Visit Mobile Site Mobile Version

You are in the European Ontology site EUROPEAN site. There is an American Mirror Site: for best performance, visit the site close to your location.

Warning: Machine translation of philosophical texts can give very misleading results; please use it with CAUTION!

Ontology in PDF format Save or print the PDF version of this page

Selected Bibliography on Brentano's Contributions to Logic and Ontology. First Part: A - K

The simplest way to navigate this site is to visit the following page:

Index of Arguments and Alphabetical Index of the Philosophers

Pages about Bernard Bolzano

Index of the Section: "The Rediscovery of Ontology in Contemporary Thought"

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL RESOURCES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  1. Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. Edited by Chisholm Roderick. Atascadero: Ridgeview 1960.
    Contents: Preface V; Editor's Introduction 3; Selections. 1. Franz Brentano: The distinction between mental and physical phenomena 39; 2. Franz Brentano: Presentation and judgment form. Two distinct fundamental classes 62, 3. Franz Brentano: Genuine and fictitious objects 76; 4. Alexius Meinong: The theory of objects 76; 5. Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology 118; 6. Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and anthropology 129; 7. H. A. Prichard: Appearances and reality 143; 8. E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding: Introduction to 'The New Realism' 151; 9. Samuel Alexander: The basis of realism 186; 10. Bertrand Russell: The ultimate constituents of matter 223; 11. Arthur C. Lovejoy: A temporalistic realism 238; 12. G. E. Moore: A defense of common sense 255; Selected bibliography 283; Index 305-308.

    "The translations of Brentano and Meinong and the second translation of Husserl ("Phenomenology and Anthropology") have not previously been published. The selections from Brentano were translated by D. B. Terrell, of the University of Minnesota, and are taken, with his kind permission, from his translation of Brentano's Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. Meinong's "The Theory of Objects" was translated by Isaac Levi, of Western Reserve University, D. B. Terrell, and Roderick M. Chisholm. Husserl's "Phenomenology" was translated by C. V. Salmon, of Belfast University; his "Phenomenology and Anthropology" by Richard Schmitt; of Brown University." (from the Preface)
  2. The Philosophy of Brentano. Edited by McAlister Linda Lopez. London: Duckworth 1976.
    Contents: Editor's Introduction VII-IX; Oskar Kraus: Biographical sketch of Franz Brentano 1; Carl Stumpf: Reminiscences of Franz Brentano 10; Edmund Husserl: Reminiscences of Franz Brentano 47; Étienne Gilson: Brentano's interpretation of medieval philosophy 56; Lucie Gilson: Franz Brentano on science and philosophy 68; E. B. Titchener: Brentano and Wundt: empirical and experimental psychology 80; Roderick Chisholm: Brentano's descriptive psychology 91; Thomas De Boer: The descriptive method of Franz Brentano: its two functions and their significance for phenomenology 101; Herbert Spiegelberg: Intention and intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl 108; Ausonio Marras: Scholastic roots of Brentano's conception of intentionality 128; Roderick Chisholm: Intentional inexistence 140; Linda McAlister: Chisholm and Brentano on intentionality 151; Roderick Chisholm: Brentano's theory of correct and incorrect emotion 160; George Edward Moore: Review of Franz Brentano's The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong 176; Gabriel Franks: Was G. E. Moore mistaken about Brentano? 182; Tadeusz Kotarbinski: Franz Brentano as Reist 194; D. B. Terrell: Brentano's argument for Reismus 204; Hugo Bergmann: Brentano's theory of induction 213; Oskar Kraus: Toward a phenomenognosy of time consciousness 224; Bibliography of the published writings of Brentano: 240; Bibliography of works on Brentano: 248; Index of names 255; General Index 259-262.
  3. Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Grazer Philosophische Studien 5 1978.

    Special Issue. Contributions to the Brentano-Konferenz Graz, 4-8 September 1977 (Edited by Roderick Chisholm and Rudolf Haller).
    Edgar Morscher: Brentano and his place in Austrian philosophy 1; George Katkov: The world in which Brentano believed he lived 11; Stephan Körner: Über Brentanos Reismus und die extensionale Logik 29; Burnham Terrell: Quantification and Brentano's logic 45; Klaus Hedwig: Der scholastische Kontext des Intentionalen bei Brentano 67;Dagfinn Follesdal: : Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and perception 83; Herbert Spiegelberg: On the significance of the correspondence between Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl 95; Izydora Dambska: François Brentano et la pensée philosophique en Pologne: Casimir Twardowski et son École 117; Peter Geach: Intentionality of thought versus intentionality of desire 131; Elizabeth Anscombe: Will and emotion 139; Heiner Rutte: Brentanos antinaturalistische Grundlegung der Ethik 149; Guido Küng: Zur Erkenntnistheorie von Franz Brentano 169; Paul Weingartner: Brentano's criticism of the correspondence theory of truth and the principle "Ens et verum convertuntur" 183; Roderick M. Chisholm: Brentano's conception of substance and accident 197; Rudolf Haller: Brentanos Sprachkritik, oder dass "man unterscheiden muss was es (hier) zu unterscheiden gibt" 211; Johann Götschl: Brentanos Analyse des Zeitbegriffes 225; Rolf George: Brentano's relation to Aristotle 249; Liste der Teilnehmer an der Brentano-Konferenz 267.
  4. The Descriptive Psychology of the Brentano School. Topoi 6, 1-64 1987.

    Guest editors: Roderick Chisholm and Rudolf Haller.
    Contents: R. M. Chisholm and R. Haller: Introduction 1; Klaus Hedwig: Brentano's hermeneutics 3; Stephan Körner: On Brentano's objections to Kant's theory of knowledge 11; Heiner Rutte: On the problem of inner perception 19; Peter M. Simons: Brentano's reform of logic 25; Barry Smith: The substance of Brentano's ontology 39; Enzo Melandri: The 'Analogia Entis' according to Franz Brentano: a speculative-grammatical analysis of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' 51; Roderick M. Chisholm: Brentano's theory of pleasure and pain 59.
  5. La Scuola di Brentano. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1988.
    Contents: Wilhelm Baumgartner: Die Rolle des deskriptiven Psychologie Franz Brentanos am Beispiel der 'Wahrnehrung' 5; Stefano Besoli: La psicologia descrittiva e il primato dell'esperienza. Rilievi su alcune divergenze rilevabili tra il sistema concettuale di Dilthey e quello di Brentano 26; Reinhard Mamitz: Deskriptive Psychologie als unerlässliche Grundlage wissenschaftlicher Philosophie? Eine Darstellung und kritische Analyse des Psychologismus Franz Brentanos 58; Paolo Spinicci: Some observations on the concept of descriptive psychology in the philosophy of Franz Brentano 82; Enzo Melandri: Emozione, sentimento e conoscenza dal punto di vista fenomenologico 93; Kevin Mulligan: Judgings: their parts and counterparts 117; Natale Stucchi: Perception, representation and persuasion in the scientific work of Vittorio Benussi 149; Richard Sylvan: Supplanting maximization, and other utilitarian assumptions, in Western ethical ideology. A satisizing alternative to Brentano's foundations 167-194.
    Also published as Topoi Supplementary volume 2.
  6. Brentano in Italia. Una filosofia rigorosa, contro positivismo e attualismo. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana and Poli Roberto. Milano: Guerini 1993.
    Indice: Giovanni Piana: Presentazione 9; Liliana Albertazzi, Roberto Poli: Introduzione. Brentano: il puzzle incompleto 11; I Pragmatisti 19. Antonio Santucci: Franz Brentano e i pragmatisti italiani 21; Francesca Modenato: Conoscere e volere. L'incontro di Vailati e Calderoni con Brentano 47; Roberto Poli: Le credenze fra logica e mondo. Reismo, pragmatismo e common-sense philosophy: alle soglie del problema dell'analiticità 67; Guido Zingari: Franz Brentano e il problema della conoscenza. Motivi e tematiche a confronto con autori italiani 91; De Sarlo e la sua Scuola 101; Riccardo Luccio, Caterina Primi: De Sarlo e Brentano 103; Simonetta Gori-Savellini: Franz Brentano ed Enzo Bonaventura. Dalla psicologia empirica alla psicologia sperimentale 121; Liliana Albertazzi: Il presente psichico tra analisi concettuale e laboratorio: Franz Brentano e Renata Calabresi 131; Benussi e la psicologia della Gestalt 173; Paolo Bozzi: Vittorio Benussi e la psicologia italiana (intervista a cura di Liana Albertazzi e Roberto Poli) 175; Natale Stucchi: La psicologia teorica di tradizione brentaniana in alcuni lavori sperimentali di Vittorio Benussi 193; Mauro Antonelli: Coscienza e temporalità. Vittorio Benussi e la comprensione del tempo 297; Presenze 235; Wilhelm Baumgartner: I corrispondenti italiani negli archivi di Brentano 237; Luigi Dappiano: Martinetti lettore di Brentano 247; Piero Di Giovanni: Franz Brentano e la biblioteca filosofica di Palermo 261; Inediti. 273; (a) Lettera di Franz Brentano a Giuseppe Amato Pojero (testo originale, p. 286) 275; (b) Corrispondenza Brentano-Salvadori (testi originali, p. 316) 299; Indice dei nomi 335.
  7. The School of Franz Brentano. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Libardi Massimo, and Poli Roberto. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1996.
    Table of contents: Analytical table of contents IX; Foreword by The Editors XV; Introduction. Liliana Albertazzi, Massimo Libardi, Roberto Poli: Brentano and his School: reassembling the puzzle 1; 1. Massimo Libardi: Franz Brentano (1838-1917) 25; Part I: The pupils 81; 2. Liliana Albertazzi: Anton Marty (1847-1914) 83; 3. Karl Schuhmann: Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) 109; 4. Dale Jacquette: Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) 131; 5. Reinhard Fabian: Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) 161; 6. Liliana Albertazzi: Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) 175; 7. Roberto Poli: Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) 207; PartII: Topics and influences 233; 8. Wilhelm Baumgartner: Act, content and object 235; 9. Johannes Brandl: Intentionality 261; 10. Paolo Bozzi: Higher-order objects 285; 11. Peter Simons: Logic in the Brentano School 305; 12. Barry Smith: Logic and the Sachverhalt 323; 13. Roberto Poli: Truth theories 343; 14. Jan Wolenski: Reism in the Brentanist tradition 357: 15. Luigi Dappiano: Theories of values 377; 16. Liliana Albertazzi: From Kant to Brentano by Liliana Albertazzi 423; Index of Topics 465; Index of names 467-477.
    "The central idea developed by the contributions to this book is that the split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology - perhaps the most important schism in twentieth-century philosophy - resulted from a radicalization of reciprocal partialities. Both schools of thought share, in fact, the same cultural background and their same initial stimulus in the thought of Franz Brentano. And one outcome of the subsequent rift between them was the oblivion into which the figure and thought of Brentano have fallen.
    The first step to take in remedying this split is to return to Brentano and to reconstruct the 'map' of Brentanism.
    The second task (which has been addressed by this book) is to revive interest in the theoretical complexity of Brentano's thought and of his pupils and to revitalize those aspects that have been neglected by subsequent debate within the various movements of Brentanian inspiration.
    We have accordingly decided to organize the book into two introductory essays followed by two sections (Parts 1 and 2) which systematically examine Brentano's thought and that of his followers. The two introductory essays reconstruct the reasons for the 'invisibility', so to speak, of Brentano and set out the essential features of his philosophical doctrine. Part 1 of the book then examines six of Brentano's most outstanding pupils (Marty, Stumpf, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Husserl and Twardowski). Part 2 contains nine essays concentrating on the principal topics addressed by the Brentanians.
    In order to facilitate cross-referencing between the various essays contained in the book, each chapter concludes with a table giving the other points in the book where the same topics are dealt with." (Foreword by the Editors).
  8. The Brentano Puzzle. Edited by Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 1998.
    Contents: List of Contributors VII; Roberto Poli: Foreword IX-X; Roberto Poli: The Brentano puzzle: an introduction 1; Dallas Willard: Who needs Brentano? The wasteland of philosophy without its past 15; Claire Ortiz Hill: Introduction to Paul Linke's 'Gottlob Frege as philosopher' 45; Paul F. Linke: Gottlob Frege as philosopher 49; John Blackmore: Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938 73; Alf Zimmer: On agents and objects: some remarks on Brentanian perception 93; Liliana Albertazzi: Perceptual saliences and nuclei of meaning 113; Jan Srzednicki: Brentano and the thinkable 139; Claire Ortiz Hill: From empirical psychology to phenomenology. Edmund Husserl on the 'Brentano puzzle' 151; Serena Cattaruzza: Brentano and Boltzmann: the Schubladenexperiment 169; Karl Schuhmann: Johannes Daubert's theory of judgement 179; Evelyn Dölling: On Alexius Meinong's theory of signs 199; Robin Rollinger: Linguistic expressions and acts of meaning: comments on Marty's philosophy of language 215-225.
    "The papers collected in this volume arise from the conference "The Brentano Puzzle," organized in Bolzano / Bozen, Italy, on the 14th and 15th of November 1996 by the Central European Institute of Culture.
    The conference's aim was to analyse the following puzzle. Even if the width and the depth of Brentano's intellectual legacy are now well known, those asked to list the principal philosophers of the nineteenth century very rarely mention his name. We may call this puzzle the problem of Brentano's 'invisibility.'
    It is obvious that Brentano's invisibility has serious consequences on assessment of his philosophical theory. The reconstruction of Brentano's thought is still flawed and incomplete. Moreover, Brentano's emphasis on oral teaching, and the meagreness of his published work, compared with the enormous quantity of his manuscripts and correspondence, are also of theoretical importance because they are rooted in Brentano's method of 'doing' philosophy. We know that the distinguishing feature of his philosophy was its empirical bias, its insistence on rigorous and partial answers rather than on the construction of systems. Given these features, it comes as no surprise that the same problem should be examined on several separate occasions and that different solutions should be proposed for it.
    This procedure has a certain amount of inner coherence. Although Brentano always began his analysis with specific topics and problems, he proposed solutions which then reverberated through the entire edifice of his philosophy. This is a manner of philosophising which takes the natural sciences as its model. These factors also account for the different solutions that Brentano proposed for the problems he addressed. His thought, in fact, displays a continuity of method and a permanence of problems, but not a univocity of solutions. It is this aspect that allows one to talk of a school of Brentano among his pupils, to detect a 'family resemblance' among philosophers and scholars belonging to different disciplines. That is to say, the school is defined more by problems and the method used in their analysis than by their solutions in the strict sense. Accordingly, his heterodox followers, such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and Kazimierz Twardowski, were more faithful to their master's thought than the orthodox Brentanians like Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand.
    One further component of the Brentano puzzle is that a number of Brentano's outstanding pupils achieved their own success and founded their own schools. Suffice it to mention Husserl's phenomenology, Twardowski's Lvov-Warsaw school and Meinong's Graz school. The personal success and academic recognition attained by these exponents of Brentano's school (in the broad sense) have come to obscure their common thematic origins. The sub–)';Ýësequent split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology generated, as a side-effect, the oblivion into which Franz Brentano's thought then fell.
    Nevertheless, Brentano and his school display surprising affinities with Frege and the tradition that he inspired. Perhaps the most interesting reconstruction of these connections is that accomplished by a number of works in German by Paul Linke. It was thought that a survey of Linke's thought might prove useful to English readers. For this reason the book also contains the English translation of his 'Gottlob Frege als Philosoph,' published in 1947, with an introduction by Claire Ortiz Hill.
    Last but not least, analyses of the relevance of Brentano's and his followers' theses for contemporary philosophical and scientific debate are also considered." (Foreword by Roberto Poli)
  9. Brentano et son École. Études Philosophiques 64 2003.

    Index: Jocelyn Benoist: Brentano et son école 1; Wilhelm Baumgartner: Le contenut et la méthode des philosophies de Franz Brentano et Carl Stumpf 3; Wojciech Zelaniec: Le Brentano de la "Deskriptive Psychologie": l'homme qui savait décrire (et poursuivait un objectif double en décrivant) 23; Jocelyn Benoist: Sprachkritik ou sémantique: sur le schisme de l'école brentanienne 35; Ronan de Calan: La caractéristique empiriste: la théorie de la rélation de Hume a Ehrenfels 53; Remarques sur le couple forme/matière. Entre ontologie et grammaire chez Anton Marty 65; Wioletta Miskiewicz: Réalisme gnoséologique contre réalisme sceptique: Ingarden et la réception de Brentano en Pologne 83; Claire Marin: L'oeil et la main: la "métaphysique du toucher" dans la philosophie française, de Ravaisson à Derrida 99-112.
  10. The School of Brentano and Husserlian Phenomenology. Studia Phaenomenologica 3 2003.

    Contents: Ion Tanasescu, Victor Popescu: Introduction 9; Wilhelm Baumgartner: Franz Brentano, "Grossvater" der Phänomenologie 15; Jocelyn Benoist: Quelques remarques sur la doctrine brentanienne de l'évidence 61; Ion Tanasescu: Ist die Empfindung intentional? Der Brentanosche Hintergrund einer Kritik Husserls 75; Klaus Hedwig: "Inseln des Unglücks". Die Stellung des Schlechten im Summationsprinzip der Güter. Aristoteles-Brentano-Katkov 99; Victor Popescu: Espace et mouvement chez Stumpf et Husserl. Une approche méréologique 115; Claudio Majolino: Le différend logique: jugement et énoncé. Eléments pour une reconstruction du débat entre Husserl et Marty 135; Dale Jacquette: Meinong on the Phenomenology of Assumption 155; Carlo Ierna: Husserl on the Infinite 179; Robin Rollinger: Husserl's Elementary Logic. The 1896 Lectures In Their Nineteenth Century Context 195; Bernhardt Waldenfels: Zwischen Sagen und Zeigen. Überlegungen zu Husserls Theorie der okkasionellen Ausdrücke 215; Bruce Bégout: Percevoir et juger. Le rôle de la croyance originelle (Urdoxa) dans la phénoménologie du jugement de Husserl 229-270.
  11. The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Edited by Jacquette Dale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004.
    Contents: List of contributors XIII; Acknowledgments XVII; List of abbreviations XVIII; Chronology XX-XXII; 1. Introduction: Brentano's philosophy by Dale Jacquette 1; 2. Brentano's relation to Aristotle by Rolf George and Glen Koehn 20; 3. Judging correctly: Brentano and the reform of elementary logic by Peter Simons 45; 4. Brentano on the mind 66; 5. Brentano's concept of intentionality 98; 6. Reflections on intentionality 131; 7. Brentano's epistemology 149; 8. Brentano on judgment and truth by Charles Parsons 168; 9. Brentano's ontology: from conceptualism to reism by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski and Barry Smith 197; 10. Brentano's value theory: beauty, goodness, and the concept of correct emotion by Wilhelm Baumgartner and Lynn Pasquerella 220; 11. Brentano on religion and natural theology by Susan F. Krantz Gabriel 237; 12. Brentano and Husserl by Robin D. Rollinger 255; 13. Brentano's impact on twentieth-century philosophy by Karl Schuhmann 277; Bibliography 298; Index 316-322.
  12. Actions, Products, and Things. Brentano and Polish Philosophy. Edited by Chrudzimski Arkadiusz and Lukasiewicz Dariusz. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2006.
    Contents: Introduction 7; Dale Jacquette: Twardowski, Brentano's dilemma, and the content-object distinction 9; Maria van der Schaar: On the ambiguities of the term Judgement: an evaluation of Twardowski's distinction between action and product 35; Arianna Betti: The strange case of Savonarola and the painted fish: on the Bolzanization of Polish thought 55, Peter Simons: Things and truths: Brentano and Lesniewski, ontology and logic 83; Arkadiusz Chrudzimski: The young Lesniewski on existential propositions 107; Barry Smith: On the phases of Reism 107; Dariusz Lukasiewicz: Brentanian philosophy and Czezowski's conception of existence 183; Jan Wolenski: Brentanism and the rise of formal semantics 217; Notes on contributors 233; Index of names 235.
  13. À l'école de Brentano. De Würzbourg à Vienne. Edited by Fisette Denis and Fréchette Guillaume. Paris: Vrin 2007.
    Table des matières: Denis Fisette et Guillaume Fréchette: Préface 7; Denis Fisette et Guillaume Fréchette: Les legs de Brentano 13; Edmund Husserl: Souvenirs de Franz Brentano 163; Carl Stumpf: Souvenirs de Franz Brentano 175; Christian Ehrenfels; Sur les qualités de forme 225; Alexius Meinong: Sur les objets d'ordre supérieur et leur rapport à la perception interne 261; Kazimierz Twardowski: Fonctions et formations 343; Anton Marty: Sur le rapport entre la grammaire et la logique 385; Références bibliographiques 423; Index des noms propres 441-446
  14. Albertazzi Liliana, "Brentano and Mauthner's critique of language," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 2 (145): 158 (1989).
    "Though different in methodological approach to language, Brentano and Mauthner share a similar background: Positivism, Aristotelian studies, empiricist psychology, anti-Kantian stance. The critique of language marks the point of significant convergence: Brentano's emphasis of reism and nominalism goes together with (1) his descriptive-semasiologic critique of language as a logical doctrine of the categories, and (2) his critique of language as a genetic semasiology, both bound by the view of the intentional nature of language. It is pointed out at lenghts that and how the component of genetic semasiology in Brentano allows comparison with the communicative, pragmatic and performative perspective of Mauthner's Sprachkritik due to a shared emphasis on the rhetorical force of language."
  15. Albertazzi Liliana, "Nominalismo e critica delle idee in Brentano," Idee: 217-235 (1990).
  16. Albertazzi Liliana, "Brentano, Meinong and Husserl on Internal Time," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3: 89-110 (1993).
    "Brentano's Descriptive Psychology marks a breakthrough into clarification of internal time, made possible by using his doctrine of intentionality (and modality) of consciousness. Husserl's version of descriptive psychology, a pure phenomenological psychology, according to its author tries to overcome Brentano's (naturalistic) description of internal experience by explicitly considering the intentional content of mental events, and the different categories of objects as objects of a possible consciousness. Husserl's investigations on internal time are an example of a quite specific sort of genetic inquiry, complementary to the descriptive one. Meinong, when discussing the relation of representation and perception of time, differentiates between the time as given in a representation (act time), in different sorts of (Meinongian) objects (object time), and in contents (content time). These questions of a Brentanist temporality problem are reconsidered and brought to a Husserlian conclusion."
  17. Albertazzi Liliana. Brentano, Twardowski, and Polish Scientific Philosophy. In Polish scientific philosophy. The Lvov-Warsaw School. Edited by Coniglione Franco, Poli Roberto, and Wolenski Jan. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1993. pp. 11-40
  18. Albertazzi Liliana, "Die Theorie der indirekten Modifikation," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 6: 263-282 (1996).
  19. Albertazzi Liliana. Introduzione a Brentano. Bari : Laterza 1999.
  20. Albertazzi Liliana, "Franz Brentano's psychology today. A programme of empirical and experimental metaphysics," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 10: 107-118 (2003).
    "In this article I try to emphasise the following three main points:
    1. Brentano's metaphysics is not speculative; it is instead a programme for scientific research. 2. Some components of his metaphysics, especially those relating to the problem of perceptive continua -- and many aspects of it developed experimentally by his pupils -- are today discussed not only by philosophy but also by the cognitive sciences, more or less accurately, more or less consciously. 3. Some areas of the cognitive sciences express the need for a scientifically -- even neurophysiologically -- founded theory of intentionality."
  21. Albertazzi Liliana. The psychophysics of the soul. Aristote and Brentano. In Aristote au XIX siècle. Edited by Thouard Denis. Villeneuve d'Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion 2004. pp. 249-275
  22. Albertazzi Liliana. Immanent Realism. An Introduction to Brentano. Dordrecht: Springer 2006.
    Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Terminological Note XI; Introduction 1; Chapter 1. A Life. A Novel 5; Chapter 2. Brentano and Aristotle 43; Chapter 3. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 83; Chapter 4. Metaphysics and the Science of the Soul 123; Chapter 5. A woodworm in the Intentional Relation 155; Chapter 6. Ficciones 189; Chapter 7. Continua 233; Chapter 8. Reverse Aristotelianism: Metaphysics of Accidents 269; Chapter 9. Other Writings: Ethics, Aesthetics and History of Philosophy 295; Chapter 10. A History of Brentano Criticism 313; Chapter 11. A Wager on the Future 335; Bibliographic Notes 341; References 355; Index of Names 373-378.
  23. Albertazzi Liliana. Retrieving intentionality. A Legacy from the Brentano School. In The Lvov-Warsaw school. The new generation. Edited by Jadacki Jacek Juliusz and Pasniczek Jacek. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2006. pp. 291-314
  24. Anasvili Valerij, "Rezeption Franz Brentanos in Russland (eileitende Materialen)," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8: 219-231 (2000).
  25. Antonelli Mauro, "Univocità dell'essere e intenzionalità del conoscere: saggio critico sulla genesi e sulle fonti del pensiero di Franz Brentano," Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana 49: 101-123 (1990).
  26. Antonelli Mauro, "Auf der Suche nach der Substanz. Zu Brentano Stellung in der Rezeption der Aristotelischen Ontologie im 19. Jahrundert," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1: 19-46 (1991).
  27. Antonelli Mauro. Alle radici del movimento fenomenologico. Psicologia e metafisica del giovane Franz Brentano. Bologna: Pitagora 1996.
  28. Antonelli Mauro. Franz Brentano psicologo. Dalla 'Psicologia dal punto di vista empirico' alla 'Psicologia descrittiva'. Bologna: Pitagora 1996.
  29. Antonelli Mauro, "Franz Brentano und die Wiederentdeckung der Intentionalitat. Richtigstellung herkömmlicher Missverständnisse und Missdeutungen," Grazer Philosophische Studien 58-59: 93-117 (2000).
  30. Antonelli Mauro. Seiendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano. Freiburg: K. Alber 2001.
  31. Antonelli Mauro. La conception de la vérité du jeune Brentano: de la dissertation sur Les significations multiples de l'être aux Leçons de Mètaphysique. In Propositions et états de choses. Entre être et sens. Edited by Benoist Jocelyn. Paris: Vrin 2006. pp. 67-86
  32. Antonelli Mauro, "Franz Brentano et l' "inexistence intentionnelle"," Philosophiques 36: 467-487 (2009).
  33. Aquila Richard, "The status of intentional objects," New Scholasticism 45: 427-456 (1971).
  34. Aquila Richard. Intentionality. A study of mental acts. University Park: Pnnsylvania State University Press 1977.
  35. Aquila Richard, "Intentional objects and Kantian appearances," Philosophical Topics 12: 9-37 (1982).
  36. Bartok Philip J., "Brentano's Intentionality Thesis: beyond the analytic and phenomenological readings," Journal of History of Philosophy 43: 437-460 (2005).
    "Philosophers in the analytic and phenomenological traditions have interpreted Brentano's intentionality thesis, and his empirical psychology more generally, in significantly different ways. Disregarding Brentano's distinctive psychological method, analytic philosophers have typically read him as a philosopher of mind, and his intentionality thesis as a contribution to the Cartesian project of clarifying the distinction between the mental and the physical. Phenomenologists, while more attentive to his method, tended to read Brentano as merely "on the way" to a truly phenomenological approach. I offer a third reading of Brentano thesis, one that attends to both the motivating concerns and the distinctive methodological features of his psychological project."
  37. Bartok Philip J. Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of ther Mental. In Intentionality. Past and Future. Edited by Forrai Gábor and Kampis George. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2005. pp. 15-24
  38. Baumgartner Elisabeth. Intentionalität. Begriffsgeschichte und Begriffsanwendung in der Psychologie. Würzburg: Könighausen & Neumann 1985.
  39. Baumgartner Elisabeth and Baumgartner Wilhelm, "Von Brentano zu Kulpe: Die Deskriptive Psychologie Brentanos und die 'urzburger Schule' der Denkpsychologie," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 7: 31-52 (1997).
  40. Baumgartner Wilhelm. Die Begründung von Wahrheit durch Evidenz: Der Beitrag Brentanos. In Geiwssheit und Gewissen. Festschrift für Franz Wiedmann zum 60. Geburstag. Edited by Baumgartner Wilhelm. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 1987. pp. 93-116
  41. Baumgartner Wilhelm, "Brentanos und Mills Methode der beschreibenden Analyse," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 2: 63-78 (1989).
  42. Baumgartner Wilhelm, "Objects analysed. Brentano's way toward the identity of objects," Topoi Supplement 4: 20-30 (1989).
  43. Baumgartner Wilhelm and Burkard Franz-Peter. Franz Brentano: Eine Skizze seines Lebens und seiner Werke. In International bibliography of Austrian philosophy 1982/83 - Internationale Bibliographie zur osterreichischen Philosophie. Edited by Baumgartner Wilhelm and Burkard Franz-Peter. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1990. pp.
  44. Baumgartner Wilhelm and Simons Peter, "Brentanos Mereologie," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4: 53-77 (1992).
  45. Baumgartner Wilhelm and Simons Peter, "Brentano's Mereology," Axiomathes.An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems 1: 55-76 (1994).
  46. Baumgartner Wilhelm. Brentano un die österreischische Philosophie. In Phenomenology and analysis. Essays on Central European philosophy. Edited by Chrudzimski Arkadiusz and Huemer Wolfgang. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2004. pp. 131-158
  47. Bausola Adriano. Conoscenza e moralità in Franz Brentano. Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1968.
  48. Bausola Adriano, "La dottrina sul giudizio di esistenza e la critica ad alcuni argomenti per l'esistenza di Dio in Franz Brentano," Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 92: 282-294 (2000).
  49. Bell John L., "Continuity and the logic of perception," Transcendent Philosophy 1: 1-7 (2000).
  50. Benoist Jocelyn, "Qu'est-ce qu'un jugement? Brentano, Frege, Husserl," Études Phénoménologiques 14 (27-28): 169-192 (1998).
  51. Bergmann Gustav. Realism. A Critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1967.
    Reprinted: Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2004
  52. Bergmann Hugo, "Brentano's theory of induction," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 5: 281-292 (1945).
    Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.): - The philosophy of Brentano - pp. 213-223.
  53. Bergmann Hugo, "Brentano on the History of Greek Philosophy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26: 94-99 (1965).
  54. Bergmann Hugo, "Franz Brentano," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20: 349-372 (1966).
  55. Berti Enrico. Brentano and Aristotle's Metaphysics. In Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism? Edited by Sharples Robert W. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 135-149
    "Franz Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy has attracted the attention of scholars right up to the present day. It has been considered important above all for two reasons: a) because it constituted the origin of the famous theory of intentionality, which was found in his book on Aristotle's Psychology (1867); and b) because of the influence that the theory of the several senses of being, developed in his Dissertation of 1862, exercised on the birth of Heidegger's thought. However, Brentano's attempt to attribute to Aristotle the concept of creation and the theory of the immortality of the human soul has been almost completely rejected.
    The first point was illustrated particularly by R. George and R. Sorabji, (1) but Brentano's interpretation of Aristotelian psychology was also at the centre of the debate on the "Mind-Body Problem", which involved several important philosophers, such as H. Putnam, the same R. Sorabji, M. Burnyeat, M. C. Nussbaum and others. (2) A part of his book on Aristotle's Psychology was included in the recent collection of Essays on Aristotle's "De anima".(3) The second point, to which Heidegger himself drew attention in his famous letter to Father Richardson, (4) was studied first by F. Volpi and afterwards by many others, including myself. (5)
    The interpretation of Aristotle's theology expounded by Brentano in an additional essay to Aristotle's Psychology, was criticised by Eduard Zeller in the third edition of his monumental history of Greek philosophy (1878). This criticism induced Brentano to write an essay on Aristotle's Creationism (1882), followed by a reply from Zeller, a new intervention on the part of Brentano and a further reply by Zeller (1883), which seemed to close the discussion.(6) But Brentano reprinted his essay of 1882, with some additions, in the volume Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung der menschlichen Geistes (1911) (7) and in the same year he also published a monograph, Aristoteles and seine Weltanschauung, where he repeated the main lines of his interpretation. (8) The controversy was definitively resolved, in my opinion, only with W. D. Ross's introduction to his edition of Aristotle's Metaphysics, where the famous English Aristotelian refuted any possibility of conceiving Aristotle's God as a creator, explicitly attacking the interpretation proposed by Brentano.(9)
    On this occasion I do not wish to return to the theory of intentionality, even if I will make some reference to it. I would like, on the contrary, to see what consequences the interpretation of Aristotle's ontology, developed by Brentano in his dissertation of 1862, and his interpretation of Aristotle's theology, developed in his later writings, had for the modern and contemporary image of Aristotle; that is, how Brentano's Aristotle influenced contemporary philosophers' judgements of Aristotle's metaphysics." pp. 135-137

    (1) Cf. R. George, 'Brentano's Relation to Aristotle', in R.M. Chisholm and R. Haller (eds.), Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978, 249-266; R. Sorabji, 'From Aristotle to Brentano; the Development of the Concept of Intentionality', in H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson (eds.), Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Supplementary Volume, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
    (2) I tried to sum up this debate in E. Berti, 'Aristotele e il "Mind-Body Problem', Iride. Filosofia e discussione pubblica 11, 1998, 43-62.
    (3) Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom Nous Poietikos, Mainz: Kirchheim, 1867, was republished by R. George, Hamburg: Meiner, 1967, and was translated into English by R. George, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
    The first chapter, 'Nous poietikos: Survey of earlier interpretations', was included in M. C. Nuussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle's De anima, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, 313-341.
    (4) This letter (1962), published by Heidegger as Preface to W.J. Richardson, Heidegger, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963, has been developed in his lecture 'Mein Weg in die Phanomenologie' (1963), in id., Zur Sache des Denkens, Tubingen, Mohr, 1969, 81-90.
    (5) Cf. F. Volpi, Heidegger e Brentano, Padua: Cedam, 1976 (Pubblicazioni della Scuola di perfezionamento in Filosofia dell'Università di Padova), and Heidegger e Aristotele, Padova: Daphne, 1984; J. Taminiaux, Le regard et l'excédent, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1977, 156-182; E. Berti, Aristotele nel Novecento, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1992, 44-111; Th. Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
    (6) F. Brentano, 'Ueber den Creatianismus des Aristoteles', S.-B. d. K. Akad. d. Wiss., philos.hist. Kl., 100, Wien 1882, 95-126; E. Zeller, 'Aristoteles Lehre von der Ewigkeit des menschlichen Geistes', S.-B. d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss., Berlin 1882 (repr. in Zeller's Kleine Schriften, Berlin 1910); F. Brentano, Offener Brief an Herrn professor Dr. Eduard Zeller, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1883; E. Zeller, Deutsche Literaturanzeigung, 1883.
    (7) Leipzig: Veit & Comp., 1911 (second edition, with an Introduction by R. George who illustrates the controversy, Hamburg: Meiner, 1980). I examined this topic in E. Berti, 'Zeller e Aristotele', Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, cl. di lett. e filos., s. III, vol. XIX.3, Pisa 1989, 1233 -1254.
    (8) Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer. In preparing this monograph Brentano wrote a series of notes on Aristotle, which remained unpublished until after his death: cf. F. Brentano, Uber Aristoteles. Nachgelassene Aufsatze, hrsg. v. R. George, Hamburg: Meiner, 1986.
    (9) Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, I, cxxxiii-cxxxix, cxlix, cliii-cliv. I occupied myself with this discussion in E. Berti, 'Da chi è amato it motore immobile? Su Aristotele, Metaph. XII 6-7', Methexis 10, 1997, 59-82.
  56. Besoli Stefano, "Brevi cenni intorno alla recezione brentaniana della filosofia di Thomas Reid," Annali di discipline fisosofiche dell'Università di Bologna: 25-30 (1986).
  57. Binder Thomas, "Die Brentano Gesellschaft und das Brentano-Archiv in Prag," Grazer Philosophische Studien 58-59: 533-565 (2000).
  58. Binder Thomas, "Die Prager Brentano Gesellschaft," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8: 259-286 (2000).
  59. Blackmore John. Ludwig Boltzmann: His Later Life and Philosophy, 1900-1906. Book Two: The Philosopher. Dordrecht: Kuwer 1995.
    See Chapter Six: Franz Brentano pp. 135-153 and Seven: Critical Realism pp. 155-180.
  60. Blackmore John. Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938. In The Brentano Puzzle. Edited by Poli Roberto. Brookfiled: Ashgate 1998. pp. 73-92
  61. Brandl Johannes. Brentanos Urteilslehre. Eine Studie über die logische Form von Akt und Inhalt. Graz: Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum für Österreichische Philosophie 1987.
  62. Brandl Johannes. Intentionality. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Libardi Massimo, and Poli Roberto. Kluwer: Dordrecht 1996. pp. 261-284
  63. Brentano J.C.M., "The manuscripts of Franz Brentano," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20: 477-482 (1966).
  64. Brown Deborah, "Immanence and Individuation: Brentano and the Scholastics on Knowledge of Singulars," Monist 83: 22-46 (2000).
  65. Buzzoni Marco, "Brentano, Sprache, Ontologie und Person," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1: 153-187 (1988).
  66. Campos Eliam. Die Kantkritik Brentanos. Bonn: Bouvier 1979.
  67. Chisholm Roderick. Intentional inexistence. In Perceiving. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1957. pp. 168-185
    Chapter XI; reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.) - The philosophy of Brentano - pp. 140-150
  68. Chisholm Roderick, "Brentano's theory of correct and incorrect emotion," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20: 395-415 (1966).
    Reprinted in: Linda McAlister - The philosophy of Brentano - pp. 160-175
  69. Chisholm Roderick. Brentano on descriptive psychology and the intentional. Vol. Phenomenology and existentialism. Edited by Lee Edward and Mandelbaum Maurice. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press 1967.
  70. Chisholm Roderick. Beyond Being and Nonbeing. Beiträge zur Meinong-Forschung. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp.
    Acts of the Colloquium held in Graz September, 30th - October, 4th 1970
  71. Chisholm Roderick, "Brentano's conception of substance and accident," Grazer Philosophische Studien 5: 197-210 (1978).
    "Brentano uses terms in place of predicates (e.g. "a thinker" in place of "thinks") and characterizes the "is" of predication in terms of the part-whole relation. Taking as his ontological data certain intentional phenomena that are apprehended with certainty, he conceives the substance-accident relation as a define-able type of part-whole relation which we can apprehend in "inner perception". He is then able to distinguish the following types of individual or ens reale: substances; primary individuals which are not substances; accidents; aggregates; and boundaries."
  72. Chisholm Roderick. Brentano's analysis of the consciousness of time. In Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Volume VI. The foundations of analytic philosophy. Edited by French Peter A., Uehling Jr.Theodore E., and Wettstein Howard K. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1981. pp. 3-16
    "Franz Brentano's conception of philosophical analysis is illustrated by his aanalysis of our consciousness of time. The analysandum is not a linguistic expression or a concept; it is an experience of a certain sort. Hence the analysis might be called "phenomenological," but Brentano prefers to say it is a matter of "descriptive psychology."
    An analysis of our consciousness of time is not, or course, an analysis of time. Hence Brentano's analysis is consistent with a number of different conceptions of time. But it does presuppose that tense is to be taken seriously. In other words, Brentano does not accept the philosophical view, advocated by many contemporary philosophers of science, according to which distinctions of tense are merely "subjective" or otherwise "illusory." Nor does he believe that all truths can he expressed in untensed sentences.
    I shall begin by formulating what Brentano takes to be a fundamental problem of descriptive psychology -- that of accurately describing our awareness of temporal succession. Then I shall set forth the development of his views with respect to this problem."
  73. Chisholm Roderick. Brentano and Meinong Studies. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1982.
    Contents: Foreword 1; 1. Brentano's theory of Substance and Accident 3; 2. Brentano's theory of Judgment 17; 3. Homeless objects 37; 4. Beyond Being and Nonbeing 53; 5. Correct and incorrect emotion 68; 6. Objectives and intrinsic value 80; 7. The quality of pleasure and displeasure 92; 8. Supererogation and offence 98; 9. Beginnings and endings 114-124.
    "I present these papers on Brentano and Meinong in the hope that they will lead the reader back to the originai sources. Some of the papers are expositions and commentaries. Others are developments of certain suggestions first made by Brentano or by Meinong.
    The first two papers are concerned with the basic presuppositions of Brentano's theoretical philosophy. "Brentano's Theory of Substance and Accident" was presented to the Congress on the Philosophy of Franz Brentano held in Graz in September 1977; it first appeared in the Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. V (1978). The second paper - "Brentano's Theory of Judgment" - has not been published before; but a preliminary version of part of it, entitled "Brentano's Nonpropositional Theory of Judgment," appeared in the Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I (1976). It should be noted that Brentano's Kategorienlehre, to which many references are made in these two papers, has now been translated into English as The Theory of Categories, The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff 1981.
    (...)
    The four papers that follow are concerned with the theory of value, as it had been conceived by Brentano and developed by Meinong. "Correct and Incorrect Emotion" and "The Quality of Pleasure and Displeasure" are both adapted from "Brentano's Theory of Correct and Incorrect Emotion," which first appeared in the Brentano issue of the Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 20 (1966).
    (...)
    The final paper - "Beginnings and Endings" - is a revision of a paper entitled "Brentano als analytischer Metaphysiker," which first appeared in the special volume of Conceptus entitled Österreichische Philosophie und ihr Einfluss auf die analytische Philosophie der Gegenwart, Jg. XI (1977), Nr. 28-30, pp. 77-82. A later version appeared in Time and Cause, edited by Peter Van Inwagen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), pp. 17-25. It has been revised once again for the present volume.
    I hope that these essays will be thought of as carrying out the tradition of the Brentano school." (From the Foreword)
  74. Chisholm Roderick. Brentano and Intrinsic Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986.
  75. Chisholm Roderick, "The object of sensation: a Brentano study," Topoi 8: 3-8 (1989).
  76. Chisholm Roderick, "The formal structure of the intentional: a metaphysical study," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3: 11-18 (1991).
    "What is the metaphysical significance of what Brentano has shown us about intentionality? It is the fact that intentional phenomena have logical or structural features that are not shared by what is not psychological.
    It was typical of British empiricism, particularly that of Hume, to suppose that consciousness is essentially sensible. The objects of consciousness were thought to be primarily such objects as sensations and their imagined or dreamed counterparts. In the Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Brentano makes clear that intentional phenomena need not be sensible. He is aware that, even if intentional phenomena are always accompanied by sensible or sensational phenomena, they are not themselves sensational or sensible phenomena. And the presence of certain intentional attitudes is at least as certain and indubitable for us as is the presence of our sensations. If I make a certain judgment or ask myself a certain question, then I can know directly and immediately that I make that judgment or ask that question. (This is not to say, of course, that every intentional attitude may be the object of such certainty. Perhaps there is a sense in which you may be said to like or to dislike a certain thing without realizing that you like or dislike that thing.)
    If I can know directly and immediately that I am making a certain judgment, then, I can know what it is to make such a judgment. And if I know what it is to make a judgment, then, in making the judgment I can know directly and immediately that there is a certain individual thing - namely, the one who makes the judgment. Arid I, of course, am the one who makes my judgments and does my thinking. The same is true, obviously, of my other intentional activities - such activities as wondering, fearing, hoping, desiring, considering, liking and disliking."
  77. Chisholm Roderick. Brentano on "Unconscious Consciousness". In Consciousness, knowledge and truth. Edited by Poli Roberto. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993. pp. 153-160
  78. Chisholm Roderick, "Spatial continuity and the theory of part and whole. A Brentano study," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4: 11-24 (1993).
    "The concepts of a spatially continuous substance, of spatial dimension and of spatial boundary are here "analyzed out" of the concepts of individual thing, of constituent and of coincidence. The analysis is based upon the theory of spatial coincidence that was developed by Brentano. Its presuppositions are essentially these: (1) if there are spatial objects of any kind, then there are continuous spatial substances. (2) such substances are possibly such that they are not constituents of any individual thing; and (3) they contain constituents (namely, boundaries) which are necessarily such that they are constituents of spatial substances."
  79. Chisholm Roderick, "Ontologically dependent entities," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 499-507 (1994).
  80. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz, "Die Theorie der Intentionalität bei Franz Brentano," Grazer Philosophische Studien 57: 45-66 (1999).
  81. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz, "Die Theorie des Zeitbewusstseins Franz Brentano im Licht der unpublizierten Manuskripte," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8: 149-161 (2000).
  82. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. Die Wahrheitstheorie Franz Brentanos. In Philosophie - Wissenschaft - Wirtschaft. Miteinander denken, voneinander lernen. Vorträge des VI. Kongresses der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Linz 1.-4. Juni 2000. Edited by Neumaier Otto and Born Rainer. Wien: Verlag Hõlder-Pichler-Tempsky 2001. pp. 456-461
  83. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano. Dodrdrecht: Kluwer 2001.
  84. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. Brentano und Meinong. Zur Ontologie der Denkobjekte. In Substanz und Identität. Beiträge zur Ontologie. Edited by Löffler Winfried. Paderborn: Mentis-Verlag 2002. pp. 155-166
  85. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz, "Von Brentano zu Ingarden: Die Phänomenologische Bedeutungslehre," Husserl Studies 18: 185-208 (2002).
  86. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz, "Brentano's Late Ontology," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 10: 221-236 (2003).
    "In the present paper I want to give an interpretation of Brentano's late, nominalistic ontology. There are two aspects of this theory: the conception of individual properties containing their substances, presented mainly in the fragments collected in Brentano's Theory of Categories and the conceptualistic reduction virtually involved in Brentano's definition of truth."
  87. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004.
  88. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. Brentano, Husserl und Ingarden über die intentionale Gegenstände. In Existence, culture, and persons. The ontology of Roman Ingarden. Edited by Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag 2005. pp. 83-114
  89. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein und Intersubjektivität. Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2005.
  90. Courtine Jean-François, "L'aristotélisme de Franz Brentano," Études Phénoménologiques 14 (27-28): 7-50 (1998).
  91. Courtine Jean-François. Brentano et l'ontologie. In Compléments de Substance. Études sur les propriétés accidentelles offertes à Alain de Libera. Edited by Erismann Christophe and Schniewind Alexandrine. Paris: Vrin 2008. pp. 197-214
  92. Crane Tim. Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence. In The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. Edited by Textor Mark. New York: Routledge 2006. pp. 20-35
  93. Dambska Izydora, "François Brentano et la pensée philosophique en Pologne: Casimir Twardowski et son École," Grazer Philosophische Studien 5: 117-130 (1978).
  94. Danzer Robert. Das Allgemeine und das Besondere zur Ontologie Franz Brentanos. Gelsenkirchen: Eurofamilia GmbH 1965.
  95. Deely John, "The ontological status of intentionality," New Scholasticism 46: 220-233 (1972).
  96. Dölling Evelyn. Brentanos und Freges Urteilslehre -- Ein Vergleich. In Philosophie und Logik. Frege-Kolloquien, Jena, 1989/1991. Edited by Stelzner Werner. Berlin: de Gruyter 1993. pp. 24-32
  97. Dölling Evelyn, "Kritik des Urteilslehre: Land versus Brentano, mit Blick auf Frege," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 7: 123-146 (1997).
  98. Drummond John, "From Intentionality to Intensionality and back," Études Phénoménologiques 14 (27-28): 89-126 (1998).
  99. Dubois James, "Investigating Brentano's Reism," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 6: 283-296 (1996).
  100. Eaton Howard Ormsby. The Austrian philosophy of values. Norman: University of Oklahoma Pres 1930.
  101. Ehrenfels Christian von. Über Brentano und Meinong. In Metaphysik. München: Philosophia 1990. pp. 426-429
    Vol. 4 of the Philososphische Schriften.
  102. English Jacques, "Pourquoi et comment Husserl en est venu à critiquer Brentano," Études Phénoménologiques 14 (27-28): 51-88 (1998).
  103. Fano Vincenzo. La filosofia dell'evidenza. Saggio sull'epistemologia di Franz Brentano. Bologna: CLUEB 1993.
  104. Fano Vincenzo, "The categories of consciousness: Brentano's epistemology," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4: 101-130 (1993).
    "The present investigation reformulates a few Brentanian ideas concerning what is mental. In particular, an attempt to define the categorial structure implicit in the notion of consciousness and in that of inner perception, keeping in mind their connections with external perception and with unconscious, is outlined. Within the mental field is observed a formal violation of some elementary rules of ontology and mereology, and such violation can be interpreted in terms of an infinite multiplicity of the mental field itself."
  105. Fisette Denis. Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences: Husserl's early Criticism of Brentano. In Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences. Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl. Edited by Ierna Carlo, Jacobs Hanne, and Mattens Filip. Dordrecht: Springer 2010. pp. 135-167
  106. Føllesdal Dagfinn, "Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and perception," Grazer Philosophische Studien 5: 83-94 (1978).
    Reprinted in: Hubert Dreyfus (ed.) - Husserl, intentionality and cognitive science - Cambridge, MIT Press 1982 pp. 31-41.

    "The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano's views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano's notion of physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory than Husserl's notion of hyle, whose role in Husserl's theory of perception is briefly sketched."
  107. Fugali Edoardo. Die Zeit des Selbst und die Zeit des Seienden. Bewusstsein und inneren Sinn bei Franz Brentano. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2004.
    Italian edition: Il tempo del sé e il tempo dell'essere. Coscienza e senso interno in Franz Brentano, Napoli, La Città del Sole, 2005.
  108. Fugali Edoardo. Toward the Rebirth of Aristotelian Psychology: Trendelenburg and Brentano. In Psychology and Philosophy. Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Philosophy. Edited by Heinämaa Sara and Reuter Martina. Dordrecht: Springer 2008. pp. 179-202
  109. Galewicz Wlodzimierz, "Die Moglichkeit der Selbstwahrnehmung bei Brentano," Conceptus 25: 49-57 (1991).
  110. Galewicz Wlodzimierz, "Substanz und Individuation in Brentanos Kategorienlehre," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4: 79-88 (1993).
  111. Galewicz Wlodzimierz, "Brentano un der epistemologische Fundamentalismus," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 8: 85-106 (2000).
  112. George Rolf, "Brentano's Relation to Aristotle," Grazer Philosophische Studien 5: 249-266 (1978).
    "The paper tries to illustrate the influence of Aristotle's thought upon Brentano by arguing that the view that all psychological phenomena have objects was proably derived from the Aristotelian conception that the mind can know itself only en parergo, and that this knowledge presupposes that some other thing be in the mind "objectively". Brentano's contribution to Aristotle scholarship is illustrated by reviewing some of his arguments against Zeller's claim that Aristotle's God, contemplating only himself, is ignorant of the world. The paper concludes with an attempt to explain the relative neglect into which Brentano's exegetical efforts have fallen."
  113. Gilson Étienne, "Franz Brentano's interpretation of mediaeval philosophy," Mediaeval Studies 1: 1-10 (1939).
    Reprinted in: Linda McAlister: - The philosophy of Brentano - pp. 56-67
  114. Gilson Lucie. La psychologie descriptive selon Franz Brentano. Paris: Vrin 1955.
  115. Gilson Lucie. Méthode et métaphysique selon Franz Brentano. Paris: Vrin 1955.
  116. Gilson Lucie, "Science et philosophie selon Franz Brentano," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20: 416-433 (1966).
    Translated in: Linda McAlister - The philosophy of Brentano - pp. 68-79
  117. Grossmann Reinhardt, "Non existent objects: recent work on Brentano and Meinong," American Philosophical Quarterly 6: 17-32 (1969).
  118. Gutierrez-Cortines Juan. Das Bewusstsein, die Seienden und ihre Beziehungen in der Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Hamburg: 1972.
  119. Haldane John, "Brentano's problem," Grazer Philosophische Studien 35: 1-32 (1989).
  120. Haller Rudolf, "Brentanos Sprachkritik, oder dass "man unterscheiden muss was es (hier) zu unterscheiden gibt"," Grazer Philosophische Studien 5: 211-224 (1978).
    Reprinted in: R. Haller - Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie - Amsterdam., Rodopi, 1979 pp. 23-36
  121. Haller Rudolf, "Franz Brentano, ein Philosoph des Empirismus," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1: 19-30 (1988).
  122. Hedwig Klaus, "Der scholastische Kontext des Intentionalen bei Brentano," Grazer Philosophische Studien 5: 67-82 (1978).
  123. Hedwig Klaus, "Intention: Outlines for the History of a Phenomenological Concept," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39: 326-340 (1979).
  124. Hedwig Klaus, "Brentano's hermeneutics," Topoi 6: 3-10 (1987).
  125. Hedwig Klaus, "Die historischen Voraussetzungen un die Rezeption Brentanos," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1: 31-45 (1988).
  126. Henry Desmond Paul, "Brentano and some medieval mereologists," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4: 25-34 (1993).
    "Discussion of what Brentano calls the 'strange arithmetic' involved in the connumeration of overlapping objects is also to be found in Abelard, John Wyclif, and in Leibniz. Brentano's divergence from the commonly-held medieval distinction between X-part and part-of-X may be partially explained by his adherence to a theory of body resembling that which occurs in a twelfth-century compendium of Porretan logic."
  127. Hickerson Ryan. The history of intentionality: theories of consciousness from Brentano to Husserl. London: Continuum International Publishing Group 2007.
  128. Hillebrand Franz. Die neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse. Eine logische untersuchung. Wien: Hölder 1981.
  129. Hossack Keith. Reid and Brentano on consciousness. In The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. Edited by Textor Mark. New York: Routledge 2006. pp. 36-63
  130. Husserl Edmund. Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano. In Zur Kenntnins seines Lebens und siner Lehre. Mit Beiträgen von C. Stumpf und E. Husserl. München: 1919. pp. 151-167
    Translated in: Linda McAlister (ed.) - The philosophy of Brentano - pp. 47-55
  131. Ingarden Roman, "Le concept de philosophie chez Franz Brentano. Première partie," Archives de Philosophie: 458-475 (1969).
  132. Ingarden Roman, "Le concept de philosophie chez Franz Brentano. Deuxième partie," Archives de Philosophie: 609-638 (1969).
  133. Jacquette Dale, "The origins of Gegenstandstheorie: immanent and transcendent intentional objects in Brentano, Twardowski, and Meinong," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3: 177-202 (1991).
    "The origins of object theory in the philosophical psychology and semantics of Alexius Meinong and the Graz school can be traced both to the insight and failure of Franz Brentano's immanent objectivity or intentional in-existence thesis. The immanence thesis is documented, together with its critical reception in Alois Höfler's Logik, Twardowski's Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, and Meinong's mature Gegenstandstheorie, in which immanent thought content and transcendent intentional object are distinguished, and Brentano's thesis of immanent intentionality as the mark of the mental is reinterpreted to imply that only content is the immanently intentional component of presentations. Brentano's thought from the early immanence thesis through the so-called Immanenzkrise and his later reism is explored against the background of his students' reactions to the original 1874 intentionality thesis and its idealist implications, in the emergence of Meinong's object theory and Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Finally, Brentano's reism in the later ontology is critically examined, as his solution to ontic problems of immanent intentionality, limiting intentional objects to transcendent concrete particulars."
  134. Jacquette Dale. Brentano's concept of intentionality. In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Edited by Jacquette Dale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001. pp. 98-130
  135. Jacquette Dale. Introduction: Brentano's philosophy. In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Edited by Jacquette Dale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001. pp. 1-19
  136. Kamitz Reinhard, "Acts and Relations in Brentano," Analysis 22: 73-78 (1962).
  137. Kamitz Reinhard. Franz Brentano. Wahrheit und Evidenz. In Grundprobleme der grossen Philosophen: Philosophie der Neuzeit III. Edited by Speck Josef. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 1983. pp. 160-197
  138. Kamitz Reinhard, "Die Rolle der Deskriptiven Psychologie in der Logik Brentanos," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 2: 79-90 (1989).
  139. Kastil Alfred. Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos. Eine Einführung in seine Lehre. Bern: A. Francke 1951.
  140. Kotarbinski Tadeusz, "Franz Brentano comme réiste," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 20: 459-476 (1966).
    Translated in: Linda McAlister - The philosophy of Brentano - pp. 194-203
  141. Körner Stephan, "Über Brentanos Reismus und die extensionale Logik," Grazer Philosophische Studien 5: 29-44 (1978).
  142. Körner Stephan, "On Brentano's objections to Kant's theory of knowledge," Topoi 6: 11-17 (1987).
  143. Krantz Susan, "Brentano's argument against Aristotle for the immateriality of the soul," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 1: 63-74 (1988).
    "The Aristotelian conception of the soul as Brentano understood it is examined, with respect to the nature of the soul and mainly to what Aristotle called the sensitive soul, since this is where the issue of the soul's corporeity becomes important. Secondly the difficulties are discussed which Brentano saw in the Aristotelian semi-materialistic conception concerning the intellectual, as distinct from the sensitive soul from Brentano's reistic point of view which and that it is an immaterial substance. Finally there follows a presentation of what is taken to be Brentano's conception of the soul as it appears from a reistic interpretation of his analyses of the act of sensation and of the subject of sensation in order to shed some light on the reistic ontology that may be taken to underlie Brentanos's psychology."
  144. Krantz Susan, "Brentanian unity of consciousness," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 4: 89-100 (1993).
    "Brentano's thoughts on unity of consciousness are of central importance to an understanding of his psychology and of his ontology. By means of a reistic interpretation of his views on unity of consciousness, and in contrast with the Aristotelian approach to unity of consciousness, one begins to see the paradoxically objective and realistic spirit of Brentano's subjectivism in psychology."
  145. Krantz Susan, "Brentano's revision of the Correspondence theory," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3: 79-88 (1993).
    "Franz Brentano took exception to the classic statement of the correspondence theory of truth, the thesis: veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. His reasons for objecting to it, and his proposed revision of the thesis, are interesting considered in themselves as well as for the light they shed on Brentano's view of the relation between the thinker and the world. With regard to the former, it is shown how Brentano analyzes the adaequatio thesis word by word in order to demonstrate what he takes to be its fundamental incoherence. With regard to the latter, it becomes apparent, by contrast with the Thomistic understanding of the adaequatio thesis, that Brentano's revision of it in the direction of a phenomenological theory of truth also involves a revised understanding of the nature of the thinker or knower.
  146. Kraus Oskar. Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens uns seiner Lehre. Mit Beiträgen von C. Stumpf und E. Husserl. München: Beck 1919.
  147. Kraus Oskar. Franz Brentanos Stellung zur Phänomenologie und Gegenstandstheorie. Leipzig: Meiner 1924.
  148. Kraus Oskar, "On categories, relations and fictions," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 42: 101-116 (1942).
  149. Küng Guido, "Zur Erkenntnistheorie Franz Brentano," Grazer Philosophische Studien 5: 169-181 (1978).
  150. Küng Guido, "Brentano an Ingarden on the experience and cognition of values," Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) 10: 57-67 (1986).
  151. Küng Guido. Brentano, Husserl und Ingarden über wertende Akte und das Erkennen von Werten. In Traditionen und Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie. Festschrift für Rudolf Haller. Edited by Gombocz Wolfgang, Rutte Heiner, and Sauer Werner. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky 1989. pp. 106-117

 

RELATED PAGES

RELATED SITES

Three sites (currently under development) which will be devoted to studies on Ontology in Italian, French and German:

Teoria e Storia dell'Ontologia

Théorie et Histoire de l'Ontologie

Theorie und Geschichte der Ontologie

Index of the PDF version of the pages and of the Essays in PDF format

Theory and History of Ontology (Mobile version for phone and laptop users)