basic distinction between en hypokeimenôi and kath' hypokeimenou Aristotle tried to face the same cluster of fundamental problems which induced later Platonists to the distinction of the Forms as taken before or after the methexis (cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Categ. 79, 12ff.). However, Plato's disciple, Aristotle (the most unfaithful one, in a sense, as must be acknowledged) was as deeply engaged on the same problems as were his condisciples and the Master himself in his most mature period. It is certainly not Aristotle who played the rôle of a catalyst and was the first to provoke the multiplication of the Platonic Form in order to solve problems which were not recognized before in the Platonic circle. On the contrary, Plato himself had saddled his pupils with a basic and most intricate problem, that of the nature of participation and logical predication. It was certainly not left quite unsolved in the later dialogues, but did still not have a perspicuous solution which could be accepted in the School as a scholastic one. So any of his serious followers, (who were teachers in the School, at the same time) was bound to contrive, at least, a scholastic device to answer the intricate question. To my view, Aristotle's solution should be discussed in this framework. For that matter, Aristotle stands wholly on ground prepared by his master to the extent that his works on physic and cosmology, too, are essentially discussions held within the Academy (Cp. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the history of his development, Oxford 1949, 308)." pp. 81-82

3.2. Aristotle's classification of being as given in the Categories; 3.2.1. The common view: categories = predicates; 3.2.2. The things said 'aneu symplokés'; 3.2.3. The doctrine of substance given in the Categories; 3.2.4. The ontological character of the classification; 3.2.5. Some obscurities of the classification; 3.2.6. The different status of the 'things' meant; 3.2.6.1 The first item of the classification; 3.2.6.2. The second item of the classification; 3.2.6.3. The third item of the classification; 3.2.6.4. The ontological status of the 'things' meant in the items (2) and (3); 3.2.6.5. The fourth item of classification; 3.2.7. The relation between the different 'things'; 3.3. Categories and predicables; 3.3.1. The opposition of category and predicable; 3.3.2. The impact of the opposition; 3.3.3. The obscure position of the differentia; 3.3.4. Conclusion.

de Rijk Lambertus Marie, "On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part III. The Categories as classes of names," Vivarium 18: 1-62 (1980).
"4. The categories as class of names; 4.1. Status quaestionis. The previous sections contain several hints to the close interrelation between three major issues in Plato's doctrine, viz. the question about the true nature of the Forms and those about participation and predication. Indeed, for the founder of the theory of the Forms, predication was bound to become a problem. Forms are immutable and indivisible; yet other Ideas have to participate in them; they are unique, by themselves and subsistent; yet, when saying ' John is man' (or white), ' Peter is man' (or white), should there be one perfect, eternal, immutable etc. Form of MAN (or WHITE) in the one and another in the other? Or, as I have put it above [1977: 85]: if John, Peter, and William are wise, does this mere fact mean that there must be something which they are all related to in exactly the same manner, namely WISDOM itself? And if ' John is wise', 'Peter is wise', and ' William is wise' are all true statements, what exactly is the meaning of the predicate name 'wise'? The former question is concerned with participation, the latter with predication. Well, that the crux of the latter problem is not the separate existence of the Forms (chôrismos) clearly appears from the fact that also the author of the Categories, who had entirely abandoned all kind of chôrismos, could apparently not get rid of a similar problem: if the categories really are classes of 'things there are' (1 a 20) (i.e. 'real' substances, 'real' natures, and 'real' properties), rather than concepts (i.e. logical attributes), what kind of 'thing' is meant by a term qua 'category'? So for Aristotle the semantic problem still remained. His distinction between en hypokeimenôi and kath' hypokeimenou could only hide the original problem. It is often said that these phrases refer to different domains, the metaphysical and the logical one, respectively. We have already found some good reasons to qualify this opposition (see [1978], 84; 88). It seems to be useful now to collect all kind of information from Aristotle's writings, not only the Categories, about the proper meaning of the categories. This will be the aim of our sections 4.2-4.7." pp. 1-2

4.2. On some modern interpretations of 'kata symplokên'; 4.3. Aristotle's use of the categories; "For this section see also my Utrecht dissertation, The place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's philosophy, Assen 1952 pp. 76-88. I have to correct or to adjust my former views on several points."; 4.31. The categories as a classification of reality; 4. 32. The categories as a classification of sentence predicates; 4.33. The categories as a classification of 'copulative being'; 4.4. How did Aristotle arrive at his list of categories?; 4.5. Are the categories the 'highest predicates'?; 4.6. The categories taken as names in Metaph. Z 1-6 and Anal. Post. I 4; 4.7. An attempt at a reinterpretation of Categories, chs. 1-5; 4.8. Aristotle's view on relatives; 4.9. Conclusion.

de Rijk Lambertus Marie. Aristotle: semantics and ontology. Volume I: General introduction. The works on logic. Leiden: Brill 2002.
From the Preface: "In this book I intend to show that the ascription of many shortcomings or obscurities to Aristotle resulted from persistent misinterpretation of key notions in his work. The idea underlying this study is that commentators have wrongfully attributed anachronistic perceptions of ' predication', and statement-making in general to Aristotle. In Volume I, what I consider to be the genuine semantics underlying Aristotle's expositions of his philosophy are culled from the Organon. Determining what the basic components of Aristotle's semantics are is extremely important for our understanding of his view of the task of logic -- his strategy of argument in particular.
In chapter 1, after some preliminary considerations I argue that when analyzed at deep structure level, Aristotelian statement-making does not allow for the dyadic 'S is P' formula. An examination of the basic function of ' be' and its cognates in Aristotle's philosophical investigations shows that in his analysis statement-making is copula-less. Following traditional linguistics I take the ' existential' or hyparctic use of ' be' to be the central one in Greek (pace Kahn), on the understanding that in Aristotle hyparxis is found not only in the stronger form of ' actual occurrence' but also in a weaker form of what I term ' connotative (or intensional) be' (1.3-1.6). Since Aristotle's ' semantic behaviour', in spite of his skilful manipulation of the diverse semantic levels of expressions, is in fact not explicitly organized in a well-thought-out system of formal semantics, I have, in order to fill this void, formulated some semantic rules of thumb (1.7).
In chapter 2 I provide ample evidence for my exegesis of Aristotle's statement-making, in which the opposition between ' assertible' and ' assertion' is predominant and in which ' is' functions as an assertoric operator rather than as a copula (2.1-2.2). Next, I demonstrate that Aristotle's doctrine of the categories fits in well with his view of copula-less statement-making, arguing that the ten categories are ' appellations' ('nominations') rather than sentence predicates featuring in an ' S is P' formation (2.3-2.4). Finally, categorization is assessed in the wider context of Aristotle's general strategy of argument (2.5-2.7).
In the remaining chapters of the first volume (3-6) I present more evidence for my previous findings concerning Aristotle's ' semantic behaviour' by enquiring into the role of his semantic views as we find them in the several tracts of the Organon, in particular the Categories De interpretatione and Posterior Analytics. These tracts are dealt with in extenso, in order to avoid the temptation to quote selectively to suit my purposes."

de Rijk Lambertus Marie. Aristotle: semantics and ontology. Volume II: The Metaphysics, semantics in Aristotle's strategy of argument. Leiden: Brill 2002.
From the Preface to the first volume: "The lion's part of volume two (chapters 7-11) is taken up by a discussion of the introductory books of the Metaphysics (A-E) and a thorough analysis of its central books (Z-H-O). I emphasize the significance of Aristotle's semantic views for his metaphysical investigations, particularly for his search for the true ousia. By focusing on Aristotle's semantic strategy I hope to offer a clearer and more coherent view of his philosophical position, in particular in those passages which are often deemed obscure or downright ambiguous.
In chapter 12 1 show that a keen awareness of Aristotle's semantic modus operandi is not merely useful for the interpretation of his metaphysics, but is equally helpful in gaining a clearer insight into many other areas of the Stagirite's sublunar ontology (such as his teaching about Time and Prime matter in Physics).
In the Epilogue (chapter 13), the balance is drawn up. The unity of Aristotelian thought is argued for and the basic semantic tools of localization and categorization are pinpointed as the backbone of Aristotle's strategy of philosophic argument.
My working method is to expound Aristotle's semantic views by presenting a running commentary on the main lines found in the Organon with the aid of quotation and paraphrase. My findings are first tested (mainly in Volume II) by looking at the way these views are applied in Aristotle's presentation of his ontology of the sublunar world as set out in the Metaphysics, particularly in the central books (ZHO). As for the remaining works, I have dealt with them in a rather selective manner, only to illustrate that they display a similar way of philosophizing and a similar strategy of argument. In the second volume, too, the exposition is in the form of quotation and paraphrase modelled of Aristotle's own comprehensive manner of treating doctrinally related subjects: he seldom discussed isolated problems in the way modern philosophers in their academic papers, like to deal with special issues tailored to their own contemporary philosophic interest."

Derrida Jacques. Le supplément de copule. La philosophie devant la linguistique. In Marges de la philosophie. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972. pp. 209-246

Dévéreux Daniel, "Inherence and primary substance in Aristotle's Categories," Ancient Philosophy 12: 113-131 (1992).
Reprinted in: L. P. Gerson (ed.) - Aristotle. Critical assessment. Volume I: Logic and metaphysics - London, Routledge, 1999, pp. 52-72.

"I argue that Aristotle is committed to non-substantial particulars' in the Categories, i.e. entities predicable of one, but not more than one, substance. I also offer an account of what Aristotle means by 'in a subject' which allows for universal as well as particular attributes to be in a subject. The key element in the account offered is using the way in which parts of a substance can exist separately (i.e., on their own) as a guide for understanding the inseparability of things 'in a subject'. Things in a subject cannot exist 'on their own', apart from the subject in which they inhere; this sort of inseparability applies to universal as well as particular attributes. Towards the end, I discuss some implications of the Categories doctrine that parts of primary substances (especially the soul and body) are themselves primary substances."

Driscoll John, "The Platonic ancestry of primary substance," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 24: 253-269 (1979).
"In this article I call attention to the fact that five of the characteristics of primary substances mentioned by Aristotle in chapter V of the Categories correspond to characteristics of the spatial receptacle postulated by Plato at Timaues 49-52. I then argue that the most important differences between the Timaues 49-52 and Categories ontologies can be accounted for on the basis of G. E. L. Owen's thesis that the Sophist, among other dialogues, was written after the Timaues."

Duerlinger James, "Predication and inherence in Aristotle's Categories," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 15: 179-203 (1970).

Duhot Jean-Joël, "L'authenticité des Catégories," Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 12: 109-124 (1994).

Dumoulin Bertrand. Sur l'authenticité des Catégories d'Aristote. In Concepts et catégories dans la pensée antique. Edited by Aubenque Pierre. Paris: Vrin 1980. pp. 23-32

Dupréel Eugène, "Aristote et le traité des Catégories," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 22: 230-251 (1909).

Ebert Theodor, "Gattungen der Prädikate und Gattungen des Seienden bei Aristoteles: Zum Verhältnis von Kat. 4 und Top. I.9," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 67: 113-138 (1985).

Edel Abraham, "Aristotle's Categories and the nature of categorial theory," Review of Metaphysics 29: 45-65 (1975).

Elders Leo. Aristotle's theory of the One. A commentary on Book X of the Metaphysics. Assen : Van Gorcum 1961.

Erginel Mehmet, "Non-substantial individuals in Aristotle's Categories," Oxford Studies in Ancient philosophy 26: 185-212 (2004).
"The non-substantial individuals of Cat. 1 A 24-5 may be « in » several individual substances. The interpretation commonly held by proponents of the traditional view is inconsistent with what Aristotle actually says in the « Categories », nor does it enjoy any other textual support."

Ermano Andrea. Substanz als Existenz. Eine philosophische Auslegung der prote ousia. Mit Text, Übersetzung und Diskussion von Aristoteles, Categoriae 1-5. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 2000.

Esposti Ongaro Michele, "Dialettica e grammatica nella dottrina delle categorie di Aristotele," Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico 26: 33-64 (2005).

Flannery Kevin L., "The synonymy of homonyms," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 81: 268-289 (1999).
"Simplicius reports in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories that Claudius Nicostratus and a certain Lucius argued that there is a problem with Aristotle's definition of homonyms in the first chapter of the Categories. If homonyms fall under that definition, they, qua homonyms, are not homonyms at all but synonyms, since they share the name 'homonym' and also the definition of homonyms. The author of the present article discusses a number of ancient and modern attempts to resolve this paradox, arguing that none of them is fully satisfactory. He proposes, rather, the elimination of the words 'of being' from lines 1a2 and 1a4, a solution that finds support in some of the oldest evidence regarding manuscripts that exists in Aristotelian studies."

Fonfara Dirk. Die Ousia-Lehren des Aristoteles. Untersuchungen zur Kategorienschrift und zur Metaphysik. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2003.

Fraser Kyle, "Seriality and demonstration in Aristotle's ontology," Oxford Studies in Ancient philosophy 25: 131-158 (2003).
"Metaphysics G and Z support a distinction between 'seriality' and 'focality' in demonstrations of ontological structure, and a precise account of the categories as they appear in these books of the Metaphysics can be given in the serial mode of demonstration. In appendix: On the Neoplatonist 'deduction' of the Categories."

From the review by Michael Pakaluk in Bryn Mawr Classical Review 06.18.2006: "It is commonly thought that Aristotle distinguishes just two ways of classifying things: genus-species hierarchies; and pros hen or 'focally related' analogues. Fraser considers whether we might take Aristotle's mention, at Met. IV.2.1005a11, of classification "with reference to a serial ordering" (tôi ephechês), to be indicating a third. Aristotle's famous remarks in De Anima, about how types of soul form a sequence (414b20-415a3), presumably refer to just that sort of ordering. But the bulk of Fraser's paper is an examination of whether Aristotle regarded the categories, too, as displaying that sort of ordering -- especially, that some categories are related to substance through the mediation of other categories. It turns out that the evidence that Aristotle thought this is surprisingly good. Fraser's program in examining this evidence is to develop, ultimately, an account of the method of the Aristotelian metaphysics as being systematic and scientific; Fraser rejects the 'dialectical' interpretations of the last several decades as over-influenced by ordinary language philosophy."

Frede Michael. Categories in Aristotle. In Studies in Aristotle. Edited by O'Meara Dominic. Washington: Catholic University Press 1981. pp. 1-25
Reprinted in: M. Frede - Essays in Ancient Philosophy - Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 29-48.

Frede Michael. Individuals in Aristotle. In Essays in ancient philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1987. pp. 49-71
English translation of: Individuen bei Aristoteles - Antike und Abendland, 24, 1978, pp. 16-39.

Frede Michael. The title, unity, and authenticity of the Aristotelian Categories. In Essays in ancient philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1987. pp. 11-28
English translation of: Titel, Einheit und Echtheit der aristotelischen Kategorienschrift - in: Paul Moraux, Jürgen Wiesner (eds.) - Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien zu einigen Dubia. Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin, 7-16 September 1981 - Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1983, pp. 1-29.

Fritz Kurt von, "Der Ursprung der aristotelischen Kategorienlehre," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 40: 449-496 (1931).
Reprinted in: K. von Fritz - Schriften zur griechischen Logik - Stüttgart, Frommann-Holzboog, 1978, vol. 2, pp. 9-61 and in: Fritz-Peter Hager (ed.) - Logik und erkenntnislehre des Aristoteles - Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buch-Gesellschaft, 1972.

Fritz Kurt von, "Zur aristotelischen Kategorienlehre," Philologus 90: 244-248 (1935).
Reprinted in: Fritz-Peter Hager (ed.) - Logik und Erkenntnislehre des Aristoteles - Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972.

Fritz Kurt von, "Review of: The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's Philosophy. by L. M. De Rijk," Philosophical Review 63: 600-605 (1954).

Furth Montgomery. Substance, form and psyche. An Aristotelean metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988.

From the Index of the Section: "History of Logic in Relationship to Ontology"