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Annotated Bibliography on Plato's Sophist. Second Part: M - Z

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  1. Malatesta, Michele. 1998. "On One Instance of the Chrysippean Syllogism of the Dog in Plato's Sophista 252e1-8." Metalogicon no. 11:1-16.

  2. Malcolm, John. 1967. "Plato's Analysis of to on and to Me on in the Sophist." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 12:130-146.

  3. ———. 1983. "Does Plato Revise His Ontology in Sophist 246c-249d?" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 65:115-127.

    "The best way to read the passage in question is not to assume that Plato is here categorically affirming metaphysical truths which he endorses, be they at the expense of his earlier views or otherwise. One cannot plausibly regard it as a source of any new commitments on his part as to the nature of the real."

  4. ———. 1985. "Remarks on an Incomplete Rendering of Being in the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 67:162-165.

  5. ———. 1985. "On 'What Is Not in Any Way' in the Sophist." Classical Quarterly no. 35:520-523.

  6. ———. 2006. "A Way Back for Sophist 255c12-13." Ancient Philosophy no. 26:275-289.

    "At Sophist 255c12-13 'being' and 'difference' are distinguished on the grounds that some things are what they are in themselves (kath'hauta - KH), others with reference to something else (pros alla - PA). Since 'difference' only obtains in this second way of being, it is distinct from 'being'. Recently scholars have challenged the traditional reading (non-relative/relative) of the KH/PA dichotomy on the grounds that it puts 'sameness' under "with reference to something else." I argue (1) that there are serious difficulties with their alternatives and (2) that something close to the traditional version may be adopted if we do not take the KH/PA division as exhaustive."

  7. ———. 2006. "Some Cautionary Remarks on the 'Is'/'Teaches' Analogy." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, no. 31:281-296.

    "Lesley Brown suggests that Parmenides and Plato were not guilty of an oft-alleged existence/predication confusion since the relevant Greek verb, when used as a copula, had a built-in existential connotation, just as the same use of "teaches" can be understood both completely and incompletely. I challenge this approach on the grounds that it implies that the ancient Greeks were in the impossible position of not being able unproblematically to attribute properties to subjects recognized not to exist. I attempt to show that the evidence Brown presents for her thesis from Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle is inconclusive."

  8. Marcos de Pinotti, Graciela E. 1991. "Aporias Del No-Ser Y Aporias De Lo Falso En "Sofista" 237b-239c." Revista Latino-Americana de Filosofia no. 17:259-274.

    In Sophist 237b-239c Plato presents three puzzles designed to show that nothing can be thought or said about the not-being: what is not in any way ("to medamos on") cannot even be unthinkable or unsayable. This paper argues that these puzzles involving the not-being are parallel to those raised with respect to falsehood, which are exploited by Plato in order to prove that false statement is possible. While "what is not in any way" cannot be denied, because this negation forces us precisely to what we are trying to deny-the being of not-being, in denying the falsehood, the Sophist is bound to accept that the false in some respect is ("einai pos").

  9. ———. 1997. "Discurso Y No Ser En Platón (Sofista 260a-263d)." Synthesis no. 4:61-83.

  10. ———. 2004. "Filosofía Versus Sofistica En El Sofista De Platón." In Diálogo Con Los Griegos. Estudios Sobre Platón, Aristóteles Y Plotino, edited by Santa Cruz, Maria Isabel, Di Camillo, Sivana and Marcos de Pinotti, Graciela E., 77-92. Buenos Aires: Colihue Universidad.

  11. Marten, Rainer. 1965. Der Logos Der Dialektik: Eine Theorie Zu Platon Sophistes. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

  12. Másmela, Arroyave Carlos. 1997. "Copia Y Simulacro En El Sofista De Platon." Tópicos.Revista de Filosofia:163-173.

    "Within the Sophist, Plato establishes a clear distinction between two types of mimetic art: the copy and the simulacrum.

    Such a distinction avoids reducing the image to the faithful reproduction of a sensitive model. The present article aims at making visible the fact that the phantasma (simulacrum), and not the copy, constitutes the starting point of artistic creation."

  13. ———. 2006. Dialéctica De La Imagen: Una Interpretación Del "Sofista" De Platón. Rubí: Anthropos.

  14. Mattéi, Jean-François. 1983. L'étranger Et Le Simulacre. Essai Sur La Fondation De L'ontologie Platonicienne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

  15. ———. 2004. Les Genres De L'être Chez Platon Et Le Système Aristotélicien Des Quatre Causes. In Cahiers de Philosophie Ancienne

    Platon et Aristote. Dialectique et métaphysique, edited by Tsimbadaros, Ilias.

  16. ———. 2005. "L'origine Platonicienne De La Métaphysique: La Communauté Des Genres De L'être." In Y a-T-Il Une Histoire De La Métaphysique?, edited by Zarka, Yves Charles and Pinchard, Bruno, 27-44. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

  17. ———. 2005. "Les Genres De L'être Chez Platon Et Le Système Aristotélicien Des Quatre Causes." In Cosmos Et Psychè. Mélanges Offerts À Jean Frère, edited by Vegleris, Eugénie, 183-202. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

  18. Matthen, Mohan. 1983. "Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 28:113-135.

  19. McDowell, John. 1982. "Falsehood and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist." In Language and Logos. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen, edited by Schofield, Malcolm and Nussbaum, Martha, 115-134. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    "For me, G. E. L. Owen's 'Plato on Not-Being' (1971) radically improved the prospects for a confident overall view of its topic. Hitherto, passage after passage had generated reasonable disagreement over Plato's intentions, and the disputes were not subject to control by a satisfying picture of his large-scale strategy; so that the general impression, as one read the Sophist, was one of diffuseness and unclarity of purpose. By focusing discussion on the distinction between otherness and contrariety (257B1-C4), Owen showed how, at a stroke, a mass of confusing exegetical alternatives could be swept away, and the dialogue's treatment of not-being revealed as a sustained and tightly organised assault on a single error. In what follows, I take Owen's focusing of the issue for granted, and I accept many of his detailed conclusions. Where I diverge from Owen - in particular over the nature of the difficulty about falsehood that Plato tackles in the Sophist (§§5 and 6 below) -it is mainly to press further in the direction he indicated, in the interest of a conviction that the focus can and should be made even sharper." p. 115

  20. McPherran, Mark L. 1986. "Plato's Reply to the 'Worst Difficulty' Argument of the Parmenides: Sophist 248a- 249d." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 68:233-252.

    "This paper offers an interpretation of the 'worst difficulty' argument of the Parmenides (133a-135a) that allows it -- contrary to other popular accounts -- to live up to Plato's suggestion that it constitutes a significant challenge to the early theory of Forms (concluding, as it does, that knowledge of the Forms is impossible). In light of Plato's hint that the argument is nonetheless flawed (133b), the paper surveys various plausible rebuttals, and then contends that Plato recognizes the best one available to him in the Sophist (248a-249d). finally, the author examines the problem of actually attributing that solution to him."

  21. Meinhardt, Helmut. 1968. Teilhabe Bei Platon: Ein Beitrag Zum Verständnis Platonischen Prinzipiendenkens Ünter Besönderer Berucksichtigung Des Sophistes. München: Alber.

  22. Migliori, Maurizio. 1999. "Verso Il Filosofo: Dialettica E Ontologia Nel Sofista Platone." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica no. 91:171-204.

  23. ———. 2007. Plato's Sophist: Value and Limitation on Ontology. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

    Five lessons followed by a discussion with Bruno Centrone, Arianna Fermani, Lucia Palpacelli, Diana Quarantotto.

    Original Italian edition: Il Sofista diPlatone. Valore e limiti dell'ontologia - Brescia, Morcelliana, 2006.

  24. Mignucci, Mario. 1988. "Platone E I Relativi." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 9:259-294.

  25. ———. 1989. "Esistenza E Verità Nel Sofista Di Platone." Atti della Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche di Napoli no. 100:267-281.

  26. Miller, Dana. 2004. "Fast and Loose About Being: Criticism of Competing Ontologies in Plato's Sophist." Ancient Philosophy no. 24:339-363.

    "This paper examines Plato's arguments against competing ontologies in the Sophist (242b6-250e4). It argues that the purpose of these arguments is largely to expose a muddle about being. This muddle reifies being. But this conception of being produces a puzzle, namely, that being seems not to be anything. Therefore, some other conception of being must be sought."

  27. Mojsisch, Burkhard. 1986. "Platons Sprachphilosophie Im 'Sophistes'." In Sprachphilosophie in Antike Und Mittelalter, edited by Mojsisch, Burkhard, 35-62. Amsterdam: Verlag B. R. Grüner.

    Bochumer Kolloquium, 2-4 Juni 1982

  28. ———. 1998. "Logos and Episteme. The Constitutive Role of Language in Plato's Theory of Knowledge." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter no. 3:19-28.

    "This essay first differentiates the various meanings of the term logos as it appears in Plato's dialogues Theaetetus and The Sophist. These are: the colloque of the soul with itself, a single sentence, a proposing aloud, the enumeration of the constitutive elements of a whole and the giving of a specific difference; further, opinion and imagination. These meanings are then related to Plato's determination of knowledge (episteme) and therewith truth and falsity. One can be said to possess knowledge only when the universal contents of thought -- dialogical thought -- are set in relation to the perceivable, imagination or opinion. Reflections on the principle significance of possibility as such -- a thematic not addressed by Plato -- conclude the essay."

  29. ———. 2001. "Das Verschiedene Als Nicht-Seiendes in Platons Sophistes." In Umbrüche: Historische Wendepunkte Der Philosophie Von Der Antike Bis Zur Neuzeit, edited by Kahnert, Klaus and Mojsisch, Burkhard, 1-9. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner.

    "Plato's dialogue The Sophist highlights the commonality of the most important genera: rest, being, identity, difference and dialogical thinking are necessarily implicated in movement. This essay

    explores how difference combines as not-being with these other genera.

    It concludes that not-being makes possible the commonality of the genera in the first place, that dialogical thinking alone justifies the thought of motive not-being and, finally, that not-being allows of conceiving the idea of being as also not-being, as in motion and as mediated through language. In sum: In Plato's late philosophy, not-being is the most important of the most important genera.

    "

  30. Moravcsik, Julius. 1962. "Being and Meaning in the Sophist." Acta Philosophica Fennica no. 14:23-78.

    From the Conclusion: "Communion and interweaving are the key concepts of the Sophist. They are used on two levels; the ontological and the semantic. The two are not sharply separated, and each helps to explain the other. The Communion of the Forms parallels the interwovenness of words, and thus 253-256 parallells 260-262. A similar parallel and relations of dependence are presented between the discussions of Not-being and falsehood. Thus 257-258 and 263 go together. This interrelatedness not only brings out the nature of Plato's philosophizing in this period, but it also presents the interpreter with the task of working out the whole passage as a unit, for the interpretations of the parts are interdependent. This justifies and necessitates my lengthy analysis.

    Plato's arguments show that truth and falsehood are not matters of mental sight or blindness. Thus one should not conceive of the objects of knowledge as self-sufficient atomic units. Philosophical atomism is denied on all levels. The paradigm-case of how not to read Plato therefore is: "each element in the statement has now a meaning; and so the statement as a whole has meaning". (1) The notion of Communion and the analogy with vowels lead to the conception of the Forms as functions, as something incomplete, something which need arguments in order really to express something. At least some of the Forms are shown to be like functions in this dialogue. If we are willing to pursue Plato's line of thought beyond the point to which it is carried in the dialogue, we see that what Plato says leads to construing all Forms as functions. For what we know are truths and falsehoods, and these are complexes which contain Forms. The constituents of these complexes are not 'simples', or metaphysical atoms of some sort. In order to understand them we have to know into what complexes they fit. We do not grasp them prior to all completions.

    It is small wonder that modern commentators of this dialogue have not made much progress with it. They approach it with the 'part-sum, division-collection, genus-species' distinctions in mind. Merely because one aspect of dialectic is said to be the method of division they identify all of Plato's methodology with this notion, and seek to explain the middle part of the Sophist within this framework. But these are the wrong tools and the wrong questions. When seen in proper light, the suggestions of the Sophist present themselves as topics the further exploration of which is one of the more important philosophical tasks today." p. 77-78.

    (1) F. M. Cornford, op. cit. p. 315.

  31. Morgenstern, Amy S. 2001. "Leaving the Verb 'to Be' Behind: An Alternative Reading of Plato's Sophist." Dionysius no. 19:27-50.

    "Equating the terms esti, to on, and ta onta with the verb "to be", understood existentially, predicatively, or as an identity sign, cannot serve as a basis of an illuminating approach to the Eleatic Stranger's investigation in Plato's Sophist. An alternative reading of esti at 256 A 1, Esti de ghe dia to methexein tou ontos, allows a more comprehensive analysis of the limitations and accomplishments of this investigation. Here esti should be interpreted as rhema, i.e. a name that, in this instance, says something about kinesis, the implied subject."

  32. Mourelatos, Alexander. 1979. "'Nothing' as 'Not-Being': Some Literary Contexts That Bear on Plato." In Arktouros. Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, edited by Bowersock, Glen, Burkert, Walter and Putnam, Michael, 319-329. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    Reprinted in: J. P. Anton, A. Preus (eds.) - Essays in ancient Greek philosophy (Volume Two) - Albany, State University of New York Press, 1983, pp. 59-69.

  33. Movia, Giancarlo. 1991. Apparenza Essere E Verità. Commentario Storico-Filosofico Al Sofista Di Platone. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.

  34. ———. 1991. Il "Sofista" E Le Dottrine Non Scritte Di Platone. Napoli: Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa.

  35. Muckelbauer, John. 2001. "Sophistic Travel: Inheriting the Simulacrum through Plato's the Sophist." Philosophy and Rhetoric no. 34:225-244.

    "The dramatic structure of the Sophist, as a search in which two characters attempt to "track down the Sophist", is inseparable from the ontological question of being and nonbeing discussed by those characters. The Sophist, like the "simulacrum" (236 B), is less a determinate identity than a differential movement of the encounter in which the subject itself is at stake. The dialogue thus points out the direction for a reversal of the oppositional distinction between philosophy and rhetoric. As readers, we cannot allow ourselves to re-mark these disciplinary distinctions either by privileging one or the other or by claiming that one is reducible to the other."

  36. Naas, Michael. 2003. "For the Name's Sake." Epoché.A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 7:199-221.

    "In Plato's later dialogues, and particularly in the Sophist, there is a general reinterpretation and rehabilitation of the name (onoma) in philosophy. No longer understood rather vaguely as

    one of potentially dangerous and deceptive elements of everyday language or of poetic language, the world onoma is recast in the Sophist and related dialogues into one of the essential elements

    of a philosophical language that aims to make claims or propositions about the way things are. Onoma, now understood as name, is thus coupled with rhema, or verb, to form the two essential elements of any logos, that is, any claim, statements, or proposition.

    This paper follows Plato's gradual rehabilitation and reinscription of the name from early dialogues through late ones in order to demonstrate the new role Plato fashions for language in these later

    works."

  37. Nehamas, Alexander. 1982. "Participation and Predication in Plato's Later Thought." Review of Metaphysics no. 36:343-374.

    Reprinted in: A. Nehamas - Virtues of authenticity. Essays on Plato and Socrates - Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 196-223.

    "In the later dialogues, especially the Sophist, Plato develops the idea that forms are capable of participating in one another and in themselves, and that to have a characteristic is not an imperfect way of being that characteristic. Plato thus offers the first solid understanding of the metaphysics of predication in Western philosophy."

  38. Notomi, Noburu. 1999. The Unity of Plato's Sophist. Between the Sophist and the Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  39. ———. 2007. "Aristotle's De Interpretatione 8 Is About Ambiguity." In Maieusis. Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, edited by Scott, Dominic, 254-275. New York: Oxford University Press.

  40. ———. 2007. "Plato on "What Is Not"." In Maieusis. Essays on Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, edited by Scott, Dominic, 254-275. New York: Oxford University Press.

    "Modern philosophers often assume that Plato treats "what is not" merely as the privation of being and that he altogether dismisses the idea of absolute nothingness from his inquiry. A reading of Plato's Sophist reveals a sophisticated understanding of the philosophical problem of "what is not", particularly as it relates to "what is". In both his introduction (Sophist 243 B-C) and later discussion (Sophist 251 A 1-3) of the relationship of these two concepts, Plato suggests that an understanding of each is contingent upon comprehension of the other. Both concepts are related to language and the problem of utterance. While the sophist attempts to confuse the two, it is the project of the philosopher to negotiate the ground between them."

  41. ———. 2008. "Plato against Parmenides: Sophist 236d-242b." In Reading Ancient Texts: Vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'brien, edited by Suzanne, Stern-Gillet and Corrigan, Kevin, 167-187. Leiden: Brill.

  42. O'Brien, Denis. 1991. "Le Non-Être Dans La Philosophie Grecque: Parménide, Platon, Plotin." In Études Sur Le Sophiste De Platon, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 317-364. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

    Réimprimé dans: D. O'Brien - Le non être. Deux études sur le Sophiste de Platon pp. 3-39.

  43. ———. 1992. "Il Non-Essere E La Diversità Nel Sofista Di Platone." Atti della Accademia di Scienze Morali e Politiche di Napoli no. 102:271-328.

    Version française dans: D. O'Brien: Le non être. Deux études sur le Sophiste de Platon pp. 43-165.

  44. ———. 1995. Le Non-Être. Deux Études Sur Le Sophiste De Platon. Sankt Augustin: Akademia Verlag.

    Brings together two studies: Le non-être dan la philosophie grecque and Le non-être et l'altérité dans le 'Sophiste' de Platon", both published separately in 1991-1992.

    Sommaire: Avertissement XI-XII; Étude I: Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon, Plotin 3; Étude II: Le non-être et l'alterité dans le Sophiste de Platon 43; Notes complementaires 91; Index: I. Auteurs anciens 133; II. Auteurs modernes 139; III. Supplément bibliographique 151; English summaries: I. Non-Being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus 169; II. Non-Being and otherness in Plato's Sophist 176-181.

  45. ———. 1996. "Á Propos Du Sophiste De Platon." Études Philosophiques:375-380.

  46. ———. 1999. "Théories De La Proposition Dans Le Sophiste De Platon." In Théories De La Phrase Et De La Proposition. De Platon À Averroès, edited by Büttgen, Philippe, Diebler.Stéphane and Rashed, Marwan, 21-41. Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm.

  47. ———. 2000. "Parmenides and Plato on What Is Not." In The Winged Chariot: Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. De Rijk, edited by Kardaun, Maria and Spruyt, Joke, 19-104. Leiden: Brill.

  48. ———. 2005. "La Forma Del Non Essere Nel Sofista Di Platone." In Eidos - Idea. Platone, Aristotele E La Tradizione Platonica, edited by Fronterotta, Francesco and Leszl, Walter, 115-159. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

  49. O'Rourke, Fran. 2003. "Plato's Approach to Being in the Theaetetus and Sophist, and Heidegger's Attribution of Aristotelian Influence." Diotima.Review of Philosophical Research no. 31:47-58.

    "Despite the state priority of the 'Good', Plato's thought is marked by a profound zeal for Being as the object and goal of all authentic thought and endeavor. Being is the most fundamental and universal concept, further articulated in the definition of being as 'Power'.

    The limits of this definition are clarified in light of the distinction between potentia activa and potentia passiva.

    Heidegger's suggestion that Plato was inspired by Aristotle is shown to be incorrect through analysis of dialogues written before Aristotle's arrival in Athens."

  50. Oscanyan, Frederick S. 1973. "On Six Definitions of the Sophist: Sophist 221c-231e." Philosophical Forum no. 4:241-259.

    "The paper shows that the definitions of the sophist on 221c-231e refer to specific contemporaries of Socrates: Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Euthydemus and Thrasymachus. Produced by the method of divisions, each definition consists of a nesting class of attributes. An examination of the Platonic corpus reveals that these same characteristics are used to satirically describe the sophists listed above. As the final definition equally describes Thrasymachus and Socrates, it is shown why Plato viewed the method of divisions as inadequate for obtaining the proper definition of sophistry: a good Platonic definition must have ostensive truth as well as essential validity."

  51. Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane. 1966. "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present." Monist:317-340.

    Reprinted in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.) - The Pre-Socratics; a collection of critical essays - Garden City, Anchor Press, 1974 and in: G. E. L.Owen - Logic, science, and dialectic. Collected papers in Greek philosophy - Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986 pp. 27-44.

    Some statements couched in the present tense have no reference to time. They are, if you like, grammatically tensed but logically tenseless. Mathematical statements such as "twice two is four" or "there is a prime number between 125 and 128" are of this sort. So is the statement I have just made. To ask in good faith whether there is still the prime number there used to be between 125 and 128 would be to show that one did not understand the use of such statements, and so would any attempt to answer the question. It is tempting to take another step and talk of such timeless statements as statements about timeless entities. If the number 4 neither continues nor ceases to be twice two, this is, surely, because the number 4 has no history of any kind, not even the being a day older today than yesterday. Other timeless statements might shake our confidence in this inference: "Clocks are devices for measuring time" is a timeless statement, but it is not about a class of timeless clocks. But, given a preoccupation with a favored set of examples and a stage of thought at which men did not distinguish the properties of statements from the properties of the things they are about, we can expect timeless entities to appear as the natural proxies of timeless statements.

    Now the fact that a grammatical tense can be detached from its tense-affiliations and put to a tenseless use is something that must be discovered at some time by somebody or some set of people. So far as I know it was discovered by the Greeks. It is commonly credited to one Greek in particular, a pioneer from whose arguments most subsequent Greek troubles over time were to flow: Parmenides the Eleatic. Sometimes it is suggested that Parmenides took a hint from his alleged mentors, the Pythagoreans. "We may assume" says one writer "that he knew of the timeless present in mathematical statements." 2 But what Aristotle tells us of Pythagorean mathematics is enough to undermine this assumption. According to him (esp. Metaph. 1091a12-22) they confused the construction of the series of natural numbers with the generation of the world. So Parmenides is our earliest candidate. His claim too has been disputed, and I shall try to clear up this dispute as I go, but not before I have done what I can to sharpen it and widen the issues at stake." pp. 317-318.

  52. ———. 1971. "Plato on Not-Being." In Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, edited by Vlastos, Gregory, 104-137. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.

    Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen - Logic, science, and dialectic: collected papers in Greek philosophy - edited by Martha Nussbaum - London, Duckworth (1986).

  53. Pacitti, Domenico. 1991. The Nature of the Negative. Towards an Understanding of Negation and Negativity. Pisa: Giardini editori e stampatori.

    Contents: Preface IX-X; On the nature of the Negative 1; Epilogue 77; Notes 79; Bibliographical references 103; Index nominum 115-118.

    On Plato's Sophist see in particular pp. 63-75.

    "The immensity of the 'tours de force' necessary in the Parmenides and Sophist for the admission of nonbeing on a par with being reflects the enormous hold that Parmenides must have exerted over the Greeks. His writing in verse, like the monotheist Xenophanes, reflects divine inspiration and the transcendent powers of thought. Thus it is not he but the goddess who speaks throughout.

    The style of Parmenides fr. B8, 12-21 is strikingly reminiscent of the Vedic hymn and may easily be read as a solution to the anonymous poet's riddle. But his answer that there is only 'is' and no 'is not' cannot, I think, be understood as meaning that Parmenides wished to reject negative predication out, as Anscombe (Parmenides, Mystery and Contradiction, 1969) would have in the first place, Parmenides himself consistently uses negatives, which would be highly implausible if that was what he wished to outlaw, and secondly, his position on the illusory nature of 'opinion' and the nonexistence of what is not is quite compatible with the use of the negative.

    For in Parmenides (fr. B2, B6, 1-2, & B8 34-36) thought and reality are probably even more closely bound together than in Plato, in that reality - or at least true reality - can be thought, and if 'opinion' is part of what is not, then the result of thinking that is what he calls a non-thought, which must be taken to mean something that is not a true or authentic thought. We find Aristotle (Posterior Analytics 89a) still pondering over this problem of how true knowledge and mere opinion could have the same object of reference.

    Similarly, Parmenides' convincing rebuttal (fr. 3) of what is having been produced out of what is not, which would then mean what is being in some sense what is not, led Aristotle (De Anima 417a and Metaphysics 1051b) to his theory of potentiality in order to bridge the gap somehow between nonbeing and being.

    And this is a radical challenge to the common concept of time: the unreality of past and future which are illusory, the present which is all there is, timeless and eternal.

    For Parmenides, then, reason, namely the correct use of thought in contact with reality - not the world of appearance but the real world - will alone lead to truth." pp. 73-74 [the number Parmenides' fragments refers to Diels-Kranz - Fragmente der Vorsokratiker].

  54. Painter, Corinne. 2005. "In Defense of Socrates: The Stranger's Role in Plato's Sophist." Epoché.A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 9:317-333.

    "In this essay I argue that the Stranger's interest in keeping the Philosopher and the Sophist distinct is connected, primarily, to his assessment of the charges of Sophistry advanced against Socrates, which compels him to defend Socrates from these unduly advanced accusations. On this basis, I establish that the Stranger's task in the Sophist, namely to keep philosophy distinct from sophistry, is intimately tied to the project of securing justice and is therefore not merely of theoretical importance but is also -- and essentially - of political and ethical significance."

  55. Palumbo, Lidia. 1994. Il Non Essere E L'apparenza. Sul Sofista Di Platone. Napoli: Loffredo Editore.

  56. ———. 2002. "Hegel Interprete Del Sofista Nelle Lezione Sulla Storia Della Filosofia." In Hegel E Platone, edited by Movia, Giancarlo, 225-249. Cagliari: Edizioni AV.

  57. Papadis, Dimitris. 2005. "The Concept of Truth in Parmenides." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 23:77-96.

  58. Partenie, Catalin. 2004. "Imprint: Heidegger Interpretation of Platonic Dialectic in the Sophist Lectures (1924-25)." In Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue, edited by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 42-71. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

  59. Peck, Arthur Leslie. 1952. "Plato and the Megista Genê of the Sophist. A Reinterpretation." Classical Quarterly no. 2:32-56.

  60. ———. 1962. "Plato's Sophist. The Symplokê Tôn Eidôn." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 7:46-66.

  61. Pelletier, Francis Jeffry. 1975. "'Incompatibility' in Plato's Sophist." Dialogue no. 14:143-146.

    "Contrary to the claims of Owen (1970), Frede (1967), and many other Platonic scholars, there is a straight forward way to explicate Plato's "Sophist" as having 'heteron' first be understood as "non-identical" and after 257b or so (transition area) be understood as "incompatible." This should encourage scholars who prefer the "incompatibility" reading but don't see how to get the required change of meaning. (Ackrill 1955, 1957; Wiggins 1970; Lorenz & Mittlestrauss 1966)."

  62. ———. 1983. "Plato on Not-Being: Some Interpreations of the Symploke Eidon (259e) and Their Relation to Parmenides Problem." Midwest Studies in Philosophy no. 8:35-65.

  63. ———. 1990. Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction XI-XXI; 1. Methodological preliminaries 1; 2. Parmenides' problem 8; 3. Plato's problems 22; 4. Some interpretations of the symploke eidon 45; 5. The Philosopher's language 94, Works cited 149; Index locorum 155; Name Index 159; Subject index 163-166.

  64. Peron, Barbara. 2008. Mit Aristoteles Zu Platon. Heideggers Ontologische Ausdeutung Der Dialektik Im "Sophistes". Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

  65. Philip, James Allenby. 1969. "The Megista Gene of the Sophistes." Phoenix no. 23:89-103.

  66. Pino Posada, Juan Pablo. 2006. "La Caza Del Filósofo: Comentarios Al Sofista De Platón." Estudios de Filosofia no. 33:123-141.

    "The following passage illustrates the theme of this paper: "Or, perhaps, have we fallen inadvertently, by Zeus, in the science of free men, and, searching for the Sophist, run the risk of having found the philosopher first?" (253c5-10). The fact that the stranger from Elea surprisingly finds himself with the Philosopher in a conversation that pretends to offer a definition of the Sophist, makes one think how little unheeded the closeness between the "free man" and his imitator was for Plato. In the Sophist, the Platonic interest in centered in evincing this closeness and, at the same time, in defining the boundaries among them, making the first a hunter of the second. The present paper explores the sense of the hunt attending the following singularities: (1) the formal procedure that it follows; (2) the question that guides it; (3) the quality of spirit that asks; (4) the words with which the interlocutors name it; and (5) the "noble" game he finds at last."

  67. Pippin, Robert B. 1979. "Negation and Not-Being in Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Plato's Sophist." Kant Studien no. 70:179-196.

  68. Pirocacos, Elly. 1998. False Belief and the Meno Paradox. Alddershot: Ashgate.

    "The philosophical concern of this book is epistemological in kind. It involves understanding the Socratic elentic method and how its structure introduces an important epistemological problem which is first raised in the Meno dialogue as a paradox. This paradox, named the Meno paradox, raises the problem of falsehood. Specifically the impossibility of falsehood. The Theaetetus dialogue is then analyzed in terms of how falsehood is there set up as a clearly epistemological problem. The Sophist dialogue is in turn discussed as offering a response to the problem of falsehood by revising it as a problem for semantics."

  69. Politis, Vasilis. 2006. "The Argument for the Reality of Change and Changelessness in Plato's Sophist (248e7-249d5)." In New Essays on Plato: Language and Thought in Fourth-Century Greek Philosophy, edited by Herrmann, Fritz-Gregor, 149-175. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales.

  70. Prior, William J. 1980. "Plato's Analysis of Being and Not-Being in the Sophist." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 18:199-211.

    "In this paper I argue that Plato does not, as most scholars believe, distinguish different senses or uses of the verb 'to be' in the "Sophist". He succeeds in differentiating existential statements from statements of identity and predications, but with the aid of a verb 'to be' which he takes to be univocal and to be equivalent to 'to participate in'. I offer an analysis of "Sophist" 251a-257c, and focus in particular on 255e-256e. This passage displays numerous parallels with the middle dialogues, and it is misleading to treat it as indicative of a change in Plato's metaphysics."

  71. ———. 1985. Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics. London: Croom Helm.

    Contents: Acknowledgments; Introduction: The problem of Plato's development 1; The metaphysics of the early and middle Platonic dialogues 9; 2. The challenge of the Parmenides 51; 3. The response of the Timaeus 87; 4. The Sophist 127; Appendix: The doctrinal maturity and chronological position of the Tmaeus 168; Bibliography 194; Index 199-201.

  72. Przelecki, Marian. 1981. "On What There Is Not." Dialectics and Humanism no. 8:123-129.

    "The paper refers to the famous discussion of the problems of falsehood and non-being contained in Plato's "Sophist" and tries to show that the difficulties which Plato is coping with and the solutions proposed by him have their close counterparts in modern logical semantics. The main outcome of the analysis is an explication of the concept of falsehood which does not resort to any kind of non-existent entities."

  73. Ray, Chadwick. 1984. For Images: An Interpretation of Plato's Sophist. Lanham: University Press of America.

  74. Rickless, Samuel C. 2010. "Plato's Definition(S) of Sophistry." Ancient Philosophy no. 30:289-298.

    "Plato offers many different definitions of sophistry in the Sophist before settling upon the one that he himself considers to be correct. He offers many definitions prior to the correct one so as to illustrate : 1) how a correct method of definition ought to include three distinct stages : paradigm ; collection ; division ; and 2) how the method's failure can lead to success."

  75. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1981. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part V. Plato's Semantics in His Critical Period (Second Part)." Vivarium no. 19:81-125.

    5. Plato's semantics in his critical period (Continuation); 5.6.2. The problem of giving several names and the Communion of Kinds; 5.6.2.1. On the 'trivial' question of 'one individual -- many names'; 5.6.2.2. Giving several names and the Communion of Kinds;

    "5.6.3. Dialectic and the Communion of Forms

    In order to clarify the Communion of Kinds an analogy is drawn between the vowels which `form a sort of bond running through the whole system (253 A 4-5) and certain Forms that are `running through all' (253 C 1). Just as without the help of vowels it is impossible for one of the other letters to fit in with any other (A 5-6), similarly it is the special Forms that make possible Communion and are responsible for Division (C 2-3). It seems to be useful to have a look at the impact of this analogy." p. 95

    5.6.3.1. The precise impact of the wovel-analogy; 5.6.3.2. The proper task of Dialectic; 5.6.3.3. The description of the dialectician's practice; 5.6.4. On the Communion of Forms as occurring in particulars; 5.6.5. The question of 'what is not' reduced into a problem of name-giving; 5.6.6. Four antinomies concerning the Five Kinds raised and solved (254D-255E); 5.6.6.1. The first round: on the relations of Being, Rest and Change; 5..6.6.2. The second round: on the relations of Change, Rest, Same and Other; 5.6.6.3. The third round: 'What is' and 'the Same' disentangled; 5.6.6.4. The fourth round: 'What is' and 'the Other' disentangled; 5.6.6.5. On the different uses of kath' hauto; 5.6.6.6. 'What is' and 'the Other' disentangled. Continuation; 5.6.6.6. 'What is' and 'Other' disentangled. Continuation.

  76. ———. 1982. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part Vi. Plato's Semantics in His Critical Period (Third Part)." Vivarium no. 20:97-127.

    5.6.7. How the diverse Kinds have communion with one another; 5.7. The reinstatement of 'What is not' (256d-259D); 5.7.1. Forms being and Forms not being: 5.7.2. The not-being of 'What is'; 5.7.3. The being of what is not'; 5.7.4. Are there Forms corresponding to negative expressions?; 5.7.5. The Parmenidean dogma refuted. Summary.

    "5. 8 Conclusion. From our analysis of Soph., 216 A-259 D it may be concluded that Plato did certainly not abandon his theory of Forms. We may try to answer, now, the main questions scholarship is so sharply divided about (see Guthrie [A History of Greek Philosophy] V, 143ff.). They are, in Guthrie's formulation: (1) does Plato mean to attribute Change to the Forms themselves, or simply to enlarge the realm of Being to include life and intelligence which are not Forms?, and (2) is he going even further in dissent from the friends of Forms and admitting what they called Becoming --changing and perishable objects of the physical world -- as part of the realm of True Being?

    The first question should be answered in the negative. Indeed, Plato is defending a certain Communion of Forms, but this regards their immanent status and, accordingly, the physical world primarily, rather than the `Forms themselves' (or: `in their exalted status' as Guthrie has it, p. 159). As to the second question, to Guthrie's mind Plato's language makes it almost if not quite insoluble. I think that if one pays Plato's expositions the patient attention he asks for 'at 259 C-D and follows his analysis stage by stage, the exact sense and the precise respect in which he makes his statements (cf. 259 D 1-2: ekeinêi kai kat' ekeino ho physi) about Being and Not-being, Sameness and Otherness, and so on will appear. It will be easily seen, then, that there is no recantation at all in Plato's development. He still maintains, as he will maintain in his later works (e.g. Philebus, 14 D ff.) the Transcendent Forms as what in the last analysis are the only True Being. But Plato succeeds in giving a fuller sense to the old notions of `sharing' and `presence in' without detracting the `paradigm' function of the Forms in any respect. Matter, Change and Becoming is given a better position in the Theory of Forms in that their immanent status has been brought into the focus of Plato's interest. From his Parmenides onwards Plato has been searching for the solution of his metaphysical problems and has actually found it in the Sophist in a new view of participation. Forms in their exalted status are just a too eminent cause for the existence of the world of Becoming. But their being shared in, i.e. their immanent status, make them so to speak `operable' and yet preserve their dignity of being paradeigmatic standards. What makes something to be a horse is, no doubt, the Transcendent Form, HORSENESS, but it only can partake of that Form and possess it as an immanent form. So the Highness of the Form and the unworthy matter can come together as matter 'informed', that is, affected by an immanent form.

    Plato never was unfaithful to his original view about Forms as the only True Being. In our dialogue, too, he brings the eminence of True Being (taken, of course, as a Transcendent Form) into relief by saying (254 A) that the true philosopher, through his devotion to the Form, `What is' ('Being'), dwells in the brightness of the divine, and the task of Dialectic, accordingly, is described from that very perspective (see Part (5), 96ff.). Focussing on the immanence of the Forms does not detract anything from their `exalted status', since immanent forms are nothing else but the Transcendent Forms as partaken of by particulars.(...)

    In his critical period Plato never ceased to believe in the Transcendent World. The important development occurring there consists in his taking more seriously than before their presence in matter and their activities as immanent forms. In the Sophist he uses all his ingenuity to show that a correct understanding of the Forms may safeguard us from all extremist views on being and not-being and zealous exaggerations of the Friends of Forms as well." pp. 125-127.

  77. ———. 1986. Plato's Sophist. A Philosophical Commentary. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

    Contents. Preface 9; Preliminary: Plato's Sophist to be reconsidered? 11; Introduction 13; Chapter 1. The dispute about interpreting Plato 22; Chapter 2. The evolution of the doctrine of Eidos 30; Reconsidering Plato's Sophist 69; Chapter 3. The dialogue's main theme and procedure 71; Chapter 4. On current views about 'what is not' 82; Chapter 5. On current views about 'what is' 93; Chapter 6. Plato's novel metaphysical position 103; Chapter 7. The variety of names and the communion of kinds 110; Chapter 8. An important digression on dialectic 126; Chapter 9. The communion of kinds; Chapter 10. How the five kinds combine 159; Chapter 11. The reinstatement of 'what is not' (256d-259d) 164; Chapter 12. On philosophic and sophistic discourse 186; The framework: semantics and philosophy in Plato; Chapter 13. Plato's semantics in the Cratylus 217; Chapter 14. Naming and representing 254; Chapter 15. Language and knowing 277; Chapter 16. Semantics and metaphysics 327; Bibliography 355; Index of passages quoted or referred to 365; Index of proper names 377; Index of terms and topics 383-394.

    "The way in which Plato announces (Sophist, 249C-D) his novel metaphysics has been puzzling modern scholars for a long time: 'What is and the All consist of what is changeless and what is in change, both together'. Did Plato really introduce Change into the Transcendent World and thus abandon his theory of Unchangeable Forms?

    Many of Plato's commentators have claimed that the use of modern techniques of logico-semantical analysis can be a valuable aid in unraveling this problem and other difficulties Plato raised and attempted to solve. However, not all modern distinctions and tools can be applied without reservation; for many of these are entirely alien to Plato's thought. Interpreters of Plato must also resist the temptation of applying methods as disjointing the dialogue and selecting specific passages only, in their eagerness to prove that Plato was explicitly interested in (their own favourite) problems of 'identity and predication' (not to mention such oddities as the `self-predication of Forms'), or the distinctions between different senses (or applications) of 'is'.

    The present author has tried to understand Plato by a close reading of the complete dialogue and to relate the doctrinal outcome of the Sophist to Plato's general development. Close reading Plato involves following him in his own logico-semantical approach to the metaphysical problems, an approach which shows his deep interest in the manifold ways to 'name' (or to 'introduce into the universe of discourse') 'what is' (or the 'things there are').

    The reader may be sure that my indebtedness to other authors on this subject is far greater than it may appear from my text. Also many of those who have gone in quite different directions than mine have been of great importance to me in sharpening my own views and formulations. Two authors should be mentioned nominatim: Gerold Prauss and the late Richard Bluck; two scholars, whose invaluable works deserve far more attention than they have received so far.

    I owe my translations of the Greek to predecessors. Where I have not followed them, my rendering is no doubt often painfully (and perhaps barbariously) literal: I do not wish to incur the suspicion of trying to improve Plato by modernising him." (from the Preface)

  78. Roberts, Jean. 1986. "The Problem About Being in the Sophist." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 3:229-243.

    Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.) - Plato. Critical Assessments - Plato's later works - vol. IV - London, Routledge, 1998 - pp. 142-157

  79. Robinson, David B. 2001. "The Phantom of the Sophist: To Ouk Ontos Ouk on (240 a-C)." Classical Quarterly no. 51:435-457.

    "The odd expression to ouk ontos ouk on in Sophist 240 B 7-B 12 has been wrongly assumed to hint at Plato's own doctrine of intermediate being from the Republic. Neoplatonists maintained a fourfold schema of degrees of being, one of which was named to ouk ontos ouk on; thus, Neoplatonist influence may have caused the introduction of words into this dialogue that were taken by interpolators to produce the direct doctrinal statement, eidolon ouk ontos ouk on. No argument is given in the Sophist for placing eidolon on a fourfold scale of reality and no further use of degrees of reality seems to be made in the dialogue; at 258 E 6-259 A 1 the opposite of being" is banished by Plato."

  80. Rosen, Stanley. 1983. Plato's Sophist. The Drama of the Original and Image. New Haven: Yale University Press.

  81. ———. 2004. "Remarks on Heidegger's Plato." In Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue, edited by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 178-191. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

  82. Rossitto, Cristina. 1995. "La Dialettica Platonica Nel Sofista: Elenchos O Diairesis?" In Platone E La Dialettica, edited by Di Giovanni, Piero, 39-57. Bari: Laterza.

    Ristampato in: C. Rossitto - Studi sulla dialettica in Aristotele - Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2000, pp. 327-346

  83. Rousset, Emmanuelle. 2009. Les Intermittences De L'être. Lecture Du Sophiste De Platon. Lagrasse: Verdier.

  84. Rudebusch, George. 1990. "Does Plato Think False Speech Is Speech?" Noûs no. 24:599-609.

    "There is an unsolved puzzle about Plato's Theaetetus and Sophist which has been too little noticed. The Sophist develops and accepts an account of false speech and belief as saying what is "other." But the Theaetetus rejects such accounts. The standard solution is that the Sophist is somehow meant to overcome or avoid the problems seen as overwhelming in the Theaetetus. I argue that such a solution fails."

  85. Runciman, Walter. 1962. Plato's Later Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Contents: Preface VII-VIII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. The 'Theaetetus': logic and knowledge 6; 3. The 'Sophist': ontology and logic 59; 4. Conclusion 127, Selected bibliography 134; Index 137.

  86. Sallis, John. 1975. Being and Logos. The Way of Platonic Dialogue. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International.

    Second edition withe a new preface 1986; Third edition titled: Being and Logos. Reading the Platonic dialogues - Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1996.

    Chapter VI. The Way of Logos: Sophist - pp. 456-532.

  87. Sasso, Gennaro. 1991. L'essere E Le Differenze. Sul Sofista Di Platone. Bologna: Il Mulino.

  88. Sayre, Kenneth. 1970. "Falsehood, Forms and Participation in the Sophist." Noûs no. 4:81-91.

    "Recapitulating what he takes to be Plato's analysis of true and false discourse in the 'Sophist', the author compares the conception of forms behind this analysis with that operating in the 'Phaedo' and the 'Republic'. On the basis of this comparison he then attempts to reconstruct the theory of participation which seems to be implicit in this later dialogue. In place of the earlier notion of resemblance between form and particular, participation in the 'Sophist' appears to be the relation by which an individual meets the criteria for being a thing of some given kind. These criteria are illustrated in the definitions of the angler and of the authentic Sophist, each of which gives necessary and sufficient conditions for being an instance of that specific kind."

  89. ———. 1976. "Sophist 263b Revisited." Mind no. 85:581-586.

    "According to the interpretation of "Sophist" 263b in "Plato's analytic method", judgments of the forms 'X is a' and 'X is not a' are true and false respectively if and only if all forms in which X participates combine with a, false and true respectively if and only if all such forms combine with not-a. If not-a comprises all forms other than a, as is usually assumed, this definition leads to paradox. On the basis of Plato's use of heteron and enantion, it is shown that not-a instead comprises only forms in which X cannot participate while participating in a, in which case no paradox arises."

  90. ———. 1983. Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Second edition: Parmenides Publishing, 2005 with a new introduction and the essay "Excess and deficiency at Statesman 283C-285C.

  91. Schipper, Edith Watson. 1964. "The Meaning of Existence in Plato's Sophist." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 9:38-44.

  92. Schüssler, Ingeborg. 1996. "Le Sophiste De Platon Dans L'interprétation De Heidegger." In Heidegger 1919-1929. De L'herméneutique De La Facticité À La Métaphysique Du Dasein, edited by Courtine, Jean-François, 91-111. Paris: Vrin.

    Actes du colloque organisé par Jean-François Marquet (Université de Paris-Sorbonne, novembre 1994).

    Reprinted in: Ada Neschke-Hentschke (ed.) - Images de Platon et lectures de ses oeuvres: les interprétations de Platon à travers les siècles - Louvain-la-Neuve, Éditions Peeters, 1997, pp. 395-415.

  93. Seligman, Paul. 1974. Being and Not-Being. An Introduction to Plato's Sophist. The Hague: Martinus Nujhoff.

  94. Serra, Mauro. 2004. "Lectures Du Sophiste Analytiques Et Continentaux." In Actualité Des Anciens Sur La Théorie Du Langage, edited by Petrilli, Raffaella and Gambarara, Daniele, 97-109. Münster: Nodus Publikationen.

  95. Silverman, Allan. 2002. The Dialectic of Essence. A Study of Plato's Metaphysics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    See in particular Chapter Five: Forms and Language pp. 137-181 and Chapter Six: Not-beings pp. 182-217

  96. Simon, Derek. 1996. "The Sophist, 246a-259e: Ousia and to on in Plato's Ontologies." De Philosophia no. 12:155-177.

  97. Soulez, Antonia. 1987. "Aux Sources Grecques De La Tradition Sémantique: Le Thème Platonicien Des "Liaisons Premieres"." Archives de Philosophie no. 50:371-401.

    "The aim in this paper is to follow the conceptual thread which leads from the early forerunners of the semantic tradition to Bolzano. Plato's "Sophist" could be seen as a semantic study of the sentence. When the meaning of false sentences is scrutinized, it becomes clear that the negation functor makes it possible to bring up the syntactical and semantical puzzle of the unity of complexes as constituted of parts."

  98. ———. 1991. La Grammaire Philosophique Chez Platon. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

  99. Starr, David E. 1974. "The Sixth Sophist: Comments on Frederick S. Oscanyan's "on Six Definitions of the Sophist: Sophist 221e-231e"." Philosophical Forum no. 5:486-492.

    ""The sixth Sophist" attacks Oscanyan's identification of the last-defined Sophist in "Sophist" 221e-231e as Thrasymachus. It contends that the sixth Sophist is Socrates, citing parallels in other dialogues to the numerical structure of the passage, as well as the content of the definition, to show that such an identification is both characteristic of Plato and significant."

  100. Stough, Charlotte. 1990. "Two Kinds of Naming in the Sophist." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 20:355-381.

  101. Strycker, Émile de. 1979. "Notes Sur Les Relations Entre La Problématique Du Sophiste De Platon Et Celle De La Métaphysique D'aristote." In Études Sur La Métaphysique D'aristote. Actes Du Vi Symposium Aristotelicum, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 49-67. Paris: Vrin.

  102. Stygermeer, Moth. 2005. Während Sokrates Schweigt. Der Zweite Anfang Der Philosophie in Platons Dialog Sophistes. Berlin: Tenea.

  103. Swiggers, Pierre. 1984. "Théorie Grammaticale Et Définition Du Discours Dans Le Sophiste De Platon." Études Classiques no. 52:15-17.

  104. Swindler, James Kenneth. 1978. Plato's Sophist and Contemporary Analytic Ontology. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.

  105. ———. 1980. "Parmenide's Paradox." Review of Metaphysics no. 33:727-744.

    "This paper presents a survey of the Russellian, Strawsonian, and Donnellanian solutions to the paradox of referring to what does not exist, Parmenides' paradox, and criticizes these for committment to uninstantiated properties as the referents of general terms. The paper then shows that this difficulty is avoided by Plato's solution (in the Sophist), which rests on the definition of nonbeing as difference. Plato's solution preserves the referential function of subjects in negative existentials, it avoids uninstantiated properties, and it avoids all equivocal concepts of being."

  106. Teisserenc, Fulcran. 2007. "Consonnes Et Voyelles: Les Fonctions De L'être Et De L'autre Dans Le Sophiste De Platon (251a-259e)." Dialogue no. 46:231-264.

    "On the functions of the forms of Being and the Other in Plato's Sophist, based on understanding the ontological role ascribed to "the great genus" in the interweaving of forms. Focusing on the vowel analogy, it may be argued that the roles of Being and the Other respectively are that of a connector and a separator actualizing the participations and the differences between the forms. The outcome of this analysis is to offer an explanation of the dialectical methods described in that dialogue in a rather obscure, abstract way; the much-debated question of self-predication can be settled without recourse to self-participation."

  107. Thom, Paul. 1992. "Critical Notice of F. J. Pelletier's Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 22:573-586.

    "Parmenides was an Object-Monist (not a Fact-Monist), relying on an Argument by Ellipsis from "a" is not "b" to "a" is not; Plato's Sophist so interprets him. Both Parmenides and Plato aimed to forge a Philosopher's Language which does not recognize negative realities. They differed in that Parmenides accepted the Principle of Non-Contradiction while Plato rejected it as conflicting with the requirements of the Argument by Ellipsis; further, Plato's (but not Parmenides') Language of Inquiry allowed for "relative" statements of non-being."

  108. Thomas, Christine Jan. 2008. "Speaking of Something: Plato's Sophist and Plato's Beard." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 38:631-668.

    "In Sophist 237-263 Plato argues that speech must be "of something" and not "of nothing", and this "of something" requirement is a metaphysical condition on significant discourse and contentful thought. For Plato, whatever is something is some one thing that is -- that is, it is a well-individuated, countable entity. Whatever is "something" is self-identical and different from everything else. One of the central aims of the Sophist is to articulate and to develop Plato's metaphysics of "somethings"."

  109. Thorp, John. 1984. "Forms, Concepts and to Me On." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 2:77-92.

  110. Trevaskis, J.R. 1955. "The Sophistry of Noble Lineage ("Sophist" 230a5-232b9)." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 2:36-49.

  111. ———. 1966. "The Megista Genê and the Vowel Analogy of Plato, Sophist 253." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 11:99-116.

  112. Turnbull, Robert G. 1964. "The Argument of the "Sophist"." Philosophical Quarterly no. 14:23-34.

  113. Vasiliu, Anca. 2008. Dire Et Voir. La Parole Visible Du Sophiste. Paris: Vrin.

  114. Vlastos, Gregory. 1973. "An Ambiguity in the Sophist." In Platonic Studies, 270-322. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Appendix I: On the interpretation of Sph. 248D4E4 pp. 309-317; Appendix II: More on Pualine prediction in Plato pp. 318-322

  115. Vries, William de. 1988. "On Sophist 255b-E." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 5:385-394.

    "At Sophist 255b7-e the Eleatic Stranger distinguishes both being and identity and being and difference. I argue that the two apparently different arguments given are in fact intrinsically related. Both ultimately turn upon the distinction between absolute and relative uses of "being," which I argue does not involve either the "is" of existence or the "is" of identity, but rather the distinction between monadic and relational predication. "

  116. Waletzki, W. 1979. "Platons Ideenlehre Und Dialektik Im Sophistes 253d." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 24:241-252.

  117. Webb, David. 2000. "Continuity and Difference in Heidegger's Sophist." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 38:145-169.

  118. Wedin, Michael V. 1981. "Plato on What "Being" Is Not." Philosophia no. 10-11:265-295.

    "Three puzzles are raised at "Sophist" 243b-245e concerning theories that make claims about the number of things that are. I argue that they are preliminary to and reflect Plato's positive theory of being, in particular they indicate that it is a mistake to regard being as a standard first-order predicate and so support the thesis that for Plato being is a second-order or formal concept."

  119. Wiggins, David. 1971. "Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of Non-Being." In Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, edited by Vlastos, Gregory, 268-303. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press.

  120. Wiles, Anne M. 1999. "Forms and Predication in the Later Dialogies." In Plato and Platonism, edited by Ophuijsen, Johannes M.van, 179-197. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

  121. Xenakis, Jason. 1957. "Plato on Statement and Truth-Value." Mind no. 66:165-172.

    "In this article the author analyses 'true', 'false', and 'statements' in Plato's "Sophist" 261e-3b. it is the author's thesis that this reference in Plato does not exemplify the theory of forms nor does it present the theory of forms as meanings. The analysis proceeds through a refutation of Crnford's thesis of the theory of forms, and the author offers alternative interpretations to the notions of true, false, and statements in Plato."

  122. ———. 1959. "Plato's Sophist: A Defense of Negative Expressions and a Doctrine of Sense and of Truth." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 4:29-43.

  123. Zadro, Attilio. 1961. Ricerche Sul Linguaggio E Sulla Logica Del Sofista. Padova: Antenore.

  124. Ziermann, Christoph. 2004. Platons Negative Dialektik. Eine Untersuchung Der Dialoge "Sophistes" Und "Parmenides". Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

  125. Zuckert, Catherine H. 2000. "Who's a Philosopher? Who's a Sophist? The Stranger V. Socrates." Review of Metaphysics no. 54:65-97.

    "Many readers have taken the Eleatic Stranger to represent a later stage of Plato's philosophical development because the arguments or doctrines the Stranger presents in the Sophist appear to be better than those Socrates articulates in earlier dialogues. When we examine the definition of the sophist to which the Stranger comes at the end of the dialogue, however, we find reasons to question the adequacy of his teaching and, consequently, his superiority to Socrates. Each or both might appear to be a pretender or sophist; each might also be seeking knowledge through dialectical sorting or a philosopher."

  126. Zupi, Massimiliano. 2007. Incanto E Incantesimo Del Dire. Logica E/O Mistica Nella Filosofia Del Linguaggio Di Platone (Cratilo E Sofista) E Gregorio Di Nissa (Contro Eunomio). Roma: Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo.

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