by Raul Corazzon - e-mail: rc[at]ontology.co
Click on the image for the mobile version 
For an overview see the Index of the Pages or the Alphabetical Index of the Philosophers: A-F - G-O - P-Z; you can also download the page as 
or see the Table of Contemporary Ontologists 
(click on the image to see the PDF file)
Change of Address: The site www.formalontology.it is now at www.ontology.co
Index of the Section "The Rediscovery of Ontology in Contemporary Thought"
Table of Formal and Descriptivists Ontologists (PDF - from Bernard Bolzano to present time)
Ontologists of the 19th and 20th Centuries (a selection of critical judgments about some of the greatest philosophers of the recent past)
Living Ontologists (a list of authors with an interest in ontology, with synthetic bibliographies)
These pages will give some essential bibliographical information about some of the most important living ontologists; only a few titles will be cited for every author.
The Authors to which I devoted an entire page are marked with an asterisk (*)
Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, Universität Bern (Switzerland)
Books
Jacquette Dale. Meinongian logic. The semantics of existence and nonexistence. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1996.
Contents: Preface IX; Introduction 1;
Part One: Meinong's theory of Objects.
I. Elements of Object theory 7; II. Formal semantic paradox in Meinong's Object theory 12; III. Meinong's theory of Defective Objects 37; IV. The Object theory intentionality of ontological
committment 56; V. Logic, mind and Meinong 70; VI. Meinong's doctrine of the modal moment 80;
Parto Two: Object theory O.
I. Syntax, formation and inference principles 95; II. Semantics 101; III. Developments of the logic 114;
Part Three: Philosophical problems and applications.
I. Twardowski on Content and Object 193; II: Private language and private mental objects 200; III. God an impossible Meinongian Object 230; IV. Meinongian models of scientific law 238; V. Aesthetics
and Meinongian Logic of Fiction 256; VI. The Paradox of Analysis 265;
Bibliography 269; Index 285.
"Alexius Meinong and his circle of students and collaborators at the Philosophisches Institut der Universität Graz formulated the basic principles for a general theory of objects.(1) They developed
branches and applications of the theory, outlined programs for further research, and answered objections from within and outside their group, revising concepts and sharpening distinctions as they
proceeded. The object theory that emerged as the result of their efforts combines important advances over traditional systems of logic, psychology, and semantics.The fate of object theory in the
analytic philosophical community has been unfortunate in many ways. With few exceptions, the theory has not been sympathetically interpreted. It has often met with unfounded resistance and
misunderstanding under the banner of what Meinong called "The prejudice in favor of the actual". (2) The idea of nonexistent objects has wrongly been thought to be incoherent or confused, and there
are still those who mistakenly believe that the theory inflates ontology with metaphysically objectionable quasi-existent entities.' These criticisms are dealt with elsewhere by object theory
adherents, and are not considered here. In what follows, the intelligibility of an object theory such as Meinong envisioned is assumed, and ultimately vindicated by the construction of a logically
consistent version. The inadequacies of extensionalist theories of ontological commitment and definite description, hallmarks of the Russell-Quine axis in recent analytic philosophy, justify an
alternative intentional Meinongian object theory logic. Analytic philosophy survives the rejection of extensionalist treatments of definite description and ontological commitment, since analytic
methods are not inherently limited to any particular set of extensional or intentional assumptions.
A comprehensive historical treatment of Meinong's philosophy is not attempted in these chapters, though some historical issues are addressed. Some of Meinong's most important philosophical writings
have now been translated or are expected to appear in the near future, and there are several recent commentaries on Meinong's work, including Richard Routley's Exploring Meinong's Jungle and
Beyond, Terence Parsons' Nonexistent Objects, and Karel Lambert's Meinong and the Principle of Independence. These studies have contributed to renewed interest in and
unprejudiced reappraisal of object theory. Analyses of the subtle turnings in Meinong's thought over several decades may be found in J. N. Findlay's Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values,
Reinhardt Grossmann's Meinong, Robin Rollinger's Meinong and Husserl on Abstraction and Universals, and Janet Farrell Smith's essay "The Russell-Meinong Debate". These works trace
the complex development of Meinong's early nominalism or moderate Aristotelian realism in the Hume-Studien to his mature realistic interpretation of relations and factual objectives or
states of affairs as subsistent entities, the theory of objects of higher order, and the doctrine of the Aussersein of the pure object. I have relied on these among other sources, I cannot
hope to improve on them in some respects, and my topic in any case is somewhat different. I am concerned exclusively with the logic, semantics, and metaphysics or ontology and extraontology of
Meinong's theory. Accordingly, I shall not discuss Meinong's epistemology, theory of perception, or value theory, which I nevertheless regard as essential to an understanding of his philosophy as a
whole. The logic, semantics, and metaphysics of object theory are in a sense the most fundamental aspects of Meinong's thought, and therefore require the most careful preliminary investigation.
The formal system I develop is a variation of Meinong's vintage Gegenstandstheorie, refined and made precise by the techniques of mathematical logic. The proposal offers an integrated
three-valued formalization of Meinongian object theory with existence-conditional abstraction, and modal and non-Russellian definite description subtheories. The logic is motivated by considerations
about the need for an object theory semantics in the correct analysis of ontological commitment and definite description. Applications of the logic are provided in phenomenological psychology,
Meinongian mathematics and metamathematics, criticism of ontological proofs for the existence of God in rationalist theodicy, the interpretation of fiction and scientific law, and formal resolutions
of Wittgenstein's private language argument and the paradox of analysis. In some areas it has been necessary to depart from Meinong's official formulation of the theory. But I have tried to make
these differences explicit, justifying them by argument and evaluating alternative interpretations. This I believe is in keeping with the spirit of the first exponents of object theory, who did not
advance their views as a fixed body of doctrine, but maintained an openminded scientific attitude, and continually sought to achieve a more accurate approximation of the truth.
(1) I refer to Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie as a theory of objects, but alternative English equivalents have been proposed which should also be considered. Reinhardt Grossmann argues that
the theory must be called a theory of entities because it includes not merely objects (Objekte), but objectives or states of affairs (Objektive). Grossmann, Meinong [1974], pp.
111-12: "If we keep in mind that Meinong will eventually divide all entities (other than so-called dignitatives and desideratives) into objects on the one hand and objectives on the other, we cannot
speak of a theory of objects as the all-embracing enterprise, but must speak -- as I have done and shall continue to do -- of a theory of entities." This argument is inconclusive, since objectives
are also objects of a kind, which Meinong describes as objects of higher order (hOherer Ordnung), superiora founded on inferiora or lower order objects. An objective in any case can be as much an
object of thought as any other nonobjective object, as when someone thinks about the fact that Graz is in Austria, and thereby makes that state of affairs an object of thought. In this sense, the
theory of objects, of lower and higher order, is already all-embracing in the way Grossmann thinks Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie is meant to be. Nicholas Griffin identifies a further
difficulty in Grossmann's terminological recommendation. In "The Independence of Sosein from Sein" [1979], p. 23, n. 2, Griffin writes: "Grossmann standardly uses the term 'entity' for Meinong's
'Gegenstand', which is usually translated as 'object'. Since the Oxford English Dictionary defines 'entity' as 'thing that has real existence', this switch is unsatisfactory. Accordingly I
have switched back either to 'object' or to the even more neutral term 'item'." Griffin's choice of translation agrees with Richard Routley's in Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond [1981],
where Routley refers to a theory of items distinct in some respects from but directly inspired by Meinong's theory of objects. Routley's 'theory of item'' is perhaps better used to designate his own
special version of object theory, which he also denotes 'noneism'. Neither Grossmann's nor Routley's terminology carries the intentional force of 'Gegenstand', which as Meinong explains is
etymologically releated to 'gegenstehen', to stand against or confront, as objects of thought are supposed to confront and presetn themselves to the mind.
(2) Alexius Meinong, "The Theory of Objects" ("Uber Gegenstandstheorie") [1904], pp. 78-81.
(3) In his early work, Meinong expressed the belief that nonexistent objects have what he then called Quasisein. " The Theory of Objects", pp. 84-5. Meinong here refers to the first edition
of his Über Annahmen [1902], p. 95. See J. N. Findlay, Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values [1963], pp. 47- 8. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond [1981], pp.
442, 854. Routley reports that Meinong renounced the theory of Quasisein in favor of the Aussersein thesis by 1899 (presumably with the publication in that year of his essay
"Uber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung"). As a statement of the frequent misinterpretations of Meinong's object theory that persist today, see P.M. S.
Hacker, Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, revised edition [1986], p. 8: "The Theory of Descriptions ... enabled Russell to thin out the luxuriant Meinongian
jungle of entities (such as the square circle) which, it had appeared, must in some sense subsist in order to be talked about ..."
Jacquette Dale. Ontology. Chesham: Acumen 2002.
Content: Preface XI; Acknowledgements XV; Introduction: Being as such 1;.
First Part: Pure philosophical ontology. 1. What is to be (on Heidegger) 12; 2. Combinatorial ontology 42; 3. Why there is something rather than nothing 89; 4. Why there is only one logically
contingent actual world 109; 5. Concepts of existence in philosophical logic and the analysis of being qua being 134;
Second Part: Applied ontology and the metaphysics of science. 6. Ontological commitment (on Quine) 156; 7. Appearance, reality, substance, transcendence 182; 8. Physical entities: space, time, matter
and causation, physical states of affair and events, natural laws 193; 9. Abstract entities, particular and universal: numbers, sets, properties, qualities, relations, propositions, and
possibilities, logical, mathematical and metaphysical laws 206; 10. Subjectivity of mind in the world of objective physical facts 233; 11. God, a divine supernatural mind? 253; 12. Ontology of
culture: language, arts and artefacts 265; Conclusion: scientific-philosophical ontology 275; Notes 281; Bibliography 309; Index 329-348.
Articles
Jacquette Dale, "A Fregean solution to the Paradox of Analysis," Grazer Philosophische Studien 37: 59-73 (1990).
Jacquette Dale, "The origins of Gegenstandstheorie. Immanent and transcendent intentional objects in Brentano, Twardowski and Meinong," Brentano Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung 3: 177-202 (1990).
Jacquette Dale, "Wittgenstein's critique of propositional attitudes and Russell's theory of judgment," Brentano Studien: Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano
Forschung 4: 193-220 (1993).
"Wittgenstein's attempt to eliminate propositional attitude contexts from a logically correct symbolism is aimed not only at defending the finite extensionality thesis or general form of proposition,
but serves also as an attack on the concept of the self or metaphysical subject in traditional psychology, and a critique of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment. The elimination strategy
is unsuccessful however in reducing nested or higher-order iterated intentionalities. If iterated propositional attitudes cannot be reduced via the picture theory semantics, then propositional
attitude contexts have a legitimate place in logic and the philosophy of mind. Wittgenstein's effort to eliminate reference to the metaphysical soul or psychological subject in a radical no-ownership
doctrine of psychological experience and the extra-worldly transcendence of self collapses with the failure of his attempt to reduce the intentional elements of propositional attitude contexts to a
purely extensional semantic philosophy."
Jacquette Dale, "Formalization in philosophical logic," Monist 77: 358-375 (1994).
Jacquette Dale, "Meinong's concept of implexive Being and Nonbeing," Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 233-271 (1995).
Jacquette Dale, "Confessions of a Meinongian logician," Grazer Philosophische Studien 58/59: 151-180 (2000).
"In a chapter of - so to speak - an intellectual autobiography I sketch the reasons and ways I became a practitioning Meinongian logician. The way is a chain of transgressions, e.g., the
transgression of extensionalism or of the law of excluded middle, and a struggle against widespread misinterpretations of Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie. Although the opposition towards
Meinong's theory of objects persists in analytic philosophy, its main insights - that thought is intentional and that logic must be ontologically neutral - haven't lost their attraction. Moreover:
there is no substantive criticism to show that we cannot refer and truely predicate properties of intended objects regardless of their ontic status."
Jacquette Dale. Aussersein of the pure object. In The School of Alexius Meinong. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacquette Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 373-396
Jacquette Dale. Brentano's concept of intentionality. In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Edited by Jacquette Dale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001. pp. 98-130
Jacquette Dale. Introduction: Brentano's philosophy. In The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Edited by Jacquette Dale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001. pp. 1-19
Jacquette Dale. Nuclear and extranuclear properties. In The School of Alexius Meinong. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana, Jacquette Dale, and Poli Roberto. Aldershot: Ashgate 2001. pp. 397-426
Jacquette Dale, "Truth and fiction in David Lewis' critique of Meinongian semantics," Metaphysica.International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 2: 73-106 (2001).
"I criticize all four of Lewis's objections to a Meinongian theory of fiction, suggesting that they can be answered or refuted, thereby blunting Lewis's charge that a Meinongian semantics is at a
theoretical disadvantage in comparison with his modal story-contexting. Lewis-style modal story-contexting, moreover, is not incompatible with a Meinongian logic of fiction. By itself, without
Meinongian object theory, Lewis's proposal moreover is subject to equally powerful countercriticisms. Some version of Lewis-style story-contexting needs to be combined with a Meinongian semantics of
fiction in order to avoid Lewis's objections to Meinongian object theory, and to avoid Meinongian objections to Lewis's story-context-prefixing."
Jacquette Dale. David Lewis on Meinongian Logic of Fiction. In Writing the Austrian tradition. Relations between philosophy and literature. Edited by Huemer Wolfgang and
Chrudzimski Arkadiusz. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2003. pp.
"In his (1978) article, "Truth in Fiction", David Lewis considers four objections to a Meinongian logic of fiction. I answer Lewis's objections and criticize his alternative 'de dicto' modal story
contexting as disadvantageous in comparison with a Meinongian semantics of fiction. Finally, I indicate directions for further development of a universal logic of fiction and nonfictional discourse
that takes its main point of departure from Meinong's object theory."
Jacquette Dale. Psychologism revisited in logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. In Philosophy, psychology, and psychologism. Critical and historical readings on the
psychological turn in philosophy. Edited by Jacquette Dale. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003. pp. 245-262
"1. Psychology and psychologism
The word 'psychologism' historically has meant many things, but has mostly been considered a term of abuse leveled against efforts to explain philosophical concepts or address philosophical problems
from the standpoint of subjective psychological experience. The same degree of opprobrium, notably, does not attach to psychology itself, which has generally been regarded as a legitimate subject of
scientific and philosophical investigation. This is true even for opponents of conventional psychological theories, ranging from Cartesian dualism to phenomenology to behaviorism, computationalism,
and other branches of cognitive science. The trouble, according to critics, occurs specifically when the attempt is made to turn psychology of any form and following any methodology into a
philosophical ideology, whenever and to whatever extent psychology becomes an 'ism'." p. 245
(...)
"7. Toward new paradigms of psychologism
To begin with and end with the limitations of any particular psychology or particular type of psychology in philosophy is bad psychologism, whether in logic, metaphysics, or epistemology, ethics or
aesthetics. But to conclude that because some psychologism is or can be bad, that therefore all psychologism is bad, or that psychology has no place whatsoever in philosophy, is bad
metaphilosophy.
The word 'psychologism' has acquired such negative connotations that I doubt whether many of the philosophers I have mentioned would much appreciate being classified as advocating any form
psychologism, including what I have called 'good psychologism'. Yet that, by my definition, albeit in different ways, is precisely what Rescher, Quine, and others, are doing. There are unlimitedly
many opportunities for elaborating good psychologistic philosophies. I have argued that it is a fundamental mistake to suppose that we can or should try to do entirely without psychological
considerations in philosophy. An anti-psychologism that is not merely a criticism of bad psychologism, but that takes issue with psychology in any form in philosophy, as I have tried to show, is
misdirected and self-defeating.
I have here barely taken the first steps in discriminating between good and bad psychologisms, let alone indicating how a good psychologism ought to be developed in logic, metaphysics, and
epistemology. I will be satisfied if I am perceived as having at least said something convincing by way of distinguishing between psychologism and bad psychologism, indicating the possibility of a
good psychologism with virtues and advantages that are worth considering in light of the most virulent generalized antipsychologisms that persist in philosophy. If my conclusions are correct, then no
one who is conscientious about the proper conduct of philosophy can afford blithely to turn the page on psychologism, and assume, as many of its detractors have done, that psychologism is dead,
buried, and never going to be resurrected. I have suggested, on the contrary, that psychologism needs to be revisited in more searching and rigorous ways." p. 258
Links
Dale Jacquette (Bern University) with the list of his publications
Head of Department of Logical Semiotics, (Warsaw University)
Books
Jadacki Jacek Juliusz and Augustynek Zdzislaw. Possible ontologies. Amsterdam: Rodopi 1993.
Jadacki Jacek Juliusz. From the viewpoint of the Lvov-Warsaw school. Amsterdam : Rodopi 2003.
Jadacki Jacek Juliusz and Pasniczek Jacek. The Lvov-Warsaw school: the new generation. Edited by Jadacki Jacek Juliusz and Pasniczek Jacek. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2006.
Articles
Jadacki Jacek Juliusz. On forms of objects. In Shapes of forms. From Gestalt psychology to phenomenology to ontology and mathematics. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1999. pp.
341-359
"Let us call all objective objects simply 'objects', and all subjective objects 'quasi-objects'. Two distinctions - between concreteness-abstractness and extramentality-mentality - seem to be made,
strictly speaking, only among objects: quasi-objects are at most quasi-concrete or quasi-abstract, and quasiextramental or quasi-mental. Secondly, only objects can be observable or material, although
some of them are probably noumenal or ideal. Thirdly, all objects are empirical or individual. Fourthly, all quasi-objects are noumenal or ideal. Thus we cannot claim that the differences between
observability and noumenality are not "ontologically essential". On the other hand, it is true that ontological forms are not identical with epistemological forms. "Objects perceived in different
ways need not belong to different ontological categories". Fifthly, only quasi-objects can be fictitious or universal, though some of them are probably empirical or individual. Thus, since only
(individual or universal) fictions are incompatible, only quasi-objects possess the property of incompatibility.
(...)
I am dubious of the view that existence is not a property, since it is not backed by adequate arguments. An answer to the question 'which objects exist?' should be preceded by an answer to the
question 'which intuitions ought to be preserved?'. It seems to me that the following statement comes closest to the intuitions of common sense:
For every x: x exists iff x is objective.
Existence would not be a property only if it had to be something identifiable with no property from among properties characterized in this paper. But then the question of what exists would be
questionae gustuum and not questionae fact.
The problem of ontological forms puts us to a great deal of trouble not so much because scholars differ on accepted solutions as because we do not exactly know what these differences consist of." pp.
355-356. (Notes omitted)
Links
Jacek Juliusz Jadacki (List of Publications)
Swedish Philosopher
Books
Articles
Johansson Ingvar, "Determinables as Universals," Monist 83: 101-121 (2000).
Links
Ingvar Johansson Philosophy Home Site
Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, The City University of New York Graduate Center
Books
Articles
Studies
The new theory of reference: Kripke, Marcus, and its origins. Edited by Humphreys Paul W. and Fetzer James H. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1998.
Fitch George W. Saul Kripke. Chesham: Acumen 2004.
Links
Saul Kripke (The Graduate Center - New York)
Professor, Emeritus, University of Fribourg
Books
Küng Guido. Ontology and the logistic analysis of language. An enquiry into the contemporary views on universals. Dordrecht : Reidel 1967.
English translation by E. C. M. Mays revised by the author, of: Ontologie und logistiche Analyse der Sprache. Eine Untersuchung zur zeitgenössischen Universaliendiskussion - Wien, Springer,
1963.
Articles
Küng Guido, "The world as noema and as referent," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 3: 15-26 (1972).
"A major stumbling block in the way of a dialogue between phenomenology and logistic philosophy is the fact that the semantical terminology of the two movements has developed in opposite directions.
In logistic philosophy Frege's 3-levelled semantics of sign, sense and referent soon gave way to Russell's 2-levelled semantics of sign and referent. In Husserlian phenomenology, on the other hand,
the notion of sense was not abandoned but broadened, especially through the elaboration of the notion of the noema. A closer look at the contemporary discussions in logistic philosophy shows however
that the 3-levelled semantical framework is reappearing in a new form. The straightforward realism of Russell has given way to a more Kantian position where the universe of discourse is no longer
simply identified with absolute reality. This means' that the logistic philosophers are discovering the noematic character of their universes of discourse.
This new logistic distinction between universes of discourse and absolute reality, which parallels the phenomenological distinction between the world as noema and the absolute real world (if there is
any), brings with it a distinction between ontology and metaphysics: the description of different universes of discourse, respectively of different noematic worlds, can be called the ontological
task, and the question as to which universe of discourse, respectively which noematic world (if any), is the best map of absolute reality is the concern of metaphysics.
The parallelism between the semantics of contemporary logistic philosophy and phenomenology is obscured by a terminological discrepancy due to the above mentioned divergent historical development: in
logistic philosophy the signs are said to refer to the entities in the universe of discourse, whereas in phenomenology the noemata are not properly speaking the referents of noetic acts, but are said
to belong on the level of sense. However, the phenomenological way of distinguishing noematic world and absolute reality in terms of sense and referent is very important, because it provides the most
adequate way of conceiving the puzzling relationship between appearance and reality, and avoids the shortcomings of the causal and the picture theory, the identity theory and the adverbial
theory."
Küng Guido, "The difficulty with the well-formedness of ontological statements," Topoi.An International Journal of Philosophy 2: 111-119 (1983).
Links
Research Professor of Logic and the Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine
Books
Lambert Karel and Van Fraassen Bas. Derivation and counterexample. An introduction to philosophical logic. Encino: Dickenson 1972.
Lambert Karel and Ulrich William. The nature of argument. New York: Macmillan 1980.
Lambert Karel. Meinong and the principle of independence: its place in Meinong's theory of objects and its significance in contemporary philosophical logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983.
Philosophical applications of free logic. Edited by Lambert Karel. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991.
Lambert Karel. Free logics: their foundations, character, and some applications thereof. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1997.
Lambert Karel. Free logic. Selected essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Articles
Lambert Karel, "Free logic and the concept of existence," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 8: 133-144 (1967).
Lambert Karel, "Russell's theory of definite descriptions," Dialectica 44: 137-152 (1970).
Lambert Karel. Being and Being So. In Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Edited by Haller Rudolf. Graz: Akademische Druck u. Verlagsanstalt 1972. pp. 37-46
Lambert Karel, "Impossible objects," Inquiry 17: 303-314 (1974).
"This paper deals with the Meinong-Russell controversy on nonsubsistent objects. The first part notes the similarity of certain contemporary semantical developments to Meinong's theory of
nonsubsistent objects. Then it lays out the major features of Meinong's famous theory, considers Russell's objections to same and Meinong's counter-objections to Russell, and argues that Russell's
well-known argument fails. However, it is possible to augment Russell's argument against Meinong with sound Russellian principles in such a way that it presents at least a strong inclining reason
against Meinong's theory of impossible objects."
Lambert Karel, "Predication and extensionality," Journal of Philosophical Logic 3: 255-264 (1974).
"Predication, writes W. V. Quine, "joins a general term and a singular term to form a sentence that is true or false according as the general term is true or false of the object, if any, to which the
singular term refers". (1) The view of predication expressed by Quine in the quoted passage is not restricted to Quine; P. F. Strawson, for example, though perhaps not a rabid supporter of Quine's
choice of words, is on record as finding the theory congenial with his own views. (2)
Quine has also written that "so long merely as the predicated general term is true of the object named by the singular term... the substitution of a new singular term that names the same object
leaves the predication true." (3) Nevertheless, most of my efforts will be directed at establishing that the theory of predication expressed in Quine's words is nonextensional.
To be precise about my quite limited objective, I need Quine's help just once more. He writes that "in an opaque construction you also cannot in general supplant a general term by a coextensive term
(one true of the same objects)... without disturbing the truth value of the containing sentence. Such a failure is one of the failures of extensionality." (4) The theory of predication under
consideration is, I claim, non-extensional in the sense that it does not satisfy the extensionality principle that coextensive general terms substitute for each other salva veritate; proof of this
claim is my major objective.
My secondary objective is to elicit some of the implications of the claim that the theory of predication under discussion is nonextensional."
(1) W. V. Quine, Word and object, Wiley, New York, 1960, p. 96
(2) P. F. Strawson, "Singular terms and predication", The Journal of Philosophy, 58 (1961).
(3) Op. cit. Word and object, pp. 142-143.
(4) Ibid., p. 151.
Lambert Karel, "On "The durability of impossible objects"," Inquiry 19: 251-253 (1976).
Lambert Karel, "On the philosophical foundations of free logic," Inquiry 24: 147-203 (1981).
"The essay outlines the character of free logic, and motivation for its construction and development. It details some technical achievements of high philosophical interest, hut urges that the role of
existence assumptions in logic is still not fully understood, that unresolved old problems, both technical and philosophical, abound, and presents some new problems of considerable philosophical
import in free logic."
Lambert Karel, "Nonexistent objects: why theories about them are important," Grazer Philosophische Studien 25/26: 439-446 (1986).
"This essay argues for the importance of developing theories of nonexistent objects. The grounds are utility and smoothness of logical theory. In the latter case a parallel with the theory of
negative and imaginary numbers is exploited. The, essay concludes with a counterexample to a general argument against the enterprise of developing theories of nonexistent objects, and outlining the
foremost problem an adequate theory of nonexistent objects must solve."
Lambert Karel, "On the philosophical foundations of free description theory," History and Philosophy of Logic 8: 57-66 (1987).
Lambert Karel, "Russell's version of the theory of definite descriptions," Philosophical Studies 65: 153-167 (1992).
Lambert Karel, "Substitution and the expansion of the world," Grazer Philosophische Studien 49: 129-143 (1995).
"The major goal of this paper is to argue that a well known argument to overturn the principle that coextensive predicates substitute in any statement without alteration of truth value can be avoided
- even in the simplest of languages. Apparently this can be clone nonartificially only by expanding the universe with nonexisting objects. It is not proved that the principle of substitution
salva veritate holds in Meinongian model structures, but in fact it does - as any completeness proof of free logics based on inner domain-outer domain semantics will show. If - as some have
suggested - Meinong's views are compatible with the attitudes of a complete extensionalist, and he subscribed to the outlined modern theory of predication, there is no escape from
Aussersein. That may seem terribly obvious, but in the light of the development of free logics, more than mere conviction is needed. This dogmatic intuition is supplanted with some strong
inclining reasons."
Lambert Karel, "Set theory and definite descriptions. Four solutions in search of a common problem," Grazer Philosophische Studien 60: 1-12 (2000).
Links
J. Karel Lambert (Personal Website)
Professor of Philosophy, Queen's University in Kingston, Canada
Laycock Henry. Words without objects. Semantics, ontology, and logic for non-singularity. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006.
"The book seeks to resolve the so-called 'problem of mass nouns' - a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate
assertions of the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable to the semantically distinctive status of
non-count nouns - nouns which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a non-singular noun, that there can be no such
single thing or object as the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them as singular expressions -
expressions which, in the case of non-count nouns, are true of 'parcels' or 'quantities' of stuff, and in the case of plural nouns, are true of 'plural entities' or 'sets'. It is argued that both
approaches are equally misguided, that there are no distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the corresponding
singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns
at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also
large amounts of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded in the realities to which it is non-ideally
or intransparently correlated."
Articles
Laycock Henry, "Some questions of ontology," Philosophical Review 81: 3-42 (1972).
Laycock Henry, "Theories of matter," Synthese 31: 411-442 (1975).
Laycock Henry. Variables, generality and existence: considerations on the notion of a concept-script. In Topics on general and formal ontology. Edited by Valore Paolo. Milano: Polimetrica Publisher 2006. pp. 27-52
Links
Professor, Emeritus, of Philosophy, University of Chicago
Books
Linsky Leonard. Referring. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1967.
Linsky Leonard. Names and descriptions. Chicago : The University of Chicago Press 1977.
Linsky Leonard. Oblique contexts. Chicago: Chicago University Press 1983.
Articles
Links
Professor of Philosophy, Durham University
Books
Lowe Jonathan E. Kinds of Being. A study of individuation, identity and the logic of sortal terms. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1989.
Lowe Jonathan E. The possibility of metaphysics. Substance,identity, and time. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998.
Lowe Jonathan E. A survey of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002.
Lowe Jonathan E. The four-category ontology. A metaphysical foundation for natural science. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006.
Articles
Lowe Jonathan E., "Primitive substances," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 531-551 (1994).
Lowe Jonathan E., "Why is there anything at all?," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70: 111-120 (1996).
Lowe Jonathan E., "Ontological categories and natural kinds," Philosophical Papers 26: 29-46 (1997).
Lowe Jonathan E., "Entity, identity and unity," Erkenntnis 48: 191-208 (1998).
Lowe Jonathan E., "Form without matter," Ratio 11: 214-234 (1998).
Abstract: "Three different concepts of matter are identified: matter as what a thing is immediately made of, matter as stuff of a certain kind, and matter in the (dubious) sense of material
'substratum'. The doctrine of hylomorphism, which regards every individual concrete thing as being 'combination' of matter and form, is challenged. Instead it is urged that we do well to
identify an individual concrete thing with its own particular 'substantial form'. The notions of form and matter, far from being correlative, are relatively independent. There is nothing
absurd in the notion of form without matter. Matter provides neither a principle of individuation nor a criterion of identity for individual concrete things: their form alone provides both.
Finally, a substance ontology which admits also the existence of particular qualities, or tropes, is to be preferred both to a substance ontology which denies the existence of tropes and to a pure
trope ontology."
Links
E. Jonathan Lowe (Durham University)
The New Ontology of Mental Causation Debate
Ontologists of the 19th and 20th Centuries
Three sites (currently under development) which will be devoted to studies on Ontology in Italian, French and German:
Teoria e Storia dell'Ontologia
Théorie et Histoire de l'Ontologie
Theorie und Geschichte der Ontologie
Mobile version of this site for phone and laptop users:
Theory and History of Ontology (Mobile version)
The PDF version of all the pages is also available:
Theory and History of Ontology (PDF version)