Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects. Selected Bibliography (A - L)

Second Part of the Bibliography: M - Z

Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects

Alexius Meinong: Editions, Translations, Bibliographic Resources and Selected Texts

General bibliography from 1872 to 1987:

• Stock Mechthild and Stock Wolfgang G. Psychologie und Philosophie der Grazer Schule. Eine Dokumentation und Wirkungsgeschichte von Alexius Meinong, Stephan Witasek, Rudolf Ameseder, Vittorio Benussi, Ernst Schwarz, Wilhelm M. Frankl und France Veber. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1990.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Meinong-Gedenkschrift. Graz: "Styria" Steirische Verlagsanstalt 1952.
   Contents: John Niemeyer Findlay: The influence of Meinong in Anglo-Saxon countries, 9; Rudolf Freundlich: Die beiden Aspekte der Meinongschen Gegenstandstheorie, 21; Rudolf Kindinger: Das Problem der unvollkommenen Erkenntnisleistung in der Meinongschen Wahrnehmungslehre, 41; Franz Kröner: Zu Meinongs "unmöglichen" Gegenständen, 67; Johann Mokre: Zu den logischen Paradoxien, 81; Kostantin Radakovic: Meinongs Beziehungen zu den Grundlagen unserer Erkenntnistheorie und Weltanschauung, 91; Mila Radakovic: Metaphysische Konsequenzen aus dem Persistenzgedanken Meinongs. Persönliches und Sachliches, 103; Amadeo Silva Tarouca: Die Erkenntnistheorie Meinongs in der Grazer Schultradition, 113; Ferdinand Weinhandl: Das Aussenweltproblem bei A. Meinong, 127; Karl Wolf: Die Entwicklung der Wertphilosophie in der Schule Meinongs, 157-171.
2. Jenseits von sein und Nichtsein. Beiträge zur Meinong-Forschung. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972.
   Acts of the Colloquium held in Graz September, 30th - October, 4th 1970.
3. Alexius Meinong. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 27 1973.
   
4. Theories of Objects: Meinong and Twardowski. Edited by Pasniczek Jacek. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Slodowskiej 1992.
   Contents: Jacek Pasniczek: Preface 7; Francesca Modenato: Alexius Meinong: the theory of relation as a theory of knowledge 9; Liliana Albertazzi: Is there a transcendental object? 26; Roberto Poli: Twardowski and Wolff 45; Jacek Juliusz Jadacki: The metaphysical basis of Kazimierz Twardowski's descriptive semiotics 57; Jan Wolenski: 'Being' as a syncategorematic word: a completion (?) of Twardowski's analysis of 'nothing' 75; Dale Jacquette: Meinongian models of scientific law 86; Jacek Pasniczek: The Meinongian logic vs. the Classical logic 105-112.
   This volume contains a selection of papers from the conference "The Theory of Objects in Central Europe. The Austrian-Polish Connection: Meinong and Twardowski" held in December 1989 in Kraków. It was supported and sponsored by the Jagiellonian University, Centro Studi per la Filosofia Mitteleuropea, The National Research Project "Sign-Language-Reality", and The Institute of Austrian Culture in Warsaw. The conference was organized by Prof. Jan Wolenski with dr. Georg Jankovic's generous assistance.
   Alexius Meinong and Kazimierz Twardowski studied philosophy at the University of Vienna at the end of XIX century. Both were under a great influence of Franz Brentano, who is considered the father of contemporary theory of intentionality. He viewed intentionality as the crucial feature of consciousness consisting in „directness to an object". Such conception should presuppose some general theory of objects of consciousness. Meinong and Twardowski adopted Brentano's idea of intentionality subsequently elaborating their own ontologies of objects. What is common in the views of the two philosophers, barring many differences, is that they assume an extensive sphere of non-existent objects that can be possibly objects of intentional acts.
   Nowadays there is a growing interest in theories of intentionality and intentional objects on the part of analytic philosophy as well as phenomenology. That is why there is also a renaissance of Meinong's and Twardowski's philosophical thought, although the former philosopher is much better known, more popular, and, what follows, more inspiring. The main purpose of the conference that took place in Kraków was to investigate, from various historical and theoretical perspectives, theories of objects created by the two of Brentano's followers. It is to be regretted that the present volume does not fill a serious gap in philosophical literature: no paper is devoted to direct comparison of Meinong and Twardowski. Nevertheless we hope that the papers collected in the volume may contribute to better understanding of the two philosophers and prepare the ground for such a comparative study.
   F. Modenato, in her essay, traces the development of Meinong's idea of relations while linking his views with the views of Hume and Locke. She is concentrating on epistemological relevance of the idea. Relations are treated by Meinong as some complexities and both relations and complexities are higher-order objects. Higher-order objects play the central role in Meinong's theory of knowledge and are of great importance to his ontology.
   L. Albertazzi points to some Kantian motives in Twardowski's ontology. The Polish philosopher distinguishes several categories of objects which, according to Albertazzi's interpretation, correspond closely to that distinguished by Kant. In particular, 'the object in general' may be taken as Kant's transcendental object, and 'the general object' as a universal presented individually in the subject of proposition.
   R. Poli argues in his paper that many elements of Wolff's ontology can be found in Twardowski's theory of objects. Both philosophers conceive objects as possible wholes. For Twardowski, being an object is ontologically prior to having existence and it is enough for being an object to be representable in an act of presentation.
   J.J. Jadacki presents a comprehensive survey of Twardowski's ontological (metaphysical) and epistemological views. On this basis he reconstructs the philosopher's descriptive semiotics focusing his attention on the theory of judgment.
   Additionally, Jadacki carries out a formal semantic analysis of Twardowski's semiotics.
   J. Wolenski considers the main traditional views of 'being' and wonders if 'being' could be situated somewhere in the formal hierarchy of concepts. He comes to the conclusion that "being" expresses no concept at all and, what follows, it has the syncategorematic character as Twardowski claimed. Wolenski proposes a completion of Twardowski's claim by appealing to modern logic and Lesniewski's ontology.
   D. Jacquette sketches informally the principles of Meinongian semantics and shows how the semantics can be applied in formalisation of scientific laws. By contrast to extensionalist models of scientific discourse which admit only existent objects, in Meinongian semantics the reference to ideal and non-existent objects is possible. Many problems of contemporary philosophy of science such as, for example, the justification of induction and confirmation can be uniformely treated and solved on the ground of Meinong's theory.
   J. Pasniczek proposes quite a simple logic which obeys the main theses of Meinong's theory of objects. This logic resembles closely the classical predicate logic with respect to syntax and semantics (it is basically extensional). Despite that resemblance, the proposed logic is associated with very rich ontology of objects including various kinds of non-existent objects.
   I am deeply indebted to Prof. Jan Wolenski for encouragement and assistance in editing this book." (Preface, pp-7-8)
5. Meinong and the Theory of Objects. Grazer Philosophische Studien 50 1995.
   
   Edited by Rudolf Haller; Papers presented at an "Internationale Meinong-Konferenz" held September, 28-30, 1995 in Graz.
6. The Philosophy of Alexius Meinong. Axiomathes 7 1996.
   
   Edited by Liliana Albertazzi
7. The School of Alexius Meinong. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacquette Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001.
8. Il pregiudizio a favore del reale. La teoria dell'oggetto di Alexius Meinong fra ontologia e epistemologia. Rivista di Estetica 30 2005.
   
   A cura di Carola Barbero e Venanzio Raspa.
9. Russell vs. Meinong. The legacy of "On Denoting". Edited by Griffin Nicholas and Jacquette Dale. New York: Routledge 2009.
   Contents: Preface XI; Acknowledgements XIII; Dale Jacquette and Nicholas Griffin: Introduction 1; 1. Alasdair Urquhart: Logic and denotation 10; 2. Graham Stevens: Antirealism and the theory of descriptions 26; 3. Francis Jeffrey Pelletier and Bernard Linsky: Russell vs. Frege on definite descriptions as singular terms 40; 4. Kevin C. Klement: A Cantorian argument against's Frege and early Russell's theories of descriptions 65; 5. Gideon Makin: 'On denoting' appearance and reality 78; 6. Omar W. Nasim: Explaining G. F. Stout's reaction to Russell's 'On denoting' 101; 7. David Bostock: Russell on 'the' in plural 113; 8. Johann Christian Marek: Psychological content and indeterminacy with respect to Being: two notes on the Russell-Meinong Debate 144; 9. Dale Jacquette: Meditations on Meinong's Golden Mountain 169; 10. Nicholas Griffin: Rethinking Item Theory 204; 11. Peter Loftson: Contra Meinong 233; 12. Gabriele Contessa: Who is afraid of imaginary objects? 248; 13. Gregory Landini: Russell's definite descriptions de re 266; 14. Michael Nelson: Quantifying in and Anti-Essentialism 297; 15. Nathan Salmon: Points, complexes, complex points, and a yacht 343; Contributors 365; Index 369.
10. Alai Mario, "Speaking of nonexistent objects," Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 2: 119-159 (2006).
11. Albertazzi Liliana, "A cubist state of mind: Meinong's ontology," Axiomathes 1996: 5-16 (1996).
12. Albertazzi Liliana, "Come tails, fleeting objects and temporal inversions," Axiomathes: 111-136 (1996).
13. Aquila Richard. Intentionality: a study of mental acts. Park: Pennsylvania University Press 1976.
14. Armstrong David Malet, "Reacting to Meinong," Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 615-627 (1995).
    "1. Some reasons are given for rejecting the view that there are entities that do not exist. 2. It is suggested, nevertheless, that this view has some plausibility when we consider unrealized empirical possibilities. 3. Even if nonexistent entities are rejected, there remains Meinong's distinction between object and objectives, roughly: things and facts. The author would analyze objects in terms of objectives, yielding a world of facts."
15. Barber Kenneth, "Meinong's Hume Studies part I: Meinong's nominalism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30: 550-567 (1970).
16. Barber Kenneth, "Meinong's Hume Studies part II: Meinong's analysis of relations," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31: 564-584 (1971).
17. Barbero Carola, "Cry for a shadow. Emotions and Object Theory," Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 2: 181-211 (2006).
18. Baumgartner Wolfgang and Zelaniec W., "Meinong values," Axiomathes: 233-240 (1996).
19. Bencivenga Ermanno, "Meinong: a critique from the Left," Grazer Philosophische Studien 25/26: 359-374 (1986).
    "Meinong justifies the need of his Gegenstandstheorie by presenting it as a generalization of (existing) metaphysics, in that the former deals with both existent and non-existent objects, whereas the latter used to deal with existent objects only. But this justification is disingenuous, since the notion of a non-existent object is virtually a contradiction in terms for the traditional paradigm. What Meinong is really proposing is a conceptual revolution of a Kantian variety, and we need to get clearer about the full import of this revolution. This is what the present paper attempts to do."
20. Benoist Jocelyn. Représentations sans objet: Aux origines de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2001.
    Contents: Introduction. La question des objets inexistants et les "origines communes" de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique 5; Chapitre I. Bolzano et le paradoxe des objets inexistants 17; Chapitre II. Un détour frégéen: la présuppostion de référence 43; Chapitre III. Une première solution intentionnaliste: Twardowski (en passant par Brentano) 67; Chapitre IV: L'objectivation de l'inexistence: Meinong 99; Chapitre V. Le dispositif onto-logique et les deux critiques possibles de Meinong 131; Appendice: Brentano sur les "quelque chose" 169; Chapitre Vi. Husserl critique de Twardowski 173; Index nominum 217-219.
21. Bergmann Gustav. Realism. A critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1967.
    Reprinted: Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, 2004
22. Beyer Christian. Austrian theories of judgement : Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl. In Phenomenology and analysis. Essays on Central European philosophy. Edited by Chrudzimski Arkadiusz and Huemer Wolfgang. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2004. pp. 257-284
23. Bonino Guido, "Why there are non facts in Meinong's world (according to Gustav Bergmann)," Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 2: 239-266 (2006).
24. Bonino Guido, "Why there are no facts in Meinong's world (according to Gustav Bergmann)," Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 2: 239-275 (2007).
    "The paper deals with Gustav Bergmann's analysis of Meinong's ontology, carried out in Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong (1967); more specifically it aims at making it clear in what sense Meinong can be regarded as a "reist". Reism is characterized by Bergmann as a position -- largely dominant in the philosophical tradition -- which
    (i) neglects the ontological category of facts;
    (ii) neglects or downplays nexus (and more in general subsistents);
    (iii) tends to consider all entities as things or thing-like.
    As a by-product, some light will be thrown on the sense of Bergmann's ontological enterprise."
25. Bottani Andrea, "Three kind of incompleteness," Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 2: 99-117 (2006).
26. Bourgeois Warren V., "Beyond Russell and Meinong," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16: 653-666 (1981).
27. Bradford Dennis. The concept of existence. A study of nonexistent particulars. Lanham: University Press of America 1980.
28. Brigati Roberto. Il linguaggio dell'oggettività. Saggio su Meinong. Torino: Thema 1993.
29. Burkhardt Hans. Das Vorurteil zugunsten des Aktualen: die philosophischen Systeme von Leibniz and Meinong. In Le teorie delle modalità. Atti del Convegno internazionale di storia della logica. Edited by Corsi Giovanni, Mangione Corrado, and Mugnai Massimo. Bologna: CLUEB 1989. pp. 155-182
30. Butchvarov Panayot, "Our robust sense of reality," Grazer Philosophische Studien 25/26: 501-531 (1985).
    "Anti-Meinongian philosophers, such as Russell, do not explain what they mean by existence when they deny that there are nonexistent objects - they just sense robustly. I argue that any plausible explanation of what they mean tends to undermine their view and to support the Meinongian view. But why are they so strongly convinced that they are right? I argue that the reason is to be found in the special character of the concept of existence, which has been insufficiently examined by anti-Meinongian as well as by Meinongian philosophers."
31. Campbell Richard, "Did Meinong plant a jungle?," Philosophical Papers 1: 89-102 (1972).
    "This article presents a detailed analysis of Meinong's paper on "Thetheory of objects" in order to untangle the complex dialectic of his argument. It is argued that Meinong's position has been grossly misunderstood; far from maintaining that all objects of reference must have some kind of logical being, Meinong explicitly denies such a 'solution' to the problem of how reference is to be understood when the expression which occurs referentially in a linguistic context fails to refer to an existing object. He is not ontologising the logic of our ordinary use of referring expressions. Rather, Meinong's position is that being is not intrinsic to having the logical status of an object, But rather is only relevant when we come to determine whether the existential proposition concerning some object is true.
    The question of being does not arise when an object is considered as such. Just what this is to be taken as meaning is developed through a discussion of intentionality. It is proposed that Meinong can be understood as holding that the meta-Remark 'reference is there being made to x' does not entail the existence, nor the non-existence of x."
32. Cantens Bernardo J., "Suarez and Meinong on beings of reason and non-existent objects", University of Miami, 1999.
    Available at UMI Dissertation Express: reference number 9938315
33. Capone Braga Gaetano, "La teoria degli oggetti e l'ontologia," Cultura Filosofica VIII (1914): 197-231; 290-318; IX (1915) 72-85. (1914).
34. Capozzi Mirella. Biangoli rettilinei e centauri: l'ontologia di Wolff e Meinong. In Le ragioni del conoscere e dell'agire. Scritti in onore di Rosaria Egidi. Edited by Calcaterra Rosa. Milano: Franco Angeli 2006. pp. 44-56
35. Cappio James John, "Meinong and reference", Princeton University, 1981.
    Available at UMI Dissertation Express (reference number 8119111)
36. Cattaruzza Serena, "Meinong and Bühler," Axiomathes: 103-110 (1996).
37. Chisholm Roderick M., "Supererogation and offence," Ratio 5 (1963).
    Reprinted in: Brentano and Meinong studies - pp. 98-113
38. Chisholm Roderick M. Beyond Being and Nonbeing. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 245-255
    Reprinted in: Brentano and Meinong Studies - pp. 53-67.
    
    "Meinong wrote: "There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects." (1) But he was well aware that this statement of his doctrine of Aussersein was needlessly paradoxical. Other statements were: "The non-real" is not "a mere nothing" and "The object as such ... stands 'beyond being and non-being." (2) Perhaps the clearest statement was provided by Meinong's follower, Ernst Mally: "Sosein is independent of Sein." (3) We could paraphrase Mally's statement by saying: "An object may have a set of characteristics whether or not it exists and whether or not it has any other kind of being."
    It is commonly supposed that this doctrine of Aussersein is absurd and that whatever grounds Meinong may have had for affirming it were demolished by Russell's theory of descriptions. I believe, however, that this supposition is false. I shall attempt here to set forth the doctrine in its most extreme form and I shall then consider what may be said in its favor."
39. Chisholm Roderick M. Einige Hauptpunkte in Meinongs philosophischer Psychologie. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 25-36
40. Chisholm Roderick M. Objectives and intrinsic value. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp.
    Reprinted in: Brentano and Meinong studies - pp. 80-91
41. Chisholm Roderick M., "Homeless objects," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 27: 207-223 (1973).
    Reprinted in: Brentano and Meinong studies - pp. 37-52.
    "In 1907 Meinong introduced the expression 'homeless object' (Heimatlose Gegenständ) to refer to certain objects which, he said, did not fall within the subject-matter of any of the generally accepted branches of knowledge. One might also characterize such objects by saying that they are neither 'concreta' nor 'abstracta'.
    Three such objects are discussed in the present paper: (1) certain 'intentionalia', or objects of thought; (2) what Meinong called 'Objecktive' and what might also be called 'states of affairs'; and (3) 'incomplete objects', or objects that are not completely determinate. Meinong's position with respect to these types of object is here assessed and to a certain extent defended."
42. Chisholm Roderick M. Brentano and Meinong studies. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1982.
    Contents: Foreword 1; 1. Brentano's theory of Substance and Accident 3; 2. Brentano's theory of Judgment 17; 3. Homeless objects 37; 4. Beyond Being and Nonbeing 53; 5. Correct and incorrect emotion 68; 6. Objectives and intrinsic value 80; 7. The quality of pleasure and displeasure 92; 8. Supererogation and offence 98; 9. Beginnings and endings 114-124.
    
    "I present these papers on Brentano and Meinong in the hope that they will lead the reader back to the originai sources. Some of the papers are expositions and commentaries. Others are developments of certain suggestions first made by Brentano or by Meinong.
    (...)
    The third and fourth papers are concerned with Meinong's theory of objects, a theory that grows out of Brentano's theoretical philosophy. "Homeless Objects" first appeared in the Meinong issue of Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 22 (1973). "Beyond Being and Nonbeing" was presented to the Colloquium on Meinong that took place at the University of Graz in September and October, 1970. It first appeared in Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein, edited by Rudolf Haller (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1972). The paper makes clear, I think, that Russell's theory of descriptions - despite its great philosophical merit - does not provide a refutation of Meinong's theory.
    The four papers that follow are concerned with the theory of value, as it had been conceived by Brentano and developed by Meinong.
    (...)
    "Objectives and Intrinsic Value" is a revised version of a second paper that I presented to the Meinong Colloquium in 1970; the original version appears in Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein.
    "Supererogation and Offence" first appeared in Ratio, Vol. V (1963). In this work I make use, not only of certain insights of Meinong, but also those of one of his followers, Dr. Ernst Schwarz. Schwarz's excellent book, Uber den Wert, das Soll, und das richtige Werthalten, has been almost entirely neglected. It was first brought to my attention by Hofrat Dr. Rudolf Kindinger who first introduced me to Graz.
    I hope that these essays will be thought of as carrying out the tradition of the Brentano school." (From the Foreword)
43. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz, "Die Theorie der Intentionalität Meinongs," Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy of Knowledge 51: 119-143 (2001).
    "The most striking feature of Meinong's theory of intentionality is his thesis that every mental act has its reference-object beyond being and non being . This theory seems, at first, to be a clear example of the so called object-theory of intentionality, as it introduces special postulated entities in the target-position of the mental act. Closer examination, however, reveals in Meinong's works important elements of the mediator-theory. Meinong speaks of auxiliary incomplete objects situated between the subject and the object of reference and mediating the intentional access to the (complete) reference-object. Moreover, even if the object of reference is of the simple nominal form, the mediating structure involves essentially propositional entities (objectives). In the paper we attempt to give a set-theoretical interpretation of Meinong's theory in the frame of which we could eventually do without the incomplete mediating objects. Yet, some general epistemological considerations suggest the indispensability of such incomplete mediating structures."
44. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. Brentano und Meinong. Zur Ontologie der Denkobjekte. In Substanz und Identität. Beiträge zur Ontologie. Edited by Löffler Winfried. Paderborn: Mentis-Verlag 2002. pp. 155-166
45. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. Meinong und supervaluation. In Phenomenology and analysis. Essays on Central European philosophy. Edited by Chrudzimski Arkadiusz and Huemer Wolfgang. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2004. pp. 105-130
    "Nowadays the philosophers that are sympathetic to Meinongian ideas are accused of planting an ontological jungle. However in the paper it is shown that a significant part of Meinong's philosophy can be interpreted within the framework of an astonishingly sparse ontology.
    The proposed interpretation does not introduce any nonexistent entities but instead uses supervaluational techniques and substitutional interpretation of quantifiers."
46. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz, "Abstraktion und Relationen beim jungen Meinong," Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 1: 7-62 (2005).
47. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz, "Drei Versionen der Meinongschen Logik," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59: 49-70 (2005).
    "The most striking part of Meinong's theory of objects is his thesis that the 'pure objects' should be considered as ontologically neutral.
    Meinong says that they are 'beyond of being and non-being'. There are three prima facie plausible ways how this ontological neutrality could be analyzed. It can be construed as (i) an expansion of ontology; (ii) an introduction of an ontologically non-committing quantification; or as (iii) a version of free logic."
48. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. Gegenstandstheorie und Theorie der Intentionalität bei Alexius Meinong. Dordrecht: Springer 2007.
    Inhaltverzeichnis: Einführung IX-XII; 1. Intentionalität und immanente Objekte. Die Lehre Franz Brentanos 1; 2. Abstraktion und Relationen. Der junge Meinong 53; 3. Inhalt und Gegenständ. Meinongs Lehre um 1900 103; 4. Die Lehre von den Objektiven (1902) 149; 5. Gegenstandstheorie (1904-1920) 179; 6. Meinongs Gegenstände und die intentionale Beziehung 251; 7. Meinong'sche "Konstitutionssysteme" 307; 8. Die Logik des Ausserseins 353; Schlusswort 371; Bibliographie 373; Namenverzeichnis 385-386
49. Cocchiarella Nino, "Meinong reconstructed versus early Russell reconstructed," Journal of Philosophical Logic 11: 183-214 (1982).
    Reprinted in Logical studies in Early Analytic Philosophy pp. 119-151.
    "A reconstruction of Bertrand Russell's pre-1905 theory of nonexisting individuals is contrasted with terry parsons' reconstruction of Meinong's theory in this book "nonexistent objects". Meinongian objects, complete and incomplete, possible and impossible, are shown to be parasitic upon Russellian individuals, and Meinong's distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties and relations is explained in terms of the distinction between those properties and relations which can hold only of existing individuals and those which can hold of nonexisting individuals as well."
50. Dappiano Luigi, "L'idealismo di Oxbridge tra Lotze e Meinong. A proposito delle origini della filosofia analitica," Axiomathes: 279 (1994).
51. De Calan Ronan. L'objectif de l' Objektiv: de l'objet du jugement à la théorie de l'objet. In Propositions et états de choses. Entre être et sens. Edited by Benoist Jocelyn. Paris: Vrin 2006. pp. 51-66
52. De Libera Alain, "Subsistance et existence: Porphyre et Meinong," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 100: 167-192 (1997).
    "According to K. Perszyk, (*) Meinong's description of homeless objects is a novelty: it does not trace back to any traditional ontological assumption, neither avicennian nor scolastic. While discussing this claim, one focuses on two key-notions in ancient and medieval ontology: subsistence and existence, which seem to be akin to the meinongian bestehen, Sosein vs. Sein and existieren. In this respect, one comments on Porphyry's, Proclus', Abaelard's, Aquinas' and Bacon's theory of general objects, fictitious entities and non-existing particulars."
    
    (*) K. Perszyk, Nonexistent Objects: Meinong and Contemporary Philosophy (Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, 49), Dordrecht-Boston-Londres, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.
53. Dejnozka Jan, "Russell's robust sense of reality: a reply to Butchvarov," Grazer Philosophische Studien 32: 155-164 (1988).
    This paper is now superseded by the chapter 4. "Russell's robust sense of reality" of "The ontology of the analytic tradition and its origins" (1996). (Personal communication by Jan Dejnozka).
54. Dejnozka Jan. The ontology of the analytic tradition and its origins. Realism and identity in Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine. Lanham, Maryland: Littefield Adams 1996.
    Paperback edition reprinted with corrections, 2002; reprinted with further corrections, 2003.
55. Dölling Evelyn, "Alexius Meinong: "Der blinde Seher Theiresias"," Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 1-27 (1995).
56. Dölling Evelyn. On Alexius Meinong's theory of signs. In The Brentano Puzzle. Edited by Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 1997. pp. 199-214
57. Dölling Evelyn. "Wahrheit Suchen und Wharheit Bekennen." Alexius Meinong: Skizze seines Lebens. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1999.
58. Dölling Evelyn. Alexius Meinong's life and work. In The School of Alexius Meinong. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacquette Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 49-76
59. Dölling Evelyn. Meinong in his and our times. In The School of Alexius Meinong. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacquette Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 3-48
60. Dölling Evelyn, ""...dieser Umweg führt über sprachliche Ausdrücke, durch die sich Annahmen verraten"
    Eine semiotsche Sicht auf Meinongs Annahmenlehre," Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 1: 129-158 (2005).
61. Eames Elizabeth Ramsden, "Russell's study of Meinong," Russell.The Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives 4: 3-7 (1971).
    "Some commentators have found Russell's treatment of Meinong to be a 'travesty,' but it is argued that the letters between Meinong and Russell and Russell's reading notes (all in the Bertrand Russell archives at McMaster) show Russell to have been a careful student whose interpretation was welcomed by Meinong."
62. Eaton Howard O. The Austrian philosophy of values. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press 1930.
63. Elie Hubert. Le complexe significabile. Paris: Vrin 1936.
    Reprinted with the title: Le Signifiable par complexe. La proposition et son objet. Grégoire de Rimini, Meinong, Russell - Paris, Vrin 2000
64. Englebretsen George, "Meinong on existence," Man and World 6: 80-82 (1973).
    "I argue here that on one plausible reading Meinong's theory of objects, far from being mistaken in the way Russell thought it was, shows considerable insight into the notion of existence. In particular, Meinong can be seen as making an important distinction between what can be significantly referred to and what exists. This distinction is very close to one made recently by Fred Sommers."
    "I argue here that on one plausible reading Meinong's theory of objects, far from being mistaken in the way Russell thought it was, shows considerable insight into the notion of existence. In particular, Meinong can be seen as making an important distinction between what can be significantly referred to and what exists. This distinction is very close to one made recently by Fred Sommers."
    "For several years I was told, and believed, that while Russell's theory of descriptions might he flawed (viz. in the way Strawson showed), his rejection of Meinong's theory of objects, which led to the theory of descriptions, was undoubtedly correct. Now I doubt very much if this is so.
    The "official" view is that Meinong had made the mistake of multiplying the senses of "exists" unnecessarily. According to this view, Meinong, since he held that the descriptive components of any meaningful sentence must refer to something, was forced to provide a special kind of existence, subsistence, for entities which are nonexistent but referred to meaningfully. Russell avoided this position by claiming that statements referring to nonexistent entities are meaningful but false (since they logically entail the existence of the entity referred to). I think the official view underestimates Meinong's philosophical abilities. Indeed, I think, rather than engaging in the philosophically dangerous task of multiplying kinds of existence, Meinong was expressing a keen insight into the nature of existential commitment." p. 80
65. Findlay John Niemeyer. Meinong's Theory of Objects. London: Oxford University Press 1933.
    Contents of the Second Edition: Preface to the Second Edition V-XV; I. The Doctrine of Content and Object 1; II. The Pure Object and Its Indifference to Being 42; III. The Theory of Objectives 59; IV: The Modal Moment 102; V. Objects of Higher Order 113; VI. The Theory of Incomplete Objects 152; VII. The Modal Properties of Objectives 185; VIII.The Apprehension of Objects 218; IX. Valuation and Values 264; X. Dignitatives and Desideratives 303; XI. Appraisal of Meinong 322; Index 349-353.
    Second edition in 1963 (Gregg Revivals Reprint); the chapters IX and X were added in this edition.
    Reprinted with the title: Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values and a new Introduction. Findlay and Meinong by Dale Jacquette (pp. XXV-LIV), Aldershot, Ashgate, 1995.
66. Findlay John Niemeyer. Axiological ethics. London: Macmillan 1970.
67. Findlay John Niemeyer, "Meinong the phenomenologist," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 27: 161-177 (1973).
68. Findlay John Niemeyer. Meinong's theory of objects and values. Secon edition. Aldershot: Gregg revivals 1995.
    Reprint of the second edition with a new introduction by Dale Jacquette pp. XXV-LIV
69. Gellman Jerome I., "Suter on Russell on Meinong," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29: 441-445 (1969).
    "The author replies to Ronald Suter's "Russell's 'refutation' of Meinong in 'On denoting'," "Philosophy and phenomenological research," June, 1967. Suter's interpretation of one of Russell's arguments is criticized on exegetical grounds, And his defense of another argument is rebutted on logical grounds. Meinong's thesis is presented as the thesis that all statements of a certain form are true. It is argued that all of Russell's arguments are attempts to pose counter-examples to this single view. Meinong is defended against Russell's counter-examples."
70. Griffin Nicholas, "Russell's "horrible travesty" of Meinong," Russell.The Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives: 39-51 (1977).
    "For a long time it was widely believed that Meinong held that every object of reference had being. This has since come to be recognized as a 'horrible travesty' (Findlay's phrase) of Meinong's position.
    However, A new horrible travesty has grown up: namely, that the original misinterpretation of Meinong was due to Russell's early discussions of his work. While it is conceded that Russell's later writings contained travesties of Meinong, it is shown (using unpublished documents in the Bertrand Russell archives as well as Russell's published writings) that, in his early critical discussions of Meinong, Russell was fully aware that for Meinong some objects had no kind of being at all."
71. Griffin Nicholas, "The independence of Sosein from Sein," Grazer Philosophische Studien 9: 27-34 (1979).
    "Meinong's theory of objects is at last getting some of the attention it deserves, and it now seems that the time has passed when the theory could be dismissed as merely a source of philosophical amusement. But, despite the fact that Meinong's position is now taken much more seriously than it used to be, the theory is, for the most part, still rejected, and even Meinong's more careful critics still fail to do justice to the plausibility of his theory of objects. Recently Reinhardt Grossmann (1) has presented a series of arguments designed to show that the greater part of the theory of objects is mistaken, although he concedes that 'Meinong's doctrine is neither too obscure to be understood nor too wrongheaded to be enlightening' (p. 67). In this paper 1 shall be concerned with showing how Meinong's theory can be defended against Grossmann's arguments.
    Grossmann usefully lists the four central theses of Meinong's theory of objects (p. 67):
    (1) Nonexistent objects (2) have no form of being whatsoever.
    (2) Such objects are, nevertheless, constituents of certain states of affairs.
    (3) They even have a number of quite ordinary properties - the golden mountain, for example, is golden.
    (4) Being is not a part of any object.
    He then argues that, of the four, only the first is true. My own view is that all four are true." p. 27
    
    (1) See R. Grosmmann - Meinong's doctrine of the Aussersein of the pure object - Noûs, 8 (1974) pp. 67-82. All references, except where otherwise indicated, are to this paper.
    (2) Grossmann standardly uses the term 'entity' for Meinong's 'Gegenstand', which is usually translated as 'object'. Since the Oxford English Dictionary defines 'entity' as 'thing that has real existence', this switch is unsatisfactory. Accordingly I have switched back either to 'object' or to the even more neutral term 'item'.
72. Griffin Nicholas, "Russell's critique of Meinong's theory of objects," Grazer Philosophische Studien 25/26: 375-401 (1986).
    "Russell brought three arguments forward against Meinong's theory of objects. None of them depend upon a misinterpretation of the theory as is often claimed. In particular, only one is based upon a clash between Meinong's theory and Russell's theory of descriptions, and that did not involve Russell's attributing to Meinong his own ontological assumption. The other two arguments were attempts to find internal inconsistencies in Meinong's theory. But neither was sufficient to refute the theory, though they do require some revisions, viz. a trade-off between freedom of assumption and unlimited characterization. Meinong himself worked out the essentials of the required revisions."
73. Grossmann Reinhardt, "Non-existent Objects: Recent Work on Brentano and Meinong," American Philosophical Quarterly 6: 17-32 (1969).
74. Grossmann Reinhardt. Meinong. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1974.
    Contents: Preface IX-X; I. Individuals and Properties 1; II. Ideal and Real Relations 21; III. Ideas and Their Intentions 48; IV. Objects of Higher Order 57; V. Assumptions and Objectives 78; VI. Being and Aussersein 106; VII. Empirical Knowledge: Perception and Introspection 121; VIII. Relational Knowledge: The Theory of Entities 156; IX. The Apprehension of Objects 182; X. Modalities 199; Appendix I. Meinong's Ontology (by Meinong) 224; Appendix II. Meinong's Life and Work (by Meinong) 230; Notes 237; Index 255.
    
    "This book on Meinong is primarily concerned with his arguments for the positions for which he is famous among some philosophers and infamous among others. But philosophical contentions carry little weight when they are viewed in isolation. Matters are too complex, too difficult, to be settled in an isolated way. Every argument must be evaluated against a background which includes a philosopher's other arguments and some of his basic assumptions or -- if you wish -- prejudices. I therefore discuss Meinong's arguments within the context in which they appear, but with an eye on his earlier positions as well as on his later changes of mind. There are at least two further reasons for adopting this particular approach in Meinong's case.
    Findlay, in his classic study of Meinong's philosophy, compares him with G. E. Moore.(1) Although this comparison is apt, there is one respect in which Meinong differs greatly from Moore. Meinong's philosophy develops over the years from a sparse ontology into an ample one. Every new idea is built upon an old one; new problems arise in the wake of earlier solutions; certain questions are raised time and again, but their answers are more and more refined. In short, there is a definite development, with a definite trend, definite stages, and a distinct final view.
    I also wished to impress on the reader how misleading the prevalent view is that Meinong was a spendthrift metaphysician who delighted in multiplying entities continuously and needlessly. If one becomes aware of how Meinong's full ontology develops very slowly over many years from very austere beginnings, how he resists the temptation to solve a problem by admitting a new kind of entity, and how he gives in only after a whole series of arguments for the new kind of entity has accumulated, one will, hopefully, be less inclined in future to think of Meinong as the 'supreme entity multiplier in the history of philosophy'.(2)" (from the Preface).
    
    (1) J. N. Findlay, Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1963), p. 348.
    (2) This phrase if from Gilbert Ryle's article in the Oxford Magazine 26 October 1933.
75. Grossmann Reinhardt, "Meinong's Doctrine of the "Aussersein" of the Pure Object," Noûs 8: 67-82 (1974).
    "Meinong's doctrine of the Aussersein of the pure object consists, in my view, of the following four main theses: (1) Nonexistent entities, like the golden mountain and the round square, have no form of being whatsoever. (2) Such entities are, nevertheless, constituents of certain states of affairs. (3) They even have a number of quite ordinary properties-the golden mountain, for example, is golden. (4) Being is not a part of any object. I shall try to explain and evaluate these four theses, and I shall claim that only the first one is true. However, even if my arguments fail to convince, they may at least show that Meinong's doctrine is neither too obscure to be understood nor too wrongheaded to be enlightening."
76. Grossmann Reinhardt, "Non-existent Objects vs. Definite Descriptions," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 363-377 (1984).
    "Some years ago, I published an article about Meinong's theory of objects. (1) I listed there four main theses of Meinong's view:
    (1) The golden mountain (and other nonexistents) has no being at all.
    (2) Nevertheless, it is a constituent of the fact that the golden mountain does not exist.
    (3) Furthermore, it has such ordinary properties as being made from gold.
    (4) Existence is not a constituent of any object.
    And I argued in that paper that only thesis (1) is true. In particular, I insisted that (3), which I consider to be the most characteristic feature of Meinong's view, is false.
    Since then, there have been quite a few discussions of Meinong's view. I would like, in response to some of these works, to reiterate my earlier criticism of Meinong. My purpose is threefold. Firstly, I would like to state once more my own view, which is a version of Russell's theory of definite descriptions, as clearly as possible. Secondly, I shall defend my past contention that the golden mountain is not golden against some recent objections. And thirdly and most importantly, I want to describe the dialectic of the philosophical problem as I perceive it. It seems to me to be an exasperating shortcoming of the discussion that most participants do not clearly state the basic options and their reasons for preferring some to others."
    
    (1) 'Meinong's Doctrine of the Aussersein of the Pure Object', Noüs, 8 (1974, pp. 67-81. See also my Meinong (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1974).
77. Grossmann Reinhardt, "Reid, Meinong and the Argument from Physics," Metaphysica.International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 1: 69-82 (2000).
78. Grossmann Reinhardt. Meinong's Main Mistake. In The School of Alexius Meinong. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacquette Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 477-488
    "Seldom has a modern philosopher become as famous for a view which he does not hold as Alexius Meinong. One generally attributes to him the belief that there are, not just such ordinary things as mountains and relations, but even such things as the golden mountain and the round square. He is therefore often viewed as a spendthrift ontologist who delighted in multiplying entities continuously and needlessly. But this conception, I shall try to show, is mistaken. Anyone who has studied Meinong's philosophy carefully will come to the conclusion that he is not the 'supreme entity-multiplier in the history of philosophy' as Gilbert Ryle claims.(1)
    But even though Meinong never embraced the rather extreme view that there are, in addition to existing things in space and time and subsisting things (ideal things) outside of space and time, also such things as the golden mountain, and even such contradictory things as the round square, he nevertheless insisted on another ontological principle not any less mistaken than what I just called the 'extreme' view. It is this insistence, and not his ontological inventory, which I consider to be Meinong's main mistake. I shall, therefore, first defend Meinong against the kind of accusation implied in Ryle's description of Meinong. And then I shall, secondly, show where Meinong really went wrong in his ontology." (p. 477)
    
    (1) See Ryle's article in the Oxford Magazine 26 October 1933.
79. Guigon Ghislain, "Meinong on magnitudes and measurement," Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 1: 255-296 (2005).
    "The paper comprises a presentation and defence of Meinong's discussion on magnitudes and measurement found in his Über die Bedeutung des Weber'schen Gesetzes. The first and longer part of the presentation examines Meinong's analysis of magnitudes. According to Meinong, we must distinguish between divisible magnitudes and indivisible ones. He argues that relations of
    distance, or dissimilarity, are indivisible magnitudes that coincide with divisible magnitudes called stretches. The second part of the presentation is concerned with Meinong's account of measurement as a comparison of parts.
    Meinong holds that measuring is comparing parts and, thus, only divisible magnitudes are directly measurable. When indivisible magnitudes like distances are indirectly measured, they are measured by means of divisible magnitudes like stretches. Meinong's account allows us to reject important objections against measurement of similarity and to reconsider the logical form of the sentences involving comparative similarity."
80. Haller Rudolf, "Meinongs Gegenstandstheorie und Ontologie," Journal of the History of Philosophy 4: 313-324 (1966).
    Reprinted in: Rudolf Haller (ed.) - Studien zur österreichischen Philosophie -Vol. I - Amsterdam, Rodopi 1979 pp. 49-65
81. Haller Rudolf. Über Annahmen. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 223-228
82. Haller Rudolf, "Über Meinong," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 27: 148-160 (1973).
83. Haller Rudolf. Facta und Ficta. Stuttgart: Reclam 1986.
84. Haller Rudolf, "Incompleteness and fictionality in Meinong's objects theory," Topoi 8: 63-70 (1989).
    "In Meinong's object theory the object is by its nature indifferent to being. Incomplete objects are distinguished from complete = existing objects which are objects completely determined, That is, Objects to which one of all possible predicates is predicable. To grasp complete objects we are relying on incomplete ones, Which are objects not determined in every respect. Functional objects are a subclass of incomplete objects, In some cases related -- But never identical -- ith existing (complete) objects."
85. Haller Rudolf, "From archives to edition," Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 207-220 (1995).
86. Haller Rudolf, "Über Meinongs Wissenschaftstheorie," Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 491-505 (1995).
87. Haller Rudolf, "Psychologische Grundlagen der Gegenstandstheorie Meinongs," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 6: 31-41 (1996).
88. Heanue James. The replacement of dependent clauses by infinitive expressions. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 179-186
89. Hintikka Jaakko. Knowledge by acquaintance - Individuation by acquaintance. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 205-222
90. Hintikka Jaakko, "Meinong in a long perspective," Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 29-45 (1995).
    "This essay is an attempt to place Meinong on the map of the history of the certain central philosophical assumptions and concepts. This task is different from placing a thinker like Meinong on the map of overt philosophical movements and schools. The reason is that the assumptions and concepts I am interested in have often remained tacit, and they have frequently been shared by members of entirely different-looking traditions.
    In the case of Meinong, a vantage point is offered by the most distinctive part of his philosophy, which is his treatment of existence and of other varieties of being. I believe strongly that his views on existence and being cannot be fully appreciated and evaluated without knowing their historical background (and also their topical foreground). And, perhaps surprisingly, this background -- that is to say, the earlier history of the notions of existence and being -- is not at all well understood. I must therefore present here a brief history of the concept of being in order to put Meinong's ideas into perspective. An examination of this history will eventually lead us to other notions crucial for the purpose of understanding Meinong." p. 29
91. Hochberg Herbert, "Abstracts, functions, existence and relations in the Russell-Meinong dispute, the Bradley Paradox and the Realism-Nominalism controversy," Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 273-291 (1995).
    "The paper begins by considering Russell's criticism of Meinong's theory of objects and Sosein that center on the notions of negation and existence. The discussion raises issues about functions, properties, predication, the "concept" of existence and relations.
    These lead to a consideration of recent revivals of moderate nominalism in the form of trope theories. An argument against such theories suggests a fundamental principle of ontology and a reformulation of the nominalism-realism dispute."
92. Hochberg Herbert, "Being and Nothingness, Nichtsein and Aussersein, Facts and Negation: Meinongian reflections in Sartre and Russell," Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 1: 199-232 (2005).
    "The paper explores connections among and problems related to (1) Sartre's notions of Being and Nothingness, (2) Meinong's concerns with non-being, Aussersein, objectives and negation, (3) Russell's diverse views of negative facts, and (4) the respective rejections (and sometimes purported refutations) of idealism stemming from considerations of the act-object distinction and the focus on "intentionality" that characterized the Brentanist turn in philosophy.
    Alternative ontological analyses of negation and their connections to the "relations" of diversity and identity are also considered, along with Sartre's attempt to place consciousness outside of any causal framework and to found an "ethic of existentialism" on his accounts of consciousness, being and negation."
93. Hodges Michael, "On "Being about"," Mind 80: 1-16 (1971).
    "Interest in the concept 'about' has often centered around Meinong's argument: I.) the golden mountain does not exist. II.) sentence (1) is about the golden mountain. III.) if sentence (1) is a sentence about a golden mountain, then there is golden mountain which it is about. IV.) there is a golden mountain. This argument, Which is formally valid, depends on two assumptions: 1) that it is generally correct to say, if a sentence has "x" as its grammatical subject then it is about 'x'; 2) that to say that a sentence is about something is to say the sentence stands in some relation to some object. Most attacks on Meinong's argument deal with the first of these assumptions while I argue that in the relevant sense the second assumption is false. Goodman has developed formal definitions of two senses of "about" which would forestall the argument a step IIIand I show that his definitions are inadequate. Having shown that (2) above is false I examine a number of attacks on Meinong's argument including those of Ryle, Linsky, Strawson and Cartwright. Each of these attacks in the transition from (i) to (ii) above and in so doing runs counter to our intuitions concerning the concept of 'being about'."
94. Höfer Ulf, "Defekte Gegenstände und andere Aspekte der Ontologie Meinongs," Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 3: 241-267 (2009).
95. Hunter Daniel, "Reference and Meinongian objects," Grazer Philosophische Studien 14: 23-36 (1981).
    "Terence Parsons has recently given a consistent formalization of Meinong's theory of objects. The interest in this theory lies in its postulation of nonexistent objects. An important implication of the theory is that we commonly refer to nonexistent objects. In particular, The theory is committed to taking fictional entities as objects of reference. Yet it is difficult to see how reference to fictional entities can be established if Parsons' theory is correct.
    This difficulty diminishes the attractiveness of the theory and also raises questions as to the ability of the theory to give a satisfactory account of intentional attitudes towards fictional entities."
96. Ierna Carlo, "Relations in the early works of Meinong and Husserl," Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 3: 7-36 (2009).
97. Jacques Francis, "Référence et description chez Meinong. De la phénoménologie à l'analyse," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 27: 266-287 (1973).
98. Jacquette Dale, "Meinong's theory of defective objects," Grazer Philosophische Studien 15: 1-19 (1982).
    "In his difficult work On Emotional Presentation, Meinong introduces the concept of defective objects. These are meant to provide part of the solution to Mally's paradox about self-referential thought. But the discussion of defective objects is ambiguous in ways which give rise to a dilemma.
    It is not clear whether defective objects are supposed to be a special kind of intentional object on Meinong's theory, or whether they are not really supposed to be intentional objects at all. If defective objects are a special kind of intentional object, then it is possible to put forward a strengthened version of Mally's paradox which cannot be solved by the theory of defective objects. The strengthened paradox represents a counter-example to the intentionality thesis, according to which every psychological experience is directed toward an object of intention. But if defective 'objects' are not really intentional objects at all, then psychological experiences which have defective objects will themselves constitute counter-examples to the intentionality thesis. In either case, the thesis cannot be consistently maintained." p. 1
99. Jacquette Dale, "Meinong's doctrine of the modal moment," Grazer Philosophische Studien 25/26: 423-438 (1986).
    "Meinong's doctrine of the modal moment and the watering-down of extranuclear properties to surrogate nuclear counterparts was offered in response to Russell's problem of the existent round square. To avoid an infinite regress of successively watered-down factualities, Meinong stipulates that the modal moment itself cannot be watered-down. This limits free assumption, since it means that the idea of the existent-cum-modal-moment round square cannot be entertained in thought. It is possible to eliminate the modal moment and watering-down from Meinongian semantics in favor of a strict enforcement of the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties. This provides a simpler, more economical Meinongian object theory, and regains unrestricted free assumption."
100. Jacquette Dale, "Mally's heresy and the logic of Meinong's object theory," History and Philosophy of Logic 10: 1-14 (1989).
     "The consistent formalization of Meinong's object theory in recent mathematical logic requires either plural modes of predication, Or distinct categories of nuclear or constitutive and extranuclear or nonconstitutive properties. The plural modes of predication approach is rejected because it is reducible to the nuclear-extranuclear property distinction, But not conversely, And because the nuclear-extranuclear property distinction offers a more satisfactory solution to object theory paradoxes."
101. Jacquette Dale, "Modal Meinongian logic," Logique et Analyse 125-126: 110-130 (1989).
     "A formalization of four distinct quantificational modal Mcinongian logics is given, with nonstandard model set theoretical semantics. The derivation of Barcan and converse Barcan theorems prompts revision of two systems of modal Meinongian logic to restore congruence of semantic and inferential structures of Mcinongian systems with identical uniform domain distributions of existent and nonexistent objects. The problem of transworld identity of incomplete and impossible objects is examined, and world-indexing of nuclear properties is recommended as a solution."
102. Jacquette Dale, "The origins of Gegenstandstheorie. Immanent and transcendent intentional objects in Brentano, Twardowski and Meinong," Brentano Studien.Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3: 177-202 (1990).
103. Jacquette Dale. Meinongian models of scientific law. In Theories of objects: Meinong and Twardowski. Edited by Pasniczek Jacek. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Slodowskiej 1992. pp. 86-104
104. Jacquette Dale, "A Meinongian theory of definite description," Axiomathes: 345-360 (1994).
105. Jacquette Dale, "Meinongian logic and Anselm's ontological proof for the existence of God," Philosophical Forum 25: 231-240 (1994).
     "The key assumption of Anselm-inspired ontological proofs for the existence of God, that existence is part of God's essence or greatness, is submitted to a Meinongian criticism. Meinong's distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties disallows existence to be included as a constitutive property of any existent or nonexistent object. The unsolved problem of evil suggests instead that to be omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly benevolent, and the author of an actual world in which there is natural evil, is tantamount to being a round square, Meinongian logic implies that even if God exists, an existent God could not possibly be greater or more perfect than an impossible necessarily nonexistent Meinongian object God."
106. Jacquette Dale, "Tarski's quantificational semantics and Meinongian object theory domains," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75: 88-107 (1994).
107. Jacquette Dale, "Meinong's concept of implexive Being and Nonbeing," Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 233-271 (1995).
     "Meinong introduces the concept of implexive being and nonbeing to explain the metaphysics of universals and as a contribution to the theory of reference and perception. Meinong accounts for Aristotle's doctrine of the inherence of secondary substances in primary substances in object theory terms as the implection of incomplete universals in complete existent or subsistent objects. The derivative notion of implexive so-being is developed by Meinong to advance an intuitive modal semantics that admits degrees of possibility. A set theoretical interpretation of Meinong's mereological concept of the implection of incomplete beingless objects in existent or subsistent complete objects is proposed. The implications of Meinong's concept of implection are exploited to answer extensionalist objections about "Meinong's jungle," defending the ontic economy of an extraontological neo-Meinongian semantic domain that supports individual reference and true predication of constitutive properties to beingless objects."
108. Jacquette Dale, "Object theory foundations for intensional logic," Acta Analytica 13: 33-63 (1995).
     "The logic of existent and nonexistent objects provides a formal theory of reference and true predication for ordinary discourse, the semantics of ontological commitment, and logic of fiction. The intensional logic proposed in what follows offers a rigorous object theory semantics with nonstandard propositional and predicate inference machinery. The system is distinguished from previous formalizations of object theory by formal criteria for nuclear (constitutive) and extranuclear (nonconstitutive) properties, three-valued propositional semantics for predications of nuclear properties to incomplete nonexistent objects for which the objects ostensibly are undetermined, nonstandard set theory semantics with unrestricted comprehension for object theory predicate semantics (licensed by existence restrictions on abstraction equivalence), demonstrations of internal determinacy, consistency, and Henkin completeness, nonstandard deduction theorem, and consistency considerations in light of free assumption and unrestricted comprehension."
109. Jacquette Dale. Alexius Meinong (1853-1920). In The School of Franz Brentano. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Libardi Massimo, and Poli Roberto. Dordrecht: Kuwer 1996. pp. 131-159
110. Jacquette Dale. Meinongian logic: the semantic of existence and nonexistence. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter 1996.
     Contents: Preface IX; Introduction 1;
     Part One: Meinong's theory of Objects.
     I. Elements of Object theory 7; II. Formal semantic paradox in Meinong's Object theory 12; III. Meinong's theory of Defective Objects 37; IV. The Object theory intentionality of ontological committment 56; V. Logic, mind and Meinong 70; VI. Meinong's doctrine of the modal moment 80;
     Parto Two: Object theory O.
     I. Syntax, formation and inference principles 95; II. Semantics 101; III. Developments of the logic 114;
     Part Three: Philosophical problems and applications.
     I. Twardowski on Content and Object 193; II: Private language and private mental objects 200; III. God an impossible Meinongian Object 230; IV. Meinongian models of scientific law 238; V. Aesthetics and Meinongian Logic of Fiction 256; VI. The Paradox of Analysis 265;
     Bibliography 269; Index 285.
111. Jacquette Dale, "On defoliating Meinong's jungle," Axiomathes: 17-42 (1996).
112. Jacquette Dale, "Confessions of a Meinongian logician," Grazer Philosophische Studien 58/59 (2000).
113. Jacquette Dale. Aussersein of the pure object. In The School of Alexius Meinong. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacquette Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 373-396
114. Jacquette Dale. Nuclear and extranuclear properties. In The School of Alexius Meinong. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacquette Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 397-426
115. Jacquette Dale, "Meinong on the phenomenology of assumption," Studia Phaenomenologica.Romanian Journal of Phenomenology 3: 155-177 (2003).
     "This essay offers a detailed critical exposition of Alexius Meinong's theory of free assumption in its relation to inner perception in his book, On Assumptions. I argue that the concept of free assumption is key to understanding the basic principles of Meinong's bject theory, and his extra-ontology of nonexistent objects, including the golden mountain and round square. I situate Meinong's object theory in the context of Brentano's descriptive psychology, and consider the phenomenological foundations of the Meinongian domain.
     Meinong's theory of assumption introduces a fourth category of assumptions to supplement Brentano's tripartite division between presentations, judgments, and emotions, on the grounds that assumptions are phenomenologically distinct from and in some sense stronger than presentations, and also distinct from and in some sense weaker than judgments."
116. Jacquette Dale. Logic for Meinongian Object Theory Semantics. In Logic from Russell to Church. Vol. 5 of Handbook of the History of Logic. Edited by Gabbay Dov and Woods John. Amsterdam: North-Holland 2009. pp. 29-76
117. Jadacki Jacek Juliusz, "Alexius Meinong and Polish philosophy," Axiomathes:
     241-266 (1996).
118. Jorgensen Andrew Kenneth, "Meinong's much maligned modal moment," Grazer Philosophische Studien 64: 95-118 (2002).
     "Russell's objections to object-theory have been refuted by the proofs of the consistency of Meinong's system given by various writers. These proofs exploit technical distinctions that Meinong apparently uses very little if at all. Instead, Meinong introduces a theoretical postulate called the modal moment. I describe this postulate and its place in Meinong's system, and I argue that it has been much under-rated by Meinong's logician expositors."
119. Jorgensen Andrew Kenneth, "Types of negation in logical reconstructions of Meinong," Grazer Philosophische Studien 67: 21-36 (2004).
     "Russell's criticisms force Meinong to adopt a distinction between two types of negation. Logical expositions of Meinong's theory show the distinction is easily drawn in formal terms, but that alone does not justify the distinction intuitively. I criticise Routley's treatment of the distinction and argue that only Terence Parsons' theory retains and preserves the tight network of conceptual connections between the notions of negation, contradiction and impossibility. Hence, Parsons' approach best expresses the Meinongian perspective."
120. Kerner George C. Urteil und Gefühl; Glaube und Absicht. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 229-244
121. Koehn Glen R., "Fictional objects (Terence Parsons, Richard Routley, Edward Zalta, Alexius Meinong)", University of Waterloo, 1996.
     Available at UMI Dissertation Express: reference number NN09353
122. Kroon Frederick W., "Was Meinong only pretending?," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 499-527 (1992).
     "In this paper I argue against the usual interpretation of Meinong's argument for nonexistent objects, an interpretation according to which Meinong imported nonexistent objects like "the golden mountain" to account directly for the truth of statements like the golden mountain is golden'. I claim instead (using evidence from Meinong's "On Assumptions") that his argument really involves an ineliminable appeal to the notion of pretense. This appeal nearly convinced Meinong at one stage that he could do without nonexistent objects. The reason, I argue, why he nonetheless embraced an ontology of nonexistents has to do with the phenomenology of representation, and not with semantics."
123. Kroon Frederick W. Russell's Descriptions and Meinong's Assumptions. In Modes of Existence. Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic. Edited by Bottani Andrea and Davies Richard. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2006. pp. 81-104
     "The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I describe a problem for Russell's account of the logical form of negative existentials involving descriptions, and suggest a Russellian solution. This solution is one that no one will care to adopt -- it seems to turn negative existentials into self-contradictions -- but I later argue that, properly interpreted, it constitutes a promising way of reconciling some of Meinong's views about negative existentials with the kind of "robust sense of reality" that informed Russell's own analysis. In section 3 I begin the task of articulating this reading of Meinong by describing Meinong's Assumption View as articulated in the second edition of his On Assumptions (Meinong 1910). Because this view presupposes Meinong's infamous commitment to non-existent objects, it would still offend Russell's "robust sense of reality", and so section 4 considers a weakened version of the view, one that retains the appeal to assumptions while giving up the appeal to non-existent objects. (Meinong defends a similar view in the 1902 edition of On Assumptions, which predates his discovery of non-existents.) Section 5 offers the finale: it shows how Meinong had himself tried to apply such a weakened Assumption View to the case of negative existentials, that Russell had known about the attempt (this arguably solves the first, hermeneutic puzzle), and that, properly interpreted, this way of understanding negative existentials provides Russell with a solution to the problem facing his theory of negative existentials." (pp. 82-83)
124. Küng Guido. Noema und Gegenständ. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 55-62
125. Küng Guido, "The intentional and the real object," Dialectica.International Journal of Philosophy of Knowledge 38: 143-156 (1984).
     "Starting from examples of genuine perception and naive hallucination, Different theories concerning the relation between the intentional and the real object are being discussed. It is shown that Meinong's theory is the most natural one, But it is argued against Meinong that the notion of "converse intentional property" should play a greater role."
126. Künne Wolfgang. Abstrakte Gegenstände. Semantik und Ontologie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1983.
127. Künne Wolfgang, "Some varieties of thinking. Reflections on Meinong and Fodor," Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 365-395 (1995).
     "The first half of the paper reflects on a couple of folk-psychological notions. "Belief" and "judgement" are selected for special attention.
     They cover two varieties of thinking, a mental state and a mental act. Both lay claim to truth, and thereby stand in marked contrast to their nowadays sadly neglected non-committal counterparts. Meinong, of course, did not neglect them, and his notions of "Annehmen (merely entertaining a thought)" and "Denken (entertaining a thought)" play a decisive role in the paper. The Lingua Mentis Hypothesis is a bold contribution to cognitive subpersonal psychology. The second half of the paper tries to show that careful reflection on the conceptual resources of folk psychology makes certain arguments for this Hypothesis as well as certain philosophical arguments against it look rather feeble. The paper culminates in a discussion of Jerry Fodor's Systematicity Argument for the Language of Thought Hypothesis. In this discussion critical use is made of certain Meinongian insights."
128. Lambert Karel. Being and Being So. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 37-46
129. Lambert Karel, "The Theory of objects. A review discussion of J. N. Findaly's Meinong's theory of objects and value," Inquiry.An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 16: 221-244 (1973).
130. Lambert Karel, "Impossible objects," Inquiry.An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17: 303-314 (1974).
     "This paper deals with the Meinong-Russell controversy on non-subsistent objects. The first part notes the similarity of certain contemporary semantical developments to Meinong's theory of non-subsistent objects.
     Then it lays out the major features of Meinong's famous theory, considers Russell's objections to same and Meinong's counter-objections to Russell, and argues that Russell's well-known argument fails. However, It is possible to augment Russell's argument against Meinong with sound Russellian principles in such a way that it presents at least a strong inclining reason against Meinong's theory of impossible objects."
131. Lambert Karel, "On "The durability of impossible objects"," Inquiry.An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19: 251-254 (1976).
     This is a reply to Richard Routley's critique of my original essay, "Impossible objects."
132. Lambert Karel, "A logical interpretation of Meinong's Principle of Independence," Topoi 1: 87-96 (1982).
     "Meinong's principle that being is independent from being so, Borrowed from his disciple Mally, is reconstructed as a claim that a certain traditional informal pattern is invalid. The place of the principle thus reconstructed in Meinong's world picture is outlined."
133. Lambert Karel. Meinong and the Principle of Independence. Its place in Meinong's theory of objects and its significance in contemporary philosophical logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983.
134. Landini Gregory, "Meinong reconstructed versus early Russell reconstructed: a study in the formal ontology of fiction", Indiana University, 1986.
     Available at UMI Dissertation Express. Order number: 8617784
135. Lejewski Ceslaw, "Logic and non-existence," Grazer Philosophische Studien: 209-234 (1985).
136. Lenoci Michele, "Bibliografia degli studi su Alexius Meinong," Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 62: 437-473 (1970).
137. Lenoci Michele. La teoria della conoscenza in Alexius Meinong. Oggetto, giudizio, assunzioni. Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1972.
138. Lenoci Michele, "Meinongs unvollständige Gegenstände und der Universalienproblem," Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 203-215 (1995).
139. Lindenfeld David. Meinong, the Würzburg School, and the role of experience in thinking. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 117-126
140. Lindenfeld David. The transformation of Positivism. Alexius Meinong and European thought 1880-1920. Berkeley: University of California Press 1980.
141. Linsky Leonard. Referring. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1967.