

## SUMMARY OF THE COMMENTARY ON CHAPTERS XII-XIV

The first text printed in the present volume contains the whole of Abailard's commentary on *De interpretatione* XII-XIV. Since *A* breaks off about half way through Abailard's introduction to chapters XII-XIII, our edition has a portion in common with Geyer's edition (pp. 483.30-497.20 = 3.1-29.15). The numbers in square brackets to be found in the following summary refer to the paragraphs into which we have divided the text.

The commentary on the three chapters includes: I. a treatise on modal propositions, introductory to chapters XII and XIII; II. the commentary on these two chapters, in which Aristotle deals with some problems arising out of modal propositions; III. the commentary on chapter XIV concerning contrary propositions.

## I. Abailard on modal propositions [1-93].

I. A. PRELIMINARIES [1-2]. – Why does Aristotle deal with modal propositions [1]. Modal and simple ('de puro inesse') propositions [2].

I. B. DIFFERENT MODES; ARISTOTLE'S FOUR MODES; THEIR RELEVANCE TO SUBJECT, PREDICATE, QUANTIFICATION, CONVERTIBILITY [3-17]. – Proper modes are adverbs which

determine verbs and answer the question 'how?' [3]. 'Possibly' (= '... can'), 'falsely' (= '... does not'), and 'truly' (= 'it is true that') are wrongly called modes by Aristotle because of their position in clauses [4-6]. Nominal ("casuales" = inflectable) modes which can be resolved into modal adverbs; four kinds of modes: "secundum sensum" (proper) and "secundum positionem", "adverbiales" and "casuales" [7]. Aristotle chose four modes related to each other by equipollence: 'possible' and 'necessary' (essentially different from each other), and 'impossible' and 'contingent' which can be reduced to 'possible' [8]. He chose nominal modes because they give rise to two negations and two affirmations, and to more uncertainty than adverbial modes: adverbial modes are always determinations of the predicate, while nominal modes are determinations of the predicate "secundum sensum", but are the whole predicate "secundum constructionem" (i.e. grammatically), the subject being in this case partly constituted by the modified verb [9-11]. Thus nominal modal propositions differ more than adverbial modal propositions from those "de puro inesse", and deserve, therefore, separate consideration [12]. – The proper, not the grammatical, subject of a nominal modal proposition can be quantified [13-14]; when dealing with mixed ("incisi") syllogisms, Aristotle does not consider as subject the grammatical subject [15]; nor are conversions (simple or by contraposition) of modal propositions comparable with those of simple propositions, unless the proper subject is used as their subject [16]. Conversions fail here, as in simple propositions, when an all-containing term is used; apparent failures suggested by other examples are due to fallacious arguments [17].

I. C. TWO ANALYSES OF MODAL PROPOSITIONS ("DE RE", I. E. "PER DIVISIONEM" OR "PERSONAL"; AND "DE

SENSU", I. E. "PER COMPOSITIONEM" OR "IMPERSONAL"); PROBLEMS ON IMPERSONAL PROPOSITIONS [18-32]. - Modal propositions can be analysed ("exponi") as saying something either of a thing ("de re") or of a sentence ("de sensu"): in the first case the subject consists of the word referring to the thing, and the predicate is compound (verb + mood), the thing thus being divided from the verb ("per divisionem"); in the second case the name of the thing plus the verb is the subject ("per compositionem"), and the mood is the predicate [18]; an example [19]. "De sensu" propositions are not really modal, cannot be quantified or properly converted, are impersonal and reducible to personal only in a clumsy way (while other impersonals can be reduced to personals) [20-22]. Propositions about necessity-of-not-being are convertible [23]. Limited application of Priscian's resolution of some impersonals into personals [24]. Usual conversions available for the clause-subject of modal impersonal propositions "de sensu" [25]. Impersonal propositions may seem not to allow the predicate to inhere in the subject, while this seems to be necessary for all predicates, as stated by Aristotle [26]; in fact this condition is valid for impersonals [27]. On the other hand, 'possible', 'necessary', 'true' etc., when making a proposition impersonal, do not name; 'est' itself may be impersonal (= 'possibile est') [28-29]. A really impersonal predication does not admit of universalization or particularization, and must be accompanied by infinitives [30]. Some adjectives used for impersonal propositions ('good', 'useful', etc.), though not predicating forms, still signify them, while 'possible' and 'necessary' only co-signify, and bring about a 'modus concipiendi' [31]. - Why is the subject of the infinitive in modal propositions in the accusative? Because the connection is not transitive (in Priscian's sense) [32].

I. D. EQUIPOLLENCE BETWEEN NON-QUANTIFIED MODAL PROPOSITIONS [33-39]. - Aristotle chose the modes most related to each other "de sensu" and "de re" [33]. Taken as "de sensu" each mode has one affirmation and one negation for each subject, and 'possible' implies 'not necessary' of the contrary, 'not possible' implies 'necessary' of the contrary [34]. Taken as "de re" there are twice as many affirmations and negations; their equipollences are set out in the Aristotelian table of the four orders [35], where every proposition in each order implies the other three [36-37], and different orders are bound together by definite rules [38]. Inference is here "secundum naturalem comitacionem", not "secundum consequentiam" [39].

I. E. EQUIPOLLENCE BETWEEN QUANTIFIED MODAL PROPOSITIONS [40-46]. - There are four affirmative and four negative quantified propositions "de re" for each mode and subject, distributed in eight orders of equipollence: four of universal, and four of particular propositions [40], each group of four having the same relation as the non-quantified orders [41]. Fallacies due to confusion between "de re" and "de sensu" in quantified propositions; some apparent failures in argumentations, and failures which are not peculiar to modal propositions [42-43]; similar failures in inferences [44-45]. Meaning ("intellectus") of propositions "de sensu" and "de re" is one and the same [46].

I. F. INFERENCE RELATIONS BETWEEN "DE RE" AND "DE SENSU" MODAL PROPOSITIONS [47-54]. - Affirmation or negation of 'possible' or 'impossible' "de sensu" implies the same "de re", not *vice versa* [47] (examples to the contrary are invalid [48-49]). Modals "de sensu" are different from modals with temporal determination [50]; reference to things changing with time leads to apparent

failure of inferences [51]. Other apparent failures exposed [52]. Affirmation (or negation) of 'necessary' "de sensu" implies affirmation (or negation) of 'necessary' "de re" [53]. Validity of inference from 'necesse non' to 'impossibile' [54].

I. G. MODAL PROPOSITIONS WITH DETERMINATIONS [55-93]. - "Determinatio intrasumpta" of a modal proposition is a clause with the same verb and subject as the proposition itself [55]; "extrasumpta" has a different verb [56]. Truth of determining clauses usually taken to be implied by truth of their modal propositions (unless both verbs are in the negative) [57-58]; Boethius confines this implication to "determinatio intrasumpta" [59]. A modal proposition of possibility with determination implies, but is not implied by, the same without determination; the other way round in the case of 'necessary' [60]. Modal propositions determined by 'dum...' analysed as hypothetical temporals (i. e. a true simple categorical plus a true modal for possibility; plus a false modal for necessity) [61], or as non-hypothetical compounds of two propositions, the second of them stating a fact [62]. 'Et' between two subject-infinitives either doubles the proposition or makes the two subjects to be one subject [63].

*A problem* [64-75]. - 'A is possible while A, and non-A' (allowing that 'A is always possible when non-A') seems to be absurd, because 'A and non-A' implies 'non-A' [64]. Real absurdity only for present infinitives (in a truly present-sense), not for omnitemporal infinitives [65-66]. That proposition is valid for a temporal 'dum' without the 'et'-value [67-68]. Difference between present and past or future [69]. 'Dum' after a future [70]. Uniqueness of present; what this implies for a determining clause [71-72]. Condition for accepting 'A is possible while non-A' when the argument is analysed into true consequences [73].

Possible application of the distinction between consequence "ex actu" and "ex natura" [74]. 'Ante' and 'post' in modal propositions [75].

*Necessity modals with determinations* [76-83]. - Three meanings of 'necessary': the true meaning occurs when 'necessary' is affected by the determination [76]. Comparison with 'possible', and apparently different behaviour of the two [77-78]. 'Necessary' implies "the contrary is impossible", and its determination implies the determination of the other, while 'possible' does not imply any real negation [79]. Modal determined necessity does not imply temporal necessity [80]. The 'et'-value, not the 'quando'-value, of 'dum' verifies a determined modal [81]. Difference between modals and temporals [82]. Modes make propositions true, sometimes with determinations, sometimes without them [83].

*Determined modals about 'not-being'* [84-86]. - If interpreted as temporal-hypothetical, they follow the pattern of those about 'being'; if as modal, the 'non' may or may not affect the determination together with the rest of the proposition [84-85]. This is true of 'necessary' and 'impossible' as well as of 'possible' [86].

*Inference and equipollence between determined modals* [87-93]. - The rules prove to be the same as for non-determined modals [87-90], with the possible exception of those determined by 'only' [91-92] (the rules may be somehow valid also in these cases [93]).

## II. Commentary on chapters XII-XIII, on modal propositions [94-198].

II. A. COMMENTARY ON CHAPTER XII: NEGATION OF MODAL PROPOSITIONS [94-129]. - Connection between this section of Aristotle's text with what precedes [94]. Summary of what follows [95].

*The general rule for making negative propositions* [96-106]. – The rule according to which ‘non-esse’ is the negation of ‘esse’ [96]. Right and wrong interpretation of the rule (‘non’ attached or not attached to copula) [97]. Aristotle provisionally does not distinguish between right and wrong interpretation, and gives indiscriminate examples [98] both with a simple [99] and a compound predicate [100]. How the ‘non’ can be put in the wrong place in compound predicates [101]. The right position of ‘non’, whatever the verb [102]. Aristotle consciously draws wrong conclusions on negation of ‘possible’: his words explained [103-105]. Connection between two passages [106].

*Wrong application of rule to ‘possible’ exposed* [107-115]. – ‘Possible esse’ and ‘non esse’ can both be true [107]. The fact that what is mentioned by the verb is not always actual allows the negative to be true [108-110]; but two contraries cannot be true together [111-112]. Analysis of Aristotle’s “syllogism.” about wrong application of rule [113-114]. Meaning of “impossibilis” [115].

*Proper negations of modal propositions* [116-129]. – Negation of ‘possible esse’: ‘non possibile esse’ [116]. Similarly for other modals [117]. This, because ‘non’ must always be attached to the predicate [118]. (Alternative meaning of “determinantes veritatem” [119]). To whatever part of the predicate the negation is attached, the whole proposition becomes negative [120]. ‘Possible non esse’ is affirmative; its negative is ‘non possibile non esse’ [121]. Connection between passages [122]. – Alternative interpretations of Aristotle’s account of relation between ‘possible est esse’ and ‘possible est non esse’ [123-124]. The rule applies to other modals [125-126]. The general rule for modals [127]. Explanation of Aristotle’s words [128-129].

II. B. COMMENTARY ON CHAPTER XIII: INFERENCES BETWEEN MODAL PROPOSITIONS [130-198]. – *Aristotle corrects wrong inferences between ‘possible’ and ‘necesse’* [130-160]. – Order of inferences set out by Aristotle for the purpose of criticizing it [130]. Connection between sections of Aristotle’s text: above and here Aristotle is concerned with correcting mistakes [131]. Details of Aristotle’s text [132]. ‘Possible’ and ‘necessary’ are contrarily equipollent, ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’, contradictorily [133]. Explanation of ‘contradictorily’ [134] and ‘contrarily’ [135]. Alternative meanings of “conversim” [136]. Relation between ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ explained and compared with relation between ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ [137-139]. Meaning of “extra” [140]. Aristotle’s arguments analysed and interpreted [141-145]. Express statement of fault in the order of inferences [146]. Connection of passages [147]. Logical analysis of Aristotle’s proof of inconsistency [148-151]. Discussion of the kind of syllogism used by Aristotle [152-153]. ‘Necesse est non esse’ and ‘necesse est esse’ do not follow ‘possible esse’ [154-155]; only ‘non possibile non esse’ follows it [156]. This can also be proved starting from ‘necesse est non esse’ [157-160].

*Doubts about implication of ‘possible’ by ‘necessary’* [161-166]. – Aristotle had used this implication in a previous argument: how can this agree with the ambivalence of ‘possible’ [161]. Connection with what precedes [162]. Two reasons for doubt: if ‘necessary’ does not imply ‘possible’, it should imply ‘not possible’ or ‘possible that not’; if it does imply ‘possible’, it should also imply ‘possible that not’ [163]. First reason justified: neither negative follows ‘necessary’ [164]. Second reason justified: ‘necessary’ cannot imply possibility of ‘non esse’ [165-166].

*Solution of doubts: meanings of ‘possible’* [167-198]. – ‘Necesse’ does imply ‘possible’, but ‘possible’ is not always ambivalent [167]. Connection between this text and

what precedes [168]. Justification of Aristotle's examples [169]. 'Possibile' classified into rational and irrational: 'possibile irrationale' is in some instances monovalent (only 'possibile esse') [170-172], while 'possibile rationale' is always ambivalent [173-174]. 'Possibilia irrationalia' which are always 'in actu' are monovalent, others are ambivalent [175-176]. Thus, the objection that 'necessary' would imply 'possibile non esse' is invalid [177]. Connection between passages [178]. Ambiguity of 'possibile': 'possibile actu nunc' and 'possibile forsitanum' [179-181]. Connection between passages [182]. Analysis of the passage [183]. 'Possibile forsitanum' is only in things that move [184-185]. 'Non impossibile' applies to both 'possibilia' [186]. 'Necesse' implies 'possibile' in movable things when they move 'actu' [187]. 'Necesse' implies 'possibile' in general, not in its entirety [188]. 'Possibile' is not equivocal: the whole of 'possibile' includes 'actu possibile' and 'forsitanum' [189]. 'Potestas' or 'possibilitas' do not refer to a form when they express modality [190]. The order of inferences should start from 'necessary' [191]. Connection between passages [192]. Reason for suggested precedence: necessity implies 'actu esse' and priority in value [193]. Explanation of 'more valuable' [194]. Things in act which never were possible-not-in-act (God, nous, matter), and things in act which were possible-not-in-act [195-196]. Nature, potency, time, act [197]. The always-not-actuals [198].

### III. Commentary on chapter XIV, on contrary propositions [199-270].

III. A. PRELIMINARIES [199-201]. - Two kinds of contrariety: Aristotle chooses the right kind [199]. Aristotle's diverging view in the *Categories* [200]. No connection with previous chapter. The right definition of 'contrary propositions' [201].

III. B. CONTRARY OPINIONS [202-263]. - Propositions signify opinions: these must be treated first [202]. Sequence in Aristotle's text [203]. Two contrary opinions can be both false, not both true [204]. Reason for dealing with opinions; explanation of 'affirmatio in voce' [205]. 'Opinion' used by Aristotle for 'intellectus' [206]. How opinions are going to be discussed [207]. This discussion takes up most of this chapter [208]. Which is the contrary of 'bonum est bonum': 'bonum non est bonum' or 'bonum est malum' [209]. Immediate and mediate contraries in propositions and opinions [210]. Connection between passages [211]. Contrary opinions are not opinions about contraries [212] because these might both be true [213]. Connection between passages [214-215]. Opinions about contraries are contrary in a sense: they are each contrary to their negatives [216]. Contrary opinions are those which opine the contrary about the same thing [217]. Exclusion of other possibilities of contrariety in opinions [218]. Contrariety is found where there is falsity, from which truth is generated [219]. Explanation of 'generatio' [220]. What Boethius calls 'prima fallacia' is found in negatives [221]; this explains Aristotle [222]. Other possible explanations of "prima fallacia": falsity *par excellence*; 'per se' and 'per accidens' applied to 'true' and 'false' [223-226]. Contrariety of opinions appears from contrariety of their forms [227]. The two syllogisms in Aristotle's argumentation [228-230]. Literal analysis [231-234]. Connection between passages [235]. End of analysis [236]. Contrariety based on extreme difference [237]. Aristotle's new argument based on 'more contrary' [238]. Connection between passages [239]. Relationship between real and apparent contrariety [240]: the first does not imply the second [241]. Confirmation of views on contrariety from other instances [242]. Analysis of Aristotle's argument [243-245]. Proportion confirming definition of contraries

[246-247]. Search for the opinion contrary to a true opinion about a negative [248]. An apparent contrary excluded [249]. (Explanation of 'dicere' as applied to 'opinio' [250]). That apparent contrary can be true together with what it is supposed to be contrary to [251-253]. Another apparent contrary excluded for the same reason [254-255]. True contrary found [256], confirming previous account [257]. From indefinites to universals [258]. Connection between passages [259]. Negative universal is contrary to affirmative universal [260-261]; why [262]. This also applies to opinions about a negative [263].

III. C. CONTRARY PROPOSITIONS [264-270]. - What applies to opinions applies to propositions: these reflect what goes on in the mind [264]. Explanation of "affirmatio, negatio in voce"; Aristotle's specification "universalis" [265]. Contraries distinguished from contradictories [266]. Connection between passages [267]. True propositions cannot be contrary to each other: why [268]. Sequence of the text [269]. Aristotle's argument [270].