by Raul Corazzon - e-mail: rc[at]ontology.co

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For an overview see the Index of the Pages or the Alphabetical Index of the Philosophers: A-F - G-O - P-Z; you can also download the page as or see the Table of Contemporary Ontologists (click on the image to see the PDF file)

Change of Address: The site www.formalontology.it is now at www.ontology.co

Annotated Bibliography on Ancient Stoic Logic and Semiotics (First Part: A - E)

Second Part: F - Z

A detailed Index of the Section "History of Logic in Relationship to Ontology" is available in "Ontological Topics in the History of Philosophy"

EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS OF THE ANCIENT STOICS AND MAIN SOURCES ON STOIC LOGIC

For the Stoic doctrine of the Categories see: Grammar and Philosophy: The Stoic Theory of Categories

For the studies devoted to specific authors see: Stoic Logicians: Diodorus Cronus, Philo of Megara, Chrysippus

1. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. Edited by Arnim Hans Friedrich August von. Stuttgart: Teubner 1903.
   Reprint: München, Leipzig: K.G. Sauri, 2004.
   Vol. I: Zeno et Zenonis discipuli (1905); Vol. II: Chrysippi Fragmenta logica et physica (1903); Vol. III: Chrysippi Fragmenta moralia -- Fragmenta successorum Chrysippi (1903); Vol. IV: Indices conscripsit Maximilianus Adler (1924).
   
   
2. Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker. Edited by Hülser Karlheinz. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog 1987.
   Vol. I: Fragmente 1-368 (1987); Vol. II: Fragmente 369-772 (1987); Vol. III: Fragmente 773-1074 (1987); Vol. IV: Fragmente 1075-1257 (1988).
   
   
3. Baldassarri Mariano. La logica stoica. Testimonianze e frammenti. Como: Litotipografia Malinverno 1984.
   Testi originali con introduzione e traduzione commentata. (Dieci volumi).
   I. Introduzione alla logica stoica (1984); II. Crisippo: il catalogo degli scritti e i frammenti dai papiri (1985); III. Diogene Laerzio (Dalle Vite dei filosofi VII) (1986); IV. Sesto Empirico (Dai Lineamenti pirroniani II, Dal Contro i matematici VIII) (1986); VA. Alessandro di Afrodisia (Dal Commento agli Analitici primi, Dal Commento ai Topici) (1986); VB. Plotino, i Commentatori aristotelici tardi, Boezio (1987); VI. Cicerone (Testi dal Lucullus, dal De Fato, dai Topica) (1986); VIIA. Galeno (Dalla Introduzione alla dialettica) (1986); VIIB. Le Testimonianze minori del sec. II. d.C.: Epitteto, Plutarco, Gellio, Apuleio (1987); VIII. Testimonianze sparse ordinate sistematicamente (1987).
   
   "Il presente lavoro tenta una ricostruzione sintetica della logica stoica considerata nei suoi rapporti storici e nella sua cornice sistematica: non è pertanto una interpretazione della logica stoica nella prospettiva della logica moderna né propriamente una esposizione di un momento della storia della logica, bensì intenderebbe presentare un momento della storia della filosofia.
   In particolare, esso nasce da un decennale contatto con tutte le fonti antiche relative alla logica stoica e vuole introdurre alla lettura di tali fonti. I testi di Crisippo, di Diogene Laerzio, di Sesto Empirico, dei commentatori di Aristotele (innanzitutto di Alessandro di Afrodisia), di Cicerone, degli scrittori del sec. Il d.C. che ci informano sulla logica stoica (innanzitutto di Galeno) sono stati raccolti, ordinati per autore e vagliati, nonché tradotti e commentati; sono state anche raccolte e ordinate secondo il contenuto secondo il quale si sviluppa l'esposizione nel presente lavoro le testimonianze che si trovano sparse nei più vari autori (anche negli autori che si potrebbero ritenere scarsamente significativi), e sono state anch'esse tradotte e commentate." (Dalla Prefazione al primo volume).
   
   
4. Stoici antichi. Torino: Utet 1989.
   Scelta e traduzione italiana di Margherita Isnardi Parente.
   
   
5. Stoici antichi. Tutti i frammenti. Milano: Bompiani 1998.
   Testo greco degli Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta di von Armin e traduzione italiana di Roberto Radice.
   
   
6. Les Stoiciens. Paris: Gallimard 1962.
   Textes choisis et traduits pat Émile Bréhier et édités sous la direction de Pierre-Maxime Schuhl.
   
   
7. Mates Benson. Stoic logic. Berkeley: University of California Press 1953.
   Second edition 1961.
   Appendix A. Translations 95-131.
   
   
8. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Edited by Long Arthur A. and Sedley David N. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987.
   Vol. I: Translations of the principal sources, with philosophical commentary; Vol. II: Greek and Latin texts with notes and bibliography.
   On Stoic logic see: Vol. I: Logic and Semantics. 31. Dialectic and rhetoric p. 183; 32. Definition and division 190; 33. Sayables (lekta) 195; 34. Simple propositions 202; 35. Non-simple propositions 208; 36. Arguments 212; 37. Fallacy 220; 38. Modality 230-236.
   
   
9. The Stoics Reader. Selected Writings and Testimonia. Edited by Inwood Brad and Gerson Lloyd P. Indianapolis: Hackett 2008.
   See Logic and Theory of Knowledge pp. 11-24.
   
   
10. Diogenes Laertii. Vitae Philosophorum. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1964.
    Critical edition of the Greek text by Herbert Strainge Long.
    See the Book VII: Zeno, Ariston, Herillus, Dionysius, Cleanthes, Sphaerus, Chrysippus.
    
    
11. Diogenes Laërtius. Lives of eminent philosophers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1925.
    Translated by R. D. Hicks with the Greek text facing.
    Reprint with an introduction by Herbert Strainge Long, 1972.
    
    
12. Diogène Laërce. Vies et doctrines des Stoïciens. Paris: LGF 2006.
    Traduction, introduction, notes de commentaire, bibliographie, index de Richard Goulet
    
    
13. Filodemo. Storia Dei Filosofi: La Stoà Da Zenone a Panezio (PHerc. 1018). Leiden: Brill 1994.
    Edizione, traduzione e commento a cura di Tiziano Dorandi.
    
    
14. Sexti Empirici opera. Edited by Mutschmann Hermann and Mau Jürgen. Leripzig: Teubner 1912.
    Vol. I: Pyrroneion hypotyposeon libri tres (1912); Vol. II: Adversus dogmaticos libri quinque (Adv. mathem. VII-XI) (1914); Vol. III: Adversus mathematicos libri I-VI (1954) ed. J. Mau.
    Vol. IV: Indices ad vol. I-III adiecit Karel Janácek (1962).
    
    
15. Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians.2005.
    Contents: Acknowledgments VI; Abbreviations VII; Introduction IX; Chronological table XXXI; Further reading XXXII; Note on the text and translation XXXV; Outline of argument XXXVIII; Against the Logicians 1. Book 1 3; Book 2 90; Glossary 184; Parallels between Against the Logicians and other works of Sextus 193; Names referred to in Against the Logicians 196; Subject index 205.
    
    
16. Galeni institutio logica. Edited by Kalbfleish Karl. Leipzig: Teubner 1896.
    
    
17. Galen's Institutio logica. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1964.
    English translation, introduction and commentary by John Spangler Kieffer.
    
    
18. Galien. Traités philosophiques et logiques. Paris: Flammarion 2010.
    Le volume contient cinq traités de Claude Galien: 1. Des textes pour les débutants; 2. Esquisse empirique; 3. De l'expérience médicale; 4. Des sophismes verbaux; 5. Institution logique.
    TRaduction de Jean-Pierre Levet.
    
    
19. The Logic of Apuleius. Edited by Londey David and Johanson Carmen. Leiden: Brill 2010.
    Including a complete Latin text and English translation of the Peri Hermeneias of Apuleius of Madara
    
    
20. Hellenistic Philosophy. Introductory Readings. Edited by Inwood Brad and Gerson Lloyd P. Indianapolis: Hackett 1997.
    Second expanded edition (first edition 1988).
    Chapter II. Stoicism pp. 103-260; see in particular the section Logic and Theory of Knowledge pp. 111-131.
    
    
21. Pearson Alfred Chilton. The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes. London: C. J. Clay & Sons 1891.
    
    
22. Zeno et Zenonis discipuli. Edited by Arnim Hans Friedrich August von. Stuttgart: Teubner 1905.
    
    Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta: Vol. I.
    
    
23. Watanabe Albert Tohru, "Cleanthes Fragments: text and commentary", 1988.
    Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation available at ProQuest Dissertation Express n. AAT 8908885.
    
    
24. Thom Johan Carl. Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2005.
    Text, translation, and commentary.
    
    
25. Chrysippi Fragmenta logica et physica. Edited by Arnim Hans Friedrich August von. Stuttgart: Teubner 1903.
    Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta: Vol. II.
    
    
26. Crönert Wilhelm, "Die Logika Zetemata des Chrysippus und die übrigen Papyri logischen Inhalts aus der herculanensischen Bibliothek," Hermes 36: 548-579 (1901).
    Traduzione italiana di Enrico Livrea in: W. Crönert - Studi Ercolanesi - Napoli, Morano, 1975 pp. 63-101
    
    
27. Del Mastro Gianluca, "Il PHerc. 1380: Crisippo, Opera logica," Cronache Ercolanesi 35: 61-70 (2005).
    "Analisi paleografica di PHerc. 1380 e ricostruzione della subscriptio: si tratta dell'opera "Degli elementi del discorso e della frase" di Crisippo, di argomento logico-dialettico, affine per tema al trattato sulle ambiguità del linguaggio tramandato in PHerc. 307."
    
    
28. Marrone Livia, "Le Questioni logiche di Crisippo (PHerc. 307)," Cronache Ercolanesi 27: 83-100 (1997).
    Critical edition and Italian translation of Chrysippus' work Logika zetemata (Investigations in logic) found in the Herculaneum Papyrus 307
    
    
29. Marrone Livia, "Nuove letture nel PHerc. 307 (Questioni Logiche di Crisippo)," Cronache Ercolanesi 12: 13-18 (1982).
    
    
30. Chrysippe. Oeuvre philosophique. Paris: Les Belles Lettres 2004.
    Édition bilingue (textes grecs et latins, traduction française). Textes traduits et commentés par Richard Dufour.
    Table des matières.
    Tome I: Remerciements IX; Avant-propos XI; Introduction XV; Avertissement LIII; Sur la vie de Chrysippe et témoignages sur ses écrits, n. 1-31 p. 1; Prolégomènes à la philosophie, n. 32-42 p. 43;
    PREMIÈRE PARTIE. LA LOGIQUE (n. 43-51) p. 57.
    Chapitre I. La doctrine de la connaissance (n. 52-112) p. 69; Chapitre II. La dialectique (n. 113-295) p. 141; Chapitre III. La Rhétorique (n. 296-306) p. 391;
    DEUXIÈME PARTIE: LA PHYSIQUE p. 401.
    Chapitre I. Les doctrines fondamentales de la physique (n. 307-535) p. 403;
    Liste des ouvrages de Chrysippe 661; Glossaire 665; Chronologie des écoles philosophiques 673; Bibliographie 675-685.
    Tome II: Chapitre II. sur le monde (n. 536-647) p. 9; Chapitre III. Des corps célestes et des phénomènes atmosphériques (n. 648-707) p. 109; Chapitre IV: Des animaux et des plantes (n. 708-772) p. 157; Chapitre V. De l'âme humaine (n. 773-913) p. 206; Chapitre VI. Sur le destin (n. 914-1014) p. 355; Chapitre VII. Sur la nature des dieux (n. 1015-1110) p. 485; Chapitre VIII. Sur la providence et la nature artiste (n. 1111-1166) p. 567; Chapitre IX. Sur la divination (n. 1167-1195) p. 621; Repères chronologiques des citateurs 649; Bibliographie des citateurs651; Index des notions 671; Index des passages cités 679; Index des personnages 705; Concordances: ce recueil-Long & Sedley 717; Concordances: ce recueil-SVF 719; Concordances: Long & Sedley-ce recueil 729; Concordances: SVF-ce recueil 733-743.
    
    
31. Posidonius. The Fragments. Edited by Kidd Ian G. and Edelstein Ludwig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1972.
    Vol. I.
    See Fragments 42. On Criterion; 43. On General Enquiry Against Hermagora; 44. Introduction to Style; 45. On Conjunctions; and 188. Dialectic: definition; 189. Rhetoric, Classication of status; 190. Cause; 191. Relationa syllogisms; 192. Grammar: etimology; 193. Etymology of Sight; 194. Sight.
    
    
32. Posidonius. The Commentary. Fragments 1-149. Edited by Kidd Ian G. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988.
    Vo. II.1.
    See Commentary to Fragments 42-45 (pp. 189-204).
    
    
33. Posidonius. The Commentary. Fragments 150-293. Edited by Kidd Ian G. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988.
    Vol. II.2.
    See Commentary to Fragments 188-194 (pp. 684-698).
    
    
34. Posidonius. The Translation of the Fragments. Edited by Kidd Ian G. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999.
    Vol. III
    
    

BIBLIOGRAPHIES ON STOICISM

1. Egli Urs. Bibliographie zur Stoischen Sprachwissenschaft (Dialektik). In Die Grammatik der Stoiker. Braunschweig: Vierweg & Sohn 1979. pp. 182-216
   Appendix to the German translation by Karlheinz Hülser of: Rudolf Traugott Schmidt - Stoicorum grammatica - Halle, 1839
   
   
2. Epp Ronald H., "Stoicism bibliography," Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 Suppl.: 125-171 (1985).
   1169 titles.
   "This bibliography cites the most important secondary literature on Stoic philosophy. It is not exhaustive in part because the term Stoic has such a bastardized legacy.
   What has been selected are important contributions to the Stoic tradition as theory and practice. This literature is concentrated in a half dozen modern European languages accessible to English language scholars, and is largely confined to the twentieth century.
   A generous sense of what is philosophical has been employed; works that are exclusively historical, philological, or literary have been excluded. The following forms of scholarship were generally ignored:
   (a) primary sources, translations, and commentaries, (b) encyclopedia and dictionary entries, (c) dissertations, (d) book reviews, and (e) standard histories.
   Several oddities should be noted. All serials titled by a single term (e.g. Phronesis) will be fully cited, whereas multi-term serials (e.g. Classical Quarterly) are abbreviated according to L'Annee Philologique, and listed here with other serials on pages 126-13 1. Since rules of capitalization are varied, I have favored a minimalist approach, and when the work of a single author is collected (e.g. Max Pohlenz's Kleine Schriften), a single citation replaces the separate citations contained therein. Indexes of key English and selected Greek subjects complete user access to this bibliography, and regretably indexes to Latin terms and the primary literature could not be included." (From the Preface by R. H. Epp)
   
   
3. Baldassarri Mariano. Logica stoica: bibliografia. In Studi di filosofia antica II. Como: Libreria Noseda 1993. pp. 139-172
   
   
4. Steinmetz Peter. Die Stoa. In Die Philosophie der Antike. Band 4: Die Hellenistiche Philosophie. Edited by Flashar Hellmut. Basel: Schwabe & Co 1994. pp. 491-716
   Inhalt: Vorbemerkung 491; 33. Die Stoa bis zum Begin der römischen Kaiserzeit im allgemeinen 495; 34. Zenon aus Kition 518; 35. Die Schüler Zenons (I). Persaios aus Kition, Philonides aus Theben, Dionysios aus Herakleia, Ariston aus Chios, Hérillos aus Kalchedon 555; 36. Die Schüler Zenons (II). Kleanthes und Sphairon 566; 37. Chrysippus Soloi 584; 38. Schüler und Nachfolger Chrysipps 626; 39. Panaitios aus Rhodos und seine Schüler 646; 40. Poseidonios aus Apameia 670; 41. Die Stoa in derr Mitte und zweiten Hälfte des 1. Jahrunderts von Christus 706-716.
   
   
5. Gourinat Jean-Baptiste. La dialectique des Stoiciens. Paris: Vrin 2000.
   Bibliographie: Textes antiques 335-341; Textes modernes 341-357.
   
   
6. Gourinat Jean-Baptiste. Bibliographie d'orientation. In Les Stoiciens. Edited by Romeyer Dherbey Gilbert and Gourinat Jean-Baptiste. Paris: Vrin 2005. pp. 545-572
   
   
7. Bibliographie complémentaire. In Les Stoïciens et leur logique. Edited by Brunschwig Jacques. Paris: Vrin 2006. pp. 475-484
   Actes du Colloque de Chantilly 18-22 septembre 1976.
   Première édition 1978; deuxième édition, revue, augmentée et mise à jour (reproduit la pagination de l'édition originale).
   
   "Nous n'avons pas reproduit dans ce volume la bibliographie de la première édition, qui aurait rendu celle-ci pléthorique; nous avons donc laissé à leur place, et sous leur forme initiale, toutes les références antérieures à 1976, telles qu'elles se trouvent dans le texte et dans les notes des articles eux-mêmes. En revanche, nous regroupons ici, par ordre alphabétique des noms des auteurs, les références complètes des études qui ont été mentionnées, sous forme abrégée, dans les compléments apportés aux textes et aux notes par les auteurs et réviseurs de la présente deuxième édition; nous y ajoutons quelques publications récentes particulièrement marquantes. On ne trouvera donc dans ce qui suit, sauf exceptions justifiées par leur importance, que des titres publiés depuis 1976."
   
   

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE STOIC LOGIC

For the studies devoted to specific authors see:

The Dialectical School and the Origins of Propositional Logic

Early Stoic Logicians: Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chrysippus

For the Stoic doctrine of the Categories see:

Grammar and Philosophy: The Stoic Theory of Categories

1. Problems in Stoicism. Edited by Long Anthony Arthur. London: Athlone Press 1971.
   Reprinted 1996.
   Contents: Preface to Reprint (1996) VI; Preface VIII; Corrigenda X; Anthony A. Long: Introduction 1; I. Francis H. Sandbach: Phantasia Kataleptike 9; II. Francis H. Sandbach: Ennoia and Prolépsis 22; III. John M. Rist: Categories and their uses 38; IV. Arthur C. Lloyd: Grammar and metaphysics in the Stoa 58; V. Anthony A. Long: Language and thought in Stoicism 75; VI. E. G. Pembroke Oikeiosis 114; VII. Ian G. Kidd: Stoic intermediates and the end for man 150; VIII. Anthony A. Long: Freedom and determinism in the Stoic theory of human action 173; IX. Ian G. Kidd: Posidonius on emotions 200; X. Gerard Watson: The natural law and Stoicism 216; Select bibliongraphy 239; Indexes 242-257.
   
   "This book brings together a set of papers by different hands on problems in Stoicism. Most of the material is published here for the first time, and it deals with problems of Stoic epistemology, logic, metaphysics and ethics. In more than one sense this book is a statement of work in progress. Several of its topics take up questions already treated in recent literature, and further publications on Stoicism by most of its authors are current or forthcoming. More particularly, half the chapters of the book were presented at a series of seminars in the Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, and we are deeply grateful to its Director, Professor E. W. Handley, for offering us such a congenial forum for discussion and for suggesting publication in this form.
   The problems in Stoicism are vast, and they vary greatly in type over a long period of time. This book makes no claim to treat more than some of them, much less to give a comprehensive account of Stoicism. But its collection of papers does cover topics of considerable philosophical and historical importance, and through the treatment of these much of the coherence and significance of Stoicism as a whole can be seen. Because we are concerned here with a school of Greek philosophy, and its Roman inheritance, part, sometimes a large part, of the discussion turns on matters of philology. But with the help of translation and transliteration it is hoped that the book will be found intelligible and interesting to those who have no knowledge of Greek and Latin. A short bibliography gives full details of most of the works on Stoicism cited in the notes and often referred to there by abbreviated titles." (From the Preface)
   
   
2. The Stoics. Edited by Rist John M. Berkeley: University of California Press 1978.
   Contents: Preface VII; Abbreviations VIII; 1. Ian Mueller: An introduction to Stoic logic 1; Michael Frede: Principles of Stoic grammar 27; Andreas Graeser: The Stoic theory of meaning 77; Anthony A. Long: Dialectic and the Stoic sage 101; George B. Kerferd: What does the wise man know? 125; 6. Robert B. Todd: Monism and immanence: the foundations of Stoic physics 137; Michael Lapidge: Stoic cosmology 161; 8. Margaret E. Reesor: Necessity and fate in Stoic philosophy 187; 9. Charlotte Stough: Stoic determinism and moral responsibility 203; 10. Arthur C. LLoyd: Emotion and decision in Stoic psychology 233; 11. Ian G. Kidd: Moral actions and rules in Stoic Ethics 247; 12. John M. Rist: The Stoic concept of detachment 259; 13. F. E. Sparshott: Zeno on art: anatomy of a definition 273; Bibliography 291-295.
   
   
3. Recovering the Stoics. Edited by Epp Ronald H. Memphis: Memphis University Press 1985.
   Spindel Conference 1984 published in the Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary volume 23.
   Contents: Ronald H. Epp: Editor's Introduction; John M. Rist: Stoicism: some reflections on the state of the art 1; Anthony A. Long: The Stoics on world-conflagration and everlasting recurrence 13; David E. Hahm: The Stoic theory of change 39: Nicholas P. White: The role of physics in Stoic ethics 57; Brad Inwood: The Stoics on the grammar of action 75; Davide Sedley: The Stoic theory of universals 87; Peter Barker: Jean Pena and Stoic physics in the 16th century 93; B. J. T. Dobbs: Newton and Stoicism 109; Ronald H. Epp: Stocism bibliography 125-171.
   
   
4. Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer. Edited by Döring Klaus and Ebert Theodor. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1993.
   Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort 7; Abkürzungsverzeichnis 8; Teilnehmerverzeichnis 9; Wolfram Ax: Der Einfluss des Peripatos auf die Sprachtheorie der Stoa 11; Mariano Baldassarri: Ein kleiner Traktat Plutarchs über stoische Logik 33; Jonathan Barnes: Meaning, saying and thinking 47; Susanne Bobzien: Chrysippus' modal logic and its relation to Philo and Diodorus 63; Walter Cavini: Chrysippus on speaking truly and the Liar 85; Theodor Ebert: Dialecticians and Stoics on the classification of propositions 111; Urs Egli: Neue Elemente im Bild der stoischen Logik 129; Michael Frede: The stoic doctrine of the tenses of the verb 141; Gabriele Giannantoni: Die Philosophenschule der Megariker und Aristoteles 155; Karheinz Hülser: Zur dialektischen und stoischen Einteilung der Fehlschlüsse 167; Katerina Ieorodiakonou: The stoic indemonstrables in the later tradition 187; Fritz Jürss: Zum Semiotik Modell der Stoiker und ihrer Vorläufer 201; Mario Mignucci: The Stoic Themata 217; Luciano Montoneri: Platon, die Ältere Akademie und die stoische Dialektik 239; Luciana Repici: The Stoics and the Elenchos 253; Andreas Schubert: Die stoischen Vorstellungen 271; Gerhard Seel: Zur Geschichte und Logik des therizön logos 291; Hermann Weeidemann: Zeit und Wahrheit bei Diodor 319; Literaturverzeichnis 331; Register 343-361
   
   
5. Topics in Stoic philosophy. Edited by Ierodiakonou Katerina. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1999.
   Contents: List of Contributors VIII; Katerina Ieorodiakonou: Introduction. The study of Stoicism: its defense and revival 1; 1. Jonathan Barnes: Aristotle and Stoic logic 23; 2. Mario Mignucci: The Liar Paradox and the Stoics 54; Michael Frede: On the Stoic conception of the Good 71; 4. Brad Inwood: Rules and reasoning in Stoic ethics 95; 5. David Sedley: The Stoic-Platonist debate on kathékonta 128; 6. Philip Mitsis: The Stoic origin of natural rights 153; 7. Dirk Obbink: The Stoic sage in the cosmic city 178; 8. Susanne Bobzien: Chrysippus' theory of causes 196; Select bibliography 243; Index locorum 249; Index of names 255-259
   
   
6. Les Stoïciens et leur logique. Edited by Brunschwig Jacques. Paris: Vrin 2006.
   Actes du Colloque de Chantilly 18-22 septembre 1976.
   Première édition 1978; deuxième édition, revue, augmentée et mise à jour (reproduit la pagination de l'édition originale).
   Table des matières: Avant propos de la deuxième édition 7; Avant propos de la première édition 11; John M. Rist: Zeno and the origins of stoic logic (non revu par l'auteur) 13; Ian G. Kidd: Posidonius and logic (revu par l'auteur) 29; Victor Goldschmidt: Remarques sur l'origine épicurienne de la "prénotion" (revu par Pierre-Marie Morel) 41; Anthony A. Long: The stoic distinction between truth (me alétheia) and the true (to alethés) (revu par l'auteur) 61; Claude Imbert: Théorie de la représentation et doctrine logique dans le stoïcisme ancien (revu par l'auteur) 79; George Kerferd: The problem of syntakatathesis and katalepsis in stoic doctrine (revu par Thomas Bénatouïl) 109; Urs Egli: Stoic syntax and sematics (revu par l'auteur) 131; Pierre Pachet: l'imperatif stoïcien (revu par l'auteur) 149; Françoise Caujolle-Zaslawsky: Le style stoïcien et la paremphasis (revu par l'auteur) 165; Richard Goulet: La classification stoïcienne des propostions simples selon Diogène Laërce, VII 69-70 (revu par l'auteur) 191; Anthony C. Lloyd: Definite propostiions and the concept of reference (revu par Jean-Baptiste Gourinat) 223; Jacques Brunschwig: Le modèle conjonctif (revu par l'auteur) 235; Gérard Verbeke: La philosophie du signe chez les stoïciens (revu par Danielle Lories) 261; Hervé Barreau: Cléanthe et Chrysippe face au maître-argument de Diodore (revu par l'auteur) 283; Mario Mignucci: Sur la logique modale des stoïciens (revu par Paolo Crivelli) 303; Pasquale Pasquino: Le statut ontologique des incorporels dans l'ancien stoïcisme (revu par l'auteur) 333; Andreas Graeser: The stoic categories 347; Janine Bertier: Une hénadologie liée au stoïcisme tardif dans le commentaire d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise à la Métaphysique d'Aristote (990 b 9) (non revu par l'auteur) 369; Jean-Paul Dumont: Mos geometricus, mos physicus (revu par Pierre-Marie Michel) 389; Joseph Moreau: Immutabilité du vrai, nécessité logique et lien causal (revu par Vaéry Laurand) 405; Jonathan Barnes: La doctrine du retour éternel (revu par l'auteur) 421; Maria Daraki: Les fonctions psychologiques du logos dans le stoïcisme ancien (non revu par l'auteur) 441; Bibliographie complémentaire 475; Index locorum 485-509.
   
   
7. Lire les Stoïciens. Edited by Gourinat Jean-Baptiste and Barnes Jonathan. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2009.
   Table des matières: Avant-propos 1; Abréviations 3; Jonathan Barnes et Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: Introduction 5; Première partie: L'école stoïcienne à l'époque hellénistique. I. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: Épistémologie, rhétorique et grammaire 23; II. Paolo Crivelli: La dialectique 41; III. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: Le monde 63; IV. David Sedley: Les dieux et les hommes 79; V. Thomas Bénatouil: La vertu, le bonheur et la nature 99; VI. Suzanne Husson: Le convenable, les passions, le sage et la cité 115; Seconde partie: Le stoïcisme impérial. VII. Jonathan Barnes: Grammaire, rhétorique, épistémologie et dialectique 135; VIII. Keimpe Algra: Cosmologie et théologie 151; IX. Anthony A. Long: L'éthique: continuité et innovations 171; X. Jean-Baptiste Gourinat: La sagesse et les exercices philosophiques 193; XI. Christelle Veillard: L'empreinte du stoïcisme sur la politique romaine 201; Chronologie 211; Bibliographie 215; Index des passages cités 225-234
   
   
8. Achard Martin, "Logos endiathetos et théorie des lekta chez les stoiciens," Laval Théologique et Philosophique 57: 225-233 (2001).
   "This paper is a discussion of Claude Panaccio's (*) interpretation of the Stoic view of logos endiathetos [internal discourse]. Two questions are more specifically addressed : 1) what is the relation between logos endiathetos and lekta? and 2) is logos endiathetos tied to language or not?"
   
   (*) Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham (1999).
   
   
9. Allen James. Inference form signs. Ancient debates about the nature of evidence. New York: Oxford University Press 2001.
   See Study III: The Stoics on sign-inference and demonstration pp. 147-193
   
   
10. Allen James. The Stoics on the origin of language and the foundation of etymology. In Language and learning. Philosophy of language in the Hellenistic age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum. Edited by Frede Dorothea and Inwood Brad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. pp. 14-35
    "James Allen hows that this assumption explains the Stoics' preoccupation with etymology as part of their concern with a time 'when language was still young' and the product of a primordial wisdom. Since they held a naturalist rather than a conventionalist view the Stoics assumed that there had been a primary stock of words that somehow 'imitate' the nature of the objects in question and could therefore be used as a natural standard of correctness. Since they assumed that there had been a high level of rationality among humans at a primordial stage, the Stoics saw nothing unnatural in proposing the notion of an original 'name-giver' as a hypothetical construct. Such a construct escapes the sceptic's ridicule because it merely assumes that the human need and the ability to converse rationally with each other, which manifests itself in every individual at a certain age, must also have been part of the nature of the (assumed) first generation of human beings. The 'naturalness' of names consists, then, in their suitability for communication with others; though it presupposes a mimetic relation between words and certain kinds of objects, it is not confined to onomatopoetics; instead it makes use of other means to augment language by associations and rational derivations of further expressions that are gradually added to the original stock of words. This explanation, as Allen points out, may make the etymologies less interesting and relevant in our eyes; but though the Stoics did not assume mechanical laws of derivation that would allow them to recover the 'cradle of words', attempts at rational reconstructions of the relation between different expressions provided them with a means to discover and to correct later corruptions of thought and so to play a crucial role in philosophical progress. Despite certain similarities of concern with the naturalist position in the Cratylus, the Stoic position therefore differs in more significant ways from the Platonic position than is usually acknowledged." From the Introduction by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 4-5
    
    
11. Annas Julia. Truth and knowledege. In Doubt and dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic epistemology. Edited by Barnes Jonathan, Burnyeat Miles, and Schofield Malcolm. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980. pp. 84-104
    
    
12. Atherton Catherine. The Stoics on ambiguity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993.
    "The subject of this book is some of the most impressive and original work on ambiguity to survive the wreck of western antiquity: that of the Stoa.
    At some point in the long history of their school Stoics constructed at least one definition of ambiguity, the earliest to survive in the western philosophical tradition, and remarkable in any case for its complexity, subtlety, and precision. It shows that its authors saw themselves as defining a linguistic phenomenon, amphibolia, which can easily be recognised today as familiar to users of most, if not all, natural languages: that one and the same linguistic item can mean or signify two or more different things. (This rough-and-ready characterisation will serve for the moment.) Two Stoic classifications of types of ambiguity, neither explicitly associated with the definition, are also extant; as these seem to differ from each other in small but important ways, they make it probable that at least one other definition was also arrived at, and this too may have survived, albeit in a mutilated form, and not explicitly attributed to the Stoa.
    Three chapters of this book will be devoted to close analysis of these three main pieces of evidence. They will reveal that Stoic philosophers had identified a range of linguistic and semantic concepts and categories with which ambiguity is intimately connected, and which serve to delimit or define it. Brief as they are, the texts to be examined will repay detailed study not only by students of ancient philosophy, at whom this book is primarily aimed, but also by workers in a variety of modern disciplines, above all by philosophers of language, theoretical and comparative linguists, and philosophical logicians: although they may all need to be convinced of the fact.
    What these texts do not reveal, in a general, explicit way, is what originally prompted Stoic interest in ambiguity. No ancient authority says in so many words why Stoics, as self- professed philosophers, found it worth while to define and classify ambiguity. If their motivations and anxieties are to be comprehensible, their conceptions of the purpose, structure, and contents of philosophy, of its internal and external boundaries, of the goal of human existence, and of the right way to achieve that goal, must all be determined. Stoic interest in ambiguity was the inevitable consequence of the basic doctrines about human nature, language, and rationality on which the whole Stoic system was based. Once ambiguity's place in the Stoic scheme of things is clear, it will be possible to trace the ways in which the form and content of Stoic work on ambiguity were shaped and constrained by its origins; and judgement by the school's own lights can be passed on its success in the projects it set itself.
    This interpretative and evaluative task is one of the two chief purposes of this book. It prepares the way for its companion, which is to assess, as far as possible, the merits and defects of Stoic work from other appropriate perspectives, including those of relevant modern concerns and interests, both inside and outside philosophy. To do so it will be necessary to abandon the special viewpoints of both the Stoics' own philosophical teachings and their philosophical and intellectual milieu. One result of this shift will be a questioning of the lines of division which moderns (philosophers, logicians, linguists, and others) and ancients (Stoics and rival philosophers, as well as non-philosophical professionals such as grammarians and rhetoricians) alike draw between what they conceive of as different disciplines or sciences, including philosophy itself.
    Given that part of the purpose of this book will be to try to analyse and explain some of the differences, in conception and method, between a range of modern and ancient perspectives on ambiguity, then restricting our inquiry to the particular contributions, however rich, which Stoics made to what are now called grammar, semantics, and epistemology, and to the other ancient disciplines or theories comparable with modern endeavours, would be a false economy even were the details of the Stoic enterprise not hopelessly distorted or understanding of them severely curtailed in the process. For the exegetical need for these larger contexts also reflects the fact that Stoic ideas of what philosophy was like, and what it was for, are vastly different from those which dominate the field today. The Stoic motivation for studying ambiguity might be called pragmatic, but not in the sense that it contributed to some narrowly practical goal, whether writing good Greek or understanding the classics, arguing in court or doing grammar -- or even doing logic, if that is conceived of as just another intellectual discipline, or as a tool of philosophy or of the sciences. The point was that seeing or missing an ambiguity could make a difference to one's general success as a human being." pp. 1-3
    
    
13. Baldassarri Mariano. Un trattatello plutarcheo di dialettica stoica: De E delphico cap. VI. In Studi di filosofia antica II. Como: Libreria Noseda 1993. pp. 43-65
    Pubblicato in tedesco in: Klaus Döring, Theodr Ebert (hers.) - Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer - pp. 33-46
    
    
14. Baldassarri Mariano. Il Simposio di Bamberg sulla logica degli Stoici e dei suoi precursori. In Studi di filosofia antica II. Como: Libreria Noseda 1993. pp. 67-107
    Note sul Symposion zur Logik der Stoiker und ihrer Vorläufer (Bamberg, 2-6 September 1991)
    
    
15. Baldassarri Mariano. Una rilevante disciplina antica documentata in modo nuovo (Discussione). In Studi di filosofia antica II. Como: Libreria Noseda 1993. pp. 109-123
    A proposito del libro di Karlheinz Hülser - Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker - Stuttgart, Frommann Holzboorg 1986-1987.
    
    
16. Baldassarri Mariano. Osservazioni sull'interpretazione prantliana della logica stoica. In Studi di filosofia antica II. Como: Libreria Noseda 1993. pp. 125-138
    
    
17. Baratin Marc, "L'identité de la pensée et de la parole dans l'ancien stoïcisme," Langages 16: 9-21 (1982).
    
    
18. Baratin Marc. La constitution de la grammaire et de la dialectique. In Histoire des idées linguistiques. I. La naissance des métalangages en Orient et en Occident. Edited by Auroux Sylvain. Liège: Mardaga 1989. pp. 186-206
    
    
19. Baratin Marc. Aperçu de la linguistique stoïcienne. In Sprachtheorien der abendländischen Antike. Edited by Schmitter Peter. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag 1991. pp. 193-216
    Geschichte der Sprachtheorie. II.
    
    
20. Barnes Jonathan. Proof destroyed. In Doubt and dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic epistemology. Edited by Barnes Jonathan, Burnyeat Miles, and Schofield Malcolm. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980. pp. 161-181
    
    
21. Barnes Jonathan, "Médecine, expérience et logique," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 94: 437-481 (1989).
    
    
22. Barnes Jonathan. Medicine experience and logic. In Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Edited by Annas Julia. Berkeley: University of California Press 1992. pp. 24-68
    
    
23. Barnes Jonathan. Meaning. Saying and Thinking. In Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer. Edited by Döring Klaus and Ebert Theodor. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1993. pp. 47-61
    
    
24. Barnes Jonathan. Logic and Imperial Stoa. Leiden : Brill 1997.
    
    
25. Barnes Jonathan. Aristotle and Stoic Logic. In Topics in Stoic philosophy. Edited by Ierodiakonou Katerina. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1999. pp. 23-53
    "Were Aristotle's logical writings known to the early Stoic logicians, and did Aristotle's logical ideas have any influence on the development of Stoic logic? The evidence which bears on this question is perplexing: there are numerous pertinent texts which favour an affirmative answer; yet as we approach them they seem, like so many will-o'-the-wisps, to retreat -- and we are stumbling in a treacherous marsh.
    But the question is not without its fascination, in as much as it concerns the historical relations between two magnificent monuments to Greek philosophical acumen; and it may stand some discussion. Section I presents some general ruminations. Section II deals with the preliminary question of whether the Stoics could in principle have read Aristotle. Section III assembles a sample of the evidence which suggests that the Stoics did in fact read and study their Aristotle. And the remaining sections try to assess the value of this evidence.
    The question is a historical one, and it invites consideration of a certain type of historical explanation. It is not merely a matter of whether the Stoics were aware of the Peripatetic achievement in logic: it is a matter of whether this awareness influenced their own logical thoughts and caused them to think in this way rather than in that." p. 23
    
    
26. Barnes Jonathan. What is a disjunction? In Language and learning. Philosophy of language in the Hellenistic age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum. Edited by Frede Dorothea and Inwood Brad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. pp. 274-298
    "That the Stoics were the instigators of the emphasis put on linguistic observations in ancient philosophy is uncontested. To what degree they are rightly accused of paying more attention to expressions rather than to things is quite another matter, despite the fact that this reproach was voiced repeatedly in antiquity by authorities such as Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias and has lasted through the nineteenth century AD. If the Stoics have enjoyed a better press since the twentieth century it is because they were taken to be logicians for logic's sake, committed formalists who stopped just short of inventing the appropriate type of artificial language. That this picture needs revision is argued by Jonathan Barnes (What is a disjunction?') in a painstaking investigation of the treatment of connectives in Apollonius Dyscolus' essay with that title and Galen's Institutio logica. Barnes shows that Apollonius' text is coherent and thereby undermines a long-standing prejudice about the Stoic impact on the development of traditional grammar: contrary to what has been assumed (via an unwarranted textual emendation in a crucial passage of Apollonius Dyscolus) Apollonius does not criticise the Stoics' meddling with grammar, but rather their insufficient interest in some of its finer points. Far from adopting a purely formalistic stance, the Stoics distinguished between natural and non-natural disjunctions and colligations. They used these considerations not only to distinguish between natural and occasional disjunctions, but also between grammatical and semantical nonsense. Since no other text besides Apollonius' attributes the conception of 'natural disjunctions' to the Stoics it is a question whether it actually is of Stoic origin rather than derived from the Peripatetics or an invention by certain grammarians. As Barnes shows, the interconnections and boundaries between natural language and formal logic did not only play a crucial role in the treatment of disjunctions by Apollonius Dyscolus. They are also the basis of Galen's criticism of Stoic logic on the differentiation between complete and incomplete conflict and implication, whose intent was to show what is and what is not a legitimate use of conjunctions. If that distinction is at stake, then Galen's view on disjunctions and conjunctions turns out to be coherent, despite initial appearances to the contrary. The differing parties accused each other of not having paid sufficient attention to the pragmata; however, their complaint is not that the facts in the world have been ignored, but rather that the meaning of the terms has not received sufficient attention." From the Introduction by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 11-12
    
    
27. Barnes Jonathan. Grammaire, rhétorique, épistémologie, et dialectique. In Lire les Stoïciens. Edited by Gourinat Jean-Baptiste and Barnes Jonathan. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2009. pp. 135-149
    
    
28. Barnouw Jeffrey. Propositional Perception. Phantasia, Predication, and Sign in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. Lanham: University Press of America 2002.
    
    
29. Barwick Karl. Probleme der Stoischen Sprachlehre und Rhetorik. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1957.
    
    
30. Becker Oskar. Zwei Untersuchungen zur Antiken Logik. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 1957.
    Contents: 1. Zum Problem der platonischen Idealzahlen (Eine Retraktation) (pp. 1-25); 2. Über die vier "Themata" der stoischen Logik (pp. 27-49)
    
    
31. Blank David and Atherton Catherine. The Stoic contribution to traditional grammar. In The Cambridge Companion to Stoics. Edited by Inwood Brad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003. pp. 310-327
    
    
32. Bobzien Susanne. Die Stoische Modallogik. Würzburg: Kõnighausen-Neumann 1986.
    
    
33. Bobzien Susanne, "Stoic syllogistic," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 14: 133-192 (1996).
    ""For the Stoics, a syllogism is a formally valid argument, and the primary function of their syllogistic is to establish the formal validity of arguments. Stoic syllogistic can be understood as a system of formal logic that relies on two types of argumental rules:' first, five rules (the accounts of the indemonstrables) which were used to determine whether any given argument is an indemonstrable argument (anapodeiktos logos), i.e. an elementary syllogism the validity of which is not in need of further demonstration (D.L. 7.79), since its validity is evident in itself (Sextus, M. 2. 223);2 second, one unary and three presumably binary argumental rules, called themata, which allow one to establish the formal validity of non-indemonstrable arguments by analysing them in one or more steps into one or more indemonstrable arguments (D.L. 7. 78). The function of these rules is not to generate non indemonstrable syllogisms from indemonstrable ones, but rather to reduce given non-indemonstrable arguments to indemonstrable syllogisms. Moreover, the Stoic method of deduction differs from standard modern ones in that the direction is reversed. The Stoic system may hence be called an 'argumental reductive system of deduction'.
    In the following I present a reconstruction of this system of logic. The rules or accounts used for establishing that an argument is indemonstrable have all survived, and the indemonstrables are among the best-known elements of Stoic logic. However, their exact role and logical status in Stoic syllogistic are usually neglected. I expound how they are integrated in the system of deduction. The state of evidence for the themata is dismal -- although perhaps not hopeless. I suggest a reconstruction of the themata, based on a fresh look at some of the sources, and then offer a reconstruction of the general method of reduction of arguments and some general remarks on Stoic syllogistic as a whole and on the question of its completeness (much of which will not depend on the particular formulation of the themata I propose, but on more general considerations for a reconstruction).
    Stoic logic is a propositional logic, and Stoic negation and conjunction are truth-functional. This has, naturally, led to comparisons with the 'classical' propositional calculus (as e.g. presented in Principia Mathematica), including repeated examinations of Stoic syllogistic on completeness in the modern sense. The Stoic theory of deduction invariably comes out as deficient, inferior, or simply outlandish in such comparisons, which has evoked adjusting additions and modifications -- tacit or explicit -- in previous reconstructions of the system. I suggest that this is the wrong approach; that the classical propositional calculus is the wrong paradigm; that Stoic logic has to be considered first of all in its own light; and that, if one looks for comparisons with contemporary logic, one can find some rather more interesting parallels when turning one's attention to non-truth-functional propositional logics."
    
    (1) By an argumental rule I mean a rule that produces arguments from (zero or more) arguments, as opposed to a rule that produces propositions from (zero or more) propositions.
    (2) The accounts of the indemonstrables, when interpreted as rules, are nullary argumental rules.
    
    
34. Bobzien Susanne, "The Stoics on hypotheses and hypothetical arguments," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 42: 299-312 (1997).
    "The article argues (i) that the hypothetical arguments about which the Stoic Chrysippus wrote numerous books (DL VII 196) are the same as those mentioned five times in "Epictetus" (e.g., Diss. I 25.11-12), and (ii) that these hypothetical arguments are formed by replacing in a non-hypothetical argument one (or more) of the premisses by a Stoic "hypothesis" or supposition. Such "hypotheses" differ from propositions in that they have a specific logical form and no truth-value. The reason for the introduction of a distinct class of hypothetical arguments can be found in the context of dialectical argumentation. Some evidence for the use of Stoic hypothetical arguments in ancient texts is discussed."
    
    
35. Bobzien Susanne. Determinism and freedom in stoic philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press 1998.
    See Chapter 3 Modality, determinism, and freedom pp. 97-143.
    
    "A considerable number of our testimonies about the Stoic doctrine of determinism are concerned with modality. In particular the concepts of possibility and necessity were central to some parts of its discussion. It seems that Hellenistic philosophers generally agreed that an action or, in general, activity does not depend on us and is not in our power, if it (or a corresponding proposition) is necessary or impossible; or, put differently, that a prerequisite for something's depending on us is that it is both possible and non-necessary. This fact is invoked both by the Stoics in defence of their theory and in the criticism of their opponents. But in the debate over fate and determinism, modalities played a role in a number of different contexts. They are dealt with separately in the following sections:
    - Chrysippus rejected Diodorus' modal theory, because of its built-in necessitarian consequences (3.1.2).
    - Chrysippus developed his own set of modal notions, which, in themselves, do not lead to necessitarianism and which secure a necessary con
    dition for that which depends on us (3.1.3-5).
    - Some critics of Chrysippus and the Stoics developed arguments to show that there is a conflict between Chrysippus' modal notions and the Stoic theory of fate (3.2).-
    - Some later Stoics replied to this type of objection by giving an epistemic interpretation of Chrysippus' modal notions (3.3).
    - Critics of the Stoics objected that fate, qua Necessity, renders all events necessary; but this objection is not justified in Chrysippus' philosophy (3.4)." p. 97
    
    
36. Bobzien Susanne and Mignucci Mario. Logic. The Stoics. In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Edited by Algra Keimpe et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999. pp. 92-157
    1-7 by S. Bobzien; 8 by M. Mignucci
    
    
37. Bobzien Susanne. Pre-Stoics hypothetical syllogistic in Galen's "Institutio logica". In The Unknown Galen. Edited by Nutton Vivian. London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London 2002. pp.
    "The text of the Institutio logica is not found in Kühn (*) because its sole surviving MS was first published, not long after its discovery, in 1844, and thus too late for inclusion. The reasons for once considering it spurious are unconvincing. Galen's Institutio is one of our main witnesses for a hypothetical syllogistic which predates Stoic propositional logic. Galen draws from a number of different sources and theories including the "ancient philosophers" (hoi palaioi ton philosophon), including Chrysippus; and the "more recent" (hoi neoteroi), post-Chrysippean Stoics or logicians of other schools who adopted Stoic terminology and theory."
    
    [* Karl Gottlob Kühn, Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia. Leipzig: C. Cnobloch, 1821-1833, 19 volumes, reprinted Hildesheim, Georg Olms,1964-1997].
    
    
38. Bobzien Susanne. Logic. In The Cambridge Companion to Stoics. Edited by Inwood Brad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003. pp. 85-123
    
    
39. Bobzien Susanne. The Stoics on fallacies of equivocation. In Language and learning. Philosophy of language in the Hellenistic age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum. Edited by Frede Dorothea and Inwood Brad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. pp. 239-273
    "As Susanne Bobzien shows, the Stoics had philosophical reasons for the development of strategies to handle `lexical' ambiguities, because they regarded fallacies of ambiguity as complexes of propositions and sentences that straddle the realm of linguistic expression (the domain of language) and the realm of meaning (the domain of logic); moreover, there is also a pragmatic component because being deceived is a psychological disposition that can be reduced neither to language nor to meaning. Not all arguments are, after all, as transparently fallacious as is the example that exploits the ambiguity of 'for men/manly' and concludes that a 'garment for men' must be courageous because manliness is courage. Bobzien provides a detailed analysis of the relevant passages, lays bare textual and interpretative difficulties, and explores what the Stoic view on the matter implies for their theory of language. She points up that the Stoics believe that the premisses of the fallacies, when uttered, have only one meaning and are true, and thus should be conceded; hence no mental process of disambiguation is needed, while Aristotle, by contrast, assumes that the premisses contain several meanings, and recommends that the listeners explicitly disambiguate them. Bobzien proffers two readings of the Stoic advice that we 'be silent' when confronted with fallacies of ambiguity, and explicates how each leads to an overall consistent interpretation of the textual evidence. Finally, she demonstrates that the method advocated by the Stoics works for all fallacies of lexical ambiguity." From the Introduction by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 10-11
    
    
40. Bochenski Joseph. A history of formal logic. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press 1961.
    Translated from the German edition "Formale Logik" (1956) by Ivo Thomas.
    Reprinted New York, Chelsea Publishing Co., 1970.
    On the Stoics see Part III. The Megarian-Stoic School pp. 105-251
    
    
41. Brancacci Aldo. Antisthène et le stoïcisme: la logique. In Les Stoïciens. Edited by Romeyer Dherbey Gilbert and Gourinat Jean-Baptiste. Paris: Vrin 2005. pp. 55-73
    
    
42. Brittain Charles. Common sense: concepts, definition and meaning in and out of the Stoa. In Language and learning. Philosophy of language in the Hellenistic age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum. Edited by Frede Dorothea and Inwood Brad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. pp. 164-209
    "Charles Brittain also focuses on an important aspect of the philosophical analysis of language: its relation to reality and to the conceptual apparatus in the human mind, which on most theories connects reality to language. To the naive mind, a concept like 'common sense' would not seem to be in need of development since it must have been in place since the dawn of human reasoning. Nor is that the issue of Brittain's paper. Instead, he focuses on the development of a theory of common sense that is based on the connection between a stock of rational conceptions that is the common possession of all humans and the words which map naturally onto those conceptions and so give expression to them. The Stoics themselves did not maintain that everyone can acquire conceptions that successfully capture the essence of things; such success presupposes the uncorrupted mind of the wise; so these normative concepts do not seem to be an obvious source for a theory of common conceptions that are open to all. As Brittain contends, it would nevertheless be wrong to attribute such a theory to the later Platonists despite the fact that they advocated the existence of universally acceptable word-meanings that are open to every human being's grasp. For Platonists regarded these meanings as mere accidental features of the thing in question. What was needed to establish a theory of common sense was a combination of the two theories: the 'preliminary definition' of a term with universal acceptance that lays claim to at least a partial grasp of the thing's essence. En route to this solution Brittain offers, inter alia, a reconstruction of the mechanism at work in the formation of common concepts with abstract and general contents and seeks to solve the conundrum of how definitions of the words corresponding to the concepts are formed. He does so by carefully sifting through different sources that employ Stoic vocabulary (such as 'preconceptions' or 'common conceptions') but that differ significantly from the Stoic view that all humans have at least a partial grasp of a thing's essential properties, rather than mere accidental properties. This assumption paves the way towards a theory of 'common sense' that establishes a direct connection between the concepts and the objects of the world and explains how ordinary language-speakers have at least an outline understanding of the world. Such a theory, so Brittain argues, is the upshot of Cicero's treatment of preconceptions, in the basis of definitions. The rendering of 'preconception' (prolepsis) as shared by all - by communis mens and finally by communis sensus - justifies the attribution to Cicero of at least 'a fragment of a theory of common sense' in civic and political matters that everyone in principle can understand. This was a theory that deeply influenced the later rhetorical tradition and thereby became a lasting asset in cultural history." From the Introduction by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 8-9
    
    
43. Brochard Victor, "La logique des Stoïciens," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 5: 449-468 (1892).
    Réimprimé dans: V. Brochard - Études de philosophie antique et de philosophie moderne: - XI. La logique des Stoïciens (Première étude 220-238); XII. La logique des Stoïciens (Deuxième étude 239-251), Paris, Vrin, 1954.
    
    
44. Brunschwig Jacques. Proof defined. In Doubt and dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic epistemology. Edited by Barnes Jonathan, Burnyeat Miles, and Schofield Malcolm. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980. pp. 125-160
    
    
45. Brunschwig Jacques, "Quelques remarques sur la théorie stoïcienne du nom propre," Histoire Épistemologie Langage 6: 3-19 (1984).
    
    
46. Brunschwig Jacques. La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et l'ontologie platonicienne. In Matter and metaphysics. Fourth symposium hellenisticum. Edited by Barnes Jonathan and Mignucci Mario. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1988. pp. 19-127
    Translated in English in: J. Brunschwig - Papers in hellenistic philosophy (1994)
    
    
47. Burnyeat Miles. Gods and heaps. In Language and Logos. Studies in ancient Greek philosophy presented to G. E. L. Owen. Edited by Schofield Malcolm and Nussbaum Martha. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982. pp. 315-338
    On the Stoic Sorite paradox.
    
    
48. Caston Victor, "Something and nothing: the Stoics on concepts and universals," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17: 145-213 (1999).
    
    
49. Cavini Walter. La teoria stoics della negazione. In Atti del convegno internazionale di storia della logica. Edited by Abrusci Michele, Casari Ettore, and Mugnai Massimo. Bologna: CLUEB 1983. pp. 229-234
    
    
50. Cavini Walter. Il papiro parigino 2. Testo, traduzione e commento. In Studi su papiri greci di logica e medicina. Firenze: Olschki 1985. pp. 85-126
    
    
51. Cavini Walter. La negazione di frase nella logica greca. In Studi su papiri greci di logica e medicina. Edited by Cavini Walter et al. Firenze: Olschki 1985. pp. 7-126
    Indice dei Contenuti: Nota liminare 9;
    LA NEGAZIONE ARISTOTELICA
    1. La sintesi dichiarativa: supplemento di frase e contenuto descrittivo 11; 2. Negazione semplice e affermazione trasposta 17; 3. Le asserzioni indeterminate: trasformazione predicativa ed equivocità composta 26; 4. Portata esistenziale dell'affermazione 36; 5. Negative categoriche 41;
    LA NEGAZIONE STOICA
    1. Frammenti e testimonianze 47; 2. La teoria stoica degli axiomata 48; 3. Negazione semplice e composta 51; 4. Opposti contraddittòri 57; 5. Ambiguità della negazione ordinaria 67;
    APPENDICE - IL PAPIRO PARIGINO 2
    Testo e traduzione 86; Commento 107; Bibliografia 122-126
    
    
52. Celluprica Vincenza, "La logica stoica in alcune recenti interpretazioni," Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico: 123-150 (1980).
    
    
53. Colish Marcia. The Stoic theory of verbal signification and the problem of lies and false statement from antiquity to St. Anslem. In Archéologie du signe. Edited by Brind'Amour Lucie and Vance Eugène. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies 1983. pp. 17-43
    
    
54. Colish Marcia. The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. Leiden: Brill 1985.
    Vol. I: Stoicism in Classical Latin literature (1985); Vol. II: Stoicism in Christian Latin thought through the Sixth century (1990).
    See Vol. I, Chapter One: Stoicism in Antiquity C) Logic pp. 50-60.
    "Logic in the Stoic philosophy deals broadly with the way men think and speak about the world. The Stoics' theory of knowledge, their formal dialectic, and their theories of language, grammar, rhetoric, and poetics show an intimate relationship to their physics and ethics. The logos of thought and speech is a cognate of the logos as the rational principle of the universe and of the human logos which enables man to make the correct judgments on which his ethical life depends." pp. 50-51
    
    
55. Corcoran John. Remarks on Stoic deduction. In Ancient logic and its modern interpretations. Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972. Edited by Corcoran John. Dordrecht: Reidel 1974. pp. 169-181
    "The purpose of this note is to raise and clarify certain questions concerning deduction in Stoic logic. Despite the fact that the extant corpus of relevant texts is limited, it may nevertheless be possible to answer some of these questions with a considerable degree of certainty. Moreover, with the answers obtained one might be able to narrow the range of possible solutions to other problems concerning Stoic theories of meaning and inference.
    The content of this note goes somewhat beyond the comments I made during the discussion of Professor Gould's paper 'Deduction in Stoic Logic', in the symposium. I am grateful to Professors Gould and Kretzmann for pointing out the implications of those comments as well as for encouraging me to prepare them for this volume.
    One of the obstacles to a careful discussion of Stoic logic is obscurity of terminology. Clarification of terminology may catalyze recognition of important historical facts. For example, in 1956 a modern logician suggested (incorrectly) in a historical note [A. Church, Introduction to mathematical logic, Princeton. 1956, fn. 529] that the distinction between implication and deduction could not have been made before the work of Tarski and Carnap. But once historians had clarified their own terminology it became obvious that this distinction played an important role in logic from the very beginning. Aristotle's distinction between imperfect and perfect syllogisms is a variant of the implication-deduction distinction and Gould 'Deduction in Stoic Logic' suggests the existence of a parallel distinction in Stoic logic." p. 169
    
    
56. Cortassa Guido, "Pensiero e linguaggio nella teoria stoica del lekton," Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica 106: 385-394 (1978).
    
    
57. Crivelli Paolo, "Indefinite propositions and anaphora in Stoic logic," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 39: 187-206 (1994).
    "The verb hupotattein belongs to the jargon of Stoic logic and expresses the operation of subordination, which yields the definite propositions that are relevant to the truth or falsity of a given indefinite proposition. The standard ("sentential") truth conditions of conditionals and conjunctions yield the expected ("quantificational") truth conditions of indefinite conditionals and conjunctions, i.e. truth conditions suitable for "universal" and "particular" propositions."
    
    
58. Crivelli Paolo. La dialectique. In Lire les Stoïciens. Edited by Gourinat Jean-Baptiste and Barnes Jonathan. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2009. pp. 41-61
    
    
59. Detel Wolfgang et al., "Lekta elliphé in der stoischen Sprachphilosophie," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 62: 276-288 (1980).
    
    
60. Dorandi Tiziano. La tradition papyrologique des stoïciens. In Les Stoiciens. Edited by Romeyer Dherbey Gilbert and Gourinat Jean-Baptiste. Paris: Vrin 2005. pp. 29-52
    Les pp. 35-37 sont sur les Recherches logiques (Logika zêtêmata) (fragmenta, P. Herc. 307) de Chrysippe
    
    
61. Döring Klaus, "Gab es eine Dialektische Schule?," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 34: 293-310 (1989).
    "Until recently, students of ancient philosophy have generally believed that Diodorus Cronus was a member of the Megarian school founded by Socrates' pupil Euclides of Megara. In 1977, however, David Sedley claimed that Diodorus should be associated with the so-called Dialectical school. The article argues against this view. The main results are (1) There are no testimonies which suggest that we should distinguish between Megarians and Dialecticians. (2) The so-called Dialectical school never existed; it is a construct of ancient historians of philosophy."
    
    
62. Drozdek Adam, "Lekton: Stoic logic and ontology," Acta antiqua.Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 42: 93-104 (2002).
    "For the Stoics, the lekton is as an intermediary between the thought and the object. They do not exist independently of the mind, but, at the same time, the mind does not create them. Due to this status, they guarantee intersubjectivity of the rational discourse. They are incorporeals that do not exist, but subsist and the Stoic Logos-God guarantees their permanent subsistence. The lekta are semantico-syntactic entities. Their role is analogous to the role of an interlingua used as a tool for automated translation of languages."
    
    
63. Dyson Henry. Prolepsis and Ennoia in the early Stoa. Berlin: de Gruyter 2009.
    
    
64. Ebert Theodor, "The origin of the Stoic theory of signs in Sextus Empiricus," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 5: 83-126 (1987).
    "In his critical discussion of the dogmatic philosophers Sextus Empiricus expounds a Stoic doctrine which has conveniently been labelled 'the theory of signs'. This chapter of Stoic philosophy offers a blend of logic and epistemology, a mixture bound to attract the interest of present-day 'ancient philosophers'. Hence, with the growing discussion focusing on the philosophy of the Hellenistic period, this part of Stoicism was to get a fair share of attention. (1) Controversy has been flourishing over the merits and weaknesses of this theory; it has been compared with tenets about the topic of signs held by earlier and later philosophers, yet in these discussions it has almost universally been taken for granted that there is a single theory of signs and that it can be attributed unqualifiedly to the Stoics. (2)
    Part of what I want to do in this paper is to challenge this assumption. I shall argue that the material relating to the theory of signs which is preserved in Sextus does not reflect Chrysippan teaching, but goes back to Stoics antedating Chrysippus. To have a convenient term, I shall refer to the pre-Chrysippan Stoics as 'early Stoics'. (3) I shall further argue that the theory of signs of the early Stoics was a harvest not grown in the fields of Stoic philosophy, but that it originated from the 'Dialecticians', a group of philosophers confused for a long time with the Megarians and rediscovered as a group in its own right by David Sedley. (4) I shall further try to point out some modifications which this theory underwent as it was integrated into the epistemology of the early Stoics. I shall not discuss the doctrine of signs advocated by the opponents of the Epicureans in Philodemus' de Signis -- almost certainly Stoic philosophers -- a doctrine which has been ably discussed by David Sedley in a recent paper. (5)" pp. 83-84
    
    (1) Cf. G. Verbeke, 'La philosophie du signe chez les Stoiciens', in Les Stoiciens et leur logique, ed. J. Brunschwig (Paris, 1978), 401-24; J. M. Rist, 'Zeno and the origins of stoic logic', ibid. 387-400; M. Baratin, 'Les origines stoiciennes de la théorie augustinienne du signe', Revue des Etudes Latines, LIX (1981), 260-8; M. F. Bumyeat, 'The Origins of Non-deductive Inference', in Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, ed J. Barnes et al. (Cambridge/Paris, 1982), 193-238; D. Sedley, 'On Signs', ibid. 239-72; D. Glidden, 'Skeptic Semiotics', Phronesis, XX (1983), 213-55. For discussions in the older literature cf. R. Philippson, De Philodemi Libro qui est peri semeion kai semeioseon et Epicureorum doctrina logica (Berlin, 1881); P. Natorp, Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems im Altertum (Berlin, 1884), 127 ff; W. Heintz, Studien zu Sextus Empiricus (Halle, 1932), 42-51; G. Preti, 'Sulla dottrina del semeion nella logica stoica', Rivista Cntica di Storia della Filosofia, XI (1956), 5-14.
    (2) The only exception known to me is D. Sedley who wants to 'put into abeyance the widespread belief that Stoic doctrine is under discussion by Sextus Empiricus throughout M VIII. 141-298 and PH II. 97-133' (Sedley, above n. 1, 241).
    (3) The traditional division of Stoicism puts Chrysippus' Stoic predecessors together with his own school into the Old Stoa, separating it from middle Stoicism inaugurated by Panaetius. This classification seems to be based on Stoic ethics, and understandably so. After all, it was their moral philosophy which, beginning with Cicero, made the Stoics so immensely influential, and here the affinity between Zeno and Chrysippus is clearly stronger than the one between Chrysippus and Panaetius. Yet in logic and epistemology, there is no similar relationship between Chrysippus and his predecessors. Here the great break comes about with Chrysippus, and we should group Stoic philosophers in this field accordingly.
    (4) Cf. D. Sedley, 'Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy', Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, CCIII, N S 23 (1977), 74- 120.
    (5) Cf. D. Sedley, above n 1.
    
    
65. Ebert Theodor. Dialektiker und frühe Stoiker bei Sextus Empiricus. Untersuchungen zur Entstehung der Aussagenlogik. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1991.
    Inhalt: Einleitung 13; I. Teil: Der Ursprung der stoischen Theorie des Zeichens. Erstes Kapitel: Die stoische Theorie des Zeichens bei Sextus Empiricus 29; Zweites Kapitel: Die stoische Theorie des Zeichens vor dem Hintergrund der Berichte bei Diogenes Laertius 54; Drittes Kapitel: Dialektiker und frühe Stoiker zur Theorie des Zeichens 66; II. Teil: Die Dialektiker bei Sextus Empiricus. Viertes Kapitel: Die Dialektische Klassifikation der Aussagen bei Sextus Empiricus 83; Fünftes Kapitel: Die Dialektische Klassifikation der Aussagen als Vorstufe der stoischen 108; Sechstes Kapitel: Die Dialektische und die stoische Klassifikation der Fehlschlüsse bei Sextus Empiricus 131; Siebtes Kapitel: Die Dialektiker über Trugschlüsse und ihre Auflösung 176; Anhang I zum II. Teil: Diodor und die 'Dialektiker' in AM 10.111 209; Anhang II zum II. Teil: Dialektiker und Stoiker bei Apuleius 213; III. Teil: Der Ursprung der stoischen Theorie des Beweis. Achtes Kapitel: Der frühstoische Charakter der Theorie des Beweises bei Sextus Empiricus 219; Neuntes Kapitel: Ubereinstimmungen und Unterschiede in den Referaten des Sextus zur stoischen Beweistheorie und das genetische Verhältnis ihrer Quellen 232; Zehntes Kapitel: Von den Dialektikern zu Chrysipp -- der Weg einer Theorie in der Alten Stoa 287; Schlussbemerkung 303; Anhang: Texte aus Sextus Empiricus zu den Dialektikern und den Stoikern 311; Literaturverzeichnis 326; Register 337-346.
    
    English translation of the first part in: The origin of the Stoic theory of signs in Sextus Empiricus (1987)
    
    
66. Ebert Theodor. Dialecticians and Stoics on the classification of propositions. In Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer. Edited by Döring Klaus and Ebert Theodor. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1993. pp. 111-127
    
    
67. Edlow Robert Blair, "The Stoics on ambiguity," Journal of the History of Philosophy 13: 423-445 (1975).
    
    
68. Egli Urs, "Zur Stoischen Dialektik", 1967.
    Inauguraldissertation (Universität Bern).
    Inhaltsverzeichnis: 1. Allgemeines zur Rekonstruktion der stoischen Dialektik 2; 2. Diokles bei Diogenes Laertios 7.49-82 8; 3. Quellengeschichtliche Nebenergebnisse zu Diogenes und Sextos 59; 4. Nebenergebnisse zu Galens Einführung in die Logik 74; Zusammenfassung und Ausblick 87; Erklärung der wichstigsten Abkürzungen 106; Bibliographie 107-113
    
    
69. Egli Urs. The Stoic Concept of Anaphora. In Semantics from different points of view. Edited by Bäuerle Rainer, Egli Urs, and von Stechow Arnim. New York: Springer 1979. pp. 266-283
    
    
70. Egli Urs. The Stoic Theory of Arguments. In Meaning, use, and interpretation of language. Edited by Bäuerle Rainer, Schwarze Christoph, and von Stechow Arnim. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1983. pp. 79-96
    Contents: 1. Relevance of the topic; 2. Concepts involved; 2.1 Arguments; 2.2 Simple and logical concepts; 2.3 A hypothesis on Stoic deduction theory; 3. A commentary on Sextus' passage on invalidity [Adv. Math. 8, 292-294]; 3.1 The context; 3.2 The passage; 4. Deductions; 5. Completeness; 6. Conclusion; Appendix: Possible existence of cut free systems; Bibliography.
    
    "1. Relevance of the Topic
    The Stoíc theory of arguments to my mind illustrates one point: If certain ancient doctrìnes had been properly understood, the correspondìng modero theories would have been developed sooner. We would have had a propositional logic by 1800, we would have had a serious syntax long before transformational grammar. Stoics, in addition, had already something like a speech act theory. In one or two cases modern theories have directly been elaborations of Stoico-Megarian developments: First, Prior's tense logic was influenced by reflections on Diodorus. Second, Kripke's semantics for modal logic was directly influenced by Prior's exposition of the theory of modality of Diodorus Kronos. Compare his truth definition of modal statements with that of Kripke:
    p is possible now iff p is true now or will be true later (Diodorus).
    p is possible in our world iff p is true in a world accessìble from ours (Kripke).
    Kripke replaced points of time by possible worlds and the relation "to be now or later" by the accessibility relation. It is not impossible that further study of Stoic theories will contribute in a similar way to modern discussions.
    It has been proved by Lukasìewìcz and Mates that the Stoic theory of what they called syllogisms contained something we might call propositional logic in modern terms. Mates also brought up the problem of deciding whether
    1) Stoics contended that their propositional logic was complete; and whether
    2) Stoic logic actually was complete according to modern criteria (Mates 1961, 81-82).
    As to the first question, the evidence that Mates adduces is not wholly conclusive, for the passages are little more than consequences of the definition of syllogisms (= valid arguments): According to this definition a syllogism is either a basic syllogism (anapodeiktos) or derived from basic syllogisms by the deductive rules (themata) (DL 7.78). From this definition follows that every syllogism (which is not basic) is derived from the basic ones -- the passages adduced by Mates say just that. If it is not clear whether the Stoics actually held that their propositional logic was complete, Becker's attempt to prove the completeness of Stoic logic by reconstructing the missing pieces of the deductive apparatus may seem futile. He has also been severely criticised by Mueller, Frede and others because it is not clear
    (a) whether the Stoic conditional sign ei is to be taken as a truth-functional connective or not,
    (b) how the Chrysippean exclusion of arguments with but one premise can be reconciled with Becker's full use of such arguments in his proofs of semantic completeness,
    (c) whether the completeness extended from the part of the system involving only conjunction and negation to other connectives.
    I now want to reopen the question by arguing that a kind of completeness is indeed to be found in Stoic passages (though not in those Mates adduced) and that an examination of the sources renders some plausibility to the thesis that the Stoics had a system of deduction rules which can be proved adequate according to modern criteria.
    (Some material on the same matter is already contained in Egli 1967, 54 and Egli 1977 [Review of Frede 1974. Gnomon 49, 1977, 784-790].)" pp. 789-80
    
    
71. Egli Urs. Stoic syntax and semantics. In The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period. Edited by Taylor Daniel J.1986. pp. 281-306
    Also published in: Hisotriographia Linguistica, 13, 1986 and in J. Brunschwig (ed.) - Les Stoiciens et leur logique, Paris, Vrin, 1986, pp. 135-147 (2nd edition 2006, pp. 131-148).
    
    "Let me now summarize the main points of my exposition of Stoic syntax:
    1. Stoic loquia (lekta) are designated by expressions of a normalized Greek. They have the same structure as these Greek expressions. Thus in most technical uses they serve approximately the same purpose as "semantic structures" or "semantic representations" in modem linguistics and philosophy of language.
    2. There is an infinity of loquia derived by a finite number of recursive rules of four types, lexical, inclusion, combination and transformation rules. Semantic categories like statement, predicate and subject are used in the formulation of these rules which enable us to build complex loquia of the various categories from atomar ones (asuntheta). The structure of a compound loquium may be revealed by using Chomsky or Montague analysis trees.
    3. This infinity of loquia is related with real things by an analogue of modern model theory. General terms are said to denote individuals according to a variant of multiple denotation theory. Deictic subjects are assigned values, like their modern analogues: individual variables by an assignment (deixis). Statements are either true or false. Complex expressions are valuated in function of their syntactic composition and the values of their parts.
    4. Denotations of Greek expressions are determined indirectly. E.g. appellatives signify appellative subjects, which refer to individuals. Thus appellatives indirectly denote these individuals too.
    5. All this would have to be refined by taking into account tense.
    6. By neglecting tense, plural and subjectivization, Stoic loquium theory becomes an analogue of modern first order predicate logic by
    a) the introduction of n place predicates with arbitrary n,
    b) the introduction of a means to handle relative clauses
    Stoic syntax and related model theory thus proves interesting and comparable to modern treatments." Les Stoiciens et leur logique, 2nd edition 2006, pp. 144-145.
    
    
72. Egli Urs. Neue Elemente im Bild der stoischen Logik. In Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer. Edited by Döring Klaus and Ebert Theodor. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1993. pp. 129-139
    
    
73. Egli Urs. Neue Züge im Bild der stoischen Logik. In Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer. Edited by Döring Klaus and Ebert Theodor. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1993. pp. 129-139
    
    
74. Egli Urs. Anaphora from Athens to Amsterdam. In Reference and Anaphoric Relations. Edited by Heusinger Klaus von and Egli Urs. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2000. pp. 17-29
    "Excavating the prehistory of dynamic predicate logic in the Stoic theory of methodical arguments makes us aware of an interrupted tradition, in a way that is possible only by philological reconstruction and the use of similar facts independently invented in modern times. That such interrupted traditions can become important has been shown by the use of ancient temporal logic and its resurrection in Kripke's (1963) semantics of modal logic. Kripke combined Prior's reconstruction of the Diodorean system of time-logical modality with ideas from Carnap on modal logic in order to get his semantic
    characterization of the Lewis systems of modal logic. Modern developments offer scholars of classical logic a modern foil that can help them to understand ancient texts and to see interesting developments in them which otherwise would be incomprehensible.
    The modern representatives of this tradition also gain an advantage from such research, in that they can build on a tradition which helps to strengthen confidence in the new methods.
    The adherents of Stoicism gave their logic high priority, saying that if the Greek gods had a logic, then it must be that of Chrysippus. As we have seen, this logic was a form of dynamic predicate logic. It is equivalent to classical predicate logic and contains it as the static part. Classical predicate logic is according to Hilbert's thesis a privileged form of logic, and according to Quine it is the right regimentation of language. Perhaps the Stoic saying was not so false after all. But we can also learn something about our own form of predicate logic, classical and dynamic, because the Stoic developments can be considered as a finalized whole. Even if the Stoic version of dynamic predicate logic is no logic of the gods, it still is an important logic for human beings." p. 28
    
    

RELATED PAGES

The Dialectical School and the Origins of Propositional Logic

Stoic Logic: The Dialectic and the Doctrine of Lekta (Sayables)

Early Stoic Logicians: Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chrysippus

Grammar and Philosophy: The Stoic Theory of Categories

Annotated bibliography on Ancient Stoic Logic and Semiotics

• First Part: A - G

  Second Part: H - Z

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