Selected Bibliography on the History of Renaissance and Modern Logic

 

Detailed Index of the Section "History of Logic in Relationship to Ontology"

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Logic and the workings of the mind. The logic of ideas and faculty psychology in early modern philosophy. Edited by Easton Patricia A. Atascadero: Ridgeview 1997.
2. The medieval heritage in early modern metaphysics and modal theory, 1400-1700. Edited by Friedman Russell L. and Nielsen Luge O. Dordrecht : Kluwer 2003.
3. The rise of modern logic: from Leibniz to Frege. Edited by Gabbay Dov and Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2004.
   Handbook of the History of Logic: vol. 3.
   Contents: Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods: Preface VII; List of Contributors IX-X; Wolfgang Lenzen: Leibniz's logic 1; Mary Tiles: Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic 85; John W. Burbidge: Hegel's logic 131; Paul Rusnock and Rolf George; Bolzano as logician 177; Richard Tieszen: Husserl's logic 207; Theodore Hailperin: Algebraical logic 1685-1900 323; Victor Sanchez Valencia: The algebra of logic 389; Ivor Grattan-Guinness: The mathematical turn in logic 545; Volker Peckhaus: Schröder's logic 557; Risto Hilpinen: Peirce's logic 611; Peter M. Sullivan: Frege's Logic 659; Index 751-770.
4. British logic in the Nineteenth century. Edited by Gabbay Dov and Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2008.
   Handbook of the History of Logic: vol. 4.
   Contents: Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods: Preface VII; List of Contributors XIII-XIV; Gordon R. McOuat and Charissa S. Varma: Bentham's logic 1; Tim Manes: Coleridge's logic 33; James Van Evra: Richard Whately and logical lheory 75; Ralph Jessop: The logic of Sir William Hamilton: tunnelling through sand to place the keystone in the Aristotelic arch 93; Laurta J. Snyder:
   "The whole box of tools": William Whewell and the logic of induction 163; Fred Wilson: The logic of John Stuart Mill 229; Michael E. Hobart and Joan L. Richards: De Morgan's logic 283; Dale Jacquette: Boole's logic 331; Maria Panteki: French 'Logique' and British 'Logic': on the origins of Augustus de Morgan's early logical enquiries, 1805-1835 381; Amirouche Moktefi: Lewis Carroll's logic 457; James Van Evra: John Venn and logical theory 507; Bert Mosselmans and Ard van Moer: William Stanley Jevons and the substitution of similars 515; Shahid Rahman and Juan Redmond: Hugh McColl and the birth of logical pluralism 533; David Sullivan: The Idealists 605; William J. Mander: Bradley's logic 663; Index 719-735.
5. Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic. Edited by Gabbay Dov and Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2008.
   Handbook of the History of Logic: vol. 2.
   Contents: Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods: Preface VII; List of Contributors IX; John Marenbon: Logic before 1100: the Latin tradition 65; Ian Wilks: Peter Abelard and his contemporaries 83; Terence Parsons: The development of Supposition Theory in the later 12th through 14th centuries 157; Henrik Lagerlund: The assimilation of Aristotelian and Arabic logic up to the later thirteenth century 281; Ria van der Lecq: Logic and theories of meaning in the late 13th and early 14th century including the Modistae 347; Gyula Klima: The nominalist semantic of Ockham and Buridan: a 'rational reconstruction' 389; Catarina Dutilh Novaes: Logic in the 14th century after Ockham 433; Simo Knuuttila: Medieval modal theories and modal logic 505; Mikko Yrjönsuuri: Treatments of the paradoxes of self-reference 579; E. Jennifer Ashworth: Developments in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 609; Peter Dvorák: Relational logic of Juan Caramuel 645; Russell Wahl: Port-Royal: the stirrings of modernity 667; index 701.
6. Anellis Irving and Houser Nathan. Nineteenth century roots of algebraic logic and universal algebra. In Algebraic logic. Edited by Andréka H., Monk J.D., and Németi I. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1991. pp. 1-36
7. Angelelli Ignacio, "The techniques of disputation in the history of logic," Journal of Philosophy 67: 800-815 (1970).
   "The aim of this paper is to outline tentatively some aspects of the techniques of disputation in their history, on the basis of some texts. Modern logic ("mathematical" logic) was conceived more geometrico by Frege, who intended to improve upon Euclid essentially by adding an explicit list of rules of inference (Grundgesetze I, p. VI). Thus, the notion of dialectica in the sense of "speech between two," so important in the past, could hardly be found relevant by modern historians of logic, who were guided by the new model. These, in fact, have so far neglected to investigate this portion of the logical heritage.(1) Only recently there has been an increasing interest in the Topica, not extended, however, to the medieval and post-medieval developments. Good old Prantl seems to be still the best source in this respect. Historical works of a more general nature are of very little help even when they abundantly refer to disputation, because the formal aspects are usually overlooked. For example, a direct examination of the sources mentioned by Thurot would be very rewarding, but what Thurot himself says on disputation is simply useless from a technical point of view.(2)
   The dialogical logic developed in the last ten years by Paul Lorenzen and his school provides the needed "modern" motivation to go back to the ars disputandi.(3) Sources for antiquity and for medieval obligationes (a form of disputation) are known. Before 1800 disputation was considered by a very large number of books on logic; after 1800 at least by most neoscholastic treatises. Fortunately, in recent years bibliographical research in the history of logic has increased so much (4) that now we also know of a small, yet interesting list of postmedieval (second-scholastic) works especially devoted to the theory of disputation."
   
   (1) There are hardly any references in the most distinguished works on the history of logic. In E. Moody's The Logic of William of Ockham (London: Sheed & Ward, 1935), the topic of obligations is considered "not very relevant to logic" 294.
   (2) Charles Thurot, De l'Organisation de l'enseignement dans l'Universiteé de Paris au Moyen Age (Paris: E. Magdeleine, 1850); pp. 87-90 for the disputes.
   (3) Paul Lorenzen, Normative Logic and Ethics (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1967); Kuno Lorenz. "Dialogspiele als Semantische Grundlage von Logik-kalkulen," Archiv fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung (1966).
   (4) Above all W. Risse, Bibliographia logica (Hildesheim: 0lms, 1965). Additions in W. Redmond, Bibliography of Philosophy in the Spanish-Portuguese Colonies (The Hague: Nijhoff, forthcoming) [publlished in 1972 wit the title: Bibliography of the philosophy in the Iberian colonies of America]; L. Hickman, Late Scholastic Logic: Another Look; to appear in Journal of the History of Philosophy [1971, 9 pp. 226-234]
8. Angelelli Ignacio, "Aristotelian-Scholastic ontology and predication in the Port-Royal logic," Medioevo: Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale 24: 283-310 (1998).
9. Angelelli Ignacio. Predication theory: classical vs modern. In Relations and Predicates. Edited by Hochberg Herbert and Mulligan Kevin. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2004. pp. 55-80
   "This essay aims, first, at describing the conflict between the theory of predication (classical, Aristotelian) prevailing in philosophy until the end of the 19th century, and the theory arisen with the new logic (modern, Fregean). Three features characterize the pre- Fregean period: 1) conflation of predication and subordination (extensionally: membership and class-inclusion), 2) conflation of identity and predication, 3) the view of quantificational phrases (e.g. "some men") as denoting phrases. A possible fourth feature is suggested by the consideration of the so-called Locke's "general triangle". Most of the paper is devoted to the first feature, also called the "principal" one, stated by Aristotle. Frege seems to be the first, in 1884, to reject the first feature; he E ISO rejected, not less vehemently, the second and the third features. Fregean predication theory became standard, and just taken for granted in the subsequent developments of logic as well as in the mainstream of philosophy. The second aim of this paper is to evaluate- relative to the notion of predication submitted in section I - the conflict between the two traditions, and to determine if both are somehow right, or one is right and the other wrong. The main result is that the Fregean revolution in predication theory is, at least with regard to the first and second features of the classical view, a clarification that would probably be welcomed by the classical authors themselves (pace Hintikka's "logic of being")."
10. Ashworth Earline Jennifer. Language and logic in the Post-Medieval period. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company 1974.
    This book is the first attempt to provide a general introduction to the type of logical inquiry pursued in Europe after 1429 by means of a systematic presentation of the doctrines which were actually written about and taught. It radically alters traditional views of the period by demonstrating that not only were medieval doctrines still of overriding importance at the beginning of the sixteenth century, but that they continued to be discussed in many European universities at least until the mid-seventeenth century.
    
    TABLE OF CONTENTS; PREFACE IX; NOTE ABOUT ABBREVIATIONS XIII; ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XV; CHAPTER I - HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 1; l. The Publication of Medieval Works 2; 2. Scholasticism in Italy and Germany 4; 3. Scholasticism in France and Spain 5; 4.Humanism 8; 5. Rudolph Agricola and His Influence 10; 6. Petrus Ramus and His Influence 15; 7. Seventeenth Century Logic: Eclecticism 17; 8. Humanism and Late Scholasticism in Spain 19; 9. Other Schools of Logic 20; 10. A Note on Terminology 22; CHAPTER II / MEANING AND REFERENCE 26; I. The Nature of Logic 26; 1. The Contents of Logical Text-books 26; 2. The Definition of Logic 29; 3. The Object of Logic 32; II. Problems of Language 37; 1. Terms: Their Definition and Their Main Divisions 38; 2. The Relationship between Mental, Spoken and Written Terms 42; 3. Other Divisions of Terms 45; 4. Sense and Reference 47; 5. Propositions and their Parts 49; 6. Sentence-Types and Sentence-Tokens 52; 7. Complex Signifiables and Truth 55; 8. Other Approaches to Truth 62; 9. Possibility and Necessity 66; III. SUPPOSITION THEORY 77; 1. Supposition, Acceptance and Verification 78; 2. Proper, Improper, Relative and Absolute Supposition 82; 3. Material Supposition 83; 4. Simple Supposition 84; 5. Natural Personal Supposition 88; 6. Ampliation 89; 7. Appellation 92; IV. SEMANTIC PARADOXES 101; 1. Problems Arising from Self-Reference 101; 2. Solution One: Self-Reference Is Illegitimate 104; 3. Solution Two: All Propositions Imply Their Own Truth 106; 4. Solution Three: Insolubles Assert Their Own Falsity 108; 5. Solution Four: Two Kinds of Meaning 110; 6. Solution Five: Two Truth-Conditions 112; 7. Later Writing on Insolubles 114; CHAPTER III / FORMAL LOGIC. PART ONE: UNANALYZED PROPOSITIONS 118; I. THE THEORY OF CONSEQUENCE 120; 1. The Definition of Consequence 120; 2. The Definition of Valid Consequence 121; 3.Formal and Material Consequence 128; 4. 'Ut Nunc' Consequence 130; 5. The Paradoxes of Strict Implication 133; 6. Rules of Valid Consequence 136; II. PROPOSITIONAL CONNECTIVES 147; 1. Compound Propositions in General 147; 2. Conditional Propositions 149; 3A. Rules for Illative Conditionals 154; 3B. Rules for Promissory Conditionals 156; 4. Biconditionals 156; 5. Conjunctions 157; 6. Disjunctions 161; 7. De Morgan's Laws 166; 8. Other Propositional Connectives 177; III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RULES FOUND IN SOME INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS 171; 1. Paris in the Early Sixteenth Century 171; 2. Oxford in the Early Sixteenth Century 181; 3. Germany in the Early Sixteenth Century 183; 4. Spain in the Third Decade of the Sixteenth Century 184; 5. Spain in the Second Part of the Sixteenth Century 184; 6. Germany in the Early Seventeenth Century 185; CHAPTER IV / FORMAL LOGIC. PART TWO: THE LOGIC OF ANALYZED PROPOSITIONS 187; I. The Relationships Between Propositions 189; 1. The Quality and Quantity of Propositions 189; 2. Opposition 192; 3. Equipollence 194; 4. Simple and Accidental Conversion 195; 5. Conversion by Contraposition 199; II. Supposition Theory and Quantification 207; 1. The Divisions of Personal Supposition 207; 2. Descent and Ascent 213; III. Categorical Syllogisms 223; 1. Figures and Modes 224; 2. How to Test the Validity of a Syllogism 230; 3. Proof by Reduction 239; 4. Syllogisms with Singular Terms 247; APPENDIX / LATIN TEXTS 253; BIBLIOGRAPHY 282; 1. Primary Sources 282; 2. Secondary Sources on the History of Logic 1400-1650 291; INDEX OF NAMES 297.
11. Ashworth Earline Jennifer. Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics. London: Variorum Reprints 1985.
    Reprint of 12 essays already published.
    
    CONTENTS: Preface;
    REFERENCE IN INTENSIONAL CONTEXTS; I 'For Riding is Required a Horse": A Problem of Meaning and Reference in Late fifteenth and Early sixteenth Century Logic - Vivarium XII. 1974; II I Promise you a Horse": A Second Problem of Meaning and Reference in Late fifteenth and Early sixteenth Century Logic (Parts 1 & 2) - Vivarium XIV. 1976; III Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in the Post-Medieval Theory of Signification - Vivarium XV. 1977;
    PROPOSITIONS AND MENTAL LANGUAGE
    IV Theories of the Proposition: Some Early sixteenth Century Discussions - Franciscan Studies 38. 1978 (1981); V The Structure of Mental Language: Some Problems Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians - Vivarium XX. 1982; VI Mental Language and the Unity of Propositions: A Semantic Problem Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians - Franciscan Studies 41. 1981 (1984);
    SCHOLASTIC INFLUENCES ON JOHN LOCKE
    VII "Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?" The Scholastic Sources of Locke's Theory of Language - Journal of the History of Philosophy XIX. 1981; VIII Locke on Language - Canadian Journal of Philosophy XIV/1. 1984;
    LOGICAL ANALYSIS
    IX The Doctrine of Exponibilia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries - Vivarium XI. 1973; X Multiple Quantification and the Use of Special Quantifiers in Early Sixteenth Century Logic - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic XIX. 1978;
    SEMANTIC PARADOXES
    XI Thomas Bricot (d. 1516) and the Liar Paradox - Journal of the History of Philosophy XV. 1977; XII Will Socrates Cross the Bridge? A Problem in Medieval Logic - Franciscan Studies 46. 1976 (1977);
    Addenda et Corrigenda; Index
12. Ashworth Earline Jennifer. Traditional logic. In The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy. Edited by Schmitt Charles B. and Skinner Quentin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988. pp. 143-172
    "I outline the developments and changes in logic and logic teaching between 1350 and 1600, paying attention to the survival of medieval doctrines and to the renewed Aristotelianism of the sixteenth century. I also discuss the philosophy of language in the same period, paying attention to speculative grammar, to the doctrines of signs and signification, and to the clash between medieval doctrines of conventional signification and the new renaissance interest in the idea of a naturally significant spoken language."
13. Ashworth Earline Jennifer. Developments in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic. Edited by Gabbay Dov and Woods John. Amsterdam: Elsevier 2008. pp. 609-644
    Handbook of the history of logic: Vol. 2.
    
    "To understand the significance of these developments for the logician, we have to consider three questions. First, how much of the medieval logic described in the previous chapters survived? Second, insofar as medieval logic survived, were there any interesting new development in tit? Third, does humanist logic offer an interesting alternative to medieval logic?
    In Part One of this chapter I shall consider the first two questions in the context of a historical overview in which I trace developments in logic from the later middle ages thorough to 1606, the year in which the Jesuits of Coimbra published their great commentary on Aristotle's logical works, the Commentarii Conimbricenses in Dialecticam Aristotelis. I shall begin by considering the Aristotelian logical corpus, the six books of the Organon, and the production of commentaries on this work. I shall the examine the fate of the specifically medieval contributions to logic. Finally, I shall discuss the textbook tradition, and the ways in which textbooks changes and developed during the sixteenth century. I shall argue that the medieval tradition in logic co-existed for some time with the new humanism, that sixteenth century is dominated by Aristotelianism, and that what emerged at the end of the sixteenth century was not so much a humanist logic as a simplified Aristotelian logic.
    In Part Two of this chapter, I shall ask whether the claims made about humanist logic and its novel contributions to probabilistic and informal logic have nay foundation. I shall argue that insofar as there is any principled discussion of such matters, it is to be found among writers in the Aristotelian tradition." p. 610
14. Auroux Sylvain. La logique des idées. Paris: Vrin 1993.
15. Barone Francesco. Logica formale e trascendentale. Torino: Edizioni di Filosofia 1957.
    Vol. I: Da Leibniz a Kant (1957); Vol. II: L'algebra della logica (1965).
    Nuova edizione con una nuova introduzione dell'autore ed un aggiornamento bibliografico a cura di Enrico Moriconi e Arianna Corotti, Milano, Unicopli, 1999 (vol. I) e 2000 (vol II).
16. Bellissima Fabio and Pagli Paolo. Consequentia mirabilis. Una regola logica tra matematica e filosofia. Firenze: Olschki 1996.
17. Beth Evert Willem, "Hundred years of symbolic logic. A retrospect on the occasion of the Boole-de Morgan centenary," Dialectica: 331-346 (1947).
18. Broadie Alexander. The Circle of John Mair. Logic and logicians in Pre-Reformation Scotland. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1985.
19. Buickerood James, "The natural history of the Understanding: Locke and the rise of facultative logic in the Eighteenth Century," History and Philosophy of Logic 6: 157-190 (1985).
20. Ceñal Ramón, "La historia de la lógica en España y Portugal de 1500 a 1800," Pensamiento 28: 277-319 (1972).
21. Cosenza Paolo. Logica formale e antiformalismo (Da Aristotele a Decartes). Napoli: Liguori Editori 1987.
22. Coxito Amândio A. Lógica, semântica e conhecimento na Escolastica Peninsular pré-Renascentista. Coimbra: Biblioteca Geral da Universidade 1981.
23. Croizer Jacques. Les héritiers de Leibniz. Logique et philosophie, de Leibniz à Russell. Paris: L'Harmattan 2001.
24. Frisch Joseph C. Extension and Comprehension in logic. New York: Philosophical Library 1969.
    Contents: Foreword by John R. Gallup VII; Introduction XV-XVI; Part I. Historical survey. Chapter I. Modern logicians (1662-1966) 1; Chapter II. Medieval and ancient logicians (1658-530 B.C.) 78; General summary of Chapter I and II 124; Part II: A doctrinal survey. Chapter III. An essay in doctrine 129; 1. Non-logical meanings of 'extension' 129; 2. Non-logical meanings of 'comprehension' 135; 3. Extension and comprehension with reference to the theory of knowledge 142; 4. Extension and comprehension in logic 149; 5. General summary of Chapter III 172; Epilogue 177; Appendix I. Grammatical sources 179; Appendix II: Different terminology and meanings 183; Bibliography 215; Footnotes 243-293.
    
    "The purpose of this work is to analyze what has been frequently described by logicians as the extension and comprehension of concepts. Even if there is a justification for extension and comprehension in logic, it may be questioned whether there are any concomitant dangers since one historian of logic claims that this distinction has done more harm than good. Can it be said that the importance of extension and comprehension has been magnified out of proportion to the other parts of logic? Would it be more advantageous to correlate extension and comprehension with the predicables, or would it be better to try to eliminate the distinction altogether?
    It is the aim of this study to explore the distinction existing between extension and comprehension, to ascertain whether such distinction is justifiable, where it should be placed in a treatise on logic, and how it should be presented. These are questions which should be answered if one intends to have a thorough grasp of logic.
    This treatise will be divided into two parts. The first part will be subdivided into two chapters. Chapter I will examine the writings of modern logicians starting from 1662. Chapter II will treat of the works of classical and ancient authors in a reverse order of time starting from 1658. The second part will present an evaluation of extension and comprehension as a doctrine of logic.
    It might be stated briefly here that the conclusion of this treatise hopes to present as probable the following declarations: (1) Extension and comprehension are basically an Aristotelian distinction. (2) Extension and comprehension are closely allied with the predicables. A logician cannot have a proper understanding of the former without a thorough understanding of the latter. (3) Any well-organized treatise on logic should begin with a study of the predicables.
    The method of the first part which will be employed in this research is the empirical, or a posteriori, method. This particular mode is characteristic of all historical research. On the other hand,
    the deductive, or a priori, method is unsound because it would oblige one to posit a principle according to which all subsequent facts ought to correspond. There is a constant danger associated with such procedure, namely, the tendency to misstate or distort historical facts for the sake of preserving a methodic balance. However, inasmuch as the second part involves an evaluation, both the a posteriori and a priori methods will be utilized.
    Perhaps it will seem strange to the reader to discover that in the initial historical research, the philosophical works of modern logicians will be examined in a chronological order, whereas, when attention is turned to the classical and ancient authors, the order of time will be reversed for this historical research. This mode of procedure was not adopted in any haphazard manner, nor was it introduced merely for the sake of adding variety to the presentation of the study. Inasmuch as the historical evidence on the distinction of extension and comprehension is limited and oftentimes confusing, it was not deemed feasible to begin the investigation at the very moment when the reality underlying the distinction was first discovered and introduced into logic so as to trace its development in one chronological direction. Instead it seemed more reasonable to select one source of information to which many modern authors had recourse and by which they were greatly influenced. It was not difficult to make such a choice. The text which was cited most frequently and which influenced modern logicians was none other than the Port Royal Logic (1662)."
25. Giard Luce, "Du latin médiéval au pluriel des langues, le tournant de la Renaissance in logique et grammaire," Histoire, Epistémologie, Langage 6: 35-55 (1984).
    "L'Auteur étudie la manière dont, dans l'Europe de la Renaissance, les relations entre langue, logique et grammaire se sont modifiées, passant de l'étude du latin et des modèles logiques d'analyse à la pluralité des approches des langues vernaculaires prônées par les Humanistes."
26. Giard Luce, "La production logique de l'Angleterre au XVI siècle in Bacon," Études Philosophiques: 303-324 (1985).
    "La production logique éditée en Angleterre, majoritairement rédigée en latin, est analysée en quatre blocs: l'héritage médiéval de grammaire modiste et de logique, le renouveau aristotélicien progressif, la querelle ramiste, enfin les premiers traités en anglais."
27. Hailperin Theodore, "The development of probability logic from Leibniz to MacColl," History and Philosophy of Logic 9: 131-191 (1988).
28. Hickman Larry, "Late Scholastics logics: another look," Journal of the History of Philosophy 9: 226-234 (1971).
29. Hickman Larry. Modern theories of higher level predicates. Second intentions in the Neuzeit. München: Philosophia Verlag 1980.
30. Howell Wilbur Samuel. Logic and rhetoric in England, 1500-1700. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1956.
    Contents: Prefgace V-VII;m 1. Introduction 3; 2. Scholastic logic 12; 3. Traditional rhetoric: the three patterns 64; 4. The English Ramists 146; 5. Counterreform: systematics an neo-Ciceronians 282; 6. New horizons in logic and rhetoric 342; Index 399-411.
    
    "Logic, conceived today as the science of validity of thought, and as the term for the canons and criteria that explain trustworthy inferences, was in the English Renaissance a theory not so
    much of thought as of statement. For all practical purposes, the distinction between thoughts and statements is not a very real distinction, since the latter are merely the reflection of the former, and the former cannot be examined without recourse to the latter. But what distinction there is consists in a differentiation between mental phenomena and linguistic phenomena, the assumption being that the thing to which either set of phenomena refers is reality Itself. Logicians of the twentieth century are primarily interested in mental phenomena as an interpretation of the realities of man's environment, and in that part of mental phenomena which we call valid or invalid inference. Logicians of the English Renaissance were primarily interested in statements as a reflection of man's inferences, and in the problem of the valid and invalid statement. Thus Renaissance logic concerned itself chiefly with the statements made by men in their efforts to achieve a valid verbalization of reality. Since such statements were the work of scholars and science, not of laymen, Renaissance logic founded itself upon scholarly and scientific discourse and was in fact the theory of communication in the world of learning. The data upon which this theory rested were all learned tractates of that and earlier times. The theory itself attempted on the one hand to explain the nature of these tractates, as to language, sentence structure, and organization, and on the other to offer assistance to the learner in his effort to master learned communication, as part of his entrance fee to the scientific and philosophical world." p. 3
31. Howell Wilbur Samuel. Eighteenth-century British logic and rhetoric. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971.
    Contents: Preface VII-IX; 1. Introduction 5; 2. The Aristotelian inheritance in logic (1615-1825). I. Some Seventeenth-century Peripatetics 13; II. Bishop Sanderson and the attack on Ramus 16; III. Crakanthorp's Logicae Libri Quinque 22; IV. John Wallis's Institutio Logicae 29; V. Dean Aldrich's famous Artis Logicae Compendium 42; VI. Syllogisms and science: John Sergeant's view 61; 3 The Eighteenth-century Ciceronians (1700-1759). 1. Rhetoric as the counterpart of logic 75; II. John Ward's Lectures at Gresham College 83; III. John Holmes's The Art of Rhetoric Made Easy 125; IV. Separative tensions in rhetoric: a retrospect 142; 4 The British elocutionary movement (1702-1806). I. Rhetorical delivery adopts a new name 145; II. Some reflections on a semantic problem 147; III: Why delivery aroused urgent interest 152; IV. Continental backgrounds of British elocution 160; V. Le Faucheur's Traitté in England 164; VI. Betterton: Major actor as minor elocutionist 182; VII. Some rules for speaking and action 190; VIII. Orator Henley: preacher, elocutionist, merry-andrew 193; IX. Mason's Essay on Elocution 204; X. Action proper for the pulpit 209; XI. Sheridan: minor actor as major elocutionist 214; XII. Burgh, Herries, Walker, Austin 244; 5.The new logic (1690-1814). I. Seven points of friction 259; II. John Locke and the new logic 264; III. Other voices: Le Clerc, Crousaz, Watts, Duncan, Wolff 299; IV. The new accent: Reid, Kames, Campbell, Stewart 372; 6 The new rhetoric (1646-1800). I. Rhetoric versus rhetoric: a litigation in six issues 441; II. Voices of the Royal Society: Wilkins, Boyle, Sprat, Glanvill, Locke 448; III. Influences from abroad: Lamy, Fénelon, Rapin, Bouhours, Rollin 503; IV. The new rhetoric comes of age: Adam Smith's Lectures at Edinburgh and Glasgow 536; V. George Campbell and the philosophical rhetoric of the new learning 577; VI. Discordant consensus: Hume, Lawson, Priestley, Blair, Witherspoon 613; 7 Conclusion 695; Index 719-742
    
    "This book undertakes to present an analysis of the major eighteenth-century British writings on logic and rhetoric and to place those writings in a chronological perspective, so that the reader may see them in relation to their antecedents in the seventeenth and their consequents in the nineteenth centuries and also in relation to their influences upon each other. Moreover, this book undertakes, as part of these two objectives, to introduce the reader to the authors of these writings and to make them and their works stand together as partners in an intellectual effort of appreciable size and duration. If history, as Carl Becker observed, is the memory of things said and done, then the present history is an attempt to tell our modern world what the chief British logicians and rhetoricians of the 1700's said when they wrote about their specialties, and what their works mean within the context of their particular time.
    The main conclusion to be drawn from this history is that the changes which took place in logical and rhetorical doctrine between 1700 and i 800 are perhaps best interpreted as responses to the emergence of the new science.
    The old science, as the disciples of Aristotle conceived of it at the end of the seventeenth century, had considered its function to be that of subjecting traditional truths to syllogistic examination, and of accepting as new truth only what could be proved to be consistent with the old. Under that kind of arrangement, traditional logic had taught the methods of deductive analysis, had perfected itself in the machinery of testing propositions for consistency, and had served at the same time as the instrument by which truths could be arranged so as to become intelligible and convincing to other learned men. In short, traditional logic prided itself upon being a theory of learned enquiry and of learned communication. Meanwhile, traditional rhetoric also prided itself upon having a share in these same two offices, its special purpose being to communicate truths through a process which, on the one hand, blended scientific conclusions with popular opinions and manners, and, on the other hand, transmitted that blend to the general populace. For all practical purposes, the differences between logic and rhetoric, within the context of the old science, were derived from the differences between the learned and the popular audience. A good statement of the concepts which governed this view of the relations of these disciplines to each other is contained in the epigraph at the head of this chapter.
    The new science, as envisioned by its founder, Francis Bacon, considered its function to be that of subjecting physical and human facts to observation and experiment, and of accepting as new truth only what could be shown to conform to the realities behind it. Bacon's vision became that of the Royal Society of London, and of similar organizations throughout Europe. The intoxicating novelty and enormous productivity of the new methods of investigation led young scientists and scholars to practice them with increasing sophistication; and logic, which had always claimed anyway to be the theory of enquiry, began to incorporate the new methods into its doctrines and ended by becoming so enamored of them that it allowed them to crowd out its waning interest in the methods of learned communication. Meanwhile, rhetoric began to see itself as the rightful claimant to the methods of learned communication and as the still unrivaled master of the arts of popular discourse; and by making these two activities its new concern, it came ultimately to think of itself as the art which governed all forms of verbal expression, whether popular or learned, persuasive or didactic, utilitarian or aesthetic. Thus in the context of eighteenth-century learning, rhetoric became the sole art of communication by means of language, and logic moved towards the realization that it was destined to become the science of scientific enquiry. A good statement of the concept which controlled these emerging relations of logic and rhetoric to each other was made by John Stuart Mill in the first half of the nineteenth century, and I have quoted it as the epigraph of Chapter 7, although in a real sense it also belongs to this Introduction." pp. 5-6
32. Jardine Lisa, "The place of dialectic teaching in sixteenth century Cambridge," Studies in the Renaissance 21: 31-62 (1974).
33. Jardine Lisa. Humanism and dialectic in sixteenth century Cambridge: a preliminary investigation. In Classical influences on European culture, AD 1500-1700. Edited by Bolgar Robert Ralph. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1976. pp. 141-154
34. Jardine Lisa. Humanism and the theaching of logic. In The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Edited by Kretzmann Norman, Kenny Anthony John Patrick, and Pinborg Jan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982. pp. 797-807
35. Jardine Lisa. Humanistic logic. In The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy. Edited by Schmitt Charles B. and Skinner Quentin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988. pp. 173-198
    "The history of medieval and Renaissance logic has traditionally been the history of the great medieval syllogistic logicians and the fortuna of their innovatory treatments down through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. When historians of logic characterise humanist dialectic as a misguided and non-rigorous intervention which disrupted the smooth development of medieval syllogistic logic, they confirm their own commitment to the interests and techniques pioneered by logicians like William of Sherwood. It is not surprising, then, if these scholars find the very different approach of the humanists trying. They hold up against the 'non-rigorous' humanist treatment of ratiocination, the 'rigour' of a commitment to formal validity as the central focus for the study of logic - a commitment, that is to say, to those fixed patterns of argumentation which guarantee that from any true premises whatsoever one can only infer a true conclusion Humanist treatments of logic, on the other hand, have a good deal in common with the interests of some recent, modern logicians, who have chosen to give a good deal of attention to non-deductive inference, and to 'good' arguments (arguments which can be counted on to win in debate), and the problematic nature of their validity. Like modern logicians they are interested, above all, in 'good' arguments.
    A humanist treatment of logic is characterised by the fundamental assumption that oratio may be persuasive, even compelling, without its being formally valid (or without the formal validity of the argument being ascertainable). It takes the view, therefore, that any significant study of argument (the subject-matter of logic/dialectic) must concern itself equally with argument (strictly, argumentation) which is compelling but not amenable to analysis within traditional formal logic.' It is this fundamental difference of opinion over what is meant by 'compelling' argument which accounts for the dogmatic insistence (on ideological grounds) of the scholastic (and of the historian of scholasticism) that the humanist is a 'grammarian' or a 'rhetorician'. Either term announces that what the humanist is concerned with is not 'rigorous' in the restricted scholastic sense: all discourse not amenable to such 'rigorous' analysis is, for the scholastic, a matter for the grammarian (to parse and construe) or the rhetorician (to catalogue its persuasive devices). It is in the same spirit that humanists always refer to their study of ratiocination as 'dialectic' (reasoning conducted between two interlocutors), rather than as 'logic', to emphasise the active, pragmatic nature of the argumentation which captures their interest." (pp. 175-176, notes omitted)
36. Michael Frederick S. Why logic become epistemology: Gassendi, Port Royal and the Reformation in logic. In Logic and the workings of the mind. The logic of ideas and faculty psychology in early modern philosophy. Edited by Easton Patricia A. Atascadero: Ridgeview 1997. pp. 1-20
37. Mugnai Massimo. Denken und Rechnen: über die Beziehung zwischen Logik und Mathematik in der frühen Neuzeit. In Neuzeitliches Denken. Festschrift für Hans Poser zum 65. Geburtstag. Edited by Abel Günter, Engfer Hans-Jürgen, and Hubig Christoph. Berlin: de Gruyter 2002. pp. 85-100
38. Mugnai Massimo. Logic and mathematics in the 18th century: before and after Christian Wolff. In Wolffiana 1: Macht und Bescheidenheit der Vernunft: Beiträge zur Philosophie Christian Wolffs; Gedenkband für Hans Werner Arndt. Edited by Cataldi Madonna Luigi. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 2005. pp. 97-109
39. Muñoz Delgado Vicente. La lógica nominalista en la Universidad de Salamanca, 1510-1530. Ambiente, literatura, doctrinas. Madrid: Revista Estudios 1964.
40. Muñoz Delgado Vicente, "Logica hispano-portuguesa hasta 1600 (notas bibliográfico-doctrinales)," Repertorio de Historia de las Ciencias Eclesiásticas en España 4: 9-122 (1972).
41. Muñoz Delgado Vicente, "España en la historia de la lógica prerrenacentista (1350-1550)," La Ciudad de Dios 186: 372-394 (1973).
42. Muñoz Delgado Vicente, "La lógica formal y su dimensión histórica," Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia 1: 111-156 (1974).
43. Muñoz Delgado Vicente, "Introducción al patrimonio escolastico de lógica," Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia 2: 45-76 (1975).
44. Muñoz Delgado Vicente, "Lógica hispano-portuguesa e iberoamericana en el siglo XVII," Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofia 9: 279-398 (1982).
45. Nuchelmans Gabriel, "Can a mental proposition change its truth-value? Some 17th-century views," History and Philosophy of Logic 15: 69-84 (1994).
    " In the first half of the seventeenth century the Aristotelian view that the same statement or belief may be true at one time and false at another and, on the other hand, the conception of a mental proposition as a fully explicit thought that lends a definite meaning to a declarative sentence originated a lively debate concerning the question whether a mental proposition can change its truth- value. In this article it is shown that the defenders of a negative answer and the advocates of a positive answer argued on the basis of different notions of what a mental proposition is: one side taking it as more or less equivalent to a specific utterance- meaning and the other side as more or less equivalent to a generic sentence-meaning."
46. Nuchelmans Gabriel. Deductive reasoning. In The Cambridge history of Seventeenth-century philosophy. Edited by Garber Daniel and Ayers Michael. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998. pp. 132-146
    Vol. I
47. Nuchelmans Gabriel. Logic in the Seventeenth century: preliminary remarks and the constituents of the proposition. In The Cambridge history of Seventeenth-century philosophy. Edited by Garber Daniel and Ayers Michael. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998. pp. 103-117
    Vol. I
48. Nuchelmans Gabriel. Proposition and Judgement. In The Cambridge history of Seventeenth-century philosophy. Edited by Garber Daniel and Ayers Michael. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998. pp. 118-131
    Vol. I
49. Peckhaus Volker, "19th century logic between philosophy and mathematics," Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 5: 433-450 (1999).
    "The history of modern logic is usually written as the history of mathematical or, more general, symbolic logic. As such it was created by mathematicians. Not regarding its anticipations in scholastic logic and in the rationalistic era, its continuous development began with George Boole's The Mathematical Analysis of Logic of 1847, and it became a mathematical subdiscipline in the early 20th century. This style of presentation cuts off one eminent line of development, the philosophical development of logic, although logic is evidently one of the basic disciplines of philosophy. One needs only to recall some of the standard 19th century definitions of logic as, e.g., the art and science of reasoning (Whateley) or as giving the normative rules of correct reasoning (Herbart).
    In the paper the relationship between the philosophical and themathematical development of logic will be discussed. Answers to the following questions will be provided:
    1. What were the reasons for the philosophers' lack of interest in formal logic?
    2. What were the reasons for the mathematicians' interest in logic?
    3. What did "logic reform" mean in the 19th century? Were the systems of mathematical logic initially regarded as contributions to a reform of logic?
    4. Was mathematical logic regarded as art, as science or as both?"
50. Picardi Eva. Assertion and assertion sign. In Le teorie delle modalità. Atti del Convegno internazionale di storia della logica. Edited by Corsi Giovanni, Mangione Corrado, and Mugnai Massimo. Bologna: CLUEB 1989. pp. 139-154
51. Proust Joëlle. Questions of form. Logic and the analytic proposition from Kant to Carnap. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1989.
    Original French edition: Questions de forme. Logique et proposition analytique de Kant à Carnap - Paris, Fayard, 1986.
    Translated by Anastasios Albert Brenner.
    
    See the Third Chapter: Bolzano's renovation of analiticity - pp. 49-108.
52. Redmond Walter. La lógica del Siglo de Oro: Una introducción histórica a la lógica. Pamplona: Eunsa 2002.
53. Roncaglia Gino, "Cum Deus calculat -- God's evaluation of possible worlds and logical calculus," Topoi 9: 83-90 (1990).
54. Roncaglia Gino, "Buone e cattive fantasie: la riflessione sugli enti inesistenti nella logica di Bartholomäus Keckermann," Metaxy 13: 80-104 (1992).
55. Roncaglia Gino. Palestra rationis. Discussioni su natura della copula e modalità nella filosofia 'scolastica' tedesca del XVII secolo. Firenze: Olschki 1996.
56. Rossi Paolo. Logic and the Art of Memory. The quest for a Universal Language. New York: Athlone Press 2000.
    Reprinted 2006 by Continuum.
    Original edition: Clavis Universalis. Arti della memoria e logica combninatoria da Lullo a Leibniz - Bologna, Il Mulino, 1983
57. Schuurman Paul. Ideas, mental faculties and method. The logic of ideas of Descartes and Locke and its reception in the Dutch Republic, 1630-1750. Leiden: Brill 2004.
58. Thiel Christian. From Leibniz to Frege: mathematical logic between 1679 and 1879. In Logic, methodology and philosophy of science, VI. Edited by Cohen Jonathan. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1982. pp. 755-770
    Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of logic. methodology and philosophy of science, Hannover 1979.
59. Trentman John A., "The Study of logic and language in England in the early 17th Century," Historiographia Linguistica: 179-201 (1976).
60. Ueberweg Friedrich. System of logic and history of logical doctrines. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1871.
    Translated from the German, with notes and appendices by Thomas M. Lindsay.
    Reprinted by Thoemmes Press 2001.
61. Vasoli Cesare. Profilo della logica umanistica nell'età del Rinascimento. In I miti e gli astri. Napoli: Guida 1974. pp. 247-282
62. Vasoli Cesare. Logica ed 'enciclopedia' nella cultura tedesca del tardo Cinquecento e del primo Seicento. Bartholomaeus Keckermann. In Atti del convegno internazionale di storia della logica. Edited by Abrusci Michele, Casari Ettore, and Mugnai Massimo. Bologna: CLUEB 1983. pp. 97-116
63. Vasoli Cesare. La dialettica e la retorica dell'Umanesimo. "Invenzione" e "Metodo" nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo. Napoli: La Città del sole 2007.
    Nuova edizione riveduta (prima edizione: Milano, Feltrinelli, 1968)
64. Vilkko Risto. A hundred years of logical investigations. Reform efforts of logic in Germany 1781-1879. Paderborn: Mentis 2002.
65. Waswo Richard. Language and meaning in the Renaissance. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987.

 

 

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