Selected Bibliography on Indian Logic and Ontology. First Part: A - L

Index of the Section: "Philosophy Study Guides: Non-Western Philosophy"

• Study Guide for Comparative Philosophy (a selection of reference works about non-Western ontology and logic)

  • Annotated bibliography on Comparative Philosophy

• African Philosophy. A Survey of Contemporary Studies (introductory works and studies about African conceptions of Being and Truth)

  • Annotated bibliography on African Philosophy

• Ancient Chinese Logic (a survey of contemporary studies)

  • Annotated bibliography on Chinese Logic

• Ancient Indian Logic and Ontology (with particular reference the Nyaya-Vaisesika School)

• Annotated bibliography:

  • First Part: A - L

  • Second Part: M - Z

  • Ancient Indian Logicians

• Buddhist Logic and Ontology (Indian and Tibetan developments of Buddhist logic)

  • Annotated bibliography on Buddhist Logic

• Islamic (Arabic and Persian) Logic and Ontology (the introduction of Greek philosophy in the Islamic world)

  • Annotated bibliography on Islamic Logic

Bibliography on Indian Logic and Ontology: M - Z

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. A source book in Indian philosophy. Edited by Radhakrishnan Sarvepalli and Moore Charles A. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1957.
2. Analytical philosophy in comparative perspective. Exploratory essays in current theories and classical Indian theories of meaning and reference. Edited by Matilal Bimal Krishna and Shaw Jaysankar Lal. Dordrecht: Reidel 1985.
3. Beyond Orientalism. The work of Wilhelm Halbfass and its impact on Indian and cross-cultural studies. Edited by Franco Eli and Preisendanz Karin. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1997.
4. Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Vol. 1. Bibliography. Edited by Potter Karl H. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1970.
   Second revised edition 1983; Third revised edition 1995.
5. Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Vol. 2. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology. The Tradition of Nyaya-Vaisesika up to Gangesa. Edited by Potter Karl H. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1977.
   Second edition 1995.
6. Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Vol. 3. Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara and his pupils. Edited by Potter Karl H. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1981.
7. Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Vol. 4. Samkhya: a dualist tradition in Indian philosophy. Edited by Larson Gerald James and Bhattacharya Ram Shankar. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1987.
8. Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Vol. 5. The philosophy of the grammarians. Edited by Coward Harold G. and Kunjunni Raja K. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1990.
9. Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Vol. 6. Indian philosophical analysis. Nyaya-Vaisesika from Gangesa to Raghunatha Siromani. Edited by Potter Karl H. and Bhattacharyya Sibajiban. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1993.
10. Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Vol. 7. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. Edited by Potter Karl H. et al. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1996.
11. Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Vol. 8. Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D. Edited by Potter Karl H. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1999.
12. Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies. Vol. 9. Buddhist Philosophy from 350 to 600 A.D. Edited by Potter Karl H. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 2003.
13. Indian logic. A reader. Edited by Ganeri Jonardon. Richmond: Curzon 2001.
14. Indian philosophy. A collection of readings. Vol. I. Epistemology. Edited by Perrett Roy W. New York: Garland 2001.
    Vol. 1: Epistemology; Vol.2: Logic and philosophy of language; Vol. 3: Metaphysics; Vol. 4: Philosophy of religion; 5. Theory of value.
    
    "Volume 1: Epistemology is concerned with the nature and scope of Indian pramâna theory, i.e. that part of Indian philosophy concerned with the nature and sources of knowledge. Indian philosophers developed a causal theory of knowledge and acknowledged the existence of a number of valid ways of knowing, including perception, inference and testimony. The Indian Pramâna theorists thus discussed many issues that have also occupied Western epistemologists, often offering importantly different perspectives on these matters. They also sometimes addressed various interesting questions about knowledge that are unfamiliar to Western epistemologists.
    The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of epistemological topics like the means of knowledge, realism and anti-realism, truth, knowledge of knowledge, illusion and perceptual error, knowability, testimony, scepticism and doubt."
15. Indian philosophy. A collection of readings. Vol. II. Philosophy of language. Edited by Perrett Roy W. New York: Garland 2001.
    "Volume 2: Logic and Philosophy of Language is concerned with those parts of Indian pramana theory that Western philosophers would count as logic and philosophy of language. Indian philosophers and linguists were much concerned with philosophical issues to do with language, especially with theories of meaning, while the Indian logicians developed both a formalised canonical inference schema and a theory of fallacies. The logic of the standard Indian inferential model is deductive, but the premises are arrived at inductively. The later Navya-Nyaya logicians went on to develop too a powerful technical language, an intentional logic of cognitions, which became the language of all serious discourse in India.
    The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of topics in logic and the philosophy of language like the nature of inference, negation, necessity, counterfactual reasoning, many-valued logics, theory of meaning, reference and existence, compositionality and contextualism, the sense-reference distinction, and the nature of the signification relation."
16. Indian philosophy. A collection of readings. Vol. III. Metaphysics. Edited by Perrett Roy W. New York: Garland 2001.
    "Volume 3: Metaphysics is concerned with the complement to pramana theory, i.e. prameya theory. Whereas the pramanas are the means of knowledge, the prameyas are the knowables, cognisable entities that constitute the world. With respect to the number and kinds of such entities, there was a very wide variety of opinion among classical Indian philosophers - including variants of monism, dualism and pluralism about both entities and kinds. Many metaphysical topics were debated, but two of the most important were causation and the nature of the self. The competing theories offered about these two issues also raised other questions about the metaphysics of wholes and parts, substances and properties, and universals and particulars.
    The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of topics in metaphysics like ontology, constructionalism, universals, negative facts, mereology, causation, relations, freedom and determinism, and theories of the self."
17. Knowing from words. Western and Indian philosophical analysis of understanding and testimony. Edited by Matilal Bimal Krishna and Chakrabarti Arindam. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1994.
18. Logic, Navya-Nyaya and Applications. Homage to Bimal Krishna Matilal. Edited by Chakraborti Mihir K. et al. London: College Publications 2008.
19. The philosophy of language in classical Indian tradition. Edited by Prasad K.S. New Delhi: Decent Books 2002.
20. Aklujkar Ajok, "The word is the world: nondualism in Indian philosophy of language," Philosophy East and West 51 (4): 452-473 (2001).
    "The meanings in which the word 'word' can be taken, the interpretations that the relevant meanings would necessitate of the 'word-equals-world' thesis, and the extent to which Bhartrhari can be said to be aware of or receptive to these interpretations are considered. The observation that more than one interpretation would have been acceptable to Bhartrhari naturally leads to a discussion of his notion of truth, his perspectivism, and his understanding of the nature of philosophizing as an activity in which language pays a basic role and epistemology and ontology are interdependent. The difference of Bhartrhari's thinking from that of the Vedantins of Sankara's tradition is identified, and a brief comment on the history of vivarta and parinama as philosophical terms is offered."
21. Arnold Dan, "Intrinsic validity reconsidered: a sympathetic study of the Mimamsaka inversion of Buddhist epistemology," Journal of Indian Philosophy 29: 589-675 (2001).
22. Arnold Daniel, "Of intrinsic validity. A study on the relevance of Purva Mimamsa," Philosophy East and West 51 (1): 26-53 (2001).
23. Balcerowicz Piotr, "The logical structure of the Naya method of the Jainas," Journal of Indian Philosophy 29: 379-403 (2001).
24. Bandyopadhyay Nandita, "The concept of contradiction in Indian logic and epistemology," Journal of Indian Philosophy 16: 225-246 (1988).
    "The article seeks to introduce to the students of philosophy the concept of contradiction in Indian philosophy. contradiction and contrariety fall under the common class of opposition called "Virodha". the former means "pervasion of mutual negation by two predicates," the latter means "pervasibility of two predicates by their mutual negation." Vontradiction is a purely logical relation, while contrariety is semilogical. The author suggests that contradiction and contrariety should better be called, respectively, "absolute contradiction" and "relative contradiction", both being based on contradiction of identity. Some formidable Indian philosophers argue that contradiction (including contrariety) is a purely logical category, for contradiction of facts is impossible."
25. Banerjee Hiranmoy, "On a mistranslation of the terms 'Visesya' and 'Prakara'," Philosophy East and West 22 (1): 93-96 (1972).
    "The translation of the Nyaya terms, 'Visesya' and 'Prakara' as 'subject' and 'predicate' is mistaken. This mistake is the progenitor of the philosophical mistake that a particular can possibly be a predicate. In 'ram is possessed of a stick', the stick is the 'Prakara', but being possessed of a stick is the predicate. This inclusion of relation in the predicate is alleged to lead to an infinite regress, for the predicate's relation to the subject should be included in it ad infinitum. There is, however, a tie and not a relation between the subject and the predicate. A relation, being a universal, is a prediate of particulars whereas a tie binds together entities of heterogeneous types."
26. Barlingay Surendra Sheodas. A modern introduction to Indian logic. Delhi: National Publishing House 1965.
27. Barua Beninadhab. A history of pre-Buddhistic Indian philosophy. Calcutta: University of Calcutta 1921.
    Reprinted: Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.
28. Bharadwaja Vijay K. Form and validity in Indian logic. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study 1990.
29. Bharadwaja Vijay K., "Implication and entailment in Navya-Nyaya logic," Journal of Indian Philosophy 15: 149-154 (1987).
    "It is argued against the claim that there exist in the concept of "Vyapti" and "Paramarsa" the two notions of implication and entailment in the Navya-Nyaya logic. Also, it is suggested that the "Pancavayava-Vakya" form of "Anumana" does not represent the deductive model of inference."
30. Bhattacharya Chandidas, "Can there be empirical evidence for general truth?," Journal of Indian Philosophy 15: 333-347 (1987).
31. Bhattacharya Kamaleswar, "A note on formalism in Indian Logic," Journal of Indian Philosophy 29: 17-23 (2001).
32. Bhattacharyya Hari Mohan. Jaina logic and epistemology. Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Co 1994.
33. Bhattacharyya Krishnachandra. Studies in philosophy. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers 1956.
    Two volumes edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya
34. Bhattacharyya Sibajiban, "Daniel H. H. Ingalls on Indian logic," Philosophy East and West 5 (2): 155-162 (1955).
35. Bhattacharyya Sibajiban, "Some features of Navya-Nyaya logic," Philosophy East and West 24 (3): 329-342 (1974).
    "Navya-Nyaya developed a technical (non-symbolic) language tied to a realistic ontology, but this became the language of all serious discourse in India -- of all philosophies, grammar, law, medicine. The problem is primarily to explain how this was possible. The answer suggested is that Navya-Nyaya developed a language for 'describing' cognitions by stating not merely the objects recognized, but also the 'mode of cognition of the object'. This necessitated the development of special concepts like the concept of limitor (Avacchedaka). in ontology, Navya-Nyaya made extensive use of Occam's razor to decide which abstract terms stood for abstract entities, and which, though abstract grammatically, still denoted entities identifiable as concrete objects."
36. Bhattacharyya Sibajiban, "Some features of the technical language of Navya-Nyaya," Philosophy East and West 40 (2): 129-149 (1990).
    "The technical language of Navya-Nyaya uses concepts like limitor, determiner, etc., to deal with sentences expressing cognition like perception, inference, memory, belief, doubt, supposition. As such sentences are not extensional, Navya-Nyaya distinguishes between what is cognised and the mode under which what is cognised is cognised. Limitor, in the technical language, determines the mode of cognition and is also used to express quantity of cognition, universality, particularity, etc. The concept of determiner is used to show what predicate is asserted of what subject in the same cognition."
37. Bhattacharyya Sibajiban, "The Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of qualities," Philosophy East and West 11 (3): 143-151 (1961).
38. Biardeau Madeleine. Thèorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique. Paris: Mouton & Co. 1964.
39. Bilimoria Purusottama, ""Jnana" and "Prama": the logic of knowing. A critical appraisal," Journal of Indian Philosophy 13: 73-102 (1985).
    "The thrust of this paper is to investigate the relative difference between "Jnana" and "Prama", two crucial concepts in Indian epistemology, since more recent treatment of them would seem to be confused. Utilizing the framework developed by Nyaya and Advaita, it is argued that the former describes a wide range of cognitive processes, such as 'cognition', 'judgment', 'remembering', 'doubting', etc., while the latter defines the bounds of cognition in respect of its truth-value. A theory of knowledge is developed that accounts for the rise of 'true' knowledge in terms of the 'psyche-activity' involved and the set of criteria ("Pramanya") that renders a "Jnana" as a "Prama". The intensional structure of such a judgment, it is argued, involves a complex qualified-qualifier relation in conformity with the property-content relation of the objective correlate."
40. Bronkhorst Johannes, "The Peacock's egg: Bhartrhari on language and reality," Philosophy East and West 51 (4): 474-491 (2001).
    "Bhartrhari was not only a clever and well-informed philosopher but also a conservative Brahmin who maintained his own tradition's superiority against the philosophies developed in his time. He exploited a problem that occupied all his philosophical contemporaries to promote his own ideas, in which the Veda played a central role. Bhartrhari and his thought are situated in their philosophical context. As it turns out, he dealt with issues that others had dealt with before him in India and suggested solutions to existing problems. Indeed it becomes clear that he was both a philosopher who dealt with current problems and challenges and a traditionalist who used the philosophical debate of his time to gain respectability for his own Vedic tradition."
41. Butzenberger Klaus, "On doubting what there is not: the doctrine of doubt and the reference of terms in Indian grammar, logic and philosophy of language," Journal of Indian Philosophy 24: 363-406 (1996).
42. Cardona George, "Paraphrase and sentence analysis: some Indian views," Journal of Indian Philosophy 3: 259-281 (1975).
43. Chakrabarti Arindam, "Against immaculate perception: seven reasons for eliminating Nirvilkalpaka perception from Nyaya," Philosophy East and West 50 (1): 1-8 (2000).
    "Besides seeing a rabbit or seeing that the rabbit is grayish, do we also sometimes see barely just the particular animal (not as an animal or as anything) or the feature rabbitness or grayness? Such bare, non-verbalizable perception is called "indeterminate perception" (nirvikalpaka pratyaksa) in Nyaya. Standard Nyaya postulates such pre-predicative bare perception in order to honor the rule that awareness of a qualified entity must be caused by awareness of the qualifier. After connecting this issue with the Western debate concerning the "myth of the given," seven distinct arguments are presented showing that the very notion of such indeterminate perception is epistemically otiose and that the Nyaya theory of perception is better off without it."
44. Chakrabarti Arindam. Denying existence. The logic, epistemology and pragmatics of negative existentials and fictional discourse. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997.
    See the Appendix: "The problem of the nonexistent in Indian philosophy of logic and language" pp. 211-245.
45. Chakrabarti Arindam, "On knowing by being told," Philosophy East and West 42 (3): 421-439 (1992).
46. Chakrabarti Arindam, "Reply to Stephen Phillips," Philosophy East and West 51 (1): 114-115 (2001).
47. Chakrabarti Chandana and Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar, "Toward dualism: The Nyaya-Vaisesika way," Philosophy East and West 41 (4): 477-492 (1981).
48. Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar. Classical Indian philosophy of mind. The Nyaya Dualist Tradiiton. Albany: Sate University of New York Press 1999.
49. Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar. Definition and induction. A historical and comparative study. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1995.
50. Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar, "Some comparisons between Frege's logic and Navya-Nyaya logic," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36: 554-563 (1976).
    "This paper consists of three parts. The first part deals with Frege's distinction between sense and reference of proper names and a similar distinction in Navya-Nyaya logic. In the second part we have compared Frege's definition of number to the Navya-Nyaya definition of number. In the third part we have shown how the study of the so-called 'restrictive conditions for universals' in Navya-Nyaya logic anticipated some of the developments of modern set theory."
51. Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar, "Some remarks on Indian theories of truth," Journal of Indian Philosophy 12: 339-356 (1985).
    "Some of the points sought to be established are (1) an overly pragmatic reading of the concept of truth in Indian philosophy should be avoided; (2) notions similar to that of knowledge as justified true belief and to the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths are found in Indian philosophy; (3) confirmation of truth through an inferential process, when properly analyzed, does not lead to an infinite regress and that (4) in some cases truth is known immediately."
52. Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar, "The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of universals," Journal of Indian Philosophy 3: 363-382 (1975).
    "The paper consists in three parts. The first part gives an exposition of the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory that universals are real entities distinct from and independent of the particulars to which they may be related. Various arguments for the theory are stated. The distinctive features of the theory are brought out by way of comparison and contrast with the views of Aristotle and Plato in particular. The second part discusses some objections to the theory. The third part explains the so called 'preventive conditions for universals' together with their bearings on recent philosophical developments."
53. Chakrabarti Kisor Kumar, "The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of negative entities," Journal of Indian Philosophy 6: 129-144 (1978).
    "The paper consists in three parts. The first part criticizes the attempt of some major Indian and Western philosophers like Plato, Cook Wilson, the Buddhists, the Prabhakaras, etc., to dispense with negative entities and builds up the case for them. The second part is devoted to their classification and contains additional arguments in favour of negative entities of particular kinds. The third part discusses some problems of a specialized nature such as the criteria for distinguishing one negative entity from another."
54. Chapple Christopher Key, "Sources for the study of Jaina philosophy: a bibliographic essay," Philosophy East and West 50 (3): 408-411 (2000).
    "Primary titles in the area of Jaina philosophy are identified, focusing on English-language materials published in the Twentieth century. Included is a brief survey of individual books and book series, with more extensive commentary on two important books published within the past five years: Nathmal Tatia's translation of Umasvati's "Tattvarthasutra" (that which is) and Nagin J. Shah's translation of Nyayavijayaju's "Jaina Darsana" (Jaina philosophy and religion)."
55. Chatterjee Satischandra and Datta Dhirendramohan. An introduction to Indian philosophy. Calcutta : University of Calcutta 1939.
    Seventh edition 1968
56. Chatterjee Satischandra. The Nyaya theory of knowledge. A critical study of some problems of logic and metaphysics. Calcutta: University of Calcutta 1939.
    Reprinted 1950, 1965 and 1978.
57. Cox Collett, "From category to ontology: the changing role of Dharma In Sarvastivada Abhidharma," Journal of Indian Philosophy 32: 543-597 (2004).
58. Dasgupta Probal, "Modern Indian work at the logic-linguistics boundary," Journal of Indian Philosophy 9: 217-225 (1981).
    "The mainstream Western logico-linguistic assumption that wh-words ("who", "when",...) in constituent questions manifest a wh-quantifier reflects features of Western languages, which position wh-words clause-initially. Languages like Sanskrit, Hindi, and Bangla form indefinite expressions systematically by adding an existential element to interrogative K-words, suggesting that K expresses a variable and not a quantifier. Further probing indicates that existential and universal quantifiers are based respectively on free and bound variables. Independent linguistic arguments show that these proposals work better than the quantifier theory of questions even for Western languages. Frege and Felix Cohen have, on logical grounds, already argued for a variable theory."
59. Dasgupta Surendranath. A history of Indian philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1922.
    Five volumes.
    Reprinted Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1975.
60. Dasgupta Surendranath. Philosophical essays. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1982.
61. Daye Douglas Dunsmore, "Circularity in the inductive justification of formal arguments (Tarka) in the Twelfth-century Indian Jaina logic," Philosophy East and West 29 (2): 177-188 (1979).
62. Dixit Krishna Kumar. Indian Logic. Its Problems as Treated by Its Schools. Vaishali (Muzaffarpur): Research Institute of Prakrit, Jainology, and Ahimsa 1975. pp.
63. Dixit Krishna Kumar. Jaina ontology. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology 1971.
64. Dravid Raja Ram. The problem of Universals in Indian philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1972.
    Second revised edition 2001.
65. Faddegon Barend. The Vaiçesika-system, described with the help of the oldest texts. Amsterdam: J. Muller 1918.
    Rreprinted Wiesbaden, M. Sändig, 1969.
66. Frauwallner Erich. History of Indian philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1973.
    Introduction by Leo Gabriel. Translated from the original German (1953) by V. M. Bedekar.
    Two volumes: 1. The philosophy of the Veda and of the Epic. The Buddha and the Jina. The Samkhya and the classical Yoga-system.. 2. The nature-philosophical Schools and the Vaisesika system. The system of the Jaina. The Materialism.
67. Frauwallner Erich, "Landmarks in the history of Indian logic," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie für das indologische Institut der Universität Wien 5: 125-148 (1961).
68. Ganeri Jonardon, "Ancient Indian logic as a theory of case-based reasoning," Journal of Indian Philosophy 31: 33-45 (2003).
69. Ganeri Jonardon, "Meaning and reference in Classical India," Journal of Indian Philosophy 24: 1-19 (1996).
    "In another paper, I discussed the grammarian Vyadi's realist' theory of meaning, and showed how its failure to distinguish between the concepts of meaning' and reference' laid open his theory to a series of powerful objections. Later grammarians and Naiyayikas were forced to seek new, more sophisticated, accounts of the semantics of proper names and nominals, and in doing so introduced important innovations in the theory of meaning. I would like in this paper to discuss the contributions of these authors, especially to our understanding of the relation between the meaning of a term and its reference, and to the semantics of context-sensitive expressions."
70. Ganeri Jonardon. Philosophy in classical India: the proper work of reason. New York: Routledge 2001.
71. Ganeri Jonardon. Semantic powers. Meaning and the means of knowing in classical Indian philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1999.
72. Ganeri Jonardon, "The Hindu syllogism: Nineteenth-Century perceptions of Indian logical thought," Philosophy East and West 46 (1): 1-16 (1986).
    "Following H. T. Colebrooke's 1824 'discovery' of the Hindu syllogism, his term for the five-step inference schema in the Nyaya-Sutra, European logicians and historians of philosophy demonstrated considerable interest in Indian logical thought. This is in marked contrast with later historians of philosophy, and also with Indian nationalist and neo-Hindu thinkers like Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan, who downgraded Indian rationalist traditions in favor of 'spiritualist' or 'speculative' texts. This article traces the role of these later thinkers in the origins of the myth that Indian thought is spiritual and a-rational. The extent to which Nineteenth-century European philosophers were aware of Colebrooke's 'discovery' is documented, and then their criticisms of the Hindu syllogism and its defense by orientalists like Ballantyne and Muller are examined."
73. Ganeri Jonardon, "Vyadi and the realist theory of meaning," Journal of Indian Philosophy 23: 403-428 (1995).
    "Vyadi, a celebrated Indian linguist, endorses a version of the realist theory of meaning, that the meaning of a word is the object for which it stands. As applied to generic nominals like " (the) cow", Vyadi's thesis faced two much rehearsed objections: 1) if, for each token utterance, a separate meaning rule must be given, then the number of such rules will be "limitless", and the word will be radically homonymous; 2) if only some finite set is given, use of the word to refer outside this set will be "aberrant". These arguments significantly resemble certain Davidsonian constraints on a theory of meaning. The application of Vyadi's theory to proper names is also examined."
74. Gangopadhyay Mrinal Kanti. Indian logic in its sources. On validity of inference. New Delhi: Munhsiram Monoharlal 1984.
75. Gangopadhyay Mrinal Kanti, "The concept of Upadhi in Nyaya logic," Journal of Indian Philosophy 1: 146-166 (1971).
76. Gerow Edwin, "Language and symbol in Indian semiotics," Philosophy East and West 34 (3): 245-260 (1984).
77. Gillon Brendan S. Negative facts and knowledge of negative facts. In Relativism, suffering and beyond. Essays in memory of Bimal K. Matilal. Edited by Bilimoria Purusottama and Mohanty Jitendra Nath. New Delhi: Oxford University Press 1997. pp. 128-149
    "Negative facts have perplexed Western philosophers ever since the time of Plato.' But the philosophers of Europe and America have not been the only philosophers to have been perplexed by them; classical Indian philosophers too have pondered their nature. My interest here is to explore how the reflections of these classical Indian philosophers, transposed into the contemporary philosophical idiom, might enrich current metaphysical thinking about negative facts; and what I shall conclude is that at least one of these philosophers has a view of negative facts and knowledge of them, which, when so transposed, is very plausible indeed.
    I shall begin by asking the fundamental ontological question of whether or not negative facts exist and then sketch various replies which European and American philosophers have given to it. Since these replies have not led to any decisive answer to the question, I shall then ask two other questions: the more specific ontological question of whether or not absences-surely paradigmatic examples of negative facts-exist; and the related epistemological question of what is known when the absence of something is said to be known. Answers to these questions comprise an important part of classical Indian philosophy; and I shall outline their answers to them, concluding that the most plausible answers to these questions are those of Jayanta Bhatta, who maintained that absences do indeed exist and that they are known not only by inference but also by perception."
78. Glashoff Klaus, "On Stanislaw Schayer's research on Nyaya," Journal of Indian Philosophy 32: 295-319 (2004).
79. Gokhale Pradeep P. Inference and fallacies in ancient Indian logic: with special reference to Nyaya Buddhism. New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications 1992.
80. Gokhale Pradeep P., "The terms Padartha and Prameya in the context of Nyayasutra," Philosophy East and West 32 (2): 207-211 (1982).
    "In this paper an attempt has been made to show that the Vaisesika concept of "padartha" as 'a type of object in this world' is not properly applicable to the sixteen terms mentioned by Gautama in Nyaya-Sutra III. Traditionally "artha" (in Gautama's list of "prameyas") was identified with "padartha" of Vaisesika's. But identification of Gautama's "prameya" or "artha" with Vaisesika "padartha" is misleading. The sixteen terms of Nyaya are also not 'categories' in the technical sense. Gautama's definition of 'padartha' has linguistic import rather than ontological."
81. Gopalan Subramania. Outlines of Jainism. New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Private 1973.
82. Gradinarov Plamen. Phenomenology and Indian epistemology: studies in Naya-Vaisesika transcendental logic and atomism. New Delhi: Ajanta Books International 1990.
83. Grimes John. A concise dictionary of Indian philosophy. Sanskrit terms defined in English. Albany: State University of New York Press 1989.
    New and revised edition 1996.
84. Guha Dinesh Chandra. Navya Nyaya system of logic. (Some basic theories and techniques). Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasan 1968.
    Second revised edition with the title: Navya Nyaya System of logic: theories and techniques - Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1979.
85. Gupta Bina, "Are "Hetvabhasas" formal fallacies?," Journal of Indian Philosophy 8: 135-147 (1980).
    "The first part of the paper examines the "Hetvabhasas" of the Nyaya school. The second part analyzes the differences between Indian and Western conceptions of fallacy and deals with the question whether the Indian account of the "Hetvabhasas" is totally devoid of the notion of formal fallacy as it is understood in the West. I have suggested that though the "completed" Nyaya inference includes the properties of formal validity, the notion of "Hetvabhasa" presents only the necessary conditions for satisfactorily completing such an inferential process. Thus, while the Nyaya inference adequately accounts for the validity of the final "product" of inference, the Nyaya "Hetvabhasas" account for the inferential process leading up to a sound product of inference."
86. Halbfass Wilhelm. India and Europe: an essay in understanding. Albany: State University of New York Press 1988.
    Translation of: Indien und Europa. Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung - Stuttgart, Schwabe, 1981.
87. Halbfass Wilhelm. On being and what there is. Classical Vaisesika and the history of Indian ontology. Albany: State University of New York Press 1992.
88. Hamilton Sue. Indian philosophy. A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001.
89. Ho Chien Hsing, "How not to avoid speaking -- "A free exposition of Dignaga's Apoha doctrine"," Journal of Indian Philosophy 24: 541-562 (1996).
90. Houben Jan E.M. Language and thought in the Sanskrit tradition. In History of the language sciences. An international handbook on the evolution of the study of language from the Beginnings to the Present. Edited by Auroux Sylvain et al. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2000. pp. 146-156
    Vol. 1
91. Houben Jan E.M. The establishment of Sanskrit tradition. In History of the language sciences. An International handbook on the evolution of the study of language from the beginnings to the present. Vol. I. Edited by Auroux Sylvain et al. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2000. pp. 113-157
92. Ingalls Daniel Henry Holmes, "A reply to Bhattacharya," Philosophy East and West 5 (2): 163-166 (1955).
93. Ingalls Daniel Henry Holmes. Materials for the study of Navya-Nyaya logic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1951.
94. Jha Ujjwala. Mimamsa philosophy of language. Delhi: SRI Satguru Publications 2002.
95. Jha Vashishtha Narayan. Relations in Indian philosophy. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications 1992.
96. Joshi N.V. Indian philosophy: from the ontological point of view. Bombay : Somalya Publications 1977.
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