Accame Silvio, "L'invocazione alla Musa e la verità in Omero e in Esiodo (prima parte)," Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica 41: 257-281 (1963).
Accame Silvio, "L'invocazione alla Musa e la verità in Omero e in Esiodo (seconda parte)," Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica 41: 385-415 (1963).
Adkins Arthur W.H., "Truth, Kosmos, and Arete in the Homeric poems," Classical Quarterly 22: 5-18 (1972).
Levet Jean-Pierre. Le vrai et le faux dans la pensée grecque archaique. Étude de vocabulaire. Paris: Les Belles Lettres 1976.
Tome I. Présentation générale. Le vrai et le faux dans les épopées homériques.
Avant-Propos: "Ce livre est la première partie d'une thèse de doctorat d'État qui a été soutenue le 11 mai 1974 en Sorbonne".

"A la description de l'état homérique de la langue et de la pensée succédera, dans une seconde partie, une étude du vocabulaire historique. Cet examen accompli, il restera à depeindre l'évolution de chaque élément lexical jusqu'à la fin du Ve siècle, à travers le Hymnes Homériques, la poésie lyrique et élégiaque, les oeuvres des poètes tragiques et comiques anciens, les écrits d'Hérodote, de Thucydide et d'Antyphon, les fragments des Présocratiques et les passages du Corpus Hippocratiique que l'on peut dater du Ve siècle. On composera enfin une dernière synthèse résumant l'ensemble de l'évolution constatée et présentant l'état de langue et de pensée dont hérite le IVe siècle." (p. 5, note omise).
Nagy Gregory. Homeric questions. Austin: University of Texas Press 1996.
See Chapter 4: Myth as exemplum in Homer - particularly pp. 122-128.
Prier Raymond Adolph. Achilles rheter? Homer and proto-rhetorical truth. In The rhetoric canon. Edited by Schildgen Brenda Deen. Detroit: Wayne State University Press 1997. pp. 63-81
Pucci Pietro. Odysseus Polutropos. Intertextual readings in the Odyssey and the Iliad. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1987.
See Chapter I.8 Disguising truth: fiction pp. 83-109
Riezler Kurt, "Homer's contribution to the meaning of truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3: 326-337 (1943).

Hesiod

Arrighetti Graziano, "Esiodo e le Muse: il dono della verità e la conquista della parola," Athenaeum 80: 45-63 (1992).
Arrighetti Graziano. Hésiode et les Muses. Le don de la vérité et la conquête de la parole. In Le métier du mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode. Edited by Blaise Fabienne, Judet de la Combe Pierre, and Rousseau Philippe. Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion 1996. pp. 53-70
Belfiore Elizabeth, "Lies unlike the truth": Plato on Hesiod, Theogony, 27," Transactions of the American Philological Association 115: 47-57 (1985).
Plato's text is: Republic 2, 376-383.
Buongiovanni Angelo. La verità e il suo doppio (Hes. Theog. 27-28). In Interpretazioni antiche e moderne di testi greci. Pisa: Giardini editore 1987. pp. 9-24
Ricerche di filologia classica. Vol. III.
Daix David-Artur, "Réalités et vérités dans la Théogonie et les Travaux et les Jours d'Hésiode," Métis.Anthropologie des Mondes Grecs Anciens 4: 139-164 (2006).
Ferrari Giovanni. Hesiod's mimetic muses and the strategies of deconstruction. In Post-structuralist classics. Edited by Benjamin Andrew E. New York: Routledge 1988. pp. 45-78
"This essay has a narrow focus but a large penumbra. My focus is a current interpretation of the couplet spoken by the Muses in the prologue to Hesiod's Theogony, an interpretation avowedly influenced by the work of Jacques Derrida. I think it not just mistaken, but mistaken in an exemplary fashion. That is, in considering how it goes wrong I hope to reveal something more general about the impact of Derrida's work, actual and potential, bad and good, on classical studies. (This will eventually involve me in a quite detailed analysis of an exemplary piece by Derrida himself.) (1) In addition, I will offer the beginnings of an account of a significant and general pattern of archaic Greek thought evinced by Hesiod's couplet (one which has particular importance for the later development of Greek philosophy); a pattern which, I argue, is obscured by a certain pervasive anachronism that classicists engaged by Derrida have imported from his work."

(1) "Signature, événement, contexte" and its companion piece "Limited, inc. a b c..." which I come to in the fourth section [both essay reprinted in: J. Derrida - Limited Inc. - Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1988]
Heiden Bruce A., "The Muses' uncanny lies: Hesiod, Theogony 27 and its translators," American Journal of Philology 128: 153-175 (2007).
Judet de la Combe Pierre. L'autobiographie comme mode d'universalisation. Hésiode et Hélicon. In La Componente autobiografica nella poesia greca e latina fra realtà e artificio letterario. Edited by Arrighetti Graziano and Montanari Franco. Pisa: Giardini 1993. pp. 25-39
Leclerc Marie-Christine. La parole chez Hésiode. À la recherche de l'harmonie perdue. Paris: Belles Lettres 1993.
Nagy Gregory, "Authorisation and authorship in the Hesiodic Theogony," Ramus 21: 119-130 (1992).
"Strict attention to poetic truth, aletheia, as the 'recovered essence of being' and to the sharp contrast between muthos and epos (especially in diachronic perspective) reveals a pan-Hellenism in Hesiod's Theogony that confers authority on the poem and authorship on the poet."
Nagy Gregory. Autorité et auteur dans la Théogonie hésiodique. In Le métier du mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode. Edited by Blaise Fabienne, Judet de la Combe Pierre, and Rousseau Philippe. Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion 1996. pp. 41-52
Neitzel Heinz, "Hesiod und die lügenden Musen. Zur Interpretation von Theogonie 27f.," Hermes 108: 387-401 (1980).
Otto Walter F. Hesiodea. In Varia Variorum. Festgabe für Karl Reinhardt dargebracht von Freunden und Schülern zum 14. Februar 1951. Münster: Böhlau 1952. pp. 49-57
Pretagostini Roberto, "L'incontro con le Muse sull'Elicona in Esiodo e in Callimaco: modificazioni di un modello," Lexis 13: 157-172 (1995).
Ristampato in. R. Pretagostini - Ricerche sulla poesia alessandrina II. Forme allusive e contenuti nuovi - Roma, Edizioni Quasar, 2007
Pucci Pietro. Hesiod and the language of poetry. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1976.
See Chapter I: The true and false discourse in Hesiod - pp. 8-44
Rudhardt Jean. Le préambule de la Théogonie. La vocation du poète. Le langage des Muses. In Le métier du mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode. Edited by Blaise Fabienne, Judet de la Combe Pierre, and Rousseau Philippe. Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion 1996. pp. 25-39
Strauss Clay Jenny. Hesiod's Cosmos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003.
See pp. 58-64 on Theogony, 27-28.
Stroh Wilfried. Hesiods lügende Musen. In Studien zum Antiken Epos. Edited by Görgemanns Herwig and Schmidt Ernst A. Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain 1976. pp. 85-112
Svenbro Jesper. La parole et le marbre. Aux origines de la poétique grecque. Lund: Studentlitteratur 1976. pp.
Chapitre 1.2 Hésiode: la vérité comme relation sociale pp. 46-73.
"Au VIIe Chant [de l' Odyssée], Alcinoos donne un banquet en l'honneur d'Ulysse. "Laissez-moi manger dans ma détresse, dit Ulysse, car il n'y a rien de plus chien que le ventre odieux (ou gar ti stugeréi epl gastéri kúnteron allo épleto)" ; sans nourriture, Ulysse ne pourrait raconter ses aventures car, dit-il, son ventre lui "commande de manger et de boire" et lui "fait oublier" (ek... léthanei) ce qu'il a éprouvé. Or, la signification de la notion archaique d'alétheia, étudiée entre autres par Detienne, nous permet de faire l'observation suivante: loin de correspondre à notre conception de "vérité", 1'alétheia archeíque tend à garder son sens "étymologique" et signifie le "non-oubli" (a-létheia), de sorte qu'on pourrait dire d'Ulysse qu'il ne saurait dire l'a-létheia qu'à condition de recevoir à manger. C'est aussi le cas des trois Vierges dans l'Hymne homérique à Hermès qui après avoir mangé du miel blond disent volontiers la vérité (alétheién agoreúein)" tandis qu'elles "deviennent menteuses (pseúdontai)" aussitôt qu'elles en sont privées. (*)" p. 54

(*) Hymnes hornériques IV.560-3.
Wismann Heinz. Propositions pour une lecture d'Hésiode. In Le métier du mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode. Edited by Blaise Fabienne, Judet de la Combe Pierre, and Rousseau Philippe. Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion 1996. pp. 15-22

Pindar

Hubbard Thomas K. The Pindaric mind. A study of logical structure in early Greek Poetry. Leiden: Brill 1985.
See Chapter II.3 Alathea / Pseudos pp. 100-106.
Komornicka Anna Maria, "Quelques rémarques sur la notion d' Alétheia et de Pseudos chez Pindare," Eos.Commentarii Societatis Philologa Polonorum 60: 235-253 (1972).
Komornicka Anna Maria. Studia nad Pindarem i archaiczna liryka grecka w kregu pojec prawdy i falszu. Lodz: Uniwersytet Lodzki 1979.
In Polish: Studies on Pindar and Archaic Greek lyric. Terms denoting true and false (with a French summary, pp. 252-272).
Komornicka Anna Maria. Termes déterminant le Vrai et le Faux chez Pindare. In Aischylos und Pindar. Studien zu Werk und Nachwirkung. Edited by Schmidt Ernst Günther. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1981. pp. 81-89
"L'analyse de ces deux notions (le Vrai et le Faux) donne lieu à maintes conclusions. Citons, à titre d'exemple, deux réflexions. Or, contrairement au Faux -- sur le plan moral -- qui est toujours double (diplóos) ou même multiple, bariolé, sinueux, furtif, qui se tapit dans l'obscurité, la Vérité morale, elle, est toujours unique, simple (aletós). Par ailleurs, ce qui m'a frappée au cours de mes recherches, c'est le fait que tandis que la vérité morale en tant que franchise, véracité, loyauté est claire, manifeste, ouverte à tous et dévoilée -- la vérité rationnelle-cognitive, elle, est cachée, difficile à trouver, invisible et insaisissable, résidant dans les profondeurs. Une autre observation -- que je partage avec M. Detienne (*) -- c'est le fait que le domaine du Vrai et du Faux se trouve gouverné -- dans toute la poésie archaïque grecque -- par deux lois fondamentales -- celle de la contradiction et celle de l'ambiguïté -- autrement dit, que ces notions résident dans un couple de contraires antithétiques et complémentaires." pp. 88-89

(*) M. Detienne, Les maitres de vérité dans la Grèce archaique, Paris, 1967, p. 146.
Nagy Gregory. Pindar's Homer. The lyric possession of an epic past. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1990.
The Mar Flexner Lectures, 1982 Bryn Mawr College.
On Alétheia see pp. 58-71.
Ortega Alfonso, "Poesia y verdad en Pindaro," Helmantica 21: 253-272 (1970)

Poets of Alexandrine Age: Callimachus, Theocritus, Apollonius of Rhodes, Herondas

Giubilo Barbara, "L'Aletheia e i suoi sinonimi nella poesia alessandrina (Callimaco, Teocrito, Apollonio Rodio, Eronda)", 2007.
Tesi di Dottorato - Università di Roma "Tor Vergata".

Thucydides

Allison June. Word and concept in Thucydides. Atlanta: Scholars Press 1997.
On Alethéia see pp. 206-237.
Moles John L. Truth and untruth in Herodotus and Thucydides. In Lies and fiction in the Ancient world. Edited by Gill Christopher and Wiseman Timothy Peter. Exeter: University of Exter Press 1993. pp. 122-146
"In this discussion, I want to mediate between 'literary' and 'historical' approaches to the question, primarily through a close reading of the prefaces of Herodotus and Thucydides (presented in my own very literal, and sometimes controversial, translations). What emerges, I think, from the content and form of these programmatic statements is the way in which 'literary' and 'historical' objectives are alike present and deeply interfused.
On the one hand, both writers see themselves as inheritors of the tradition of epic narrative, especially as expressed in Homer's commemoration of a great war in the Iliad. Both writers also see themselves as developing the project built into Homer's poem (a project itself not without a certain 'historical' concern), namely that of analysing the causation and process of war and conflict, and of doing so by the invention of significant speeches and by the selection and presentation of concrete events. On the other hand, both writers also see themselves as engaged in a project which is distinctive from that of the poetic tradition in its attempt to establish factual truth and to distinguish this from factual 'untruth' or 'falsehood'.
Thucydides is more explicit about the nature and methodology of this project than Herodotus, and also about the kind of history (that is, primarily, recent history) in which this project can be pursued effectively. Indeed, in this respect especially, he presents himself as a critic, and rival, of Herodotus as well as a successor. But, in the prefaces of both historians, as in their full-scale narratives, we can recognize the combination of objectives (the perpetuation of epic narrative and interpretation and the innovative search for factual truth) that makes it so difficult to characterize their writings either in terms of 'literature' or 'history'. This combination also makes it difficult to characterize their work in terms of 'truth', 'falsehood' or 'fiction', though if we examine their own descriptions of their project, we have a better chance of seeing how these concepts match with theirs."
Romilly Jacqueline de. La construction de la vérité chez Thucydide. Paris: Juillard 1990.

Heraclitus

Texts:

Studies:

O'Meara Dominic. "Dire le vrai" chez Héraclite. In La verité. Antiquité - Modernité. Edited by Aenishanslin Jean-François, O'Meara Dominic, and Schüssler Ingeborg. Lausanne: Payot 2004. pp. 11-17

Parmenides

Texts:

Studies:

Germani Gloria, "Aletheie in Parmenide," La Parola del Passato 43: 177-206 (1988).
Mourelatos Alexander. The route of Parmenides. A study of word, image and argument in the fragments. New Haven: New Haven University Press 1970.
New, revised edition including a new introduction, three additional essays and a previously unpublished paper by Gregory Vlastos Names of Being in Parmenides - Las Vegas, Parmenides Publishing, 2008.

Classen Carl Joachim. Protagoras' Aletheia. In The Criterion of Truth. Essays written in honour of George Kerferd. Edited by Huby Pamela and Neal Gordon. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 1989. pp. 13-38

INDEX

Plato's Doctrine of Truth

Texts:

Studies:

Benardete Seth, "The Right, the True and the Beautiful," Glotta 41: 54-62 (1963).
Bury Robert Gregg. The Philebus of Plato. New York: Arno Press 1973.
Edited with introduction, notes and appendices (first edition 1897).
See Appendix F (on aletheia) pp. 201-211.
Casertano Giovanni. Paradigmi della verità in Platone. Roma : Editori Riuniti 2007.
Des Places Édouard, "La langue philosophique de Platon: le vocabulare de l'accès au savoir et de la science," Syculorum Gymnasium 16: 71-83 (1961).
Réimprimé dans: É. Des Places - Études plationiciennes 1929-1979 - Leiden, Brill, 1981 pp. 36-48 (sur alétheia pp. 44-46).
Fiorentino Fernando, "Il problema della verità in Platone," Sapienza 55: 3-38 (2002).
Frede Michael. Plato's Sophist on false statements. In The Cambridge companion to Plato. Edited by Kraut Richard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992. pp. 397-424
Gill Christopher. Plato on falsehood - not fiction. In Lies and fiction in the Ancient world. Edited by Gill Christopher and Wiseman Timothy Peter. Exeter: University of Exter Press 1993. pp. 88-121
"I begin by drawing three types of distinction between kinds of discourse. The first relates to the speaker's intended form of communication with a listener. This distinction involves two aspects: that between factual and fictional discourse, and that between forms of factual discourse. Factual discourse is intended either to convey to the listener what the speaker takes to be true ('veracious'), or to convey what the speaker takes to be false ('lying'). Fictional discourse is different in kind from factual: its statements (and other forms of expression) do not constitute truth- telling or lying, and in this sense fiction has no truth-status.
The second type of distinction differs from the first in that it characterizes discourse by reference to whether it is in fact true or false rather than whether the speaker intends to convey what he or she takes to be true or false.
The third type of distinction relates to the mode of expression. I have in mind such distinctions as that between analytic discourse and non-analytic (representative or narrative); between prosaic discourse (historical, philosophical) and poetic (epic, dramatic, lyric); between literal discourse and figurative (imagistic, musical); and between general and specific discourse. This type of distinction differs from the first two in several ways, notably in not designating truth-status in either of the senses involved in those distinctions. But I include this distinction here because the question of the truth-status of a given discourse is often connected closely with that of the mode of expression involved. Thus, for example, a given statement may be false (in intention or fact) on the literal level but true (in intention or fact) on the figurative level; or it may be false in a specific case but true in general. This is only the most obvious way in which the distinctions drawn in the first two types may be connected with those in the third type.
My claim is that these distinctions, while broadly intelligible to modern readers, do not correspond in one crucial respect to the conceptual framework presupposed by Plato. The distinction between factual and fictional discourse, which is familiar to us, has no obvious equivalent in Plato's framework." pp. 39-40
Guillamaud Patrice, "La doctrine de la vérité dans le Cratyle de Platon," Revue de l'Enseignement Philosophique 38: 1-9 (1987).
Hestir Blake, "A conception of truth in Republic V," History of Philosophy Quarterly 17: 311-332 (2000).
"Plato sometimes refers to truth (aletheia) as an object. The thesis of this paper is that Plato's "object" truth is being, an object of knowledge. I provide an examination of the difficult stretch of text at "Republic" V 476e-480a, where Plato argues for the separation of knowledge, belief, and ignorance with respect to their objects. Plato claims that knowledge is "set over" being, by which he means forms. Since philosophers are lovers of the sight of truth and Plato thinks that in one respect forms are truth, it follows that the being knowledge is set over is truth."
Hestir Blake, "A "conception" of truth in Plato's Sophist," Journal of the History of Philosophy 41: 1-24 (2003).
"Plato's solution to the problem of falsehood carries a notorious reputation which sometimes overshadows a variety of interesting developments in Plato's philosophy. One of the less-noted developments in the Sophist is a nascent conception of truth which casts truth as a particular relation between language and the world. Cornford and others take Plato's account of truth to involve something like correspondence; some find the origin of Aristotle's "correspondence" account of truth in Plato's Sophist. But all this assumes a lot about Plato, much less Aristotle. For one, it assumes that to claim that the statement 'Theaetetus is sitting' is true is to claim that it is true because it corresponds with the fact that Theaetetus is sitting. Other scholars have been reluctant to accept Cornford's view, but few offer any explanation of what sort of account of truth we might ascribe to Plato by the end of the Sophist. Tarski has argued that truth is a simpler notion than that of correspondence. In fact, he claims his own "conception" of truth is similar to the classical conception we find in Aristotle's Metaphysics-a conception of truth formulated in Greek in much the same way Plato formulates it in the Sophist. Unfortunately, Tarski never sufficiently explains what it is about the classical conception that makes it closer to his own. I argue that Tarski is generally right about the ancient conception of truth, but this is not to claim that Tarski's own conception is in Plato. By interpreting Plato's solution to the paradox of not being and his solution to the problem of falsehood, I argue that Plato's account of truth implies a simpler notion of truth than correspondence. I outline various types of correspondence theory and show that none of these fits what Plato says about truth, syntax, and meaning in the Sophist."
Hestir Blake, "Plato and the split personality of ontological Aletheia," Apeiron 37: 109-150 (2004).
"I argue that Plato conceives of truth in at least two distinct and fundamentally important ways: (T1) truth is simply that being or substance which he identifies as forms, and (T2) truth is the ontological stability of the forms which is the precondition for the forms being what they are insofar as they are forms and for each form having the particular F-property it has by virtue of itself, and which guarantees that each form will satisfy the Parmenidean requirements for knowledge. Plato's ontological truth has a split personality, the latter of which (T2) I argue has been misunderstood."
Jenks Rod. The contribution of Socratic method and Plato's theory of truth to Plato scholarship. Levinston: Edwin Mellen Press 2001.
Contents: 1. The problem of the Socratic method; 2. The Coherence Theory of Truth; 3. The Coherence Theory within the Platonic corpus; 4. Coherence and anamnesis; 5. Socratic ignorance and the Coherence Theory of Truth; 6. The uniqueness of the world; conclusion; Notes; Bibliography; Index.
Knight Thomas, "The Use of "Alétheia" for the "Truth of Unreason": Plato, the Septuagint, and Philo," American Journal of Philology 114: 581-609 (1993).
"Orthodoxy about the semantic evolution of Aletheia in the Hellenistic period represents Philo Judaeus and Plutarch as the non-Christian representatives of a line of development beginning in Plato (where Aletheia is said to denote abstract, conceptual Truth, 'die Wahrheit') (1) and ending in the sense of absolute truth, specifically 'the content of Christianity as absolute truth.' (2) The problem of such a stemma is that it fails to stand up to close inspection; the present study considers one of the circumstances under which 'truth' was equated with doctrinal content in the Hellenistic period. (3) Specifically, I undertake to demark the distinction between 'truth' as Philo Judaeus understands it from 'truth' as it is used by the philosophers who are his stylistic and intellectual models; I intend to show that Philo's notion of pure truth is not a natural semantic extension of Platonic (or even contemporary philosophic) usage, but is rather an expression of deeper cultural determinants." p. 581

(1) Bultmann, 'Alétheia.' The passages he cites here in support of this development (Plut. De Isid et Os. 351c, e, and Hierocles Carm. Aur. 21-23 Mullach) are far too late to represent the direct semantic development of Platonic usage of the term. The same objection holds for Bultmann's citation of Epictit. (Diss. 1.4, 31; 3.24, 40) for the extension of Alétheia into 'the sense of 'correct learning.' From these observations he proceeds into his second major heading in the discussion of the Classical and Hellenistic evolution of the word, 'The Usage of Dualism.' In this section he again fails to make the crucial distinction between fourth- and third-century (and later) usage.

(2) Bauer,Arndt, and Gingrich, Lexicon, s.v. 'Alétheia', cite Plutarch (Is. and Os. 351e) and Philo (Spec. Leg. 4.178, 'the proselyte is a metanastàs eis aletheian') as the non-Christian antecedents for Alétheia denoting 'the content of Christianity as absolute truth.'
Marcos De Pinotti Graciela, "La distinción Platónica entre episteme y doxa alethes a la luz del tratamiento del error (Teeteto 188 a-c)," Revista de Filosofia 2: 135-154 (1987).
Rankin H.D., "A-letheia in Plato," Glotta 41: 51-54 (1963).
Szaif Jan. Platons Begriff der Wahrheit. Freiburg / München: Verlag Karl Alber 1996.
Revised paperback edition 1998.
Szaif Jan, "Platon über Wahrheit und Kohärenz," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 82: 119-148 (2000).
"This article tries to explain how the concepts of truth and coherence feature in Plato's theory of knowledge. It sets out Plato's concept of coherence (homologia, symphonia) in connection with the methods of his dialectic, gives a critical assessment of the evidence for the foundationalist or intuitionist interpretations of his theory of knowledge, and tries to unearth the presuppositions that allow Plato to combine his specific criterion of coherence with the hard realism of his concept of truth."
Szaif Jan, "Sprache, Bedeutung, Wahrheit. Überlegungen zu Platon und seinem Dialog Kratylos," Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 26: 45-60 (2001).
Szaif Jan. Die Aletheia in Platons Tugendlehre. In La verité. Antiquité - Modernité. Edited by Aenishanslin Jean-François, O'Meara Dominic, and Schüssler Ingeborg. Lausanne: Payot 2004. pp. 19-45
Wolz Henry G., "Plato's doctrine of truth: orthótes or aletheia?," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27: 157-182 (1966).

INDEX

Aristotle's Definition of Truth

Texts:

Studies:

Caston Victor, "Commentary on Pritzl: Aristotle on the conditions of thought," Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 14: 202-211 (1998).
Crivelli Paolo, "Aristotle on the truth of utterances," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17: 37-56 (1999).
Crivelli Paolo. Aristotle on truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Notes on the text X; List of abbreviations of titles of Aristotle's works XI; Introduction 1; Part I. Bearers of truth or falsehood 45; 1. States of affairs. thoughts. and sentences 45; 2. Truth conditions for predicative assertions 77; 3. Truth conditions for existential assertions 99; Part II. 'Empty' terms 129; 4. Truth as correspondence129; 5. 'Vacuous' terms and 'empty' terms 152; Par III. Truth and time 183; 6. Truth and change 183; 7. Truth and determinism in De Interpretatione 9 198; Appendix I. Metaph. Theta 10 1051b 1: the text 234; Appendix 2. Metaph. Theta 10 1051b 2-3: the text 238; Appendix 3. Int. 7, 17b 16-18: the text 239; Appendix 4. The two place relations in Aristotle's definition of truth 254; Appendix 5. Aristotle's theory of truth for predicative assertions: formal presentation 258; Appendix 6. The failure of Bivalence for future-tense assertions formal presentation 266; References 284; Index of names 313; Index of subjects 319; Index of passages 321.
Fiorentino Fernando, "Il problema della verità in Aristotele," Sapienza 54: 257-302 (2001).
Pearson Giles, "Aristotle on Being-as-Truth," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 28 (2005).
Pritzl Kurt, "Being true in Aristotle's thinking," Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 14: 177-201 (1998).
Razzino Giuseppe, "Essere e verità in Aristotele. Una rilettura di E, 4 e Theta, 10 della Metafisica," Filosofia e Teologia 4: 84-97 (1990).
"The problem of the relation between the determinations of the concept of truth in the chapters E, 4 and Theta, 10 of Metaphysics in the modern exegesis has been prevalently framed in the distinction between a logical meaning and an ontological one of truth. In this article it is re-examined with reference to the strict connection between thought and being as a peculiar character of the Aristotelian (and generally Greek) thought of truth. The result is the character of arché and aitia of truth of asuntheton (as it presents itself in the noein) in relation to every determinable truth in the dianoein, and so the character of original foundation of the eidos, as it shows itself to the thought in the simplicity of the intellectual intuition."
Sonderegger Erwin. La vérité chez Aristote. In La verité. Antiquité - Modernité. Edited by Aenishanslin Jean-François, O'Meara Dominic, and Schüssler Ingeborg. Lausanne: Payot 2004. pp. 47-63
Tugendhat Ernst. Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Aristoteles. In Philosophische Aufsätze. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1992. pp. 251-260
Vigo Alejandro, "Die aristotelische Auffassung der praktischen Wahrheit," Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie 2: 285-308 (1998).
Wilpert Paul, "Zum aristotelischen Wahrheitsbegriff," Philosophische Jahrbuch 53: 3-16 (1940).
Wilpert Paul, "Die Wahrhaftigkeit in der aristotelischen Ethik," Philosophische Jahrbuch 53: 324-338 (1940).
Wolff Francis. Proposition, être et verité: Aristote ou Antisthène? In Théories de la phrase et de la proposition de Platon à Averroès. Edited by Büttgen Philippe, Diebler Stéphane, and Rashed Marwan. Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm / Presses de l'École normale supérieure 1999. pp. 43-63

INDEX

Epicureanism

Texts:

Studies:

Everson Stephen. Epicurus on the truth of the senses. In Epistemology. Companions to ancient thought. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990. pp. 161-183
Striker Gisela, "Epicurus on the truth of senses impressions," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 59: 125-142 (1977).
Reprinted in: G. Striker - Essays on Hellenistic epistemology and ethics - Cambridge, Cambridge Universipty Press, 1996, pp. 77-91

INDEX

Stoicism

Texts:

Studies:

Long Anthony Arthur. Language and thought in Stoicism. In Problems in Stoicism. Edited by Long Anthony Arthur. London: Athlone Press 1971. pp. 75-113
Long Anthony Arthur. The Stoic distinction between truth (aletheia) and the true (alethes). In Les Stoïciens et leur logique. Edited by Brunschwig Jacques. Paris: Vrin 2006. pp. 61-78
Second revised edition; first edition 1976.

INDEX

Scepticism

Texts:

Studies:

Groarke Leo. Greek Scepticism. Anti-Realist trends in ancient thought. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1990.
Long Anthony Arthur, "Sextus Empiricus on the criterion of truth," Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 25: 35-58 (1978).

INDEX

Neoplatonism

Texts:

Studies:

Beierwaltes Werner. Deus est veritas. Zur Rezeption des griechischen Wahrheitsbegriffes in der frühchristlichen Theologie. In Pietas. Festschrift für Bernhard Kotting. Edited by Dassmann Ernst. and Frank K.Suso. Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1979. pp. 15-29

INDEX

Cicero (106 BC - 43 BC)

Texts:

Studies:

Muchnova Dagmar, "Veritas dans les traités philosophiques de Marcus Tullius Cicéron," Graecolatina Pragensia 8: 41-51 (1980).
"L'examen des synonymes et antonymes et l'analyse de l'emploi de veritas, surtout du point de vue sémantique, montrent que Cicéron a contribué à la diffusion de ce terme, ainsi qu'à celle du mot verum, et qu'il les a enrichis d'un sens philosophique."