Bhartṛhari, Grammarian-Philosopher. Annotated bibliography of the studies in English

Last update: August 18th, 2022

by Raul Corazzon

website: https://www.historyoflogic.com

e-mail: rc@ontology.co

Bibliography on Bhartrhari, grammarian-philosopher

Contents

This part of the section Intercultural logic includes the following pages:

Ancient Chinese Logic (a survey of contemporary studies)

Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient China A - F

Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient China G - Z

Ancient Indian Logic and Ontology

Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient India A - L

Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient India M - Z

Bibliography on the Indian grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari A-Cha (Current page)

Bibliography on the Indian grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari Cow-Hon

Bibliography on the Indian grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari Hou-Oet

Bibliography on the Indian grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari Par-Z

Bibliographie sur le grammarien-philosophe Indien Bhartrhari

Bibliography on the Indian logician Gaṅgeśa

Buddhist Logic and Ontology. Indian and Tibetan developments

Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient Buddhism

Bibliography on the Buddhist logician Dignāga

Bibliography on the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti

Bibliography on the Buddhist logician Nāgārjuna

Islamic (Arabic and Persian) Logic and Ontology

Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient Islam

Bibliography (Studies in English)

1.   Akamatsu, Akihiko. 1993. "*Pratibhā* and the meaning of the sentence in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* no. 47:37-43. Reprinted in Saroja Bhate, Johannes Bronkhorst (eds.), *Bhartṛhari, Philosopher and Grammarian*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1994, pp. 37-44.

   "In the second book of the Vākyapadīya (VP), Bhartṛhari sets forth a theory that pratibhä 'intuition' or 'flash of understanding' is the meaning of the sentence (väkyärtha). He discusses the issue of pratibhä in kärikäs 2.143-152. The first kärikä of this section is as follows:

   When we understand the meanings [of the individual words in a sentence] by discriminating them from each other, there arises flash of understanding (pratibhä) which is totally different [from every knowledge of the meanings of the words]. We call that [*pratibhä*], caused by the meanings of the words, the meaning of the sentence.

   As a beginning, by placing this statement in the philosophical and historical context about the linguistic theory in India, I will reconsider the reason Bhartrhari introduced the concept of pratibhä into his linguistic theory." (p. 37, sanskrit text omitted)

2.   ———. 1999. "The Two Kinds of *Anumāna* in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 27:17-22.

   "The aim of the present paper is to make clear how Bhartṛhari characterized inference (*anumāna*) when he put forward the two kinds of *anumāna*. The problem of *anumāna* may not be important for Bhartṛhari.

   Although it is evident that he counted *anumāna* among the *pramāṇas*,(9) he considered it as indirect and incomplete cognition in comparison with *agama*. Accordingly it is useless to attempt to estimate his view in the history of Indian logic. Finally, however, we can ask the following question: From where did Bhartṛhari borrow the twofold distinction of *anumāna*?

   As is well known, Bhartṛhari lived and worked before Dignāga and Praśastapāda. Now we must recall a passage of Dignāga translated by Frauwallner (1968). It runs as follows: "Der Vṛttikāra [= Bhavadāsa] vertritt im allgemeinen die Lehre des Vaiśeṣika von der Schlußfolgerung, da er Sehen (*dṛṣṭam*) und Sehen dem Gemeinsamen nach (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*) usw. unterscheidet" (p. 87). It is probable that Bhartṛhari also borrowed the view on the two kinds of *anumāna* from the early Vaiśeṣika system. Bronkhorst (1993) has noted some possible links between Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and the early Vaiśeṣika; we can see the same possibility in Bhartṛhari's view on *anumāna*." (p.20)

   (9) Cf. Aklujkar (1989).

   References

   Aklujkar, Ashok (1989). 'The Number of Praman. as according to Bhartṛhari, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 33: 151–158.

   Bronkhorst, Johannes (1993). 'Studies on Bhartrari, 5: Bhartṛhari and Vaiśeṣika', Asiatische Studien/ Études Asiatiques XLVII–1: 75–94.

   Frauwallner, E. (1958). 'Die Erkenntnislehre Klassischen Sāmkhya Systems', Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd– und Ostasiens 2: 84–139

3.   Aklujkar, Ashok. 1969. "Two Textual Studies of Bhartṛhari." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* no. 89:547-563.

   Abstract: "The first half of the article discusses the range of reference and the significance of the title *Vākyapadīya*. It is argued that the title was originally given to the first two books only of Bhartṛhari's monumental work and that the word

"Vākyapadīya" has been explained moreprecisely by ancient writers than is generally supposed. In the second half, the article points out how the published parts of Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa* contain a number of borrowings from Bhartṛhari's partly *vṛtti* of the *Vākyakāṇḍā*, and how the discovery is significant for a textual study of both the works, the manuscript material for which is extremely insufficient."

4.   ———. 1970. *The Philosophy of Bhartṛhari's Trikāṇḍi.*
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
"My completed dissertation could have been published in Professor Matilal's then newly established *Journal of Indian Philosophy.* However, Professor Matilal did not think he could publish the whole dissertation together in one issue, and, in my view, on the other hand, the chapters of the dissertation were too interdependent to withstand segmented publication. Thus, it remained unpublished. I did not make any effort to have it published elsewhere either, for by that time almost every established scholar who was known to be interested in B [= Bhartṛhari] had either read it or had acquired a photocopy of it and I had moved on to (or returned to) an activity I had deliberately suspended to complete the dissertation, namely the activity of settling the TK [= Trikāṇḍi] text. Recently, I have once again been advised by kind colleagues in the field that I should do the minimally necessary revision and have the dissertation published. But now it seems wasteful to publish it without coordinating the textual references with the better or more convenient editions I think I will be able to finish in the next few years." (A. Aklujkar, *An Introduction to the Study of Bhartṛhari,* (1993), pp. 12-13)

5.   ———. 1971. "Nakamura on Bhartṛhari." *Indo-Iranian Journal*:161-175.
"An article by Professor Hajime Nakamura, "Bhartṛhari The Scholar", was published in the fourth volume of the *Indo-Iranian Journal* (1960: 282-305). That article was a revised translation of a part of Nakamura's *Kotoba no Keijijogaku,* which is regarded by many scholars to be Nakamura's important contribution to the study of Vedānta in general and to Bhartṛhari studies in particular. Naturally I was very surprised to find in it, as I shall presently demonstrate, a large number of inaccurate translations, remarks, conclusions, and comparisons. My purpose in demonstrating what I consider to be Nakamura's mistakes is, of course, purely that of *śāstra-śuddhi* "purification of a branch of learning"; the positive aspects of the present article, namely the correct translations of some of the key verses in Bhartṛhari's *Trikāṇḍi* (1) (*TK* in abbreviation) and a correct understanding of Bhartṛhari's position, are more important in my view than the refutation of the contents of Nakamura's article." (p. 161, anote omitted)
(1) (a) It is generally believed that the title of the work to which I refer as the *Trikāṇḍi* is *Vākyapadīya*. In a recent article (Aklujkar, 1969: 547-555), I have argued that *Vākyapadīya* was originally the title of only the first two books of Bhartṛhari's magnum opus and that *Trikāṇḍi* liis th only ancient name that can refer to the work under study as a whole. (b) Some scholars advocate the view that the composition referred to as *Vṛtti* (as *V* in abbreviation) is not Bhartrhari's work and that it is much later than the verses (*kārikā*) which alone form the genuine *TK*. I see absolutely no reason to subscribe to this view. In my paper, "Authorship of the *Vākyapadīya-vṛtti* ", read at the annual meeting of the American Oriental Society (1969) (to appear in *Wiener Zeitsschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*, vol. xvi, May 1972), I have exposed the weaknesses of the arguments on which this view is based, and I have shown with unmistakable internal evidence that the traditional ascription of the *V* to Bhartṛhari cannot be doubted by any unprejudiced mind."

6.   ———. 1972. "The Authorship of the Vākyapadīya-Vṛtti." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* no. 15:181-198.
"1.1 It has been a long tradition in India to ascribe the Vṛtti (*V* in abbreviation) of the first two kāṇḍas of the Trikāṇḍi to Bhartṛhari and to accept it as an integral part of the Vakyapadiya."
(...)

"1. 2 Under these circumstances, any doubt about Bhartṛhari's authorship of the *V* may seem highly improbable; but, today, all scholars who are interested in the Trikāṇḍi, as far as I know, entertain such a doubt. Their uncertainty of opinion usually begins when they realize that the *V* occasionally gives two or more interpretations of one verse (kārikā). Then this uncertainty is deepened either by the occurrence in the *V* of the word *tatra-lihavat*, which, in the usage of some ancient authors, serves as Bhartṛhari's epithet, in a manner indicating reference to a person other than the author (S. Iyer 1965: >xxxi-xxxii), or by a feeling that some divergence of views exists between the *V* and thekārikā-text (Bi8ardeau 1964a: 5-21 (summarized by S. Yier 1965: xxxiii-xxxiv), 1964b: 260). But doubtful as they may be, no scholar except Madeleine Biardeau is known to me who has declared the traditional authorship of the *V* to be ill-founded and incorrect. Biardeau has gone beyond the range of uncertainty about the validity of the tradition and reached the conclusion that the *V* cannot be a work of Bhartrhari, that it must have been written by Hari Vṛṣabha sometime after Kumarila, and that the tradition accepted it as Bhartrhari's work through a confusion of names.
1.3 The purpose of the present article is to refute this conclusion.
Not only do I uphold the validity of the traditional ascription, but I also maintain that the *V* is an inseparable part of the Vākyapadīya and that it is wrong to think of the Vākyapadīya as a work consisting of *kārikās* only. Now, there are two ways of establishing this thesis, one negative and another positive. The negative way consists in challenging Biardeau's method of solving the problem of authorship, in pointing out the difficulties to which her conclusion leads, and in demonstrating that the divergences which she notices between the views and use of terms in the *V* on the one hand, and in the *karikas* on the other, are superfluous and that some of her interpretations are inaccurate. I have followed this way in a forthcoming sequel article, and hence it would be proper to devote the present article to a positive demonstration of Bhartṛhari's authorship of the *V*." (pp. 181-185, notes omitted)

7.   ———. 1974. "The Authorship of the Vākya-kānda-tīkā." In *Charudeva Shastri Felicitation Volume*, 165-188. Delhi: Charu Deva Shastri Felicitation Committee.
"1.1 Since the date of its publication (1887) in the Benares Sanskrit Series, the *ṭikā* on the verses of the second book of Bhartṛhari's *Trikāṇḍi* or *Vākyapadīya* (Aklujkar 1969: 547-555) has been ascribed to Punya-rāja. A few scholars (e.g. Kosambi 1945:65.9-10, ft7.7-9: Bhattacharya 1954:4-5) have given the name of the author of this commentary as Helā-rāja, but that is obviously due to oversight and is not intended to be a deliberately reached conclusion regarding the authorship of the work. Thus, on the whole, the ascription to Punya-rāja has gone unchallenged in the writings of the compilers of manuscript catalogues, of the editors of Bhartṛhari's works, of the scholars working on Bhartṛhari's views and of the historians of Sanskrit grammar. However, it seems likely to me that a serious mistake has been made in deciding the problem of authorship in this case and that the Vakya-kāṇḍa-ṭikā is more likely to be a work of Helā-rāja, the well-known commentator of the third book of the *Trikāṇḍi*, than of Punya-rāja. The evidence favouring this view is manifold and considerably strong when taken cumulatively." (pp. 165-166, notes omitted)
References
Aklujkar, Ashok. 1969. "Two Textual Studies of Bhartṛhari." *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, S9:547-63. 'New Haven.
Bhattacharya, Ram Shankar. 1954. "A New Verse of the Saṁgraha." *Poona Orientalist*, 19:4-5. Poona.
Kosambi, D. D. 1945. "The Authorship of the Śataka-trayi" *Journal of Oriental Research*, 15:64-17. Madras.

8.   ———. 1977-78. "The concluding verses of Bhartṛhari's 'Vākya-kāṇḍa'." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* no. 58-59:9-26.
"In this paper I wish to offer some observations on verses 481-490 (1) appearing at the end of the second book of Bhartṛhari's *Trikãndi* or *Vākyapadīya.*
(,,,)

My objective here is neither to review what has been said about them, nor to pronounce judgements on all the controversies they have given rise to. I wish rather to put forward a few considerations that have not so far appeared in print and to refute a few interpretations that have so far gone unrefuted." (p. 9)

(1) (a) In the present and following publications I shall follow Rau's (1977) enumeration of the Trikãndi kãrikãs. It is the only flawless enumeration we have at present that enables us to refer to a tradition of the Trikãndi text (the kãrikã manuscript tradition) in a form determined by objective textual criticism. It will be highly convenient if the Trikãndi text as preserved in the other (Vṛtti and Tīkā) traditions is critically established by following Rau's enumeration. This I advocate simply as a procedure that facilitate future text-critical research concerning Bhartṛhari. I do not hold that the kãrikã manuscripts give us the oldest accessible form of the Trikãndi text. See Aklujkar 1971, 1978.

(b) The text of verses 481-490 given below is based on a consideration of all known manuscript traditions. In the case of kãrikã manuscripts I have simply followed Rau's lead. It is only the collection and evalution of the evidence of the Vṛtti and Tīkā manuscripts that I have freshly attempted.

[Note added by R. Corazzon: in the English translation by K. A. Subramania Iyer, *The Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari. Chapter II*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1977, the verses are numbered 476-485, pp. 203-205]

9.   ———. 1982. "Interpreting Vakyapadiya 2.486 Historically (Part 1)." In *Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja Felicitation Volume*, 581-601. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre.

"The verse I propose to discuss (*parvatād āgamaṃ, labdhvā bhāsya-bijānusāribhiḥ/ sa nīto bahu-śakhatvaṃ candrācāryādibjiḥ punah//*) [*] is a part of the ten epilogue type· verses found at the end of the Vākya-kānda or second book of *Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya* or *Trikāṇḍi*.(1)

l have argued elsewhere (Aklujkar 1978:9-26) that the ten verses were not written by Bhartṛhari but by a student of his. However, this does hot diminish the historical importance of the verses, for they remain almost as ancient as they have been thought to be. Secondly, acceptance of my view on the authorship of the verses is not a presupposition underlying the points I wish to make in this article. As far as I can see, the observations I offer below are logically independent of the problem of authorship." (pp. 581-582)

In referring to the *Vākyapadīya*/*Trikāṇḍi*. verses I have followed the enumeration in Rau 1977.

(1) Eight of these verses are directly or indirectly relevant to the following discussion. They are given below for easy reference: [the author cite the verses in sanskrit, I give the translation by K. A. Subramania Iyer, *The Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari. Chapter II*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1977, verse 476-483, pp. 203-204 [Rau numeration is given in parenthesis):]

476. [481] After the *Saṅgraha* declined when it came into the hands of Grammarians who were fond of abridgements and had acquired only little knowledge.

[The *Saṅgraha* is mentioned in the *Mahābhāṣya*, I. p.6.1.12

We are told that there the question whether the word is eternal or only an effect is discussed as one of the main topics.

Commenting on this, Bhartṛhari says in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya that there were 14 000 topics discussed in the *Saṅgraha*: *Caturdaśa sahasrāṇi vastūni asmin saṃgrahagranthe* (M. Bhā. dīpikā, p. 21, 1. 4-5. B. O. R. I. Post Graduate and Research Department Series no. 8.)]

477. [482] And when the Master Patañjali who knew all the traditions (*tīrtha-darśinā*) had incorporated into his Mahābhāṣya all the arguments and principles.

478. [483] It was found that those who were not sufficiently equipped (*akṛtabuddhīnām*) could not arrive at proper decisions while studying that work at once bottomless because of its depth and clear because of its lucidity.

479. [484] When that sacred work which was an epitome of the *Saṅgraha* was ruined by Baiji, Saubhava and Haryakṣa who merely followed dry reasoning.
480. [485] The Grammatical Tradition slipped away from the hands of the disciples of Patañjali and in time the mere text of it survived in the South.
481. [486] Then Ācārya Candra and other followers of the principles of the Bhāṣya obtained the true Tradition from the mountain and elaborated it into many branches.
482. [487] After mastering those principles and cultivating his own discipline this collection of traditions was composed by our Teacher.
483. [488] Here only the gist of a few of those traditions is given. In the third *Kāṇḍa*, there wiil be full discussion.
References
Aklujkar, Ashok. 1978. The concluding verses of Bhartṛhari's Vākya-kāṇḍa. *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Diamond Jubilee Volume, pp. 9-26.
Rau, Wilhelm. 1977. (Ed.) *Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya (mula-karikas).* Monograph Series of the Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, no. 42, 4. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.

10.   ———. 1982. "Interpreting Vakyapadiya 2.486 Historically (Part 2)." In *Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday*, edited by Hercus, Luise Anna, 1-10. Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies.
"In the first part of this article, to be published in the Dr K. Kunjunni Raja Felicitation Volume, I have pointed out, among other things, that the explanation of *parvatād āgamaṃ, labdhvā bhāsya-bijānusāribhiḥ// sa nīto bahu-śakhatvaṃ candrācāryādibjiḥ punahIi* II given in Puṇyarāja's or Helārāja's Tīkā is contextually unjustifiable. In the present part I wish to analyse the Tīkā explanation further to establish its mythic character and to account for its acquisition of that character.(...) (1)" (p. 1)
(1) An English summary of the Tīkā explanation is given in section 2.5 of the first part of this article. The aspects in which the Tīkā explanation appears hazy and hesitant are clarified in a footnote to that section.
[From the section 2. 5 of the first part of this article:
"According to it [the Tīkā], what happened in the history of Pāṇinian grammar was essentially this: Because of the peculiar style of the *Mahābhāṣya* and because of the insensitive interpretations· advanced by Vaiji and others, the successors of Pataṇjali lost the knowledge of what Pataṇjali actually wished to say and what Pataṇjali accepted as *siddhānta.* This knowledge was no longer a part of their living tradition of study and was preserved only in manuscripts among the Southerners.
Candrācārya and others again gave it currency in a much developed form, once they came in possession of the *mūla-bhūta vyākaraṇāgama*. In other words, although the *Tīka* seems hesistant and hazy it probably visualizes the relevant happenings as follows: Candrācārya and others got hold of the essential, most fundamental, body of Vayākaraṇa doctrines.
They studied the intimations in the *Mahābhāṣya* on the background of these doctrines; they used the principles implicit in Pataṇjali's statements to provide flesh to the skeleton they had received. This activity enabled them to make current once again a multifaceted, robust tradition of Vayākaraṇa views." (pp. 588-569, a note omitted)

11.   ———. 1989. "The Number of *Pramāṇas* According to Bhartṛhari." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* no. 33:151-158.
"In an article entitled "*prāmāṇya* in the philosophy of the Grammarians", expected to be published in the near future,[*] I have tried to explain the distinctive nature of the view of *prāmāṇya* or 'validity of the means of cognition' which the Grammarians or Vaiyākaraṇas held.
I have pointed out in that article that whereas most other traditions of Indian philosophy, knowingly or unknowingly, emphasized the separability of the means of cognition (*pratyakṣa* 'perception', *anumāna* 'inference', etc.), the Gram-marian-philosophers like Bhartṛhari ("B" in abbreviation) played down the separability of

the means and looked upon them as functioning conjointly(1). In particular, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* work on the backdrop of *āgama*, and *āgama* changes, usually gradually, in the light of the knowledge received through *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. This is so because the Grammarian's idea of *āgama* was significantly different, which, in turn, was due mostly to his four-fold or multi-level concept of language and his awareness of the centrality of language in our experience of the world." (pp. 151-162)

[*] "Prāmāṇya in the philosophy of the grammarians", in Avinandra Kumar et al. (eds.), Studies in Indology. Prof. Rasik Vihari Joshi Felicitation Volume, Delhi: Shree Publishing House 1989, pp. 15-28.

(1) This is not to say that Indian philosophers of other persuasions are not aware of the mutual dependence or limitations of *prāmāṇas*. They too would readily concede that an *anumāna* is not valid if it is vitiated by a perception, that the perception of a rope as a snake should be rejected if one can infer at a later momerit the real nature of the object, and that one cannot assert that fire does not burn simply because a reliable text or person says so. What I have in mind here is not invalidation or delimitation that obtains after the operation of a *prāmāṇa*. My remark has rather to do with what takes place while a *prāmāṇa* is in operation: The Grammarian school is unlike the other schools of Indian philosophy in accepting at that point the penetration of (what is considered to be) the domain of one *prāmāṇa* by (what is considered to be) the domain of another *prāmāṇa*. While the Buddhist thinkers like Dignāga avoid such overlapping of *prāmāṇas* by restricting the object of *pratyakṣa* (to *svalakṣaṇa*, i.e, by redefining *pratyakṣa*), the Grammarians accept the overlapping as an unavoidable fact of life and view the operations of (so-called separate) *prāmāṇas* as basically complex."

12.   ———. 1990. "Introduction and Summary of the First Two Books of the Vākyapadīya." In *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 5: The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, edited by Coward, Harold G. and Raja, Kuniunni, 121-153. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

"As with many great figures of classical times in India, a large number of works have been attributed to Bhartṛhari, and once again current scholarship has hardly settled all questions concerning the authenticity of some of these claims. By definition, the Bhartṛhari we are speaking of is the author of the work that is regularly referred to as the *Vākyapadīya*, a seminal work on Grammar and grammatical philosophy the influence of which, though difficult to calculate precisely, is certainly considerable in subsequent philosophical developments, both within Grammar and outside it. This work has three chapters, and it was more properly termed *Trikāṇḍī* on that account. Ashok Aklujkar has argued that only the first two chapters constitute the *Vākyapadīya*.

It seems likely that Bhartṛhari also composed th e commentary called *vṛtti* on at least the first two chapters of the *Trikāṇḍī*. Beside this body of literature—verses and prose commentary—Bhartṛhari apparently also wrote a commentary—or part of one— on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*.

Again, the proper title is a matter of discussion: Aklujkar points out that the title *Tripādi* for it has extensive sanction among early commentators in the grammatical tradition , while the title under which it is frequently known nowadays, *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā,* has only one manuscript mention in its favor. No doubt the work is referred to regularly as a ṭikā on the *Mahābhāṣya*. It seems likely that it was a lengthy work, perhaps covering the entire scope of Patañjali's masterpiece, though only a small portion is now available." (pp. 121-122, a note omitted)

13.   ———. 1990. "Summary of the Third Book of the Vākyapadīya." In *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 5: The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, edited by Coward, Harold G. and Raja, Kuniunni, 153-172. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. In collaboratio with Karl. H. Potter.
"1. On Universal Property (*Jātisamuddeśa*)
1-5 (E58; Tl-9). Words abstracted from sentences have been regard ed as falling into two (noun, verb), four (with the addition of prepositions and particles) or five

(with the addition of postpositions) categories. In the analysis into word meanings there are said to be two eternal word meanings for all language (or linguistic forms), namely universal and particular. Sometimes the particular as characterized by the universal of its class is intended, and sometunes without such a characterization." (p. 153)

14.　　———. 1991. "Interpreting Vakyapadiya 2.486 Historically (Part 3)." In *Paninian Studies: Professor S. D. Joshi Felicitation Volume*, edited by Deshpande, Madhav and Bhate, Saroja, 1-48. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
"Vākyapadīya (VP in abbreviation) 2.486, the first word of which I intend to discuss here, runs thus:
parvatād āgamaṃ, labdhvā bhāsya-bijānusāribhiḥ/ sa nīto bahu-śakhatvaṃ candrācāryādibjiḥ punah//
The question of the precise import of this verse has given rise to a substantial body of literature extending over 125 years (Aklujkar 1978:9). As I have already examined this literature directly and indirectly in the publications mentioned above, I shall merely state here that I prefer to translate the verse along the following lines: 'Having acquired the traditional knowledge from parvata, Candrācārya and others, who followed the indications in the *Bhāṣia*, again made it (i.e., the traditional knowledge) many-branched'. I should also clarify that in my view, as argued in the 1978 article, the verse was probably authored by a student of Bhartṛhari (B in abbreviation) and not by B as has been commonly supposed.
Although parvata is a common Sanskrit word with 'mountain, mountain range' as its definite meaning and it would not be incompatible in that meaning with the other words of VP 2.486, it has caused much reflection on the part of scholars." (pp. 1-2)

15.　　———. 1993. "An Introduction to the Study of Bhartṛhari." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* no. 47:7-36.
Reprinted in Saroja Bhate, Johannes Bronkhorst (eds.), *Bhartṛhari, Philosopher and Grammarian*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1994, pp. 7-36.
"My lecture has been described as introductory and to some extent it *will* be introductory. However, please note that it will not be introductory in the sense of a presentation proceeding on the assumption that the audience knows nothing or little about Bhartṛhari (hereafter abbreviated to "B") and the works associated with him and hence the principle goal should be to give to the audience some very basic or preliminary information in that regard. Rather, I am principally going to talk about what research has achieved so far, what parameters are emerging, and what we could expect in the future. From the obseivations made along these lines and the information given in the appendix, it should be possible for you to infer, if you do not already know, what basic factual information and surmises made by scholars there are regarding B, his works, and his commentators." (p. 8)

16.　　———. 1993. "Once Again on the Authorship of the Trikāndī-Vṛtti." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* no. 47:45-57.
Reprinted in Saroja Bhate, Johannes Bronkhorst (eds.), *Bhartṛhari, Philosopher and Grammarian*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1994, pp. 45-58.
"I keep an open mind on the issue of the authorship of the Vṛtti (hereafter "V" in abbreviation) of the first two kāṇḍas of the Trikāndī (abbreviated to "TK" in the following lines) or Vākyapadīya. My interest is not in arguing for a position by implicitly assuming the adversarial system analogous to that of the British or North American judiciary. That is why when I discussed the problem in 1972 I tried to consider in as much detail as possible all the pieces of evidence that had the potential to disturb the traditional authorship of the V. For example, I collected all cases of double or multiple glossing in the V and attempted to determine if each of them indicated alternative possibilities of meaning entertained by an uncertain commentator or whether the different glosses were in fact intended by the kārikā author - whether what we had in front of us were, in effect, cases of sophisticated *śāstra* punning. In the end, the time-consuming investigation I invited upon myself revealed that the latter indeed was the case. Wherever we had more than one

explanation given for a kārikā expression, the content of each explanation was acceptable to the kārikā author on some level or in some specific context. The alternative explanations could not be thought of as signs of uncertainty of understanding and thus be an evidence of the V author's difference from the kārikā author." (p. 45)

17.   ———. 2000. "The Epistemological Point of View of Bhartṛhari." In *Concept of Knowledge: East and West*, edited by Shaw, J. L. , 1-19. Calcutta: Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture.
§S.1 In the preceding, I have implicitly made a distinction between B [= Bhartṛhari] as a philosopher (in our most prevalent contemporary Western sense of the term) and as a religious thinker. What that distinction suggests is that B, as a philosopher, need not be seen as needing the concept of *mokṣa* or, to use his expression in Vṛtti 1.5, of *brahmaṇaḥ prāptiḥ* or the other elements of his philosophy to stand. Another implication of what I have said so far is that there are levels in B's ontology and they are related to his roles as a thinker. As a Grammarian or Vaiyākaraṇa, he accepts as existing everything that words can denote (even 'hare's horn' is deemed to exist from the Grammarian's perspective).(24) As a philosopher, he admits only the physical things and the language principle as truly existing. Everything else is seen as inseparable from either the things or the principle (time and space, as capacities of the latter, are inseparable from it; all other entities such as qualities, universals, etc. have no separate existence from substance).
And as a religious thinker, he entertains the possibility that his philosophical ontic world could be superseded by one in which the language principle alone remains. The assumption then is that a person can reach a certain stage in which his mind (= *buddhi*, *paśyantī*) is divested of diversity and he 'becomes' the language principle.
§S .2 The distinction between B's roles as a Grammarian thinker and as a non-Grammarian thinker is conveyed by the remarks of his ancient commentators, particularly the remarks of Helā-rāja. The differentiation between a *śabda-pramāṇaka* ontology and a *non-śabda-pramāṇaka* (in effect, corresponding to our philosophical) ontology, which Helā-rāja makes, has support in B's remarks. That the *non-śabda-pramāṇaka* ontology is not explicitly characterized as philosophical or is not further divided into philosophical and religious is due to the absence of distinctive terminology for philosophy and religion in the Indian tradition." (p. 11, three notes omitted)
(24) Compare Quine's procedure of beginning the investigation of what exists with the position 'everything.'

18.   ———. 2001. "The Word *is* the World: Nondualism in Indian Philosophy of Language." *Philosophy East and West* no. 51:452-473.
"Bhartṛhari the Grammarian-Philosopher most eligible for attributing the view "the word is the world," lived sometime around A.D. 425-450, if not earlier. In the current state of our resources, he can be viewed as the originator of the view, although it is clear from his major surviving work, the *Trikāṇḍī* or *Vākyapadīya*, that the view must have preceded him by quite some time, probably many centuries, in several important details if not in its entirety. The argumentation in support of the view, as distinct from the statement of the view, is at present found for the first time only in Bhartṛhari's incompletely preserved *magnum opus*, albeit it is not Bhartṛhari's principal intention, except maybe for a part of the first book, to argue systematically in favor of the view. My aim here is to identify myself with Bhartṛhari, unearth the many facets of his argumentation, and give him the best possible hearing that I can." (p. 456)

19.   ———. 2009. "Veda Revelation according to Bhartṛhari." In *Bhartṛhari: Language, Thought and Reality*, edited by Chaturvedi, Mithilesh, 1-98. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
"In his paper "Veda Revelation according to Bhartṛhari", Ashok Aklulkar discusses the connotations of words like *sākṣākṛta-dharma*n and *pratyakṣadharman* used in Bhartṛhari's Vṛtti and earlier by Yāska and Patañjali. He interprets *dharma* as

'properties of things'. According to him, Bhartṛhari uses the word *veda* in more than one sense: Veda in a subtle form as appearing in the vision of seers comes before the sequential language form or the textual corpus that is later divided into four Vedas and different śākhās. Aklujkar equates Veda in pre-revelation stage with para-paśyanti-rūpa or the language principle itself and the first revelaton with paśyanti, i.e., the active or the extrovert stage of it. He also thinks that Bhartṛhari's account of Veda revelation is not an expression of faith only but also has philosophical content and there is empiricist spirit in the account. He further draws the conclusion that although Bhartṛhari has genuine reverence for the Veda, he opts for theoretical fictions when necessary. Aklujkar has added four appendices, mainly discussing the relevant Vṛtti and Nirukta Passages textually, to his paper." (*Editor's Introduction*, p. XXVI)

20.   Alackapally, Sebastian. 2002. *Being and Meaning: Reality and Language in Bhartrhari and Heidegger*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Contents: Foreword. General introduction. Philosophical background of Bhartrhari and Heidegger: Bhartrhari: the grammarian philosopher. Heidegger: the philosopher of being and language. 1. Sabdatattva: the ultimate reality; 2. Sabdatattva: the Sphota of language; 3. Heidegger's concept of reality; 4. Language: the saying of being; General conclusion; Being and language in Bhartrhari and Heidegger: a synthesis; Glossary; Appendix; Bibliography. Index.
"This is a study of the concepts of Being (Reality) and Language (Meaning) as has been envisioned by Bhartrhari, the Indian linguistic Philosopher and Martin Heidegger, a great independent German thinker. For both, the question of Being is essentially interwoven into the experience of the question of language. For them, there is no philosophy of Being without a philosophy of Language. Hence a thinking of Being is simultaneously a thinking of Language; to experience the truth of the one is necessarily to experience the truth of the other.
In Bhartrhari's vision the language we speak is the medium of the self-expression of the ultimate Reality communicated through all meaning-bearing words. It leads us across the external appearance to the core of reality which is the source and the underlying unity beneath everything. This approach depends for its validity upon the presupposition that the real is a luminous Truth which needs to be discovered by every speaker and in every speech. The real breaks-forth (sphut) through the medium of speech *(sabda)*. This *sabda* is not merely a means to a truth or reality but it is the Truth and Reality. The awareness of this fact leads one to the realization of the meaningfullnes of Being." (p. 1)

21.   Ananthanarayana, H. S. 1992. "Bhartṛhari on Semantics and Pragmatics." *Bulletin of the Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute* no. 51/52:211-219.
"The present paper makes an attempt to bring to the notice of the students of modern linguistics, as they seem to be unaware of their great heritage, some of the finer points in Bhartṛhari's discussion of semantics which is interpreted syntactically and determined to an extent also pragmatically. We may quote Bhartṛhari himself on this who warns that the Goddess of learning does not smile on those students who would neglect their own ancients (11.485). There is close similarity between Bhartṛhari and modern linguistics in many issues discussed in Vākyapadīya. The paper makes a reference also to these similarities to the extent possible and suggests that a closer study of the Indian tradition is worth its trouble and makes us proud of our heritage. Bhartṛhari starts from the observation that a linguistic unit say, a word, can be considered under two aspects, viz. sound and meaning bearer (1.44). He terms the first as *dhvani* which the speaker utters and which are the *nimitta* 'manifestors' of the real word. The second is called *sphoṭa* which, when manifested by the d*hvanis*, conveys the meaning. It is the meaning bearing aspect of the word, an indivisible entity which is over and above the sounds. The latter are many in number and are uttered by the speaker in a temporal sequence in order to manifest the sphoṭa. *Sphoṭa* is eternal while *dhvani* is transitory. The unit of expression as well as the unit of meaning is, for Bhartṛhari, the sentence since it is only the sentence that is real and meaningful. Individual words for him have no reality and,

thus, do not convey meaning. He says 'sounds have no separate existence in words nor do component features within the sounds; nor have the words any separate existence apart from the sentence' (1.73)." (pp. 211-212)

22. Antil, Ritoo Kartari, and Gautam, Vikas Singh. 2022. "Bhartṛhari's Linguistic Philosophy: Śabda Brahman and the Question from Ineffability." *International Journal of Sanskrit Research* no. 8:280-283.
Abstract: "Bhartṛhari mainly focuses on correct interpretation of Vedic literature through grammar and creates the notion of verbal holism, which describes the ultimate reality as a universal language (śabda) without any components. According to his philosophy, śabda is absolute reality, and the universe expresses itself in the shape of language; that is, objective reality is nothing more than the linguistic explanation of any kind of experience. We can only know something if we are able to cognise it verbally, whether in mind or orally. There is, nevertheless, a sense of ineffability, and there are experiences that do not fit within the realm of linguistic cognition and can only be described in terms of raw sensations. As a result, Bhartṛhari's philosophical argument that absolute reality only exists in a word form, i.e. Śabda Brahman, is called into doubt. The paper briefly discusses the scope of ineffability in verbal holism, as well as some alternative remedies from other philosophical traditions, in order to keep the notion of effability alive in Bhartṛhari's Śabda Brahman theory."

23. Bandyopadhyay, Nandsita. 1988. *Being, Meaning, and Proposition: A Comparative Study of Bhartṛhari, Russell, Frege, and Strawson*. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.

24. Behera, Pitambar. 2015. "The Sphoṭa Theory in the Indic Philosophy: The Ancient vs the Modern." In *Proceedings of Twenty Second International Congress on Vedanta*, 223-235. New Delhi: D. K. Print World Publications.
Abstract: "Since the advent of the period of the great grammarians, Patañjali and Pāṇini, in the Indic philosophy, the concept of meaning has been a primordial concern. Different schools of philosophers have attempted to address the said conceptual issue in various ways in consonance with the philosophy of language ranging from the ancient to the modern. Almost all the schools of philosophy (the Vedic, Vedāntic, Buddhist and Jaina) have participated in the deliberation on the origin of meaning in semantics, which encapsulated the larger chunk of the Indian philosophy on language. The mystic and whimsical doctrine of the articulation of sounds *(sphoṭa)* and the meanings that they respectively convey has been revisited and demystified with a special reference to Bhart¦hari's exponential theory of *sphoṭa*."

25. Bhate, Saroja. 1993. "Bhartṛhari on Language and Reality." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* no. 47:67-73.
Reprinted in Saroja Bhate, Johannes Bronkhorst (eds.), *Bhartṛhari, Philosopher and Grammarian*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1994, pp. 67-73.
"The present paper is an attempt to sum up Bhartrhari's views on the relation of language with reality. It is, in fact, a further extention of the problem posed by Dr. J. Kelley in his paper, namely, whether the Vâkyapadïya (VP) can be looked upon as an argument about the limitations of a formal system of analysis to describe linguistic phenomena.(1) I would like to go a step further and pose the problem whether the VP represents an argument about the limitations of language to describe reality.
Bhartṛhari accepts perception, inference and word as valid means of knowledge. However, he acknowledges highest authority to word. He declares in the Brahmakända that there is no knowledge which does not assume the form of a word(2). All knowledge must culminate in verbal knowledge. No object which is not expressed in words exists. Language is the only window to the world. Our knowledge of reality is shaped by the language we use. Thus Bhartṛhari has initially accepted an intimate relationship of language with reality.

However, Bhartṛhari shows the superficial character of this intimacy by pointing out how language falls short of reality. At several places in the VP he describes language not only as an inadequate tool to represent reality but also as a wrong means, which, in fact, never takes us to reality.

It is very intriguing that the VP begins with a declaration that there is no world beyond language, whereas it ends up with a note of disharmony between the two and declares that reality transcends language. What follows is a résumé of the views presented in the VP about the nature of language in relation to reality." (p. 67)

(1) John D. Kelly's paper entitled 'Meaning and the limits of analysis: Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists, and post-structuralism' elsewhere in this volume [pp. 171-194].

(2) VP. 1.123:

na so 'sti pratyayo loke yah sabdänugamäd rie /
anuviddham iva jnânam sarvam iabdena bhäsate //

26. Bhate, Saroja, and Bronkhorst, Johannes, eds. 1994. *Bhartṛharii, Philosopher and Grammarian: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992)*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Table of Contents: Acknowledgements 5; Ashok Aklujkar: An introduction to the study of Bhartṛhari 7; Akihiko Akamatsu: Pratibha and the meaning of the sentence in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya 37; Ashok Aklujkar: Once again on the autorship of the Trikāndī-Vrtti 45; PT. V.B. Bhagavat: śrīmad-Bhartharih Nāgeśaś ca 59; Saroja Bathe: Bhartṛhari on language and reality 61; Johannes Bronkhorst: Studies on Bhartṛhari, 5 Bhartṛhari and Vaisesika 15; Madha V.M. Despande: The changing notion of *śista* from Patañjali to Bhartṛhari 95; Brendan S. Gillon: Bhartṛhari's solution to the problem of *asamartha* compounds 111; Masaaki Hattori: Kamalaśīla's interpretation of some verses in the Vakyakanda of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya 135; Yoshichika Honda: Bhartṛhari's definition of *kriyā* 141; Jan Houben:: Who are Bhartrhari's *padadarśins*? On the development of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language 155; John D. Kelly: Meaning and the limits of analysis: Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists, and post-structuralism 171; Chr. Lindtner: Linking up Bhartṛhari and the Bauddhas 195; G.B. Palsule: Points of agreement and difference between the Vākyapadīya and the Mahābhāṣya-Dīpīka m the matter of sphoṭa 215; Anna Radicchi: Vivakṣā in the Vākyapadīya 221; Yvves Ramseier: Bibliography on Bhartṛhari 235; Index of references 262.

27. Bhattacharya, Bishnupada. 1985. *Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and Linguistic Monism*. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

The *Vakyapadiya*, the magnum opus of the great Bhartṛhari, is not only the most authoritative text on the analytic aspect of Sanskrit language as such, but also one of the most important philosophical works dealing with some of the basic problems of linguistic philosophy, which has also engaged the attention of some of the most eminent linguistic philosophers of our age. The question of the relation of language with the external reality on the one hand and with the internal thought-process on the other is one of the fundamental problems of philosophy. We are aware that there have been various trends of metaphysical quest in India from the very earliest times, and they can be usually classed under two broad heads viz. dualism-pluralism and monism. The Sāmkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and Purva-Mīmāṃsā systems are examples of dualistic/pluralistic metaphysics, while the Vedanta of the school of Śaṅkara is the most outstanding example of monism. But besides Śaṅkara's advaita, which is usually known as *brahmādvaita* there have been several other attempts at explaining the phenomenal universe of diversity from one absolute principle without any second. Several variants of monism, however, can be traced in the ancient philosophical literature of India, of which *śabdādvaita-vādā*, *vijñānādvaita-vāda*, and *sattādvaita-vāda* have been noticed in authoritative texts, besides the well-known *brahmādvaita-vāda* or *ātmādvaita-vāda* as taught in the Upaniṣads according to the interpretation of the school with which Śaṅkara is affiliated. Bhartṛhari is the propounder of the theory of *śabdādvaita* or Linguistic Monism, which is a novel doctrine altogether, though the origin of the doctrine is traceable in

the Vedic Saṃhitās. Thus Bhartrhari is a great exponent of Monism, though of a different sort, beside Śaṅkara." (pp. 1-2)

28.   Bhattacharyya, Gaurinath. 1937. "A Study in the Dialectics of Sphoṭa." *Journal of the Department of Letters. University of Calcutta* no. 29:1-121.
"We do not know when and by whom the doctrine of *sphoṭa* was first promulgated. There is no reference to it in the *sūtras* of Pāṇini nor in the *vārtikas* of Kātyāyana, But in the Pān. Su. VI. 1. 123, there is the name of a grammarian named Sphoṭāyana. The name may suggest that the grammarian was an exponent of the doctrine of sphoṭa. It is, however, Patañjali who for the first time appears to make a reference to sphoṭa in his epoch-making work on Sanskrit grammar, the *Vyākarana-mahābhāṣya*. Therein he acknowledges in clear terms the distinction between two kinds of word (*śabda*)-permanent (*nītya*) and created (*kārya*); and it is "vith reference to the former that he uses such epithets as "abiding" (*dhruva*), "unchangeable" (*kūṭasta*), etc., epithets that are ascribed to Brahman with which Sphoṭa bas been identified. But Patañjali has not only hinted at *sphoṭa* by noticing the distinction referred to above; he has also actuaJly used the term in his work and has given us a definition of the same. Thus Patañjali observes a distinction between *sphoṭa* and sound by holding that the latter is only a quality of the former and serves to manifest it. And he defines *sphoṭa* as what is perceived by the auditory organs, apprehended by the intellect, manifested by the auditory organs, apprehended by the intellect, manifested by sound and pertaining to ether.
It is Bhartṛhari, the celebrated author of the Vākyapadīya, who, to our knowledlge, is the first grammarian to have presented to us a systematic treatment of the conception of *sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari has looked at *sphoṭa* from two standpoints - metaphysical and empirical. From the metaphysical standpoint, Bhartṛhari conceives *Sphoṭa* as identical with the *Brahman* of the Vedāintists, the material cause of the phenomenal world. From the empirical point of view, *sphota* is an indivisible sentence which is expressive of sense.
His attitude towards word, syllable and letter is that they are no better then mere artifices resorted to for the purpose of helping the subject to grasp the indivisble character of *sphoṭa*." (pp. 1-2)

29.   Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban, ed. 2002. *Word and Sentence: Two Perspectives. Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein*. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi.
Contents: Preface 5; K.G. Shah: Word and sentence: Two prespeclives: Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein 9; ndra Nath Choudhuri: Welcome Speech 18; Vidya Niwas Misra: Key-note Address 21; Hiranmoy Banerjee: Understanding Bhartṛhari A Modem Perspective 27; S. 8hattacharyya: Word and Sentence: Wittgenstein, Bhartṛhari and Jagadiśa 34; Arindam Chakravarty: The 'glory' and impenetrability of the Peacock-egg: Eternalism versus Conventionalism about the Word-Meaning Relationship 45; D.P. Chattopadhyaya: Wittgenstein on Language: Some Remarks 55; Probal Dasgupta: The Sentence as Freedom 63; V.N. Jha: Word and Meaning: Identical? 67; Ashok R. Kelkar: What has Bhartṛhari got to say on Language? 78; Lachman M. Khunchandani: Speech as an Ongoing Activity Comparing Bhartṛhari and Wit!genstein 104; P.K. .Mukhopadhyay: Allemalive Conceptions of Sentence and Conflicting Perspectives of Language 123; R.C. Pradhan: Meaning Holism in Wittgenstein and Bhartṛhari: A Study in Two Semantic Perspectives 134; M. Sreemannarayana Murti: Sphoṭa Theory Vis-a-Vis Picture Theory 162-185.

30.   Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1989. "Studies on Bhartṛhari, 2: Bhartṛhari and Mīmāṃsā." *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* no. 15:101-117.
[Studies 1 and 4 are in French].
Reprinted in R. C. Dwivedi (ed.), *Studies in Mīmāṃsā. Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994, pp. 371–388.
"Both Bhartṛhari and Śabara pay a good deal of attention to the subject of *ūha* 'modification, adjustment'. Bhartrhari discusses it in the first Āhnika of his ·commentary on the Mahābhāṣya (AL 5.18-8.17, Sw 6.17-9.27, Ms 2b9-3c1, while

parts of Adhyāya 9 of Sahara's Bhāṣya deal with it. Two cases in particular are treated by both the authors and allow of a detailed comparison." (p. 101)
(...)
"The conclusion must be that Bhartṛhari's description of *uha*, or rather of the absence of, in *aditiḥ pāśān pramoktu* does not represent the position of any group of Mimāṃsakas, but rather the po.sition of the Maitrāyaṇīya branch of the Yajurveda. The Mimāṃsakas on the other hand, or at any rate Śabara , did not confine their attention to one Vedic school." (p. 104)
(...)
"The above observations, if correct, allow us to draw the following conclusions. Bhartṛhari was acquainted with Mimāṃsa, but did not use it where we would expect him to use it. In the context of ritual details he rather draws upon another tradition, most probably on the traditional manuals current in his Vedic school, that of the Maitrāyaṇīyas. And where he makes references to Mimāṃsa, it is never to Śabara's Bhāṣya, but rather to a Mimāṃsa work in verse, or containing verse, which has not survived, but may have been Bhavadāsa' s Vṛi. He may have known the Pūrva Mimāṃsa Sūtra, or a part of it, but this is not certain." (p. 114)

31.　　　———. 1991. "Studies on Bhartṛhari, 3: Bhartṛhari on *Sphoṭa* and Universals." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* no. 45:5-18.
"Both Brough and Herzberger worked from 'below' 'upward' in their attempt to understand Bhartṛhari's thought. Brough never reaches the metaphysical 'superstructure', whose existence he none-the-less does not deny. For Herzberger the 'superstructure' is the 'top' of a construction built by her 'from below'. For Bhartṛhari, however, we can be sure that the metaphysical superstructure did not come at the end, but rather at the beginning. It comes at the beginning literally, for the first stanzas of the Vākyapadīya speak of Brahman.
But it must have come at the beginning in another sense as well: Bhartṛhari wrote his work starting from a vision, in which the metaphysical aspects of his thought were already clearly represented. This at any rate seems an extremely reasonable assumption to make." (p. 12)
(...)
"The picture which thus evolves of universals is hardly that of an abstract entity different from the things in which it manifests itself, like the universals of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. In an important way Bhartṛhari's universal rather is the thing. It is not correct to think that there is a pot, and the universal potness which is different from it. Quite on the contrary, the pot in as far as it really exists is the universal; its not really existing shadow in the phenomenal world is the individual. It is therefore not possible to say that pot and potness are different, even though the former has a spatial and a temporal dimension, which the latter has not. Universals, seen in this way, can most easily be compared with Plato's ideas: they are real and unchanging, while the things that figure in our experience are their unreal reflections.
Returning now to Bhartṛhari's sphoṭa, if the real pot is the universal, the same must be true of words: the real word, i.e. the sphoṭa, is a universal." (p. 14)
References
John Brough, "Theories of general linguistics in the Sanskrit grammarians", *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1951, pp. 27-46. Reprinted in *A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians,* edited by J.F. Staal, MIT Press, Cambridge - Massachusetts and London - England, 1972, pp. 4()2-414.
Radhika Herzberger, *Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists, An Essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought*, Dordrecht /Boston/ Lancaster / Tokyo: D. Reidel. 1986. (Studies of Classical India. 8.)

32.　　　———. 1993. "Studies on Bhartṛhari, 5: Bhartṛhari and Vaiśeṣika." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* no. 47:75-94.
Reprinted in Saroja Bhate, Johannes Bronkhorst (eds), *Bhartṛhari, Philosopher and Grammarian: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari*

(University of Poona, January 6–8, 1992), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994, pp. 75–94.

"There are reasons to think that Bhartṛhari's writings may shed light on the early history of Vaiśeṣika. One of these is that he obviously knew the Vaiśeṣika system. Almost all of its categories play a role in his work.

Separate sections (*samuddeśa*) of the Vākyapadīya are dedicated to the categories *jāti, dravya, guṇa* and *kriyā*. The relationship called *samavāya* - a special feature of Vaiśeṣika - is mentioned and used repeatedly.

Vaiśeṣika substances appear as 'powers' (*śakti*), most notably *kāla* (time) and *diś* (space).

A second reason is Bhartṛhari's chonological position. I have argued in another publication that Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmaṁsagraha*; as well as Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* before it, were heavily indebted to the Kaṭandī, a work written not long before Dignāga. This Kaṭandī, further argued, exerted a dominating influence on all Vaiśeṣika literature that came after it, including perhaps the versions of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra

itself, not to speak of the surviving commentaries on this Sūtra work.(2) Bhartṛhari, on the other hand, lived long enough before Dignāga that someone different from Bhartṛhari could write a commentary on the first two kāṇḍas of his Viikyapadiya still before Dignaga. Bhartṛhari, therefore, lived and worked most probably before the *Kaṭānd*i! If his work provides information on Vaiśeṣika, it would then be one of the very few sources of information dating form the pre-*Kaṭānd*i period of this system.

In what follows we shall consider some possible links between Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and the Vaiśeṣika of his days." (p. 75)

(2) See Bronkhorst, forthcoming."The Vaiśeṣika vākya and bhāṣya." Annals of the Bhandatkar Oriental Research Institute.

33.   ———. 1994. "Studies on Bhartṛhari, 6: The Author of the Three Centuries." In *Vācaspatyam. Pt. Vamanshastri Bhagwat Felicitation Volume*, edited by Bhate, Saroja and Deshpande, Madhav, 32-41. Pune: Vaidika Samshodhana Mandala.
"There seems to be a tendency among recent scholars to consider as possible, or even probable, the identity of Bhartṛhari, supposedly the author of the Three Centuries (śatakatraya, subhāṣitatriśat), with the grammarian-philosopher of the same name.

This article is meant to draw attention to the fact that the arguments adduced to support this position are far weaker than is generally realized." (p. 32)

34.   ———. 1995. "Studies on Bhartṛhari, 7: Grammar as the Door to Liberation." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* no. 76:97-106.
"In the beginning of his *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari describes grammar as *dvāram apavargasya* 'the door to liberation'. This remark has drawn the attention of several scholars, none of whom have been able to explain how the study of grammar could possibly lead to the highest aim of Indian religions, liberation from this world. Some complain about the lack of information about this in the *Vākyapadīya*. (p. 97)
(...)
"There are many aspects of Bhartṛhari's thought where the influence of Buddhism is clearly noticeable. His conception of the highest reality is an example, as I have tried to show elsewhere.(21) His view as to to what extent the world of our daily experience is determined by language, is another example(.22) The present paper has tried to show that even his ideas about the ultimate religious aim, and how to reach it, may have been borrowed from the Buddhists. To all this we must however add that Bhartṛhari never borrows ideas without thoroughly adjusting them to their new surroundings. Many of his ideas may be Buddhist in origin, together they constitute Bhartṛhari's philosophy which, as such, is not Buddhist at all. His is the philosophy of a traditional Brahmin, who manages to adjust the Buddhist and other ideas in such a way, that they come to contribute to a Veda-centered view of the world." (pp. 104-105)
(21) Bronkhorst, 1992.

(22) Bronkhorst, 1996.
References
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1992): "Études sur Bhartṛhari, 4: L'absolu dans le *Vākyapadīya* et son lien avec le Madhyamaka." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* 46.1 (Études bouddhiques offertes à Jacques May), 6-80.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1996): "Sanskrit and reality: the Buddhist contribution." *Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the history of the Sanskrit language*. Ed. Jan E. M. Houben. Leiden etc.: E.J. Brill. Pp. 09-135.

35. ———. 1996. "Sanskrit and Reality: the Buddhist Contribution." In *Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the History of the Sanskrit Language*, edited by Houben, Jan E. M., 109-135. Leiden: Brill.
"With this in mind we turn to another Brahmanical thinker who, as it seems to me, has been profoundly influenced by Buddhist ideas.(53) This is Bhartṛhari, the linguistic thinker par excellence of classical India.
Bhartṛhari stood, in fact, under the influence of both Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism, not to speak of several other currents of thought. The extent to which he is indebted to Vaiśeṣika is evident on almost every page of his *Vâkyapadïya*. The Buddhist influence is less immediately obvious, but not any the less important, as it appears to me. I have drawn attention to Bhartṛhari's indebtedness to Buddhist thought in an earlier publication.(54)
In the present lecture I will try to show how Bhartrhari, at least where ideas concerning the relationship between language and phenomenal reality are concerned, remains closer to the Buddhists than to the Vaiśeṣikas. I will also point out how he adapts these essentially Buddhist ideas to his own vision of the world. We will see that Bhartrhari accepts the close correspondence between language and phenomenal reality, that, like the Buddhists, he looks upon phenomenal reality as ultimately unreal, and that, like Nägärjuna, he includes sentences in the parts of language that correspond to the phenomenal world." (p. 125)
(53) For the argument here presented it is not important to know whether Bhartṛhari was directly acquainted with Nägärjuna's works. Nägärjuna's style of reasoning left a profound impression on Buddhist thought after him, so that Bhartrhari may have undergone his influence indirectly. Some features of Bhartrhari's thought suggest that he may have been acquainted with one or more Yogäcära thinkers; see note 81 below.
(54) Bronkhorst 1992a. [1992a "Études sur Bhartrhari, 4: L'absolu dans le Vâkyapadïya et son lien avec le Madhyamaka." *Asian Studies/Études Asiatiques* 46.1 (Études bouddhiques offertes à Jacques May): 56-80.
(81) One is of course reminded of the *abhilapaväsana* of the Yogäcäras, which is responsible for a number of percepts (*vijnapti*) besides the one of linguistic usage (*vyavahäravijnapti*). Cf. Lamotte [*La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asanga (Mahäyänasamgraha). Tome II:traduction et commentaire. Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, 8 Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste] 1973: 88-89, 108 (= Mahäyänasamgraha II, 2; II, 16).

36. ———. 1999. "Studies on Bhartṛhari, 8: *prākṛta dhvani* and the Sāṃkhya *tanmātras*." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 27:23-33.
"Bhartṛhari distinguishes between the word itself (sometimes called *sphoṭa*) and the sounds that manifest it. These sounds themselves are subdivided in one passage of the Vākyapadīya into *prākṛta dhvani* and *vaikṛta dhvani*. These two expressions have puzzled modern scholarship." (p. 23)
(...)
"To conclude. For a correct understanding of Bhartṛhari's *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta dhvani*, his intellectual context must first be taken into consideration. Comparison with theories of modern linguistics is delicate, and should not be made until Bhartṛhari's own intellectual background has been properly explored.
It seems likely that the notions of *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta* forms of sound come from Sāṃkhya, where these notions appear to have been current until the revision of that

philosophy during which the qualities as final evolutes were replaced by the five elements.

This hypothesis explains both Bhartṛharis terminology and the ideas it covers: both Sāṃkhya and Bhartṛhari distinguish between two perceptible forms of sound, the one "pure", the other one "impure". Questions remain as to their temporal relationship: does the *vaikṛta dhvani*, come into being after the *prākṛta dhvani*? Neither Bhartṛhari's text nor our limited knowledge about the Sāṃkhya known to him allow us to reach a clear and certain answer to this question.

The revision of Sāṃkhya referred to above did away with both *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta dhvani*. Not surprisingly, the commentator Vṛṣabhadeva no longer understood Bhartṛhari's short and enigmatic passage, and gave it a different interpretation." (pp. 32-33)

37.   ———. 2001. "The Peacock's Egg: Bhartrhari on Language and Reality." *Philosophy East and West* no. 51:474-491.

"Bhartrhari was not only a clever and well-informed philosopher but also a conservative Brahmin who maintained his own tradition's superiority against the philosophies developed in his time. He exploited a problem that occupied all his philosophical contemporaries to promote his own ideas, in which the Veda played a central role. Bhartrhari and his thought are situated in their philosophical context. As it turns out, he dealt with issues that others had dealt with before him in India and suggested solutions to existing problems. Indeed it becomes clear that he was both a philosopher who dealt with current problems and challenges and a traditionalist who used the philosophical debate of his time to gain respectability for his own Vedic tradition."

38.   ———. 2009. "Bhartṛhari and His Vedic Tradition." In *Bhartṛhari: Language, Thought and Reality*, edited by Chaturvedi, Mithilesh, 99-118. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

"In this paper I wish to concentrate on one thinker and explore to what extent his thought may have been influenced, or even determined, by the Vedic school to which he belonged. This thinker is Bhartṛhari — a Brahmanical philosopher belonging to the fifth century of the common era, author of the Vākyapadīya and of a commentary, Tikā, on the Mahābhāṣya, nowadays often referred to as Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā. The Vedic school to which he belonged is that of the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas. Is it possible that this famous thinker may have borrowed, or rather inherited, some of his key ideas from this, his own, Vedic tradition? (p. 102)

(...)

"What can we conclude from the preceding? Not very much, ! fear. It seems possible, even likely, that Bhartṛhari looked upon his Vedic school, that of the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas, as one of his sources of inspiration which he refers to as authoritative tradition, *āgama*. The specific texts belonging to that tradition which he used probably include the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad.

He also used other treatises of the Mānava school, among them probably a Mānava Dharmaśāstra. Whether he derived philosophical ideas from these treatises is not clear. The Manusmṛti — assuming that it is based on the Mānava Dharmaśāstra known to Bhartṛhari — does not provide much information that might support this." (p. 112)

39.   ———. 2011. *Language and Reality: On an Episode in Indian Tought*. Leiden: Brill.

Revised and updated English edition of: *Langage et réalité : sur un épisode de la pensée indienne*, Turnhout: Brepols 1999.

Chapter Two, § 15: *Bhartṛhari*, pp. 108-117.

"Bhartṛhari, according to a few verses added at the end of the second book of his principal work, the Vākyapadīya ("Treatise on Sentences and Words"), played an important role in the resurgence of the Mahābhāṣya in the fifth century of the common era. The Vākyapadīya was aware of the problems relating to the

correspondence principle, particularly the problem of the impossibility of the arising of things.

Bhartṛhari proposes several solutions. We should not be surprised to find him making greater use, in comparison with other thinkers we have discussed, of the ideas found in the Mahābhāṣya.

A verse from the third book of the Vākyapadīya articulates the central problem as follows: "What we call origination is the fact of attaining one's own nature, and only something existent attains what is to be attained. If [this thing] exists [already], why does it arise? But if it does not exist, how does it arise?"(271) The problem is easily recognizable: for something to arise, it has to exist; but if it already exists, why would it arise? To quote once again the words of Nāgārjuna: "If there existed anywhere something unarisen, it could arise. Since no such thing exists, what is it that arises?"(272)" (P. 108, Sanskrit omitted)

(271) [Bhartṛhari, Vākyapadīya, ed. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977] 3.3.4.

(272) [Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, ed. J. W. de Jong, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras 1977 7.17:

40. ———. 2012. "Studies on Bhartṛhari, 9: Vākyapadīya 2.119 and the Early History of Mīmāṃsā." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 40:411-425.

Abstract: "This article argues that in early Mīmāṃsā the view was current that there are objects in the world corresponding to all words of the Sanskrit language. Evidence to that effect is primarily found in passages from Bhartṛhari's works, and in some classical Nyāya texts. Interestingly, Śabara's classical work on Mīmāṃsā has abandoned this position, apparently for an entirely non-philosophical reason: the distaste felt for the newly arising group of Brahmanical temple-priests."

41. Cardona, George. 1976. *Pāṇini: A Survey of Research*. The Hague: Mouton.

VI.2. Bhartṛhari 295; VI.2.1, The Vākya-padīya: editions and translations. 295; VI.2.2. The authorship of the Vṛtti 297; VI.2,3, The dates of Bhartṛhari and his commentators 298; VI.2 4 Studies on the doctrines set forth in the Vākya-padīya 299; VI.2.5. Evaluations of Bhartṛhari and his commentators 304-305.

"The major text on semantics and philosophy of grammar in the Paninian school is Bhartṛhari's Vākya-padīya. This, together with the Mahā-bhāṣya, is the basic work for later treatments of topics in the treatises of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa. Not only this, the Vākya-padīya is also referred to extensively in later treatises of many schools.

The text is composed in verses (*kārika*) and divided into three parts (*kānda*)'. the Āgama-samuccya ('compendium of traditional teaching') also called the Brahma-kaṇḍa, the Vākya-kaṇḍa, and the Pada-kaṇḍa or Prakirnakaṇḍa ('miscellaneous part'). The third part is further subdivided into fourteen sections called *samudeśa* in which are treated; generic properties (*jāti*), substance (*dravya*), relation (*sambandha*) between items and their meanings, substance again (*bhūyo-dravya-samuddeśa*), properties (*guṇa*), spatial concepts (*dik*), kārakas (*sādhana*), action (*kriyā*), time (*kāla*), the concept of person (*puruṣa*), number (*saṃkhyā*), the semantics associated with active and middle endings (*upagraha*), gender (*liñga*), derivatives such as compounds (*vṛtti*, see note 263). The last kāṇḍa is considered by both commentators and most modern scholars to be lacking sections originally included therein. Ther term *vākya-padīya* was used to refer to the first two kaṇḍas and the term *trikāṇḍi* to refer to the whole work.

The following commentaries on the Vākya-padīya are extant: the Vṛtti on the first and second parts, the latter fragmentary; the Ṭīkā on the second part, usually attributed to Punyarāja. Helārāja's Prakāśa on the third kāṇḍa. In addition, the Vṛtti on the first section itself has a commentary, the Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva." (pp. 295-296, notes omitted)

"It is generally agreed that Bhartṛhari deserves his reputation for his insights into language. There has, nevertheless, been some disagreement on how one should evaluate him. In particular, should one approach him as a linguist or as a philosopher, through his commentaries in addition to the Vākya-padīya and the Tripādi or through these alone?" (p. 304)

42. ———. 1999. "Approaching the Vākyapadīya." *The Journal of the American Oriental Society* no. 119:88-125.
This is a review-article of: *The Sambandha-Samuddesa (Chapter on Relation) and Bhartrhari's Philosophy of Language: A Study of Bhartrhari's Sambandha-samuddesa in the Context of the Vakyapadiya with a Translation of Heldrdja's Commentary, Prakirna-prakasa.* B y Jan E. M. Houbeng. Gonda Indological Studies, vol. II. Groningen: Egbert Forsten, ,995. Pp. 460 + xv.
Abstract: "In connection with a recent work on the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, I consider some major issues concerning Bhartṛhari, the tradition he represents, and how a modern scholar might approach the *Vākyapadīya*. I discuss theoretical principles which have been set forth as a basis for dealing with Bhartṛhari and evidence from the *Vākyapadīya* in connection with these principles, chiefly what is referred to as Bhartṛhari's perspectivism. I take up in some detail one large issue: the status of the received high language, associated with a group of model speakers called *sista*, who use speech forms characterized as "correct" (*sādhu*) linguistic units (*śabda*) opposed to incorrect linguistic units (*asadhusabda, apaśabda*), that are viewed as corruptions *(apabhramsa)* with respect to how meanings are understood by users. The principal issue here is: do *apaśabdas* directly signify meanings for *sista*s when they communicate with someone using a vernacular, or do these speakers resort to a translation technique such that the *apaśabda* used calls to mind a *sadhusabda*, which then directly signifies a meaning? This topic also involves another important question: how one should consider the *Vrtti* and other commentaries in relation to what is said in the kārikā text."

43. ———. 2000. "Addendum to JAOS 119.1: Approaching the Vākyapadīya." *The Journal of the American Oriental Society* no. 120:234.
"Interpretation and paraphrase of Vākyapadīya 2.7-8 clarified."

44. ———. 2009. "Bhartṛhari and Patanjali: Traditions Preserved." In *Bhartṛhari: Language, Thought and Reality*, edited by Chaturvedi, Mithilesh, 119-162. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
"While remaining faithful to the tradition of his predecessors in grammar, Bhartṛhari ranges widely in his treatment of pertinent topics, to the extent that he has been characterized as embracing an attitude of accomodation towards the views of others and of being not only encyclopedic but also perspectivistic.
Scholars who have, with some justification, emphasized this aspect of Bhartṛhari's approach, though they acknowledge Bhartṛhari's close affiliation with the Mahābhāṣya, to the point where in many places—especially in the third kaṇḍa—the Vākyapadīya takes on aspects of a learned commentary on this work, have not, in my opinion, sufficiently emphasized the degree to which Patanjali anticipates Bhartṛhari in devoting attention to various points of view. In addition, insufficient attention has been paid to the manner in which both authors can make known their sharp disagreements with views they find unacceptable. In the present contribution, | consider examples from the Mahābhāṣya and the Vākyapadīya to illustrate the similarity in approach, then discuss some general issues concerning Bhartṛhari's attitude." (pp. 120-121, note omitted)

45. ———. 2012. "A Note on Vākyapadīya 1.45/46: ātmabhedas tayoḥ kecid ..." In *Saṃskṛta-Sādhutā. Goodness of Sanskrit: Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok Aklujkar*, edited by Watanabe, Chikafuma, Desmarais, Michele M. and Honda, Yoshichika, 100-109. New Delhi: D. K. Printworld.

46. Chattopadhyay, Madhumita. 2010. "Nature of Cognition in the Philosophy of Bhartrhari: A Short Note." *International Journal on Humanistic Ideology* no. 1:181-191.
Abstract: "In the history of Indian philosophy Bhartṛhari occupies a very distinguished position for relating grammar to philosophy and elaborating the language-philosophical ideas which were hinted at in the grammatical traditions of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali"

47.   Chaturvedi, Mithilesh, ed. 2009. *Bhartṛhari: Language, Thought and Reality*.
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Proceedings of the International Seminar Delhi, December 12-14, 2003.
Contents: Publisher's Note IX; G. C. Pande: Foreword XI; V. N. Jha: Keynote
Address XV; Editor's Introduction XXV-XXXII; Ashok Aklujkar: Veda Revelation
according to Bhartṛhari 1; Johannes Bronkhorst: Bhartrhari and His Vedic Tradition
99; George Cardona: Bhartṛhari and Patanjali: Traditions Preserved 19; Madhav M.
Deshpande: Revisiting the Notion of Sista in Bhartrhari 163; K. D. Tripathi:
Thought, Language and Consciousness: Bhartrhari's View of Language 177; Tandra
Patnaik: Thought and Language: The Bhartrharian Perspective 185; Mithilesh
Chaturvedi: Does Language Map the Reality: Bhartrhari View 205; Pierre-Sylvain
Filliozat: Time as Power of Word according to Bhartrhari 215; Hideyo Ogawa: On
Bhartrhari's Notion of 'Power'(sakti) 225; Vladimir P. Ivanov: Vidyā and Avidyā
in Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya 253; P. K. Mukhopadhyay: Did Bhartrhari Give Us a
Philosophy of Language 259; R. C. Pradahan: Bhartrhari as a Philosopher of
Language 281; Karunasindhu Das: Changing Approaches to Language in Indian
Schools of Thought vis-a-vis Bhartrhari 's Vākyapadīya 291; Navjivan Rastogi: Vak
as Pratyavamarśa: Bhartrhari from Abhinavan Perspective 301; Raffaele Torella:
From an Adversary to the Main Ally: The Place of Bhartrhari in the Kashmirian
Śaiva Advaita 343; Anna Radiccchi: Dhvani in Bhartrhari and Abhinavagupta's
Philosophical Works 355; Jan E. M. Housen: Bhartrhari and the Jainas 383; Toshiya
Unebe: Mimāmsā and Buddhist Criticism on Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya 2.119 and
His Counterarguments 415; Brendan S. Gillon: Bhartrhari and the Syntax of
Sanskrit Gerunds 433; Arindam Chakrabarti: The Case of the Accusative:
Contemporary Relevance of Bhartrhari on the Kārakas 447; Vincenzo Vergiani;
Bhartrhari on Śesa relationships 459; Yoshie Kobayashi: All Words Denote the
Universal (jāti): Bhartrhari's Approach 483; Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti:
The Conception of Liṅga in Vākyapadīya III.13 499; Noriyuli Kudo: Some
Remarks on the Term 'vākyabheda' in Bhartrhariās Mahabhāsya-dīpikā 507; Jan E.
M. Housen: Bhartrhari as a 'Cognitive Linguist' 523; Ana Agud: Comparing
Humboldt and Bhartrhari 545; Yves Ramseier: A Bibliography on Bhartrhari 557;
Contributors 613-615.

48.   Coward, Harold G. 1976. *Bhartṛhari*. Boston: Twayne Publishers.
Contents: About the Author; Preface; Chronology; 1. Bhartrhari in His Own Day
13; 2. The Vakyapadlya's Theory of Language 31; 3. The Yoga Psychology
Underlying Bhartrhari's Vakyapadlya 53; 4. Bhartrhari's Dhvani as Central to
Indian Aesthetics 80; 5. Yoga in the Vairagya-Sataka of Bhartrhari 95; 6. The
Contribution of Bhartrhari 105; Notes and Beferences 125; Selected Bibliography
139; Glossary of Sanskrit Terms 141; Index 147-150.
"The Vākyapadīya, Bhartṛhari's great work on language and metaphysics, is
technical Indian Sanskrit philosophy at its best. I have done my best to make it
understandable to the beginning English reader, but have also included in the text
the key Sanskrit terms (with translations) since some of these concepts are not
always clearly expressible in English. A glossary of Sanskrit terms is provided. All
quotations from and references to the Vākyapadīya are based upon K. A.
Subramania Iyer's excellent English translation. It should be noted, however, that
his numbering of verses is sometimes different from the usual numbering.
Bhartrhari's philosophy of language, and the Yoga psychology assumed, is complex
and may prove to be heavy going for those not philosophically inclined.
Readers more interested in Bhartrhari's poetry or contribution to Indian aesthetics
can safely omit the more difficult parts of Chapters 2 and 3 and go on to Chapter 4.
In Chapters 4 and 5, brief summaries or reviews of Bhartṛhari's philosophy and
psychology have been included." (from the *Preface*)

49.   ———. 1977. "Bhartrhari versus Sankara on the overcoming of error." In *Buddhist
Thought and Asian Civilization: Essays in Honor of Herbert V. Guenther on His
Sixtieth Birthday*, edited by Kawamura, L. S. and Scott, K., 1-15. Emeryville, Cal.:
Dharma Publishing.

50.   ———. 1980. *The Sphota Theory of Language: A Philosophical Analysis*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
"Sanskrit grammar was an attempt to discipline and explain the behaviour of a spoken language, so that the inner meaning could shine forth unobstructed.
It was this latter aspect, the perceiving of the intended meaning, that commanded the attention of the Indian philosophers of language. Among the many excellent Indian philosophers of language (e.g. Maṇḍana Miśra, Kumārila, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭha, Abhinavagupta, etc.) Bhartṛhari(5) (580 a.d.) consistently ranks as the most important. In Bhartrhari's major work, the Vākyapadīya, the ways in which Indian philosophy conceives the
outer word form to be united with its inner meaning are discussed.
Bhartrhari's own position has come to be known as the *Sphoṭa* Theory after the Sanskrit term sphuṭ, which means " to burst forth" or when applied to language "a bursting forth of illumination or insight." V. S. Apte in his Sanskrit-English Dictionary defines sphoṭa as the idea that bursts out or flashes on the mind when a sound is uttered.(*)" (pp. 10-11)
(5) For a beginner's introduction see Harold G. Coward, *Bhartṛhari*.
(*) V. S. Aple, *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 1013.

51.   ———. 1982. "Time (Kala) in Bhartrhari's "Vakyapadiya"." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 10:277-287.
"Summary and Conclusion.
Behind the discussion of the levels of language in the *Vākyapadīya* is Bhartṛhari's notion of the dynamic limiting function of time (*kālaśakti*). After setting forth the absolute nature of Brahman as being the one eternal essence of word and consciousness Bhartṛhari then introduces the notion of time as the power or means by which this one unchanging absolute (sabdatattva-Brahman) manifests itself as the dynamic diversity mankind experiences as
creation. Time is the creative power of Brahman, and thus is responsible for the birth, death and continuity of everything in the cosmos. Time is one, but when broken or limited into sequences appears as moments or actions. These segments of time are mentally categorized as seconds or minutes. Such limited segments of time are then mentally unified into day, week, month and year. In the same fashion notions of past, present, and future are developed. When time is thought of as an action not yet completed, the notion of the present is established. An action that has been completed is time as past; and an action yet to be completed is time as future. All of ordinary life is sequenced by these three powers of time. Yet all the while, declares Bhartṛhari, there is really no sequence at all. From the ultimate viewpoint all three powers of time are constantly present. Time is One. Although the effects of the three powers of time (i.e., past, present, and future) are mutually contradictory, they function without causing any disorder in the cosmos. They are like three paths on which objects move about without any confusion. Similarities and differences with the Advaita Vedānta, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Buddhist views of *Kāla* were briefly explored.
Bhartṛhari enters into this deep discussion of time in relation to the absolute, not as a fascinating metaphysical aside, but to explain how the unitary Word (*Sabda-brahman*) manifests itself in experience as the diversity of words called language. As a grammarian, he is also providing a metaphysical basis for the experience of the tenses past, present and future in language.
And, it is past and future that have the veiling function of keeping one apart from the absolute eternal present. In religious terms union with the eternal present is union with the Divine, and, for Bhartṛhari, this is the inherent goal toward which all language, all grammar, is reaching." (pp. 285-286)

52.   ———. 1982. "The Meaning and Power of *Mantras* in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*." *Studies in Religion* no. 11:365-375.
"Bhartṛhari, the fifth century systematizer of the Grammarian School, presents a philosophy of language which proves helpful in understanding both the factual and the intuitive levels of language. Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* offers a metaphysical,

philosophical, and psychological analysis of language which spans the Vedic through to the Tantric experience of *mantra*. All the views of *mantra* summarized above (including *mantra* as 'meaningful' and *mantra* as 'meaningless') are encompassed by Bhartṛhari within one understanding in which language is seen to function at various levels." (p. 367)

53.   ———. 1990. "Derrida and Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* on the Origin of Language." *Philosophy East and West* no. 40:3-16.
Reprinted in H. G. Coward, *Derrida and Indian Philosophy*, Albany: State University of New York Press 1990, pp. 27-48.
"Professor T. R. V. Murti, in his 1963 presidential address(1) to the Indian Philosophical Congress, presented a challenge to Indian philosophy - a challenge that seems to have fallen on deaf ears. Murti challenged the traditional schools of Indian philosophy to rethink themselves and their relationships with one another from the perspective of language.
Not only would this breathe fresh air into the stale situation obtaining in Indian philosophy-because the Kantian and Hegelian reinterpretations of basic Indian metaphysics had about run their course - it would also allow a significant engagement between Indian philosophy and the contemporary Western concern with the philosophy of language. This chapter takes up that challenge by entering a dialogue between traditional Indian philosophy as formulated by Bhartṛhari and the modern Western deconstructionist thought of Jacques Derrida. In approaching this dialogue I will follow the insightful suggestions of Professor Murti as to one point on which this dialogue should be focused, namely, the issue of the origin of language." (pp. 27-28 of the reprint)
(1) T. R. V. Murti, "Some Thoughts on the Indian Philosophy of Language. " Presidential Address to the 37th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held in Chandigarh in 1963, and reprinted in *Studies in Indian Thought: The Collected Papers of Professor T. R. V. Murti*, ed. Harold Coward. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983, pp. 355-376 .

54.   ———. 1991. ""Speech versus Writing" in Derrida and Bhartrhari." *Philosophy East and West* no. 41 (2):141-162.
Reprinted in H. G. Coward, *Derrida and Indian Philosophy*, Albany: State University of New York Press 1990, pp. 49-79.
"Both Derrida and Bhartṛhari agree that, since philosophy must be done in language, literary analysis is as important and perhaps more important than logical analysis. As Derrida puts it, philosophers have been able to impose their various conceptual systems only by ignoring or suppressing the disruptive effects of language.(20)
Bhartṛhari in Vākyapadīya 1 : 14 describes Grammar as the "purifier of all the sciences." It is through the use of correct forms of language-as identified by the Grammarians-that philosophic or any other kind of knowledge can be obtained. Both Bhartṛhari and Derrida break down the barrier between literary criticism and philosophy." (p. 56 of the reprint)
(20) Christopher Norris, *Deconstruction: Theory and Practice*. London: Methuen, 1982, p. 18.

55.   ———. 1994. "Kumārila's theory of word meaning in relation to the sphoṭa theory of Bhartṛhari." In *Studies in Mīmāṃsā, Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume*, edited by Dwivedi, R. C., 215-219. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
"Kumārila of the Mīmāṃsā school and Bhartṛhari of the Grammarian school share many points of agreement with reg:ird to word meaning. Over against schools such as the *Cārvāka, Jaina, Nyāya and Buddhists*, that see the relationship between word and meaning as human-made or conventional, Kumārila and Bhartṛhari agree that the relationship between the word (*śabda*) and its meaning (*artha*) is inborn, eternal and therefore not subject to creation by any person including even God.(1)" (p. 215) (...)

"Kumārila, arguing against Bhartṛhari, maintains that the word or *śabda*, whether it be the sentence or the individual word, is nothing more than a collection of word-sounds or spoken letters, and it is with this collection alone that the word-meaning is associated. When such a coIIection is brought to the mind of the hearer by the sounds uttered by the speaker, the hearer understands the meaning from the sounds alone. No mystical entity, such as *sphoṭa*, need be postulated at all.(6) According to Bhartṛhari, however, "the essence of the *Sphoṭa* doctrine is the idea that the word, mainly in the form of the sentence and secondarily in the form of the individual word and the phoneme (the articulated letter sound), is an entity over and above the sounds and not a mere collection of them and that it is this entity which is the bearer of the meaning.(7)"
(...)
"The debate between Kumārila and Bhartṛhari as to how words reveal their meaning is clearly summarized in the *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Misra.(4)" (p. 216)
(...)
"Although Maṇḍana in presenting this debate clearly favours the Grammarian position, a dispassionate reading of the analysis suggests a draw rather than a victory for one side or the other. Neither Kumārila nor Bhartṛhari solve the question of how words convey meaning on purely logical grounds. Both take recourse to non-logical argument. For Kumārila it is the postulation of *apūrva*, based on the revelation of the Veda, that is found to be necessary for words to convey meaning. For Bhartṛhari it is the postulation of the *sphoṭa*, based on the intuitive experience of the speaker and hearer, that is found to be necessary for words to convey meaning. Both Kumārila and Bhartṛhari ground themselves upon the Vedas and argue that their respective schools provide the true understanding and prescription for life offered by the Vedic revelation." (pp. 218-219, a note omitted)
(1) See the *Śabara Bhāṣya* in Ganganatha Jha, *Purva-Mīmāṃsā in Its Sources* (Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 2nd Edition, 1964). p. 98.
(6) *Ślokavārtika* of Kumarilābhatta, trans. by Ganganatha Jha (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1909), sūtra v, section 12, pp. 261-68. Śaṅkarā offers essentially the same argument against the *Sphoṭa* Theory (see Śaṅkarā 's *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma Sūtras* 1.3.28).
(7) K.A. Subramania Iyer, 'Introduction' to *Sphoṭasiddhi*, of Maṇḍana Miśra, trans. by K.A.S. Iyer (Poona: Deccan College, 1966), p. 3.

56.   Das, Nilanjan. 2022. "Pratibhā, Intuition, and Practical Knowledge." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*:1-27.
First online 9 June 2022.
Abstract: "In Sanskrit philosophy, the closest analogue of intuition is pratibhā. Here, I will focus on the theory of pratibhā offered by the Sanskrit grammarian Bhartṛhari (fifth century CE). On this account, states of pratibhā play two distinct psychological roles. First, they serve as sources of linguistic understanding. They are the states by means of which linguistically competent agents effortlessly understand the meaning of novel sentences. Second, states of pratibhā serve as sources of practical knowledge. On the basis of such states, both human and non-human agents unreflectively know which actions they should perform under which circumstances. Given these two roles of pratibhā, modern commentators have often claimed that states of pratibhā, as understood by Bhartṛhari, are intuitions. In this article, I will reconstruct Bhartṛhari's view and to explore its consequences, I will argue that, if Bhartṛhari's theory of pratibhā is right, then a form of human exceptionalism – which makes rationality a unique trait of human beings – becomes difficult to maintain."

57.   Dash, Narendra Kumar. 1998. Bhartṛhari's Critism [sic] in Jain Logic: a study. 1-9.
Available on at Jain Quantum.
"The grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari opines that *Sabda* is the substratum of the world of appearance and thus he accepts the theory of *Sabdāvaita*. However this key-stone of the Grammarians' system of Metaphysics has elaborately been

controverted by the rival schools. Here we propose to record the dialectics of the Jains Philosophers, one of the rival schools of Metaphysics.

This theory of Bhartṛhari has been subjected to severe criticism by the Naiyayikas, Mimamsajas, Buddhists and Jains. Now, for our practical purpose we discuss the view of the Jaina logicians like Vidyanandi (9th century A.D.), Abhayadev Suri (11th century A.D.), Prabhacandra (1st half 12th Century A.D.), Vadideva Suri (later half of 12th Century, A.D.) and Shree Yasovijaya jee (18th Century A.D.)." (p. 1)

58.   Davis, Lawrence Ward. 1978. *Studies in Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya*, University of Massachusetts.
Doctoral dissertation.
Absract: "Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* was the work in which the speculations of the Indian Grammarians found their fullest expression. In this dissertation three topics treated in the *Vākyapadīya* are explicated: ākānksā, sphoṭa, and sabda-brahman. A Montague-style categorial grammar for a fragment of Sanskrit is given to provide an explication of the term ākānksā. The semantics of that fragment is discussed in connection with the concept sphota and it is argued that Bhartrhari's theory of sphota was not the one currently attributed to him by scholars of his work. The concept of sabdabrahman is discussed with reference to two questions: Why did Bhartṛhari think that the study of Grammar leads to salvation, and how can a monistic position be consistently asserted? The formal machinery of the earlier chapters is employed in these discussions. Another concept—that of metalanguage hierarchies—is discussed but the intent is to demonstrate that such hierarchies need not be employed in a formal treatment of Bhartṛhari's work and a different system is given within which such hierarchies may be accommodated without recourse to a different language."

59.   Deshpande, Madhav. 1992. "Bhartṛhari (ca. 450—510)." In *Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language / La philosophie du langage. Vol. 1*, edited by Dascal, Marcelo, Gerhardus, Dietfried, Lorenz, Kuno and Meggle, Georg, 269-278. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
1. Introduction 269; 2. Summary of the *Vākyapadīya* 271; 3. Assessment of Bhartṛhari's contribution to
philosophy of language 277; 4. Selected references 278.
"We know from the tradition that a work called *Saṅgraha* by Vyāḍi was the first known massive work devoted to general issues such as the eternal or non-eternal nature of language, and whether a word denoted a universal or a particular. However, this work which existed before Patañjali's time was soon lost. Among available texts, Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* is the very first devoted to a systematic investigation of issues relating to language.
While many such discussions are scattered in the works of Kātyāyana, Patañjali, Jaimini etc., Bhartṛhari deals with them in a systematic fashion. While he explains hundreds of different theories, there are some theories for which he is particularly well known. Among these, we must include his notion of *Brahman*, the ultimate reality, as a language-principle, the evolution of the material world from the *Brahman* being likened to the manifestation of meanings by words.
While this notion existed in a rudimentary form before Bhartṛhari, he presents it in a decisive shape. The second significant contribution of Bhartṛhari is the notion of *sphoṭa*, ›real word‹, being without parts and sequence, and yet being manifested by sounds which appear in a particular sequence. A related notion is that of a sentence being indivisible and its meaning also being indivisible. If the sentence-meaning is indivisible, then it is certainly not understood as a sequence of the constituent word-meanings. Bhartṛhari's notion is that the sentence-meaning is understood in a flash of understanding (*pratibhā*).
While granting this unitary character of a sentence, its meaning etc., Bhartṛhari also admits that subsequent analysis allows us to isolate components of sentences and words, as well as those of sentence-meanings and word-meanings. Such an analytical understanding is valued for theoretical purposes, but one is warned that in

the actual linguistic communication in the real world, such analysed entities do not occur." (p. 277)

60.　　———. 1998. "Evolution of the Notion of Authority (*Prāmāṇya*) in the Pāṇinian Tradition." *Histoire Épistémologie Langage* no. 20:5-28.

Abstract: "The Paninian tradition assumes a special structure of authority for the three founding grammarians, i.e. Pânini, Kâtyâyana, and Patanjali. It is assumed that among these founding grammarians, Patanjali has the highest authority. Then comes Kâtyâyana, and then comes Pânini himself. It is also assumed that these three grammarians are sages (*muni*) and hold a special status, while the tradition after Patanjali is believed to fall into decline and does not command the same high authority. This paper traces the historical evolution of these notions. It first points out that Pânini had not deified (or rather muni-fied) the grammarians who are cited in his grammar. Similarly, Pânini himself was not muni-fied by Kâtyâyana and Patanjali. However, they ascribe some special respect for him, and treat his grammar as being like the Vedas, the scriptures of the Hindus. It is in Bhartrhari's works (500 A.D.) that we see the first signs of muni-fication of the early grammarians and a feeling that contemporary scholars do not have a native command of Sanskrit. In Kaiyata, we have the full statement of authority of the three early grammarians, with indications of Patanjali being considered an incarnation of the snake divinity Sesa. In the works of Nâgesabhatta, we have the full development of these conceptions, with the inspiration for the grammar of Pânini being attributed to Shiva and his grammar acquiring the status of Veda."

61.　　Desnitskaya, Evgeniya. 2006. "Antinomy of One and Many in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya." *Acta Orientalia Vilnensia* no. 7:209-221.

Abstract: "Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (VP) is notorious for the multiplicity of the mutually exclusive doctrines expounded there, without any final solution. This paper aims to demonstrate that in the case of every controversial question discussed in VP, the variety of views on it can be reduced to a basic antinomy which serves as a kind of proposition for the problem under consideration. These antinomies are sometimes expressed explicitly but very often they are hidden in the text of VP. The fundamental dichotomy is the opposition between pluralism and monism, the origin of which in turn can be traced in the contradiction between the grammatical background and ontological trends of Bhartṛhari's philosophy.

The way in which Bhartṛhari integrates these extremities into a total system is analyzed in this paper on the basis of some passages, dealing with a certain semantic problem, from the 1st and the 3rd *kāndas* of VP. Attention is focused on the concept of activity and its role in Bhartṛhari's philosophical discourse."

62.　　———. 2016. "*Paśyantī, Pratibhā, Sphoṭa and Jāti*: Ontology and Epistemology in the Vākyapadīya." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 44:325-335.

Abstract: "Eli Franco has recently suggested to distinguish the two main periods in the history of Indian philosophy, i.e. the older ontological and the new epistemological.

In the Vākyapadīya, however, ontology and epistemology are evidently intertwined and interrelated. In this paper ontological and epistemological features of the concepts of *paśyantī, pratibhā, sphoṭa* and *jāti* are analyzed in order to demonstrate that all these concepts, while being ontologically different, are engaged in similar epistemological processes, i.e. the cognition of a verbal utterance. Thus the identification of *sphoṭa* and *jāti* as well as of *paśyantī* and *pratibhā* met with in some passages of VP and the commentaries implies not the absolute identity of these concepts, but only their overlapping in the sphere of epistemology. Considering concepts of different origin in one epistemological perspective enables to escape controversies in interpretation and provides a kind of consistency in a bit but amorphous work of Bhartṛhari."

References

Franco, E. (2013). On the periodization and historiography of Indian Philosophy. In E. Franco (Ed.). Periodization and historiography of Indian Philosophy (pp. 1–34).

Verein "Sammlung de Nobili, Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Indologie und Religionsforschung", Institut för Südasien-, Tibet-und Buddhismuskunde der Universität Wien.

63.   ———. 2018. "Bhartrhari's Perspectivism as a Philosophical Strategy: Its Origins and Possible Interpretations." *Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research* no. 233:9-11.
Abstract: "The 'Vakyapadiya' of Bhartṛhari, the famous Indian linguistic philosopher (5th CE), presents many different, often mutually exclusive, views on language and its relationship with cognitive processes and extra-linguistic relation. Modern scholars designate this methodological approach as perspectivism. This paper provides the analysis of perspectivism as a philosophical strategy. Two general features of Bhartṛhari's perspectivism have been identified, namely the functional attitude and the idea of the relative incompleteness of every single doctrine. The origin of both features has been traced in the works of the ancient grammarians as well as in the earlier Brahmanic texts."

64.   ———. 2018. "Language and Extra-linguistic Reality in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya." *Sophia* no. 57:643-659.
Abstract: "Relation between language and extra-linguistic reality is an important problem of Bhartṛhari's linguistic philosophy. In the 'Vākyapadīya,' [VP] this problem is discussed several times, but in accordance with the general perspectivist trend of Bhartṛhari's philosophy each time it is framed through different concepts and different solutions are provided. In this essay, an attempt is undertaken to summarize the variety of different and mutually exclusive views on language and extra-linguistic reality in VP and to formulate the hidden presuppositions on which the actual viewpoints expressed in the *kārikās* are based. As a result, the following approaches are formulated: (A1) Language is coextensive with external reality. (A2a) Language, designated as *kalpanā/vikalpa,* is distinct from reality. (A2b) Language refers to the secondary/metaphorical reality (*upacārasattā/aupacārikī sattā*). (A3) Language and reality somehow correlate, because otherwise, practical/linguistic activity (*vyavahāra*) would be impossible. The origin of these approaches and their affinities with different schools of Indian philosophy (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist Pramāṇavāda) are examined. Approach (A3), according to which correlation between language and reality is functional and not ontological, seems very close to Dharmakīrti's concept of *arthakriyā*. This approach accords with Bhartṛhari's perspectivist philosophical strategy. It enabled him to explain how effective linguistic activity is possible, capturing language in its dynamic aspect, without limitative static ontological constructions."

65.   ———. 2021. "Atman as Substance in the *Vākyapadīya* and Beyond." *Philosophy East & West*:287-308.
"The "Dravyasamuddeśa" is a chapter of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (VP) that considers substance (*dravya*) to be the referent of all words and the ultimate essence of all phenomena. In the first *kārikā* of this chapter (VP 3.2.1) Bhartṛhari lists several synonyms of *dravya*, with *Ātman* being the first among them. It follows from Helārāja's commentary that each member of this list is the central concept of some philosophical tradition—*Ātma*n in particular belongs to the Advaitavādins. Being a traditional commentator, Helārāja could not have cared less for the chronology, but approaching his explanation critically one may wonder what particular form of Advaita he might have in mind and whether Bhartṛhari, who flourished circa the fifth century C.E., could have been familiar with this teaching. Moreover, there is another question that may arise with respect to this *kārikā* and Helārāja's explanation: what generally is the reason to identify *Ātman* with substance?"
(...)
"The present essay attempts to clarify the meaning of this doctrine and the possible reasons for it to appear. An attempt is also made to trace possible origins of this doctrine in the tradition prior to Bhartṛhari. In what follows, I will dwell, first, on

the immediate context of *kārikā* 3.2.1. Second, I will focus attention on the concepts of *dravya* and *Ātman* as they appear in the VP and in some earlier works, namely in the *Mahābhāṣya*, in the Upaniṣads, and in some other works. Finally, I will analyze possible reasons for *dravya* and *Ātman* to be equated, arguing that the clay or gold analogy widely used in different texts can be considered a clue to this equation." (pp. 287-288)

66.   Devi, Shantipriya. 2020. "Transmission of Language in the Metaphysical Framework of Bhartṛhari." *International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (IJTSRD)* no. 4:386-387.
Abstract: "As the traditional texts have shown many lights on the theory of language, the Vedas have shown the path to a large extent. The people started communicating with each other and it became the medium of expression. When language started then systematization started slowly and grammatical treatises became possible and were made available through transmission. In the grammatical tradition Bhartṛhari became the champion in analyzing the metaphysical framework of it in detail. The paper discusses that very aspect here."

67.   Dobre, Florina. 2007. "The Sphoṭa Theory of the Indian Grammarians and Structural Linguistics Theories." In *Proceedings of the International symposium, University of Valahia, Targoviste, 3-4 november 2006*, 1-9. Targoviste: Valhai University Press.
"The sphoṭa theory is a rather wide topic of discussion among the Indian linguistics theories given its role on both the phonetic as well as the semantic plan of language. In this paper, I do not plan to take care of all aspects of the theory but rather focus on certain similarities and disagreements between the Indian grammarians' theories on sphoṭa and some interpretations of the linguistic sign as envisaged by the structural linguistics schools of Saussure and Hjelmslev.
The sphoṭa doctrine is generally considered as one of the most important contributions of the old Indian grammarians to the central problem of general linguistic as well as philosophy of language(1). According to it, the word or the sentence when taken as an indivisible meaning-unit is the sphoṭa. It's not certain whether Pāṇini knew the term in its full complexity, but in the sūtra 6.1.123 "avaṅ sphoṭāyanasya"(2) of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* he refers an early grammarian called Sphoṭāyana. The later grammarians such as the 10th century Harādātta or the 16th century Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa are of the opinion that this Sphoṭāyana fathered the doctrine. On the other hand, Yāska(3) who is generally placed one century earlier than Pāṇini holds that another grammarian Audumbarāyaṇa is the forerunner of the sphoṭa theory." (p. 1)
(1) B.K. Matilal, *The Word and the World. India's Contribution to the Study of Language*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990.1989, p. 77.
(2) Pā 6.1.123: avaṅ sphoṭāyanasya "According to the opinion of Sphoṭāyana, there is a substitution of avaṅ for the *o* of *go* when it is follwed by any vowel".
(3) The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta of Yāska., I.1-2, 1998, p. 29.

68.   Dravid, Raja Ram. 1972. *The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Chapter IX: *The Grammarian's view of word and meaning*, pp. 209-263.
"The Grammarian has made significant contribution to the study of word and meaning. Our discussion of the Grammarian's view would be based mainly on Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and the commentaries thereon by the author himself, Puṇyāraja and Helārāja. It is necessary to state at the very outset that the philosophical standpoint of the Grammarian is absolutistic. The ultimate reality (Brahman), as Bhartṛhari describes it, is of the nature of the word; it is without beginning or end, it is the cause of the manifested phonemes, it is what appears as the objects, and it is from which the creation of the world proceeds. The word-Absolute
is said to have dual aspects of unity (vydiā) and diversity (avydiā), but, of these, the former alone is real, while the latter is merely apparent. In itself the Word-Absolute

is undifferentiated, but due to the power of *nescience* it appears as diverse. Thus, the world of objects, according to the Grammarian, is nothing but the appearance of the Absolute Word." (p. 209, note omitted)

69.   Dwivedi, Prabha Shankar. 2016. "Signification and Resolution of Absolute in a Textual Structure: A Study in Relation to Bhartṛhari and Jacques Lacan." *Journal of Comparative Literature and Aesthetics* no. 39:123-133.

Abstract: "This paper intends to explore affinity and interface between Indian and Western concepts of the signification and configuration of meaning in conceptual forms by focusing the attention on Bhartṛhari (Indian Grammarian, Linguist and Philosopher of c. 5th Century A.D.) and Jacques Lacan (A French psychoanalyst and early Poststructuralist critic). This comparative study of historically and culturally wide apart Indian and Western epistemology and linguistics aims to provide exegesis to those unearthed concepts, which could only be explained in relation to each other. Both, Bhartṛhari and Lacan confer the ultimate eminence to language, according to them the governing power of the whole world is contained in language/word/*śabda*. Bhartṛhari concedes śabda to be a seed of the entire universe, everything evolves from it. It is this śabda that expresses itself in all the forms; all the three states of *bhoktā* (enjoyer), bokta (enjoyed) and *bhoga* (enjoyment) are its varied manifestations. As per Bhartṛhari, who considers it Brahman, it is this śabda Brahman that prevails everywhere. It simultaneously is the cause of reality and illusion in one and the same thing. Lacan, like Bhartṛhari, has full faith over the power of language which in itself sufficiently deals with all the transactions of the world and proffers it its immediate existence which particularly by human beings is viewed as organized, systematic, coherent and to a large extent real.

(...)

The paper concludes as Bhartṛharian ideas/expositions present in the *Vākyapadīyam*, unequivocally, have the universal appeal and extant acceptance irrespective of physical limitations, spatial contexts and temporal boundaries; that is why his stand in respect of language studies precedes all the major theoreticians in the field regardless of cultural and historical variations."

70.   ———. 2017. "Thinking Dialectically on Indian Tradition of Knowledge and Western Knowledge System with Special Reference to Bhartrhari and Saussure." *Litterit*:133-143.

Abstract: "This paper aims at the dialectical study of Indian and Western traditions of knowledge with special reference to Bhartṛharian philosophy of language and Saussure's conception of linguistics. Philosophico-linguistic study of both the systems of knowledge leads the researcher to a point where postulation of one is clearly perceived to be corresponding with the other. Opinions of the scholars in language study won‟t be divided on the fact that Saussure's theory of language and meaning was much influenced with his study of Sanskrit grammar and linguistic philosophy propounded and taken forward by Pāṇinian school and particulaly by Bhartṛhari, which the present paper supports with textual evidences. Both Bhartṛhari and Saussure consider meaning to be the result of the interplay of relations among individual linguistic units in a structure of the system of language. This paper also uncovers the conceptual growth of the idea establishing the structural notion of language in respect of configuration of meaning through constitutive linguistic units. Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīyam* deals with many ground-breaking linguistic facts in which the idea of language as structure is centrally located. Both, Bhartṛhari and Saussure consider meaning to be the result of the interplay of relations among individual linguistic units in a structure of the system of language. The paper also gives a detailed account of how Saussure's thought the founding-stone of structuralism, pre-figure in those of Bhartṛhari‟s pronouncements in his monumental treatise, the *Vākyapadīyam*."

71.   ———. 2019. *Bhartṛhari, Structuralism and Poststructuralism*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Contents: Preface VII; 1. Vâkyapadîya and (Post)Structuralism 1; 2. Bhartṛhari and Saussure 33; 3. Bhartṛhari and Derrida 77; 4. Bhartṛhari and Lacan 117; 5. Conclusion 149; Appendix 169; Bibliography 175; Index 185-188.

"The convergence of content into being is actually the consequence of the contextual value inscription, which supposedly commences after the valid permutations, authorised by the existing rules and laws of the language in the construction of a textual structure. In a textual form, value is not generated; instead it is configured for having been due upon varied contextual conditions, as in different contexts and relational associations, a linguistic unit hardly stands for the same meaning. That is why, Ferdinand de Saussure observes it to be arbitrary, and Bhartṛhari considers smaller units as 'unreal' before the structure obtained by the authorized permutations of the contents, which for the similar reasons is viewed as 'erratic' and 'unreal' by Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan. But these poststructuralist theoreticians vary from Bhartṛhari in the final resolution of this semantic event, where for Bhartṛhari the forms/structures consecutively emerged bear meanings, and if the event continues, the finally obtained value would be considered 'real' against the forms obtained at different steps. This state, which in Bhartṛhari, is being addressed as final, never arrives in Derrida, and even for that matter in Lacan. Both the theoreticians view the whole process as a chain of endless signification, where each content is constitutive of some other content, and thus, the process attains a state of infinity. Here, the value obtained, being aberration leads to another value, which further directs to some other, and in this way a constant event of perpetual postponement of meaning begins, not to be resolved at any point, while structuralism, like Bhartṛhari, always procures a meaning that can be considered to be final by the authority of the logos, where the process of signification may end for the given conceptual form. In the subsequent pages of the present book, an effort has been made to comprehend the nature of meaning as it is obtained in the views expressed by Bhartṛhari, and European structuralist and poststructuralist theorists so as to establish the nature of affinity between discursive formation inherent upon Indian and Western traditions of thought." (from the *Preface*)

72.   Ferrante, Marco. 2013. "Vṛṣabhadeva's Sphuṭākṣarā on Bhartṛhari's Metaphysics: Commentarial Strategy and New Interpretations." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 41:133-149.
Abstract: "Although somewhat neglected in the scholarly debate, Vṛṣabhadeva's commentary (known as *Sphuṭākṣarā* or *Paddhati,* possibly 8th c. CE) on Vākyapadīya's first chapter, offers a remarkable analysis of Bhartṛhari's views on metaphysics and philosophy of language. Vākyapadīya's first four *kārikās* deal with ontological issues, defining the key elements of Bhartṛhari's non-dualistic edifice such as the properties of the unitary principle, its powers, the role of time and the ontological status of worldly objects. Vṛṣabhadeva's interpretation of the *kārikās* in question is intriguing and seems to be guided by the urgency to find a solution to the riddle which every non-dualistic theory has to face: how is it possible to postulate a unitary principle of reality when reality is cognized as multiple? In accomplishing the task Vṛṣabhadeva proposes various solutions (some of them based on concepts which are hardly detectable in Vākyapadīya and appear close to the ones propounded in certain trends of Advaita Vedānta), finally suggesting an explanation which, focusing on the pragmatic aspect of language, is altogether consistent with Bhartṛhari's theoretical picture."

73.   ———. 2014. "How ro Obtain Salvation Through Language? Bhartṛhari on *śabdapūrvayoga*." *Rivista di Studi Orientali* no. 87 - Supplemento n* 2:161-176.
Abstract: "Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (5th century AD) is a seminal work in the history of Sanskrit grammatical tradition. It offers an original blending of linguistic and philosophical ideas that will have a strong impact in the ensuing history of Indian speculation. Among other issues, the work endorses the idea that language is capable to bring about spiritual consequences that goes far beyond the boundaries of the ordinary experience. In a nutshell, language has a soteriological import. In particular the article deals with a puzzling expression contained in the first chapter

of the work — *śabdapūrvayoga* — which seems to embody Bhartṛhari's peculiar conception of language as a tool for obtaining "salvation"."

74.   ———. 2015. "Vṛṣabhadeva on the Status of Ordinary Phenomena: Between Bhartṛhari and Advaita Vedānta." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 43:61-83.
Abstract: "Vṛṣabhadeva's *Sphuṭākṣarā,* a commentary on the first chapter of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* and its *Vṛtti*, offers a peculiar interpretation of the monistic ideas exposed at the beginning of the *mūla* text. The reflection on the status of ordinary reality and its relation with the unitary metaphysical principle is particularly interesting. Although according to Bhartṛhari's perspective the entities of the world are real, the *Sphuṭākṣarā* offers a more intricate picture in which different degrees of reality seem involved. Furthermore, the author adopts hermeneutical tools that are unusual in Bhartṛhari's texts, and comparable to those of Advaita Vedānta. In particular, the article will deal with Vṛṣabhadeva's use of the notion of 'inexpressibility' (*anirvacanīyatva*), as well as with other concepts which are typical of the scholastic phase of Advaita. In discussing these affinities the paper will also touch upon the problem of Vṛṣabhadeva's historical collocation."

75.   ———. 2017. "Studies on Bhartṛhari and the Pratyabhijñā: The Case of *svasaṃvedana*." *Religions* no. 8:1-25.
Abstract: "The article addresses a critical problem in the history of South Asian philosophy, namely the nature of the 'knowledge of knowledge' (*svasaṃvedana*). In particular, it investigates how the ´Saiva tantric school of the Pratyabhijñā (10th–11th c. CE) used the notion as an argument against the Buddhists' ideas on the nature of the self. The paper then considers the possibility that the source of the ´Saivas' discussion was the work of the philosopher/grammarian Bhartṛhari (5th c. CE)."

76.   ———. 2017. "Bhartṛhari and verbal testimony: a 'hyper-antireductionist' approach?" *Kervan – International Journal of Afro-Asiatic Studies* no. 21:227-246.
Abstract: "The grammarian and philosopher Bhartṛhari (5th. c. CE) developed a philosophy that is essentially characterized by the prominent role language has in structuring humans' efforts to cope with reality. Within this broader picture, he adopted an epistemological standpoint that was somehow at odds with the standard view of other South Asian thinkers, usually founded on a careful and systematic distinction of the means able to lead to a reliable cognitive event (technically called pramāṇas). Bhartṛhari claimed that such an interpretation is rather artificial, and that a cognition is actually a multifaceted process, whose single components are almost always hard to pinpoint. His main theoretical contribution consists of affirming that such a multifaceted cognitive act is informed and shaped by language.
The article deals with Bhartṛhari's epistemology by discussing the author's opinion on the nature of testimony. Furthermore, it addresses the question whether pure inference should always be regarded as an accurate way of acquiring knowledge."

77.   ———. 2020. "Studies on Bhartṛhari and the Pratyabhijñā: Language, Knowledge and Consciousness." *Journal of Indian Philosophy*:147-159.
Abstract. "The article examines the impact the grammarian/philosopher Bhartṛhari (460–510) had on the way the 'School of Recognition' (Pratyabhijñā, tenth/eleventh c. CE) elaborated the notion that knowledge and consciousness have a close relationship with language. The paper first lays out Bhartṛhari's ideas, showing that his theses are rationally defensible and philosophically refined. More specifically, it claims that the grammarian is defending a view which is in many respects similar to 'higher-order theories' of consciousness advanced by some contemporary philosophers of mind. In the second part, the paper shows how Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta adopted Bhartṛhari's scheme without significant alteration."

78.   ———. 2020. "The Place of Language in the Philosophy of the Recognition." In *The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Philosophy of Language*, edited by Graheli, Alessandro, 135-149. New York: Bloomsbury.
§ 4. *The Influence of Bhartṛhari and Pratyabhijñā's Innovations*, p. 142.

"Bhartṛhari's discussion of the issue [the necessary relationship that obtains between knowledge and language] takes place around a well-known stanza of his Vākyapadīya (VP), the one in which the author claims that language pervades all knowledge.(20) In regard to this, Bhartṛhari holds that the criterion of veridical cognition is causal efficiency.(21)
He maintains that there is no knowledge without a cognitive synthesis that binds together nonconscious cognitions, and that this higher order cognitive synthesis is conceptual and linguistic.(22)" (p. 142, sanskrit in the notes omitted)
(20) 20 VP, 1.131: "In the world there is no cognition without the pervasion of language. All knowledge shines as if pierced by language."
(21) VP, 1.129: "In the world all that is required to be done is dependent on language. A child too understands it on the basis of the traces of previous births."
See *Vākyapadīya-Vṛtti* on 1.131: "Just like one has a verbal potentiality in a contracted form, similarly no effect is produced by indeterminate knowledge, even if it arises in relation with objects that are [already] known." And finally VP, 1.135: "Language urges all creatures towards successful activities. If it were to disappear, all this world would appear as unconscious as a piece of wood."
(22) *Vṛtti* on VP, 1.132: "If knowledge were not by nature linguistic, that very vague cognition that has been produced, being unable to contribute to another cognition, would not function as a means to accomplish the action of knowing. In fact, once there is a cognition of a bare object, whose different parts are not functional to each other and are mutually independent, immediately after comes a unification, a synthesis, the production of a unitary content, that is, the grasping of conjoined capacities as undifferentiated; all this is connected to the linguistic nature of knowledge."

79.   Gajjam, Jayashree Aanand, Kanojia, Diptesh, and Kulkarni, Malhar. 2018. New Vistas to study Bhartṛhari: Cognitive NLP. *World Sanskrit Conference (WSC 2018)*: 1-19.
Abstract: "The Sanskrit grammatical tradition which has commenced with Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* mostly as a *Padaśāstra* has culminated as a *Vākyaśāstra,* at the hands of *Bhartṛhari*. The grammarian-philosopher *Bhartṛhari* and his authoritative work 'Vākyapadīya' have been a matter of study for modern scholars, at least for more than 50 years, since Ashok Aklujkar submitted his Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard University.[*] The notions of a sentence and a word as a meaningful linguistic unit in the language have been a subject matter for the discussion in many works that followed later on. While some scholars have applied philological techniques to critically establish the text of the works of *Bhartṛhari,* some others have devoted themselves to exploring philosophical insights from them. Some others have studied his works from the point of view of modern linguistics, and psychology. Few others have tried to justify the views by logical discussions.
In this paper, we present a fresh view to study *Bhartṛhari,* and his works, especially the 'Vākyapadīya'. This view is from the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP), more specifically, what is called as Cognitive NLP. We have studied the definitions of a sentence given by Bhartṛhari at the beginning of the second chapter of 'Vākyapadīya'. We have researched one of these definitions by conducting an experiment and following the methodology of silent-reading of Sanskrit paragraphs. We collect the Gaze-behavior data of participants and analyze it to understand the underlying comprehension procedure in the human mind and present our results. We evaluate the statistical significance of our results using T-test, and discuss the caveats of our work. We also present some general remarks on this experiment and usefulness of this method for gaining more insights in the work of *Bhartṛhari*."
[*] Ashok Aklujkar, *The philosophy of Bhartṛhari's Trikāṇḍī*, unpublished dissertation, Harvard Univesity, 1970.

80.   Gajjam, Jayashree Aanand, and Kulkarni, Malhar. 2019. A Novel Outlook for Studying 'Vakyapadiya': A point of Departure. In *Proceedings of Academics World 106th International Conference, Pune, India, 24th - 25th November, 2018.*

Abstract: "The 'Vākyapadīya' written by ancient Indian grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari in the fifth century CE ranks among the principal authoritative works in Sanskrit Grammar. This phenomenal text has been the topic of research for various grammarians, philosophers, philologists, and linguists since then. While various modern scholars have applied different methods to critically examine the theories stated in the 'Vākyapadīya', we propose a novel approach to study them i.e. psycholinguistics perspective. We present the theoretical discussion of the sentence-definitions given in the 'Vākyapadīya' along with the experimental design for each of them to analyze them from a cognitive point of view. This preliminary work is the first of its kind of work in Sanskrit grammar and can be considered as a bridge which brings two disciplines together i.e. Sanskrit grammar and the psycholinguistics. The approach in this paper is to provide a point of departure for the researchers working in these two fields. We also present guidelines for the experimental procedure and the methodology that is to be followed. We discuss the caveats of this work and suggest possible future work."

81.   Ganguli, Hemanta Kuma. 1963. *Philosophy of Logical Construction: An Examination of Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism in the Light of the Philosophies of Bhartṛhari, Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta*. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.
"The author of the present treatise has tried to view the matter from a new angle of vision. It is perhaps the first attempt of its kind to examine some fundamental tenets of modern positivism in the light of some systems of ancient Indian Philosophy. Bhartṛhari was the greatest theoretician of Nominalistic Idealism as it is understood in Indian Philosophy, and Dharmakīrti the most formidable figure of Yogacara Buddhism, along with his most competent commentator Prajñākaragupta, was perhaps more enthusiastic about the status of the 'pure given' than many among the modern positivists.
Without entertaining any mission for murdering metaphysics, but with an unsurpassed zeal for hair-splitting analysis, they discussed some basic problems which are still plaguing the minds of the modern positivists, such as, the relation between language and reality, the role of language in shaping human knowledge, the nature of logical fictions, the status of meaning, the essence of the 'given' and the possibility of its representation in language, and lastly, the problem of verification and contradiction.
They reached their respective conclusions which received from them a full-throated declaration, but which might have also been announced by the modern positivists had they been less afraid of being called metaphysicians or subjective idealists. These ancient philosophers might have been right or wrong, but they were at least more consistent than most of the modern positivists. This is the matter in the main that I have attempted to show in this book." (*Introduction*, pp. IV-V)

82.   Haag-Bernede, Pascale. 2001. "Conflicting Views in the Interpretation of Bhartṛhari? The Case of *Madhyamapurusa* in the *Vākyapadīya*." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* no. 82:233-242.
"This paper aims to draw attention to a problem of interpretation in the *Purusasamuddeśa* (PS), which is the 10th chapter of the *Praklrnakanda*, the third part of the Vākyapadīya (VP). This *samuddeśa* is one of the shortest chapters of the whole work, as it contains only nine *kãrikãs*. The PS can be divided into three parts: the first three *kãrikãs* deal with the meanings of the three persons (*prathama*, *madhyama* and *uttamapuruṣa*). The first *kãrikã* establishes that *uttamapuruṣa* expresses the state of *pratyañc*, that is to say, according to Helārāja's commentary, the ego-sense, or the individual soul. *Madhyamapuruṣa* expresses the state of being different from that *pratyañc* (*parabhāva*). The second and third *kãrikãs* state that these two persons alone are able to convey the meaning of *caitanya*, "consciousness", whereas *prathamapuruṣa* in the remaining cases (i.e. when the meaning of *caitanya* by the verbal-ending). The second part is devoted to one special feature of the second person: some hold that the sense of (*sambodhana*) is always understood when the verbal-is used. This question is discussed in three

kãrikãs (be dealt with in the present paper. The third part of the last three *kãrikãs*, does not actually concern the but constitutes a general statement about the interpretation rules. The above mentioned problem lies in the last *kãrikã* section, which I find difficult to interpret: it appears the quotation of another view by Bhartṛhari, or his refutation view." (pp. 233-234, notes omitted)

83. Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1991. *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Chapter 2: *The Presence of the Veda in Indian Philosophical Reflection,* pp. 23-50 (On Bhartṛhari pp. 37-41).
Chapter 3: *Vedic Orthodoxy and the Plurality of Religious Traditions*, pp. 51-85 (On Bhartṛhari pp. 59-66).

84. Hattori, Maasaki. 1980. "Apoha and Pratibhā." In *Sanskrit and Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Daniel H.H. Ingalls*, edited by Nagatomi, M., Matilal, Bimal Krishna, Masson, J. M. and Dimock Jr., E. C., 61-73. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"The apoha-theory which aroused much controversy concerning the meaning of the word among the Indian philosophers in the classical period was first expounded by Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya. The fifth chapter of this comprehensive work, which is devoted to the elucidation of the apoha theory, begins with the following verse [*Sanskrit omitted*]:(1)
That [means of cognition] which is based on word is not an [independent] means of cognition other than inference. Because [the word as the basis of] it expresses its own object through the exclusion of the other [things], just as [the inferential mark] '*krtakatva*' or the like [establishes the object to be proved through the exclusion of what is not a possessor of that inferential mark].
As is clear in this verse, the function of a word is recognized by Dignāga as identical with the function of a *linga* (inferential mark) in the process of inference." (p. 61)
(...)
"It is to be noted that pratibhd is recognized in this statement as the meaning of the sentence. The concept of pratibhd is of great importance in the philosophy of word and meaning of the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari.
In the Vākyakāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya, Bhartṛhari sets forth his doctrine of pratibhā in some verses, beginning with: [*Sanskrit omitted*](8)
When the meanings [of the words in a sentence] are understood by separating [the words from the sentence], there arises pratibhā which is different [from the meanings of the words]' That [pratibhā] effected by the meanings of the words is called the meaning of the sentence." (p. 63)
(1) PS: *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, V, k. 1, cited in TSP: *Tattvasamgrahapanjikā* (Bauddha Bharati Ser., 1), p. 539.17-18.
(8) VP: *Vākyapadīya*, II. 143. The verse number of VP is given in accordance with M. Biardeau, *Vākyapadīya Brahmakāṇḍa, avec la vṛtti de Harivṛṣabha,* Paris 1964 for I (*Brahmakāṇḍa*) and with K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye (ed.), *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, Poona 1965 for II *(Vākyakāṇḍa)*. The doctrine of pratibhā is expounded in VP, 11.143-152. Cf. also ibid., I.118, II.117, etc.

85. Herzberger, Hans Georg, and Herzberger, Radikha. 1981. "Bhartṛhari's Paradox." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 9:1-17.
Reprinted in Roy W. Perrett (ed.), *Indian Philosophy. A Collection of Readings: Vol. 2. Logic and Philosophy of Language*, New York: Routledge 2001, pp. 311-327.
"Assuming that many things in our experience and in the world can be named, one may consider whether there are any limits to this process, and whether there are any things which cannot be named. This was a standing question in traditional Indian philosophy, with some schools of thought affirming that everything could be named while others denied it. The affirmative position was especially characteristic of the Nyaya-Vaiṣesika school:(1)
"Naiyāyikās are fond of a saying, which is sometimes found at the head of their works: whatever is, is knowable and nameable".

The negative position was characteristic of the Buddhist philosophers and may have been held by others as well. In its most general terms it may be formulated by an existential statement:
Unnameability Thesis: There are some things which are unnameable.
While it may be surprising and to some extent counter to commonsense, this unnameability thesis belongs to the theory of language and should be subject to rational inquiry. But perplexities arise as soon as one tries to verify it by positive instances, for any positive instance of the unnameability thesis seems bound to name that which it declares to be unnameable. This is the problem we call "Bhartṛhari's paradox", after the fifth century grammarian and philosopher of language, who clearly enunciated it in his *Vākyapadīya*." (p. 311 of the reprint)
(1) See K. Potter, 1977, p. 48. Further discussion is to be found in K. Potter, 1968, which also describes a contradiction having some affinity with Bhartṛhari's paradox, but arising within a rather different philosophical context.
References
Potter, Karl (1968). "Astitva Jñeyatva Abhidheyatva", in *Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner*, Wiener zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud-und Ostasiens und Archiv fürindische Philosophie, Wien, 275-280.
Potter, Karl (1977). *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. Volume 2 (Princeton

86.   Herzberger, Radhika. 1986. *Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists: An Essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari and the Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga(*) are seminal texts in the history of ancient Indian philosophy. One text deals with grammar, the other with logic, both are the work of committed metaphysicians. Written within a span of less than a hundred years, between the fifth and the sixth centuries A.D., these texts have generally been treated separately, as representing independent schools of thought.
This essay attempts to interpret these texts jointly, as a dialogue between a grammarian and a logician. This way of approaching these texts highlights unexpected facets of Bhartṛhari and Dignāga's theories of language and is intended to identify the individual achievements of each. Above all, this treatment is an exercise in writing the intellectual history of a period in time, rather than a history of a school of philosophy.
The prevailing view of Bhartṛhari holds that his linguistic techniques are not intrinsic to his metaphysics. The conclusions reached in the present essay are that Bhartṛhari's metaphysics underlie his linguistic techniques and articulate their presuppositions.
The prevailing view of Dignāga maintains that for him language deals with illusory entities and must falsify what is real. The conclusions reached in the present essay are that Dignāga's logical rules are designed to ensure that in using language one is not committed to a belief in fictional entities." (from the *Preface,* p. IX)
(*) *Note*: I follow the current practice of spelling the logician's name Dignāga rather than Dinnāga.

87.   ———. 1986. "Apoha and Śimśapāvrksa." In *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology: Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and Language*, edited by Matilal, Bimal Krishna and Evans, Robert D., 143-169. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"... I shall try in the course of this paper to identify the philosophical problems that Dinnaga's *apoha* doctrines were designed to solve, and to locate the problem so identified within a historical frame of reference; a part of my overall concern will be to articulate the relevant philosophical issues in universally recognizable terms. The major theories regarding names can be identified as predating Dinnaga's writings on *apoha*: the first can be traced to Bhartṛhari, a philosophical grammarian belonging to the fifth century A.D. whose name ancient tradition associated with that of a celebrated poet: the second is attributed to Katyāyana, a grammarian who belonged to the second or third century B.C. My attempt in this paper will be to find a place for Dinnaga's *apoha* doctrines within the tensions arising between Bhartṛhar's and Katyāyana's theories." (p. 143)

88. Ho, Chien-hsing. 2006. "Saying the Unsayable." *Philosophy East and West* no. 56:409-427.

Abstract: "A number of traditional philosophers and religious thinkers advocated an ineffability thesis to the effect that the ultimate reality cannot be expressed as it truly is by human concepts and words. However, if X is ineffable, the question arises as to how words can be used to gesture toward it. We can't even say that X is unsayable, because in doing so, we would have made it sayable. In this article, I examine the solution offered by the fifth-century Indian grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari and develop it into a linguistic strategy based on the imposition-cum-negation method. The purpose is to show how we can non-contradictorily say, or rather indicate, the unsayable."

89. Ho, Cheh-hsing. 2014. "Meaning, Understanding, and Knowing-what: An Indian Grammarian Notion of Intuition (*Pratibhā*)." *Philosophy East and West* no. 64:404-424.

"For Bhartṛhari, a fifth-century philosopher of the Indian Grammarian (Vaiyākaraṇika) school, all conscious beings — beasts, birds and humans — are capable of what he called *pratibhā*, a flash of indescribable intuitive understanding such that one knows what the present object "means" and what to do with it. Contemporary scholars writing on pratibhā generally translate the Sanskrit term as "intuition," not in the sense understood by many analytical philosophers as an a priori judgment appealed to in thought experiments to test philosophical hypotheses, but in the sense of a spontaneously arising awareness that is immediate, reliable, indescribable, and pregnant with meaning. Significantly, our instantaneous understanding of a sentence or complete utterance already counts as an instance of pratibhā. Given that to understand a sentence is to know its meaning, such an understanding, if correct, amounts to a mode of knowing that may best be termed knowing-what, to distinguish it from both knowing-that and knowing-how.

This essay attempts to expound Bhartṛhari's conception of pratibhā in relation to the notions of meaning, understanding, and knowing laid out in his magnum opus, the Vākyapadīya (henceforth VP).(1) The conception is philosophically intriguing and contemporarily relevant. Yet, it has not hitherto been subjected to a systematic analytical philosophical treatment.(2) Here, I hope to fill this lacuna." (p. 404)

(1) For a critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the *Vākyapadīya*, see Rau 1977. Verse numbers in the present article are given according to that edition.

(29 Bhartṛhari's presentation of the topic is laconic and requires hermeneutic elucidation, for which one may refer to Subramania Iyer 1982, Tola and Dragonetti 1990, and Akamatsu 1994. However, the approach of these works is more philological than philosophical. Readers may also consult Coward and Raja 1990 for discussions of the relevant issues in the Grammarian school.

References

Akamatsu, Akihiko. 1994. "Pratibhā and the Meaning of the Sentence in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya." In *Bhartṛhari: Philosopher and Grammarian*, edited by Saroja Bhate and Johannes Bronkhorst, pp. 37–43. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Coward, Harold G., and K. Kunjunni Raja, eds. 1990. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*. Vol. 5, *The Philosophy of the Grammarians*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rau, Wilhelm, ed. 1977. *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya: Die Mūlakārikās nach den Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem Pāda-Index versehen*. Wiesbaden: Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner GMBH.

Subramania Iyer, K. A., 1982. *The Vākyapadīya: Some Problems*. Pune, India: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

Tola, Fernando, and Carmen Dragonetti. 1990. "Some Remarks on Bhartṛhari's Concept of Pratibhā." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 18, no. 2 : 95–112.

90. Honda, Yoshichika. 1998. "Bhartrhari on Sentence (*vākya*) and Its Meaning (*vakyārtha*) as *Pratibhā*." *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* no. 46:1033-1044.

"Bhartrhari, a grammarian-philosopher, is well known as the upholder of the view that a sentence is an indivisible unit (*akhandavākyavāda*).

According to him, it is not the word (*pada*) but the sentence (*vākya*) that really conveys the meaning in our verbal communication; the meaning of the sentence (*vākyārtha*) is pratibhā. The word pratibhā is usually rendered as 'intuition', 'flash of insight', 'flash of understanding', 'instinct' and so on. These renderings are not able to give us an accurate understanding of pratibhā; rather, they are very misleading. The pratibhā Bhartrhari considers to be the sentence-meaning is properly the cognition by which all its constituent word-meanings are unified into an integrated whole and in which they are connected with one another through the qualificand-qualifier relation (*viśesanaviśeyabhāva*)." (p. 1044)

91.   Houben, Jan E. M. 1990. "The Sequencelessness of the Signifier in Bhartṛhari's Theory of Language." *Indologica Taurinensia: Official Organ of the International Association of Sanskrit Studies* no. 15-16:119-129.
"Since J. Brough's article *Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians*, TPS, 1951, pp. 27-46 and K. Kunjunni Raja's, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, Madras, 1963, it is habitual in the study and interpretation of the concept of śabda in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya (short: VP) or Trikāṇḍī(1) to refer to de Saussure's theory of the sign, or to use a saussurean terminology(2). But what we still miss is a systematic comparison between the two philosophies of language. In this paper I want to give a small contribution to such a comparison.
A systematic comparison of Bhartṛhari with especially de Saussure is useful, because de Saussure expresses by way of the *Cours de Linguistique Générale* (Course in General Linguistics) many ideas that still form to a considerable extent the methodological basis of modern linguistics." (p. 119)
(1) I. Aklujkar, 1969.
2. Ruegg, 1959: 55-56; Joshi, 1967: 49; Aklujkar; 1970; R. Herzberger; 1986: 10, 21, repeats what Brough has said in this context.
References
Aklujkar, A., «Two textual studies of Bhartrhari», *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 89, 1969 547-63.
-- «Ancient Indian Semantics», *Annals of the Bandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, 51, 1970, 11-29.
Brough, J., «Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians», *Transactions of the Philological Society* (1951, 27-46). Also in: Staal: *A reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians* (MIT press, 1972): 402-414.
Herzberger, R., *Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists,* Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster/Tokyo, 1980.
Joshi, S., *Sphoṭanirṇaya*; edited with Introduction, Translation and Critical Notes. Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class C, no. 2, University of Poona, 1967.
Ruegg, D., *Contributions à l'histoire de la Philosophie Linguistique Indienne*, Pub!. de l'institut de Civilisation Indienne, Serie in-8, fasc. 7, Paris, 1959.

92.   ———. 1992. "Bhartṛhari's *Samaya* / Helārāja *Samketa*: A Contribution to the Reconstruction of the Grammarians' Discussion with the Vaiśeṣikas on the Relation between 'śabda' and 'artha'." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 20:219-242.
"In the Saṃbandhasamuddeśa (VP book 3, chapter 3) Bhartṛhari uses the word *samaya* in a discussion of the relation between *śabda* (word) and *artha* (meaning or object)(1) (VP 3.3.31cd). It is used by the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas to explain that an *artha* is understood from a *śabda*, and it may usually be translated as 'convention'. The relevant sūtra of the Vaiśeṣikas(2) is *sāmayikaḥ śabdād arthapratyayaḥ* according to two of the three main recensions of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* (VS (1) 7.2.24 and (3) 7.2.20) corresponding to *sāmayikaḥ śabdārthapratyayaḥ* in the other recension (VS (2) 7.2.24). Both versions of the sūtra may be translated as: "The understanding of an *artha* from a *śabda* is based on *samaya*, 'convention'."
(1) The fact that *artha* may mean 'linguistic meaning' as well as 'concrete object' makes it impossible to adopt a single translation for this word. In general,

Bhartṛhari and the grammarians would tend to accept *artha* in the first place as 'linguistic meaning' and the Vaiśeṣikas in the first place as a 'concrete object' or 'really existing entity', but for both groups the other meaning cannot be neglected. Similarly, it is not without importance that *śabda* is for the Vaiśeṣikas also 'sound' in general, thought of mainly as a *guna* 'quality' of *ākāśa* 'space' (at least since the classical period inaugurated by Praśastapāda). In the context of language *śabda* may refer to a sentence, a word, or a phoneme. Since the third book of the VP is devoted to problems relating to words and their meanings, the translation 'word' for *śabda* is here quite appropriate.

(2) In the course of this article several ideas will be attributed to the Vaiśeṣikas on the basis of some of their sūtras. Because the origins of the Vaiśeṣika-system and its sūtras are so much shrouded in darkness (e.g. Matilal, 1977: 53—62), this should imply no more than that the Vaiśeṣikas (or some of them) apparently supported these ideas at some stage in their evolution, but in any case at the time of Bhartṛhari's literary activity. It should be noted, however, that the sūtras referred to here do not seem to belong to the oldest kernel of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra.* They belong to a passage (sūtras 7.2.14—20 in VS (3)) which looks very much like an insertion, as was already noted by Faddegon, 1918: 29. Faddegon (*loc. cit.*) described the passage as: "Polemics on the relation between word and meaning against the Mīmāṃsākas," and added that "this passage is inserted, in a forced way . . ." Finally, the date of Bhartṛhari ("Bhartṛhari lived no later than the fifth century A.D.", Cardona, 1976: 299) makes it very likely that several important old Vaiśeṣika-texts of which we know only the names (cf. Matilal, 1977: 59—62) were still available to him.

References

Cardona, George (1976). *Pânini. A survey of research.* The Hague — Paris: Mouton, 1976.

Faddegon, Barend (1918). *The Vaisesika-System. Described with the help of the oldest texts.* Amsterdam, Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen. (Reprint: Liechtenstein: Saendig Reprint Verlag, 1969.)

Matilal, Bimal K. (1977). Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (A Flistory of Indian Literature, vol. 6 fasc. 2). Wiesbaden: Harassowitz.

93.   ———. 1993. "Bhartṛhari's Perspectivism (3): on the structure of the third Kāṇḍa of the Vâkyapadîya." *Sambodhi*:1-32.

Abstract: "The present article is part 3 in a series on "perspectivism" in the philosophy of language of the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari (India, early fifth century C.E.). It is part 3 in the sequence in which the series is meant to be read, although it is the one which was published before all others, in 1993, in volume XVIII of the journal *Sambodhi* of the L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad (edited by J.B. Shah and N.M.Kansara) pertaining to 1992-1993. The discussion in this article is parallel to pp. 81-122 and pp. 132-134 ofThe *Saṁbandha-samuddeśa* (chapter on relation) and Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language (Houben 1995b). Parallel means: the discussion in this article contains less and more, it is more compact and more focused on"perspectivism" as the guiding principle in the structuring of the Third Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya, esp. regarding the 13 Samuddeśas preceding the final Vṛtti-samuddeśa (on the structure of which see pp. 123-131 in Houben 1995b). Other articles in the series of studies on "perspectivism" in the philosopy of language of Bhartṛhari appeared in 1994, 1995 and 1997."

94.   ———. 1994. "[Bhartṛhari's Perspectivism (4):] Bhartṛhari's familiarity with Jainism." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* no. 75:1-24.

"In comparison with many authors of Indian philosophical texts, is remarkably non-polemic. His attitude, both in the Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā and in the Vākyapadīya, may be described not only as 'encyclopedic' in the sense that he seems to be eager to discuss all important views on a certain subject, but also as 'perspectivistic' in the sense that he seems to acknowledge that each view represents a possible and in its own theoretical context valid perspective.(1) Different views are enumerated and

contrasted, and sometimes positively or negatively reassessed, but hardly ever fully rejected.(2) Bhartṛhari refers to the different views in a very concise way, and for modern students of his works the precise identity of those who held the views remains often unclear. Of those (apart from grammarians, and authors of Šikṣā and Nirukta) whose views Bhartrhari frequently takes up for discussion, K. A. Subramania Iyer has mentioned Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṃsākas, Sāṃkhyas and Buddhists (Iyer, 1969 : 72). Iyer has not mentioned the Jainas, and one may wonder whether they remained outside the scope of Bhartṛhari's encyclopedic approach. This, however, is not the case. Bhartṛhari is aware of Jaina philosophers and refers to them explicitly in at least one place ia the Mahābhãsya-Dípikã. Other passages in the Mahābhãsya-Dípikã and Vākyapadīya are remarkably well compatible with Jaina ideas. They may have been intended as references to their views, although their name is not explicitly mentioned." (pp. 1-2)

(...)

"In this paper, without aiming completeness, I will discuss a few indications and possible indications of Bhartṛhari's familiarity with Jainism in the Mahābhāṣya-Dipikā (MBhD) and Vākyapadīya (VP), including two places in VP Kāṇḍa 2 which seem to refer to a technicality in Jainendra-vyākaraṇa. This would show that Bhartṛhari was not only familiar with the Jaina doctrines, but also with their literature in the field of grammar. Finally, in the concluding section I will mention some possible implications of Bhartṛhari's familiarity with Jainism for our understanding of Bhartṛhari's perspectivism and his philosophy of language."

1 See my article, "Bhartṛhari's Perspectivism (1) : The Vṛtti and Bhartṛhari's Perspectivism in the first Kãnja of the Vākyapadīya" for a provisionary discussion of Bhartṛhari's perspectivism. I hope to discuss it in a philosophically more comprehensive way in a future article.

2 Cf. Houben, 1992 : 23-24. K. A. S. Iyer speaks of Bhartrhari's "spirit of accommodation "(K. A. S. Iyer, *Bhartṛhari, a Study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the ancient commentaries*, Poona, 1969; 75-82).

95. ———. 1994. "Early Indian Authors and Linguistic Change (Postscript ot Bhartrhari's Familiarity With Jainism)." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* no. 75:255-279.

"I am very gratrful to Professor A. Wezler (Hamburg) and Dr. Ch. Werba (Vienna) to have pointed out to me that the problems discussed in sections 1. 2. 1 - 1. 2. 6 of my article " Bhartrhari's perspectivism (4) ; Bhartrhari's familiarity with Jainism " have also been addressed, in a different context, by Eivind Kahrs in an article entitled "What is a *tadbhava* word?" (*Indo-Iranian Journal* 35 (1992 : 225-249). The passages cited by me in these sections are also cited by Kahrs. It is Kahrs' purpose to find out what the term *tadbhava* (usually referring to Prakrit words derived from Sanskrit words, as opposed to those similar to them, *tatsama*, and regional or deśī words) must have originally meant in the context of Indian thought about language." (p. 255)

96. ———. 1995. "Bhartṛhari's Solution to the Liar and Some Other Paradoxes." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 23:381-401.

"Fully aware of these modern developments and inspired Bhartṛhari's treatment of paradoxes in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya (VP), especially in the Saṃbandha-samuddeśa,(2) Hans and Herzberger have presented a lucid exposition of what "Bhartṛhari's paradox' (Herzberger and Herzberger, 1981), special kind of paradox involving self-reference. But the under discussion contains also (see kārikā 25) nothing than the classical 'Liar paradox' ("everything I am saying otherwise known as the paradox of Epimenides the Cretan "All Cretans are liars"). In our view, what is of special the Saṃbandha-samuddeśa, passage, is not so much that adds a new member to a well-known family of paradoxes, he provides us with the key to an interesting and elegant to them. It would probably prove worthwhile to go deeper implications for modern treatments of these paradoxes, place we will focus on the interpretation of the relevant their own context. Before turning to the kārikās

themselves, review some discussions and interpretations of the passage previous works and articles.(3)" (p. 382, a note omitted)
(2) The Saṁbandha-samuddeśa is the third Samuddeśa of the third Kānda of Bhartrhari's Vàkyapadïya (short: VP). I will refer mainly to Wilhelm Rau's edition for the kārikās (Rau, 1977), and to Iyer's edition for Helâràja's commen tary Prakïrnaka-Prakâsa (Iyer, 1963).

97.   ———. 1995. *The Sambandha-samuddeśa (Chapter on Relation) and Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Language*. Groningen: Egbert Forsten.
"The themes of the Sambandha-samuddeśa pervade the entire third Kāṇḍa and even the whole of the VP. Because of Bhartṛhari's perspectivism, and his awareness of the limits of philosophical and theoretical discourse (cf. above, section 2), it is of the utmost importance never to lose sight of the place a certain passage occupies in a larger argumentative complex. To provide material for this, much more is needed than just a translation of the kārikās with Helārāja's commentary. Moreover, a very critical attitude towards Helārāja's commentary is indispensible. By taking other parts of the VP into account, it is to some extent possible to check Helārāja's interpretations. Usually this leads to a justitication of Helārāja's views, occasionally they turn out to be questionable.
The approach sketched above determines the form of the present work.
After this introduction about Bhartṛhari and the Vākyapadīya, the body of the work is formed by three parts: (1) A discussion of *sambandha* in some early Indian traditions and in Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language; (2) A discussion of the third Kāṇḍa and the immediate context of the Sambandha-samuddeśa; (3) The Sambandha-samuddeśa, translation and discussion of the kārikās. Finally, in an appendix, Helārāja's commentary on the Sambandha-samuddeśa will be given in translation. (In this organisation of the work it was unavoidable that the kārikās of the Sambandha-samuddeśa be given (at least) twice: once in part 3 with my own discussion, once in the appendix with Helārāja's comments.)" (p. 27)

98.   ———. 1995. "Bhartṛhari's Perspectivism (2): Bhartṛhari on the Primary Unit of Language." In *History and Rationality: the Skoevde Papers in the Historiography of Linguistics*, edited by Dutz, Klaus D. and Forsgren, Kjell-Åke, 29-62. Münster: Nodus Publikationen.
"As for its subject matter, the present article is to be studied in tandem with the conceptual and theoretical introduction to the Sanskrit tradition of linguistic and semantic thought in J.E.M. Houben, "The Sanskrit Tradition," in: *The Emergence of Semantics in Four Linguistic Traditions* (by W. van Bekkum, J.E.M. Houben, I. Sluiter, and K. Versteegh): 49-145. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1997, esp. section 2 "Terminology" (pp. 56-61)." Additional note (30 January 2018).
"According to Saussure, "the linguistic entity is not accurately defined until it is delimited, i.e. separated from everything that surrounds it on the phonic chain" (Saussure 1916: 145 [103]). However, what are the units to be isolated? The question is important, pragmatically, for anyone trying to learn an entirely new language from the speakers of that language. And it is of crucial theoretical importance for anyone setting out to describe, analyse and study a language." (pp. 29-30)
(...)
"The view of the grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari (India, ca. 5th century C.E.) on this problem has been described in 1951 by John Brough in a pioneering article as follows: "In Bhartrhari's view, then, the primary linguistic fact is the undivided sentence-sphoṭa. Just as a bare root has no meaning in the world, so also the meanings of individual words are merely hints or stepping stones to the meaning of the sentence." (Brough 1951: 45-46)." (p. 30)
(...)
"Unfortunately for the lovers of pure and simple, well-defined ideas, and fortunately for the lovers of major intellectual challenges, the Vākyapadīya is a difficult work with an extremely complex argumentative structure."
(...)

Those who expect on the basis of the indications by Punyaraja, Brough, Robins, Siderits and others to find in the *VP* a straightforward exposition and defence of the idea that the sentence is the indivisible unit of language will be somewhat surprised when they are confronted with the text of the *VP*." (p. 32)

(...)

"Yet, there is perhaps another way to make Bhartṛhari's exposition more perspicuous and I will attempt to follow this way in the present paper. I will focus not on the details of the exposition and description of theories in the sequence in which we find them in the text, but I will try to see what arguments Bhartṛhari uses to evaluate different theories on the sentence and the word. We will see that the types of argument used are very limited in number and by focusing on these we can perceive, in spite of all difficulties, a comparatively clear plan at the basis of the extremely complex exposition in the second book of the *VP*." (p. 33)

References

Brough, John 1951 "Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians". *Transactions of the Philological Society.* 45-46.

Saussure, Ferdinand de 1916 *Cours de Linguistique Générale*. Geneva.

99.   ———. 1996. "Socio-linguistic Attitudes Reflected in the Work of Bhartṛhari and later Grammarians." In *Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the History of the Sanskrit Language*, edited by Houben, Jan E. M., 157-193. Leiden: Brill.

"In this paper I will first discuss some aspects of the sociolinguistic context in which the Sanskrit grammarians, and especially Bhartṛhari, the grammarian-philosopher of ca. the 5th century C.E., were working, and

next study in the light of this context the statements Bhartṛhari and some of his interpreters made regarding Sanskrit and its relation to non-Sanskrit. Although, as someone with a philological training, I believe

that one should let the texts speak for themselves as much as possible, I also agree with Popper that all knowledge is theory-impregnated.(1)

At some point it is always necessary to reflect on the scope and limits of the theories with which we approach a text. Acts and utterances to which our texts refer are understood in a social and sociolinguistic

context. This context is to be reconstructed on the basis of (1) the incomplete and often problematic data available for the period; and (2) unavoidably, either intuitively or methodicaly, some theories and concepts

are brought in to organize the data and to predict aspects of the situation about which no direct information is available." (pp. 157-158)

(1) Popper [*Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach*. London: Oxford University Press] 1972:104-105: "Since all knowledge is theory-impregnated, it is all built on sand; but its foundations can be improved by critically digging deeper; and by not taking any alleged 'data' for granted."

100.   ———. 1997. "Bhartṛhari's Perspectivism (1): The Vṛtti and Bhartṛhari's perspectivism in the first Kānda of the Vâkyapadîya." In *Beyond Orientalism: the Impact of the work of W. Halbfass on Indian and Cross-cultural Studies*, edited by Preisendanz, Karl and Franco, Eli, 317-358. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

[*Bhartṛhari's Perspectivism* (6) is in French].

"The present article is part 1 in a series on "perspectivism" in the philosophy of language of the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari (India, early fifth century C.E.). It is part 1 in the sequence in which the series is meant to be read, although it appeared later than the other articles which appeared in 1995, 1993 and 1994. These articles are to be studied in tandem with another series of articles, on "Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and the Ancient Vṛtti", of which three parts appeared between 1997 and 1999.! Additional note (22 December 2017)."

"There is a simple principle which pervades the whole of the Vākyapadīya (short: VP, which will usually mean in this article: the *Vākyapadīya-kārlkās*, or VP-*kārlkās*).1t is reflected in its structure from beginning to end, and finds sometimes more explicit expression in specific *kārlkās*s, The principle is that, in a very

fundamental way, the validity of different perspectives is accepted. Throughout the Vakyapadiya, different viewpoints are discussed in their mutual opposition and complementariness. Sometimes the viewpoints are simply enumerated. Sometimes Bhartṛhari adds a statement of what would be acceptable from two opposed points of view. Sometimes he has an undeniable preference for one view or the other. And sometimes he seems to develop his own view by integrating the opposed views of other thinkers. But even if he prefers one view or develops a new synthesis, others are not totally discarded. His preferences are generally pronounced against the background of a relativizing attitude. With this approach Bhartrhari differs from the familiar, more openly polemic approach in Indian philosophical works in which other systems are unequivocally refuted and one's own system is defended." (pp. 317-318, notes omitted)

101.   ———. 1997. "Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and the Ancient Vṛtti (2): The Vedic background of the author of the Vākyapadīya-Vṛtti " *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* no. 21:71-77.

102.   ———. 1997. "Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and the Ancient Vṛtti (3): On syntactic and stylistic evidence regarding the authorship of the Vākyapadīya-Vṛtti " *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* no. 43:167-197.
"With Iyer (1965 and 1969) and Aklujkar (1972 and 1993b) arguing for the identity of the Vākyapadīya (VP)-Kārikā-author and the Vṛtti-author (the 'single authorship thesis'), and Biardeau (1964) and Bronkhorst (1988 and 1991a) for différent authors (the 'separate authorship thesis'), the issue of the authorship of the VP-Vṛtti can be considered to be still open.(1)" (p. 167)
(...)
"In what follows we will discuss first (sections 2-4) the arguments brought forward by A. Aklujkar in 1972 and refer to Bronkhorsts criticism and Aklujkar's answers. Next, we will discuss a few other stylistic arguments which have played a rôle in the discussion so far, and draw attention to some aspects and additional points which have been largely neglected so far. These may give a décisive turn to our final judgment." (p. 169)
(...)
"While the argument developed in this article is greatly the discussions in the main studies referred to, we had to reject especially some of the conclusions of Aklujkar 1972. In a future article in this séries, I hope to demonstrate that this study was nevertheless right in rejecting the great différence in time and doctrine Biardeau 1964 suspected to exist between the VP-*kārikās* (even if there are indeed some diverging trends in these two works; cf. Houben 1996 and 1997a). Without claiming that it can be proven beyond any doubt, I contend that all this suits perfectly and naturally the historical hypothesis (HH) which has been formulated in the first article of this series,(45 but which may be repeated here for the convenience of the reader:
HH The Vṛtti on the first two Kārikās was written by a close follower of Bhartṛhari (author of BhD [Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā] and VP-kārikās), e.g. a direct pupil of his, who finalized his commentary not long after Bhartṛhari finished the VP-kārikās (three Kārikās), and who explained Bhartṛhari quite honestly and faithfully, although hedoes have his own intellectual character which shows in a few diverging trends in the Vṛtti as compared to the kārikās (and MBhD)." (p. 192)
(1) Cf. Torella 1994: XXV n. 36, who "provisionally accept[s] the thesis of identity". The most important early formulation of the VP-Vṛtti-authorship issue can be found in Shastri 1934: Introduction (cf. also id. 1930).
References
Aklujkar 1972 Ashok N. Aklulkar, The Authorship of the Vākyapadīya-Vṛtti. WZKS 16 (1972) 181-198.
Aklujkar 1993b Id., Once Again on the Authorship of the Trikāṇḍi-Vṛtti AsSt 47,1 (1993 [= Bhate 1994]) 45-57.
Bhate 1994 Saroja Bhate - Johannes Bronkhorst (ed.), Bhartṛharii: Philosopher and Grammarian. Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartrhari

(University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994.
Biardeau 1964 Madeleine Biardeau, Bhartṛhari. Vākyapadīya Brahmakāṇḍa avec la
Vṛtti de Harivṛṣabha. Traduction, Introductionet Notes. [Publications de l'Institut de
Civilisation Indienne, Fasc. 24]. Paris: E. de Boccard, 1964.
Bronkhorst 1988 JJohannes Bronkhorst, Patañjali and the Yoga Sūtras. StII 10
(1985) 191-212
Bronkhorst 1991a Two Literary Conventions of Classical India. AsSt 45 (1991)
210-227.
Houben 1996 Socio-linguistic Attitudes Reflected in the Work of Bhartṛhari aμd
Later Grammarians. In: Ideology and Status of Sanskrit. Contributions to the
History of the Sanskrit Language, ed. J.E.M. Houben. Leiden 1996, p. 157-193.
Houben 1997a Bhartrhari's Perspectivism (1): The Vr̥tti and Bhartṛhari's
Perspectivism in the First kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya. In: Beyond Orientalism. The
Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, ed.
E. Franco - K. Preisendanz. Amsterdam 1997, p. 317-358.
Iyer 1965 Subramania Iyer, The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti. Chapter
I. English Translation. [Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee
Series 26]. Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1965.
Iyer 1969 Id., Bhartrhari. A Study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the Ancient
Commentaries. [Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series 68].
lb. 1969.
Shastri 1930 Charudev A. Shastri, Bhartṛhari. A Critical Study with special
references to the Vākyapadīya and its Commentaries. In: Proceedings and
Transactions of the Fifth Indian Oriental Conference. Lahore 1930, 1/630-655.
Shastri 134 Bhagavadbhartṛhariviracitaṃ Vākyapadīyam. Lahore 1934.
Torella 1994 The Iśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author's Vr̥tti.
Critical Edition and Annotated Translation. [Serie Orientale Roma LXXI]. Roma:
ISMEO, 1994.

103.   ———. 1997. "The Sanskrit Tradition." In *The Emergence of Semantics in Four
Linguistic Traditions*, edited by Van Bekkum, Wout, Houben, Jan E. M., Sluiter,
Ineke and Versteegh, Kees, 49-145. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
9: Bhartṛhari's discussion of linguistic and semantic theories: major issues and
parameters, pp. 110-119.
"Bhartṛhari, who became famous with his Vākyapadīya, has also been credited with
another work, viz. the *Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā* or "light on the Mahābhāṣya". It is a
subcommentary on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya (Great Commentary) on Pāṇini's
grammar. Because it is the earliest commentary (partly) available on Patañjali's
Mahābhāṣya which has greatly influenced later major exponents of the Pāṇninian
tradition like Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa, this text is of considerable importance.
Unfortunately, the work is available only in a single, incomplete manuscript." (p.
110)

104.   ———. 1998. "Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and the Ancient Vṛtti (1): The Vṛtti and
Vṛsabhadeva's Paddhati on Vākyapadīya 1.46a *atmabhedam / atmabhedas* ..."
Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute no. 78:177-198.
"I first started to doubt siagle authorship of kãrikãs and Vṛtti in 1987, when I
discovered a passage in the Vṛtti which rather clearly refers to two different
versions of the kãrikã (VP. 1. 46a *ãtmabhedam / ãtmabhedah*). For Charudeva
Shartri, a strong argument to accept the Vṛtti as the work of Bhartṛhari in spite of
some difficulties was that there would be no mention of different readings of the
kãrikãs. As other commentaries which are known to stem from a later period
frequently do mention different readings, a mention of a different reading would
have been a strong indication that the Vṛtti was indeed written after the kãrikãs and
by a different author.(6) Because two recent references to this small but important
Vṛtti-passage have not yet taken into account all relevant material (Vṛṣabhadeva, for
instance, has been largely neglected(7)), and because the evaluation of the passage
was quite divergent - Bronkhorst (1988) accepted it as an argument for the 'separate

authorship' thesis(8) ; Aklujkar (1993) has sought to explain according to the "single authorship" thesis(9) - it deserves to be studied here in some detail. This should form the beginning of a series of articles, in which I plan to discuss all main arguments used so far in support of either one of the two theses." (p. 179)

(6) Charudeva Shastri in the introduction (*Upodghātah*) to his edition of the first Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya and Vṛtti: *etasmin vrttigranthe naikam apt kārikāsu pāthāntaram upāttam / tad api nāma balīyah pramānaṁ tasya ca kārikānāṁ ca samānakartṛkatāyām // (Upodghātah* P. 17). Biardeau (1964:4) accepts Charudeva Shastri's statement that the Vṛtti does not refer to different readings for the kãrikãs but does not consider it a sufficiently strong argument to accept 'single authorship' Iyer 1969 : 19 mentions the point again as an argument in support of 'single authorship'.

(7) Only Aklujkar 1993 : 49 note 9 briefly refers to this subcommentator on kãrikãs and Vṛtti of Kāṇḍa 1.

(8) Bronkhorst 1988 : 115 and 139 note 13.

(9) Aklujkar 1993 : 46, section 2, 6.

References

Aklujkar, A. N. 1993 "Once again on the authorship of the Trikāndl-Vṛtti." *Proceedings of the Bhartṛhari Conference* (see Bhate and Bronkhorst, 1993, 1994) : 45-57.

Bhate, S., and J. Bronkhorst (eds.) 1993 *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari* (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992), *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* (Bern, Switzerland), vol. 47.1. -- 1994 *Bhartṛhari: Philosopher and Grammarian. Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari* (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992). Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass. (First Indian edition of the preceding).

Biardeau 1964 Madeleine Biardeau, *Bhartṛhari. Vākyapadīya Brahmakāṇḍa avec la Vṛtti de Harivṛṣabha.* Traduction, Introductionet Notes. [Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Fasc. 24]. Paris: E. de Boccard, 1964.

Bronkhorst, Johannes 1988 "Études sur Bhartṛhari, 1 ; L 'auteur et la date de la Vṛtti." *Bulletin d' Études Indiennes* 6 : 105-143.

Iyer 1969 Id., Bhartrhari. *A Study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the Ancient Commentaries.* [Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series 68]. lb. 1969.

105.   ———. 1999. "The Theoretical Positions of Bhartṛhari and the Respectable Grammarian." *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* no. 72:101-142.

[= Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and the Ancient Vṛtti (4) = Vākyapadīya's Perspectivism (5)].

"The (Vâkyapadïya) VP, as well as the other important work by Bhartṛhari (ca. 5th cent. C.E.), the MBhD (Mahãbhãsya-Dlpikã), testify to a rich and mature tradition of reflection on language, meaning and grammar. The same can said of the ancient commentary on the first two books of the VP, the Vṛtti, which is very close to both the VP and the MBhD in the treatment of its subject. The MBhD, the VP, as well as the Vṛtti, frequently refer to the views of different thinkers or groups of thinkers with regard to the numerous issues that are taken up for discussion. Scholars generally agree on the monumental importance Bhartrhari as a grammarian and philosopher. However, it is possible to estimate his real place in Indian philosophy of grammar and language, his own contributions and possibly the developments in his thought, only against the background of his contemporaries, near contemporaries and immediate predecessors. Not only the grammarians are to be taken into account, but also the representatives of different schools of thought in Bhartrhari's time, such as Vaiśeṣika (cfr. Bronkhorst 1993, Houben 1992), Mīmāṁsā (cfr. Bronkhorst 1989), the Jainas (cfr. Houben 1994), and Buddhist schools (cfr. Ruegg 1959:57-93, Lindtner 1993).

Unfortunately, it is often very difficult to decide precisely which persons and texts precede Bhartṛhari and which follow. Some important texts which we know existed and were probably known to Bhartrhari are now irretrievably lost. In the present

article, the focus will be on Bhartrhari's predecessors and contemporaries among the grammarians, especially on one «respectable grammarian» to whom Bhartrhari sometimes refers. For information about this respectable grammarian and his colleagues we depend largely on Bhartrhari's own works, and on the Vṛtti." (pp. 101-102, two notes omitted)

References

Bronkhost, J.

1989 «Studies on Bhartṛhari, 2: Bhartrhari and Mimiiqlsa», *Studien zur Indologie und lranistik*, 15:101-117.

1993 «Bhartṛhari and Vaiśeṣika». *Asiatische Studien / Etudes Asiatiques*, 47.1 (Proceedings of the Bhartṛhari Conference, Poona University, January 6-8, 1992):75-94.

Houben, JAN E.M.

1992 «Bhartrhari's *samaya* / Helārāja's *saṃketa*», J*ournal of Indian Philosophy,* 20: 219-242.

1994 «Bhartrhari's familiarity with Jainism» *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, 75, pts. 1-4:1-24.

Lindtner, Chr..

1993 «Linking up Bhartrhari and the Bauddhas», *Asiatische Studien / Etudes Asiatiques*, 47.1 (Proceedings of the Bhartrhari Conference, Poona University, January 6-8, 1992): 195-213.

Rueg, David Seyfort

1959 *Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne*. (Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Fascicule 7.) Paris: de Boccard.

106. ———. 2000. "Language and Thought in the Sanskrit Tradition." In *History of the Language Sciences / Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaften / Histoire des sciences du langage: An International Handbook on the Evolution of the Study of Language from the Beginnings to the Present. Vol. 1*, 146-157. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

§ 5. Bhartṛhari on language and thought, pp. 149-150.

"Thus, in numerous philosophical schools (not only Buddhist, but also Jaina and Brahminical), problems concerning language and thought posed themselves, but the first extensive treatise in which language and its relation with thought is not a side issue but a major one, can be found not earlier than in the Vākyapadīya , the mature and comprehensive work on semantics, linguistics, and philosophy of language, of the Brahminical grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari (5th century CE).

Bhartṛhari's work can be seen as a systematic investigation of the presuppositions and basic notions and categories of the grammar composed by Pāṇini (ca. 4th century BCE) and amended and annotated by later grammarians, notably Patanjali (ca. 2nd century BCE). In his investigation, Bhartṛhari takesa grammatical category, for instance 'time', 'gender', 'number' etc., and confronts it with the diverging conceptions of time etc. in the major philosophical schools with which he was familiar. Bhartṛhari's attitude to the various views is generally non-committal: we find him often engaged in demonstrations of the compatibility of Pāṇinian notions, categories and presuppositions with those of quite diverging philosophical schools and systems.

At the same time, we do see arise certain 'own' philosophical positions, or at least preferences, from Bhartṛhari's careful discussions of the views of different schools." (p. 149)

107. ———. 2007. "Ṛgveda 1.164.23-24 and Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Language." In *Expanding and Merging Horizons: Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, edited by Preisendanz, Karl, 711-719. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

"In a rich and insightful paragraph on Bhartṛhari and the Veda, Wilhelm Halbfass remarked that "Bhartṛhari oes not draw a strict border between the uncreated Veda and the traditions of human thought and exegesis" (Halbfass 1991:37). Nevertheless, we find that there is a significant contrast between the way the grammarian and philosopher Bhartṛhari deals with these two types of texts. He

frequently supports his discussion with precise references to the traditions of human thought and exegesis – first of all the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition, but also various philosophical schools in his time (Mīmāṃsā, Vaiśeṣika, buddhist schools). However, it is only to exemplify grammatical points and not on account of the thoughts expressed that he gives quotations from Vedic texts.(1) Bhartṛhari's own work, as is well known, has a direct exegetical relationship with the Pāṇinian tradition: his Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā (MBhD), to the extent it is available, is a running commentary on Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, while his magnum opus the Vākyapadīya (VP) is a topical commentary on major philosophical issues in the same text of Patañjali. Apart from the occasions where the Veda is a transcendent "entity" nearly identical with Brahman,(2) and apart from Vedic expressions cited only by way of grammatical example or illustration, are there any direct links with Vedic texts, and especially with the oldest and in several respects most important Vedic text, the Ṛgveda?"

(1) That is, Vedic texts in the strict sense: the Saṃhiās and Brāhmaṇas of the various Śākhās (cf. the dictum *mantra-brāhmaṇayor veda-nāmadheyam*, ĀpŚs 24.1.31, and *mantrāś ca brāhmaṇaṃ ca vedaḥ*, Śabara on Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra 2.1.33). Such quotations are predominantly from Yajurvedic texts, and among these especially from the Maitrāyaṇīya-Saṃhitā: cf. Rau 1980 and Bronkhorst 1981, 1987.

(2) VPā1.5ab: *prāptyupāyo 'nukāraś ca tasya* (viz., *brahmaṇaḥ*) *vedo ...* "Of this (Brahman) the Veda is the means of attainment and the image"; VP 1.172ab *anādim anavacchinnāṃ śrutim āhur akartṛkām* "It is said that the authorless Śruti (revealed text, i.e., the Veda) is beginningless and uninterrupted"; cf. also VP 1.173 *avibhāgād virṛttānām abhikhyā svapnavac chrutau* "Those evolved from the undivided (i.e., the primeval *ṛṣis* evolved from *brahman*), (had) a perception with regard to the Śruti as in a dream." See further Houben 1997: 331-336 and cf. Aklujkar 1991.

References

ĀpŚS = Āpastamba-Śrauta-Sūtra, ed. R. Garbe (Bibl. Indica 92), Calcutta 1882-1902.

Aklujkar, Ashok N.
1991 "Bhartṛhari's concept of the Veda." *Pāṇini and the Veda*. (Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference: Kern Institute, Leiden: August 23-29, 1987, Vol. V, ed. by M. Deshpande): 1-18. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Bronkhorst, Johannes
1987 "Further remarks on Bhartṛhari's Vedic affiliation." *Studies in Indian Culture (S. Ramachandra Rao Felicitation Volume)*: 216-223. Bangalore: Prof. Ramachandra Rao Felicitation Committee.
1998 "Les éléments linguistiques porteurs du sens dans la tradition grammaticale du sanskrit." *Histoire – Épistémologie – Langage*: Journal published by the SHSL and the PUV (Paris), Tome 20, fasc. 1: 29-38.

Halbfass, Wilhelm
1991 *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Houben, Jan E.M.
1997 "Bhartṛhari's Perspectivism (1): The Vṛtti and Bhartrhari's perspectivism in the first Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya." *Beyond Orientalism: the impact of the work of W. Halbfass on Indian and cross-cultural studies* (ed. by K. Preisendanz and E. Franco): 317-358. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997.

108.   ———. 2009. "Bhartṛhari as a "Cognitive Linguist"." In *Bhartṛhari: Language, Thought and Reality*, edited by Chaturvedi, Mithilesh, 523-543. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
"The 5th century Sanskrit grammarian and philosopher Bhartṛhari has often been seen as the one who elaborates language-philosophical speculations hinted at in Patañjali's commentary on the grammar (Aṣṭādhyāyī) of Pāṇini.

In such a view Bhartṛhari would carry us away from grammar to philosophy, and he would be introducing his own peculiar viewpoints, for instance the view that the sentence is the main unit in language. Is it possible that Bhartṛhari is in fact all the time focusing on the actual starting points and presuppositions of Panini's Aṣṭādhyāyī, taking into account Patañjali's commentary? Can we see Bhartṛhari as an author offering a very convincing interpretation and exposition of the basic axioms and procedures of Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī? Can it be that a simple point has been overlooked by most scholars of Pāṇini's Astadhyayi, namely, that there too the starting point and final aim of the user of grammar has always been the sentence and never a word in isolation, that the starting point is a preliminary sentence that needs to be checked or that needs some little extra refinement? If the latter applies, a fresh look is required, at Bhartṛhari's work, at the Aṣṭādhyāyī, and also at our ideas of what a good grammar should be. At present I start with Bhartṛhari - elsewhere I addressed the Aṣṭādhyāyī and its context, purpose and formal structure (Houben 1999). At crucial points [will have to refer to the Aṣṭādhyāyī, its basic features and current interpretations and representations." (pp. 523-524, a note omitted)

References

Houben, Jan E.M. "'Meaning statements' in Pāṇinian grammar: on the purpose and context of the Aṣṭādhyāyī," *Studien zur Indologre und Iranistik* 22: 23-54.

109.   ———. 2009. "Bhartṛhari and the Jainas." In *Bhartṛhari: Language, Thought and Reality*, edited by Chaturvedi, Mithilesh, 383-413. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Updated version of *Bhartṛhari's familiarity with Jainism* (1994).
"Bhartṛhari refers to the different views in a very concise way, and for modern students of his works the precise identity of those who held the views often remains unclear. Of those (apart from grammarians, and authors of Śikṣā-texts and the Nirukta) whose views Bhartṛhari frequently takes up for discussion, K.A. Subramania Iyer has mentioned Vaiśeṣikas,(3) Mīmāṃsākas,(4) Sāṃkhyas(5) and Buddhists(6) (Iyer 1969: 72). Iyer has not mentioned the Jainas, and one may wonder whether they remained outside the scope of Bhartṛhari's encyclopedic approach. This, however, is not the case. Bhartṛhari is very well aware of Jaina authors and refers to them explicitly in at least one place in the Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā. Other passages in the Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā and Vakyapadiya are remarkably well compatible with Jaina ideas. These passages were no doubt intended as references to their views, although their name is not explicitly mentioned." (p. 384)
(3) Cf. also Houben 1992 and Houben 1995a: 48-53.
(4) Cf. Bronkhorst 1989; Houben 1997b: 278.
(5) Cf. Houben 1995a: 58-63.
(6) Cf. Herzberger 1986; Houben 1995a: 53-58.
References
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1989): "Studies on Bhartṛhari, 2: Bhartṛhari and Mīmāṃsā," *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 15: 101-117.
Herzberger, Radhika (1986): *BBhartṛhari and the Buddhists, An Essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought,* Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Houben, Jan E.M. (1992): "Bhartṛhari's *samaya* / Helārāja's *saṃketa* contribution to the reconstruction of the grammarian's discussion with the Vaiśeṣikas on the relation between *śabda* and *artha*," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 20: 219-249.
——— (1995a): *The Saṃbandha-Samuddeśa (Chapter on Relation) and Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Language*, Groningen: Egbert Forsten.
——— (1997b): "sūtra and bhāṣyasūtra in Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣya Dīpikā: on the theory and practice of a scientific and philosophical genre," *India and beyond: essays in honour of Frits Staal* (ed. by D. van der Meij), pp. 271-305, London: Kegan Paul.
Iyer, K.A.S. (ed.) (1969): *Bhartṛhari, a Study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the ancient commentaries*, Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute.

110.　Hyung, Yi Jae. 2009. "Bhartṛhari on the Action Referred to the Present (*vartamānakriyā*)." *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* no. 57:1172-1176.
"In his Mahābhāṣya on P3.2.123, Patañjali cites the following verse to answer the argumentsagainst accepting present time:
Ślokavārttika on P3.2.123: kriyāpravṛttau yo hetus tadarthaṃ yad viceṣṭitam / tat samikṣya prayuñjīta
gacchatīty avicāyaran //
"There is a thing which serves as a reason (*hetu*) for which one enters into an action (*kriyāpravṛttau*). One performs an activity (*viceṣṭita*) for the purpose of attaining such a thing. Having in view (*samīkṣya*) such an activity, one should use the finite verb form *gacchati* ' ... is going' without considering (*avicārayan*) something about what one says."
The point to be noted here is that this verse says that one should use the verb form *gacchati* (3rd sg. pres.) without considering something about what one says. The verb form *gacchati*, which is in the present tense (*vartamāna*), signifies the action of going currently taking place. Consequently, it follows that the statement intends to imply that once the action signified by a verb form in the present tense is considered, there occur difficulties in accounting for the use of such a verb form. In VP 3.9.85-90 Bhartṛhari discusses the difficulties.
The aim of this paper is to show how he deals with them in the discussion." (p. 1172)

111.　Isayeva, Natalia. 1995. *From Early Vedānta to Kashmir Shaivism. Gauḍapāda, Bhartṛhari and Abhinavagupta*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Part II: *Bhartṛhari. Speech and the World: Creation or Expression?*, pp. 69-87.
"As it was already said, Bhartṛhari's principal work is his metrical treatise *Vākyapadīya*, that is, "[The Treatise] on theSaying and the Word." It is composed of three chapters (*kaṇḍa*); hence another name by which it became known, *Trikāṇḍī* (" [The Work] in Three Chapters"). The first chapter, "The Chapter on Brahman" ("Brahma-kaṇḍa"), is devoted to the philosophical investigation of the nature of Brahman and the universe. The second chapter ("Vākya-kaṇḍa," or "The Chapter on the Sentence") deals with the sentences that manifest the meaning of a statement, while the third chapter ("Pada-kaṇḍa, or "The Chapter on the Word") deals with the separate words that are brought together to form the sentence. Besides treating purely linguistical matters, the second and the third chapters include discussions on the nature of time, space, the function and origin of general categories, and so forth. Most of the present essay is based on the material of the first chapter of *Vākyapadīya*, which offers the most concentrated exposition of Bhartṛhari's main ideas." (p. 77)

112.　Jha, Vashishtha Narayan. 1985. "Problem of Error: the views of the Grammarians." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*:231-238.
Reprinted in V. N. Jha, *Studies in Language, Logic, and Epistemology,* Delhi: Pratibha Prakashan, 1986, pp. 92-100.
"Long before Mādhavācārya (1350 - 75 A. D.)(1) put the label of *darśana* on Pāṇinian System there was, it sems, a conscious effort to establish a philosophy of Grammar(2) till it got established at the hands of Bhartṛhari.(3) Once it was agreed upon that any *śāstra* leads a man to achieve the final aim of his life (*niḥśreyasa*), how is it that the *Vyākaraṇaśāstra* should remain behind? This seems to be the logic behind such an attempt. attempt. But ancient Indian Philosophers cannot close their eyes to such an activity. Thus we find Somānandanātha in his *Śivadṛṣṭi*(4) questioning the propriety on the part of Bhartṛhari to dabble with philosophy. He asks : "You are a grammarian and your job is already defined. Why should you give up that and hunt for *vijñāna* which does not come under your sphere of analysis?" (p. 231)
(...)
"To me it seems that Somānanda is not cent per cent correct in holding such a view. Because so far as the description of a language is concerned it is true that a grammarian need not dabble in the question of *yathārthajñāna* and

ayathārthajñāna, which will settle reality and non-reality respectively. But if a grammarian is interested in knowing the relation between language and worldly behaviour and in searching out the truth in it on the background of logic, ontology and metaphysics, one can hardly question his propriety of discussing the question of *pramā* (correct cognition) and *apramā* (erroneous cognition). It is in this light that we should look at the *Pāṇinīyadarśana* literature from Bhartṛhari onwards upto Nāgeśa." (p. 232)

(1) *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* includes the Philosophy of grammar under the name of *Pāṇinīyadarśanam*.

(2) There must have been a long tradition. Today some of the works are known only by name like *Saṁgraha* etc. which are lost.

(3) In his *Vākyapadīya* and its *Vṛtti*.

(4) Ed. by Pdt. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri. Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, No. 54.

113.   Joshi, Narayan R. 2007. "Sphota Doctrine in Sanskrit Semantics Demystified." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* no. 88:183-197.

Abstract: "From the time of the great grammarian Pāṇini (about 400 B. C.E.) to this day, Indian Sanskrit scholars are preoccupied with language on one hand and with philosophy on the other. In the past 2500 years of known history Indian linguists are discussing the semantics of Sanskrit. In this discussion on the philosophy of word and meaning all schools of thought belonging to Vedic, Buddhist and Jain-traditions have participated. The problem of meaning in Indian linguistic philosophy revolves around the ancient *Sphoṭa* doctrine discussed by Patañjali. Different authors have interpreted *Sphoṭa* in various ways from the high level mystic concept down to the physical property of articulated sounds. In this paper the ancient *Sphoṭa* doctrine in Sanskrit semantics is revisited and demystified by using Physics of sound. This step leads us next to the study of *Varnavāda* freeing us from confusion generated by unnecessary mysticism associated with *Sphoṭa* doctrine."

(...)

"Bhartṛhari on *Sphoṭa*

According to the observations of Dr. S.D. Joshi(4), *Bhartrhari* has used the term *Sphoṭa* only nine times in Vākyapadīya and that too occurs in the first chapter of it. Like Patañjali, Bhartrhari has also invariably used the term *Sphoṭa* in its relation with the *Dhvani*. Without referring to *Dhvanis,* he has nowhere used the term *Sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari has nowhere clearly stated in his work Vākyapadīya that *Sphoṭa* is over and above the sounds, it is indivisible and without any inner sequence, and it is meaning bearing unit of language' . He stated that *Sphoṭa* did not involve the difference in the speed of utterance (*vṛttibheda*). Bhartṛhari differentiated between the 'form' of the word and its 'object'. According to him it is the 'form' of the word which changes, while its object remains the same. And this unity of 'object' is carried by the Buddhist concept of *Śabda*, which is mentally retained 'self' of the word." (p. 189)

114.   Kahrs, Eivind. 2012. "Bhartṛhari and the Tradition: *karmapravacanīya*." In *Devadattīyam. Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume*, edited by Voegeli, François, Eltschinger, Vincent, Feller, Danielle, Candotti, Maria Piera, Diaconescu, Bogdan and Kulkarni, Malhar, 107-122. Bern: Peter Lang.

"The statement *nāmākhyātayos tu karmopasaṃyogadyotakā bhavanti,* then, I take to mean: "But they indicate (*dyotakā bhavanti*) that a noun or a verb has a specific connection with an action." If we are talking about *upasargas* that indicate a specific connection with an action, it seems to me possible to put forward the hypothesis that what Śākaṭāyana and Yāska are talking about in the Nirukta is precisely what the Pāṇinīan tradition calls *karmapravacanīya,* and that it is this link back to Śākaṭāyana and Yāska that is reflected in the *Vākyapadīya* and its surrounding literature. This also goes some way to illustrate how and why the *Vākyapadīya* puts forward certain views only to discard them later on. The text serves as a kind of reference point or origo reflecting the earlier grammatical

tradition, bridging over into the works of later authors as if through a looking glass." (p. 120)

115.   Kapoor, Kapil. 2000. "Reality and Its Representation: The Verbal Image in Indian Thought and Bhartrhari." In *Signs and Signification. Vol. II*, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni, 9-28. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.

116.   Kelkar, Ashok R. 1999. "What Has Bhartṛhari Got to Say on Language?" In *The Yearbook of South Asian Languages and Linguistics*, edited by Singh, Rajendra, 37-52. London: Sage Publications.

Abstract: "Bhartṛhari has not received due attention for a variety of reasons. After a word about Bhartṛhari and his works, a sketch of the Indian intellectual tradition in which to place him is presented in terms of its key questions, the resulting affiliations, and broad periodization. The difficulties in presenting Bhartṛhari to the modern reader need to be overcome. Thus, no citations; Sanskrit terms are parenthesized; the risk of tidying up his thought is taken.

A conspectus of Bhartṛhari's thought on language is best presented under three headings in a certain order. Language as communication: Bhartrhari's conceptual framework and ideas of related causal dependencies are touched upon. Language as human practice: For Bhartṛhari it is human practice that sustains speech power and its acquisition and the power of the speech bond.

Language as cognition: All cognition, even seemingly non-linguistic cognition, is sustained by specific and generalized language competence. Bhartṛhari's position on the interpretative element and on the presence of chains of signation was well-motivated.

Bhartṛhari's thought on language is considered in the perspective of Indian and Western thought on language."

117.   Li, Chalres. 2018. "Sounding out Différance: Derrida, Saussure, and Bhartṛhari." *Philosophy East and West* no. 68:447-459.

"Saussure's explication of the arbitrary and differential nature of the sign, that it articulates its own category rather than naming an independently existing concept, (14) is almost identical to Bhartṛhari's, except that it is not grounded in his non-dual metaphysics.

The overarching thesis in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* is structured by his concept of *śabdādvaita*, or word non-dualism, which posits a monistic, eternal, and undifferentiated Reality from which all differences — all words — issue forth. Change is an illusion due to the power of *śabdatattva*, the linguistic potential that prefigures language, to organize the phenomenal world in terms of space (*dik*) and time (*kāla*).(15)

Bhartṛhari's non-dualism is intimately related to one of the main tenets of the grammarians: the eternality or ahistoricity of the Sanskrit language. The grammarians understood Sanskrit as the eternal, divine language, not subject to change, and thus their method of studying the language was purely ahistorical, or synchronic.

Bhartṛhari neatly intertwines this notion with that of an unchanging, underlying Reality at the very beginning of the *Vākyapadīya*, where he qualifies brahman as both *śabdatattva* and *akṣara*, which is an adjective meaning "imperishable" as well as a noun meaning a "syllable" or a "sound."(16) For him, the eternality of the Sanskrit language is equivalent to the eternality of non-dual Reality. (p. 449)

(14) Culler 1976, p. 22.
(15) Subramania Iyer 1969, pp. 125–126.
(16) *anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabadatattvaṃ yad akṣaram* (I.1, p. 1).
References
Culler, Jonathan. 1976. Saussure. London: Fontana.
Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1969. *Bhartṛhari: A Study of the Vākyapadīya in Light of the Ancient Commentaries*. Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute.

118. Lindtner, Christian. 1993. "Linking up Bhartrhari and the Bauddhas." *Asiatische Studien : Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft = Études asiatiques : revue de la Société Suisse-Asie* no. 47:195-213.

"There is, as will be recalled, a good tradition (Punyarāja and Siṃhasūri) to the effect that Vasurāta was at one time the guru of Bhartṛhari.

According to another source (Paramārtha), the Bauddha teacher Vasubandhu was attacked by Vasurāta, the grammarian, i.e. Bhartṛhari's teacher.(1)

On the basis of these pieces of independent external evidence only, it would be natural to conclude that Bhartṛhari cannot have been absolutely ignorant about at least some of the writings of "the master of 1000 *śāstra*-s", as the Chinese sources occasionally speak of Vasubandhu (thus, probably, not implying more than that Vasubandhu was an extremely prolific author). When I here speak of Vasubandhu, I am, to be sure, speaking of the author of *Abhidharmakośa, Karmasiddhi, Pañcaskandhaka, Vimśatikā, Triṃśikā, Vyākhyāyukti*, etc. - to mention only the most important of his authentic works.

Naturally, the question then arises, whether we can detect any palpable pieces of influence from Vasubandhu in Bhartṛhari's magnum opus, the *Vākyapadīya* (VP). We might then find ourselves in a position to understand what I-ching had in mind when he reported that Bhartṛhari was "intimately acquainted with the doctrine of vijnaptimätratä (Chinese: *weishih*)"?" (p. 195, two notesd omitted)

(1) For the references, see E. Frauwallner, *Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden 1982, p. 857 "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic", in WZKSO [Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens] 5 (1961), pp. 125-148).

119. Loundo, Dilip. 2015. "Bhartṛhari's Linguistic Ontology and the Semantics of Ātmanepada." *Sophia* no. 54:165-180.

Abstract: "The distinct function of *ātmanepada* in Sanskrit language remains a sort of linguist mystery in Sanskrit studies. In this article, I analyze the larger implications and subliminal meaning of *ātmanepada* by moving beyond the realm of linguistics, which has been the dominant approach, and entering the territory of philosophy and, more specifically, the purportful approach of traditional Indian philosophy of language represented by Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*. Bhartṛhari's analytical procedure seeks to unveil the ontological interdependence that binds together the constituent elements of linguistic sentences, understood as modal appearances of the ever present foundational ground of the world/word—Brahman as *Vāc*. This is our referential guide to the semantic reconstruction of *ātmanepada*'s teleology."

120. Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1992. "The Sphota doctrine of the Indian Grammarians." In *Sprachphilosophie / Philosophy of Language / La philosophie du langage. Vol. 1*, edited by Dascal, Marcelo, Gerhardus, Dietfried, Lorenz, Kuno and Meggle, Georg, 609-620. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

3. *Bhartṛhari view*, pp. 612-616.

"Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language is ultimately grounded in a monistic and idealistic metaphysical theory. He speaks of a transcendental word-essence (śabdatattva) as the first principle of the universe. His sphoṭa doctrine is finally aligned with the ultimate reality called 'śabda-brahman'. A self-realized person attains unity with the word-principle — a man of perfect knowledge. There is no thought without language, no knowledge without word in it. Consciousness vibrates through words, and such vibrating consciousness or a particular cognitive mode motivates us to act and obtain results. Hence language offers the substratum upon which human activity is based. Language and meaning are not two separate realities such that one conveys the other. They are in essence the two sides of the same coin. The ›sphoṭa‹ is this unitary principle where the symbol and what is signified are one. To understand each other's speech and to communicate, we do separate the inseparable, the sound and its sense.

This is only instrumental to our mutual understanding.

At the ultimate level, they are one. Bhartṛhari talks about three kinds of ›sphoṭa‹: sound-sphoṭa (letter), word-sphoṭa and sentence-sphoṭa, but his primary interest lies

with the sentence-sphoṭa. He underlines the importance and primacy of sentence (s. art. 63) in the language analysis, in the second kāṇḍa of *Vākyapadīya*." (p. 616)

121.   ———. 2002. "What Bhartrhari Would Have Said about Quine's Indeterminacy Thesis." In *The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal: Mind, Language and World*, edited by Ganeri, Jonardon, 333-342. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. "Since Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation was formulated and defended in his *Word and Object* (1960) about twenty-five years ago, it has generated various sorts of reactions and responses from philosophers." (p. 333)
"I wish to describe here an old theory of language prevalent in classical Indian writing, which from a slightly different point of view and on different grounds found the notion of meanings as separate and distinct entities unsuitable and superfluous. On the same theory one could have conceded the possibility of the indeterminacy of translation, not on the ground that even when everything is taken into account alternative ways of translating the native's sentence remain open, but on the ground that each translator's linguistic disposition is stimulated in some unique way and one need not match with the other. This theory was championed by Bhartrhari in AD sixth-century India. In giving an outline of this theory of language and meaning, I shall try to show how this can be seen as a critique of Quine's theory by emphasizing that the elimination of the separate and distinct meaning-entities can be achieved even from a different set of hypotheses.
There are many ways to skin a cat or a rabbit or a *Gavagai*." (p. 334)

122.   Mishra, K. K. . 1986. "Bhartrhari's Theory of Sphoṭa." *Indologica Taurinensia: Official Organ of the International Association of Sanskrit Studies* no. 13:115-121. "The theory of sphoṭa is one of the important contributions of Indian grammarians to the problem of Semantics in General Linguistics.
Its first mention has been traced as early as *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali (2nd Cent. B.C.), though the word sphoṭa has been referred to by earlier grammarians like Pāṇini in his pioneer work *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.(1) But it is the *Vākyapadīya* of the great grammarian Bhartrhari (5th Cent. A.D.) where we get a fully developed and systematized description of the *sphoṭa*-doctrine." (p. 114)
(1) *Avan sphoṭayanasya, Aṣṭādhyāyī* VI, 1, 123.

123.   Murti, Srimannarayana. 1997. *Bhartrhari, the Grammarian*. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi.
Contents: Date and Works of Bhartrhari; Language, Grammar and Culture; Scope and Scheme of the Vākyapadīya; Communicative and Analytic Language; Sentence; Indivisibility of Sentence; Theory of Sphota; Sentence Sense Pratibha Word; Intention of the Speaker; Referent of the Word; Substance and Universal; The Qualifier and the Qualificant; Basal and Contextual Referents; Negative Particle; Yugapadadhikaranavacana; Abhedaikatvasamkhya; Time Sabdadvaita Philosophy; Epilogue; Bibliography.
"Bhartrhari, the celebrated grammarian philosopher, is believed to have lived in the 5th century. This monograph presents the linguistic and philosophical theories connecting the analysis of the sentence with the ultimate reality-Sabdabrahman. The linguistic principles dealt with here are applicable not only to Sanskrit but to any language. His magnum opus the Vākyapadīya, even though partly incomplete, is the only extant work comprehensively dealing with the linguistic features of the Sanskrit language and the philosophy of grammar. It contains three kandas-Brahma-kanda or Agama-kanda, Vakya-Kanda and Prakirna-Kanda. The first two kandas together consist of 635 slokas, and deal with the Sabdabrahman, the creation of the world, jiva, world and language. The Prakirna-kanda running into 1300 slokas, divided into 14 sections called samuddesas, deals with the linguistic categories and semantic speculations prevalent in the Indian grammatical tradition. The other extant works of Bhartrhari are his fragmentary commentary of the Mahabhasya of Patanjali and auto-commentary on the kandas I and II of the Vākyapadīya."

124.   Nakamura, Hajime. 1955. "Tibetan Citations of Bhartṛhari's Verses and the Problem of His Date." In *Studies in Indology and Buddhology presented in Honour of*

Professor Susumu Yamaguchi on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday, edited by Nagao, Gajin, 122-136. Kyōto: Hozokan.

"About twenty years ago, the illustrious scholar to whom we are dedicating this commemoration volume pointed out the fact that some verses of a Vedantin called Bhadrahari (?) is mentioned in the Tibetan version of some philosophical works of later Mahayana Buddhism. The author of the present article wants to elaborate on the problem, gathering Tibetan verses ascribed to him, and collating some of them with Sanskrit originals which have been identified by the author." (p. 122)

125.   ———. 1960. "Bhartṛhari the Scholar." *Indo-Iranian Journal* no. 4:282-305.

"Bhartrhari declared himself to be a grammarian, and contemporary scholars of India looked upon him as one. But the study of grammar originated in the interpretation of the Vedas; orthodox Brahmanic scholars had included grammar in the six *angas* which were supplementary to the Vedas, and from ancient times it had held an important and revered place. Bhartṛhari was also held in high esteem as a Vedänta philosopher and since this philosophy was founded on various orthodox Brahmanic sacred books, the Upanisad in particular, it clearly follows that Bhar trhari, in addition to being a grammarian and a Vedänta philosopher, was also a believer in those sacred books. The question arises as to whether he really believed in the authority of those sacred books. The historical fact that grammar originally developed out of the Vedāngas, prejudiced his thinking, so that he was obliged to declare that the grammar which he taught was based on the Vedas and that he himself was a follower of the Vedic lore." (p. 282)

126.   ———. 1981. "The Concept of Brahman in Bhartṛhari's Philosophy." *Journal of Oriental Research* no. 40-41:135-150.

127.   Nicholson, Andrew J. 2018. "Early Vedānta." In *History of Indian Philosophy*, edited by Bilimoria, Purushottama, 223-232. New York: Routledge.
Bhartṛhari, pp. 228-230.

"We can shed more light on the question of the reality or unreality of the world by returning to Bhartṛhari's conception of Word (*śabda*), the essence of Brahman, and its intimate involvement with the process of creation. Word is the energy (*kratu*) that exists within Brahman, just as the yolk exists within the peacock's egg. In its latent state, Word is undifferentiated, just as the yolk is a uniform color (VP 1.51). Yet the yolk contains within itself all of the variegated colors of the peacock, just as Word contains within itself all sentences and words. For Bhartṛhari, as for other grammarians concerned with Vedic exegesis, words and their meanings are eternal (VP 1.23).

The relations between words and their meanings are also eternal, not arbitrary and variable as taught by Saussurean linguistics (as well as Buddhist linguistic philosophy).

According to Bhartṛhari's ontology of Word, Word in its absolute state is the ground of all words, meanings, and indeed all knowledge: "There is no cognition in the world n which Word does not figure. All knowledge is, as it were, intertwined with Word" (VP 1.123).(12)" (p. 229)

(12) Bhartṛhari (1965, 110).

References

Bhartṛhari. 1965. The Vākyapadīya (= VP) of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti, ch. 1. K. A. Subramania Iyer (trans.).
Poona: Deccan College.

128.   Oetke, Claus. 2013. "Inconsistency, Paradox and Linguistic Content. Did Bhartṛhari offer a solution for Truth-Paradoxes?" *Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica* no. 52:9-39.

Abstract: "The article attempts to clarify the nature of truth-paradoxes by demonstrating why it cannot be maintained that a particular philosophical treatise offers a way to their solution. In the light of objective qualities of statements leading to paradoxes of truth it emerges that the question of the nature of the content to which properties of (absolute) truth can be ascribed possesses critical

relevance. This supports the dismissal of a claim made by some scholars with respect to the pertinent text."

129. ———. 2016. "Is the section of verses 1-29 in Vākyapadīya III.3 based on a sound theoretical motivation?" *Revista Científica Guillermo de Ockham* no. 14:2-21.
Abstract: "The present article attempts to establish the following propositions: The remarks to be found in the initial segment of the so-called Saṃbandha-Samuddeśa of Bhartṛharti's Vākyapadīya, or Trikāṇḍī, can be interpreted in a way which permits to regard them as the expression of a valid theoretical view. It is important to investigate the possible existence of a sound theoretical motivation in philosophical treatises not only under the perspective of philosophical analysis but even in the framework of traditional textual exegesis irrespective of whether the textual sources represent a Western or a non-Western tradition of thought."

130. Ogawa, Hideyo. 1999. "Bhartṛhari on *Śakti*: the Vaiśeṣika Categories as *Śaktis*." *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* no. 47:15-26.
Abstract: "According to Bhartṛhari, the phenomenal world is a manifold appearance of *śaktis* which *Śabdabrahman,* the seed of all (sarvabija), is assumed to have and which in themselves are not susceptible of modification (*aparināminī)*. In his Vākyapadīya [VP] Bhartrhari describes *śaktis* in the framework where the Vaiśeṣika categories (*padārtha*) are taken up and equated with them. The aim of this paper is to present, by examining VP III, *sādhana, kk,* 9(-)l 5 where s·uch a framework is observed, a few aspects of the *śakti* Bhartṛhari conceives of. The ontological status of the *śakti* in relation to the ultimately real, that is, its unreality (*asatyatā*) the equivalents for which are *avicāritaramanīyatā*) iyatii ('the state of being beloved without having been well-considered') and *bhedavicārānarhatā* ('the incapability of predicating the difference and non-difference'), shall be kept aside in this paper."

131. ———. 1999. Bhartṛhari on the Non-distinction between Reality and Unreality. Paper read at the XIIth conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Lausanne, August 26th, 1999.
"In view of Bhartṛhari's fundamental thesis that the ultimate reality, the undelimited, appears as delimited, we have to say that the one permanent reality appears as being of the nature of existence and non-existence and not that what is of the nature of existence and non-existence appears as something. For Bhartṛhari, the ultimate reality Brahman is beyond relativization and cannot involve a contradiction in it. Therefore, against the interpretations by Iyer and Houben who understand that Bhartrhari considers Brahman to have the two aspects of *sat* and ā2 I would like to argue that taking *sadasadātmaka* as qualifying the appearances of Brahman (*bahurūpa*) is more consistent with Bhartrhari's thesis. As will be seen later, Helārāja interprets it in that manner. We must give his views careful consideration. To my understanding, his interpretation faithfully reflects the core of Bhartṛhari's linguistic thought.
The question of the *sadasadātmaka*-interpretation is related to the questions of the verbalization of Brahman, the relativism holding in the domain of the things in the phenomenal world, and the capacities of Brahman underlying its verbalizations. In this paper, examining these questions, I shall propose a new interpretation of the kārikāunder consideration." (pp. 6-7)

132. ———. 1999. "Bhartṛhari on Representation (buddhyākāra)." In *Dharmakīrti's thought and Its impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy: Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference, Hiroshima, November 4-6, 1997*, 267-286. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
"As is well known, Buddhist epistemologists posited as the *śabdārtha* a conceptual representation (*buddhyākāra*) from the viewpoint of appearance (pratibhāsa), an external individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) from the viewpoint of reification or judgement (*adhyavasāya*), and the exclusion of others (*anyāpoha*), where others are either other conceptual representations or other external individuals. This is succinctly summed up by Jñānaśrīmita in his *Apohaprakaraṇa* as follows:
[sanskrit text omitted]

"First of all, an object (*artha*) is primarily conveyed by the word. In that case, *apoha* ('exclusion'), being subordinate to it [i.e., the object] (*tadguṇatvena*), is to be understood. And the object [is twofold]: One is posited as a denotatum (*vācya*) from the viewpoint of reification or judgement (*adhyāsa = adhyavasya*) and the other from the viewpoint of appearance (*bhāsa = pratibhāsa*).
[But] in reality (*tattvataḥ*) neither [of them] are [the denotatum of the word]." (p. 267)
(...)
"In this paper I shall demonstrate that Bhartṛhari posits a *buddhyākāra* and an external individual as *śabdārthas* from the same points of view as Jñānaśrīmita mentions. Such a semantic position of Bhartṛhari is taken for granted by later Pāṇinīyas like Kaiyaṭa, Helārāja and Puṇyarāja but has not yet been traced back to Bhartṛhari's words themselves so far. As is well known, Dignāga, who is believed to have first advocated the *apoha* theory, is well acquainted with Bhartṛhari's linguistic thought. And moreover, he is a representationalist, as is shown by his theory of 'appearance' (*ābhāsa*). Naturally, Dignāga did know that the conceptual representation and the external individual were involved in verbal behavior. It is certain, therefore, that clearing up the situation in which Dignāga had to propound the apoha theory will give a new perspective of the so-called historical development of the *apoha* theory and stimulate Buddhists scholars to re-examine it." (p. 269)

133.   ———. 2001. "Bhartṛhari on A.1.1.68." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 29:531-543.
"Bhartr.hari's interpretation of A.1.1.68 in VP 1.60–68 leads to the following conclusion:
A.1.1.68 is the general rule from which a particular definitional rule such as *agner agniḥ saṃjñā bhavati* is deduced. By this rule, the item in use whose form is equal to that of the item which is uttered in the sūtra is brought in and the relationship of name and the named is established between their own forms. In other words, the rule provides that the form which is understood from the item uttered in the sūtra refers to the form which is differentiated from the item in use when the latter is uttered.
(...)
In addition, if we accept that whatever item is uttered has its own form differentiated from it and denotes the form, it will make no sense to say that when a linguistic item is mentioned, its own form is to be understood from it. A.1.1.68 never describes the self-referring nature of the linguistic item, which nature is not determined without the conceptual discrimination between a linguistic item and its form; rather, it makes use of such a nature for building a bridge between the grammar and the practical use of the linguistic item." (p. 536, notes omitted)

134.   ———. 2012. "Patañjali's View of a Sentence Meaning and Its Acceptance by Bhartṛhari." In *Devadattīyam. Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume*, edited by Voegeli, François, Eltschinger, Vincent, Feller, Danielle, Candotti, Maria Piera, Diaconeswcu, Bogdan and Kulkarni, Malhar, 159-188. Bern: Peter Lang.
"In his Bhāṣya on A 1.2.45, Patañjali advances his view of a sentence meaning as follows:
MBh on A 1.2.45 (I.218.10) *eteṣāṃ padānāṃ sāmānye vartamānānāṃ yadviśeṣe 'vasthānaṃ sa vākyārthaḥ.*
A particular meaning (*viśeṣa*), as a conveyer of which these words conveying a general meaning (*sāmānya*) are established, is a sentence meaning.(1)
In this Bhāṣya Patañjali intends to say that a sentence meaning is a qualifier-qualificand relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*) among the meanings of words in a sentence. Here Patañjali assumes that a sentence is a composite of independently meaningful words and that a sentence is an independent unit which has a sentential meaning separate from word meanings. This is natural, considering that grammarians operate with words as constituents of sentences. Studies of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language, however, reveal that Bhartṛhari maintains that an impartite sentence is the real unit of actual communication and that he still

accepts that through analysis one can and should abstract words and word meanings. It is interesting in this regard to consider how Bhartṛhari deals with Patañjali's view of a sentence meaning in the Bhāṣya. The Bhāṣya is quoted and discussed in the Vṛtti on VP 2.15, 246, 441 and in Helārāja's commentary on VP 3.1.74." (p. 159)
(1) See Ogawa (2004–5). In short, according to this Bhāṣya, the meaning of a sentence is the particular meaning which the words of the sentence, denoting general meanings, convey.
References
Ogawa, Hideyo 2004–2005: "Approaching the sentence meaning in the Mahābhāṣya: the Vṛtti and the Ṭīkā." *Journal of Indological Studies* 16/17, pp. 109–152.

135.   ———. 2013. "Bhartṛhari on Three Types of Linguistic Unit-meaning Relations." In *Vyākarana Across the Ages: Prtoceedings of the 15th World Sanskrit Conference. Vol. II*, edited by Cardona, George, 217-279. New Delhi: Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan.
"To summarize the main points Bhartṛhari makes about the relation of 'this-is-that' between a linguistic unit and a meaning:
First, this relation is taught and learned through an utterance of the type so '*yam* 'this-is-that'. Secondly, the relation is established by the identification of the linguistic unit and the meaning. Once the relation is established, the linguistic unit and the meaning appear respectively as identical with the meaning and the linguistic unit.
Thirdly, the identification comes to the restriction on the linguistic units and meanings which can be related to each other.
All this gives the answer to the second question mentioned earlier in §0. Therefore we may be justified in arguing that Helārāja's understanding of the relation between linguistic unit and meaning is thoroughly founded on Bhartṛhari's theory on it." (p. 274)

136.   ———. 2016. "Bhartṛhari on Unnameable Things." In *Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy*, edited by Balcerowicz, Piotr, 415-430. Warsaw: Indological Studies.
"In his *Mahā-bhāṣya* Patañjali declares that for grammarians what words express is their authority. Later Pāṇinîyas from Bhartṛhari onwards illustrate this principle by stating that grammarians are not concerned with things as they are (*vastv-artha*) but as they are spoken of (*śabdārtha*). It is interesting that they recognise that there are things which are unnameable, beyond verbalisation. In his Vṛtti on the Vākyapadīya Bhartṛhari calls them *asaṁvijñāna-padas*—'those which have not words to convey themselves'. In this paper I shall show how Bhartṛhari accounts for the existence of a thing defined as asaôvijñāna-pada and what philosophical significance he attaches to the issue of whether a certain thing has a word defined as *saṁvijñāna-pada*." (p. 415, a note omitted)

137.   ———. 2016. "Bhartrhari on A 3.2.60 *tyadādisu drśo 'nālocane kan ca*." In *Vyākaraṇaparipṛcchā: Proceedings of the Vyākaraṇa Section of the 16th World Sanskrit Conference*, edited by Cardona, George and Ogawa, Hideyo, 237-264. New Delhi: DK Publishers.
Abstract: "In his Bhāṣya on A 3.2.60 Patañjali proposes that in an upapada compound such as *tāḍṛś* 'such-like' the kt affix to be introduced after the verb dṛś 'see' be taken to denote an agent-object (*karmakartṛ*). In VP 3.7.64 Bhartṛhari observes that some Pāṇiniyas try to explain the agent-object construction proposed by Patañjali, on the basis of a logical construction (*parikalpana*) that would attribute to this verb as a meaning the act of becoming the object of seeing (*viṣayatāpatti*). According to Bhartṛhari, however, the logical construction has undesirable consequences in Pāṇini's derivational system. The present paper shows how Pāṇiniyas, accepting that a meaning (*artha*) serves as a cause (*nimitta*) of the explanation (*anvākhyāna*) of a correct speech form, put a limit on semantics.

For Pāṇiniyas, the meaning which serves as such a cause must be the meaning to convey which a linguistic item is found to be used in actual usage, since their fundamental position is that the denotation of meanings by linguistic items (*abhidhāna*) is a natural thing (*svābhāvika*)."

138.   ———. 2019. "Two Truths Theory: What is *vyavahāra*? Language as a Pointer to the Truth." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 47:613-633.
Abstract: "Mādhyamikas argue that ultimate reality, which is without any delimitation and hence cannot be verbalized in itself (*anakṣara*), can be expressed in words on the basis of the attribution o rsuperimposition (*samāropa*) of the basis for the application of the word (*pravṛttinimitta*). The denotation theory of ultimate reality Bhartṛhari advances in the *Dravyasamuddeśa* of his Vākyapadīya convincingly explains that, insofar as ultimate reality is spoken of, we must say that it is denoted by the word; ultimate reality is said to be ineffable only in the sense that it is far from what is conveyed as somethingby the word; language is a pointer to the ultimate reality. The point that the application of a word to ultimate reality depends on the attribution of the basis for the application of the word to it naturally leads to an idea that one should not hypostatize the basis, although without resorting to it any word cannot be used to convey the ultimate reality; otherwise, it would have to be said that the ultimate reality to which the word isapplied has in essence the property which serves asthe basis. Such a property is precisely what theMādhyamikas consider to be the *svabhāva* 'intrinsic nature'. What they understand by the term *śūnyatā* is precisely that everything has no real basis for the application of the word to it."

139.   Parsons, Terence. 2001. "Bhartṛhari on What Cannot Be Said." *Philosophy East and West* no. 51 (4):525-534.
"Bhartṛhari claims that certain things cannot be signified -- for example, the signification relation itself. Hans and Radhika Herzberger assert that Bhartṛhari's claim about signification can be validated by an appeal to twentieth-century results in set theory. This appeal is unpersuasive in establishing this view, but arguments akin to the semantic paradoxes (such as the "liar" paradox) come much closer. Unfortunately, these arguments are equally telling against another of his views: that the thatness of the signification relation can be signified. Bhartṛhari also claims that the relation of inherence cannot be signified -- a quite different view that is not borne out by twentieth-century results. Finally, further research is needed to investigate what Bhartṛhari's own reasons might have been for these views."

140.   Patnaik, Tandra. 1994. *Śabda, a Study of Bhartrhari's Philosophy of Language*. New Delhi: D. K. Prrintworld.

141.   ———. 2014. *Kālaśakti: Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Time*. New Delhi: D.K. Printworld.

142.   R., Pathiraj. 1995. "The Sphota doctrine of Bhartṛhari." *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* no. 22:67-74.
"The lingustic theory of *sphota* is chiefly associated with the grammarian Bhartṛhari, although he is not the propounder of the doctrine. He gave sphota a metaphysical significance and defended it against its critics.
One can trace the use of the word '*sphota*' in the ancient writings, around the time of Pāṇini. It is doubted as to whether Pāṇini himself knew of such a thing as *sphota*, though the words '*sphotāyana*' appears once in his work, Aṣṭādhyāyī (6.1.123). Anyway we don't know the propunder of the doctrine. It was Patanjali who, (in his *Mahābhāshya*), for the first time, made a distinction between *sphota* and *dhvan*i. The sound that is produced when the word is uttered he called *dhvani*. It is ephemeral. The permanent element in the word, which is not affected by the peculiarities of the individual speaker, he called *sphota*. The *sphota*, in Patanjali's system, is an unchanging unit of sound. It may be an isolated letter (*Varnasphota*), having a normal and fixed size or a series of such letters (*Padasphota*).(1) Thls is quite diffferent from Bhartṛhari's concept of *sphota*.

The claim of Bhartṛhari is that "a sentence is to be considered not a concatentaion made up of different sound-units arranged in a particular order but mainly as a single meaningful symbol."(2)
(1) Cf. K. Kunjunnia Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, (Madras: Adyar Library, 1963) ,p. 102. (Henceforward this book will be referred to as ITM)
(2) *Ibid.*, p. 97

143.   Raja, K. Kunjunni. 1969. *Indian Theories of Meaning*. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre.
Second edition; first edition 1963.
"To Bhartṛhari the linguistic theory of sphoṭa is part of his monistic and idealistic metaphysical theory according to which the transcendental speech-essence. (*śabda-tattva*)is the First Principle of the universe." (p. 146)
(...)
"According to Bhartṛhari the speech-principle has three stages in the course of its manifestation, namely *paśyantī, madhyamā* and *vaikharī*.(1) *Paśyantī* is the supreme Reality, Śabdabrahman, and has been identified with *pratibhā*, the flash of insight or the principle of consiousness.) The Pratyabhijñā school of philosophy accepted four different stages in the manifestation of the Śabdabrahman, adding a fourth stage called *parā* which is identical with the *paśyantī,* stage in Bhartṛhari's system." (p. 147, two notes omitted)
(1) *VP* I, 144.

144.   ———. 1990. "Chapter on Bhartṛhari's Ṭīkā on Patañjali's Mahābhsāya." In *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 5: The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, edited by Coward, Harold G. and Raja, Kuniunni, 172-174. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
"Ṭika on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya.*
Bhartrhari's philosophical ideas are found in their fully developed form in the *Vākyapadīya*, which is his magnum opus; but the germs of his theories may be found in his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, of which a fragmentary manuscript alone is now available. It has been establish ed that this fragmentary manuscript forms a genuine part of Bhartrhari's *Mahābhāṣyaṭikā*. Th.is work was mentioned by ltsing in the seventh century and by Kaiyaṭa as a source book for his *Pradipa* commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya.*
The Ṭikā is not a regular word-for-word commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*. It contains observations and comments on select words and points raised in them. Some of the ideas that were developed later into a cogent system are found scattered here and there in the commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*.
In some cases Bhartrhari's comments in the Ṭikā help us to understand his basic standpoint in the *Vākyapadīya*."

145.   ———. 1990. "Chapter on Helārāja." In *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 5: The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, edited by Coward, Harold G. and Raja, Kuniunni, 193-197. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
"Helārāja
This important commentator on Bhartṛhari tells us that he is the son of Bhūtirāja and a descendant of a minister named Lakṣaṇa, or King Muktāpīda of Kashmir. Abhinavagupta, who flourished in 1014, appears to have studied with Bhūtirāja as well as with a son of Bhūtirāja whom Abhinavagupta calls " Indurāja." It 'is clear that Abhinavagupta is referring to Helārāja in some passages, as he is credited with having written a grammatical work called *Prakīrṇakavivaraṇa*, which may have been a commentary on Helārāja's *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa*—at least the title strongly suggests Abhinavagupta's awareness of Helārāja's work. Thus we may place Helārāja's date about A.D. 980.
Regarding his commentary on Bhartṛhari's *Trikāṇḍi*, it seems clear that such a work was written covering the entire three chapters. There is some doubt about which portions of the work are available to us now. The commentary on book 3 is available in print. Aklujkar argues that its proper title is *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa*, and

that Helārāja's commentary on book I was called *Śabdaprabhā*, while that on book 2 was *Vākyakāṇḍaṭikā* or *Vākyapradipa*. Aklujkar further argues that the Tikā on book 2, which is available in print and credited to Punyarāja, is in fact Helārāja's work instead." (p. 193, notes omitted)

146.   ————. 1997. "Bhartrhari's Philosophy of Language, *Sphotavada* and *Sabdabrahmavada*: Are they Interrelated?" In *India and Beyond: Aspects of Literature, Meaning, Ritual and Thought: Essays in Honour of Frits Staal*, edited by van der Meij, Dick, 405-407. London: Kegan Paul International.
"Bhartṛhari, who flourished in the beginning of the fifth century, was an eminent Sanskrit grammarian and a deep and original philosopher of language. He is well known for enunciating two theories: the *Sphoṭavāda* and the *Śabdabrahmavāda*. They created a storm among thinkers; orthodox schools attacked them severely; modern thinkers of the present century are attracted by the novelty and significance of Bhartṛhari and are trying to understand these views in their proper perspective. Some scholars, like Biardeau, believed that the two theories are interrelated and cannot be explained in isolation. In my book *Indian Theories of Meaning,* I held that even if they are interrelated, each can be studied individually also. I shall try to give a brief summary of the two theories." (p. 405)

147.   Rath, Gayatri. 2000. *Linguistic Philosophy in Vākyapadīya: With special reference to first two Kandas*. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.

148.   Ratié, Isabella. 2018. "On the Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā, a Lost Work Attributed to Bhartṛhari: An Examination of Testimonies and a List of Fragments." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* no. 138:709-741.
Abstract: "The fifth-century grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari has long attracted scholarly attention, and deservedly so: his magnum opus, the *Vākyapadīya*, had a profound impact on later Indian schools of thought, Brahmanical as well as Buddhist. The *Vākyapadīya* is not, however, the only grammatical and/or philosophical work ascribed to Bhartṛhari in addition to a commentary on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*: according to several sources dating back at least to the tenth century, the same author also composed a *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* or *Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣāi*, which, unfortunately, has not come down to us, and which is still shrouded in mystery, as its main topic, and even title and attribution, are considered uncertain to date. The goal of this article is to examine the available fragments and testimonies and to establish on their basis that the work, the original title of which must have been the *Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā*, endeavored to show that the whole phenomenal world is made of six elements (earth, fire, water, air, ether, and consciousness) while ultimately defending a nondualistic point of view. Verses quoted by later authors as belonging to the *Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā* are gathered and translated in an appendix to the article."

149.   Rukmani, T. S. 1987. "Patañjali's 'Prajñā' and Bhartṛhari's Pratibā. A Comparative Study." *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* no. 14:81-90.
In this paper I intend to undertake a comparative study of Patañjali's concept of Prajñā and Bhartṛhari's concept of Pratibhā and bring out some of their implications.
The word *prajñā* occurs in 3 *sūtras*(1) in the 1st *pāda*, in one *sūtra*(2) in the 2nd *pāda*, in one *sūtra* 3 in the 3rd *pāda* and in no *sūtra* in the 4th *pāda* of the *Yogasūtras*. This means that Patañjjali has used the word prajñā in only five *sūtras* in the entire work of about 195 *sūtras*. If one were to deduce the importance of *prajñā* from the number of times the word is used in the *sūtras* then of course the answer is obvious. But the answer is also not correct because the entire system of *Rājayoga* hinges on the concept of *prajñā*." (p. 81)
(...)
"lf we now turn to the concept of *pratibhā* in Patañjali's *Yogasūtras*, we find that it occurs for the first time in the *Vibhūtipāda*, *sūtra* 33.(19) Even here it is mainly used to describe the knowledge (*jñāna*) which arises from *pratibhā*. The *sūtra* mentions that 'Due to *pratibhājñāna* the *yogi* knows all'.

Vyāsa states this is prior to the dawn of *viveka* or discriminate discernment between the '*sattva* intellect' and *Puruṣa*.(20) Thus,*pratibhā* 1s not the highest state of *prajñā* which gives rise to *kaivalya* later." (p. 84)
(...)
"In the *Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari uses the expression *pratibhā* in a comprehensive manner equating it to istinctive nature at one end of the scale and to the special insight of divine knowledge of *rṣis* and sages at the other end.(27) In all, Bhartṛhari has mentioned six kinds of *pratibhā*. What is common to all of them is a flash of understanding and the difficulty in analysing this process of understanding." (p. 86, sme notes omitted)
(1) *Yogasūtra*, I. 20, 48, 49.
(2) *Yogasūtra*, II. 27.

150.   Saito, Akane. 2017. "Internalization of Speech: Pronunciation and Perception of the Word." *Journal of World Philosophies* no. 2:109-120.
Abstract: "There are various philosophers who have discussed the role of language in ancient India. Among them, Bhartṛhari considered the relation between the superficial appearance of speech and its essential nature. In actual life, we pronounce and perceive the word. He held that there must be some link between ideal logic and worldly truth. His focus in the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, is on the process of communication, the process of the internalization of speech. He differentiates the perspective of the speaker and the hearer, and explains the movement of sounds. The sphoṭa theory addresses both how to pronounce the word and how to perceive it. Traces of his discussion are found in the works of his follower Maṇḍanamiśra in his book, *Sphoṭasiddhi*."

151.   ———. 2020. "Mīmāṃsāsūtra 6.5.54 on bādha in Maṇḍanamiśra's Brahmasiddhi." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 48:915-944.
Abstract: "This paper will show how the philosopher Maṇḍanamiśra discusses in his Brahmasiddhi the cancellation (bādha) of a former element by a latter, which is prescribed in Mīmāṃsāsūtra 6.5.54. We do not have yet a clear idea of what the value of this text holds for him. I would emphasize that probably more than we had expected, it forms an essential part of Maṇḍana's philosophy. Its authority is sometimes stated explicitly and sometimes not; and we easily overlook the fact that his argument is highly dependent on the Mīmāṃsā scheme. This rule, 6.5.54, was originally purely concerned with the performance of the sacrifice, but Maṇḍana applies it to his epistemic analysis, i.e. his discussion on the relative strength of the valid means of knowledge, giving this rule the status of basic testimony. Furthermore, he interprets therule in his own unique way, or at least differently from Kumārilabhaṭṭa, integrating it with the argument by his famous predecessor Bhartṛhari.
The mutual relationship among Maṇḍana, Kumārila, and Bhartṛhari, will be illuminated by focusing on what Mīmāṃsāsūtra 6.5.54 really means."

152.   ———. 2020. "The Theory of the Sphoṭa." In *The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Philosophy of Language*, edited by Graheli, Alessandro, 76-107. New York: Bloomsbury.
§ 3. *Bhartṛhari on the Sphoṭa*, pp. 79-82.
"The investigation of the word's phonetic form is found in the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, one of the greatest Grammarians and philosopher, who had a huge influence on the later history of Indian philosophy. Bhartṛhari refined the few remarks on sphoṭa left by Patañjali into an elaborate philosophical theory. His sphoṭa has three characteristics:
1. Phonemes *(varṇa)*, sounds (*dhvani*), and bodily resonance (*nāda*) are differentiated.
2. Sphoṭa is the indivisible sound-form manifested in both the utterance and the hearing perception of a word, which are both discussed by Bhartṛhari.
3. Various views on sound, the nature of sphoṭa, and the relation between them, are discussed by Bhartṛhari as alternatives." (p. 79)

153. Sastri, Gaurinath. 1959. *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning: Some Indian approaches with special reference to the philosophy of Bhartṛhari*. Calcutta: Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series.

"It was Bhartṛhari, author of the *Vākyapadīya*, who was the first grammarian to take upon himself the task of evolving a school of philosophy which is known by the name of Verbal Monism, *Śabdādvaita* or *Śabdābrahmavāda*. Monism in Indian thought is said to have found expression in three ways -- the *Brahmādvaita* or *Bhāvādvaita* of the Vedāntist, the *Vijñānādvaita* of the Buddhist, and the *Śabdādvaita* of the grammarian. The term *Śabdābrahman* is no new coinage of Bhartṛhari's, for there are texts in the Upaniṣads where we are told that there are two *Brahmans, Para* and *Apara*, and while the *Parabrahman* means the Higher Brahman, i.e., the Transcendental Absolute, the *Aparabrahman* means the Lower Brahman or the *Śabdābrahman*, the realization of which leads one to the attainment of the other. But we must be careful not to identify the *Śabdābrahman* of the grammarian with the *Śabdābrahman* of the Upaniṣads, for according to Bhartṛhari *Śabdābrahman* is identical with the Transcendent Reality.

The present work starts with an attempt to describe the Transcendental Reality of the grammarian, which, though a unitary principle in essence, is yet inseparably associated with *Śaktis* or Powers which lie therein, and of which the most important is the *Kālaśakti* or the Time Power. It is on the eve of creation that these Powers are sundered from the *Śabdābrahman*, as it were, and the cosmic process runs in two directions, viz, that of word (*śabda*) and that of meaning (*artha*). In the first four chapters of the book I have discussed the nature of the *Sabdabrahman* and of *Kālaśakti* and other Powers and have not only examined the cosmic process as presented by the grammarian-philosopher but compared it with parallel schemes in other systems of philosophy as well.

From this I have proceeded to the study of the empiric realities on the *śabda* side, letters, words and sentences, and I have shown that the grammarian understands *sphoṭa*, the indivisible word, as *śabda qua* denoter." (*Introduction*, pp. XXIV-XXV, a note omitted)

154. ———. 1980. *A Study in the Dialectics of Sphota*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

"To discuss the nature of 'word' or more precisely, 'significany word' (*upādāna śabda*) is a problem that has arrested the attention of Indian philosophers for centuries. Words are used convey meanings. Now, a word in common parlance is not anything but the sum-total of a few letters and a sentence, which usually held to be the unit of our thoughts and expressions, is an aggregate of a few words. On a careful and scientific analysis, however, it appears that a combination of letters forming a word and, likewise, a combination of words forming a sentence is never possible. Life of letters is only of short duration as they die out the next moment after they are pronounced. And, as combination of objects is possible only in the case of their co-existence, it is not understood how an aggregate of a few lettersmaking up a word or that of some words forming a sentence is obtainable. !f it, however, be presumed that letters are not short-lived entities but are endowed with permanent existence, a combination of letter, constituting a word may be conceivable but the manner in which such combination is to be achieved for purposes of expression of meaning remains to be studied in detail. The Naiyāyikas who believe in the evanescent character of letters and the Mimāṁsakas who are advocates of their etemal character have in their own ways attempted to return suitable answers to the objections that at times seem to have been baffling. But, it is worthy of notice that the grammarians do not find them suitable for acceptance. They adumbrate a theory strikingly original to claim that both word and meaning are indivisible units. The indivisible unit of expression is called *sphoṭa* and the indivisible unit of meaning is also called *sphoṭa* or *pratibhā*. The grammarians do not believe that a word is divisible into letters or a sentence is divisible into words. Likewise. they do not believe that the meaning of a sentence is the sum-total of the meaning of words which are ordinarily described as its parts." (*Preface*, p. IX) (...)

We have stated that Bhartṛhari has elaborated the Vedic tradition when he describes the Absolute as brahman and *śabdatattva*.

But, may we go a step further to point out that he introduces it as *akṣara* too. Usually, the expression *akṣara* means that which does not change or perish, i.e., unchanging or imperishable.

The Transcendent is viewed as the prius of the universe that comes out of it but it remains constant in spite of those transformations.

But, as it has been noticed before that the word may be derived from *vaś*, to pervade, meaning thereby 'what is pervasive and ubiquitous'. In this way the identity between brahman and *akṣara* may be understood. And, If brahman and *śabdatativā* are conterminous, it is understandable how the Indescribable One is described as *brahman*, *śabdatativā* and *akṣara*." (*Preface*, p. XI)

155.   Seneviratne, Rohana. 2019. "Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein on Grammar: A Few Observations." *IRA: International Journal of Education and Multidisciplinary Studies* no. 15:129-140.

Abstract: "Irrespective of spatiotemporal limitations of the world's intellectual history, discussions on the language have attracted considerable attention of philosophers, linguists, and even the public.

The topics of such discussions have also included the meaning, nature or function/s, and necessity of grammar while diverse arguments have been raised both in support and against even its ontic presence. Among the philosophers from all ages who attempted to analyze the foundation of those arguments, i.e. the common notion that grammar is prescriptive and fruit of pedagogical instructions, Bhartṛhari (c. 450 - 510 C.E.) stands significant because of the richness and legitimacy of his arguments at such an early age of history. More than a millennium later, Ludwig Wittgenstein as a highly influential philosopher from the last century shows some relationship with Bhartṛhari in (re)confirming that our common construal of grammar cannot be valid because of its non-prescriptive nature. While attempting to examine the ways in which Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein have interpreted grammar, this paper succinctly investigates each philosopher approaches towards the language in use."

156.   ———. 2019. "Unity of Sentential Meaning: Bhartṛhari's Approach to the Indivisibility Thesis." *Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies (AJMS)* no. 7:18-26.

Abstract: "A doyen of profound discussions on the Indian philosophy of language, Bhartṛhari (fl. 500 – 700 CE) introduced in the light of the Advaita Vedanta system of philosophy a major theory known as the indivisibility thesis (*akhaṇḍapakṣavāda*) of meaning. His expertise in Sanskrit grammar rooted in the time-honored tradition bolstered with applied approach to the language in use enabled him to establish firmly this theory. Some later grammarians in the mainstream Pāṇinian grammatical tradition and Vedantic philosophers modelled their theories on Bhartṛhari's approach to sentential meaning, while some others criticized him for misusing the Advaita Vedantic theology and its standard line of arguments in order to justify the indivisibility of meaning, whereas primacy of words cannot be ascertained in any context of language use. This paper examines the background of Bhartṛhari's arguments for the legitimacy of his claim that sentence meaning is the primary entity, which is divisible neither syntactically nor semantically. It also seeks to justify that his approach to the indivisibility thesis deserves a significant position among the early thoughts on the derivation of meaning and its composition."

157.   Serebryakov, Igor D. 1986. "Bhartṛhari Problem in Contemporary Indology " In *Sanskrit and World Culture: Proceedings of the Fourth World Sanskrit Conference of the International Association of Sanskrit Studies, Weimar, May 23–30, 1979*, 663-666. Berlin: De Gruyter.

"The interest in studies of Bhartṛhari's scientific and philosophical heritage increased immensely within the last decades. It especially concerns *Vākyapadīya*. Many editions of the text itself as a whole or in parts appeared and we should like to remind about the critical text of the *Vakyapadiya* prepared and published by our

highly esteemed colleague S. K. Iyer. The net result of all researches concerning this tract of Bhartṛhari is given in S. K. Iyer's fundamental monograph "*Vākyapadīya* in the Light of Ancient Commentaries".(6) It is worth to note that the *Vākyapadīya* is widely used by scholars dealing particularly with the theory of meaning. It involved some ontological and epistemological problems and brought to attempts to define the place of Bhartṛhari in the ideological field of his time." (pp. 664-665)

(6) K. A. Subramania Iyer, *Bhartṛhari, A Study of Vākyapadīya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries,* Poona 1969.

158.   Shastri, Gaurinath Bhattacharyya. 1991. *The Philosophy of Bhartṛhari*. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan.
"We propose to review in this monograph the cardinal ·points of this unique system of thought which, in our opinion, brings out Bhartṛhari's stature as one of the most outstanding intellectuals and dialecticians of all times. It is most unfortunate, however, that he could not become the fountain-head of a school like Dharmakirti or Śaṅkarācārya who had a continuous band of eminent writers to develop the central thesis of their original promulgators. Nevertheless, his sparkling originality of thought coupled with an amazingly compelling power of logic secured for him a position of great eminence with a host of outstanding philosophers belonging to rival schools of thought." (p. 1)
(...)
"To sum up: Io the opinion of the grammarian, Śabda means both the perishable sound and the Imperishable Word.
When the Absolute is described as *a-śabda*, śabda means ·'sound'. The grammarian adumbrates that the Absolute is Śabda. In the absence of a suitable expression in the English language, the Absolute in the system of the grammarian is called Word (*Śabda*) or the Eternal Verbum." (p. 7)

159.   Shukla, Ved Mitra. 2021. *Meaning in Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya*. New Delhi: D. K Printworld.

160.   Shulman, David. 2008. "Illumination, Imagination, Creativity: Rājasekhara, Kuntaka, and Jagannātha on *Pratibhā*." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 36:481-505.
Abstract: "Sanskrit poeticians make the visionary faculty of *pratibhā* necessary part of the professional poet's make-up. The term has a pre-history in Bhartṛhari's linguistic metaphysics, where it is used to explain the unitary perception of meaning.
This essay examines the relation between *pratibhā* and possible theories of the imagination, with a focus on three unusual theoreticians—Rājasekhara, Kuntaka, and Jagannāthaita. Rājasekhara offers an analysis of *pratibhā* that is heavily interactive, requiring the discerning presence of the bhāvaka listener or critic; he also positions *pratibhā* in relation to Bildung (*vyutpatti*) and practice. For Kuntaka, *pratibhā*, never an ex nihilo creation by a poet, serves as the basis for the peculiar forms of intensified insight and experience that constitute poetry; these may also involve the creative scrambling and re-articulation of the object in terms of its systemic composition. At times, Kuntaka's *pratibhā* comes close to a strong notion of imaginative process. But the full-fledged thematization of the imagination, and of *pratibhā* as its support and mechanism, is best seen in the seventeenth-century debates preserved for us by Jagannātha. A link is suggested between the discourse of poetic imagination in Jagannātha and similar themes that turn up in Indo-Persian poets such as Bedil."

161.   Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1969. *Bhartṛhari: A Study of Vâkyapadîya in the Light of Ancient Commentaries*. Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate Research Institute.
"To put it briefly, an attempt has been made in this work, after giving a brief account of the problems relating to the text of Bhartrhari's work, including his commentary on the Mahabhashya of Patañjali and to the commentaries on the Vākyapadīya, to expound briefly the philosophical ideas and the notions pertaining

to General Linguistics and those underlying the forms of the Sanskrit language, found mainly in the Vākyapadīya and to a certain extent, in the commentary on the Mahabhashya. As the whole of even the available fragment of the latter work has not yet been published, it has not been possible to bring out all the linguistic notion lying embedded in it.

But I have taken note of some of the notions found in the published portion and they are found to confirm what one can gather from the Vākyapadīya. The present work is chiefly a study of the Vākyapadīya on the basis of the four available ancient commentaries. It does not claim to expound everything that the Vākyapadīya contains. It deals only with the basic notions found in its three *kāṇḍas*. The last section of the third *kāṇḍa*, the one relating to complex formations (*Vrtti*) is particularly rich in linguistic notions and some of them have been briefly explained here. The rest have not been dealt with, not only because they have been left for later treatment elsewhere, but also because some of them pertain particularly to the Sanskrit language whereas I have been anxious to bring out those notions like that of *sphoṭa* which concern language in general and not any particular language. The reason is that I look upon Bhartrhari as one who has, in a philosophical background, made a contribution to General Linguistics. He may be said to have given a definite shape to the contribution of ancient India to General Linguistics, though his ideas go back to Patañjali in the grammatical and linguistic tradition and to the Vedas themselves as far as the philosophical side is concerned. As I have indicated briefly what I have tried to do here in the section entitled 'Problems of Interpretation', it is not necessary to say anything more here." (*Preface*, pp. IX-X)

162.   ———. 1982. *The Vākyapadīya: Some Problems*. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
Contents: Lecture I: Some Aspects of Bhartṛhari's Śabdādvaita 1-11; Lecture II: Bhartṛhari on Sphoṭa 12-50; Lecture III: the Vākyapadīya and the Pramāṇas 51-69.
"In *Vāk*. I. 44, according to tradition, Bhartṛhari begins his treatment of two kinds of words, included among the eight topics declared by himself to form the subject matter of the Vākyapadīya.
There he tells us that in connection with the expressive word, one has to distinguish between two things: (1) that element which is the cause of the manifestation, (2) that element which, when manifested, conveys the meaning. Of these, the latter is the real word, the *vācaka* and the former is what manifests it. It is through the former that the indivisible expressive word is manifested and transferred to the hearer. Patañjali, in his Mahābhāṣya also makes a distinction between that which conveys the object, the meaning and that which is mere sound (*dhvani*); but he does not say anywhere clearly that the latter manifests the former. That element which, when manifested conveys the meaning is the real indivisible word, the *vācaka*. It already exists in the speaker and the hearer but it has to be awakened or mianifested before it can convey the meaning. That which awakens it is called the *nimitta*. These two aspects exist only in the case of words which are expressive (upādānaśabda) ·and are therefore used for communication. The sounds which are uttered by the speaker awaken or manifest the expressive word, primarily the sentence, which already exists in the hearer.
The manifesting sounds are, therefore, the *nimitta*, the immediate cause of the awakening. It is not they which convey the meaning. That is done by the indivisible, sequenceless word which is manifested because it is eternally associated with it. It always carries, as it were, the reflection of the object and that reflection is the meaning. The main purpose is to convey it." (pp. 18-19)

163.   Timalsina, Stfianeshwar. 2009. "Bhartṛhari and Mṇḍaṇa on *Avidyā*." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 37:367-382.
Abstract: "The concept of *avidyā* is one of the central categories in the Advaita of Sankara and Mṇḍaṇa. Shifting the focus from *māyā*, interpreted either as illusion or as the divine power, this concept brings ignorance to the forefront in describing duality and bondage. Although all Advaitins accept avidyā as a category, its scope and nature is interpreted in multiple ways. Key elements in Mṇḍaṇa's philosophy

include the plurality of avidyā, individual selves as its substrate and the Brahman as its field (*visaya*), and the distinction in *avidyā* between non-apprehension and misapprehension. A closer investigation shows that Maṇḍana is directly influenced by Bhartṛhari's linguistic non-dualism in developing the concept of Bhartṛhari. This study also compares other key constituents such as *vivartta* and *parināma* that are relevant to the analysis of *avidyā*. As the concept of counter-image (*pratibimba*) emerges as a distinct stream of Advaita subsequent to Maṇḍana, this study also compares the application of *pratibimba* in the writings of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana."

164.   ————. 2009. "The Brahman and the Word Principle (*Śabda*). Influence of the Philosophy of Bhartrhari on Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 37:189-206.
Abstract: "The literature of Bhartrhari and Maṇḍana have drawn significant attention in contemporary times. The writings of the prominent linguistic philosopher and grammarian Bhartrhari and of Maṇḍana, an encyclopedic scholar of later seventh century and most likely a senior contemporary of Sankara, shape Indian philosophical thinking to a great extent. On this premise, this study of the influence of Bhartrhari on Maṇḍana's literature, the scope of this essay, allows us to explore the significance of Bhartrhari's writings, not only to comprehend the philosophy of language, but also to understand the contribution of linguistic philosophy in shaping Advaita philosophy in subsequent times. This comparison is not to question originality on the part of Maṇḍana, but rather to explore the interrelationship between linguistic philosophy and the monistic philosophy of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Besides excavating the role of Bhartrhari's writings on the texts of Maṇḍana, this analysis will reveal the interrelatedness of the Advaita school of Sankara, often addressed as 'pure non-dualism' (*Kevalādvaita*) and the Advaita of Bhartrhari, identified as 'non-dualism of the word-principle' (*Śabdādvaita*)."

165.   ————. 2014. "Semantics of Nothingness: Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Negation." In *Nothingness in Asian Philosophy*, edited by Liu, JeeLoo and Berge, Douglas R., 25-43. New York: Routledge.
"Conclusion
This discussion of Sanskrit semantics has multiple philosophical implications. Bhartṛharii's treatment of negation as ultimately grounded on being, and his assertion that there is no absolute negation of speech, removes it from the paradox that underlies negating something. This speech, or *vāc*, of Bhartṛhari is not just a means of communication though. When speech is identified with the absolute, the Brahman, the consequence is that no negation of the foundational being is possible, a rejection of the Nāgārjunian approach.
Bhartṛhari's treatment of sentence negation and word negation further illuminate other issues. It has been discussed above that negation in a sentence relates to the verb and negation in compounds relate to the second word. The consequence is that word negations do not simply negate something. Bhartṛhari's logic rests on three-tiered negation:
$\sim P = Q$
$\sim P = \sim$
$\sim = P'$
(Where P' stands for something that is neither identical to P nor is absolutely different from it, in the sense that P' shares many of the constituents of P but not all.) While Bhartṛhari rejects the position that $\sim P = Q$, this is only in the context of the compound terms. His analysis of three-tiered negation (which stems from Patañjali's analysis) still has relevance in understanding negation in the issues outside of semantics.
The consequence of Bhartṛhari's conclusion is that $\sim P = P'$ leaves negation as affirming something existing. For the Advaitins, 'ignorance' (*avidyā*) is of the essential character of being (*bhāvarūpa*). This understanding of ignorance as something phenomenal (while not having its own intrinsic being) would be semantically impossible had not the philosophy of language allowed such interpretation. Along the same lines, the Svātantrika-Prāsangika discourse on

negation also stems from the semantic issue of whether the negative terms simply negate being or affirm something else.

The discourse on language is therefore pivotal to understanding a wide range of philosophical issues that originated in classical India. Although I have restricted myself to the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, his answers to the issues regarding negation are relevant for a wider discourse not only on language but also epistemology." (pp. 40-41)

166.   ———. 2018. "Bhartṛhari and the Daoists on Paradoxical Statements." *Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion*:5-24.

Abstract: "Rather than considering paradox in a literal sense to be unresolvable, both Bhartṛhari and the Daoists develop a distinctive hermeneutics to decipher them, always exploring an overarching meaning where the fundamental differences are contained within. The conversation on paradox escapes the boundary of paradox then, as it relates to interpreting negation, and above all, the philosophy of semantics. Being and non-being, one and many, or something being both true and false at the same time are examples found from their texts. Just as the static and dynamic domains of the Dao remain a key to address paradox in Chinese literature, the stratification of speech, wherein deeper layers of speech are capable of resolving the apparent tension found at the surface level, seems central to Bhartṛhari's approach."

167.   Tiwari, Devendra Nath. 1997. "Bhartṛhari on the Indivisibility of Single-Word Expressions and Subordinate Sentences." *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* no. 24:197-216.

"The aim of Bhartṛhari' s Philosophy of language is to explain the cognition accomplished by expressions in usual communication. By the term 'expression' Bhartṛhari means the unit of language which illuminates itself (its real nature) and the meaning as well on the basis of which communications are accomplished.

It as such is a unit of communication comprising utterances, signs, symbols, gestures etc. as instrumental in the manifestation of real language (sphoṭa) and the sphoṭa as well which when manifested by them reveals itself and the meaning as well. Expression is not confined to tokens we utter, write or read because communication is accomplished by it. It is the differences of tokens used that the vitality or otherwise of an expression is decided; though Vaiyākaraṇas give importance to the tokens popularly used in ordinary usages. An expression is expressed in the mind of a speaker before communicating through utterances and reveals meaning when it is revealed in the mind of the audience through hearing and mainfesting sphoṭa. The utterances/tokens by proxy are called expressions. According to his philosophy there is no cognition without śabda (language) and all cognition. is congition shot through and through by *sabda*.(1)" (p. 197)

(1) *Vākyapadīyam*, 1/ 123 edited, Sampurnanand Sanskrit Yisvavidyalya, Varanasi.

168.   ———. 2008. *The Central Problems of Bhartrhari 's Philosophy*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

Contents: Notes on Transliteration of Sanskrit Alphabets VI; Abbreviations VII; Acknowledgements IX; Preface XI-XIX; Chapter I: Philosophical Problems of *Vākyapadīya* 1; Chapter II: Concept of Speech-Element (*Vāk-tattva*) 75; Chapter III: The Concept of Sentence (*Vākya*) 143; Chapter IV: The Concept of Sentential-Meaning (*Vākyārtha*) 176; Chapter V: The Concept of Word (*Pada*) 257; Chapter VI: The Concept of Word-Meaning (*Padārtha*) 285; Chapter VII: Concept of Grammatical Analysis (*Apoddhāra*) 360; Chapter VIII: Relation betweern Language and Meaning 377; Chapter IX: Critical Estimate 404; Index 420-434.

"The present work is a cognitive approach that views Bhartrhari's philosophy in accordance with his goal of analyzing and interpreting cognition as revealed by language in usual communication. It views even the metaphysical concepts, as they are revealed in the mind by language. Philosophy cannot excel, or there is no possibility of any philosophy, if it is taken to engage with transcendental, non-cognitive and incommunicable things beyond the reach of language. Philosophy is a

cognitive activity par excellence in the sense that it is concerned with and is confined to the beings that are awareness in character, and the world of awareness, for a Bhartṛharian, comprises the being of language and that of the meaning revealed non-differently by it in the mind. The language expresses/reveals those beings independently of things in-themselves - empirical or transcendental - and of our allegiances to them. Such beings, as are revealed by language, are alone intelligible and, hence, philosophical beings.

Language (*śabda*) for Bhartṛhari is not confined to what we speak, read or write. It is the light, the unit of awareness, a conscious force, different in character and in function from other lights, viz. sun, lamp, etc. which serve as tools in perception. Unlike other lights, it is awareness and, hence, foundational in character. It functions as the expresser of both itself and its meaning. Lights, other than language, illuminate external things caught in their compass, while language reveals all light, non-light, consciousness, unconsciousness and self-awareness as well. As a lamp illuminates many things falling within its compass, but the thing desired or expected, specifically, is taken primarily as illuminated by it, language (*śabda*) is expressive of all meanings (*sarve sarvārtha vācākāḥ*), but the meaning popularly expected is primarily taken to be known by it and other meanings are known on its basis either by implication or by closeness to the primary meaning. The present work observes that any oversight of the importance of expressive or primary meaning may cause confusion in understanding philosophical excellence of *Vākyapadīya*, because it is the primary meaning on the basis of which secondary and tertiary meanings of the word/language are known by imposition and nearness to it." (*Preface*, p. XIII)

(....)

"In order to impart to the book a pattern of organic unity, it is symmetrically arranged into nine chapters. The presentation contains investigations into the problem of different theories of language, meaning and the relation between the two from the point of view of analysis of cognition as revealed by language in communication. It deals with almost all the major arguments of the Naiyyikas, Bauddhas and the Mīmāṃsakas on the various issues of philosophical semantics and syntactics and answers them persuasively from the point of view of Bhartrhari's philosophy. Attempt has been made to present a philosophical exposition of the concepts without leaving any important verse of *Vākyapadīya* untouched. That is why, it has become a useful monograph not only for scholars, but also for general readers interested in the central philosophy of *Vākyapadīya*. The author is well aware of his limitations. It is up to wise readers to correct him for an improved next edition." (*Preface*, p. XIX)

169.   Todeschini, Alberto. 2010. "Bhartṛhari's view of the *pramāṇas* in the Vākyapadīya." *Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East*:97-109.

Abstract: "This paper is a study of Bhartṛhari's understanding of the *pramāṇas,* i.e. the means whereby knowledge is acquired, as can be evinced from his Vākyapadīya and the corresponding commentary (Vākyapadīya Vṛtti). Both Bhartṛhari's general attitude towards pramāṇas as well as his specific understanding of the individual means of knowledge are analyzed. In particular, it is established that Bhartṛhari accepts exactly three pramāṇas: perception (pratyakṣa), inferential reasoning (anumāna) and tradition (āgama). However, the status of the three is unequal: perception and inferential reasoning are fallible and hence cannot provide reliable guidance with regard to Dharma. These two pramāṇas do have their place and according to Bhartṛhari should not be discarded entirely. As for āgama, it is clear that Bhartṛhari accords it primacy in matters related to Dharma. But again, Bhartṛhari does not discard anumāna and pratyakṣa entirely. Rather, he seems to suggest that they have to be supplemented by āgama, which is the unimpeacheable judge of tradition."

170.   Tola, Fernando, and Dragonetti, Carmen. 1990. "Some Remarks on Bhartṛhari's Concept of Pratibhā." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 18:95-112.

"Among the meanings which the word *pratibhā* possesses in Bhartṛhari three interest us:

(1) *Pratibhā* as the meaning of the word (*pāda*) and of the sentence (*vākyārtha*).

(2) *Pratibhā* as an act of intuitive knowledge, whose object is the meaning of the word and of the sentence. Both aspects of *pratibhā* as the meaning of the word and of the sentence and as an intuitive knowledge are indissolubly connected. This relation is expressed by Punyarāja when he says, ad kārikā II, 13, that *artha*, the meaning is *pratibhārūpa* and, ad kārikā II, 31, that it is *pratibhātmaka*. Bhartṛhari himself affirms that the śabda(2) and the artha are not separated (II, 31, *sabdārthāv apṛthakslhitau*). It is only the conceptual analysis that can separate the meaning of the sentence (*arth*a) from its cognition {*pratibhā*)(3)

(3) *Pratibhā* as an act of intuitive knowledge whose object is not the meaning of the word or of the sentence, but the 'meaning of an action', 'the meaning of a situation', and other objects of diverse kinds. With this third value the semantic sphere covered by the word *pratibhā* becomes much broader. The second and third meanings differ only in relation to the object to which the act of intuition applies. So in what follows we shall treat them together." (pp. 95-96)

(2) The word śabda comprises words (*pāda*) and sentences (*vākya*).

(3) This remark on the indissoluble unity of the meaning of the sentence and its cognition is also valid for any other object of *pratibhā*.

171.   Unebe, Toshiya. 2000. "Jñānaśrībhadra's Interpretation of Bhartrhari as Found in the *Lankāvatāravrtti* ('*Phags pa Langkar gshegs pa'i 'grel pa*)." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 28:329-360.

"The *Lankāvatārasūtra* (LAS) is one of the most important scriptures of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It was translated into Chinese four times. Three translations are still extant. Many commentaries on those Chinese versions were written in China, as well as in Japan,(1) whereas only two commentaries on the Sanskrit version have come down to us in the form of Tibetan translations. Jñānaśrībhadra (*Ye shes dpal bzang po*), who is thought to have been active in the eleventh century in Kashmir, wrote one of them: the Ārya-Lankāvatāravrtti ('Phags pa Langkar gshegs pa'i 'grel pa = LAV)." p. 329)

(...)

"In his LAV Jñānaśrībhadra frequently refers to the positions of Bhartṛhari, the Grammarians (vaiyākaraṇa/lung ston pa rnams), or the Śabdabrahmavādin (sgra tshangs par smra ba rnams) holders of the theory of Brahman as language). As far as I am aware, under these names, forty-six verses are directly quoted from the *Vākyapadīya* (VP), the magnum opus of Bhartṛhari. Given the fact that Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha*, cited Bhartṛhari's verses in many places, and even devoted one chapter to refuting his Vedāntic philosophical thought, Buddhists could not ignore Bhartṛhari's philosophy and linguistic theory.

In this paper I will deal with some of the verses cited by JJñānaśrībhadra and his comments on them to illustrate how this Buddhist scholar understood Bhartṛhari's thought. The paper will also offer some interpretations of LAS passages in the light of the commentary of Indian origin; in addition it will provide material to understand the world of thought of eleventh century Kashmir from a Buddhist perspective." (p. 330, a note omitted)

(1) For this tradition, based on the Chinese versions of the LAS, see Suzuki (1930: 3–11, 51–65).

172.   ———. 2004. "The "Grammarian Objection" in Sthiramati's *Triṃśikābhāṣya* and Bhartṛhari's Argument on the Secondary Application of Words." In *Three Mountains and Seven Rivers: Prof. Musashi Tachikawa's Felicitation Volume*, edited by Hino, Shoun and Wada, Toshihiro, 135-152. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

"My attempt in this paper is only to show that the connection between the objection recorded in the Sthiramati's commentary and the grammatical literature, especially, Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya. Using these earlier studies, we shall discuss it further in detail." (p. 136)

(...)

"In conclusion, let us summarize our discussion briefly. As we have examined, the close ideas to the "Grammarian's objection" presented in Sthiramati's *Triṃśikābhāṣya* are recorded in Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya. But it is doubtful that he intends to make an objection to the Vijnanavadins per se, as he seems to introduce just various views with reference to the secondary application or secondary meanings of words. Among the various views taken up by Bhartrhari, the one particular to him is that a word primarily refers only to its form (svarupa), a ·particular pattern of phonemes; whatever else the word may refer to is secondary. In spite of Sthiramati's rejection of this view, we can see some kind of affinity between Bhartrhari and the Vijnanavadins on this point, since it is the Vijñānāvadins who assert that whatever a word may refer to is secondary." (p. 146)

173.   ———. 2010. "Bhartṛhari on Text and Context." In *Indian Philosophy and Text Science*, edited by Wada, Toshihiro, 115-131. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
"... in this paper, I would like to introduce the ancient Indian counterpart of modern contextualism by presenting how the fifth-century Indian grammarian/philosopher Bhartṛhari treats context in his linguistic theory, widely known as the theory of the indivisible sentence (*akhaṇḍa-vākya-vāda*). Scholars have clarified that Bhartṛhari considers a sentence (*vākya*) as the indivisible unit of speech and meaning of a sentence (*vakyārtha*) as something indivisibly and instantaneously perceived as a flash of understanding (*pratibhā*) by the listener of the speech. However; the role of context in his theory has not been sufficiently explained thus far.
As the title of his magnum opus, the *Vākyapadīya* (VP), indicates, Bhartṛhari mainly argues about a sentence (*vākya*) in contrast with a word *(pada)*. Therefore, he focuses on the significance of a sentence vis-a-vis the words that constitute it. Thus, there seems to be no independent section in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* where he solely explains context. However, this still does not imply that he considers the issue to be an insignificant one. l hope that the idea of this ancient Indian grammarian will prove to be relevant even for the present *Text Science*." (p. 116, a note omitted)

174.   ———. 2011. ""*Apūrva*," "*Devata̅*," and "*Svarga*": Arguments on Words Denoting Imperceptible Objects." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 39:535-552.
Abstract: "We cannot directly perceive and experience objects of words such as "apūrva" "devata̅," and "svarga," while objects of words such as "cow" and "horse" are perceptible. Therefore in the Indian linguistic context, some assert that there are two categories of words. However, a grammarian philosopher Bhartṛhari (450 CE) in the second book of his Vākyapadīya, introduces a verse stating that there is no difference between them. Other Indian thinkers as well deal with this issue in various contexts. This paper aims at exploring the ideas expressed in Bhartṛhari's verse and the related arguments found in other treatises of different schools. It consists of discussions of the following: (1) Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya 2.119 and its commentarial texts; (2) Kumārila's Criticism; (3) The Nyāya context; (4) The Sāmkhya and the Buddhist context; (5) Related grammatical passages and the background of the Vākyapadīya 2.119; and (6) Conclusion."

175.   ———. 2012. "Cognition and Language: A Discussion of Vākyapadīya 1.131 with Regard to Criticism from the Buddhists." In *Saṃskṛta-Sādhutā. Goodness of Sanskrit: Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok Aklujkar*, edited by Watanabe, Chikafuma, Desmarais, Michele M. and Honda, Yoshichika, 488-508. New Delhi: D. K. Printworld.

176.   ———. 2018. "Cognition and Language: Buddhist Criticism of Bhartṛhari' Thesis." In *History of Indian Philosophy*, edited by Bilimoria, Purushottama, 446-455. New York: Routledge.
"This chapter is primarily concerned with the fifth-century (c. 450– 510 CE) Indian grammarian and philosopher Bhartrhari. Bhartṛhari's thesis on the relation between cognition and language is frequently visited by various thinkers from other schools. We will examine arguments in a few Buddhist logico- epistemological compendia,

in which certain authors criticized Bhartṛhari for neglecting non- conceptual (*avikalpa/ nirvikalpa*) perception.

Bhartṛhari proclaims his thesis in the first book of his magnum opus, the *Vākyapadīya* (V) as follows:

[Sanskrit omitted]

(VP 1.131; VPwr, p. 49; VPI, p. 188)

In the world there is no notion (*pratyaya*) without conforming to/ accompaniment of language. All cognition (*jñāna*) appears as if penetrated by language.

As it reads, Bhartṛhari asserts that all cognition is closely related to language. The relationship between language and cognition intrigued ancient Indian scholars, and Bhartṛhari's theory generated arguments among them. Quoting this verse, many thinkers argue for and against his thesis.(2)" (p. 446)

(2) See Jan Houben, "Language and Thought in the Sanskrit Tradition," in *History of the Language Sciences: An International Handbook on the Evolution of the Study of Language from the Beginnings to the Present*, vol. 1, ed. S. Auroux et al. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2000, pp. 146-157.

Abbreviations

VP *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, with the commentaries *Vṛtti* and the *Paddhati* of Vṛsabhadeva, Kāṇda I, ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer, Deccan College Monograph Series 32. Poona: Deccan College, 1966.

VPI The *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari with the *Vṛtti*i: English translation, ch. 1. Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series 26. Poona: Deccan College, 1965.

VPwr Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, ed. Wilhelm Rau, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 42.4. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1977.

177.   Vergiani, Vincenzo. 2004. "Two Parallel Passages in the Mahabhayasyatika and the Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari." *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* no. 77.

"THE six *kāraka* categories are, as is known, a pivotal feature of Pāṇini's grammar. This explains why they have repeatedly drawn the attention of both ancient Grammarians and modern Indologists, stimulating considerable debate on the subject. Despite minor criticisms and modifications, the Pāṇiniyas have basically accepted the *kāraka* system as expounded in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, making a clear distinction between *kāraka* and non-*kāraka* syntactic relations.

It is all the more disconcerting, therefore, to come across the mention of «seven *kārakas*» in one of the best-known and most authoritative commentaries on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣyaṣyaṭīkā*,(1) the *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa*(2) of Kaiyaṭa, even though this occurs within the context of what appears to be an alternative view, which the author rejects.

In all likelihood Kaiyaṭa is inspired by a remark made by Bhartṛhari in his *Mahābhāṣyaṣyaṭīkā*(3) the most ancient extant commentary on the MBh.(4) In Bhartṛhari's *ṭikā* on the *Paspasāhnika*, in fact, there is a puzzling statement, which is made more difficult to comprehend by the fact that in one place the manuscript has a barely legible akṣara (...). Here I would like to suggest a new interpretation of Bhartṛhari's words(5) by drawing a parallel with v. 44 of the Sādhanasamuddesa,(6) the chapter on the factors of action in the third *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*.(7) My interpretation is based on a reading of the passage that differs from the one found in the 1987 BORI critical edition of this section of the MBhT by Bronkhorst." (p. 86)

(1) Henceforth, MBh.

(2) Henceforth, MPr.

(3) Henceforth, MBhT.

(4) As is known, the MBhT is preserved in only one incomplete and often corrupt manuscript, the facsimile of which has been published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute of Pune.

(5) And, consequently, of Kaiyaṭa's.

(6) Henceforth, SaS. Unfortunately, for the understanding of this verse we cannot rely on Helārāja's help, because one of the two gaps occurring in the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* (henceforth, PrPr) includes the

commentary on this section of the SaS. The gaps are filled in the manuscripts with the text of an otherwise unknown author called Phullarāja.
(7) Henceforth, VP.

178.   ———. 2009. "A Quotation from the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari in the Pratyāhāra Section of the Kāśikāvṛtti." In *Studies in the Kasikavrtti. The Section on Pratyaharas Critical Edition, Translation and Other Contributions*, edited by Haag, Pascale and Vergiani, Vincenzo, 161-189. London: Anthem Press.
"In the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (henceforth, KV) on psū. 5, *ha ya va ra Ṭ*, a passage occurs that is present in a very similar form in two earlier texts, the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* (henceforth, MD) of Bhartṛhari and the *Cāndravṛtti* (henceforth, CV) on the *Cāndravyākaraña* (henceforth, C.) of Candragomin. A second passage elaborating on the first is found in almost identical form in the CV and the KV. Although many scholars, from Kielhorn (1886) onwards, have drawn attentionto the numerous similarities that exist between the C., and especially its commentary, the CV, and the KV, even in the *pratyāhāra* section, these particular passages seem to have gone virtually unnoticed. However, as I will try to show in the following pages, they represent one piece of direct evidence that can help to establish on a more reliable basis the still controversial relative chronology of the authors and texts mentioned above, as well as their relationships to each other. Before examining the passages in question, I will present the terms of the ongoing debate, thus situating their interpretation in a historical perspective." (pp. 161-162, notes omitted)
References
Kielhorn, Franz Lorenz (1886), "The Chāndra-Vyākaraṇa andthe Kāśikā-Vṛtti", *Indian Antiquary*, 15, pp. 183-85. [Reprint: Rau, W. (Ed.), Franz Kielhorn. *Kleine Schriften*, 2 vols., Steiner, Wiesbaden 1969, pp. 244-46.]

179.   ———. 2012. "Bhartṛhari's Views on the Role of Liminal Perception in Individual Self-awareness." In *Saṃskṛta-Sādhutā. Goodness of Sanskrit: Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok Aklujkar*, edited by Watanabe, Chikafuma, Desmarais, Michele M. and Honda, Yoshichika, 331-349. New Delhi: D. K. Printworld.
"Even sensations and impressions that have hardly been consciously recorded at the time of their occurrence can often be retrieved to some extent by an effort of recollection and therefore verbalised. Thus, a question arises about their status after the sense-object interaction takes place: should they be regarded as unformed perceptions that already possess cognitive value, namely, that are already somewhat imbued with linguistic categories? And is it possible that Bhartṛhari uses the phrase *avikalpa jñāna* to refer to such liminal states of cognition, when one's attention is either unfocussed or, on the contrary, deeply absorbed in what one is doing whilst generally alert to one's surroundings?
In order to answer these questions, I will first briefly present Bhartṛhari's views on the physical and physiological aspects of perception, for I think these have a bearing on the topic of this article." (pp. 332-333, a note omitted)

180.   ———. 2013. "The Adoption of Bhartṛhari's Classification of the grammatical object in Cēṉāvaraiyar's commentary on the Tolkāppiyam." In *Bilingualism and Cross-cultural Fertilisation: Sanskrit and Tamil in Medieval India*, edited by Cox, Whitney and Vergiani, Vincenzo, 161-197. Pondichéry: Publications de l'Institut Français de Pondichéry.
"In this article I will look at one episode in the long history of the interaction between the Sanskrit and Tamil grammatical traditions and draw from it some — largely tentative — conclusions in the hope that they may help to cast some light on larger processes at work.
The episode in question is quite a clear-cut case of conceptual borrowing.
It consists in the adoption of a semantic classiication of the grammatical object, irst formulated by the Sanskrit author Bhartṛhari (probably 5th century CE), at the hands of Cēṉāvaraiyar (13th–14th century CE), a mediaeval Tamil commentator of the Collatikāram (TC) of the Tolkāppiyam (T.). In order to assess the full significance and the wider implications of this borrowing, I will first have to situate

both authors within their respective scholastic traditions. In particular, their views on the grammatical object will need to be seen in the broader context of each school's treatment of cases. his is a vast, complex and a highly technical topic, and even more so in an inter-linguistic perspective like the one attempted here. I will therefore have to be content with providing an inevitably sketchy outline of the two systems before narrowing my focus down to the grammatical object, and with that focus in mind I will also briely discuss other broadly coeval texts and traditions, in the hope that even a simple presentation of textual data will give a sense of the complexity of the underlying socio-cultural dynamics." (pp. 161-162, a note omitted)

181.   ———. 2014. "The concept of *prayoktṛdharma* in the *Vākyapadīya* and some later works: The expression of feelings through words: a linguistic and philosophical outlook." *Bulletin d'Études Indiennes* no. 32:267-291.
"It is not uncommon for an utterance in the context of ordinary communication not only to predicate something about a given state of affairs but also to convey something about the speaker's emotional disposition towards the particular situation he/she is talking about. Clearly, any utterance reflects the uniquely subjective point of view of a certain speaker, which depends on the motivation behind his/her speech act as well as on what can be broadly defined as the context in which the communication takes place – and the context itself can be further described or analysed in terms of a number of variables such as the time and place, the level of formality/informality of the exchange, the nature of the relation between the people involved, and so on.
(...)
In an article published in 1991 Saroja Bhate draws attention to this remarkable feature of Pāṇini's work, one more token of his linguistic genius. "In his Aṣṭādhyāyī", she writes, "he showed in at least two hundred rules that a number of emotive and attitudinal meanings were relevant to the form of language" (Bhate 1991: 59).(2)
(...)
In the Pāṇinian tradition, the concept of *vyañjanā* was adopted by one of its greatest later exponents, Nāgeśa, in the 17th century (Bhate 1991: 56), to designate meanings that are not directly expressed but rather suggested or implied. However, long before Nāgeśa, the grammatical tradition, and in particular Bhartṛhari (5th c. CE), had speculated on this elusive aspect of semantics from a linguistic and philosophical point of view, coming up with different insights of great theoretical interest. In this paper I will focus on one such insight – the notion of *prayoktṛdharma* "property of the speaker" – found in the third *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* (VP), Bhartṛhari's major treatise on philosophical semantics, and look at the use some of the later Pāṇinīyas made of it in their works."
(2) A systematic survey of these rules in the A. is still a desideratum. I intend to carry it out in the future.
References
Bhate, Saroja (1991), "Vyañjanā as reflected in the formal structure of language". Pāṇinian Studies. Professor S.D. Joshi Felicitation Volume, ed. by Madhav M. Deshpande & Saroja Bhate, 55-64. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, The University of Michigan.

182.   ———. 2015. "Āgamārthānusāribhiḥ. Helārāja's Use of Quotations and Othe Referential Devices in His Commentary on the Vakyapadiya." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 43:191-217.
Abstract: "Examining the function and style of the references to grammatical literature found in a substantial section of Helārāja's Prakīrṇaprakāśa on Bhartṛhari's third book of the Vākyapadīya, the article argues that the likely ideological motive of this commentary was to establish its *mūla* work firmly within the Brahmanical canon and should therefore be seen in the context of the appropriation of Bhartṛhari's ideas on the part of the roughly contemporary Pratyabhijñā philosophers of Kashmir. Incidentally, it also touches upon the making

of the Pāṇinian tradition and the relation between Helārāja and Kaiyaṭa, the Kashmiri commentator of Mahābhāṣya."

183.   ———. 2016. "Bhartṛhari on Language, Perception, and Consciousness." In *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy*, edited by Ganeri, Jonardon, 231-252. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Among the followers of the three sages (*munis*)—Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali—Bhartṛhari is the first whose works are extant. But rather than focusing primarily on the technical side of grammar, in his magnum opus, the Vākyapadīya, Bhartṛhari develops the reflection on semantics initiated by Patañjali. This reflection is elaborated within the framework of his unique metaphysical vision according to which the very essence of brahman , the Absolute, is language (*śabda*), the ordering principle that is the fountainhead of the light of consciousness shining inside all living beings as well as the ultimate source of the physical world.
If the language principle (śabda-tattva) is the stuff the universe is made of, it follows that its sentient manifestations, and in particular human beings, are never divorced from language, for their capacity for knowledge (in fact their very consciousness and self-awareness, as will be argued below) is innately infused with language. The epistemological counterpart of Bhartṛhari's ontological monism is epitomized in this much-quoted verse from the first book of the VP: "In ordinary experience there is no cognition that does not conform to language. All knowledge appears as if it were transfixed by language." This position certainly has metaphysical underpinnings, as I have mentioned, but at the same time it is rooted—like all of the Grammarians' statements on language and epistemology—in the insightful observation of the actual linguistic practices and mental processes at play in everyday experience. And yet, the content of this particular statement may seem counterintuitive, because we are not normally aware of language playing any evident role in the sensory apprehension of physical objects. For Bhartṛhari's epistemology, it is of crucial importance, then, to show how language operates in a subtle but pervasive way even in perception, the most immediate mode of cognition." (p. 233, notes omitted)

184.   Watanabe, Chikafuma. 2012. "Bhartṛhari, Dignāga and the Epimenides Paradox." In *Studies in Logic: A Dialogue between the East and the West: Homage to Bimal Krishna Matilal*, edited by Mitra, Madhabendra Nath, Chakraborty, Mihir Kumar and Sarukkai, Sundar, 115-141. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.
"For the Indian Grammarians, including Bhartṛhari, a statement represents the speaker's intention.(7) Accordingly, the hearer should not assume in advance that the speaker is telling a lie or what he is saying is false, as otherwise it would not be possible to establish communication between the speaker and the hearer.
However, when a speaker utters the sentence "all I say is lies" (*sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmi*), if the word "all" refers to the statement itself, then the statement itself would be refuted and the speaker's intention to convey what he has in mind would not be accomplished. In order to prevent this self-refutation, the meaning of the quantifier "all" must be restricted. As a result, the meaning of the statement is understood as "all I say is lies except for this statement."
In this sense, it might be said that Bhartṛhari employs the theory of meta-language as devised from the semantic point of view. But the crucial point in his manner of evading self-reference is his introduction of the notion of the speaker's intention and his emphasis on the purpose of speech acts. This point is more intimately related to pragmatics than to semantics. It is to be noted that A.P. Martinich tries to solve the liar paradox from the pragmatic point of view. According to him, a statement must fulfill an "essential condition." He explains this technical term as follows:
The essential condition for making a statement is that the speaker intends that the audience will take his utterance as representing how things are. (10)
In the light of this "essential condition" for making a statement, a paradoxical sentence such as "this statement is false" cannot be accepted as an adequate statement, because the hearer of this statement cannot ascertain its truth. It can be said that this "essential condition" for making a statement is considered a means for

preventing self-reference, ancl thus, this idea is quite similar to Bhartṛhari's theory described above.

As is this "essential condition," Bhartṛhari 's notion of the speaker's intention is related to the purpose of speech acts, and it confines a speaker to saying something he considers to be true when he makes an utterance. Through such a presupposition, he precludes self-reference from arising." (pp. 119-120, two notes omitted)

(7) See Ogawa [1999: 270-271, fn 7]

(10) See Martinich [1983: 64).

References

Martinich, A.P., 1983. "A Pragmatic Solution to the Liar Paradox." *Philosophical Studies* 43:63-67.

Ogawa, Hideyo, 1999. "Bhartṛhari on Representations (*buddhyākāra*)." In *Dharmakiti's Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy*, ?67-286. Wien, 1999.