Buridan's Logic and Metaphysics: An Annotated Bibliography (A - K)

Pages about Buridan

• Buridan's Logical Works. I. An Overview of the Summulae de dialectica

• Buridan's Logical Works. II. The Treatise on Consequences and Other Writings

Selected Studies on His Logic and Metaphysics:

• Editions, Translations and Studies on the Manuscript Tradition

• Annotated Bibliography:

  A - K

  L - Z

BIBLIOGRAPHY

For the studies up to the year 2000, see also the Bibliographie spéciale sur Jean Buridan by Fabienne Pironet (logic = pp. 8-14; metaphysics = p. 25).

N.B. The original link to the personal page of Fabienne Pironet does not work; I posted the bibliography on my site for educational purpose.

For Buridan's contributions to the theories of supposition and mental language see: Medieval Theories of Supposition (Reference) and Mental Language

1. The Logic of John Buridan. Edited by Pinborg Jan. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press 1976.
   Acts of the 3rd European Symposium on medieval logic and semantics, Copenhagen 16-21 November 1975.
2. John Buridan: A Master of Arts. Some Aspects of His Philosophy. Edited by Bos Egbert Peter and Krop Henri. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1993.
   Acts of the Second Symposium organized by the Dutch Society for medieval philosophy Medium Aevum on the occasion of its 15th anniversary. Leiden-Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit) 20-21 June 1991.
   Contents: J.A. Aertsen Introduction VII-XI; R. van der Lecq: Confused Individuals and Moving Trees - John Buridan on the Knowledge of Particulars 1; J. Spruyt: John Buridan on Negation and the Understanding of Non-Being 23; L.M. de Rijk: On Buridan's View of Accidental Being 41; T. Stuart:
   John Buridan on Being and Essence 53; H.A. Krop: Kunsttheorie und Physik in via antiqua und moderna - Der Naturbegriff des Johannes Buridan 69; M.J.F.M. Hoenen Die Intellektlehre des Johannes Buridan - Ihre Quellen und historisch-doktrinären Bezüge 89; O. Pluta: Einige Bemerkungen zur Deutung der Unsterblichkeitsdiskussion bei Johannes Buridan 107; O. Krieger: Bietet "Buridan's Esel" den Schlüfiel zum Verständnis der Philosophie des Johannes Buridanus? 121; A. Vos: Buridan on Contingency and Free Will 141; Bibliography. 1. Primary Sources (editions and translations) 157 1.1. John Buridan 157; 1.2. Other Primary Sources 158; 2. Secondary Sources 161; Indices. 1. Index of Ancient and Medieval Names 169; 2. Index of Modem Names 171; 3. Selective Index in English and Latin of Subjects and Terms 173-176.
3. The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan. Edited by Thijssen Johannes M.M.H. and Zupko Jack. Leiden: Brill 2001.
4. John Buridan and Beyond. Topics in the Language Sciences, 1300-1700. Edited by Friedman Russell L. and Ebbesen Sten. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters 2004.
   Contains papers of a symposium held by the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters in Copenhagen in September 2001.
   "Whereas the impressive contributions made by John Buridan (d. after 1358) to medieval logic and linguistics are widely recognized today, his influence in the later Middle Ages and Early Modern period remains largely uncharted, as indeed does the development of the language sciences more generally in that period. The eight articles and the introductory essay collected in this volume explore topics in logico-linguistic theory from Buridan in the fourteenth century through Hobbes and Vico in the seventeenth and eighteenth. The focus of the articles range from grammar and logic to epistemology and philosophical psychology, and in nearly every case they demonstrate the impact of Buridan's ideas in the centuries following his death. Moreover, by investigating early modern thought against the backdrop of medieval ideas, the articles address the issue of the continuity or discontinuity of thought in this period on the border between medieval and modern, and indicate possible avenues of future research."
5. Anfray Jen-Pascal, "Non ens Intelligitur. Jean Buridan sur le non-être," Cahiers de philosophie de l'Université de Caen 43: 95-129 (2007).
   "Est-il possible de parler de ce qui n'est pas ou d'y penser sans présupposer une forme d'être pour cela même que nous pensons ne pas exister ? La vieille énigme parménidienne, qui hante toujours la philosophie contemporaine, est au coeur non seulement de la philosophie médiévale mais aussi des études médiévales, comme en témoigne le récent ouvrage d'Alain de Libera sur la référence vide (1). L'objet de cette étude est en comparaison beaucoup très limité, dans la mesure où nous nous concentrerons sur le traitement de ce problème du non-être par Jean
   Buridan. Dans la logique et la métaphysique médiévale, le non-être (non ens) est l'objet de discussions relevant aussi bien de la logique des termes que de celle des propositions. En employant une terminologie moderne, nous pourrions dire que le non-être apparaît dans la discussion philosophique tant à propos de l'engagement au domaine de quantification des énoncés qu'à propos de ce qui rend vrai les énoncés eux mêmes (2)." p. 95
   
   (1) Sous le titre La référence vide, A. de Libera (Paris, Vrin 2002) a abordé ces deux ensembles de questions, en mettant l'accent sur le second (comme l'indique le sous-tire : Théories de la
   proposition). Au long des chapitres de l'ouvrage, l'auteur n'est jamais loin de l'une des problématiques annoncée en introduction (p.3-4) : la référence aux particuliers inexistants, la référence aux objets imaginaires et le signifié propositionnel. Cependant, conformément à sa propre méthode historiographique, il soutient que le pont explicite entre ces différentes problématiques n'apparaît qu'à la fin du XIVe siècle. Pierre de Venise serait le témoin privilégié de cette quasi-fusion des problèmes à travers une formule définissant disjonctivement le signifié de la proposition : aliquid vel aliqua vel aliqualiter. Davantage qu'une fusion, ce serait même plutôt une absorption des deux premières problématiques au sein de celle du signifié propositionnel. La page 338 expose remarquablement ce point de vue: "grâce à la formule disjonctive [absente avant la deuxième moitié du XIVe siècle], les problèmes de référence vide d'un terme sont traités ultimement dans le cadre unifié d'une véritable sémantique des propositions." Si nous devions exprimer un désaccord avec l'auteur, il porterait seulement sur cette hypothèse méthodologique, car nous pensons que les problématiques de la référence vide et du signifié propositionnel sont également abordées conjointement par un auteur antérieur tel que Jean Buridan. Quoi qu'il en soit, notre dette envers le travail d'A. de Libera est immense.
   (2) Pour un partisan des vérifacteurs, adversaire du nominalisme comme David Armstrong, il y a par conséquent, outre l'engagement ontologique classique (au domaine de quantification) un
   engagement distinct aux vérifacteurs.
6. Ashworth Earline Jennifer. Equivocation and analogy in Fourteenth-Century logic: Ockham, Burley and Buridan. In Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag. (vol. I). Edited by Mojsisch Burkhard and Pluta Olaf. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: B. R. Grüner 1991. pp. 23-43
7. Ashworth Earline Jennifer. Singular terms and singular concepts: from Buridan to the early Sixteenth century. In John Buridan and beyond. Topics in the Language Sciences 1300-1700. Edited by Ebbesen Sten and Friedman Russell L. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel 2004. pp. 121-151
   "This article considers medieval treatments of proper names and demonstrative phrases in relation to the question of when and how we are able to form singular concepts. The logical and grammatical background provided by the authoritative texts of Porphyry and Priscian is examined, but the main focus is on John Buridan and his successors at Paris, from John Dorp to Domingo de Soto. Buridan is linked to contemporary philosophers of language through his suggestion that, although the name 'Aristotle' is a genuine proper name only for those who have the appropriate singular concept caused by acquaintance with Aristotle, it can be properly treated as a singular tem by subsequent users because of their beliefs about the original imposition of the name."
8. Berger Harald. Der Substanzbegriff im spätmittelalterlichen Nominalismus. In Substantia - Sic et Non. Eine Geschichte des Substanzbegriffs von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart in Einzelbeiträgen. Edited by Gutschmidt Holger, Lang-Balestra Antonella, and Segalerba Gianluigi. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2008. pp. 235-255
   "Late medieval nominalism's ontological commitment is mainly to Aristotelian individual substances and individual qualities, the status of quantities is a matter of dispute (not in semantics, however, but in natural philosophy). In this paper the commentaries on pertinent Aristotelian texts by three main figures of Fourteenth century nominalism, William of Ockham, John Buridan, and Albert of Saxony, are presented and discussed. Regarding the relation between substance and accident the Christian Aristotelians had to conceive of it as a relation of dependence according to the natural laws and not as a relation of logical dependence; otherwise, the sacrament of the Eucharist could not be explained in Aristotelian terms. Finally, two deviating views are mentioned: According to John of Mirecourt reality consists solely of substances (with modes of being such and such), whereas according to Nicholas of Autrecourt ("the Medieval Hume") physical reality consists solely of accidents in the sense of appearances, sensations, sense data."
9. Biard Joël, "Les sophismes du savoir: Albert de Saxe entre Jean Buridan et Guillaume Heytesbury," Vivarium 27: 36-50 (1989).
10. Biard Joël. L'analyse logique des termes transcendantaux selon Jean Buridan. In Le problème des Transcendantaux du 14. au 17. siècle. Edited by Federici Vescovini Graziella. Paris: Vrin 2002. pp. 51-66
11. Biard Joël, "L'être et la mesure dans l'intension et la rémission des formes (Jean Buridan, Blaise de Parme)," Medioevo.Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale 27: 415-448 (2002).
12. Biard Joël. La théorie de l'être et de l'essence de Jean Buridan. In Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aerstsen zum 65. Geburtstag. Edited by Pickavé Martin. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2003. pp. 383-394
13. Biard Joël. L'organisation des sciences spéculatives selon Jean Buridan. In Méthodes et statut des sciences à la fin du Moyen Age. Edited by Grellard Christophe. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion 2004. pp. 26-40
14. Biard Joël. John Buridan and the mathematical demonstration. In Mind and modality. Studies in the history of philosophy in honour of Simo Knuuttila. Edited by Hirvonen Vesa, Holopainen Toivo J., and Tuominen Miira. Leiden: Brill 2006. pp. 199-213
15. Biard Joël. Buridan et la connaissance des accidents. In Compléments de Substance. Études sur les propriétés accidentelles offertes à Alain de Libera. Edited by Erismann Christophe and Schniewind Alexandrine. Paris: Vrin 2008. pp. 357-371
16. Boh Ivan. Consequence and Rules of Consequence in the Post-Ockham Period. In Medieval formal logic. Obligations, Insolubles and Consequences. Edited by Yrjönsuuri Mikko. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2001. pp. 147-182
17. Bos Egbert Peter, "Mental verbs in terminist logic (John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of Inghen)," Vivarium 16: 56-69 (1978).
18. Bos Egbert Peter. John Buridan on Substance in his Commentary (Summulae) on Aristotle's Categories. In Signs and Signification. Vol. I. Edited by Gill Harjeet Singh and Manetti Giovanni. New Delhi: Bahri Publications 1999. pp. 85-99
    "As a master of arts John Buridan commented on Aristotle's logic. The quaestiones, in which specific problems are discussed in the traditional medieval form, are more elaborate and detailed commentaries.
    One of Aristotle's text to be commented are the Categories (Praedicamenta). The Quaestiones in Praedicamenta have been edited recently by J. Schneider (München, 1983); I have prepared a critical edition of Buridan's commentary (summulae) on the same work, which is due to appear soon. This edition is part of an intemational project, of which it is the intention to issue the first complete edition of Buridan's Summulae, which contains eight treatises, supplemented with a new edition of his Sophismata.
    In the present contribution I shall give an analysis of Buridan's commentary on the category of substance. Before entering this subject, I shall make some remarks on the general nature of the work. This contribution is practically the same as a part of the introduction to my forthcoming edition." p. 85
    "4. A summary of the Contents
    Buridan starts with a discussion on aequivocatio, univocatio and denominatio. Sometimes, he says, aequivocatio is attributed to a word having signification, sometimes to things signified. Here (3.1.1.) Buridan attributes aequivocatio to things as far as they are signified equivocally by one and the same word. This signification is not matched by one concept (ratio, 3.1.2), but by two, or more, one for each thing. E.g. a dog, a star and a fish are signified by the word canis ('dog') that may have supposition for them under different concepts.
    There is univocation when the several things signified are united, not only by a common designation, but also by a common definition. Buridan emphasizes (3.1.2) that both equivocatio and univocatio are on the level of conventional terms and propositions, and are not properties of mental terms and propositions.
    Equivocation and univocation are mutually opposed in an exhaustive division. The third item of the Antepraedicamenta, denomination (denominatio), is different. For a term to be denominative it must satisfy both a morphological-cum-semantical criterion and a purely semantical one. First, (1.a) it must be a concrete term (a term signifying concrete entities), and (1.b) it must be morphologically related to the corresponding abstract term; album ('white [thing]') satisfies (1.a-b), having albedo ('whiteness') as its abstract counterpart. Second, (2) the term must have appellation. This, Buridan explains, means that it must 'evoke' or 'connote' some disposition which is extrinsic to the nature of that for which the term supposits. Album ('white [thing]') satisfies this condition; it may supposit, say, for a man, but it also connotes something which is extrinsic (nonessential) to man, namely whiteness. By contrast, homo ('man') only satisfies criteria (1.a-b); it is a concrete noun with a morphologically related abstract counterpart, viz. humanitas. Criterion (2) remains unsatisfied because humanity is essential to all supposits of homo and thus cannot fulfil the role of an extrinsic disposition connoted by the term." p. 91 (notes omitted).
19. Caroti Stefano, "Generatio / generare: Ontological Problems in John Buridan's natural Philosophy," Medioevo.Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale 27: 373-414 (2002).
20. d'Ors Angel. Ex impossibili qudlibet sequitur. In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns. Edited by Jacobi Klaus. Leiden: Brill 1993. pp. 195-212
21. De Rijk Lambertus Marie. On Buridan's doctrine of connotation. In The logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium on medieval logic and semantics, Copenhagen 16-21 November 1975. Edited by Pinborg Jan. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum 1976. pp. 91-100
    Reprinted as chapter XI in: Through language to reality: studies in medieval semantics and metaphysics.
    "Mediaeval Terminist logic was concerned with the so-called properties of terms (proprietates terminorum), to the extent that it not only studied the formal structures of Latin language, its logical syntax, and all kinds of specifications within this scope, but also interpreted the linguistic elements and structures. This interpretation mainly focussed on what the moderns would call semantics rather than on formal logic as such. The properties of terms (significatio, appellatio, suppositio and its various forms: ampliatio, restrictio, distributio) were investigated in their relation to the so-called res extra animam (extra-mental reality).
    Two statements can be made. First: Who wants to detect a Mediaeval thinker's implicit ontological points of view, finds a wealth of firm evidence in his doctrine of the properties of terms. Secondly: Within the domain of these properties it is Buridan's appellatio that has a very interesting role because of its affinity with the modern concept of connotation. So Buridan's appellatio is entitled to have the attention of both the historians of Mediaeval thought and learning as of those modern logicians who do not want to seclude themselves from the historical background of modern doctrines.
    My approach to the matter concerned now is to compare Buridan's appellatio with modern connotation, more specifically to put the translation 'connotation' for Buridan's appellatio to the test." p. 91
22. De Rijk Lambertus Marie, "John Buridan on Universals," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 97: 35-59 (1992).
    "It is common knowledge that Plato strongly believed that, in order to explain the nature of whatever is (either things or states of affairs, including Man and his environment), the assumption of Transcendent Universal Forms is indispensable. In his view, these universal Forms are the ontic causes of each and every sublunary entity, which all owe their being to their sharing in these Forms. Consequently, everyone who is in want of firm knowledge (episteme) about, the things of the outside world is bound to direct his attention to the transcendent domain of the universal Forms'.
    However, Plato was the first to recognise, and seriously deal with, the objections that can be raised to this doctrine. These objections mainly concern the status (and the dignity, however modest) of our transient world and, above all, the possibility to obtain, true knowledge of this world as it stands, in its ever-changing nature, that is." p. 35
    (...)
    "To be sure, the Medievals all rejected the Platonic Ideas taken as separate substances and they adhered to the Aristotelian common sense principle that only individuals have independent existence. Nevertheless, they were still under the spell of the status of «universal being» as the indispensable basis of true knowledge.
    Marylin McCord Adams has analysed some early fourteenth century solutions to the problem of universals (Scotus, Ockham, Burley and Harclay) (*). In McCord's article Buridan's view of the matter is left out of consideration. Quite understandably so, since Buridan's solution to the problem differs considerably from the sophisticated arguments given by his contemporaries. Buridan seeks.for a solution in analysing the several ways of human understanding. In directing his attention to the propositional attitude involved in the cognitive procedure Buridan is remarkably close to the ingenious solution Peter Abelard had come up with two centuries earlier. In the next sections I shall give an outline of Abelard's treatment of the question of universals followed by an analysis of Buridan's discussion of the matter (as found in his commentary on the Metaphysics and elsewhere)." p. 37
    (...)
    "We may conclude, then, that two bright logicians of the Parisian tradition have come up with quite an ingenious solution to the problem of universals. Both of them started out from the firm conviction that nothing exists but particulars. Nevertheless, they apparently were not satisfied with purely extensional solutions as brought forward by Oxford logicians such as Heytesbury and Ockham. Maybe extensionalists are out to show how people ought to think. Abelard and Buridan, however, were especially interested in the various ways of conceiving we actually use in daily life, in our attempts to conceptually deal with the outside world." p. 59
    
    (*) "Universals in the early Fourteenth century" in Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, from the rediscovery of Aristotle to the desintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600 pp. 411-439.
23. De Rijk Lambertus Marie. On Buridan's view of Accidental Being. In John Buridan: A Master of Arts. Some aspects of his philosophy. Acts of the second Symposium organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum on the occasion of its 15th anniversary.
    Leiden-Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), 20-21 June, 1991. Edited by Bos Egbert Peter and Krop Henri. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1993. pp. 41-51
    "One of the most striking characteristics of late medieval metaphysics is the upgrading of 'accidental being'. The strict opposition between 'esse per se' and 'esse per accidens', which had been of paramount importance ever since Aristotle, has lost its relevance in the ontological discussions of the fourteenth century. The status of 'accidental being' came rather close to that of 'substantial being'. In the views of philosophers such as Ockham and Buridan (not to mention thinkers like Crathorn) the nature of 'accidental being' (or rather 'quantitative and qualitative being') can no longer be properly defined in terms of ontological dependency upon substance. In other words, 'per se subsistence' is assigned not only to substance but to 'accidental being' as well.
    In the present contribution I will illustrate this development by discussing some of Buridan's expositions in his Questiones commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (IV, q. 6 and VII, q. 3-4)." p. 41
24. De Rijk Lambertus Marie. John Buridan on man's capability of grasping the truth. In Scientia et ars im Hoch- und Spätmmittelalter. Edited by Craemer-Rügenberg Ingrid and Speer Andreas. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter 1994. pp. 282-303
    Miscellanea Mediaevalia, vol. 22/1.
    "As is well-known, two subjects are distinctive of the fourteenth century theory of cognition, namely 'certitudo' and 'evidentia'. It is true, thirteenth century philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, were also concerned with certitude and evidentness as indispensable requisites for 'true knowledge' ('scientia'). However, until the end of the thirteenth century certitude and evidentness were not prominent in the discussions about the cognitive procedure nor were they treated as separate matters, requiring separate attention. In Thomas Aquinas for example, the conviction that man is really capable of grasping the truth with certainty is really constitutive of his philosophical (and theological) thought and praxis (*)', or to speak with J. A. Aertsen, of 'Thomas' way of thought'.(**) This, however, does not alter the fact that in Aquinas' philosophy 'certitudo' is not highlighted as such, and the specific role of 'evidentia' is even virtually ignored.
    Buridan's theory of cognition, on the contrary, clearly focusses on the ingredients 'certitudo' and 'evidentia', and, within this framework, on the notion of 'assensus'. In the present paper I aim to elucidate the role of this key notion of John Buridan's theory of cognition."
    
    (*) See the excellent paper by Gerard Verbeke, "Certitude et incertitude de la recherche philosophique selon saint Thomas d'Aquin", in: Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica 66 (1974), 740-57.
    (**) Jan Aertsen, Nature and Creature. Thomas Aquinas' Way of Thought. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters herausgegeben von Albert Zimmermann, Band XXI, Leiden etc. 1988, passim.
25. Ebbesen Sten. Proof and its Limits According to Buridan, Summulae 8. In Preuve et raisons à l'Université de Paris. Logique, ontologie et théologie au XIVe siècle. Edited by Kaluza Zénon and Vignaux Paul. Paris: Vrin 1984. pp. 97-110
    Reprinted in: S. Ebbesen, Topics in Latin Philosophy from the 12th-14th centuries. Collected Essays Volume 2, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2009, pp. 209-220.
    "John Buridan was a remarkable and courageous man. Remarkably consistent. He almost invariably says the same about the same things, and what he says about one subject is usually consistent with what he says about any other somehow related subject. His works abound in cross-references, from one part of a work to another, and from one work to another. He obviously wanted his readers to think of his philosophical works as one coherent corpus presenting one coherent philosophy. Perhaps this ought to scare the historian away from an attempt to interpret Buridan on the basis of one work. But, on the other hand, the fact that he very rarely disagrees with himself and the fact that he repeats his basic tenets in every work make it possible to reconstruct the essentials of Buridanian philosophy without using all available sources, in particular because his pen was as sharp as his mind. His prose possesses to an eminent degree the virtue of clarity. This paper is based on treatise 8 of his Summulae, or Handbook of Logic. As subsidiary sources I have used the remaining part of the Summulae and his quaestiones on the Prior and Posterior Analytics and on the Metaphysics.
    The very existence of treatise 8 of the Summulae demonstrates that Buridan was a man of courage. Treatises 1-7, which deal with 1) terms and propositions, 2) predicables, 3) categories, 4) supposition, 5) syllogistic, 6) topics and 7) fallacies, all have models in earlier literature which helped him structure his work. Treatise 8 has no known predecessor. The subject is 'Division, Definition and Demonstration'. Treatise 8 is the longest treatise of all, and demonstration is the subject that takes up most space by far.
    It lakes a bold man to write a summulistic treatise on a subject not thus treated by this predecessors. It requires extra courage when one is Buridan, for the subject is that of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Is the universalism of the Posterior Analytics compatible with Buridanian mentalism and particularist ontology? II might seem not, but a professor from the fourteenth century could not neglect or reject Aristotle's treatment of a broad and important philosophical topic.
    (...)
    Buridan proceeds like people who renovate old uninhabitable houses. He keeps an Aristotelian facade, but changes the interior so that it fits his purposes. The titles of the ten chapters on demonstration look old-fashioned and Aristotelian. They are: 8.3 "On the questions about which knowledge is obtainable and on knowledge preceding demonstration"; 8.4 "On the affinity and difference between demonstrations and dialectical arguments, and between knowledge and opinion; 8.5 "On the indemonstrable principles of demonstration"; 8.6 "On 'being said of all and in itself 'and on 'universal 'or 'qua itself ' "; 8.7 "On various classifications of demonstrations"; 8.8 "On 'demonstration because of ' "; 8.9 "On 'demonstration that' and whether demonstration may be circular"; 8.10 "On demonstration 'ad impossibile' "; 8.11 "On comparison of the different sorts of demonstration"; 8.12 "On how to settle each of the questions about which knowledge is obtainable". But this is just the facade behind which Buridan builds up his own doctrine of proof, applying a strongly biased interpretation to Aristotle's text." pp. 97-98.
26. Epstein Richard, "A theory of truth based on a medieval solution to the Liar Paradox," History and Philosophy of Logic 13: 149-177 (1992).
    "In the early part of the 14th century Jean Buridan wrote a book called Sophismata. Chapter 8 of that deals with paradoxes of self-reference, particularly the liar paradox. Modern discussions of the liar paradox have been dominated by the formal analysis of truth of Tarski, and more recently of Kripke, and Gupta. Each of those either denies that the sentence 'What I am now saying is false' is a proposition, or denies that the usual laws of logic hold for such sentences. In Buridan's resolution of the liar paradox that sentence is a proposition, every proposition is true or false though not both, and the classical laws of logic hold.
    In this paper I present a formal theory of truth based on Buridan's ideas as exposited by Hughes, contrasting it with the analyses of Tarski, Kripke, and Gupta. I believe that Buridan's ideas form the basis for the most convincing resolution of the liar paradox in a modern formal theory of truth.
    I first survey the theories of Tarski, Kripke, and Gupta. Then I state the principles on which the Buridanian theory is based. After a brief description of how these principles are used in analyzing the truth-values of propositions, I set out the formal theory. Following that I discuss a number of examples in which the informal principles and the technical methods are explained and tested for their aptness; in those discussions I often draw on Buridan's explanations."
27. Fitzgerald Michael J., "Problems with Temporality and Scientific Propositions in John Buridan and Albert of Saxony," Vivarium 44: 305-337 (2006).
    "The essay develops two major arguments. First, if John Buridan's 'first argument' for the reintroduction of natural supposition is only that the "eternal truth" of a scientific proposition is preserved because subject terms in scientific propositions supposit for all the term's past, present, and future significata indifferently; then Albert of Saxony thinks it is simply ineffective.
    Only the 'second argument', i.e., the argument for the existence of an 'atemporal copula', adequately performs this task; but is rejected by Albert. Second, later fourteenth-century criticisms of Buridan's natural supposition, given in certain Notabilia from the anonymous author in, Paris, BnF, lat. 14.716, ff. 40va-41rb, are nothing but an interpolated hodge-podge of criticisms given earlier in the century against various views of Buridan's by Albert of Saxony. It is this fact that makes Albert the real source of late fourteenth-century criticisms of Buridan's view of natural supposition.
    "
28. Flüeler Christoph. From Oral Lecture to Written Commentaries: John Buridan's Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics. In Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition. Acts of the Symposium: The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy. Edited by Ebbesen Sten and Friedman Russell L. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters 1999. pp. 497-521
    "Summary. This paper focuses on John Buridan's reported commentaries, especially on the oldest manuscripts, with the aim of finding new evidence regarding the process from oral lecture to written commentary. Six among the more than 250 manuscripts containing authentic works by Buridan were written in Paris during the philosopher's lifetime, and at least two of them show how the oral teaching of the Parisian master was converted into a written form. The Expositions, i.e. the literal commentaries, play an important role in these oldest manuscripts. These were understood as the foundation of the subsequently treated Quaestiones, and they had a fixed place in university teaching. The Parisian manuscript BN, lat. 16131 probably contains an original reportation (the original student's copy book) of both exposition of, and questions on, Aristotle's Metaphysics. The manuscript Darmstadt, Hessische LuHB, Hs. 561 contains a "compilated", i.e. revised, lecture on the same Aristotelian work, but not the final version as edited in 1518 by Josse Bade. The present study will examine the formal character of these different versions and their relation to one another."
29. Geach Peter. A medieval discussion of intentionality. In Logic, methodology and philosophy of science (vol. 4). Edited by Bar-Hillel Yehoshua. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1965. pp. 425-433
    "In this paper I shall critically examine the way a fourteenth-century logician, Jean Buridan, dealt with certain puzzles about intentional verbs. The class of verbs I shall be considering will all of them be expressions that can be completed into propositions by adding two proper names; the class will include, not only ordinary transitive verbs, but also phrases of the verb-preposition type like 'look for' or 'shoot at', and furthermore constructions like 'hopes-will be a better man than his father' or 'believes-to be a scoundrel', which turn into propositions as soon as we add mention of who hopes or believes this and about whom he does so. In modern grammar, the term 'a verbal' rather than 'a verb' is used for this wider class; following a suggestion of Professor Bar-Hillel, I adopt this term.
    In either or both of the proper-name places that go with such a verbal, it is possible, without destroying the, propositional structure (salva congruitate, as medieval logicians say), to substitute a phrase of some such form as 'some A' or 'every A' or 'the (one and only) A'; the letter 'A' here represents a simple or complex general term which is grammatically a noun or noun-phrase. The peculiarity of certain verbals that presently concern us comes out when such a phrase formed from a general term stands in object position, in a construction 'b F'd an A' or the like. Consider for example the sentence 'Geach looked for a detective story'. This sentence is ambiguous : in ordinary conversation we might successfully resolve the ambiguity by asking the question 'Was what Geach was looking for a particular detective story, or was it just a detective story?' It is an odd psychological fact that this question would convey the intended distinction of meanings; for logically the words of the question leave it wholly obscure what is intended. After all, nothing in this world or in any possible world could be "just a detective story" without being "a particular detective story"; and even if such an individuum vagum could somehow have being, Geach could not read it, so it certainly is not what he looked for." p. 425
    
    "In a way parallel to the Buridan convention we may distinguish between 'There is a poet whom both Smith and Brown admire' and 'Smith and Brown both admire the same poet'; the latter would cover the case where both Smith and Brown are victims of the same literary fraud as to the existence of a poet, as well as the more normal case where they both admire (say) Wordsworth's poetry. Let us use the expression 'AP' as short for 'admire as a poet someone conceived under the ratio evoked by'; then 'There is a poet whom both Smith and Brown admire' would come out as:
    For some x, x is,a poet and, for some w, w is a description true just of x, and-both Smith and-Brown AP w
    whereas 'Smith and Brown both admire the same poet', taken as conveying only intentional identity, would come out in the simpler form:
    
    For some w, w is a definite description, and Smith and Brown both AP w.
    
    Unfortunately, the line of solution we have been following leads us into difficulties. Suppose we use 'D'd' as short for the verbal 'dreamed of someone under the ratio expressed by'. Then in our present view we should have to paraphrase 'There is a red-head Harris dreamed of as:
    For some x, x is a red-head and, for some w, w is a description true just of x, and Harris D'd w.
    Now suppose we take w to be the description 'the fattest woman in the world': The paraphrase would be true if Harris dreamed of the fattest woman ili the 'world and the fattest woman in the world is in fact a redhead; but the propostion paraphrased might then quite well be false, because in Harris's dream there may have been no red-head, and the fattest woman he saw in his dream may have been as bald as an egg. (I owe this counter-example to my pupil Mr. David Bird) Similar difficulties arise for our account of intentional identify: for if c and d each worshipped something under the ratio expressed by 'the deity of the Sun', it does not follow that c and d both worshipped the same deity-c might be an ancient Egyptian worshipping the ancestor of Pharaoh, and d a Japanese worshipping the ancestress of the Mikado.
    I hope this paper shows why modern logicians still need to take medieval logicians seriously. In great measure their problems are ours; while for some of them, like the problems of suppositio, modern logic provides adequate solutions, there are other problems, about modal and intentional contexts for example, that are still wide open; and the talent that was shown by medieval logicians in wrestling with their problems demands our deepest admiration." pp. 432-433
30. Ghisalberti Alessandro. Giovanni Buridano dalla metafisica alla fisica. Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1975.
31. Ghisalberti Alessandro. The categories of temporality in William Ockham and John Buridan. In The medieval concept of time. Edited by Porro Pasquale. Leiden: Brill 2001. pp. 255-286
32. Grellard Christophe, "Scepticism, Demonstration and the Infinite Regress Argument (Nicholas of Autrecourt and John Buridan)," Vivarium: 328-342 (2007).
33. Habib Nicholas, "A medieval perspective on the meaningfulness of fictitious terms: a study of John Buridan," Franciscan Studies 45: 73-82 (1985).
34. Hall Alexander W. John Buridan: On Aristotle' Categories. In Medieval Commentaries in aristotle's Categories. Edited by Newton Lloyd A. Leiden: Brill 2008. pp. 295-316
35. Herzberger Hans G., "Dimensions of truth," Journal of Philosophical Logic 2: 535-556 (1973).
    Reprinted in: Donald Hockney (ed.) - Contemporary research in philosophical logic and linguistic semantics - Dordrecht, Reidel, 1975, pp. 71-92.
36. Hubien Hubert, "John Buridan on the Fourth Figure of the syllogism," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 29: 271-285 (1975).
37. Hubien Hubert. Buridan and Lesniewski on the Copula. In English logic and semantics: from the end of the Twelfth century to the time of Ockham and Burleigh. Edited by Braakhuis Henk A.G., Kneepkens Cornelis Henri, and De Rijk Lambertus Marie. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 1981. pp. 415-425
    "It has often been contended that Lesniewski's Ontology is the best system in which to formalize medieval logic. I submit that this is not the case and propose a new one, which, as I shall show, is both more faithful to one of the medieval logics (for there is more than one) and richer than Ontology, since it contains it but is not contained in it." p. 415
38. Hughes George. The modal logic of John Buridan. In Atti del convegno internazionale di storia della logica. Le teorie della modalità. Edited by Corsi Giovanna, Mangione Corrado, and Mugnai Massimo. Bologna: CLUEB 1989. pp. 93-112
    "This paper will be almost wholly expository. My aim in it is to give an outline, though I fear a very incomplete one, of the system of modal logic developed by one of the greatest of mediaeval logicians, the 14th century French philosopher John Buridan. I shall base my account on two of his logical works. One is his Consequentiae, a work on inferences in general, about a third of which is devoted to modal logic. There is an excellent modern edition of this work by Hubert Hubien, in the Introduction to which Hubien argues, to my mind convincingly, that it was written about 1335. The other is his lengthy and comprehensive work on logic, the Summulae de Dialectica, which contains two substantial sections on modal logic. There are serious problems involved in dating this work, but I shall not try to discuss these here. Most of it, including all the modal material, still exists, unfortunately, only in manuscript form. The modal material is arranged differently in these two works, each is fuller than the other on certain topics, and there are a few discrepancies between them on points of detail; but substantially they present the same ideas, and for the most part I shall not try to distinguish between them here." p. 93
39. Jacquette Dale, "Buridan's Bridge," Philosophy 66: 455-471 (1991).
    On Sophism 17 of Chapter 8 of Sophismata (Insolubilia)
40. Karger Elizabeth. Un débat médiéval sur le concept de sujet d'un énoncé catégorique. Étude d'un texte de Jean Buridan. In Preuve et raisons à l'Université de Paris. Logique, ontologie et théologie au XIVe siècle. Edited by Kaluza Zénon and Vignaux Paul. Paris: Vrin 1984. pp. 111-125
    "Le présent essai porte sur quelques pages du Traité des suppositions (1) de Jean Buridan. Dans ces pages, l'auteur présente un débat portant sur l'identification du sujet d'énoncés catégoriques (2) dont le terme initial est à un cas dit "oblique", c'est-à-dire autre que le nominatif (3). Selon certains logiciens -- que Buridan ne nomme pas --, c'est ce terme à un cas oblique qui est le véritable sujet de l'énoncé; selon l'auteur, au contraire, le sujet ne peut être qu'un terme au nominatif.
    Un des exemples discutés est le suivant:
    
    (1) Cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit.
    
    Selon l'analyse récusée par Buridan, 'hominis ' est le sujet de cet énoncé, alors que, selon l'auteur, le sujet de (1) est 'hominis asinus' et "principalement" (4) 'asinus'.
    D'aucuns jugeront peut-être que l'intérêt de ce débat réside dans l'occasion qu'il fournit de mettre en évidence la difficulté de la tâche à laquelle s'est épuisée la logique scolastique -- tâche qui aurait consisté à remédier aux insuffisances de la logique aristotélicienne.
    Tel cependant n'est pas notre propos principal. Notre objectif dans l'étude de ce texte, fut de découvrir plutôt les divergences doctrinales en raison desquelles les théoriciens en présence proposent, pour les énoncés concernés, des analyses aussi différentes, et en particulier de dégager ce qui rend incompatibles les deux concepts de sujet présupposés par l'une et l'autre des positions adverses.
    Nous présentons donc ici les résultats de cette étude. Nous commencerons par exposer l'essentiel de l'argumentation par laquelle, d'après Buridan, ces logiciens anonymes défendent leur thèse ; nous serons ainsi en mesure de dégager les éléments principaux d'une certaine doctrine logico-grammaticale. Nous passerons en second lieu à l'examen des objections que Buridan oppose aux raisons de ses adversaires, découvrant à travers elles ainsi que dans la défense qu'il apporte à sa thèse propre, les caractéristiques d'une doctrine profondément différente de la première. Nous terminerons par une évaluation, du point de vue de leur mérite logique, des deux positions en présence." pp. 111-112.
41. Karger Elizabeth, "Syllogistique buridanienne," Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review 31: 445-458 (1992).
42. Karger Elizabeth. A theory of immediate inferences contained in Buridan's logic. In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns. Edited by Jacobi Klaus. Leiden: Brill 1993. pp. 407-429
43. Karger Elizabeth. John Buridan's theory of the logical relations between general modal formulae. In Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary tradition. Edited by Braakhuis Henk A.G. and Kneepkens Cornelis Henri. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers 2007. pp. 429-444
44. Karger Elizabeth. A Buridanian response to a Fourteenth century skeptical argument and its rebuttal by a new argument in the early sixteenth cenury. In Rethinking the History of Skepticism. The Missing Medieval Background. Edited by Lagerlund Henrik. Leiden: Brill 2010. pp. 215-232
45. Kärkkäinen Pekka, "On the Semantics of 'Human Being' and 'Animal' in Early 16th-Century Erfurt," Vivarium 42: 237-256 (2004).
    "John Buridan discussed the problem, whether it follows from the definition of the term 'animal' that all quantitative parts of an animal are to be called animals. His solution was that parts of the animal are to be called animals, though in a extraordinary, non-connotative, sense of the term. The problem was variously discussed by some later Buridanian authors from Erfurt. Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen ends up to deny the use of such terms as 'animal' and 'human being' as connotative terms. Jodocus Trutfetter, however, uses the distinction between the absolute and connotative senses of these terms without reservation."
46. King Peter. Introduction to Jean Buridan's Logic. In Jean Buridan's logic. The Treatise on Supposition. The Treatise on Consequences. Dordrecht: Reidel 1985. pp. 3-82
47. King Peter. Consequence as Inference: Mediaeval Proof Theory 1300-1350. In Medieval formal logic. Obligations, Insolubles and Consequences. Edited by Yrjönsuuri Mikko. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2001. pp. 117-145
48. Klima Gyula, "Latin as a formal language. Outlines of a Buridanian semantics," Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin 61: 78-106 (1991).
49. Klima Gyula. Buridan's Logic and the Ontology of Modes. In Medieval analyses in language and cognition. Acts of the Symposium The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy January 10-13 1996. Edited by Ebbesen Sten and Friedman Russell L. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters 1999. pp. 473-495
    "Summary: The aim of this paper is to explore the relationships between Buridan's logic and the ontology of modes (modi). Modes, not considered to be really distinct from absolute entities, could serve to reduce the ontological commitment of the theory of the categories, and thus they were to become ubiquitous in this role in late medieval and early modern philosophy. After a brief analysis of the most basic argument for the real distinction between entities of several categories ("the argument from separability"), I point out that despite nominalist charges to the contrary, "older realists" - that is, authors working before and around Ockham's time - were not committed to such real distinctions, and thus to an overpopulated ontology, by their semantic principles. However, what did entail such a commitment on their part, along with the argument from separability, was treating abstract terms in several accidental categories as "rigid designators", that is, essential predicates (species and genera) of their supposita. Therefore, although in the form of "extra-categorial" modi essendi modes were well established in earlier medieval thought, their appearance within the theory of categories was conditioned on analyzing several abstract terms in the accidental categories as non-essential predicates of their particulars, something that "older realists" would in general not endorse. (This does not mean that even "older realists" were universally committed to really distinct entities in all ten categories. See on this e.g. notes 13 and 18.) Next, I show how this type of analysis is achieved "automatically" by Buridan's theory of "eliminative" nominal definitions (in contrast to the older "non-eliminative" theory). However, since "realist" semantic principles in themselves did not yield a commitment to really distinct entities in all categories, it was also open for later "realists" to operate with not-really-distinct modes in several categories, although using different, "non-nominalist" tactics to treat the abstract accidental terms signifying them as non-rigid designators. The conclusion of the paper is that, as a consequence, both nominalist and later "realist" thinkers were able to achieve the same degree of ontological reductions in their respective logical frameworks, and so it was not so much their ontologies as their different logical "tactics" that set them apart."
50. Klima Gyula. John Buridan. In A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages. Edited by Gracia Joerge J.E. and Noone Timothy B. Oxford: Blackwell 2003. pp. 340-348
51. Klima Gyula, "Consequences of a Closed, Token-Based Semantics: The Case of John Buridan," History and Philosophy of Logic 25: 95-110 (2004).
    "This paper argues for two principal conclusions about natural language semantics based on John Buridan's considerations concerning the notion of formal consequence, that is, formally valid inference. (1) Natural languages are essentially semantically closed, yet they do not have to be on that account inconsistent. (2) Natural language semantics has to be token based, as a matter of principle. The paper investigates the Buridanian considerations leading to these conclusions, and considers some obviously emerging objections to the Buridanian approach."
52. Klima Gyula. John Buridan and the Force-Content Distinction. In Medieval theories on assertive and non-assertive language. Edited by Maierù Alfonso and Valente Luisa. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki 2004. pp. 415-427
53. Klima Gyula. John Buridan on the Acquisition of Simple Substantial Concepts. In John Buridan and beyond. Topics in the Language Sciences 1300-1700. Edited by Ebbesen Sten and Friedman Russell L. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel 2004. pp. 17-32
54. Klima Gyula, "The Demonic Temptations of Medieval Nominalism: Mental Representation and "Demon Skepticism"," Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 4: 37-44 (2004).
55. Klima Gyula, "Quine, Wyman, and Buridan: Three Approaches to Ontological Commitment," Korean Journal of Logic 8: 1-22 (2005).
56. Klima Gyula, "The Essentialist Nominalism of John Buridan," Review of Metaphysics 58: 301-315 (2005).
    "To many contemporary philosophers, the phrase "essentialist nominalism" may appear to be an oxymoron. After all, essentialism is the doctrine that things come in natural kinds characterized by their essential properties, on account of some common nature or essence they share. But nominalism is precisely the denial of the existence, indeed, the very possibility of such shared essences. Nevertheless, despite the intuitions of such contemporary philosophers, John Buridan was not only a thoroughgoing nominalist, as is well-known, but also a staunch defender of a strong essentialist doctrine against certain skeptics of his time. But then the question inevitably arises: could he consistently maintain such a doctrine?
    In the following discussion I will first examine Buridan's essentialism to show why he could reasonably think that he can both adhere to his nominalist metaphysics and endorse a version of essentialism that can serve as the foundation of genuine scientific knowledge in the strong Aristotelian sense.
    In the subsequent section I will argue that on the basis of his logical theory of essential predication Buridan is definitely able to maintain a version of essentialism that is sufficient to provide the required foundation of valid scientific generalizations, and to refute skeptical doubts against the possibility of such a foundation.
    Next, I will examine the question whether Buridan's solution is consistent with the broader context of his logic and epistemology. In this section I will argue that although Buridan's logical theory is consistent with his nominalist essentialist position, his cognitive psychology is not. In particular, I will argue that Buridan's abstractionist account of how we acquire our simple substantial concepts is incompatible with his account of the semantic function of absolute terms subordinated to these concepts.
    Finally, I will draw some general conclusions from this discussion concerning the relationships between metaphysical essentialism and the philosophy of mind and language." (notes omitted)
57. Klima Gyula, "The Universality of Logic and the Primacy of Mental Language in the Nominalist Philosophy of Logic of John Buridan," Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 35: 167-177 (2006).
58. Klima Gyula, "Aquinas vs. Buridan on Essence and Existence," Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 7: 66-73 (2007).
59. Klima Gyula. Logic without Truth. Buridan on the Liar. In Unity, Truth and the Liar. The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox. Edited by Rahman Shahid, Tulenheimo Tero, and Genot Emmanuel. New York: Springer 2008. pp. 86-112
60. Klima Gyula. The nominalist semantic of Ockham and Buridan: a 'rational reconstruction'. In Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic. Edited by Gabbay Dov and Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2008. pp. 389-431
    Handbook of the history of logic: Vol. 2.
61. Klima Gyula. John Buridan. New York: Oxford University Press 2009.
62. Klima Gyula. The anti-skepticism of John Buridan and Thomas Aquinas: putting skeptics in their place versus stopping them in their tracks. In Rethinking the History of Skepticism. The Missing Medieval Background. Edited by Lagerlund Henrik. Leiden: Brill 2010. pp. 145-170
63. Klima Gyula. Two Summulae, Two Ways of Doing Logic: Peter of Spain's 'Realism' and John Buridan's 'Nominalism'. In Methods and Methodologies. Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500-1500. Edited by Cameron Margaret and Marenbon John. Leiden: Brill 2011. pp. 109-126
64. Knuuttila Simo. Buridan and Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic. In Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag. (vol. I). Edited by Mojsisch Burkhard and Pluta Olaf. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner 1991. pp. 477-488
    "In the first section of this paper some remarks are made on Aristotle's modal syllogistic. In the second part it is shown at a general level how Aristotle's theory is related to what Buridan says about modal syllogisms. The purpose of the paper is to elucidate late medieval attitudes towards Aristotle's modal logic." (p. 477)
65. Krieger Gerhard. Subjekt und Metaphysik. Die Metaphysik des Johannes Buridan. Münster: Aschendorff 2003.
66. Krieger Gerhard, "Menschliche Vernunft als Terminus der Reflexion: Zu einer Übereinstimmung zwischen mittelatlerlicher Philosophie und Kant," Kant-Studien 96: 187-207 (2005).
    "The article deals with the metaphysical thought of the Magister Artium John Buridan, who was active in Paris in the first half of the fourteenth century, in the context of the discussion of the
    relationship of medieval to modern philosophy. Systematically, the justification of this investigation is that Buridan is in agreement with Kant as to the primacy of practical reason. To this extent, this consideration of the metaphysics of John Buridan in comparison to that of Kant deals with the question of the meaning of the primacy of practical reason for the transcendental justification of knowledge and science and, with this question, also with the transformation of metaphysics.""
67. Krieger Gerhard. Conceptus absolutus: Zu einer Parallele zwischen Wilhelm von Ockham, Johannes Buridan und Nicolaus Cusanus. In Intellectus und Imaginatio. Aspekte geistiger und sinnlicher Erkenntnis bei Nicolaus Cusanus. Edited by André João Maria, Krieger Gerhard, and Schwaetzer Harald. Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner 2006. pp. 3-18
68. Kukkonen Taneli. "The Impossible, insofar as it is possible": Ibn Rushd and Jean Buridan on Logic and Natural Theology. In Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter. Edited by Perler Dominik and Rudolf Ulrich. Leiden: Brill 2005. pp. 447-467