

Franz Brentano: Annotated bibliography of the studies in English

Last update: July 9th, 2023

by Raul Corazzon

website: <https://www.ontology.co>

e-mail: rc@ontology.co

Theory and History of Ontology (www.ontology.co) by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co

Franz Brentano: Annotated bibliography of the studies in English

Contents of this Section

This part of the section [Ontologists of 19th and 20th centuries](#) includes the following pages:

[Franz Brentano Ontology and His Immanent Realism](#)

[Editions and translations](#)

Selected bibliography on the Philosophical Work of Franz Brentano:

Studies in English

First part: A - Bar

Second Part: Bau - Chr

Third Part: Cos - Gau

Fourth Part: Gea - Kra

Fifth Part: Kri - Moh

Sixth Part: Mon - Rut

Seventh Part: San - Srz

Eigth Part: Tai - Z

Studies in French

Studies in German

Studies in Italian

Bibliographical resources

1. Paolo Gregoretti. 1983. *Franz Brentano. Bibliografia completa (1862-1982)*, Trieste,;Università degli Studi.
Contents: I. Works by Franz Brentano 7; II. translations 21; III. Studies on Brentano 25; Index of Authors 81-87.
2. Wilhelm Baumgartner and F. P. Burkard. 1990. *Franz Brentano Bibliographie in: International Bibliography of Austrian Philosophy 1982/83 - Internationale Bibliographie zur osterreichischen Philosophie* - Compiled with assistance of Thomas Binder, Jutta Valent, Helmut Werba, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Contents: Teil I / Part I. 1. W. L. Gombocz: Vorwort 7; Literaturhinweis zur IBÖP / Bibliographical Notes 13; 2. Bildnis / Portrait: Franz Brentano 16; 3. W. Baumgartner, F.-P. Burkard: Franz Brentano. Eine Skizze seines Lebens und seiner Werke 17; 4. W. Baumgartner, F.-P. Burkard: Franz-Brentano-Bibliographie 54; 5. Hinweise für den Gebrauch der Bibliographie und register 161; 6. How to use Bibliography and Index 166-170.
3. Liliana Albertazzi. 2006. *Immanent Realism. An Introduction to Brentano*, Dordrecht: Springer.
Bibliographic notes pp. 341-354.

Bibliography

1. "Die Philosophie Franz Brentano." 1978. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5. Special Issue. Contributions to the Brentano-Konferenz Graz, 4-8 September 1977 (Edited by Roderick Chisholm and Rudolf Haller).
Studies in English: Edgar Morscher: Brentano and his place in Austrian philosophy 1; George Katkov: The world in which Brentano believed he lived 11; Burnham Terrell: Quantification and Brentano's logic 45; Dagfinn Føllesdal: Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and perception 83; Herbert Spiegelberg: On the significance of the correspondence between Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl 95; Peter Geach: Intentionality of thought versus intentionality of desire 131; Elizabeth Anscombe: Will and emotion 139; Paul Weingartner: Brentano's criticism of the correspondence theory of truth and the principle "Ens et verum convertuntur" 183; Roderick M. Chisholm: Brentano's conception of substance and accident 197; Rolf George: Brentano's relation to Aristotle 249-266.
2. "The Descriptive Psychology of the Brentano School." 1987. *Topoi* no. 6:1-64.
Guest editors: Roderick Chisholm and Rudolf Haller.
Contents: R. M. Chisholm and R. Haller: Introduction 1; Klaus Hedwig: Brentano's Hermeneutics 3; Stephan Körner: On Brentano's Objections to Kant's Theory of Knowledge 11; Heiner Rutte: On the Problem of Inner Perception 19; Peter M. Simons: Brentano's Reform of Logic 25; Barry Smith: The Substance of Brentano's Ontology 39; Enzo Melandri: The 'Analogia Entis' According to Franz Brentano: A Speculative-Grammatical Analysis of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' 51; Roderick M. Chisholm: Brentano's Theory of Pleasure and Pain 59-64.
3. "The School of Brentano and Husserlian Phenomenology." 2003. *Studia Phaenomenologica* no. 3.
Contents: Ion Tănăsescu, Victor Popescu: Introduction 9; Wilhelm Baumgartner: Franz Brentano, "Grossvater" der Phänomenologie 15; Jocelyn Benoist: Quelques remarques sur la doctrine brentanienne de l'évidence 61; Ion Tanasescu: Ist die Empfindung intentional? Der Brentanosche Hintergrund einer Kritik Husserls 75; Klaus Hedwig: "Inseln des Unglücks". Die Stellung des Schlechten im Summationsprinzip der Güter. Aristoteles-Brentano-Katkov 99; Victor Popescu:

- Espace et mouvement chez Stumpf et Husserl. Une approche méréologique 115; Claudio Majolino: Le différend logique: jugement et énoncé. Eléments pour une reconstruction du débat entre Husserl et Marty 135; Dale Jacquette: Meinong on the Phenomenology of Assumption 155; Carlo Ierna: Husserl on the Infinite 179; Robin Rollinger: Husserl's Elementary Logic. The 1896 Lectures In Their Nineteenth Century Context 195; Bernhardt Waldenfels: Zwischen Sagen und Zeigen. Überlegungen zu Husserls Theorie der okkasionellen Ausdrücke 215; Bruce Bégout: Percevoir et juger. Le rôle de la croyance originelle (*Urdoxa*) dans la phénoménologie du jugement de Husserl 229-270.
4. "Brentano's Concept of Intentionality. New Assessments." 2015. *Brentano Studien* no. 13.
 Edited by Guillaume Fréchette.
 Contents: Guillaume Fréchette: Introduction. Brentano's Conception of Intentionality: New Facts and Unsettled Issues 9; Mauro Antonelli: Franz Brentano's Intentionality Thesis. A New Objection to the "Nonsense that was Dreamt up and Attributed to him" 23; Carlo Ierna: Improper Intentions of ambiguous objects: Sketching a New Approach to Brentano's Intentionality 55; Arkadiusz Chrudzimski: Intentional Objects and Mental Contents 81; Klaus Hedwig: „eine wesentliche Umbildung“. Über die Transformation der Intentionalität bei Brentano 121; Cyril McDonnell: Understanding and Assessing "Brentano's Thesis" in Light of His Modification of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality 153; Hamid Taieb: Relations and Intentionality in Brentano's Last Texts 183; Ion Tănăsescu: The two Theories of Intentionality in Brentano and the Program of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* 211; Klaus Hedwig: Buchrezension: María del Carmen Paredes Martín, *Teorías de la intencionalidad* 233; Wilhelm Baumgartner: Buchrezension: Ion Tanasescu (Hg.), *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology. Upon the sesquicentennial of Franz Brentano's Dissertation* 243-257.
 5. "Brentano." 2017. *The Monist* no. 100.
 Contents: Johannes L. Brandl: Was Brentano an Early Deflationist About Truth? 1; Anna Giustina: Conscious Unity from the Top Down: A Brentanian Approach 15; Olivier Massin and Marion Hämmerli: Is Purple a Red and Blue Chessboard? Brentano on Colour Mixtures 37; Michelle Montague: A Contemporary View of Brentano's Theory of Emotion 64; Kevin Mulligan: Brentano's Knowledge, Austrian Verificationisms, and Epistemic Accounts of Truth and Value 88; Jonas Olson: Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism: Brentano's and Reid's 106; Hamid Taieb: Intentionality and Reference: A Brentanian Distinction 120; Mark Textor: From Mental Holism to the Soul and Back 133-154.
 6. "Special Symposium: New Work on Brentano." 2023. *European Journal of Philosophy* no. 31:337-523.
 Contents: Guillaume Fréchette and Hamid Taieb: Descriptive psychology: Franz Brentano's project today 337; Charles Siewert: Why we need descriptive psychology 341; Johannes L. Brandl: Why we need descriptive psychology 358; Denis Seron: Experiencing the a priori 371; Anna Giustina: Introspective acquaintance: An integration account 380; Arnaud Dewalque: Introspective acquaintance: An integration account 398; Guillaume Fréchette: Why does it matter to individuate the senses: A Brentanian approach 413; Hamid Taieb: Brentano on the individuation of mental acts 431; Michelle Montague: Brentano's theory of intentionality 445-454.
 Book Symposium: *Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value* by Uriah Kriegel.
 Uriah Kriegel: Précis of Brentano's Philosophical System 445; Angela Mendelovici: Brentano on phenomenal and transitive consciousness, unconscious consciousness, and phenomenal intentionality 458; Jonas Olson: Kriegel on Brentano on value and fittingness 479; Uriah Kriegel: Brentano on consciousness, intentionality, value, will, and emotion: Reply to symposiasts 486-493.

7. Albertazzi, Liliana. 1989. "Brentano and Mauthner's Critique of Language." *Brentano Studien* no. 2:145-157.
 Abstract: "Though different in methodological approach to language, Brentano and Mauthner share a similar background: Positivism, Aristotelian studies, empiricist psychology, anti-Kantian stance. The critique of language marks the point of significant convergence: Brentano's emphasis of reism and nominalism goes together with (1) his descriptive-semasiologic critique of language as a logical doctrine of categories, and (2) his critique of language as a genetic semasiology, both bound by the view of the intentional nature of language. It is pointed out at lights that and how the component of genetic semasiology in Brentano allows comparison with the communicative, pragmatic and performative perspective of Mauthner's Sprachkritik due to a shared emphasis on the rhetorical force of language."
8. ———. 1993. "Brentano, Twardowski, and Polish Scientific Philosophy." In *Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School*, edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan, 11-40. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
 "It is not an easy task to give a clear and brief summary of the thought of Franz Brentano, because of the shifting nature of its development and the complexity of its subject-matter. However, mention should be made of certain themes which constantly recur in his work: first, his Aristotelean inheritance(27) in particular his examination of the doctrine of the categories; second. his Cartesian choice of the evidence of inner perception of psychic phenomena, and his complementary notion of the mediated - and therefore not immediately evident - perception of outer perception, i.e. of physical phenomena. Third, his view of psychology as a discipline of high ontological value(28): a psychology of the act rather than of contents, and at the same a descriptive psychology or psychognosis(29). Brentano defined his descriptive psychology as an exact science and a pure psychology(30) seeking to analyse the elements of psychic life and the laws that govern it(31). This definition is particularly important because it gave rise to a whole series of taxonomies of psychic behaviour as variously developed in Husserlian phenomenology, Meinong's theory of objects, Marty's linguistic theories, Ehrenfels' and Stumpf's school researches in *Gestaltpsychologie*." (pp. 13-14, notes abbreviated)
- (27) Brentano's thought is part of the Aristotelean Renaissance which was the work of the commentaries on Aristotle by Bonitz, Tricot and Schwegler, the *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre* by Trendelenburg, Prantl's history of logic and Steinthal's studies in linguistics, but it was also a result of the influence of Hegel. Brentano saw Aristotle as mediating between predominantly metaphysical interests and problems of theoretical psychology (...)
- (28) Note that although Brentano's original interest lay in metaphysics rather than in psychology, his descriptive psychology had considerable ontological valency. At Würzburg Brentano mainly taught metaphysics, history of philosophy and deductive and inductive logic; he only began lecturing in psychology in the summer of 1871. Cf. C. Stumpf, "Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano", in O. Kraus. *Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seine Lehre, mit Beiträgen v-on Carl Stumpf und Edmund Husserl*, (Munich: Beck, 1919). (...)
- (29) The term 'descriptive' in the psychology and philosophy of this period embraces a variety of conceptions. One of the first to introduce the term 'descriptive' (*beschreibend*) in the sciences (in mathematics) was Kirchhoff. where he used it in contrast with 'explicative' (*erklärend*). In Brentano. 'descriptive' (*deskriptiv*) has the specific meaning of 'morphological' merely classificatory. (...)
- (30) F. Brentano, *Deskriptive Psychologie*. (ed.) W. Baumgartner and R.M. Chisholm, (Hamburg: Meiner, 1928).
- (31) The fact that Brentano's descriptive psychology is a *reine Psychologie* demonstrates that it is essentially a theoretical science, entirely distinct from physiology.

9. ———. 1993. "Brentano, Meinong and Husserl on Internal Time." *Brentano Studien* no. 3:89-110.
 Abstract: "Brentano's *Descriptive Psychology* marks a breakthrough into clarification of internal time, made possible by using his doctrine of intentionality (and modality) of consciousness. Husserl's version of descriptive psychology, a pure phenomenological psychology, according to its author tries to overcome Brentano's (naturalistic) description of internal experience by explicitly considering the intentional content of mental events, and the different categories of objects as objects of a possible consciousness. Husserl's investigations on internal time are an example of a quite specific sort of genetic inquiry, complementary to the descriptive one. Meinong, when discussing the relation of representation and perception of time, differentiates between the time as given in a representation (act time), in different sorts of (Meinongian) objects (object time), and in contents (content time). These questions of a Brentanist temporality problem are reconsidered and brought to a Husserlian conclusion."
10. ———. 1998/9. "The phenomenon of time in Brentanist tradition." *Brentano Studien* no. 7:163-192.
11. ———. 2003. "Franz Brentano's psychology today. A programme of empirical and experimental metaphysics." *Brentano Studien* no. 10:107-118.
 Abstract: "In this article I try to emphasise the following three main points:
 1. Brentano's metaphysics is not speculative; it is instead a programme for scientific research. 2. Some components of his metaphysics, especially those relating to the problem of perceptive continua -- and many aspects of it developed experimentally by his pupils -- are today discussed not only by philosophy but also by the cognitive sciences, more or less accurately, more or less consciously. 3. Some areas of the cognitive sciences express the need for a scientifically -- even neurophysiologically -- founded theory of intentionality."
12. ———. 2004. "The Psychophysics of the soul. Aristote and Brentano." In *Aristote au XIX siècle*, edited by Thouard, Denis, 249-275. Villeneuve d'Asq Cédex: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
 "Brentano's studies on Aristotle are of a complexity such that they can be analysed along various dimensions:
 1. *Environmental* (specifically, the relationship between Brentano and the exponents of the Aristotelian revival, in particular Zeller, Prantl, Trendelenburg and Bonitz).
 2. *Psychological* (the connections between psychology and physiology, the problem of the intensity of the sensations and their measurement, the debate on intensive and extensive magnitudes, etc.).
 3. *Metaphysical* (in particular, the theme of being with regard to the categories and the relationship between being-in-potency and being-in-act, between accident and substance, and the problem of the continua).
 4. *Logico-ontological* (the theme of being with regard to true or false being, accidental being, etc.).
 These various dimensions are interconnected, so that analysis of Brentano's writings furnishes a sort of 'diorama' on the Aristotelian themes addressed by the nineteenth century's Aristotelian Renaissance.
 This essay examines a number of aspects relative to psychology and, to some extent, metaphysics which distinguish not only the thought of Brentano but also that of his school - as regards both descriptive psychology and experimental psychology. Specifically, Brentano's book *The Psychology of Aristotle* marks his shift of interest from metaphysical questions to problems of a gnoseological and psychological nature, although these latter are still presented in the form of commentary on, and interpretation of, Aristotle's theories. The book acts as a prelude to *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*(9) Brentano best-known work, and it also marks the point at which Brentano's interest turned to psychophysical questions.
 In this paper, after a brief overview of Aristotle's theory of the soul (in particular of the sensitive soul) — which constitutes Brentano's conceptual framework — I shall

outline Brentano's psychological theories. I shall then examine his specific conceptions, focusing on the difference between psychic phenomena and physical phenomena, and on the part/whole relation which characterizes the former. The Brentano texts to which I shall refer are *The Psychology of Aristotle*, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, and *Descriptive Psychology*." (pp. 249-250, notes omitted)

13. ———. 2006. *Immanent Realism: An Introduction to Brentano*. Dordrecht: Springer.
Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Terminological Note XI; Introduction 1; Chapter 1. A Life. A Novel 5; Chapter 2. Brentano and Aristotle 43; Chapter 3. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 83; Chapter 4. Metaphysics and the Science of the Soul 123; Chapter 5. A woodworm in the Intentional Relation 155; Chapter 6. Ficciones 189; Chapter 7. Continua 233; Chapter 8. Reverse Aristotelianism: Metaphysics of Accidents 269; Chapter 9. Other Writings: Ethics, Aesthetics and History of Philosophy 295; Chapter 10. A History of Brentano Criticism 313; Chapter 11. A Wager on the Future 335; Bibliographic Notes 341; References 355; Index of Names 373-378.

"This 'Introduction to Brentano' is primarily aimed at conceptual interpretation even though it has been written with scrupulous regard to the texts and sets out its topics according to their chronological development."

(...)

"This book is not an introduction to all the themes treated by Brentano, since this would be beyond its scope. Moreover, even less does it claim to be definitive. The idea of writing this introduction to the thought of Brentano sprang from a theoretical exigency, namely to argue for a more defensible form of realism, and from the conviction that, at the moment, a categorial apparatus able to handle the problems raised by contemporary science is lacking, in particular in cognitive science. The various forms of direct and indirect realisms are, in my opinion, inadequate to deal with the problems addressed by contemporary cognitive science. I believe, instead, that Brentano's immanentist realism, with its sophisticated architecture, is a framework that can be applied and developed in various areas of scientific inquiry: for example, psychophysics and theory of perception, semantics, aesthetics, and more generally, the theory of consciousness (see L. Albertazzi ed., *Unfolding Perceptual Continua*, Amsterdam, Benjamins Publishing Company 2002). Brentano's realism can oppose both the theory of Cartesian Theatre and the neuroreductionist proposal as well, and it is also a framework able to establish the scientific legitimacy of metaphysics (see L. Albertazzi ed., *The Dawn of Cognitive Science. Early European Contributors*, Dordrecht, Kluwer 2000). The book therefore pays close attention to Brentano's writings on psychology and metaphysics.

No reader of Brentano can fail to be astonished by the multiplicity of the disciplinary references to be found in his thought and writings. Consequently, although this introduction privileges themes of psychology and metaphysics, it also takes account of Brentano's other writings, especially those on language." (pp. 1-2)

14. ———. 2006. "Retrieving intentionality. A Legacy from the Brentano School." In *The Lvov-Warsaw School: The New Generation*, edited by Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz and Pasniczek, Jacek, 291-314. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"The expression 'actus mentis' then has a metaphysical connotation and as such constituted the basis of Franz Brentano's theory of intentional reference, which became the standard source for subsequent and even contemporary citations on intentionality (Brentano 1874).

Brentano, moreover, despite the widely held belief to the contrary, did not develop a thoroughgoing theory of intentionality, but rather one in only embryonic form, and especially in his unpublished writings. A thoroughgoing theory of intentionality, in fact, must fulfil a number of conditions, namely:

(1) The moment-now of the intentional presentation must extend through a continuing set of durations which comprise fringes of the past and of the future

contents.

(2) Distinctions must be made among the various ways in which the psychic act is directed towards an object.

(3) The relation between psychic act, object and content must be reconstructed, with a precise distinction being drawn between their distinctive parts.

A modern version of a theory of intentionality of this type, which focuses on the relationship between act, object and content, has been developed in Poland by Twardowski, a pupil of Brentano. Twardowski's theory was then resumed by Husserl with some modifications which accentuated the feature of temporal dynamicity.(2) Bearing these developments of Brentano's theory in mind, the argument that I wish to develop below is the following:

(1) Reference to a theory of intentionality is much more complex than the currently canonical versions employed by analytic philosophy.

(2) It can serve the purposes of cognitive science and in particular the development of an empirical-experimental theory of cognitive space (see Albertazzi 2002)." (pp. 291-292)

(Note 2) The first outline of a theory of intentionality, in fact, is to be found in an essay written by Husserl in 1894, *Intentionale Gegenstände*, in reply to a question raised by Twardowski in §§ 13 and 14 of his (1894). On this, see Schuhmann (1993), Albertazzi (1993).

References

Albertazzi, L. (1993). Brentano, Twardowski and Polish Scientific Philosophy. In: Coniglione et al., eds. (1993), pp. 11-40.

Albertazzi, L. (2002). Towards a Neo-Aristotelian Theory of Continua: Elements of an Empirical Geometry. In: L. Albertazzi (ed.), *Unfolding Perceptual Continua*, pp. 29-79. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Brentano, F. (1874). *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*. Leipzig: Duncker & Humboldt. English translation: *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).

Coniglione, F., R. Poli and J. Woleński, eds. (1993). *The Scientific Philosophy of the Lvov-Warsaw School*. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 28. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Husserl, E. (1990/1). *Intentionale Gegenstände*. [1894] Edited by K. Schuhmann. *Brentano Studien* 3, 137-176. [English translation: *Intentional objects*, in Edmund Husserl, *Early writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics*, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1994, pp. 344-378]

Schuhmann, K. (1993). Husserl and Twardowski. In: Coniglione et al., eds. (1993), pp. 41-58. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Twardowski, K. (1894). *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*. Edited by R. Haller. München-Wien: Philosophia Verlag, 1982. English translation: *On the Content and Object of Presentations* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977).

15. ———. 2018. "Brentano's Aristotelian Concept of Consciousness." In *The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Consciousness*, edited by Jacqueline Dale, 27-56. New York: Bloomsbury.
- "Developing a science of consciousness per se as proposed by Brentano (Brentano 1995b, 4–5) is a great endeavour and challenge for current research. In fact, starting from the analysis and description of conscious experience, one should re-define the qualities classically considered to be primary, such as the attributes of physics, like shapes, size, motion and the like, in the qualitative terms of 'voluminousness', 'remoteness', 'solidness', 'squareness' and so on, all of which are relational, distributed qualities of what is perceived. One has to bracket off the correlated psychophysical and/or neurophysiological inquiries and develop an autonomous science of qualities. For the time being, we still do not know how life emerged from an inanimate being, and we also do not know how consciousness arises from unconscious entities. We nevertheless have evidence of both. Moreover, we know at least some of the relations of dependence among the different levels of reality (Hartmann 1935; Poli 2001, 2012). It seems to be more productive and

scientifically honest to recognize the existence of different realms, categorically different phenomena, governed by specific laws, and enjoying equal ontological dignity, instead of reducing all types of reality to the one we presently know better, or are supposed to know better, that is physical being. Future discoveries may allow us to know more about the complete nature of reality. Within this framework, consciousness is part and parcel of nature, and it is given *to us* phenomenologically or, as Brentano would have said, in phenomenal presence." (pp. 47-48)

References

Brentano, F. (1995b). *Descriptive Psychology*, edited by B. Müller, London: Routledge (1st German ed. 1982, edited by R. M. Chisholm and W. Baumgartner, Hamburg: Meiner).

Hartmann, N. (1935). *Ontologie* (4 Vols), I: *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*, Berlin-Leipzig: de Gruyter. [English translation: *Ontology: Laying the Foundations*, Berlin: de Gruyter 2019]

Poli, R. (2001). 'The Basic Problem of the Theory of Levels of Reality', *Axiomathes*, 12 (3-4), 261-83.

Poli, R. (2012). 'Nicolai Hartmann', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*:

<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nicolai-hartmann/>

16. Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo, and Poli, Roberto, eds. 1996. *The School of Franz Brentano*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Analytical table of Contents IX; Foreword by The Editors XV; Introduction. Liliana Albertazzi, Massimo Libardi, Roberto Poli: Brentano and his School: reassembling the puzzle 1; 1. Massimo Libardi: Franz Brentano (1838-1917) 25; Part I: The pupils 81; 2. Liliana Albertazzi: Anton Marty (1847-1914) 83; 3. Karl Schuhmann: Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) 109; 4. Dale Jacquette: Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) 131; 5. Reinhard Fabian: Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) 161; 6. Liliana Albertazzi: Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) 175; 7. Roberto Poli: Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) 207; Part II: Topics and influences 233; 8. Wilhelm Baumgartner: Act, content and object 235; 9. Johannes Brandl: Intentionality 261; 10. Paolo Bozzi: Higher-order objects 285; 11. Peter Simons: Logic in the Brentano School 305; 12. Barry Smith: Logic and the *Sachverhalt* 323; 13. Roberto Poli: Truth theories 343; 14. Jan Wolenski: Reism in the Brentanist tradition 357; 15. Luigi Dappiano: Theories of values 377; 16. Liliana Albertazzi: From Kant to Brentano 423; Index of Topics 465; Index of names 467-477.
- "The central idea developed by the contributions to this book is that the split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology - perhaps the most important schism in twentieth-century philosophy - resulted from a radicalization of reciprocal partialities. Both schools of thought share, in fact, the same cultural background and their same initial stimulus in the thought of Franz Brentano. And one outcome of the subsequent rift between them was the oblivion into which the figure and thought of Brentano have fallen.
- The first step to take in remedying this split is to return to Brentano and to reconstruct the 'map' of Brentanism.
- The second task (which has been addressed by this book) is to revive interest in the theoretical complexity of Brentano's thought and of his pupils and to revitalize those aspects that have been neglected by subsequent debate within the various movements of Brentanian inspiration.
- We have accordingly decided to organize the book into two introductory essays followed by two sections (Parts 1 and 2) which systematically examine Brentano's thought and that of his followers. The two introductory essays reconstruct the reasons for the 'invisibility', so to speak, of Brentano and set out the essential features of his philosophical doctrine. Part 1 of the book then examines six of Brentano's most outstanding pupils (Marty, Stumpf, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Husserl and Twardowski). Part 2 contains nine essays concentrating on the principal topics addressed by the Brentanians.
- In order to facilitate cross-referencing between the various essays contained in the book, each chapter concludes with a table giving the other points in the book where

the same topics are dealt with." (Foreword by the Editors).

17. Alves, Pedor M. S. 2019/20. "The Not Always Conscious Mind. A Reappraisal of Brentano's Theses." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:195-226.
 Abstract: "In this article I discuss the three Brentanian theses of intentionality, self-consciousness, and the unity of consciousness. Regarding the first two, I argue that there is a shift in the meaning of consciousness when one passes from the first to the second, and I conclude that the best reading of self-consciousness is an intransitive one, opposing the strong transitive sense of the first thesis. Based on that, I examine whether there are non-conscious psychical acts or states . Disagreeing with Brentano, I present an empirical argument for the establishment of non-conscious psychical acts or states . Based on that, I construe the Brentanian thesis of the secondary object, presented by an *intentio obliqua*, as a process of time-constitution of the actuality of psychical, conscious life . Finally, I address the issue of unity of simultaneity of consciousness, presenting it in light of this new framework. Throughout the paper, especially in the first and last sections, I contrast the Aristotelian psyche-soma distinction with the modern mind-body dualism, trying to account for Brentano's rather complex stance vis- à-vis one and the other."
18. Antonelli, Mauro. 2003. "Franz Brentano, the "Grandfather of Phenomenology" and the Spirit of the Times." In *Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations - Expanding Dynamics - Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 11-29. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 "Brentano, teacher of Husserl
 In the literature on Husserl there is a marked tendency to interpret the thought of the founder of phenomenology in the light of his later works, particularly focusing on *The Crisis of European Sciences*, which deals with the fundamental concept of *Lebenswelt*, as well on the themes of passive synthesis and intersubjectivity, which were central concerns of this phase. Another dominant approach tends to view phenomenology purely in terms of transcendental phenomenology, a concept systematically developed in *Ideas I* of 1913, the text that most clearly reveals the closeness of Husserl to neo-Kantian movements.
 While undoubtedly legitimate, such approaches presuppose the presence of some immanent directive idea driving the development of Husserl's entire work and, in so doing, tend to impose corresponding directive criteria for its comprehension and interpretation. They therefore underplay the slow and complex evolution of the founder of phenomenology, the conceptual work to which he submitted his early ideas, and his continual effort to give them more precise definition and radically greater depth.
 This is even more true in considering the initial phase of Husserl 's work, which preceded and paved the way for *Logical Investigations*, a phase when the influence of his teacher Franz Brentano was strong and decisive. The fact that it was later dismissed by Husserl himself as being "psychologistic", does not justify its removal or neglect.
 On the contrary, it must be evaluated historically in terms of the preparatory stage for the development of a line of thinking that would lead, through the above-mentioned work of conceptual clarification and investigation, to an increasingly precise definition of the sphere of action of phenomenology.
 In the light of such remarks, we intend to review some of the crucial points along the philosophical itinerary traveled by Brentano, the man whom Husserl considered "my one and only teacher in philosophy" and from whose lessons the then youthful mathematician "first acquired ... the conviction that philosophy, too, is a field of serious endeavor, and that it too can-and in fact must-be dealt in rigorous scientific manner". (Husserl, 1919, 154; translation, 48)
 The outstanding feature of Brentano's philosophical propositions, which surfaces in the work of all his pupils, is the attribution of an essentially philosophical value to psychological investigation, which is in tum the basis for the revival and renewal of philosophy as a scientific discipline, whose crisis he imputes to the abandonment of

the empirical method of research and the surrender to the speculative temptations typifying idealistic philosophy.

It is in the singular blend of Aristotelian, Cartesian and Empiricist elements permeating this project that we uncover a series of decisive ideas which, critically perceived, were to influence profoundly the work of Husserl." (p. 11)

References

Husserl, E. 1919. "Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano", in Kraus: 1919, 153-167. Eng. trans. in McAlister: 1976, 47-55.

Kraus, O. (ed.) 1919. *Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre*. München: Beck.

McAlister, L. L. (ed.) 1976. *The Philosophy of Brentano*. London: Duckworth.

19. ———. 2015. "Franz Brentano's Intentionality Thesis. A New Objection to the "Nonsense that was Dreamt up and Attributed to him". *Brentano Studien* no. 13:23-53.
Abstract: "Brentano's thesis of intentionality has been traditionally interpreted as a theory of the "intentional relation", i.e., of the (ordinary binary) relation between the mental act and its intentional or "immanent" object. This object is immanent in the sense that it is in fact contained in the mind, and with an ontological status that is distinct from that of the transcendent, existent or non-existent object. On the basis of Brentano's Aristotelian- Scholastic sources, especially Aristotle's perception theory and his theory of *relativa*, the author rejects the view of the immanent object as a con- sciousness-immanent, ontologically diminished entity and highlights the continuity which exists between Brentano's earlier and later (the so-called reistic) view of intentionality."
20. ———. 2017. "In Search of Lost Substance. Brentano on Aristotle's Doctrine of Categories." *Brentano Studien* no. 15:173-228.
Abstract: "Brentano's doctoral dissertation 'On the Manifold Senses of Being in Aristotle' (1862) takes up Aristotle's ontology and theory of categories in order to show that a realistic ontology requires the interweaving of factual being and its adequate logical expression. The scheme of categories manifests itself on a grammatical-linguistic level – as Trendelenburg pointed out – , but it is grounded in the variety and multiplicity characterising the level of real things – as Aquinas held. The logic-linguistic side of the categories is thus dependent on the ontological and founded by it. Brentano's first book thus has two main interpretative sources, one which is fundamental but hidden, the other more explicit but superficial: the first is Thomas Aquinas – for Brentano as a young catholic seminarian, of course, 'sine Thomas mutus esset Aristoteles' – , the second Adolf Friedrich Trendelenburg, his Berlin teacher and leader of the Aristotelian revival in Protestant Germany. The Thomist influence lead Brentano to propose a univocal reading of the Aristotelian ontology, allowing that deduction of the categories from the general concept of being, that Aquinas had already worked out during the Middle Ages. Considering the Aristotelian ontological framework compatible with a deductive trend, which was aimed at bringing the equivocal nature of being back to an analogical structure, Brentano forced, at least partially, an interpretation that would be particularly appreciated by Heidegger, to the point that according to him it is due to Brentano that "the systematic impact of Aristotelian philosophy begins". This Thomist influence is also analysed through a comparison between the printed version of the dissertation and its preliminary version, dating back to 1861, which is preserved as a manuscript in Brentano's Nachlass (Werkmanuskripte, Frühe Schriften, Ms. 16)"
21. ———. 2022. "Consciousness and Intentionality in Franz Brentano." *Acta Analytica* no. 37:301-322.
Abstract: "The paper argues against the growing tendency to interpret Brentano's conception of inner consciousness in self-representational terms. This trend has received support from the tendency to see Brentano as a forerunner of contemporary same-order theories of consciousness and from the view that Brentano models intransitive consciousness on transitive consciousness, such that a

mental state is conscious insofar as it is aware of itself as an object. However, this reading fails to take into account the Brentanian concept of object, which is ultimately derived from ancient and medieval philosophy, as well as the secondary, elusive character that Brentano attributes to inner perception. According to Brentano, we have an aspectual but transparent consciousness of transcendent objects, whereas our awareness of our own mental acts is always complete but incidental, and ultimately opaque. Reversing the relationship between intentionality and consciousness faces difficulties at the textual interpretative level, but also raises theoretical problems, for it risks treating Brentano's theory of mind as a form of subjectivism and idealism."

22. Antonelli, Mauro, and Binder, Thomas, eds. 2021. *The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller*. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.
 Contents: Mauro Antonelli and Thomas Binder: Editors' Introduction 1; Mauro Antonelli: In Memory of Rudolf Haller (1929–2014) 7;
 Part 1: Brentano's Philosophical Program
 Wolfgang Huemer: Was Brentano a Systematic Philosopher? 11; Denis Fisette: Remarks on the Architecture of Brentano's Philosophical Program 28; Susan Krantz Gabriel: Brentano on Kant's Transcendental Idealism 50;
 Part 2: Ontology
 Werner Sauer: Beobachtungen zur Deduktion der Kategorien in Brentanos Dissertation 73; Laurent Cesalli: Medieval and Austro-German Realisms: Universals and States of Affairs 117;
 Part 3: Psychology
 Denis Seron: Psychology First! 141; Johannes L. Brandl and Mark Textor: 'Disentangling Judgement from Its Linguistic Clothing': Brentano's View of Judgement and Its Linguistic Guises 156; Ion Tănăsescu: Franz Brentano and Anton Marty: Two Versions of Descriptive Psychology? 179; Hamid Taieb: Brentano on the Characteristics of Sensation 192; Bernhard M. Geißler: Der Einfluss Franz Brentanos auf Sigmund Freud: Der Versuch eines umfassenden ideengeschichtlichen Arguments 209;
 Part 4: Philosophy of Mind
 Mauro Antonelli: Selbst-Repräsentation und Phänomenale Intentionalität bei Brentano: Eine kritische Stellungnahme 231; Christiane Schreiber: Was versteht Brentano in der Intentionalitätspassage unter einem Objekt eines psychischen Phänomens? 250; Johann C. Marek: Brentano und Meinong: Versuch einer dokumentarischen Gegenüberstellung 263;
 Part 5: Logic, Ethics, Religion, and Politics
 Carlo Ierna: Brentano as a Logician 301; Robin D. Rollinger: Brentano and von Ehrenfels on Emotion, Desire, and Absolute Value: An Extreme Contrast in Austrian Phenomenology 312; Klaus Hedwig: Die Transformation des Glaubens beim frühen Brentano 328; Adrian Măitre: Zum psychologischen Gottesbeweis bei Franz Brentano 351; Thomas Binder: Eine politische Wissenschaft gibt es noch nicht: Einige Bemerkungen zu Franz Brentanos Verhältnis zur Politik 368;
 Index of Names 389-395.
23. Antonelli, Mauro, and Boccaccini, Federico, eds. 2019. *Franz Brentano: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. Vol. 1: Sources and Legacy*. New York: Routledge.
 Contents: Acknowledgements; General introduction; Introduction to volume 1
 Part 1. Brentano's Life and Work
 1. Mario Puglisi, 'Franz Brentano: A Biographical Sketch', *The American Journal of Psychology*, 35, 3, 1924, 414–419.
 2. John Passmore, extract from 'The Movement towards Objectivity', in *Hundred Years of Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1957), pp. 175–181.
 3. Herbert Spiegelberg, 'Franz Brentano (1838–1917): Forerunner of the Phenomenological Movement', in *The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction*, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960).

Second revised edition 1978. Third expanded edition with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann, 1982), pp. 27–50.

Part 2. Brentano and Aristotle

4. Rolf George and Glen Koehn, 'Brentano's Relation to Aristotle', in D. Jacquette (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 20–44.

First published in *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 5, (1978) 197–210.

5. John L. Ackrill, 'Review of F. Brentano, *The Psychology of Aristotle (in Particular His Doctrine of the Active Interest)*', *Classical Review*, 29, 1, 1979, 165.

6. Barry Smith, 'The Soul and Its Parts: A Study in Aristotle and Brentano', *Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung*, 1, 1988, 75–88.

7. Jonathan Barnes, 'Review of F. Brentano, *Über Aristoteles*', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 49, 1, 1988, 162–167.

8. Susan F. Krantz, 'Brentano's Argument Against Aristotle for the Immateriality of the Soul', *Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung*, 1, 1988, 63–74.

9. Mauro Antonelli, 'In Search of Lost Substance: Brentano on Aristotle's Doctrine of Categories', revised and enlarged translation of 'Auf der Suche nach der Substanz. Brentanos Stellung in der Rezeption der Aristotelischen Ontologie im 19. Jahrhundert', *Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung*, 1990/91, 19–46.

10. Richard Sorabji, 'From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, Supplementary Volume: *Aristotle and the Later Tradition*, edited by H.

Blumenthal & H. Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 227–259.

11. Enrico Berti, 'Brentano and Aristotle's Metaphysics', in R. W. Sharples (ed.), *Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 135–149.

12. Werner Sauer, 'Being as the True: From Aristotle to Brentano', in D. Fisette and G. Fréchette (eds.), *Themes from Brentano*, (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2013), pp. 193–226. Revised version by the author for the volume.

Part 3. Brentano on Medieval and Modern Philosophy

13. Herbert Spiegelberg, '"Intention" and "Intentionality" in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl', in L. L. McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 108–127. Originally published in *Studia Philosophica*, 29, 1970, 189–216.

14. Etienne Gilson, 'Franz Brentano's Interpretation of Medieval Philosophy', in L. L. McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 56–67. Originally published in *Mediaeval Studies*, 1, 1, 1939, 1–10.

15. Ausonio Marras, 'Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality', in L. L. McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 128–139. Originally published in *Rassegna di Scienze Filosofiche*, 1, 1974, 213–226.

16. Richard Aquila, 'Brentano, Descartes, and Hume on Awareness', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 35, 2, 1974, 223–239.

17. Dieter Münch, 'Brentano and Comte', *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 35, 1989, 33–54.

Part 4. Legacy

18. Carl Stumpf, 'Reminiscences of Franz Brentano', in L. L. McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 10–46. Originally published in O. Kraus (ed.), *Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre*, (Munich: Beck, 1919), pp. 85–149.

19. Edmund Husserl, 'Reminiscences of Franz Brentano', in L. L. McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano* (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 47–55. Originally published in O. Kraus (ed.), *Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre*, (Munich: Beck, 1919), pp. 151–167.

20. Alexius Meinong, ['Reminiscences of Franz Brentano'], extracts from 'Meinong's Life and Work', in R. Grossmann *Meinong* (London: Routledge, 1974 [1921]), pp. 230–232.
21. Martin Heidegger, 'Letter to Richardson', in W. J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), pp. X–XI.
22. John C. M. Brentano, 'The Manuscripts of Franz Brentano', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 20, 78, 1966, 477–482.
23. Michael Dummett, 'The Legacy of Brentano', in *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 28–42.
24. Roderick M. Chisholm and Michael Corrado, 'The Brentano-Vailati Correspondence', *Topoi*, 1, 1982, 3–7.
25. Barry Smith, 'Austrian Philosophy and the Brentano School', in *Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano*, (Chicago/La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1994), pp. 7–30.
26. Dariusz Łukasiewicz, 'Polish Metaphysics and the Brentanian Tradition', in Sandra Lapointe, Jan Wolenski, Mathieu Marion and Wioletta Miskiewicz (eds), *The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy: Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophical Legacy* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2009), pp. 19–31.
24. ———, eds. 2019. *Franz Brentano: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. Vol. 2: Intentionality and Philosophy of Mind*. New York: Routledge.
Contents: M. Antonelli, F. Boccaccini: Introduction to volume 2;
Part 5. Psychology
27. Robert Flint, 'Review of F. Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*', *Mind*, 1, 1, 1876, 116–122.
28. Théodule Ribot, 'Brentano', in *German Psychology of Today: The Empirical School*, translated from the second French edition by J. M. Baldwin, (New York: Schribner, 1886), pp. 295–300.
29. William James, 'On Brentano', extract in *The Principles of Psychology* (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: Harvard University Press, 1981 [1980]), vol. 1, pp. 185–191.
30. George F. Stout, 'On Brentano', extracts from *Analytic Psychology*, vol. 1 (London/New York: Mcmillan & Co., 1896), pp. 40–42; pp. 106–111; pp. 116–120.
31. H. T. Watt, 'Review of F. Brentano, *Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie*', *Mind*, 17, 65, 1908, pp. 128–129.
32. Paul Natorp, 'Brentano', trans. R. D. Rollinger, in *Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1912), pp. 241–245.
33. Martin Heidegger, 'Review of F. Brentano, *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene* (1914)', trans. R. D. Rollinger, *Literarische Rundschau für das katholische Deutschland*, 40, 5, 1914, 233–234.
34. Edward B. Titchener, 'Brentano and Wundt: Empirical and Experimental Psychology', *American Journal of Psychology*, 32, 1, 1921, 108–120.
35. Edward B. Titchener, 'Review of F. Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*', *American Journal of Psychology*, 36, 2, 1925, 303–304.
36. Edwin G. Boring, 'Franz Brentano', in *A History of Experimental Psychology* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1929/1950), pp. 356–361.
37. Raymond E. Fancher, 'Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Freud's Early Metapsychology', *Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences*, 13, 3, 1977, 207–227.
38. Ernst Sosa, 'Review of Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint III', *Canadian Philosophical Reviews/Revue Canadienne de Comptes Rendus en Philosophie*, 4, 1, 1984, pp. 6–8.
- Part 6. Intentionality
39. Alexius Meinong, 'Object and Content', in Marie-Luise Schubert Kalsi, *Alexius Meinong on Objects of Higher Order and Husserl's Phenomenology* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978), pp. 141–143.
40. Edmund Husserl, 'Appendix: External and Internal Perception: Physical and Physical Phenomena', from *Logical Investigations*, translated by J.N. Findlay from

the second German edition of *Logische Untersuchungen*; with a new preface by Michael Dummett; and edited with a new introduction by Dermot Moran, (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 335-348.

41. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'Brentano', in Gordon Backer (ed.), *The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle* (London: Routledge, 2003 [1930]), pp. 443-451.
 42. Roderick M. Chisholm, 'Intentional Inexistence', in L. L. McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 140-150. Originally published in *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1957) pp. 168-185.
 43. Linda L. McAlister, 'Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality', in L. L. McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp.151-159. Originally published in *Review of Metaphysics*, 28, 2, 1975, 328-338.
 44. Dagfinn Føllesdal, 'Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception', *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 5, 1978, 83-94.
 45. Roderick M. Chisholm, 'The Formal Structure of the Intentional: A Metaphysical Study', *Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung*, 3, 1990/91, 11-17.
 46. Dermot Moran, 'Brentano's Thesis', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volumes, 70, 1996, 1-27.
 47. Tim Crane, 'Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence', in M. Textor (ed.), *The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy* (London/New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 20-35.
 48. Guillaume Fréchette, 'Brentano's Thesis (Revisited)', in D. Fisette and G. Fréchette (eds.), *Themes from Brentano* (Studien zur österreichischen Philosophie, vol. 44, (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2013), pp. 91-119.
 49. Mauro Antonelli, 'Franz Brentano's Intentionality Thesis. A New Objection to the "Nonsense that was Dreamt up and Attributed to Him"', *Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung*, 13, 2015, 23-53.
- Part 7. Philosophy of Mind
50. Max Scheler, 'Illusion and Internal Perception', extract from *The Idols of Self-Knowledge* in D. R. Lachterman (ed and trans.), *Selected Philosophical Essays* (Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 17-29. Translated from the German "Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis", in *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, 4 ed. rev., *Gesammelte Werke* III (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1955), pp. 215-292.
 51. Bertrand Russell, ['Brentano's Analysis of Mind'], extract in *The Analysis of Mind*, (London/New York: Allen & Unwin-McMillan, 1921), pp. 14-16; 142-143, 246-247.
 52. Charles W. Morris, 'Mind as Intentional Act. Brentano and the Historical Background', in *Six Theories of Mind* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1932), pp.149-152.
 53. Reinhardt Grossmann, 'Acts and Relations in Brentano', *Analysis*, 21, 1, 1960/61, 1-5.
 54. Reinhard Kamitz, 'Acts and Relations in Brentano: A Reply to Prof. Grossmann', *Analysis*, 22, 4, 1961/62, 73-78.
 55. Jaegwon Kim, 'Materialism and the Criteria of the Mental', *Synthese*, 22, 3, 1971, 323-345.
 56. Elisabeth Anscombe, 'Will and Emotion', *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 5, 1978, 139-148.
 57. Roderick M. Chisholm, 'Brentano's Analysis of the Consciousness of Time', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 6, 1, 1981, 3-16.
 58. Kevin Mulligan and Barry Smith, 'Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 45, 4, 1985, 627-644.
 59. David Bell, 'Self-evidence, Self-knowledge, and Self-perception', in *Husserl*, (London, Routledge, 1990), pp. 23-28.
 60. Roderick M. Chisholm, 'Brentano on "Unconscious Consciousness"', in R. Poli (ed.), *Consciousness, Knowledge and Truth: Essays in Honour of Jan Szednicki*, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), pp. 153-159.

61. Amie L. Thomasson, 'After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 8, 2, 2000, 190–209.
62. Uriah Kriegel, 'Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 33, 1, 2003, 103–132, plus epilogue.
63. Dan Zahavi, 'Back to Brentano?', *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 11, 10–11, 2004, 66–87.
64. Federico Boccaccini, 'Brentano's Use of Mental Act' (original contribution for the volume).
25. ———, eds. 2019. *Franz Brentano: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. Vol. 3: Metaphysics, Logic, Epistemology*. New York: Routledge.
Contents: M. Antonelli, F. Boccaccini: Introduction to volume 3;
Part 8. Theory of Categories
65. Oskar Kraus, 'On Categories, Relations and Fictions', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 42, 1941/42, 101–116.
66. Roderick M. Chisholm, 'Brentano's Conception of Substance and Accident', *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 5, 1978, 197–210.
67. Andrew Burgess, 'Review of F. Brentano, *The Theory of Categories*', *The Thomist*, 48, 3, 1984, 493–497.
68. Barry Smith, 'The Substance of Brentano's Ontology', *Topoi*, 6, 1, 1987, 39–49.
69. Peter M. Simons, 'Brentano's Theory of Categories: A Critical Appraisal', *Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung*, 1, 1988, 47–61.
- Part 9. Reism
70. Tadeusz Kotarbinski, 'Franz Brentano as Reist', trans. Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schattle in L. L. McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 194–203.
Originally published as 'Franz Brentano comme réiste', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 20, 78, 1966, 459–476.
71. D. B. Terrell, 'Brentano's Argument for Reismus', in L. L. McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano* (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 204–212. Originally published in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 20, 78, 1966, 446–458.
72. Jan Wolenski, 'Reism in the Brentanist Tradition', in L. Albertazzi, M. Libardi and R. Poli (eds.), *The School of Franz Brentano* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), pp. 357–375.
73. Arkadiusz Chrudzinski and Barry Smith, 'Brentano's Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism', in D. Jacquette (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 197–219.
- Part 10. Logic and Language
74. Jan P. N. Land, 'Brentano's Logical Innovations', *Mind*, 1, 2, 1876, 289–292.
75. Wilhelm Windelband, 'Contributions to the Theory of Negative Judgement', trans. R. D. Rollinger, *Strassburger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie. E. Zeller zu seinem 70. Geburtstag*. (Freiburg i.Br./Tübingen, 1884), pp. 165–195.
76. Martin Heidegger, 'Judgement Characterised as a Basic Class of Psychical Phenomena (Franz Brentano, Anton Marty)', trans. R. D. Rollinger, in *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus: Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik* (Leipzig: Barth, 1914), pp. 57–66.
77. Hugo Bergmann, 'Brentano's Theory of Induction', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 5, 2, 1944/45, 281–292.
78. Jan T. J. Szrednicki, 'Some Elements of Brentano's Analysis of Language and their Ramifications', *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 20, 78, 1966, 434–445.
79. Peter Geach, 'The Hume-Brentano-Gilson Thesis', extract in *Logic Matters* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), pp. 263–267.
80. Roderick M. Chisholm, 'Brentano's Theory of Judgement', in *Brentano and Meinong Studies*, (Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi, 1982), pp. 17–36.
81. Peter M. Simons, 'Brentano's Reform of Logic', *Topoi*, 6, 1, 1987, 25–38.

82. David Bell, 'A Brentanian Philosophy of Arithmetic', *Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung*, 2, 1989, 139–144.
83. Marietje van der Schaar, 'Brentano on Logic, Truth and Evidence', *Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung*, 10, 2003, 113–142.
- Part 11. Epistemology
8. Moritz Schlick, 'On Evidence', extracts in *General Theory of Knowledge*, trans. by A. E. Blumberg; with an introduction by A. E. Blumberg and H. Feigl, (New York: Springer, 1974 [1918]), pp. 39–44, 82–90, 147–161.
845. Wolfgang Stegmüller, 'Critical Empiricism: Franz Brentano', trans. R. D. Rollinger in *Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie* 1 ed. (Wien/Stuttgart: Humboldt-Verlag, 1952), pp. 45–88.
86. Stephan Körner, 'On Brentano's Objections to Kant's Theory of Knowledge', *Topoi*, 6, 1, 1987, 11–17.
87. Jan Wolenski, 'Brentano's Criticism of the Correspondence Conception of Truth and Tarski's Semantic Theory', *Topoi*, 8, 1, 1989, 105–110.
26. ———, eds. 2019. *Franz Brentano: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers. Vol. 4: Ethics, Aesthetics, Religion*. New York: Routledge.
Contents: M. Antonelli, F. Boccaccini: Introduction to volume 4;
- Part 12. Ethics and Value Theory
88. George E. Moore, 'Review of F. Brentano, The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong', *International Journal of Ethics*, 14, 1, 1903, 115–123.
89. George E. Moore, 'Preface', in *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1960 [1903]), pp. vii–xii.
90. Max Scheler, 'The Non-Formal A Priori in Ethics', in *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*, translated from the German 5 ed. rev., *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1966) by M. S. Frings and R. L. Funk, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973 [1916]), pp. 81–91.
91. Howard O. Eaton, 'Brentano's Empirical Psychology', in *The Austrian Philosophy of Values* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1930), pp. 15–39.
92. William D. Ross, 'Brentano and the Foundations of Ethics', extract in *Foundations of Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 279–283.
93. Everett W. Hall, 'Is Value the Being an Object or a Right Love?', extract in *What is Value? An Essay in Philosophical Analysis* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 94–112.
94. John N. Findlay, 'Review of F. Brentano, Grunlegung und Aufbau der Ethik', *The Philosophical Review*, 63, 3, 1954, 432–435.
95. Gabriel Franks, 'Was G. E. Moore Mistaken About Brentano?', in L. L. McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano* (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp. 182–193. Originally published in *The New Scholasticism*, 43, 2, 1969, 252–268.
96. John N. Findlay, 'Brentano and the Axiological Ethics', extract in *Axiological Ethics*, (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 16–24.
97. Linda L. McAlister, 'The Development of Brentano's Later Ethical Theory', in *The Development of Franz Brentano's Ethics* (Elementa, vol. 27), (Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi, 1982), pp. 141–167.
98. Roderick M. Chisholm, 'Correct Emotion', in *Brentano and Intrinsic Value* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 47–58.
99. Roderick M. Chisholm, 'The Hierarchy of Values', in *Brentano and Intrinsic Value* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 59–67.
100. Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson, 'Brentano and the Buck-Passers', *Mind*, 116, 463, 2007, 511–522.
- Part 13. Aesthetics, History, Religion
101. Mario Puglisi, 'Wisdom and Religion According to Franz Brentano', *The Personalist*, 16, 1935, 68–72.

102. George Katkov, 'The Pleasant and the Beautiful', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 40, 1939/40, 177–206.
103. Roderick M. Chisholm, 'Review of F. Brentano, *Religion und Philosophie*', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 16, 3, 1955/56, 439–440.
104. Rush Rhees, 'Review of F. Brentano, *Religion und Philosophie*', *Mind*, 66, 262, 1957, 274–276.
105. Hugo Bergman, 'Brentano on the History of Greek Philosophy', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 26, 1, 1965, 94–99.
106. Andrew J. Burgess, 'Brentano as Philosopher of Religion', *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 5, 2, 1974, 79–90.
107. Andrew J. Burgess, 'Brentano's Evolving God', *The New Scholasticism*, 55, 1, 1981, 438–449.
108. Roderick M. Chisholm, 'Brentano's Theory of Pleasure and Pain', *Topoi*, 6, 1, 1987, 59–64.
109. Lynn Pasquerella, 'Brentano and Aesthetic Intentions', *Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung*, 4, 1992/93, 235–249.
110. Rudolf Haller, 'Remarks on Brentano's Aesthetics', trans R. D. Rollinger, in *Brentano Studien. Internationales Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung*, 5, 1994, 177–186.
111. Eberhard Tiefensee, 'Philosophy and Religion in the Work of Franz Brentano', trans. R. D. Rollinger, in E. Coreth, W. Ernst and E. Tiefensee (eds.), *Von Gott reden in säkularer Gesellschaft*, (Leipzig: Benno Verlag, 1996), pp. 175–195.
112. Peter Simons, 'The Four Phases of Philosophy: Brentano's Theory and Austrian's History', *The Monist*, 83, 1, 2000, 68–88.
113. Werner Sauer, 'Erneuerung der Philosophia Perennis: Über die ersten vier Habilitationsthesen Brentanos', *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 58–59, 2000, 119–149.
114. Susan F. Krantz Gabriel, 'Brentano on Religion and Natural Theology', in D. Jacquette (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 237–254.
115. Richard Schaefer, 'Infallibility and Intentionality: Franz Brentano's Diagnosis of German Catholicism', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 68, 3, 2007, 477–499.
- Index.
27. Aquila, Richard. 1974. "Brentano, Descartes, and Hume on Awareness." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 35:223-239.
- "In an important sense, however, Brentano's real significance - or at least his real historical significance - does not turn upon either of these issues. For suppose that we grant that sensory experiences are mental but nonintentional phenomena, and that linguistic events are intentional but nonmental phenomena. Even if both of these things are so, we would still need to draw a clear distinction between any mental event which is intentional and the object of that event. And we must insist with Brentano that, with the exception of some special cases, the object of any mental event could not *itself* be something mental. The major force, I believe, of Brentano's concern with intentionality does not lie merely in his concern for some general distinction between mental and nonmental phenomena, although such a distinction was naturally of importance to him. Of at least as great an importance is the distinction which Brentano requires that we draw, once we have acknowledged the intentionality of consciousness, between mental phenomena and, whether they be a "reality" or not, the *objects* of such phenomena. The object of ordinary sensory awareness, for example, is never in any literal sense something which has a merely mental status, not even in cases where that object is the sheerest of illusions or hallucinations. The object is, even in such cases as these, a purely physical phenomenon. The historical force of these points will become clear, I think, once we have set them in contrast with a certain "classical" approach that has been taken to the problem of awareness. This approach is provided by what we may call the "content theory" of awareness. This is a theory which, as I shall point out later, was

in fact broadly influential among Brentano's contemporaries in psychology." (pp. 224-225)

28. ———. 1982. "Intentional objects and Kantian appearances." *Philosophical Topics* no. 12:9-37.

"Fairly obviously, Kant's epistemology raises questions concerning the intentionality, or the "object-directed" character, of perception.

It is, as one might therefore expect, fruitful to consider Kant's views in comparison with some of those of Franz Brentano. This, it turns out, is no mere exegetical device, for it is not unreasonable to suggest that precisely the originality of Kant's approach to perceptual awareness lies in his anticipation of a point of view characteristic of the later thinker.

Brentano's thesis, for the purpose of this discussion, does not involve his claim that all psychological states are intrinsically object-directed. Kant in fact appears to reject that claim, for he appears to share with Husserl the view that mere "sensations" constitute an exception to it. The relevant Brentanian thesis may be stated by restricting our attention to those sensory states which, in the opinion of all parties, are object-directed, namely, ordinary perceptions, or Kantian (empirical) intuitions (as opposed to the mere "sensations" ingredient in those intuitions). The thesis concerns a particular sense in which each such state is, in its intrinsic character, an object-directed state. Each, namely, is object-directed in a way that is logically independent of the ascription of ontological status to any object of that state." (p. 9, notes omitted)

29. Arnaud, Richard B. 1975. "Brentanist Relations." In *Analysis and Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of R. M. Chisholm*, edited by Lehrer, Keith, 189-208. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

"A single passage from Franz Brentano's *Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint* has, in the century since its publication, spawned more than its share of mythological beasts, mathematical monsters and philosophical treatises. It runs: ... Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (and also mental) inexistence (Inexistenz) of an object (*Gegenstand*), and what we could call, although in not entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object (by which we are not to understand a reality in this case), or an immanent objectivity. Each one includes something as object within itself, although not always in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love [something is] loved, in hate [something] hated, in desire [something] desired, etc.

This intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything similar. Consequently, we can define mental phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as include an object intentionally within themselves.(1)

This passage sets forth, or at least strongly intimates, three doctrines that were to preoccupy Brentano and his followers in later years, namely: (I) the doctrine that intentionality, reference to an object, is a distinctive mark of the mental; (II) the doctrine that intentional reference radically differs from other, merely physical, relations primarily in virtue of the fact that mental phenomena may be directed not only upon objects that exist but even upon objects that do not exist; and (III) an obscure and problematic doctrine to the effect that any object of intentional reference thereby has a special ontological status called 'intentional inexistence'. What has come to be called the intentionality thesis of Brentano is the conjunction of (I) and (II).(…)

In what follows, we shall concentrate on some of the philosophical difficulties that seem to be connected with (II), and very little will be made of (I). Nothing will be said here concerning the unsatisfactory doctrine (III), since the problematic nature of the notion of intentional inexistence has been forcefully demonstrated by Chisholm.(3)" (p. 189), note 2 omitted)

(1) Brentano [2], pp. 88-89.

(3) cr. Chisholm [3], pp. 6-20; and [4], pp. 201-203. Compare McAlister [1].

References

Brentano, Franz [2] *Psychology from an Empirical Standpunkt*, transI. by Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister, Humanities Press, New York, 1973.

Chisholm, Roderick M. [3] 'Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional', in *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, ed. by Edward N. Lee and Maurice Mandelbaum, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967.

Chisholm, Roderick M. [4] 'Intentionality', in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* Philosophy, editor-in-chief, Paul Edwards, Macmillan Co. and The Free Press, New York, 1967.

McAlister, Linda L. 'Franz Brentano and Intentional Inexistence', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 8 (1970), 423-430.

30. Bacigalupo, Giuliano. 2018. "Towards a New Brentanian Theory of Judgment." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 95:245-264.
 Abstract: "In the last few decades, the interest in Brentano's philosophical psychology, especially in his theory of judgment, has been steadily growing. What, however, has remained relatively unexplored are the modifications that have been introduced over the years into this theory by Brentano himself and by his student Anton Marty. These amendments constitute the focus of the present paper. As will be argued, only by making such changes can the weaknesses of the first formulation of the theory be overcome.
 Moreover, as the final section of the paper attempts to show, these modifications may even trigger further steps towards what we might label a new Brentanian theory of judgment."
31. Bartok, Philip J. 2005. "Brentano's Intentionality Thesis: beyond the analytic and phenomenological readings." *Journal of History of Philosophy* no. 43:437-460.
 "The task of this paper is to navigate a route between the excesses of these two influential readings of Brentano's thesis [*the analytical and the phenomenological*]. By attending closely to both the motivating concerns and the distinctive methodological features of Brentano's psychology, as it is presented in PES [*Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*] and in the posthumously published lectures on *Descriptive Psychology* (DP), this reading aims to avoid both the methodological insensitivity of the analytic reading and the Whiggishness of the phenomenological reading while preserving what is of value in each. The picture of Brentano that emerges from such an investigation is that of an innovating founder of a new empirical psychology, a psychology that was to serve as the foundation not only for metaphysics, but also for fields like logic, ethics, and aesthetics. While this psychology bears significant methodological and doctrinal similarities to both contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and phenomenology, the attempt to identify its methods and concerns with those of either of these two successors occludes what is truly distinctive about it. An appreciation of the distinctive character of Brentano's psychology permits a fairer reading of his intentionality thesis and thus allows for a more accurate assessment of the complex relationship of Brentano's empirical psychology to the philosophical and psychological works of his twentieth-century successors on both sides of the Atlantic.(...)
 I shall proceed as follows: In section 1 I survey the "analytic reading" of Brentano's thesis, drawing attention to its misunderstandings of the central Brentanian terms 'phenomena' and 'intentional inexistence' as well as its general insensitivity to Brentano's psychological method. Section 2 introduces the "phenomenological reading" as an improvement upon the analytic reading, in that it attends to methodological issues, permitting distinctions to be drawn between descriptive psychological, genetic psychological, metascientific, and metaphysical elements in his work. Section 3 criticizes the tendency of phenomenologists to impute their own theoretical motives to Brentano and his psychological project.

- Finally, section 4 introduces the elements of a third reading of Brentano's thesis and of the psychological project of PES and DP as a whole, one that takes seriously his claim to be an empirical psychologist intent upon erecting a new psychology upon solid theoretical foundations." (p. 439, a note omitted)
32. ———. 2005. "Reading Brentano on the Intentionality of the Mental." In *Intentionality: Past and Future*, edited by Forrai, Gabor and Kampis, George, 15-24. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
 "Franz Brentano's attempts to develop a new empirical psychology, as presented in works like *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* of 1874 (Brentano, 1955/1995a; hereafter in text as "PES") and the later lectures posthumously published in *Descriptive Psychology* (Brentano, 1982; 1995b; hereafter in text as "DP"), stand at the historical point of departure of the two dominant traditions in twentieth-century philosophy, the analytic and phenomenological traditions. Prominent thinkers in both of these camps have identified Brentano's psychological explorations as an inspiration for central aspects of their philosophical views. But thinkers in these two traditions have read Brentano's psychology and his most important discovery, his intentionality thesis, in quite different ways. As a result, they have arrived at different interpretations of the same theoretical elements. This state of affairs raises puzzling questions: How can the work of a single philosopher have given rise to such variant readings? Do relevant texts equally support both these readings? To what extent did the philosophical projects of Brentano's readers color their understanding of his thought? Have his readers in either of these traditions recovered anything like Brentano's understanding of his psychological project and his intentionality thesis?
 I will argue that while both of these broad strategies for reading Brentano involve significant misrepresentations of his intentionality thesis, phenomenologists have generally read Brentano in a far more methodologically sensitive fashion than have his analytic interpreters. Because of this, the phenomenological reading corrects some of the more serious interpretive errors made by many of his analytic readers. My strategy will be to examine each of these readings in turn, beginning with the analytic reading. A brief concluding section summarizes the results of these examinations." (p. 15)
33. Baumgartner, Wilhelm. 1989. "Objects analysed. Brentano's way toward the identity of objects." *Topoi Supplement* no. 4:20-30.
34. ———. 1996. "Act, Content, and Object." In *The School of Franz Brentano*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 235-259. Kluwer: Dordrecht.
 "In what follows, I will deal with some aspects of Brentano's theory and terminology concerning the nature of the psychical, i.e. his descriptive psychological analysis which is, in fact, an early phenomenological theory about mental states, their structure, their mutual relation, and their intentional correlates (objects and contents). This theory goes along with his ontological theory of mind, which is an application of Aristotelian substance-accident or part-whole ontology, to the realm of mind, or more concretely, to a thinking person.
 Taking the teachings of the natural sciences (the world existing outside of us and its physical laws) for granted, Brentano develops a special, individual ontology of mind (facts and motivational interrelations of the psychical). In describing the two aspects of the minds intentional relations to things other than itself and the self-relating character of psychical phenomena, Brentano describes both the inner world of mind and the outer world of inner world (general ontology). The analysis of phenomena (phenomenology) serves as link between special and general ontology." (p. 235, a note omitted)
35. ———. 2013. "Franz Brentano's Mereology." In *Themes from Brentano*, edited by Fisette, Denis and Fréchet, Guillaume, 227-245. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
 "Introduction

In his search for a scientifically based worldview, and in contrast to “blind a priori” assumptions (Brentano 1925), Brentano aimed at an analysis of parts, down to their last fundamental elements, their properties and interconnections in order to demonstrate “what binds the world from within”. He did so from an ontological (and from a broader metaphysical) standpoint on the one hand, and from a psychological perspective on the other.

In what follows, I will examine Brentano’s methodological attempts to provide a foundational account of an ontology of things (§ 2) and an ontology of mind (§ 3) on the basis of his mereology, that is, his theory of part-whole-relations. In § 1, I refer to his lectures on the history of philosophy and to his essay on “The Four Phases of Philosophy”.

I consider these investigations on scientific history in general, its periods, main themes, and endeavors, as relevant examples which illustrate my thesis that the relations of parts and wholes in Brentano’s thought can also be observed beyond his ontology and his psychology." (p. 227)

References

Brentano, Franz. 1925. *Versuch über die Erkenntnis*, Leipzig: Meiner.

Brentano, Franz. 1998. *The Four Phases of Philosophy*. Amsterdam: Rodopi

36. Baumgartner, Wilhelm, and Pasquerella, Lynn. 2004. "Brentano’s value theory: beauty, goodness, and the concept of correct emotion." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacqueline Dale, 220-236. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Brentano’s theory of value, derived from his philosophical psychology, attempts to locate an objective basis for the intrinsic value of both aesthetic and ethical contemplation through the intentional objects of emotions and desires. As theories of intrinsic value, Brentano’s aesthetics and ethics are concerned with what is good and bad, beautiful and ugly, pleasurable and displeasurable, in and of themselves, and not merely as a means to an end. As objective theories, Brentano presupposes that our aesthetic and ethical evaluations, like our judgments or beliefs, are either correct or incorrect. In what follows, we will set forth some of the basic principles involved in Brentano’s aesthetics and ethics and elucidate how Brentano attempted to provide a foundation for these disciplines using his descriptive psychology." (p. 220)

37. Baumgartner, Wilhelm, and Simons, Peter. 1994. "Brentano’s Mereology." *Axiomathes* no. 5:55-76.

"1. Introduction

Many philosophers have considered the fundamental properties of the relational concept part/whole to be self-evident.

Serious investigation of the formal properties of the concept part/whole began only in our century with the work of Whitehead and - especially - Lesniewski.

Brentano employed the concept of part variously as a tool of his philosophy but he also considered the concept for itself. The topic part/whole runs right through his thinking and for good methodological and systematic reasons: he constructs and consolidates his conception of science(1) and his individual theorems in analytic descriptive manner "from below". Problems that appeared important to him, often the same problem, such as the interpretation of being, were turned around and looked at from different sides; he was always looking to explicate a complex problem step by step via partial solutions, always seeking to systematize the (apparently) disparate, while allowing individual issues their rightful place.(2)

(1) Probably under the influence of Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*, cf. its

Introduction, § 7,

p. 32 f., § 58, p. 253.

(2) See the investigations into the "principle of mereological essentialism" in (Chisholm 1982), 8, also his (1973) and (1975).

References

[Chisholm 1973] Roderick M. Chisholm, "Parts as essential to their wholes", *Review of Metaphysics* 25, 1973, 581-603.

- [Chisholm 1975] Roderick M. Chisholm, "Mereological essentialism: some further considerations", *Review of Metaphysics* 28, 1975, 477-484.
- [Chisholm 1982] Roderick M. Chisholm, *Brentano and Meinong Studies*, Amsterdam, Rodopi.
38. Bell, David. 1989. "A Brentanian Philosophy of Arithmetic." *Brentano Studien* no. 2 (139-144).
Abstract: "The aim of this paper is to identify the main respects in which Husserl's early philosophy, and in particular his early writings on the foundation of arithmetic, were influenced by Brentano's thought. It is claimed that the doctrinal, conceptual, and methodological perspective within which Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is conceived and executed (but which remains very largely suppressed in Husserl's texts) is that which he inherited, more or less without modification, from Brentano in the period to which *Psychology from an empirical Standpoint*, *The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, and the lectures on *Descriptive Psychology* belong. That influence was extensive and profound enough to warrant calling Husserl's philosophy of arithmetic 'Brentanian'."
39. Bell, John L. 2000. "Continuity and the logic of perception." *Transcendent Philosophy* no. 1:1-7.
"In his *On What is Continuous* of 1914 ([2]), Franz Brentano makes the following observation:
If we imagine a chess-board with alternate blue and red squares, then this is something in which the individual red and blue areas allow themselves to be distinguished from each other in juxtaposition, and something similar holds also if we imagine each of the squares divided into four smaller squares also alternating between these two colours. If, however, we were to continue with such divisions until we had exceeded the boundary of noticeability for the individual small squares which result, then it would no longer be possible to apprehend the individual red and blue areas in their respective positions. But would we then see nothing at all? Not in the least; rather we would see the whole chessboard as violet, i.e. apprehend it as something that participates simultaneously in red and blue. [p. 6]
In this paper I will describe a simple and natural framework—a logic of perception—in which this “simultaneous participation” or superposition of perceived attributes is accorded a major role. (This framework was originally introduced in [1] for a different purpose.) The central concept of the framework is that of an attribute being manifested over a region or part of a proximity space—an abstract structure embodying key features of perceptual fields. An important property of the manifestation relation is nonpersistence, namely, the fact that a space may manifest an attribute not manifested by some part. This will be shown to be closely related to the idea of superposing attributes.
I will also show how this framework is tied up with the continuity of perceptual fields." (p. 1)
References
[1] Bell, J.L., A New Approach to Quantum Logic. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 37, 1986.
[2] Brentano, Franz, *Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time and the Continuum*. Barry Smith, translator. London: Croom Helm, 1988.
40. Benoist, Jocelyn. 2003. "The Question of Grammar in Logical Investigations, With Special Reference to Brentano, Marty, Bolzano and Later Developments in Logic." In *Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations - Expanding Dynamics - Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 94-97. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"The question of grammar is among the most important in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. Grammar measures the ability of thought to produce sense, thus opening the question of the possibility of objects—even where they cannot exist in any real sense. Grammar is the basic structure of the meaning modality of intentionality which, in *Logical Investigations*, is the fundamental modality.

Brentano's criticism of language may have prepared Husserl to a reflect upon grammar. However, this last theme remained foreign to Brentano, who never engaged in any real inquiry into *meaning*, which is the basis of grammar. Brentano cared much more for the problem of the reference or lack of reference of signs within the framework of a "fiction-theory". The decisive stimulus for Husserl's theory in fact came from the Brentanist Anton Marty (Mulligan, 1990; Benoist, 1997a, Ch. 3), who developed a philosophy of language where grammar played a significant role. Marty introduced the basic grammatical categories that characterize Husserl's system." (p. 94)

References

Benoist, Jocelyn (1997a). *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie: Husserl et la tradition logique autrichienne*. Paris: P.U.F.

Mulligan, Kevin ed. (1990), *Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

41. Bergmann, Gustav. 1967. *Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Reprinted Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2004, with an introduction by Erwin Tegtmeier.
Contents. Preface VII;
Book One. Facts, Things, Ideas
Part I: General Ontology 3; Part II: Representationalism 125;
Book Two: Brentano and Meinong
Part III: Brentano 221; Part IV: Meinong 335;
Bibliographical Note 445; Index 447.
"On the one hand, Brentano's ontology is not easy to understand; nor therefore is it easy to describe accurately. That makes it difficult to achieve that alternation of exposition and criticism, both fluent and lucid, or at least not too crabbed and not obscure, which one ought to aim at when undertaking a task of this sort. On the other hand, Parts I and II have put us into possession of a considerable apparatus, developed at least in part with a view toward this task. In this situation an introductory section, consisting wholly of reflections designed to provide some preliminary orientation about matters both strange and difficult, should do some good. I shall present these reflections as a numbered string of comments or remarks. The last is about Brentano's metaphilosophy. The one preceding it indicates how the issues I take up are distributed over the several sections. If at that point you will have a first glimpse of the reasons that led me to select just these issues and to discuss them in just this order, the Introduction will have served its purpose. But I do not feel like starting without first making explicit what I just implied. Both exposition and criticism are selective. For I am not, as a historian of the sort I am not, concerned with Brentano's views on all issues nor with how they developed in the course of his career, but, rather, as a philosopher of the sort I am, with what is interesting about them." (p. 222)
42. Bergmann, Hugo. 1945. "Brentano's theory of induction." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 5:281-292.
Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, pp. 213-223.
"It is a remarkable fact that Hume's problem of the validity of the incomplete induction did *not* disquiet most of the logicians of the nineteenth century. They studied the logical mechanism of induction, but the problem as discovered by Hume, that is, as an epistemological issue, was scarcely realised as existent. To quote one example, F.F. Apelt's *Theorie der Induktion* (1854), a book of great merit in many respects, virtually disregards the incomplete induction as such, and treats complete and incomplete induction as being on an equal footing. The exception, of course, is John Stuart Mill, whatever may be our opinion of the answers he offers to the question. On the European continent, Franz Brentano found himself grappling with the problem from the beginning of his philosophical thought. His *Versuch über die Erkenntnis*, edited from his literary remains by Alfred Kastil in 1925, is in essence a theory of induction." (p. 281)

43. ———. 1965. "Brentano on the History of Greek Philosophy *." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 26:94-99.
 * *Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie*, in conformity with the lectures contained in his literary remains published by Franziska Mayer-Hildebrand. Bern: A. Francke, 1963. Pp. Lxiii, 396.
 "Franz Brentano, did not like to publish books; as he once said, he hated the "secondary work" that was connected with proof-reading, referencing of quotations, etc. He thus left the publication of his literary remains to his disciples. Indeed, after his death (1917) Alfred Kastil and Oskar Kraus undertook the publication of his literary remains and, in the time permitted to them, carried it out with great loyalty and dedication.
 In the years 1922 through 1934, there appeared in Felix Meiner's *Philosophische Bibliothek* ten volumes of Brentano's works; the editor's rich annotations are invaluable for understanding Brentano's lectures and the development of his thoughts. After Kastil's death the work of publication was taken over by Franziska Meyer-Hillebrand, his disciple. She published the *Grundlegung and Aufbau der Ethik, Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil, the Grundzuege der Aesthetik, and Religion und Philosophie*; to these are now being added the lectures on the *Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie*." (p. 94)
 (...)
 "The editor calls our attention (p. 371) to "profound changes" in Brentano's comprehension of certain doctrines of Aristotle. Three times as much space in this book is devoted to Aristotle as to Plato. The exposition is divided not into three parts, as is that on Plato, but into seven parts: logic; metaphysics (subdivided into Being in general and the origin and principle of Being); theology ("God is not only efficient cause, but creator of the world, but He is not identical with Plato's idea of the good; discussion of the proofs for the existence of God"); cosmology ("The eternity of the world is unacceptable; from this assumption there could be no progress, no proper evolution, no history"); psychology (in this chapter discussion of the doctrine that the soul does not think without images; weighty objections against this doctrine and its refutation by Aristotle - the psychological efforts of the Wuerzburg school in the early years of our century, which were influenced directly or indirectly by Brentano, are unfortunately not mentioned); and ethics and politics, in chapters six and seven respectively." (p. 98)
44. Berti, Enrico. 2001. "Brentano and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*." In *Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?*, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 135-149. Aldershot: Ashgate.
 "Franz Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy has attracted the attention of scholars right up to the present day. It has been considered important above all for two reasons: a) because it constituted the origin of the famous theory of intentionality, which was found in his book on *Aristotle's Psychology* (1867); and b) because of the influence that the theory of the several senses of being, developed in his Dissertation of 1862, exercised on the birth of Heidegger's thought. However, Brentano's attempt to attribute to Aristotle the concept of creation and the theory of the immortality of the human soul has been almost completely rejected.
 The first point was illustrated particularly by R. George and R. Sorabji, (1) but Brentano's interpretation of Aristotelian psychology was also at the centre of the debate on the "Mind-Body Problem", which involved several important philosophers, such as H. Putnam, the same R. Sorabji, M. Burnyeat, M. C. Nussbaum and others. (2) A part of his book on *Aristotle's Psychology* was included in the recent collection of Essays on Aristotle's "De anima". (3) The second point, to which Heidegger himself drew attention in his famous letter to Father Richardson, (4) was studied first by F. Volpi and afterwards by many others, including myself. (5)
 The interpretation of Aristotle's theology expounded by Brentano in an additional essay to *Aristotle's Psychology*, was criticised by Eduard Zeller in the third edition of his monumental history of Greek philosophy (1878). This criticism induced

Brentano to write an essay on *Aristotle's Creationism* (1882), followed by a reply from Zeller, a new intervention on the part of Brentano and a further reply by Zeller (1883), which seemed to close the discussion.(6) But Brentano reprinted his essay of 1882, with some additions, in the volume *Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung der menschlichen Geistes* (1911) (7) and in the same year he also published a monograph, *Aristoteles and seine Weltanschauung*, where he repeated the main lines of his interpretation. (8) The controversy was definitively resolved, in my opinion, only with W. D. Ross's introduction to his edition of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, where the famous English Aristotelian refuted any possibility of conceiving Aristotle's God as a creator, explicitly attacking the interpretation proposed by Brentano.(9)

On this occasion I do not wish to return to the theory of intentionality, even if I will make some reference to it. I would like, on the contrary, to see what consequences the interpretation of Aristotle's ontology, developed by Brentano in his dissertation of 1862, and his interpretation of Aristotle's theology, developed in his later writings, had for the modern and contemporary image of Aristotle; that is, how Brentano's Aristotle influenced contemporary philosophers' judgements of Aristotle's metaphysics." (pp. 135-137)

(1) Cf. R. George, 'Brentano's Relation to Aristotle', in R.M. Chisholm and R. Haller (eds.), *Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978, 249-266; R. Sorabji, 'From Aristotle to Brentano; the Development of the Concept of Intentionality', in H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson (eds.), *Aristotle and the Later Tradition*, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Supplementary Volume, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

(2) I tried to sum up this debate in E. Berti, 'Aristotele e il "Mind-Body Problem"', *Iride. Filosofia e discussione pubblica* 11, 1998, 43-62.

(3) *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom Nous Poietikos*, Mainz: Kirchheim, 1867, was republished by R. George, Hamburg: Meiner, 1967, and was translated into English by R. George, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

The first chapter, '*Nous poietikos*: Survey of earlier interpretations', was included in M. C. Nuussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), *Essays on Aristotle's De anima*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, 313-341.

(4) This letter (1962), published by Heidegger as Preface to W.J. Richardson, *Heidegger*, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963, has been developed in his lecture 'Mein Weg in die Phanomenologie' (1963), in id., *Zur Sache des Denkens*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1969, 81-90.

(5) Cf. F. Volpi, *Heidegger e Brentano*, Padua: Cedam, 1976 (Pubblicazioni della Scuola di perfezionamento in Filosofia dell'Università di Padova), and *Heidegger e Aristotele*, Padova: Daphne, 1984; J. Taminioux, *Le regard et l'excédent*, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1977, 156-182; E. Berti, *Aristotele nel Novecento*, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1992, 44-111; Th. Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

(6) F. Brentano, 'Ueber den Creatianismus des Aristoteles', S.-B. d. K. Akad. d. Wiss., philos.hist. Kl., 100, Wien 1882, 95-126; E. Zeller, 'Aristoteles Lehre von der Ewigkeit des menschlichen Geistes', S.-B. d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss., Berlin 1882 (repr. in Zeller's *Kleine Schriften*, Berlin 1910); F. Brentano, *Offener Brief an Herrn professor Dr. Eduard Zeller*, Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1883; E. Zeller, *Deutsche Literaturanzeige*, 1883.

(7) Leipzig: Veit & Comp., 1911 (second edition, with an Introduction by R. George who illustrates the controversy, Hamburg: Meiner, 1980). I examined this topic in E. Berti, 'Zeller e Aristotele', *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, cl. di lett. e filos.*, s. III, vol. XIX.3, Pisa 1989, 1233 -1254.

(8) Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer. In preparing this monograph Brentano wrote a series of notes on Aristotle, which remained unpublished until after his death: cf. F. Brentano, *Über Aristoteles. Nachgelassene Aufsätze*, hrsg. v. R. George, Hamburg: Meiner, 1986.

- (9) *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, I, cxxxiii-cxxxix, cxlix, cliii-cliv. I occupied myself with this discussion in E. Berti, 'Da chi è amato il motore immobile? Su Aristotele, *Metaph.* XII 6-7', *Methesis* 10, 1997, 59-82.
45. Betti, Arianna. 2013. "We owe it to Sigwart! A new look at the content/object distinction in early phenomenological theories of judgment from Brentano to Twardowski." In *Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology*, edited by Textor, Mark, 74-96. Palgrave.
- "In a series of articles, Dale Jacquette has offered the following picture of Twardowski's contribution to Brentano's theory of intentionality. Brentano made no distinction between the content and the object of mental acts: he 'seems to place the real world beyond the reach of thought' (Jacquette 1990: 181, Jacquette 2004: 107; see also Jacquette 2006: 12). By distinguishing sharply between content and object instead, Twardowski went beyond Brentano (although, contrary to what others claim, he was not the first Brentanian to do so). This picture needs fine-tuning." (p. 74)
- (...)
- "On the basis of the logic manuscript EL 80 he edited, Robin Rollinger has recently argued that Brentano himself has the distinction in place (Rollinger 2009), and, given Rollinger's dating of EL80, this implies not only that Brentano acknowledged the distinction before Twardowski, but also before Höfler and Meinong's *Logik*.(1)" (p.75)
- (...)
- "Why did Brentano himself introduce the content/object distinction at a certain point, and at which 'certain point'? Here's the story as I'll tell it in this paper. It is, on the face of Rollinger's dating of EL80, a (possibly) controversial story. Brentano was forced to consider (or consider more seriously) the content/object distinction at a certain point, I'd say not before 1888–89, by attacks against his theory of judgement made by critics such as Sigwart and Windelband." (p. 76)
- (1) For an earlier discussion of the issue, see Chrudzimski 2001: 33 and ff.
- References
- Chrudzimski, A. (2001) *Intentionalitäts-theorie Beim Frühen Brentano/Intentionality Theory, the Early Brentano*. (Dordrecht: Kluwer).
- Jacquette, D. (1990) 'The Origins of Gegenstandstheorie: Immanent and Transcendent Intentional Objects in Brentano, Twardowski and Meinong', *Brentano-Studien* 3, 177–202.
- (2004) 'Brentano's concept of intentionality', In D. Jacquette (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, 98–130. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- (2006) 'Twardowski, Brentano's Dilemma, and the Content-Object Distinction', in A. Chrudzimski & D. Łukasiewicz (eds.), *Actions, Products and Things. Brentano and Polish Philosophy*, 9–33. (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag).
- Rollinger, R.D. (2009) 'Brentano's Psychology and Logic And The Basis Of Twardowski's Theory Of Presentations', *The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication* 4, 1–23.
46. Blackmore, John. 1998. "Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938." In *The Brentano Puzzle*, edited by Poli, Roberto, 73-92. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- "Introduction
- The recent publication of the lectures given by the University of Vienna Philosophical Society from 1888 to 1922 has apparently stimulated increased interest among many scholars. The primary reason, of course, is that the Vienna background of many of the best-known philosophers of the 20th century has raised the distinct possibility that the Philosophical Society was a significant or even principal incubator for this remarkable development. Mach, Wittgenstein, Boltzmann, Neurath, Popper, von Hayek, and Feyerabend were all Viennese. The first four thinkers were clearly influenced by lectures and discussions given in the Society, the father of Sir Karl Popper was a member,³ Friedrich von Hayek alleges

that most philosophical discussion revolved around Mach's ideas at that time, and concerning Feyerabend's attraction to philosophy, one might suspect a source in Boltzmann's *Populäre Schriften*. Some of the groups which appear to have been 'spun off from the Society include Schlick's Circle, Reininger's Circle, and Heinrich Gomperz's Circle.

But in this paper, I would like to explore the relations of Franz Brentano and his students with the Society, which as we shall see were important until the First World War and for a few years afterwards. Brentano gave the first lecture, his students held top positions in the society often until their deaths, his followers actually gave more talks or led more discussions than the numerous adherents of Mach and Boltzmann, and Franz Brentano's most famous students, Meinong and Husserl, were corresponding members of this Vienna Society for some length of time." (p. 73, notes omitted)

47. Bonino, Guido. 2018. "Brentano in America. Three episodes." *Paradigmi* no. 1:49-64.
Abstract: "The article aims to investigate how Gustav Bergmann, Reinhardt Grossmann and Roderick Chisholm used Brentano's notion of intentionality in their own philosophical pursuits, and on how they saw themselves and their works with respect to what they regarded as Brentano's place in the history of philosophy. It is shown how the differences among their interpretations depend mainly on their different philosophical agendas."
48. Brandl, Johannes. 2018. "Brentano's Renewal of Philosophy: A Double-Edged Sword." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:25-52.
Abstract: "This paper discusses Brentano's plan to renew philosophy as consisting of two goals. One goal is to restore the scientific reputation of philosophy by employing the natural methods of descriptive psychology. In contrast to sceptical and critical approaches in 19th-century philosophy, Brentano seeks to renew philosophy by reviving a purely theoretical interest that he associates with the work of Aristotle. The other goal derives from Brentano's theistic worldview. Like scholastic thinkers, Brentano believes that philosophy can provide a rational foundation for theism. His plan is therefore not just to align philosophy with the empirical sciences, but also to arbitrate between scientific knowledge and belief in God. But can one really expect from philosophy to serve as a bridge between science and religion? Since there is good reason to doubt that philosophy can play that role, Brentano's plan for a renewal of philosophy remains a double-edged sword that cuts one way or the other, aligning philosophy with either science or religion, but not both."
49. Brandl, Johannes L. 1996. "Intentionality." In *The School of Franz Brentano*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 261-284. Kluwer: Dordrecht.
"There is one assumption which all participants in this debate, whether modern or traditional, agree on: they all accept propositional entities. Meinong accepts objectives, Husserl accepts states of affairs, and Fodor and Searle accept propositions.(12) They accept these entities as the objects of our propositional attitudes. Not so Brentano after 1874. His account of belief and desire makes do with the same entities as are already involved in his analysis of non-propositional acts. But it is not clear what those entities are to which Brentano is committed from the beginning.
(...)
In what follows I want to explore this idiosyncrasy of Brentano's theory, not as a historical curiosity, but as a source of inspiration for dealing with contemporary issues. I start out from a standard version of the representational theory of mind (section 2). I then consider two possible ways of attributing such a theory to Brentano (sections 3-5). The first approach emphasizes the fundamental role of presentations. The second approach leads to the result that only acts which are

neither propositional nor non-propositional can play this fundamental role. In the final section I briefly consider the merits of this latter interpretation." (pp. 263-264) (12) 12 The difference between these types of entities is explored, both from a modern and a traditional perspective, in Künne 1987.

References

Künne 1987. W. Künne, "The intentionality of thinking: The difference between state of affairs and propositional matter", in Mulligan 1987, 175-186.

Mulligan 1987. K. Mulligan (ed.), *Speech act and sachverhalt*, Dordrecht, Nijhoff.

50. ———. 2013. "What is Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness? Brentano's Theory of Inner Consciousness Revisited." In *Themes from Brentano*, edited by Fisette, Denis and Fréchette, Guillaume, 41-65. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"The plan of the paper is as follows. I begin with Brentano's definition of mental phenomena (section 2) and his idea that mental phenomena have a distinctive internal structure (section 3). I then consider what inner consciousness contributes to this structure by clarifying two distinctions with which Brentano operates here: the distinction between primary and secondary objects (section 4), and his distinction between inner perception and inner observation (section 5).

The main step in my interpretation will then consist in pointing out that inner perception and inner observation need not be conceived as two distinct cognitive faculties. Rather we can think of them as one faculty that gives rise to gradually different forms of self-knowledge (section 6). In the remaining part of the paper I will then exploit this interpretation for rebutting two objections that have been raised against Brentano's theory. David Rosenthal has argued that Brentano's model rests on a Cartesian premise and should therefore be replaced by a proper higher-order theory of consciousness (section 7).

Others, including Henrich, Frank and many phenomenologists have questioned Brentano's treatment of the regress-problem and on that basis suggested that Brentano's model of consciousness should be replaced by a strictly one-level theory (section 8). I will argue that both objections miss their target because Brentano's fits neither the mould of a higher-order nor of a one-level theory." (pp. 42-43)

51. ———. 2017. "Was Brentano an Early Deflationist about Truth?" *The Monist* no. 100:1-14.

Abstract: "It is often assumed that deflationist accounts of truth are a product of philosophy of logic and language in the twentieth century. In this paper I show why this assumption is historically short-sighted. An early version of deflationism about truth can already be found in Brentano's 1889 lecture "On the Concept of Truth." That Brentano is a precursor of deflationism has gone largely unnoticed because of a different reception of his lecture: according to most scholars, Brentano proposes in it a revision of the correspondence theory of truth that he later rejected in favour of an epistemic theory. Contrary to this received interpretation, I argue that Brentano actually tried to show how one can minimize an account of truth without thereby sacrificing a robust realist intuition about the objectivity of truth. Brentano held on to this deflationist view in his later years, when he assigned self-evident judgments a primary role in our understanding of truth."

52. ———. 2017. "Brentano on Truth." In *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*, edited by Kriegel, Uriah, 163-168. New York: Routledge. "How to understand Brentano's account of truth is a question of some controversy. A number of different views have been put forward as positions that Brentano held at some stage in his career. The received view has it that the early Brentano subscribed to a form of correspondence theory which he later rejected in favor of a definition of truth in terms of correct judging, where the correctness of a judgement is defined in terms of the notion of self-evidence (...)."

(...)

"Section 1 first summarizes the received view and then indicates two problems raised by this interpretation. Section 2 explains in which sense Brentano may have

- been a deflationist and how this interpretation avoids the problems of the received view." (p. 163)
53. ———. 2023. "The purposes of descriptive psychology." *European Journal of Philosophy*:358-370.
Abstract: "In this paper, I discuss the different views of the founders of descriptive psychology in the 19th century about the meaning and purpose of this discipline and sketch a new plan for connecting descriptive psychology with the language-critical tradition of analytic philosophy. I will show that the goals Hermann Lotze, Franz Brentano, and Wilhelm Dilthey set for descriptive psychology were too lofty for different reasons. The common problem they faced was how to reconcile the ideal of autonomous philosophical knowledge with the empirical relevance that descriptive psychology should have. Faced with this dilemma, I outline a new plan to conceive of descriptive psychology as a critical project aimed at overcoming the obstacles that language places in the way of our knowledge of mental phenomena."
54. Brandl, Johannes L., and Textor, Mark. 2021. "Disentangling Judgement from Its Linguistic Clothing': Brentano's View of Judgement and Its Linguistic Guises." In *The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller*, edited by Antonelli, Mauro and Binder, Thomas, 156-178. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.
"What seems clear is that the potential of Brentano's criticism of ordinary language has not yet been fully explored. We found that at least three points deserve further attention: Brentano's view that noun phrases, for example, demonstratives, can express a simple judgment; his idea that assertoric sentences can express non-propositional acknowledgements; and last but not last, Brentano's concept of double judgement. Taking together, these three insights may provide us with a better ground for introducing propositional objects into a theory of judgement. Disentangling our judgements from language also means not to follow the usual procedure of simply taking the meaning of assertoric sentences to constitute the objects that we judge to be true or false." (p. 177)
55. Brentano, J. C. M. 1966. "The Manuscripts of Franz Brentano." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 20:477-482.
"The philosopher Franz Brentano, my father, left at his death an unusual number of unpublished papers. This is due to two main reasons. One is that true to the principle he had announced in one of his theses when applying for the *venia legendi* at Würzburg university: *Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est*, which meant that philosophy should proceed by small well consolidated steps and that each step before being accepted should stand the test of not being in conflict with any other part of true philosophy, he wished to withhold his findings from publication until they were checked and rechecked. Apart from his lectures the medium for communicating the results of his investigations was the correspondence with other philosophers, particularly with former pupils. The other reason is that in the later part of his life he was affected by an eye ailment and gradually almost lost his eyesight. From about 1904 onwards writing and particularly reading became very difficult." (p. 477)
56. Brito, Evandro Oliveira de. 2018. "Franz Brentano's theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth." *Trans/Form/Ação* no. 41:39-56.
Abstract: "The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of truth formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889. As a textual basis, I take Brentano's communication, presented to the philosophical community of Vienna in March 1889, entitled "On the concept of truth" (*Über den Begriff der Wahrheit*), and I provide a systematic exposition of Brentano's analysis of the problems surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. My analysis explains how Brentano reinterpreted the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence within the conceptual framework of his descriptive psychology."

57. Brown, Deborah. 2000. "Immanence and Individuation: Brentano and the Scholastics on Knowledge of Singulars." *The Monist* no. 83:22-46.
 "The primary aim of this paper is to explain the connection between the theory of immanence in its medieval and Brentanian forms and the problem of individuation. The predominant Scholastic solution to the problem will be compared with Brentano's own "Leibnizian" account of singular knowledge. I shall begin in the next section with a discussion of how the problem arose in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of the middle ages for it is in this metaphysico-epistemological tradition that Brentano's work is best located. In Section III, I outline Brentano's theory of immanence in more detail and discuss his proposed analysis of singular knowledge. I shall argue that there can be found in Brentano's later modifications of the theory of immanent objects nominalist tendencies which should have made the task of explaining singular knowledge easier. Brentano's general rejection of nominalism and the residual Aristotelian Thomistic ideas in his theory of intentionality, however, prevented a full swing to nominalism. In the fourth Section I consider one medieval nominalist solution to the problem of singular knowledge, William of Ockham's, in the light of Brentano's objections to nominalism. It is my contention that not only does Brentano's reading of medieval nominalism contain a fundamental misunderstanding, but that his own philosophy of mind requires the possibility of direct, non-abstractive epistemic access to individuals. Thus in the final Section I discuss how an adequate theory of the unity of consciousness requires an adequate account of our knowledge of singulars." (pp. 23-24)
58. Cesalli, Laurent, and Taieb, Hamid. 2018. "Brentano and Medieval Ontology." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:335-362.
 Abstract: "Since the first discussion of Brentano's relation to (and account of) medieval philosophy by Spiegelberg in 1936, a fair amount of studies have been dedicated to the topic. And if those studies focused on some systematic issue at all, the beloved topic of intentionality clearly occupied a hegemonic position in the scholarly landscape. This paper considers the question from the point of view of ontology, and in a twofold perspective: What did Brentano know about medieval ontology and what kind of access did he have to that material (section 1)? What kind of use did Brentano make of medieval material in his own philosophy, and with what kind of results (section 2)?"
 References
 Spiegelberg H. (1936), "Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und Husserl", *Philosophische Hefte* 5, p. 75-91 (reprint in *Studia Philosophica* 29 (1970), p. 189-216). [Revised by the author and translated in: Linda McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, pp. 108-127]
59. Chisholm, Roderick M. 1952. "Intentionality and the Theory of Signs." *Philosophical Studies* no. 3:56-63.
 "Franz Brentano wrote, in a well-known passage, that intentionality is peculiar to psychological phenomena. No physical phenomenon, he said, shows anything like it; hence intentionality affords us a criterion of the mental or psychological(1). Let us refer to this view as "Brentano's thesis." Among the phenomena which he would have called "intentional" is the interpretation of signs. One may ask, is it possible to provide an adequate theory of signs which will show Brentano's thesis to be mistaken? In the present paper I shall make certain general points which, I believe, must be considered in any attempt to answer this question, I shall first attempt to state Brentano's thesis somewhat more exactly; then I shall turn to the analysis of the concept *sign*."
 (1) Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte* (Leipzig, 1924), vol. 1, pp. 124-25.

60. ———. 1955/56. "Sentences About Believing." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 56:125-148.
 "1. " I can look for him when he is not there, but not hang him when he is not there".(1) The first of these activities, Brentano would have said, is intentional; it may take as its object something which does not exist. But the second activity is "merely physical"; it cannot be performed unless its object is there to work with. " Intentionality ", he thought, provides us with a mark of what is psychological. I shall try to reformulate Brentano's suggestion by describing one of the ways in which we need to use language when we talk about certain psychological states and events.
 I shall refer to this use as the " intentional use " of language.
 It is a kind of use we can avoid when we talk about nonpsychological states and events.
 In the interests of a philosophy contrary to that of Brentano, many philosophers and psychologists have tried to show, in effect, how we can avoid intentional language when we wish to talk about psychology. I shall discuss some of these attempts in so far as they relate to the sorts of things we wish to be able to say about believing. I believe that these attempts have been so far unsuccessful. And I think that this fact may provide some reason for saying, with Brentano, that " intentionality " is a mark of what is psychological." (p. 125)
 (1) Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, page 133e.
61. ———. 1957. "Intentional Inexistence." In *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study*, 168-185. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
 Chapter XI; reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, pp. 140-150.
 "I have suggested that the locution 'There is something that S *perceives* to be *f*' may be defined as meaning: 'There is something such that it is *f*, it appears to S in some way, S takes it to be *f*, and S had adequate evidence for so doing.' And I have suggested that 'S *takes* something to be *f* may be defined by reference to what S assumes, or accepts. I have now said all that I can about the philosophic questions which the concepts of *adequate evidence* and of *appearing* involve. Let us finally turn, then, to the concept of *assuming*, or *accepting*. The principal philosophic questions which this concept involves may be formulated by reference to a thesis proposed by Franz Brentano.
 Psychological phenomena, according to Brentano, are characterised 'by what the scholastics of the middle ages referred to as the intentional (also the mental) inexistence of the object, and what we, although with not quite unambiguous expressions, would call relation to a content, direction upon an object, (which is not here to be understand as a reality), or immanent objectivity.'(2) This 'intentional inexistence', Brentano added, is peculiar to what is psychical; things which are merely physical show nothing like it.
Assuming, or *accepting*, is one of the phenomena Brentano would have called intentional. I will first try to formulate Brentano's thesis somewhat more exactly; then I will ask whether it is true of assuming." (p. 168)
 (2) Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*, (Leipzig, 1924), vol. 1, pp, 124-5. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (New York and London, 1973), p. 88.
62. ———, ed. 1960. *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
 Contents: Preface V; Editor's Introduction 3; Selections. 1. Franz Brentano: The distinction between mental and physical phenomena 39; 2. Franz Brentano: Presentation and judgment form. Two distinct fundamental classes 62, 3. Franz Brentano: Genuine and fictitious objects 76; 4. Alexius Meinong: The theory of objects 76; 5. Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology 118; 6. Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and anthropology 129; 7. H. A. Prichard: Appearances and reality 143; 8. E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B. Perry, W. B. Pitkin, and E. G. Spaulding: Introduction to 'The New Realism' 151; 9. Samuel Alexander: The

basis of realism 186; 10. Bertrand Russell: The ultimate constituents of matter 223; 11. Arthur C. Lovejoy: A temporalistic realism 238; 12. G. E. Moore: A defense of common sense 255; Selected bibliography 283; Index 305-308.

"The translations of Brentano and Meinong and the second translation of Husserl ("Phenomenology and Anthropology") have not previously been published. The selections from Brentano were translated by D. B. Terrell, of the University of Minnesota, and are taken, with his kind permission, from his translation of Brentano's *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. Meinong's "The Theory of Objects" was translated by Isaac Levi, of Western Reserve University, D. B. Terrell, and Roderick M. Chisholm. Husserl's "Phenomenology" was translated by C. V. Salmon, of Belfast University; his "Phenomenology and Anthropology" by Richard Schmitt; of Brown University." (from the Preface)

63. ———. 1966. "Brentano's Theory of Correct and Incorrect Emotion." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 20:395-415.
Reprinted in: R. M. Chisholm, *Brentano and Meinong Studies*, pp. 68-79 and in Linda McAlister, *The Philosophy of Brentano*, pp. 160-175.
"Brentano's theory of correct and incorrect emotion is based upon the analogy he believes to hold between what he calls the sphere of the intellect and the sphere of the emotions. What he has to say about this presumed analogy seems to me to be very important indeed.
Even where his views are controversial, they are extraordinarily suggestive, not only for ethics, but also for the theory of preference and for philosophical psychology.
(...)
Brentano divides judgments into two exclusive classes - those that are affirmative and those that are negative. Affirmative judgments are those that affirm, acknowledge, or accept something. Negative judgments are those that deny or reject something. All judgments are also either correct or incorrect; or, as we usually say, they are either true or false. And finally, there is a very close connection between the correctness and incorrectness of judgments, on the one hand, and existence and non-existence, on the other. For to say of an object that it exists, Brentano suggests, is to say that it is correct to accept that object, and to say of an object that it does not exist is to say that it is correct to reject that object. The latter point may also be put by saying that an object exists if and only if it is worthy of being accepted or affirmed, and that an object does not exist if and only if it is worthy of being rejected or denied.(1)
And now Brentano thinks, we may say much the same thing, *mutatis mutandis*, about emotions - about "love and hate".
Emotions are either positive or negative; they are either proemotions or anti-emotions, love or hate. Love and hate may be correct and they may also be incorrect. There is a very close connection between the correctness and incorrectness of emotions, on the one hand, and goodness and badness on the other. For to say of an object that it is good, Brentano suggests, is to say that it is correct to love that object, and to say of an object that it is bad is to say that it is correct to hate that object. The latter point may also be put by saying that an object is good if and only if it is worthy of being loved, and an object is bad if and only if it is worthy of being hated.
But to put the analogy this way is to oversimplify Brentano's doctrine. And, so he concedes, there are fundamental points of disanalogy that hold between the intellectual and the emotive spheres." (pp. 396-397)
(1) For the details of this view, see Brentano's *Wahrheit und Evidenz* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1958; first published in Leipzig in 1930), ed., Oskar Kraus. The English edition is *The True and the Evident* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1966), ed., Roderick M. Chisholm.
64. ———. 1967. "Brentano on descriptive psychology and the intentional." In *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, edited by Lee, Edward and Mandelbaum, Maurice, 1-23. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press.

- "Brentano's doctrine of the intentional, as well as much of the rest of what we would now call his philosophy, was a part of what he called "descriptive psychology." Brentano's "descriptive psychology" and Husserl's "phenomenology" are closely related. Husserl had studied with Brentano in Vienna from 1884 to 1886. (3) Brentano had used "beschreibende Phänomenologie" as an alternative name for descriptive psychology but evidently did not use "Phänomenologie" in this way after 1889.
- The relation that descriptive psychology bears to genetic or explanatory psychology, Brentano said, is analogous to the relation that anatomy bears to physiology and to the relation that "geognosy" bears to geology (hence "psychognosy" was still another term that Brentano used for descriptive psychology). (4) Genetic or explanatory psychology is concerned with the causal status of psychological phenomena and hence with the relations that such phenomena bear to physical and chemical processes. It is not an exact science but, like meteorology, must qualify its generalizations with such terms as "on the average" and "for the most part." But descriptive psychology, Brentano thought, was an exact science." (p. 2)
- (3) See Husserl's "Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano," in Oskar Kraus, *Franz Brentano: Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seine Lehre* (Munich: 1919).
- (4) See Franz Brentano, *Grundzüge der Ästhetik*, ed. F. Mayer-Hillebrand, pp. 36ff., and *Meine letzten Wünsche für Oesterreich* (Stuttgart: 1895).
65. ———. 1972. "Sentences about Believing." In *Intentionality, Mind, and Language*, edited by Marras, Ausonio. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. From *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. II, eds. H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell, pp. 510-520. Copyright, 1958, by the University of Minnesota. Reprinted by permission of the author, the University of Minnesota Press, and the editors of *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, where an earlier version of this paper was first published [56 (1955-56), 125-148].
 "I can look for him when he is not there, but not hang him when he is not there."
 (1) The first of these activities, Brentano would have said, is intentional; it may take as its object something which does not exist. But the second activity is "merely physical"; it cannot be performed unless its object is there to work with.
 "Intentionally," he thought, provides us with a mark of what is psychological. I shall try to reformulate Brentano's suggestion by describing one of the ways in which we need to use language when we talk about certain psychological states and events. I shall refer to this use as the "intentional use" of language. It is a kind of use we can avoid when we talk about nonpsychological states and events." (p. 31)
 (1) L. Wittgenstein. *Philosophical Investigations* (London and New York: Macmillan, 1953) p. 133e.
66. ———. 1976. "Brentano's nonpropositional theory of judgment." *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* no. 1:91-95.
 "Burnham Terrell [*] has performed a valuable service in presenting Brentano's theory of judgment and his "logical innovations" in the light of contemporary logical developments. In what follows, I will attempt to supplement what Terrell has done by showing how the reistic side of Brentano's theory might be developed. As Terrell notes, Brentano in the final reistic phase of his thought rejects such *entia irrealia* as propositions, judgmental contents, and states of affairs.
 But it is normally supposed that a nonpropositional theory of judgment cannot possibly be made adequate to so-called compound judgments. I shall attempt to show that this supposition is false." (p. 91)
 [*] *Franz Brentano's Logical Innovations* (1976).
67. ———. 1976. "Brentano's Descriptive Psychology." In *The Philosophy of Brentano*, edited by McAlister, Linda Lopez, 91-100. London: Duckworth. Revised by the author, who notes, 'I have profited by certain criticisms made by D.B. Terrell'. The first version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the XIVth International Congress of Philosophy, 2-9 September 1968 (Vienna, 1968), volume 2, pp. 164-74.

"It is most fitting that one session of an international congress of philosophers meeting in Vienna should be devoted to the topic, 'Brentano, philosophical psychology, and the phenomenological movement'. Franz Brentano's lectures on descriptive psychology were given at the University of Vienna three-quarters of a century ago. Husserl said that without Brentano's researches 'phenomenology could not have come into being at all'.(2) Brentano's descriptive psychology is doubtless very close to what Husserl originally took phenomenology to be. But in the philosophical problems that are central to it, and in the precise analytic manner with which Brentano dealt with them, his descriptive psychology is also very close to the 'philosophy of mind' or 'philosophical psychology', that is now of concern to philosophers in the analytic tradition. Yet it would not be fitting, here in Vienna, to look upon Brentano merely as a precursor of subsequent philosophical movements. I shall try to say briefly what he took descriptive psychology to be and I shall comment upon what I take to be its philosophical significance." (p. 91)

(2) See Edmund Husserl, 'Author's Preface to the English Edition', *Ideas—General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (London, 1931), p. 23; *Phänomenologische Psychologie* (The Hague, 1962), pp. 31-4, 267-9, 353-4.

68. ———. 1978. "Brentano's Conception of Substance and Accident." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:197-210.
Abstract: "Brentano uses terms in place of predicates (e.g. "a thinker" in place of "thinks") and characterizes the "is" of predication in terms of the part-whole relation. Taking as his ontological data certain intentional phenomena that are apprehended with certainty, he conceives the substance-accident relation as a define-able type of part-whole relation which we can apprehend in "inner perception". He is then able to distinguish the following types of individual or ens reale: substances; primary individuals which are not substances; accidents; aggregates; and boundaries."
69. ———. 1981. "Brentano's analysis of the consciousness of time." In *Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Volume VI. The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*, edited by French, Peter A., Uehling Jr., Theodore E. and Wettstein, Howard K., 3-16. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
"Franz Brentano's conception of philosophical analysis is illustrated by his analysis of our consciousness of time. The analysandum is not a linguistic expression or a concept; it is an experience of a certain sort. Hence the analysis might be called "phenomenological," but Brentano prefers to say it is a matter of "descriptive psychology."
An analysis of our consciousness of time is not, of course, an analysis of time. Hence Brentano's analysis is consistent with a number of different conceptions of time. But it does presuppose that tense is to be taken seriously. In other words, Brentano does not accept the philosophical view, advocated by many contemporary philosophers of science, according to which distinctions of tense are merely "subjective" or otherwise "illusory." Nor does he believe that all truths can be expressed in untensed sentences.
I shall begin by formulating what Brentano takes to be a fundamental problem of descriptive psychology -- that of accurately describing our awareness of temporal succession. Then I shall set forth the development of his views with respect to this problem." (p. 3)
70. ———. 1982. *Brentano and Meinong Studies*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Contents: Foreword 1; 1. Brentano's Theory of Substance and Accident 3; 2. Brentano's Theory of Judgment 17; 3. Homeless Objects 37; 4. Beyond Being and Nonbeing 53; 5. Correct and Incorrect Emotion 68; 6. Objectives and Intrinsic Value 80; 7. The Quality of Pleasure and Displeasure 92; 8. Supererogation and Offence 98; 9. Beginnings and Endings 114-124.
"I present these papers on Brentano and Meinong in the hope that they will lead the reader back to the original sources. Some of the papers are expositions and

commentaries. Others are developments of certain suggestions first made by Brentano or by Meinong.

The first two papers are concerned with the basic presuppositions of Brentano's theoretical philosophy. "Brentano's Theory of Substance and Accident" was presented to the Congress on the Philosophy of Franz Brentano held in Graz in September 1977; it first appeared in the *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, Vol. V (1978). The second paper - "Brentano's Theory of Judgment" - has not been published before; but a preliminary version of part of it, entitled "Brentano's Nonpropositional Theory of Judgment," appeared in the *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I (1976). It should be noted that Brentano's *Kategorienlehre*, to which many references are made in these two papers, has now been translated into English as *The Theory of Categories*, The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff 1981.

(...)

The four papers that follow are concerned with the theory of value, as it had been conceived by Brentano and developed by Meinong. "Correct and Incorrect Emotion" and "The Quality of Pleasure and Displeasure" are both adapted from "Brentano's Theory of Correct and Incorrect Emotion," which first appeared in the Brentano issue of the *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, Vol. 20 (1966).

(...)

The final paper - "Beginnings and Endings" - is a revision of a paper entitled "Brentano als analytischer Metaphysiker," which first appeared in the special volume of *Conceptus* entitled *Österreichische Philosophie und ihr Einfluss auf die analytische Philosophie der Gegenwart*, Jg. XI (1977), Nr. 28-30, pp. 77-82. A later version appeared in *Time and Cause*, edited by Peter Van Inwagen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), pp. 17-25. It has been revised once again for the present volume. I hope that these essays will be thought of as carrying out the tradition of the Brentano school." (From the *Foreword*).

71. ———. 1982. "Brentano's Theory of Judgment." In *Brentano and Meinong Studies*, 17-36. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"Introduction. In the final reistic phase of his thought Brentano rejects such *entia irrationalia* as propositions, Judgmental contents, and states of affairs, and he develops what may be called a "nonpropositional theory of judgment". It is normally supposed that a nonpropositional theory of judgment cannot possibly be made adequate to so-called compound judgments. I shall attempt to show that this supposition is false.

The two essential features of Brentano's theory of judgment are these: (1) that there are two irreducibly different types of judgment, one affirmative and the other negative; and (2) that the only terms needed in the formulation of such judgments are terms that a reist could countenance as being genuine." (p. 17)

72. ———. 1983. "Boundaries as Dependent Particulars." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 20:87-95.

"Introduction

Stephan Körner has noted that one way of drawing up a theory of categories will divide all particulars "into (a) a class of independent particulars, i.e. particulars which are ontologically fundamental, and (b) a class of dependent particulars, i.e. particulars which are not ontologically fundamental."(1) The dependent particulars might be said to be "parasitical upon" the fundamental particulars.

I shall here discuss the nature of spatial boundaries, viewing them as dependent particulars." (p. 87)

(1) Stephan Körner, *Categorical Frameworks*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970, p. 4.

73. ———. 1986. *Brentano and Intrinsic Value*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Editors' introduction IX; Acknowledgments XIII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Thought and its objects 9; 3. The phenomena of love and hate 17; 4. Correct judgment 33; 5. Correct emotion 47; 6. The hierarchy of values 59; 7. Organic unities 69; 8. Evil 91; Index 103.

- "The psychological approach to the theory of value.
I have tried to do two things in this book. The first is to set forth Franz Brentano's theory of value within the context of the remarkable philosophical system that he worked out.
And the second is to develop in further detail some of his more suggestive insights about the nature of intrinsic value.
My concern, for the most part, has been with exposition and clarification and not with criticism.
Much of Brentano's philosophy is based upon psychological considerations. The most important of these, as far as the theory of value is concerned, is his conception of the analogies that hold between intellectual and emotive phenomena." (p. 1)
74. ———. 1987. "Brentano and One-Sided Detachability." *Conceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie* no. 21:153-159.
75. ———. 1987. "Brentano's theory of pleasure and pain." *Topoi* no. 6:59-64.
"In one of their uses, the words "pleasure" and "pain" designate *sense qualities* of a certain sort. When they are used in this way, then "pleasure" may be said to designate one type of sense *content* and "pain" may be said to designate another. But in another of their uses, "pleasure" and "pain" designate certain types of mental act and not sensory contents. I can say "I am pleased that you are well" or "I am displeased about the bad news". In this case my statement may express an intentional attitude comparable to belief and desire.
What is the relation, then, between *sensory* pleasure and pain, on the one hand, and *non-sensory*, or *intentional*, pleasure and pain on the other? Are they simply two different types of phenomena that happen to have the same name? Or is there a sense in which both can be said to be subspecies of more generic types of pleasure and pain? These are among the basic philosophical questions of the theory of pleasure and pain. They present a problem, therefore, for descriptive psychology.(1)
The descriptive problem was clearly set forth by Stumpf in a lecture that was given in 1906 and published in the following year. Brentano's discussion of pleasure and pain in the *Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie* (1907) is essentially a commentary on Stumpf's lecture.(2)" (p. 59)
(1) Compare the general discussion by William Alston, in 'Pleasure', in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1967), Vol. VI, pp. 341-347.
(2) Carl Stumpf, 'Über Gefühlsempfindungen', *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, Band 44 (1907), pp. 1-49.
In a later article, Stumpf replies in detail to Brentano's criticisms; see 'Apologie der Gefühlsempfindungen', *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, Band 75 (1916), pp. 104-140.
76. ———. 1989. "The objects of sensation: a Brentano study." *Topoi* no. 8:3-8.
"Introduction
The objects of sensation -- that is to say, such things as sense-qualities, sense-data, or phenomena -- continue to be what Meinong had called "homeless objects (heimatlose Gegenstände)". (1) Investigators cannot agree as to what kind of things they are and they cannot even agree as to whether there are such things. I will try to show in this paper that Brentano's final view about them tells us just what they are and what kind of a home they have.
To explicate Brentano's view, I will begin, as he did in the *Psychology*, by considering the nature of the psychological.
For I think we can do what he wanted to do -- namely, to find a mark that is peculiar to what is psychological.
I assume, as he did, that we can agree pre-analytically about *what* things are psychological. All of our psychological properties are properties that include the property of *thinking*. Examples of such properties are judging, wishing, hoping and desiring. And the property of sensing -- the property of having a sensation -- is also a psychological property.

- Let us first consider the kinds of thing that can have psychological properties." (p. 3)
- (1) In "Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften" (1907); see Meinong *Gesamtausgabe* Band V, eds. Rudolf Hailer, Rudolf Kindinger and Roderick M. Chisholm, Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1975, pp. 214--220.
77. ———. 1991. "The formal structure of the Intentional: A metaphysical Study." *Brentano Studien* no. 3:11-18.
 Abstract: "What is the metaphysical significance of what Brentano has shown us about intentionality? It is the fact that intentional phenomena have logical or structural features that are not shared by what is not psychological. It was typical of British empiricism, particularly that of Hume, to suppose that consciousness is essentially sensible. The objects of consciousness were thought to be primarily such objects as sensations and their imagined or dreamed counterparts. In the *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, Brentano makes clear that intentional phenomena need not be sensible. He is aware that, even if intentional phenomena are always accompanied by sensible or sensational phenomena, they are not themselves sensational or sensible phenomena. And the presence of certain intentional attitudes is at least as certain and indubitable for us as is the presence of our sensations. If I make a certain judgment or ask myself a certain question, then I can know directly and immediately that I make that judgment or ask that question. (This is not to say, of course, that every intentional attitude may be the object of such certainty. Perhaps there is a sense in which you may be said to like or to dislike a certain thing without realizing that you like or dislike that thing.) If I can know directly and immediately that I am making a certain judgment, then, I can know what it is to make such a judgment. And if I know what it is to make a judgment, then, in making the judgment I can know directly and immediately that there is a certain individual thing - namely, the one who makes the judgment. And I, of course, am the one who makes my judgments and does my thinking. The same is true, obviously, of my other intentional activities - such activities as wondering, fearing, hoping, desiring, considering, liking and disliking."
78. ———. 1993. "Spatial continuity and the theory of part and whole. A Brentano study." *Brentano Studien* no. 4:11-24.
 "The concepts of a spatially continuous substance, of spatial dimension and of spatial boundary are here "analyzed out" of the concepts of individual thing, of constituent and of coincidence. The analysis is based upon the theory of spatial coincidence that was developed by Brentano. Its presuppositions are essentially these: (1) if there are spatial objects of any kind, then there are continuous spatial substances. (2) such substances are possibly such that they are not constituents of any individual thing; and (3) they contain constituents (namely, boundaries) which are necessarily such that they are constituents of spatial substances."
79. ———. 1993. "Brentano on "Unconscious Consciousness"." In *Consciousness, Knowledge, and Truth: Essays in Honour of Jan Srzednicki*, edited by Poli, Roberto, 153-160. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 "Introduction
 In his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Franz Brentano sets forth a theory of consciousness which implies (i) that every mental state includes an awareness of the subject of that state. (ii) that every mental state is itself an object of consciousness and (iii) that there are no unconscious mental states. Brentano's views on these matters, it seems to me, are of first importance. Many of Brentano's critics have felt that they involve insuperable difficulties. In the present essay, I will attempt to put these views as clearly as possible and to suggest how Brentano might deal with some of the criticisms that have been made.
 I will discuss three questions: (1) Does Brentano's concept of a "secondary" object lead to a regress? (2) Is every mental act an object of an evident judgement? And (3) are there unconscious mental states?" (p. 153)

80. Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 2003. "Brentano's Late Ontology." *Brentano Studien* no. 10:221-236.
 Abstract: "In the present paper I want to give an interpretation of Brentano's late, nominalistic ontology. There are two aspects of this theory: the conception of individual properties containing their substances, presented mainly in the fragments collected in Brentano's *Theory of Categories* and the conceptualistic reduction virtually involved in Brentano's definition of truth."
81. ———. 2013. "Brentano and Aristotle on the Ontology of Intentionality." In *Themes from Brentano*, edited by Fissette, Denis and Fréchette, Guillaume, 121-137. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
 "It is often claimed that Brentano's rediscovery of intentionality has been strongly influenced by Aristotle. Brentano himself stressed repeatedly his affinity to Aristotle(1) and this self-interpretation was by no means restricted to the theory of intentionality. In fact, Brentano seemed to believe that almost all of what he had discovered during his most influential years (1874–1895) has its more or less remote roots in the philosophy of Aristotle.(2) Yet if we carefully compare the picture of intentionality that is to be found in Aristotle's *De Anima* with Brentano's theory of immanent objects, we find more differences than similarities. The truth is that Brentano developed a quite different ontology of intentionality, and his references to Aristotle should be seen as a conventional homage to his master rather than as something of substance that could help us to understand better Brentano's own theory. What Brentano in fact took from Aristotle was rather his way of doing philosophy and certain isolated ideas, but certainly not theories in their entirety.(3)" (p. 121)
 (1) Cf. e.g. Brentano (1874/1924, 124f.); Brentano (1982, 26).
 (2) Cf. e.g. his frequently cited letter, in Brentano (1977, 291).
 (3) This is true even of Brentano's early metaphysics, as developed in his *Lectures on Metaphysics* from 1867 (manuscript M 96). Cf. Chrudzimski (2004, ch. 3) and Chrudzimski and Smith (2004, 197-204).
 References
 Brentano, F. 1874/1924. *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* vol. I. ed. by O. Kraus, Leipzig: Meiner [1st ed. 1874].
 ——— 1891/1982. *Deskriptive Psychologie*, ed. by Roderick M. Chisholm and Wilhelm Baumgartner, Hamburg: Meiner.
 ——— 1977. *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen*. Hamburg: Meiner.
 Chrudzimski, A. 2004. *Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
 Chrudzimski, A. and B. Smith. 2004. 'Brentano's Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism' in: D. Jacquette, (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 197–219.
82. ———. 2015. "Intentional Objects and Mental Contents." *Brentano Studien* no. 13:81-119.
 Abstract: "In this paper I present a sketch of a theory of intentionality introducing special entities called intentional objects. Elaborated theories of this kind can be found in the works of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. Nowadays those philosophers who are sympathetic to intentional objects are accused of planting an ontological jungle. All the problems of the theory of intentionality, it is claimed, can be resolved within the framework of a theory assuming a much more parsimonious ontology, like the theory of mental content proposed by the early Husserl or the so-called "adverbial" theory of intentionality. However, I show that the competitors of the theory of intentional objects face serious difficulties, the most important being that within their framework the relation between the representing entity (mental content or "adverbially specified" mental property of the subject) and the external target object has to be construed as primitive, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined. The consequence is that the partisans of mental contents and adverbialists are forced to require a distinguished kind of epistemic access not only to the representing entity but also to this "representing relation".

- This consequence, which is very seldom made explicit, seems indeed to be fatal. Intentional objects appear in this light not as products of an ontological extravagance but instead as entities that are indispensable, if we are to be able to explain the phenomenon of intentionality at all. Moreover, it turns out that we gain nothing if we introduce mental contents in addition to intentional objects. The approach to intentionality that I finally advocate postulates an external relation between a conscious subject and an intentional object, and is thus at bottom Brentanian."
83. Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, and Lukasiewicz, Dariusz, eds. 2006. *Actions, Products, and Things: Brentano and Polish Philosophy*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. Contents: Introduction 7; Dale Jacquette: Twardowski, Brentano's dilemma, and the content-object distinction 9; Maria van der Schaar: On the ambiguities of the term Judgement: an evaluation of Twardowski's distinction between action and product 35; Arianna Betti: The strange case of Savonarola and the painted fish: on the Bolzanization of Polish thought 55, Peter Simons: Things and truths: Brentano and Lesniewski, ontology and logic 83; Arkadiusz Chrudzimski: The young Lesniewski on existential propositions 107; Barry Smith: On the phases of Reism 107; Dariusz Lukasiewicz: Brentanian philosophy and Czezowski's conception of existence 183; Jan Wolenski: Brentanism and the rise of formal semantics 217; Notes on contributors 233; Index of names 235.
84. Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, and Smith, Barry. 2004. "Brentano's ontology: from conceptualism to reism." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 197-220. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. "It is often claimed that the beginnings of Brentano's ontology were Aristotelian in nature; but this claim is only partially true. Certainly the young Brentano adopted many elements of Aristotle's metaphysics, and he was deeply influenced by the Aristotelian way of doing philosophy. But he always interpreted Aristotle's ideas in his own fashion. He accepted them selectively, and he used them in the service of ends that would not have been welcomed by Aristotle himself. The present paper is an exposition of the development of Brentano's ontology, beginning with the *Lectures on Metaphysics* first delivered by Brentano in Würzburg in 1867 and concluding with his late work from 1904-17." (p. 197)
85. Cosci, Matteo. 2023. "Brentano and Hillebrand on Syllogism: Development and Reception of the 'Idiogenetic' Theory." In *Aristotle's Syllogism and the Creation of Modern Logic: Between Tradition and Innovation, 1820s-1930s*, edited by Verburgt, Lukas M. and Cosci, Matteo, 129-163. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. "The seventh chapter presents Franz Brentano and Franz Hillebrand's 'idiogenetic theory', a post-scholastic type of syllogistic theory involving acts of judging which were regarded as belonging as such to a special genus (*idios genos*) of psychical phenomena. The logical traits of the theory were first put forward by Brentano in his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874, first ed.) and then formally presented in Hillebrand's *Die neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse* (1891). The most novel aspect of the theory was that all judgements were restated in existential form as single-membered assertions, or rejections, whose subject and predicate could be simpliciter converted. The proposal provoked numerous reactions. Particularly the last part of Hillebrand's system, namely the extension about 'double judgments' (existential and predicative judgments bound together), was criticized by Husserl and Meinong, among others. But it also received active support from Brentano's student Anton Marty. In his chapter, Matteo Cosci recalls the Leibnizian antecedent that showed the character of supposition of the existential import holding in the traditional square of oppositions. That assumption was a matter of concern for Brentano, who may have been aware of its formulation (possibly via Leibniz's *Difficultates Quaedam Logicae*) in the process of developing his own reform of syllogistic on new, intentionalistic grounds. Aside from its intrinsic merits and originality, Brentano and Hillebrand's 'idiogenetic theory' had a considerable impact in the fields of descriptive psychology, analytic

- philosophy and early phenomenology towards the end of the century – not to mention its relevance for the great current in logic inaugurated by Kazimierz Twardowski, prominent student of Brentano and the standard-bearer of his reform in Poland at the beginning of the twentieth century." (*Introduction*, p. 7)
86. Crane, Tim. 2006. "Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence." In *The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy*, edited by Textor, Mark, 20-35. New York: Routledge.
Reprinted in: T. Crane, *Aspects of Psychologism*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2013, pp. 25-39.
"First I will attempt to expound Brentano's concept of intentional inexistence in its original 1874 context. This will enable us to eliminate some of the relatively superficial misunderstandings alluded to above.
Then I will outline Brentano's change of mind when he later came to write the appendices to his 1874 *Psychology*. Although any reasonably careful reading of the text will show that Brentano did in fact change his mind, it is not always clearly recognised in the discussions of Brentano's thesis what it is that he changed it from. Third I will show how the tension between his earlier view and the later view of the appendices is in fact the tension which is responsible for the problem of intentionality as we have it today." (p. 20)
87. Curvello, Flávio Vieira. 2016. "Franz Brentano's Mereology and the Principles of Descriptive Psychology." *Dialogue and Universalism* no. 26:109-123.
Abstract: I analyse Brentano's argumentative strategy from his lectures in the *Deskriptive Psychologie* and how he introduces and reframes his fundamental psychological theses. His approach provides us with the reasons why psychology can be distinguished into different domains of investigation and how the tasks of one of these domains the descriptive-psychological one imply a specific understanding about the structure of consciousness. Thereby a mereology of consciousness is developed, which offers the theoretical background to the aforementioned reframing of the Brentanian theses."
88. ———. 2021. "Brentano on scientific philosophy and positivism." *Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy* no. 62:657-679.
Abstract: "In this paper, I analyze Brentano's fourth habilitation thesis, according to which the philosophical method should be none other than the natural scientific one.
The meaning of this thesis can be initially assessed through an examination of Brentano's views on the relationship between natural and human sciences. His arguments for methodological unity in this debate show that he actually argues for an overarching idea of scientific knowledge, which is not restricted to the fields already recognized as scientific, but which can also be applied to philosophical domain. A fuller comprehension of that idea is provided by Brentano's writings on Comte's positivism."
89. Dainton, Barry. 2017. "Brentano on Phenomenal Unity and Holism." *Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger* no. 142:513-528.
"To provide anything approaching a complete picture of what Brentano is offering us here would mean engaging with some of the most distinctive (and inevitably) controversial aspects of his philosophy: the nature of "real unities" and "inner perception", for example.
I shall be touching on some aspects of these issues, albeit briefly, later on. For now I want to focus on just one important and distinctive element of his position.
Returning to our total experience E, according to Brentano its constituents parts, e1, e2, e3 and e4 are phenomenally unified if and only if they are experienced by us as occurring together (or "inwardly perceived as existing together" as he puts it).
Whereas Descartes appealed to co-instantiation within a substance to explain the unity of consciousness, Brentano appeals to a phenomenal relationship: contents or

- objects are unified in consciousness if they are experienced as existing together. Let us say (for obvious reasons) that experiences related in this way are *co-conscious*."
90. de Boer, Theodorus. 1976. "The Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano: Its Two Functions and Their Significance for Phenomenology." In *The Philosophy of Brentano*, edited by McAlister, Linda Lopez, 101-107. London: Duckworth. Translated from the German by Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schättle. Reprinted from the *Proceedings of the XIVth International Congress of Philosophy*, 2—9 September 1968 (Vienna, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 191-9.
 "When Brentano published his lecture *The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*(2) in 1889, he wrote in the foreword that 'this work will develop some of the views that there set forth in my *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* and will differ in fundamental respects from everything that has previously been said upon the subject. My readers will then be able to see, I hope, that I have not been idle during the long period of my literary retirement.' There had, in fact, taken place an important change in Brentano's thought during the period between 1874 and 1889. We would like to take this opportunity to direct attention to this and to ask in how far it signifies a further elaboration, a correction, or perhaps even a renunciation of his earlier views. This change in his views is reflected in the position that is now assigned to descriptive psychology. In 1874 it had only a subordinate function: it served as a preliminary for genetic psychology. All this is in line with the natural scientific character of Brentano's philosophy. In 1866 he had defended the well-known thesis, 'The true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences'." (p. 101)
 (...)
 "But by 1889 descriptive psychology had become an independent, autonomous science. The reason for this is the new function that it had acquired in the meantime - that of providing the foundations for the universally valid laws of the normative sciences: logic, aesthetics, and ethics. This is not psychologism, as Chisholm rightly points out, for Brentano strongly opposes the very attempt to make empirical generalisations the basis of apodictic laws for these sciences." (p. 102)
 (2). Trans. Roderick M. Chisholm (London and New York, 1969).
91. Dewalque, Arnaud. 2013. "Brentano and the parts of the mental: a mereological approach to phenomenal intentionality." *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* no. 12:447-464.
 Abstract: "In this paper, I explore one particular dimension of Brentano's legacy, namely, his theory of mental analysis. This theory has received much less attention in recent literature than the intentionality thesis or the theory of inner perception. However, I argue that it provides us with substantive resources in order to conceptualize the unity of intentionality and phenomenality. My proposal is to think of the connection between intentionality and phenomenality as a certain combination of part/whole relations rather than as a supervenience or identity relation. To begin, I discuss some reasons for being a (neo-)Brentanian about the mind and briefly introduce the main characteristics of Brentano's internalist description program. Then, I turn to the current "inseparatist" way of dealing with intentionality and phenomenality, focusing on the demand for unity coming from advocates of phenomenal intentionality. I suggest that the unity of the mind may be put in a new light if we put aside metaphysical–epistemological questions, go back to Brentano's description program, and endorse his thesis that the mental is something unified in which various parts must be distinguished. In the last section, I draw some lessons from this approach, holding that, for any representational content *R*, *R* is (in Brentano's terms) an abstractive or "distinctional" part of the relevant state and that, for any qualitative aspect *Q*, *Q* is an abstractive or "distinctional" part of the relevant representational content *R*."
92. ———. 2013. "Schema of the Brentano School intellectual progeny." *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* no. 12:445.

- Abstract: "This schema gives an overview of the main branches and key members of the school of the German philosopher Franz Brentano (1838–1917)."
93. ———. 2018. "Natural Classes in Brentano's Psychology." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:111-142.
 Abstract: "This article argues that Brentano's classification of mental phenomena is best understood against the background of the theories of natural classification held by Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. Section 1 offers a reconstruction of Brentano's two-premise argument for his tripartite classification. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the reception and historical background of the classification project. Section 3 addresses the question as to why a classification of mental phenomena is needed at all and traces the answer back to Mill's view that psychological laws are class-specific. Sections 4 and 5 connect the second premise of Brentano's argument to Comte's principle of comparative likeness and Mill's insistence that class membership is determined by the possession of common characteristics. And section 6 briefly discusses the evidence Brentano provides for the first premise."
94. ———. 2019. "Brentano's Case for Optimism." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* no. 111:835-847.
 Abstract: "Call *metaphysical optimism* the view that this world is the best of all possible worlds. This article addresses Franz Brentano's case for metaphysical optimism. I argue that, although Brentano does not offer any conclusive argument in favour of the latter, he disentangles many related issues which are interesting in their own right. The article has five sections corresponding to five claims, which I argue are central to Brentano's view, namely: (§1) metaphysical optimism is best spelled out as the view that this world is the only good among all possible worlds; (§2) the notion of "correct"—or "fitting"—love offers a criterion of the good and the *test of inverted love* offers a means to identify that which is good; (§3) pessimism has to be distinguished from *pejorism*, viz. the view that the non-existence of this world is preferable to its existence; (§4) there is something good involved in every "bad" thing, to the effect that pejorism is false; (§5) it is wrong to consider the value of something in isolation."
95. ———. 2020. "The Phenomenology of Mentality." In *Franz Brentano's Philosophy after Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism*, edited by Fiset, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Janoušek, Hynek, 23-40. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
 Abstract: "This paper offers a phenomenological interpretation of Brentano's view of mentality. The key idea is that mental phenomena are not only characterized by intentionality; they also exhibit a distinctive way of appearing or being experienced. In short, they also have a distinctive phenomenology. I argue this view may be traced back to Brentano's theory of inner perception (henceforth, IP). Challenging the self-representational reading of IP, I maintain the latter is best understood as a way of appearing, that is, in phenomenological terms. Section 2 addresses Brentano's claim that IP is one mark of the mental alongside intentionality. Sections 3 and 4 present support for a phenomenological interpretation of IP. And Section 5 briefly discusses two objections."
96. ———. 2021. "Misleading Expressions: The Brentano-Ryle Connection." In *Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School: Reassessing the Brentanian Legacy*, edited by Dewalque, Arnaud, Gauvry, Charlotte and Sébastien, Richard, 95-118. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan.
 "Some linguistic expressions are misleading in the sense that they look as if they are about something while they actually are about something else. In this chapter I argue that Gilbert Ryle's account of misleading expressions, which is rightly considered a milestone in the history of analytic philosophy, is continuous with Brentano's critique of language. Not only did they identify roughly the same classes of misleading expressions, but their analyses are driven by a form of

- ontological parsimony which sharply contrasts with rival views in the Brentano School, like those of Meinong and Husserl. It is true that Brentano's account, unlike Ryle's, is put in terms of underlying mental phenomena. However, this difference, I submit, is mainly terminological and does not reflect any substantial disagreement. The chapter has four sections. Section 1 ('Analysis') suggests that Ryle and Brentano share a similar notion of analysis as paraphrase of misleading expressions. Section 2 ('Two Senses of "About"') spells out the notion of misleading expression by means of the surface-grammar/truth-conditions distinction, which I argue is implicit in their accounts. Section 3 ('*Ficta*') zooms in on a specific class of misleading expressions, namely expressions about *ficta*. Finally, Sect. 4 ('A Moral About the Meaning of "Meaning"') draws the consequences of what precedes for a correct understanding of the notion of meaning." (pp. 95-96)
97. ———. 2021. "The Occamization of 'Meaning': Ryle and Brentano." *Logique & Analyse* no. 256:511-532.
Abstract: "To Occamize a nominal expression *N* is to show that, despite grammatical appearances, *N* does not name, or denote, an entity. This article argues that the Occamization of 'meaning,' which was central to Gilbert Ryle's metaphilosophy, had already been advanced by Franz Brentano. The core thesis of the article is that Brentano's notion of 'content,' albeit different from that of linguistic rules, does a similar job of eliminating expendable entities. If the meaning of a linguistic expression is not an entity at all, then the question as to what kind of entity it is—what I shall call *the Locke-Frege problem*—turns out to be a pseudo-problem and is better dispensed with."
98. ———. 2023. "On noticing transparent states: A compatibilist approach to transparency." *European Journal of Philosophy*:398-412.
Abstract: "According to the transparency thesis, some conscious states are transparent or "diaphanous". This thesis is often believed to be incompatible with an inner-awareness account of phenomenal consciousness. In this article, I reject this incompatibility. Instead, I defend a compatibilist approach to transparency. To date, most attempts to do so require a rejection of *strong transparency* in favor of *weak transparency*. In this view, transparent states can be attended to by attending (in the right way) to the presented world: that is, they are merely *translucent*. Here, I first argue that this understanding of transparency is too weak to qualify as a compatibilist view. Drawing on insights from Franz Brentano, I then describe a middle road between strong and weak transparency. The crucial idea is that, although transparent states cannot be attended to, they can be noticed (under suitable conditions). This view, I submit, allows supporters of inner awareness to commit themselves to a more interesting understanding of transparency—*moderate transparency*—that preserves the initial intuition underlying the transparency metaphor."
99. Dewalque, Arnaud, Gauvry, Charlotte, and Richard, Sébastien, eds. 2021. *Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School: Reassessing the Brentanian Legacy*. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave-Macmillan.
Contents: 1. Arnaud Dewalque, Charlotte Gauvry, and Sébastien Richard: Introduction: Mind, Meaning and Reality 1
Part I Brentano and Philosophy of Language 33
2. Guillaume Fréchette: The Context Principle in Austro-German Philosophy 35; 3. Charlotte Gauvry: A Context Principle in Brentano? 57; 4. Denis Seron: Brentano and Mauthner on Grammatical Illusions 77; 5. Arnaud Dewalque: Misleading Expressions: The Brentano-Ryle Connection 95; 6. Héléne Leblanc: Sign and Language in Anton Marty: Before and after Brentano 119;
Part II The Brentano School: Act, Meaning and Object 141
7. Sébastien Richard: De Significatione: The Brentano-Ingarden Axis 143; 8. Olivier Malherbe: Meaning(s) in Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Language 169;

9. Denis Fiset: Overcoming Psychologism: Twardowski on Actions and Products 189; 10. Bruno Leclercq: Is the Content-Object Distinction Universally Valid? Meaning and Reference in Twardowski and Meinong 207; 11. Jan Woleński: Extensionality/Intensionality in Polish Philosophy of Language: From Twardowski to Ajdukiewicz 227;
Part III Brentano's Wider Legacy 243
12. Maria van der Schaar: Modifying Terms and Modification in Husserl and the Brentano School 245; 13. Hamid Taieb: The Early Husserl on Typicality 263; 14. Basil Vassilicos: Wundt and Bühler on Gestural Expression: From Psycho-Physical Mirroring to the Diacrisis 279; 15 Kevin Mulligan: On Being Guided, Signals and Rules: From Bühler to Wittgenstein 299;
Index 317-322.
100. Drummond, John. 1998. "From Intentionality to Intensionality and back." *Études Phénoménologiques* no. 14:89-126.
101. Dubois, James. 1996. "Investigating Brentano's Reism." *Brentano Studien* no. 6:283-296.
102. Eaton, Howard Ormsby. 1930. *The Austrian Philosophy of Values*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Pres.
Chapter One: *Brentano's Empirical Psychology*, pp. 15-39.
"The concept of values had long been regarded as being rather incidental to metaphysics, or else to economics, ethics, aesthetics or some other of the many social sciences which made use of it. It had been rather taken for granted, and had been, consequently, almost completely neglected as a field of speculative or scientific investigation. The present study is an attempt to analyze in considerable detail the value theories of a small group of men in Austria who did their best to remedy that state of affairs. We designate this group as the Second Austrian School, hinting at their intimate relations with the first Austrian School of economic theory. The founders of this school were Franz Brentano, Alexius von Meinong, and Professor Christian von Ehrenfels, to whom we shall devote the major share of our attention.
This school is of significance because of its attempt to rescue the abstract concept of values as such from its Cinderella-like subordination in the households of the various social sciences and establish it in its rightful place as an independent and coordinate department of philosophic thought. Of course it is not possible to study values quite independently of the particular value sciences; a value which is neither economic, ethic, esthetic, nor any other of the specific types of value seems to be unthinkable. This does not mean that the study of values is open only to economists, or ethicists, or students of aesthetics.
It is becoming a matter of pressing concern to discover if there are any respects in which one can generalize concerning values simply qud values, regardless of metaphysical theory or connection with a social science." (p. 16)
103. Fano, Vincenzo. 1993. "The categories of consciousness: Brentano's epistemology." *Brentano Studien* no. 4:101-130.
Abstract: "The present investigation reformulates a few Brentanian ideas concerning what is mental. In particular, an attempt to define the categorial structure implicit in the notion of consciousness and in that of inner perception, keeping in mind their connections with external perception and with unconscious, is outlined. Within the mental field is observed a formal violation of some elementary rules of ontology and mereology, and such violation can be interpreted in terms of an infinite multiplicity of the mental field itself."
104. Farrell Krell, David. 1975. "On the Manifold Meaning of Aletheia: Brentano, Aristotle, Heidegger." *Research in Phenomenology* no. 5:77-94.
"In 1964 Heidegger cited as the persistent task of his thought the meaning of ἀλήθεια -no longer to be translated as "truth" but to be pondered as unconcealment or "the clearing that first grants Being and thinking and their presencing to and for

- each other."(4) Now one of the four senses ascribed to "being" in Brentano's dissertation on Aristotle is *ὄν ὡς ἀληθῆς* "being in the sense of the true." Does Brentano's account of "being in the sense of the true" have significant bearing on Heidegger's response to the matter of his thinking, i.e. *Aletheia* as the unconcealment of beings in presence? This brief study tries to answer that question by offering (I) a general account of Brentano's thesis, (II) a detailed resume of its third chapter, concerning *ὄν ὡς ἀληθῆς*, (III) a condensed treatment of Heidegger's aletheological notion of Being, and (IV) a summary of results and response to the question." (p. 79)
105. Fischer, Kurt Rudolf, and Miller, Leon R. 1976. "Notes on Terrell's "Brentano's logical innovations"." *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* no. 1:95-97.
 "The purpose of Professor Terrell's paper[*] is to bring to light some of the genuinely distinctive features of Brentano's logical innovations through the development of a 'Brentano-style' notation and formal system. This method enables him to achieve a standard of explicitness that is not to be found in the work of Brentano himself. The dangers inherent in such an approach are formidable; as many recent studies in the history of logic have amply demonstrated, the desire for formal clarity may easily result in a number of major distortions. Some inkling of the difficulty may be gleaned from Brentano's claim that existents are individuals, but that reflection about individuals is always general. In Professor Terrell's treatment, 'thinking' becomes 'reference,' and the terms of a Brentanist formal logic are, accordingly, general terms. These general terms are not functions constructed out of more primitive expressions, predicates and one or more individual expressions; they are primitives. As a result, the notion of substituting an individual constant for the variable in an expression such as 'Fx' is meaningless. Therefore, as Professor Terrell is well aware, any attempt to formalize Brentano's logical theory in the familiar notation of the first-order predicate calculus is doomed to failure. However, Professor Terrell's suggestions for surmounting these difficulties do not seem entirely successful." (pp. 95-96)
 [*] *Franz Brentano's Logical Innovations* (1976).
106. Fisette, Denis. 2015. "Franz Brentano and higher-order theories of consciousness." *Argumentos* no. 7:9-39.
 Abstract: "This article addresses the recent reception of Franz Brentano's writings on consciousness. I am particularly interested in the connection established between Brentano's theory of consciousness and higher-order theories of consciousness and, more specifically, the theory proposed by David Rosenthal. My working hypothesis is that despite the many similarities that can be established with Rosenthal's philosophy of mind, Brentano's theory of consciousness differs in many respects from higher-order theories of consciousness and avoids most of the criticisms generally directed to them. This article is divided into eight parts. The first two sections expound the basic outline of Rosenthal's theory, and the third summarizes the principal objections that Rosenthal addresses to Brentano, which I, then, examine in sections 4 and 5. In sections 6 and 7, I discuss Brentano's principle of the unity of consciousness, and in section 8, I consider the scope of the changes that Brentano brings to his theory of consciousness in his later writings, which follow the 1874 publication of *Psychology*. I then draw the conclusion that Brentano's theory rests on a view of intransitive and intrinsic self-consciousness."
107. ———. 2018. "Franz Brentano and Auguste Comte's Positive Philosophy." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:73-110.
 Abstract: "My aim in this study is to show that the philosophical program elaborated by Brentano in his *Psychology* is largely indebted to the research conducted by Brentano on British empiricism and Comte's positive philosophy during the Würzburg period (1866-1873). This research represents the starting point of, and backdrop to, the project for philosophy as science, which is at the heart of his *Psychology*, and sheds new light on the philosophical stakes of many debates he

- leads in that work. Furthermore, Brentano's research informs us about his philosophical preoccupations during the Würzburg period, and simultaneously provide us with a new perspective on the evolution of his thought from his habilitation at Würzburg in 1866 to his arrival in Vienna in 1874. In this study, I propose to examine some of the factors that motivated Brentano's interest in Comte's philosophy and to evaluate the influence that the latter exerted on Brentano's thought during the Würzburg period and beyond."
108. ———. 2019. "Brentano's Lectures on Positivism and His Relationship to Ernst Mach." In *Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence*, edited by Stadler, Friedrich, 39-50. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Abstract: "Franz Brentano's criticism of Mach in his lectures on Positivism (1893–1894)
This paper is mainly about Brentano's commentaries on Ernst Mach in his lectures "Contemporary philosophical questions" which he held one year before he left Austria. I will first identify the main sources of Brentano's early interests in positivism during his Würzburg period. The second section provides a short overview of Brentano's 1893–1894 lectures and his criticism of Comte, Kirchhoff, and Mill. The next sections bear on Brentano's criticism of Mach's monism and Brentano's argument, based on his theory of intentionality, against the identification of mental to physical phenomena. The last section is about Brentano's proposal to replace the identity relation in Mach's theory of elements by that of intentional correlation. I conclude with a remark on the history of philosophy in Austria."
109. ———. 2020. "Brentano and J. Stuart Mill on Phenomenalism and Mental Monism." In *Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy*, edited by Fisette, Denis, Fréchette, Guillaume and Stadler, Friedrich, 251-267. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Abstract: "This study is about Brentano's criticism of a version of phenomenalism that he calls "mental monism" and which he attributes to positivist philosophers such as Ernst Mach and John Stuart Mill. I am interested in Brentano's criticism of Mill's version of mental monism based on the idea of "permanent possibilities of sensation." Brentano claims that this form of monism is characterized by the identification of the class of physical phenomena with that of mental phenomena, and it commits itself to a form of idealism. Brentano argues instead for a form of indirect or hypothetical realism based on intentional correlations."
110. ———. 2020. "Introduction: Franz Brentano in Vienna." In *Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy*, edited by Fisette, Denis, Fréchette, Guillaume and Stadler, Friedrich, 3-21. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
"But all this recent interest in Brentano's philosophy cannot develop as much as many would like because, contrary to the writings of several of his students, including Husserl's, only a fraction of Brentano's writings is currently accessible to Brentano's actual and potential readers. And many of his writings that are accessible through the editions of O. Kraus, A. Kastil, and F. Mayer-Hillebrand present major problems because of the editorial policies that prevailed in their editions. This editorial work has to be done all over again because Brentano's writings have been systematically manipulated in order to promote Brentano's late philosophical views. (17)
Since 2008, the reedition of Brentano's works published during his lifetime has been undertaken by Ontos Verlag (now de Gruyter),(18) supplemented by original introductions. Needless to say, the publication of numerous manuscripts, dictations, seminars, lecture notes, or Brentano's abundant correspondence would greatly contribute to enhancing the contemporary interest in Brentano's work." (P. 6, a note omitted)
(17) Cf, Fisette/Fréchette (Eds.) (2013), *Themes from Brentano*, Section V, p. 359–418.
(18) Brentano (2008–2018), *Sämtliche veröffentlichte Schriften*, Berlin: De Gruyter.

111. ———. 2021. "Remarks on the Architecture of Brentano's Philosophical Program." In *The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller*, edited by Antonelli, Mauro and Binder, Thomas, 28-49. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.
 "This paper is about Brentano's philosophical program in Vienna and the overall architecture that holds together the main parts of his philosophy. My point of departure is the recent literature on the unity of Brentano's philosophy, which has sometimes been understood as a "system" in the spirit of Kant and his successors, for example. I am particularly interested in the research program that he began to develop during his stay in Würzburg and that he exhibited upon his arrival in Vienna, namely in his inaugural address at the University of Vienna (Brentano, 1929a) and in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*.
 (...)
 The aim of this study is to investigate, from a bird's eye view, the main articulations of Brentano's philosophical program." (p. 28, a note omitted)
112. Fisette, Denis, and Fréchette, Guillaume, eds. 2013. *Themes from Brentano*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
 Contents: Guillaume Fréchette: Introduction: Brentano's Impact 9.
 Consciousness. Brentanian and Neo-Brentanian Perspectives.
 Denis Fisette: Introduction; Uriah Kriegel: Brentano's Most Striking Thesis: No Representation Without Self-Representation 23; Johannes L. Brandl: What is Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness? Brentano's Theory of Inner Consciousness Revisited 41; Mark Textor: Unity Without Self: Brentano on the Unity of Consciousness 67; Varieties of Intentionality.
 Guillaume Fréchette: Introduction 87; Guillaume Fréchette: Brentano's Thesis (Revisited) 91; Arkadiusz Chrudzimski: Brentano and Aristotle on the Ontology of Intentionality 121; Laurent Cesalli: Anton Marty's Intentionalist Theory of Meaning 139; Matjaž Potrč: Phenomenology of Intentionality 165.
 Ontology and Metaphysics.
 Guillaume Fréchette: Introduction 189; Werner Sauer: Being as the True: From Aristotle to Brentano 193; Wilhelm Baumgartner: Franz Brentano's Mereology 227; Susan Gabriel: Brentano at the Intersection of Psychology, Ontology, and the Good 247.
 Critics and Heirs. The School of Brentano.
 Denis Fisette: Introduction 273; Denis Fisette: Mixed Feelings. Carl Stumpf's Criticism of James and Brentano on Emotions 281; Olivier Massin: The Intentionality of Pleasures and Other Feelings. A Brentanian Approach 307; Riccardo Martinelli: Brentano and Stumpf on Tonal Fusion 339.
 Expositions and Discussions. Selected Materials and Translations.
 Denis Fisette: Introduction 359; Thomas Binder: There and Back Again. An Updated History of Franz Brentano's Unpublished Papers 369; Franz Brentano: Abstraction and Relation, followed by Selected Letters to Marty 419; Guillaume Fréchette: Editorial Remarks: 421; Franz Brentano: Modern Errors concerning the Knowledge of the Laws of Inference 501; Franz Brentano: Moderne Irrthümer über die Erkenntnis der Gesetze des Schließens 513.
 Index of Names 525-530.
113. Fisette, Denis, Fréchette, Guillaume, and Janoušek, Hynek, eds. 2020. *Franz Brentano's Philosophy After One Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism*. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
 Contents: Denis Fisette, Guillaume Fréchette, and Hynek Janoušek: Preface V;
 Part I Descriptive Psychology and Philosophy of Mind
 1. Ingrid Vendrell Ferran: Brentano and the Birth of a New Paradigm in the Philosophy of Emotions 3; 2. Arnaud Dewalque: The Phenomenology of Mentality 23; 3. Denis Seron: Consciousness and Representation 41; 4. Maik Niemeck: Current Accounts of Subjective Character and Brentano's Concept of Secondary Consciousness 55;
 Part II Brentano and Husserl

5. Hynek Janoušek: Brentano's Theory of Time-Consciousness in Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* 75; 6. Hamid Taieb: Husserl on Brentanian Psychology: A Correct Criticism? 87; 7. : Brentano, Husserl and Psychological Immanence 109; Part III Ontology and Metaphysics. On Reism
8. Bruno Leclercq: Foundational Mereology as a Logical Tool for Descriptive Psychology 125; 9. Sébastien Richard: Are There Ideal Objects?: The Controversy Between Kotarbiński and Ingarden 149; 10. : Brentano on *entia rationis* and Linguistic Fictions 167;
- Part IV History of Philosophy
11. Venanzio Raspa: Brentano on Aristotle's *Categories* 185; 12. Emanuele Mariani: The Analogies of the Soul: Brentano, Aristotle and the Project of a Scientific Psychology 205; 13. Laurent Cesalli: Brentano as a Historian of (Medieval) Philosophy 221; 14 David Torrijos-Castrillejo: F.J. Clemens and Some Aspects of Neo-Scholasticism in the Education of F. Brentano 231; 15. Josef Hlade: Brentano and Brain Research in His Time: His Criticism of Theodor Meynert's Brain Theory 243;
- Appendix: *Ontologische Fragen/Ontological Questions: A Treatise from Franz Brentano's Manuscripts* 261; Franz Brentano - Edited and Translated by Robin Rollinger;
- Index 341-345.
114. Fisette, Denis, Fréchette, Guillaume, and Stadler, Friedrich, eds. 2021. *Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy*. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
- Contents: Part I Brentano and Austrian Philosophy
1. Denis Fisette: Introduction: Franz Brentano in Vienna 3; Descriptive Psychology and Phenomenology: Brentano and Husserl
2. Dagfinn Føllesdal: Brentano and Husserl on Intentionality 23; 3. David Woodruff Smith: Descriptive Psychology and Phenomenology: From Brentano to Husserl to the Logic of Consciousness 49; 4. Dermot Moran: Brentano's Concept of Descriptive Psychology 73; 5. Guillaume Fréchette: Brentano on Phenomenology and Philosophy as a Science 101;
- Brentano and the Vienna Circle
6. Hans-Joachim Dahms: Brentano's Appointment to the University of Vienna 117; 7. Thomas Uebel: Intentionality in the Vienna Circle 135; 8. Christian Damböck: (Dis-)Similarities: Remarks on "Austrian" and "German" Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century 169;
- Brentano and the History of Philosophy
9. Richard Schaefer: Learning from Lasaulx: The Origins of Brentano's Four Phases Theory 181; 10. Anna Brożek: Franz Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School 197; 11. Mark Textor: How Many Terms Does a Judgement Have? Jerusalem Versus Brentano 235; 12. Denis Fisette: Brentano and J. Stuart Mill on Phenomenalism and Mental Monism 251;
- Documentation: Alfred Kastil and the Vienna Circle
13. Alfred Kastil: Ist die Unterscheidung von Ganzheit und Summe eine sachliche? Bemerkungen zum Vortrage Prof. Schlicks „Über den Begriff der Ganzheit“ 269; 14. Alfred Kastil: Franz Brentanos Kritik der Antimetaphysiker 289; 15. Moritz Schlick: Gestaltpsychologie 309;
- Part II General Part
16. David J. Chalmers: Carnap's Second *Aufbau* and David Lewis's *Aufbau* 329; 17. Gergely Ambrus: Carnap and Wittgenstein on Psychological Sentences: 1928–1932. Some Further Aspects of the Priority-Dispute Over Physicalism 353; 18. Markus Arnold: Scientific Communities. A History of Theories and Concepts 387;
- Part III Reviews
19. Georg Schiemer: Paolo Mancosu, *Abstraction and Infinity*. Oxford University Press, 2016 427; 20. Christopher Burke: Jordi Cat, Adam Tamas Tuboly (Ed.) *Neurath Reconsidered: New Sources and Perspectives*. Cham: Springer Nature, 2019 431;

Index 437-441

115. Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1978. "Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:83-94.
Reprinted in: Hubert Dreyfus (ed.), *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982, pp. 31-41.
"In order to shed some light upon the relationship between Brentano and Husserl, I shall discuss briefly their views on intentional objects and on perception. I have chosen to focus my comments on these two themes partly because they were central to their relationship and partly because they are also interconnected in a certain way that we shall look at. I will begin by saying a little about Brentano's views on intentionality. These views have been mentioned several times in the earlier papers of this meeting, and they will probably be brought up again in many of the later papers. I will then explain how Husserl tried to solve these problems. Afterwards I will go on to discuss some features of Brentano's view on perception, and I will finally show how Husserl here too starts out from Brentano, but modifies Brentano's ideas in such a way as to create a really quite different theory." (p. 83)
116. ———. 2020. "Brentano and Husserl on Intentionality." In *Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy*, edited by Fisette, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Stadler, Friedrich, 23-48. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Abstract: "Brentano's lectures attracted a large number of very gifted students who became fascinated with the idea of intentionality and developed it further in several different directions. Brentano followed up Aristotle's view on our mind taking on the form of the object and he was particularly influenced by Thomas Aquinas' approach. His students struggled with how to deal with acts without objects, for example hallucinations, and proposed different solutions. Husserl tried to agree with his teacher as far as he could. He even regarded agreement with one's teacher as a duty, which could only be forsaken for very good reasons. But he thought he had such reasons. These led him to phenomenology, which is briefly presented in this paper. In a short appendix I use the connection between Aristotle and Husserl to examine the controversy between two prominent Aristotle scholars, Myles Burnyeat (1992) and Richard Sorabji (1974, 1992), and their many followers on both sides concerning the interpretation of Aristotle's theory of perception. The appendix was presented in lectures at conferences in 1995 and 1996, but never sent off for publication.
It was published in Greek translation in 1997. In the following years, Burnyeat, who died on September 20, 2019, modified his view, probably without knowing about my criticism. As far as I know, Sorabji stands by his view."
References
Burnyeat, Myles. 1992. Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft). In *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. M. Nussbaum and A. Rorty, 15–26. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sorabji, Richard. 1974. Body and soul in Aristotle. In *Philosophy* 49, pp 63–89. Here quoted from the reprint in Michael Durrant, (Ed.), *Aristotle's De Anima in focus*, London: Routledge, 1993.
———. 1991. From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, Supplementary volume, pp. 227–259.
117. Fréchette, Guillaume. 2011. "Leibniz and Brentano on Apperception." In *Natur und Subjekt. Vorträge 1. Teil, Proceedings of the ninth international Leibniz Congress, Hannover 2011*, edited by Breger, H., Herbst, J. and Erdner, S., 351-359. Hannover: Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-Gesellschaft.
"Whereas Leibniz is often seen as defending a traditional HOT-theory[*], Brentano is often believed to be offering a viable alternative, within the framework of HOT-theories, to the assumption that first-order and second order acts are distinct existences without compromising the core idea of HOT-theories, namely that the

explanation of phenomenal consciousness to be reached rests on the cognitive level and not on

the sensory level of our experience.

One might, however, wonder how one single strategy concerning the explanation of consciousness relies on two philosophers who are in disagreement regarding consciousness.

Brentano and Leibniz have indeed different views concerning the nature of perception as well as different views concerning the nature of consciousness and the possibility of unconscious perceptions. In this paper, I will address some of the difficulties of both these strategies by comparing Leibniz's and Brentano's concepts of apperception (*Bewußtsein* or *inneres Bewußtsein* in Brentano's language). The view adopted here is quite wide. Due to shortage of space, I will have to put aside the numerous debates in the contemporary literature on Leibniz concerning the various meanings of apperception in his writings. In my view, both Leibniz's and Brentano's accounts of apperception are, as they stand, unsatisfactory regarding their contribution to a HOT-theory. In order to show this in more details, I will first start by contrasting their views of the nature of perception and apperception. It will soon become clear that their respective views lead to distinct HOT-theories. In the conclusion, I will propose an interpretation of their theories in which they would both be able to contribute to one model of HOT-theories." (pp. 351-352)

[*] Higher-Order-Theories.

118. ———. 2013. "Kant, Brentano and Stumpf on Psychology and Anti-Psychologism." In *Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010*, edited by Bacin, Stefano, Ferrarin, Alfredo, La Rocca, Claudio and Ruffing, Margit, 727-736. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"In all the criticisms made by Franz Brentano against nineteenth-century philosophy, be it in the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* or in his later writings, Kant undoubtedly occupies the place of honor. In Brentano's view, Kant not only postulated without any justification synthetic a priori judgments, but he also instigated the phase of decadence that characterized German philosophy in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Beyond these polemic affirmations that often attract attention, it is important to put things in perspective and investigate how such criticisms are construed and what their origins are. In the present paper, I focus more specifically on the reception of Kantian psychology by Brentano and his students. Certainly, Brentano's rejection of Kantian psychology goes along with his total rejection of the synthetic a priori judgments.

What I want to suggest here is that in the specific case of psychology, the hostile reception of Kantian philosophy in the school of Brentano is mainly due to a combination of two factors. The first is Kant's rejection of psychology in the theory of knowledge. The second, which is correlative to the first factor, is the Brentanian rejection of Kant's thesis on the impossibility of psychology becoming a science. In what follows, I investigate these two factors in detail, using as a case study the position advocated by Carl Stumpf in "Psychology and Theory of Knowledge".(2) This work fully deserves to be discussed: Stumpf (1848–1936) was not only one of the most brilliant and influent students of Brentano, but his essay also played an important role in the school of Brentano, offering one of the rare printed confrontations with the Kantian and Neokantian positions on psychology." (pp. 727-728, a note omitted)

(2) Stumpf, Carl: "Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie". In: *Abhandlungen der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 19, 1891, 465– 516. All further references to this essay are abbreviated here as PE.

119. ———. 2013. "Brentano's Thesis (Revisited)." In *Themes from Brentano*, edited by Fisette, Denis and Fréchette, Guillaume, 91-119. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"In the following paper, I will first discuss a presupposition in Chisholm's understanding of intentional sentences. This presupposition – namely, that intentional sentences are about intentional objects and that these objects possess a

diminished form of existence – supports of course his reading of Brentano's thesis, but there are good reasons, as I will try to show, to question this presupposition. As I will argue, Brentano was not in the first place arguing against reductionism, although he certainly would have disputed it: rather, he took the reality of the mental as it is given in experience, but wanted to identify a common ground shared by all mental phenomena which would still take into account the intrinsic diversity of mental phenomena. In this respect, intentionality was introduced as a feature that comes in different varieties and that still provides a golden thread to the unity of sensations, presentations, judgments, strivings, willings, desirings, etc., which constitute every man's mental life." (pp. 92-93)

120. ———. 2014. "Austrian Logical Realism? Brentano on States of Affairs." In *Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations*, edited by Cumpa, Javier, Jesson, Greg and Bonino, Guido, 379-400. Berlin: de Gruyter. Abstract: "In the following paper, I will discuss the motives behind Franz Brentano's judgment contents and the strategies offered by him to support them, suggesting that most of these strategies—based on his treatment of true negative existential judgments—are not clearly compatible with the logical realism he often professed. More generally, I would like to suggest that although there definitely is a realist concern in Austrian philosophy introducing them to support states of affairs, reducing their introduction to a realist concern is misguided. As shown in the case of Brentano, states of affairs were not always introduced in order to answer the question of what makes our assertions true, but rather to provide a psychological account of judgments that would help distinguish between the two basic classes of acts: presentations and judgments. I argue that Brentano's way of dealing with states of affairs shares some similarities with nominalists' motivations and strategies for introducing states of affairs."
121. ———. 2015. "Brentano's soul and the unity of consciousness." *Argumentos* no. 7:65-76. Abstract: "In the following paper, I discuss Fisette's reconstruction of Brentano's view, according to which Brentano's conception of consciousness and of its unity is based on the presupposition that consciousness has a bearer, i.e. the soul. First, I identify Fisette's real target (sect.1) and challenge his conception of the mental agent as central to Brentano's account (sect. 2 and 3). In section 4, I formulate some doubts about the sources used by Fisette, and, in section 5, I propose another reading of the relation between the unity of consciousness and the mental agent in the late Brentano." References Fisette, Denis. Franz Brentano and higher-order theories of consciousness, *Argumentos*, 7, 2015, pp. 9-39.
122. ———. 2015. "Brentano's Conception of Intentionality: New Facts and Unsettled Issues." *Brentano Studien* no. 13. "1. The unsettled issues in Brentano's Thesis While Brentano's thesis on intentionality definitely is his most important contribution to the philosophy of the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries, it is remarkable that it has been understood in so many different ways. It is well known that Chisholm (1955-56) saw in Brentano's thesis a thesis about intentional sentences, and Quine a thesis "of a piece with the thesis of indeterminacy of translation" (Quine 1960, 221), two readings which were decisive in the philosophy of mind between the 1960s and the 1980s, where Brentano's intentionality thesis was often considered to be the target par excellence of naturalism. Things changed between the 1980s and 1990s, when consciousness and intentionality regained some philosophical dignity, thanks most notably to the works of Searle. Building upon this, more recent works proposed another approach of the thesis, moving its focus from an anti-reductionist view of the relation between the mental and the physical to a more general view on the nature of mind. Among many interesting and

stimulating reappraisals of Brentano's thesis in this context, it is worth mentioning Tim Crane (1998), who developed Brentano's thesis of intentionality as the mark of the mental into an intentionalist account of the mind, and Uriah Kriegel (2003a, 2003b, 2013), who suggested that the intentionality thesis comes together with a thesis on the self-representational nature of mental acts, akin to Brentano's account of consciousness.

From a historical and interpretive perspective however, the question of the true meaning of Brentano's intentionality thesis seems to remain unsettled, even today. Three main issues, involved directly or indirectly in the interpretation of Brentano's thesis on intentionality, remain particularly sensitive:" (p. 9)

References

Chisholm, R., 1955-56, "Sentences about believing", in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 56, p. 125–148.

Qune, W.v.O. *Word and Object*, Harvard, The MIT Press 1960.

Kriegel, U., 2003a, "Consciousness and Intransitive Self-Consciousness. Two Views and an Argument", in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 33, 103–132.

———, 2003b, "Is Intentionality dependent upon Consciousness?", in *Philosophical Studies*, 116, 271–307.

———, 2013, "Brentano's Most Striking Thesis", in Fissette, D. and G. Fréchet (eds.), *Themes from Brentano*, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 23–40.

123. ———. 2017. "Content and Object in Brentano." *The IfCoLog Journal of Logics and their Applications* no. 4:3609-3628.

"It has usually been maintained that Brentano's theory of intentionality never actually distinguished between the content of an act and its object, and that the distinction was introduced by Meinong and Höfler (1890), then more systematically by Twardowski (1894), and later by Husserl (1900/1)."

(...)

"Recent research on Brentano's lecture manuscripts from the 1870s and 1880s, however, has shown that Brentano discussed the distinction between content and object at length in the very lectures that were attended by Meinong, Höfler, and Twardowski.(4)"

(...)

"These limitations on Brentano's concept of intentionality are particularly difficult to maintain when one considers his lectures on logic from the late 1860s and early 1870s, in which he clearly states and develops the distinction between content and object; moreover, his lecture notes on descriptive psychology from the mid- and late-1880s also basically follow the same concern, as did his logic lecture notes from the Vienna period.(5) One finds in these documents an explicit concern with the distinction itself and its application in a more general theory of intentionality. I will discuss these lectures and the quotes themselves in section 3. Before that, in section 2, I would like to suggest that Brentano's own conception of philosophy speaks in favour of a more general reading of the intentionality thesis than the one suggested by Dale Jacquette's "immanent intentionality" and by the sympathizers of the Chisholmian reconstruction of Brentano." (pp. 3609-3610)

(4) This is for instance the case with the numerous lectures delivered by Brentano in Vienna between 1874 and 1891, most notably on logic, descriptive psychology, and ethics.

(5) Some of this material will be published soon in Brentano (forthcoming).

References

[11] Brentano, F. (forthcoming), *Deskriptive Psychologie und beschreibende Phänomenologie. Vorlesungen 1887/88 und 1888/89*, Dordrecht, Springer.

[18] Husserl, E. (1900/1), *Logische Untersuchungen* (in 3 volumes), Halle, Max Niemeyer.

[23] Meinong, A., Höfler, A. (1890), *Logik*, Vienna, Tempsky.

[27] Twardowski, K. (1894/1977), *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine psychologische Untersuchung*, Vienna, Hölder. English

translation: *On the Content and Object of Presentations. A Psychological Investigation*, translated by R. Grossmann, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.

124. ———. 2018. "Brentano on Perception." *Hungarian Philosophical Review* no. 62:13-33.
 "However, the standard reading of Brentano – according to which he believes that intentionality is a relation to an immanent object, and perception is a special case of intentionality – has a grain of truth, at least insofar as there are many passages from the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* that seem to support this reading. But as mentioned above, there are obvious problems with this reading when it comes to Brentano's supposition of an external world directly responsible for what we see, hear, etc. Furthermore, Brentano's criticism of phenomenalism(7) makes it difficult to champion a reading on which he appears to defend a variety of this same phenomenalism.
 In short, the common reading of Brentano's thesis on intentionality attributes to him a suboptimal account of perception which does not fit with his critique of phenomenalism. Furthermore, it suggests that Brentano should be seen as a defender of the argument from illusion. But if causality is a relation that, according to him, operates between the external world and physical phenomena, and if the external world is not a simple theoretical posit but something of which perceiving agents are parts, then there must be a way in which, as perceiving agents, we are after all related with the external world." (p. 16)
 (7) See for example Brentano against Mach (Brentano 1988), but also Brentano's lectures on positivism from 1894–95 (Brentano 1894–95), where he defends the view of a correlation between the seeing and the seen (against the identification proposed by Mach), advocating at the same time for the irreducibility of causality.
 References
 Brentano, Franz 1894/95. *Positivismus*. Kolleg 1894/95. Unpublished lecture notes. Manuscript O. Kraus. Prague, Masaryk Archives (Kraus IIIa19).
 Brentano, Franz 1988. *Über Ernst Machs "Erkenntnis und Irrtum"*. Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1988.
125. ———. 2018. "The 'Philosopher of Intentionality' a Century Later." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:13-21.
 "A commemorative issue of the Brentano Studien for the centenary is an unusual and challenging task: How could a commemorative volume on Brentano distinguish itself from any other issue of a journal that is dedicated to the philosophy of Brentano and publishes articles on Brentano as part of its mission?" (p. 13)
 (...)
 "In soliciting contributions to this volume, we followed three main streams: Brentano's metaphilosophy, both from a historical and systematic perspective (section 1); his metaphysics and epistemology (section 2); and finally his relation to Aristotle, also from a historical and systematic perspective (section 3)." (p. 15)
126. ———. 2019. "From Brentano to Mach. Carving Austrian Philosophy at its Joints." In *Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence*, edited by Stadler, Friedrich. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
 Abstract: "In many respects, Mach's arrival in Vienna in 1895 marks the beginning of a new era in Austrian philosophy, paving the way for young philosophers and scientists like Hahn and Neurath and preparing the soil for the Vienna Circle. While this understanding of Mach's contribution to the development of Viennese philosophy seems correct to an important extent, it leaves aside the role of Brentano and his school in this development. I argue that the Brentanian and Machian moments of Austrian philosophy are jointed. I propose a description of the nature of these joints based on institutional, methodological, and philosophical aspects of these phases, and suggest a diagnosis that supports what I take to be the right carving between these two moments."
127. Frechette, Guillaume. 2019. "Brentano on Perception and Illusion." In *The Philosophy of Perception: Proceedings of the 40th International Wittgenstein*

- Symposium*, edited by Limbeck-Lilienau, Christoph and Stadler, Friedrich, 119-134. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Abstract: "Brentano's philosophy of perception has often been understood as a special chapter of his theory of intentionality. If all and only mental phenomena are constitutively intentional, and if perceptual experience is mental by definition, then all perceptual experiences are intentional experiences. I refer to this conception as the "standard view" of Brentano's account of perception. Different options are available to support the standard view: a sense-data theory of perception; an adverbialist account; representationalism. I argue that none of them are real options for the standard view. I suggest that Brentano's conception of optical illusions introduces a presupposition that not only challenges the standard view – the distinction between the subjectively and objectively given – but that also makes his account more palatable for a naïve understanding of perception as openness to and awareness of the world."
128. ———. 2019. "The Origins of Phenomenology in Austro-German Philosophy. Brentano, Husserl." In *A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Philosophy*, edited by Shand, John, 418-453. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.
- "Brentano is the backbone of Austro-German philosophy for many reasons. He came to Austria in 1874, which he considered to be a favorable context to found a philosophical school;(2) he was instrumental in reintroducing Bolzano, the grandfather of Austro-German philosophy, to Austrian philosophers; he trained or contributed to the training of many generations of Austro-German philosophers, ranging from Carl Stumpf and Anton Marty to Alexius Meinong, Thomas Masaryk, Christian von Ehrenfels, Alois Höfler, Edmund Husserl, Kazimierz Twardowski, Oskar Kraus and Schmuël Hugo Bergman; and he was an acknowledged influence on many philosophers ranging from Stout, Moore, and Heidegger to the Vienna Circle (the authors of the Manifesto) and many other late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century philosophers, on both sides of the analytic vs. continental divide. As the "grandfather of phenomenology"(3) resp. the "disgusted grandfather of phenomenology,"(4) but also as the key figure on the "Anglo-Austrian Analytic Axis" (Simons 1986; Dummett 1988, p. 7), Brentano is at the source of the two main philosophical traditions in twentieth-century philosophy. In this article, I will focus mainly on his place in nineteenth-century European philosophy and on the central themes and concepts in his philosophy that were determinant in the development of the philosophy of his most gifted student: Edmund Husserl." (pp. 418-419)
- (2) On his philosophical appreciation of Austria, see for instance his inaugural lecture "On the Causes of Discouragement in the Philosophical Domain," in Brentano (1929, p. 85ff.). See also his recollections in his letter to Bergman from 1909, published in Bergman (1946, p. 125).(...)
- (3) See Baumgartner (2003).
- (4) Ryle (1976).
- References
- Baumgartner, W. (2003). Franz Brentano: Grossvater der Phänomenologie. *Studia Phaenomenologica* 3: 15–60.
- Bergman, H. (1946). Briefe Franz Brentanos an Hugo Bergman. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 7: 83–158.
- Brentano, F. (1929). *Über die Zukunft der Philosophie*. Leipzig: Meiner.
- Ryle, G. 1976. "Disgusted Grandfather of Phenomenology" *Times Higher Education Supplement*, September 10: 15.
129. Fréchette, Guillaume. 2020. "Descriptive Psychology: Brentano and Dilthey." *Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science* no. 10:290-307.
- Abstract "Although Wilhelm Dilthey and Franz Brentano apparently were pursuing roughly the same objective—to offer a description of our mental functions and of their relations to objects—and both called their respective research programs

- 'descriptive psychology', they seem to have used the term to refer to two different methods of psychological research.
- In this article, I compare analyses of these differences. Against the reading of Orth but also against a possible application of recent relativist accounts of the epistemology of peer disagreement to this case, I argue that their apparent shared objective is not enough to support an understanding of their views as two alternatives within a given historical or scientific context, or as a mutual peer disagreement. I show that the impression of a shared objective can be explained away as stemming from the influence of their teacher Adolf Trendelenburg, and I stress that the case of introspection strongly suggests that an account in terms of peer disagreement is not plausible. Finally, I conclude that the opposition between two traditions, Austrian philosophy and historicism, might be better suited to account for the dispute and its apparent common historical context."
130. ———. 2020. "Brentano on Phenomenology and Philosophy as a Science." In *Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy*, edited by Fisette, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Stadler, Friedrich, 101-115. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Abstract: "I argue in this paper that Brentano's grand project of philosophy as a science remained constant throughout his lifetime, from his habilitation thesis of 1866 to his last published writings. I suggest that this project has two main domains of application, namely, metaphysics and psychology. I focus on the application of the programme to psychology. According to my account, the project is based not only on the 1866 thesis that the method of philosophy is nothing other than the method of natural science (Thesis 4), as the standard reading of Brentano's project suggests, but also on the thesis that philosophy should reject the distinction between speculative science and exact science (Thesis 1). I argue that the interplay between these two theses is present not only in Brentano's early works, but also in his later lectures on descriptive psychology given in Vienna at the end of the 1880s. Not only does this explain why the grand project of philosophy remained constant, it also offers a more faithful account of the kind of investigation actually conducted by Brentano in the late 1880s – and later under the label of 'phenomenology', or descriptive psychology – than the one offered by the standard reading."
131. ———. 2023. "Why does it matter to individuate the senses: A Brentanian approach." *European Journal of Philosophy*:413-430.
Abstract: "How do we individuate the senses, what exactly do we do when we do so, and why does it matter? In the following article, I propose a general answer to these related questions based on Franz Brentano's views on the senses. After a short survey of various answers offered in the recent literature on the senses, I distinguish between two major ways of answering this question, causally and descriptively, arguing that only answers giving priority to description and to the classification involved in it are on the right track for a general answer to the related questions. In the second part of the article, I argue that Brentano's descriptive psychology is an attractive candidate for such an answer. His descriptive psychology provides a plausible account of the classification involved in description, in particular regarding the classification of sensory qualities. I close the article by briefly explaining how Brentano spells out the priority of descriptive answers over causal ones."
132. Fugali, Edoardo. 2008. "Toward the Rebirth of Aristotelian Psychology: Trendelenburg and Brentano." In *Psychology and Philosophy: Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Philosophy*, edited by Heinämaa, Sara and Reuter, Martina, 179-202. Dordrecht: Springer.
Abstract: "The chapter studies the concepts of the self, the soul and the subject as they were developed around the first half of the nineteenth century in German philosophy presiding over the birth of psychology as a science. The topic is addressed by examining particularly the leading roles that Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg and Franz Brentano played in this development. Both thinkers

- worked out an original conception of the soul through recourse to Aristotle's theories of the soul, combining them with insight stemming from the modern tradition of the philosophy of subjectivity, particularly Kantianism. The first part of the chapter explicates Friedrich Trendelenburg's argument, that psychology constitutes an independent discipline, and show how his arguments contributed to the general discussion about the status of psychology. The second part consists of an explication of Franz Brentano's reinterpretation of the Aristotelian tradition and provides a critical comparison between his position and that of Trendelenburg. The main argument of the chapter is that Trendelenburg had an important mediating role in the post-Aristotelian tradition, which developed further and culminated in idealistic theories of subjectivity and self-consciousness."
133. ———. 2018. "Sensus Communis and Imagination as Precursors of Inner Perception in Brentano." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:305-334.
Abstract: "Aim of this contribution is an inquiry about the double bind between both key notions of *sensus communis* (*koiné aísthesis*) and imagination in Brentano's interpretation of Aristotelian psychology and in his later work. I will try to show how the treatment of these concepts prefigures Brentano's theory of inner perception in its full-grown formulation. Strictly knit together with sensible imagination, as far as it allows for the coordination of the cognitive operations carried out by the proper senses and for establishing a level of metareflective awareness about them, *sensus communis* is defined as a modality of self-consciousness directly rooted in sense perception. Yet, at the same time, it provides for the genesis of a higher-order form of self-consciousness and of a structure of self-reference of all cognitive acts to their bearer. The theoretical issue at stake here consists in verifying if Brentano does really succeed in providing the adequate conceptual tools for the task of developing an unitary account of self-consciousness. This should be able to overcome the Cartesian-Kantian divide between the blind automatisms of sense perception and the empty certitude of a merely intellectual awareness."
134. Gabriel, Susan. 2013. "Brentano at the Intersection of Psychology, Ontology, and the Good." In *Themes from Brentano*, edited by Fisette, D. and Frechette, G. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"In what follows I shall be painting with a broad brush, not without some trepidation, but with the end in view of showing an aspect of Brentano's thought that can only be uncovered by connecting three large areas, namely, psychology, ontology, and ethics. Specifically I shall be considering these areas as they relate to Brentano's natural theology, and in particular his theodicy or defense of God's justice. Brentano took the optimistic view, that is, he thought it reasonable to believe, even though it could not be fully proved, that the evils in this world are or will be defeated by the good, and he thought it provable with an exceedingly high degree of probability that there is an infinitely perfect necessary being, i.e., God. But I do not intend to present or examine the proofs for God's existence here, much less to solve the problem of evil per se; rather, I hope simply to show how certain features of Brentano's psychology, ontology, and ethics come together to allow Brentano to raise, and perhaps partially answer, the question of evil in a unique and thought-provoking way." (pp. 247-248, notes omitted)
135. Gauvry, Charlotte. 2020. "Brentano on *entia rationis* and Linguistic Fictions." In *Franz Brentano's Philosophy after Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism*, edited by Fisette, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Janoušek, Hynek. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Abstract: "In line with a rich and long tradition revived by Suárez, Brentano maintains that all non-determined entities have to be considered as non-beings. In this respect, he makes use of the concept of *entia rationis*. Interestingly, he suggests, at least since his 1901 letter to Marty[*], that these entities have to be considered not things or beings at all but "fictions," more precisely, as linguistic fictions. The purpose

of my text is twofold. First, I intend to clarify the status of linguistic fictions in Brentano. In particular, I will consider the extent to which they are connected or not with medieval theories of *entia irrationalia* and *entia rationis* (Suárez). Secondly, I will emphasize the linguistic nature of those fictions and sketch some remarks on Brentano's view on language and concepts."

[*] in F. Brentano, *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen*, ed. F. Mayer-Hillebrand. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1977.

136. ———. 2021. "A Context Principle in Brentano?" In *Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School. Reassessing the Brentanian Legacy*, edited by Dewalque, Arnaud, Gauvry, C. and Richard, Sebastian, 57-75. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave. "The (historical) purpose of my chapter is to show that we are facing a paradox. Although considering Brentano as a 'philosopher of language' in the Frege-Wittgenstein sense is questionable—for reasons that I will dwell on below –, his dense and little-known manuscripts on language are full of 'pragmatic' insights, even fuller than Frege's, Russell's or the early Wittgenstein's own works. Brentano actually anticipates some of the main claims of the later philosophers of ordinary language. The (systematic) purpose of this chapter is then to explore Brentano's analyses on ordinary language in order to ask whether it makes sense to consider him a 'contextualist'." (p. 58)
(...)
"Throughout this article, I will essentially focus on Brentano's Logic manuscripts, which include the 1869–1871 Würzburg Lesson "Deduktive und Induktive Logik" (Ms. EL 80)—which was also taught in Vienna in 1875 and 1877 –, and the 1878–1885 Vienna Lesson "Die elementare Logik und die in ihr nötigen Reformen" (Ms. EL 72). Although still unpublished, these manuscripts are precious and provide a reliable source on Brentano's work, contrary to the often quoted Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand's compilation (see Brentano 1956), which includes numerous and not clearly identified fragments which are not from Brentano.
Besides, although they cover almost twenty years, these lessons were all taught before Brentano's so-called 'reist' turn and are thus rather homogeneous." (p. 59)
References
Brentano Franz. 1956. In *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, ed. Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand. Bern: Francke.
137. Geach, Peter. 1978. "Intentionality of Thought versus Intentionality of Desire." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:131-138.
Abstract: "The work of Brentano's English contemporary J.E. McTaggart is in several ways profitable for Brentano scholars to study: I here consider his views on the nature and classification of mental states. In McTaggart's account the characteristic of being a 'cognition', one that some but not all 'cogitations' have, corresponds to Brentano's notion of *Anerkennen*; quite unlike Brentano, he holds that contrariety obtains only between the contents of judgments, not between contrary acts of affirming and denying; like Brentano however he recognizes contrariety in the realm of emotion and feeling, e.g. between love and hate, pleasure and pain. He regards feelings and emotions as mere colourings of cogitations, and thinks that their relation to an object (intentionality, as Brentano would say) comes about merely from their cogitative aspect. This view is attractively simple; but by considering McTaggart's own view of emotions' being *in respect of* characteristics of their objects, we can find serious ground to reject it."
138. Geniusas, Saulius. 2014. "The origins of the phenomenology of pain: Brentano, Stumpf and Husserl." *Continental Philosophy Review* no. 47:1-17.
Abstract: "The following investigation aims to determine the historical origins of the phenomenology of pain. According to my central thesis, these origins can be traced back to an enthralling discussion between Husserl and two of his most important teachers, Brentano and Stumpf. According to my reconstruction of this discussion, while Brentano defended the view that all feelings, including pain, are *intentional experiences*, and while Stumpf argued that pain is a *non-intentional*

feeling-sensation, Husserl of the *Logical Investigations* provides compelling resources to resolve the polemic between his teachers by showing how pain can be conceived as a *pre-intentional experience*. According to my argument, this largely forgotten discussion is of significance not only because it enriches our understanding of pain, but also because it modifies the phenomenological conception of consciousness. Thus in the concluding section, I show why the Husserlian resolution of the controversy between Brentano and Stumpf is of importance for our understanding of the central phenomenological theme—*intentionality*."

139. George, Rolf. 1978. "Brentano's Relation to Aristotle." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:249-266.
Abstract: "The paper tries to illustrate the influence of Aristotle's thought upon Brentano by arguing that the view that all psychological phenomena have objects was probably derived from the Aristotelian conception that the mind can know itself only *en parergo*, and that this knowledge presupposes that some other thing be in the mind "objectively". Brentano's contribution to Aristotle scholarship is illustrated by reviewing some of his arguments against Zeller's claim that Aristotle's God, contemplating only himself, is ignorant of the world. The paper concludes with an attempt to explain the relative neglect into which Brentano's exegetical efforts have fallen."
140. George, Rolf, and Kohen, Glen. 2001. "Brentano's relation to Aristotle." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacqueline Dale, 20-44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"To conclude: Brentano's way of philosophizing and treating the history of the subject really does represent a renewal of style and substance, a more scientific attitude, a profound change from the obscurities of German Idealism. There are few writers for whom Aristotle was more alive. And even if his interpretations are often speculative and daring, his manner of arguing for them is always challenging, demanding a kind of active involvement that cautious historical accounts seldom manage to produce." (pp. 41-42)
141. Gilson, Étienne. 1939. "Franz Brentano's interpretation of mediaeval philosophy." *Mediaeval Studies* no. 1:1-10.
Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, pp. 56-67.
"The section of J.A. Möhler's *History of the Church* that deals with the history of the ecclesiastical sciences during the Middle Ages, has been compiled from the posthumous notes of Möhler, by Franz Brentano, then a Catholic priest and a professor at the German University of Würzburg.(2) As is usually the case in general histories, Brentano's chapter is a rather short one, but it gives a clear account of what was then known on the subject. Its main interest however does not lie in its remarkable clarity and general accuracy, but rather in the philosophical interpretation of the evolution of medieval thought which it propounds. As will be seen later, there are good reasons to think that the responsible author for that interpretation was not Möhler, but Brentano." (p. 1)
(2) The *History of the Church* of J.-A. Möhler will be quoted from the French translation: J.-A. Möhler, *Histoire de l'Eglise*, trans. P. Belet and published by Gams (3 vols, Paris 1868—9). Interesting details on the history of the book will be found in the Preface of Gams. The chapter on the History of ecclesiastical sciences is in vol. 2, pp. 467-520. In the German edition of Möhler's *Kirchengeschichte*, the chapter written by Brentano will be found in vol. 2, pp. 526-84.
142. Gilson, Lucie. 1976. "Franz Brentano on Science and Philosophy." In *The Philosophy of Brentano*, edited by McAlister, Linda Lopez, 68-79. London: Duckworth.
Translated from the French by Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schättle.
Reprinted from *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, vol. 20, no. 78 (1966), pp. 416-33.

- "Can philosophy be saved, and, if so, how? A consideration of these questions marks the starting point of Brentano's work, and the desire to bring about the salvation of philosophy is his principal motivation. It is this desire that inspired the first and fourth of his habilitation theses which he defended in a public disputation at the University of Wurzburg one hundred years ago. In the first thesis he stated: 'Philosophy must protest against the distinction between speculative and exact sciences; and the justification for this protest is philosophy's very right to existence.' (2) His fourth thesis read: 'The true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences.'"
- (2) See *Über die Zukunft der Philosophie*, ed. Oskar Kraus (Leipzig, 1929), p. 136 (Latin text) and p. 137 (German text).
143. Girard, Charles. 2021. "Reflexivity Without Noticing: Durand of Saint-Pourçain, Walter Chatton, Brentano." *Topoi* no. 41:111-121.
 Abstract: "According to Franz Brentano, every mental act includes a representation of itself. Hence, Brentano can be described as maintaining that: (T1) reflexivity, when it occurs, is included as a part in mental acts; and (T2) reflexivity always occurs.
 Brentano's way of understanding the inclusion of reflexivity in mental acts (T1) entails double intentionality in mental acts. The aim of this paper is to show that the conjunction of (T1) and (T2) is not uncommon in the history of philosophy. To that end, the theories of two medieval thinkers, namely, Walter Chatton and Durand of Saint-Pourçain, are presented.
 The repeated conjunction of (T1) and (T2) paves the way for a more general distinction than that between subjectivist and objectivist theories of reflexivity, namely, one between automatic theories of reflexivity (where noticing is not required for reflexivity) and apperceptive theories of reflexivity (where noticing is required for reflexivity)."
144. Giustina, Anna. 2017. "Conscious Unity from the Top Down: A Brentanian Approach." *The Monist* no. 100:15-36.
 Abstract: "Many contemporary views on unity of consciousness adopt a bottom-up approach: a subject has several conscious experiences at a time, which are unified in virtue of a special relationship. In this paper I explore an alternative, top-down approach, according to which (to a first approximation) a subject has one single conscious experience at a time. I present three top-down approaches: Priority unity monism, Existence unity monism, and Brentanian unity monism.
 The first two are defined in analogy with the homonymous metaphysical theories of object composition. Brentanian monism retraces Franz Brentano's view on unity of consciousness, and is defined by appeal to some of his mereological ideas. I argue that the latter is the best top-down approach to unity of consciousness."
145. ———. 2023. "Introspective acquaintance: An integration account." *European Journal of Philosophy*:380-397.
 Abstract: "In this paper, I develop a new version of the acquaintance view of the nature of introspection of phenomenal states. On the acquaintance view, when one introspects a current phenomenal state of one's, one bears to it the relation of introspective acquaintance. Extant versions of the acquaintance view neglect what I call the phenomenal modification problem. The problem, articulated by Franz Brentano in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, is that drawing introspective attention to one's current conscious experience may modify its phenomenology. Failing to take phenomenal modification into account affects the adequacy of extant versions of the acquaintance view. The purpose of this paper is to develop a better version, the integration account, that meets the phenomenal modification challenge while preserving the merits of other versions."
146. Gonzáles Porta, Mario Ariel. 2019/20. "Brentano and his School on the Psychological Method." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:37-68.
 Abstract: "The standard expositions of Brentano's philosophical antecedents went no further than to recall his Aristotelian background and, against this backdrop, to

- indicate his assimilation of English empiricism, including John Stuart Mill, and of French positivism, primarily Comte. In recent times, this perspective has begun to be reappraised. In what follows, I propose to contribute to this reappraisal process by concentrating on the relations existing between the Brentanian program and the Germanic tradition of the "psychological method".
147. Grossmann, Reinhardt. 1960. "Acts and Relations in Brentano." *Analysis* no. 21:1-5.
 "When I think of John as thinking of Paris, there is therefore still only one mental substance which is now modified in two ways, and not, as one may perhaps think, two arrows pointing at John and Paris, respectively: one, if I may so put it, pointing from myself to John thinking of Paris, the other, from John's self to Paris. The only difference between thinking of a relational property and thinking of a non-relational property consists in the fact that in the former case the thinker's self is modified in two ways, while in the latter there is only one. But whether acts are relational or not in the usual sense, does not at all depend on how we think of them. Brentano, it seems, confuses a philosophical question, namely, the nature of relations, with a psychological one, namely, how we think about them; or, if not, then he answers two different questions. He asserts, first, that there are no relations and that acts in particular are properties. He asserts, second, that, psychologically speaking, one thinks of act-properties in a certain way, namely, the way in which one thinks of all his so-called relational properties. Hence he has not been able to show that one can deny the existence of relational acts and at the same time solve the problem of how selves are connected with other selves and independent material things." (p. 5)
148. ———. 1962. "Brentano's Ontology: A Reply to Mr. Kamitz." *Analysis* no. 23:20-24.
 "In a recent article, Mr. Kamitz claims that I misrepresented the views of Brentano. (1) He then goes on to correct my alleged errors. Before I examine his corrections, a general remark may be appropriate. It was not my intention to expound Brentano's views in detail. This is of course impossible in five pages. Nor did I use or even mention Brentano's own terminology. Rather, I tried to offer an analysis of some of Brentano's crucial ideas in my own words." (p. 20)
 (...)
 "(4) Finally, Mr. Kamitz claims that I am unjustified in saying that Brentano confused the two questions "What is a relation?" and "How do we think about relations?", because Brentano proved that there are no relations. But I did not just say that Brentano confused the two questions. What I said was that either he confused the questions or, if he didn't, he answered two different questions. Brentano asserted, first, that there are no relations. He asserted, second, that, psychologically speaking, one thinks of all his so called "relational properties" in a certain way. Hence I stated a disjunction. And Mr. Kamitz' statement that Brentano proved that there are no relations shows that this disjunction is true." (pp. 23-24)
149. ———. 1969. "Non-existent objects: recent work on Brentano and Meinong." *American Philosophical Quarterly* no. 6:17-32.
 "There are two problems which must be faced.
 First, what are ideas as contrasted with senseimpressions?
 Secondly, how are they related to their objects? Brentano's school, I submit, gave the correct answer to the first question, but did not find a satisfactory answer to the second. More accurately, it was a student of Brentano's, K. Twardowski, who had the right idea. Every mental act, he held, has two sides: it is an act of a certain kind, say, a judgment or a representation (*Vorstellung*), and it also has a so-called content, say, the content expressed by the sentence "This is red."(11)
 The sharp distinction between a mental act, its kind, and its content is one of the most outstanding achievements of Brentano's school.(12) Bergmann, in his book [*Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong* (Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967)], says everything that needs to be said about this distinction and its importance.(13)

But this leaves us with the second and more formidable problem: How are contents of mental acts related to what they intend? We need not worry about the general problem of the existence of relations; the shackles of Aristotelian ontology do not hamper us. But not all mental acts-and hence not all contents-intend existents. We see things that are not there and we believe things that are not so. How can such mental acts intend anything?

There is nothing there for them to be related to or connected with. On the other hand, the mind is not just blank, if I may put it so, when one has an hallucination or clings to a mistaken belief. Even non-veridical mental acts seem to intend something; and we can tell what they intend. Actually, we know what our mental acts intend before we know whether or not their intentions exist. I am convinced that if there is a key-issue of the realism-idealism controversy, it is the issue raised by these and similar considerations. Bergmann agrees with this assessment. He shows in painstaking detail that and how Brentano's school contributed to the discussion of the problem of non-existent objects.

And we also agree that no one from that school found the right solution." (p. 20)

(11) See K. Twardowski, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* (Wien, 1894) .

(12) It can be found, for example, both in Meinong and in Husserl.

(13) Bergmann's exposition is flawed by a small but persistent mistake in his own ontology. He says that a mental act is a state of affairs. In general, he thinks of ordinary things like chairs and tables as states of affairs. This, I believe, is wrong. A mental act or a chair is not a state of affairs, but rather what Bergmann calls a particular and what I would prefer to call an individual thing. Such individual things must be distinguished from properties, states of affairs, and other categorial kinds. Bergmann's mistake, though, is slight because he acknowledges all the relevant ontological kinds, if I may put it so. He merely "identifies" ordinary things with the wrong kind, namely, states of affairs rather than with the right kind, namely, individual things (particulars).

150. Gyemant, Maria. 2017. "Contrasting Two Ways of Making Psychology: Brentano and Freud." *Axiomathes* no. 27:491-501.
 Abstract: "Brentano's views on psychology influenced the way philosophy was made at the beginning of the 20th century. But did this influence spread as far as to give place to Freud's revolutionary discovery of the psychoanalytical unconscious? There are reasons to believe that Brentano had a profound influence on Freud. An attentive analysis of Freud's vocabulary as well as his arguments against "philosophical" objections supports this point rather convincingly. However, Freud was not a philosopher and Brentano's historical influence does not suffice to transform the Freudian unconscious in a philosophical concept. It is the purpose of this paper to sketch a way to make a philosophical use of Freud's unconscious by reconstructing the dialogue between Brentano and Freud on a conceptual level. Despite the explicit critique of the unconscious that we find in Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, I show that Freud never truly opposed Brentano. He rather took Brentano's descriptive psychology a step further: he introduced a dynamic component to the analysis of the psyche that is complementary to Brentano's descriptive psychology and could be considered a type of genetic psychology."
151. Haldane, John. 1989. "Brentano's Problem." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 35:1-32.
 Abstract: "Contemporary writers often refer to 'Brentano's Problem' meaning by this the issue of whether all intentional phenomena can be accounted for in terms of a materialist ontology. This, however, was not the problem of intentionality which concerned Brentano himself. Rather, the difficulty which he identified is that of how to explain the very contentfulness of mental states, and in particular their apparently relational character. This essay explores something of Brentano's own views on this issue and considers various other recent approaches. It then examines the scholastic doctrine of 'intentional inexistence' in the version associated with

- Aquinas, according to which content is explained by reference to the occurrence in *esse intentionale* of the very same features (forms) as contribute to the constitution of extra-mental reality. Various interpretations and aspects of this view are considered and a version of it is commended as providing a plausible solution to Brentano's problem."
152. Hao, Liu. 2019/20. "Brentano's Two Stages of Intentionality in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint." *Brentano Studien* no. 16.
Abstract: "This paper deals with Brentano's notion of intentionality, aiming to elaborate on the puzzles surrounding it: the distinction between mental and physical phenomena, how to interpret intentional in-existence, the non-existent object, and the implication of "in" in "in-existence". Meanwhile, Brentano's notion of intentionality varies in his two stages of PES. The change Brentano made in the second stage, I think, results from the confusion between content and object in the first stage. Based on these, this paper provides a comprehensive and dynamic picture of Brentano's topic of intentionality."
153. Hart, James G. 2012. "Individuality of the "I": Brentano and Today." *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* no. 26:232-246.
"Introduction
The Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), as a fifty-year-old movement of both phenomenologically and existentially disposed philosophers, may regard Franz Brentano (1838–1917) as at least a grandfather. For many SPEP members, including myself until very recently, Brentano has been known in a rather vague and inauthentic empty intention merely as the teacher of Husserl, foremost in regard to some aspects of the doctrine of intentionality. Upon closer inspection this is pitifully shortsighted, and I have come to believe that the phenomenologist's lineage to the grandfather is not to be forgotten and that retrieving it may bring out not only differences but surprising enrichments that will emerge through wrestling with the differences. As merely one example, I want to discuss Brentanian propositions regarding the individuality of the I." (p. 232, a note omitted)
154. Hedwig, Klaus. 1979. "Intention: Outlines for the History of a Phenomenological Concept." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 39:326-340.
"Brentano made only short reference to the scholastic concept of *intentio*.(1) In its philosophical implications, however, this reference rendered possible a new interpretation of reality which has subsequently become one of the main themes of phenomenological philosophy. On the other hand, the terminological parallels with the scholastic use of the concept of intention and its partial dependence on an Aristotelian problem generally conceal that Brentano referred to a very limited version of the late medieval discussion on intentionality a limitation which is at least partially responsible for the radical reformulation of this concept in Brentano's later writings." (p. 326)
(1) *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, Leipzig 1924, I, p. 124. Cf. K. Hedwig, "Der scholastische Kontext des Intentionalen bei Brentano," *Grazer Phil. Studien* (1978).
155. ———. 1987. "Brentano's Hermeneutics." *Topoi* no. 6:3-10.
"It is surprising and often even puzzling to see that Brentano, who in his own scientific work strictly insisted on the return to "experience", to the "empirical standpoint" and the "exact method" of natural science, was for the whole of his life occupied with historical texts - from the young student who wrote numerous notes on Aristotle(1) to the old man, who was no longer able to read but who listened to texts read to him, who was no longer able to write but who dictated his extremely subtle philosophical reflections, which are interwoven with numerous historical quotations.(2) While considering any of these texts, one is surprised by the actual relevance of historical references. It seems as if Brentano did not understand history in a historical sense, nor the past as past, but as "now" relevant. History is obviously preceded by a theory of history or, as Brentano says, by a "philosophy of the history of philosophy".(3) Historical hermeneutics is part of philosophy itself." (p. 3)

- (1) The *Nachlass* contains 159 Mss on Aristotle. Brentano developed his hermeneutical theories mainly in contrast to E. Zeller (cf. Note 52), but also in the context of his own studies on Aristotle; cf. Ms. A20: *Aristoteles' Terminologie*; Ms. A2: *Grundzüge für die Interpretation grosser philosophischer Denker, insbesondere des Aristoteles*; Ms. A154: *Zur Methode Aristotelischer Studien und zur Methodik geschichtlicher Forschung auf philosophischem Gebiet überhaupt*. -- The quotations follow the Meiner editions of Brentano's works and the *Catalogue of Manuscripts* established by F. Mayer-Hillebrand and revised by W. Baumgartner.
- (2) In his last dictation (9 March 1917) on *Anschauung und abstrakte Vorstellung* Brentano refers to Aristotle, Leibniz, Berkeley, Newton, Clarke, Kant, Euler, and Schopenhauer.
- (3) This is the title of several *Seminarübungen* held at Vienna (SS 1878; SS 1880; SS 1883). A fragment of this text is included in Ms. H45: *Gesch. d. Phil.* (25248-25252).
156. Heller Britto, Arthur. 2019/20. "Brentanian Continua and their Boundaries." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:157-194.
Abstract: "Just as mathematicians were constructing the set-theoretical topological conceptions that permeate contemporary mathematical and scientific thinking, Brentano was also thinking about the subject but from a more traditional Aristotelian perspective that could not be fully harmonized with the mathematical approach. In this paper, we attempt to reconstruct Brentano's account of continua and their boundaries, which is his response to the set-theoretical topology of his time, as well as comment on other such attempts by previous authors."
157. Henry, Desmond Paul. 1993. "Brentano and Some Medieval Mereologists." *Brentano Studien* no. 4:25-34.
"Discussion of what Brentano calls the 'strange arithmetic' involved in the connumeration of overlapping objects is also to be found in Abelard, John Wyclif, and in Leibniz. Brentano's divergence from the commonly-held medieval distinction between X-part and part-of-X may be partially explained by his adherence to a theory of body resembling that which occurs in a twelfth-century compendium of Porretan logic."
158. Hickerson, Ryan. 2007. *The History of Intentionality: Theories of Consciousness from Brentano to Husserl*. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
Chapter 1: What was Brentano's Problem? Physical phenomena in *Psychology from Empirical Standpoint*, pp. 21-44.
"In order to understand that claim, what has come to be known as 'Brentano's Thesis' (also sometimes called the 'Intentional Thesis' or the 'Intentionalist Thesis'), we need only three basic concepts: the mental, the physical, and intentionality. Everything mental is intentional, and nothing physical is intentional, says the Brentanian.
(...)
"The task of this chapter will be a direct interpretation of the most neglected of these three basic concepts, proper accounting for which upsets now-standard readings of the other two. I argue below that Brentanian physical phenomena are not merely phenomenal qualities or mental entities, but are instead robustly physical, i.e. we should take Brentano at his word when he labelled them 'physical'. The upshot is attributing to Brentano a somewhat older understanding of the physical, one that he inherited from the positivism of Auguste Comte, and that will return him to the fold of *fin-de-siècle* phenomenalisms. But I will also argue that this does not vitiate Brentano's basic commitment to a kind of physicalism, because Brentano did not treat these physical facts as mind dependent. In addition to treating physical phenomena as mental contents, Brentano treated them as psychophysical causes. This pairing of theses, part and parcel of Brentano's 'empirical standpoints', results in a rather severe theoretical problem: integrating sensible contents with judgeable contents. But this problem, Brentano's (actual) problem is quite different from what has come to be known as 'Brentano's Problem'."

- I will deny a ubiquitous misreading of Brentano as an immanentist, i.e. someone who treated physical phenomena as existing only within the mind. I do so not to rehabilitate Brentano's reputation, so much as try to set the record straight." (p. 22)
159. Hossack, Keith. 2006. "Reid and Brentano on consciousness." In *The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy*, edited by Textor, Mark, 36-63. New York: Routledge.
- "Among the principal philosophical problems that any satisfactory account of consciousness has to address are the following three. First, the problem of qualitative character: do experiences have intrinsic nonrepresentational properties, namely *qualia*, which determine what the experience is like for the subject of the experience? Second, the problem of the necessity of co-occurrence: why is it that, necessarily, an experience and the consciousness of it co-occur, i.e. necessarily either both are present together, or both are absent together? Third, the problem of introspection: what account should be given of the introspective knowledge one has of one's own current experiences?
- In this chapter I discuss the contributions of Thomas Reid and Franz Brentano to these three problems. There is a fundamental similarity between their accounts of consciousness, for they both endorsed an 'Identity Theory', according to which an experience, and the consciousness of the experience, involve only a single mental event. But although they both subscribed to the Identity Theory, they meant different things by it. For the Scottish philosopher of common sense, consciousness was a species of knowledge; but for the Austrian founder of phenomenology, consciousness was the same thing as appearance.
- This is a fundamental difference between their two approaches: taking knowledge as the central concept in the philosophy of mind tends to promote philosophical realism; taking appearance as the central concept risks anti-realism and idealism. I shall be suggesting that Reid's more realist approach is to be preferred to Brentano's, since it does a better job of solving the three problems of consciousness." (p. 36)
160. Huemer, Wolfgang. 2018. "'Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est' Brentano's conception of philosophy as rigorous science." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:53-72.
- Abstract: "Brentano's conception of scientific philosophy had a strong influence on his students and on the intellectual atmosphere of Vienna in the late nineteenth century. The aim of this article is to expose Brentano's conception and to contrast his views with that of two traditions he is said to have considerably influenced: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. I will shed light on the question of how and to what extent Brentano's conception of philosophy as a rigorous science has had an impact on these two traditions. The discussion will show that both took their liberties in the interpretation of the thesis, a move that allowed them to liberate themselves from Brentano's inheritance and to fully develop their own philosophical positions."
161. ———. 2019. "Is Brentano's Method a Unifying Element of the Brentano School?" *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica*:897-910.
- Abstract: "Among historians of philosophy it is often taken for granted that the «Brentano school» was one of the influential philosophical movements at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century – but Brentano's own contributions are often eclipsed by that of his direct students. This invites to reflect on the nature of and the unity within the school. Since Brentano's conception of a rigorous, scientific philosophy had a strong impact on his students, it has been argued that this conception constitutes a unifying element in an otherwise heterogeneous group. The scope of this article is to shed light on this thesis and to show its limits. I argue for a differentiated view: the Brentano school is best seen not as a compact movement, but as a heterogeneous group of scholars who approached, in a given historical and geographical period, similar topics in very similar ways."

162. ———. 2021. "Was Brentano a Systematic Philosopher?" In *The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller*, edited by Antonelli, Mauro and Binder, Thomas, 11-27. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.
- "In the following, I will discuss whether this qualifies Brentano's philosophical position as a "grand system" from which one could deduce a profound and informative answer to any serious philosophical problem.(1) I will pay particular attention to two aspects: Brentano's view that philosophy should be done in a rigorous, scientific manner and the fragmentary character of Brentano's work. I will argue that both aspects stand in contrast to the very idea of system-philosophy: the maxim that philosophy should adopt the method of the natural sciences was intended by Brentano as a way of distancing himself from system-philosophy; while the fragmentary character of Brentano's work does not fulfill the aspiration of system-philosophy to provide an answer to everything. Yet, the incompleteness of his work is not an arbitrary or contingent aspect; it is rather a necessary side-effect of his methodological views." (pp. 11-12)
- (1) The modification "profound and informative" seems necessary, or else Wittgenstein's early position would qualify as a philosophical system, as the picture theory of the *Tractatus* provides a unified account of the true, the good, and the beautiful, which, however, is not (and does even not intend to be) very profound or informative, at least not with regard to the latter two concepts, as it merely consists in the thesis that statements in ethics and aesthetics are meaningless.
163. Huemer, Wolfgang, and Landerer, Christoph. 2010. "Mathematics, experience and laboratories: Herbart's and Brentano's role in the rise of scientific psychology." *History of the Human Science* no. 23:72-94.
- Abstract: "In this article we present and compare two early attempts to establish psychology as an independent scientific discipline that had considerable influence in central Europe: the theories of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) and Franz Brentano (1838–1917).
- While both of them emphasize that psychology ought to be conceived as an empirical science, their conceptions show revealing differences. Herbart starts with metaphysical principles and aims at mathematizing psychology, whereas Brentano rejects all metaphysics and bases his method on a conception of inner perception (as opposed to inner observation) as a secondary consciousness, by means of which one gets to be aware of all of one's own conscious phenomena. Brentano's focus on inner perception brings him to deny the claim that there could be unconscious mental phenomena – a view that stands in sharp contrast to Herbart's emphasis on unconscious, 'repressed' presentations as a core element of his mechanics of mind. Herbart, on the other hand, denies any role for psychological experiments, while Brentano encouraged laboratory work, thus paving the road for the more experimental work of his students like Stumpf and Meinong. By briefly tracing the fate of the schools of Herbart and Brentano, respectively, we aim to illustrate their impact on the development of psychological research, mainly in central Europe."
164. Ierna, Carlo. 2014. "Making the Humanities Scientific: Brentano's Project of *Philosophy as Science*." In *The Making of the Humanities: Volume III: The Modern Humanities*, edited by Bod, Rens, Maat, Jaap and Weststeijn, Thijs, 543-554. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- "On July 14, 1866, Brentano stepped up to the pulpit to defend his thesis that 'the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences'.(21) This thesis became the north star of his school, rallying his first students to his flag, (22) and remained a central and lasting concern for many of them.(23) This thesis is part of a greater whole and actually follows from another thesis, namely that: 'Philosophy must deny that the sciences can be divided into the speculative and the exact; because if this is not correctly denied, then philosophy itself would have no right to exist'.(24) Here a more general claim is made about the nature of science and philosophy: there is just one kind of science and philosophy is part of it. Philosophy is not done by speculative construction, but by humble, detailed

- investigation.(25) As Brentano told his students some years later: 'We are taking the first steps toward the renewal of philosophy as science', not by conjuring up 'proud systems' out of thin air, but by humbly 'cultivating fallow scientific ground'.(26) Thus Brentano instilled in his students a strong sense of scientific rigor and his students did not consider themselves to practice 'armchair philosophies', but to do science." (p. 545)
- (22) The expression comes from a letter of Carl Stumpf to Brentano from 1892, quoted in Oskar Kraus, *Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre* (Munich: Beck, 1919), 19. Also see Carl Stumpf, 'Erinnerungen an Franz Brentano', in Kraus, *Franz Brentano*, 88.
- (23) About this thesis, see Dale Jacquette, 'Brentano's Scientific Revolution in Philosophy', *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 40 (2002), and Robin Rollinger, *Austrian Phenomenology: Brentano, Husserl, Meinong and Others on Mind and Object, Phenomenology & Mind* (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2008), 3.
- (24) Brentano, 'Die Habilitationsthesen', in *Über die Zukunft der Philosophie*, 136-137.
- (25) Poli, 'Introduction', in *The Brentano Puzzle*, 7, and Roberto Poli, 'At the Origin of Analytic Philosophy', *Aletheia* (1994).
- (26) Franz Brentano, 'Über Schellings Philosophie', in *Über die Zukunft der Philosophie*, 131; Wilhelm Baumgartner, 'Nineteenth-Century Würzburg: The Development of the Scientific Approach to Philosophy', in Roberto Poli (ed.), *In Itinere: European Cities and the Birth of Modern Scientific Philosophy* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), 86.
165. ———. 2015. "Improper Intentions of Ambiguous Objects: Sketching a New Approach to Brentano's Intentionality." *Brentano Studien*:55–80.
"In this article I will begin by discussing recent criticism, by Mauro Antonelli and Werner Sauer of the ontological interpretation of Franz Brentano's concept of intentionality, as formulated by i.a. Roderick Chisholm. I will then outline some apparent inconsistencies of the positions advocated by Antonelli and Sauer with Brentano's formulations of his theory in several works and lectures. This new evaluation of (unpublished) sources will then lead to a sketch of a new approach to Brentano's theory of intentionality. Specifically, it will be argued that the notion of "intentional object" is inherently and unavoidably ambiguous in every act of external perception, due to the fact that we can only have improper intentions directed at the external world." (p. 55)
166. ———. 2021. "Brentano as a Logician." In *The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller*, edited by Antonelli, Mauro and Binder, Thomas, 301-311. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.
"In the present contribution I would like to make three related claims: 1) There was an original and shared philosophy of mathematics in the School of Brentano; 2) In the School of Brentano mathematics was considered as the paradigmatic and foundational science, and more specifically as deductive, analytic, and a priori; 3) Brentano founds the concept of number on elementary logical operations, i.e. Brentano was a logician. I will concentrate mainly on the third claim, using the other two as background and support." (p. 301)
167. Jacquette, Dale. 1990/1991. "The Origins of *Gegenstandstheorie*: Immanent and Transcendent Intentional Objects in Brentano, Twardowski, and Meinong." *Brentano Studien* no. 3:177-202.
"The origins of object theory in the philosophical psychology and semantics of Alexius Meinong and the Graz school can be traced both to the insight and failure of Franz Brentano's immanent objectivity or intentional in-existence thesis. The immanence thesis is documented, together with its critical reception in Alois Höfler's *Logik*, Twardowski's *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*, and Meinong's mature *Gegenstandstheorie*, in which immanent thought content and transcendent intentional object are distinguished, and

- Brentano's thesis of immanent intentionality as the mark of the mental is reinterpreted to imply that only content is the immanently intentional component of presentations. Brentano's thought from the early immanence thesis through the so-called *Immanenzkrise* and his later reism is explored against the background of his students' reactions to the original 1874 intentionality thesis and its idealist implications, in the emergence of Meinong's object theory and Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Finally, Brentano's reism in the later ontology is critically examined, as his solution to ontic problems of immanent intentionality, limiting intentional objects to transcendent concrete particulars."
168. ———. 2001. "Brentano's concept of intentionality." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 98-130. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 "Among Brentano's most important and philosophically influential achievements is his thesis of the intentionality of mind. To say that thought is intentional is to say that it intends or is about something, that it aims at or is directed upon an intended object. Intentionality is thus the aboutness of thought, the relation whereby a psychological state intends or refers to an intended object." (p. 98)
 (...)
 "The intentionality thesis holds out the prospect of understanding the essential nature of thought. If Brentano is right, then an intentionalist metaphysics of mind distinguishes psychological from nonpsychological or extrapsychological phenomena. This, unsurprisingly, is precisely how Brentano proposes to apply the concept of intentionality, which he significantly describes as "the mark of the mental.(2)" (p. 99)
 (2) See *Psychologie from empirischen Standpunkt* §5; especially, pp. 115–17.
169. ———. 2001. "Introduction: Brentano's philosophy." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 1-19. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 "Brentano is among the most important yet under-appreciated philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He led an intellectual revolution that sought to reverse what was then the prevalent post-Kantian trend of German-Austrian philosophy in the direction of an Aristotelian scientific methodology. At the same time, he made valuable contributions to philosophical psychology, metaphysics, ontology, value theory, epistemology, the reform of syllogistic logic, philosophical theology and theodicy, and the history of philosophy and philosophical methodology." (p. 1)
170. ———. 2002. "Brentano's Scientific Revolution in Philosophy." *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 40:193-221.
 "The standard, and by now almost cliché, description of Brentano as an Aristotelian empiricist doing battle with post-Kantian transcendentalism ignores what I find genuinely philosophically revolutionary-and, in the same measure, philosophically risky-about Brentano's philosophy.
 The truly revolutionary aspect of Brentano's thought is its attempt to make individual internal first-person a posteriori phenomenological experience the empirical basis for inductive reasoning in support of universal a priori propositions in philosophical psychology. In turn, these are supposed to uphold all of metaphysics and ontology, as well as logic, epistemology, value theory, and the social sciences. The idea that a scientific psychology must be both empirical and a priori is a requirement Brentano consistently makes, beginning with the foreward to the 1874 edition of *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, where he writes: "My psychological standpoint is empirical; experience alone is my teacher. Yet I share with other thinkers the conviction that this is entirely compatible with a certain ideal point of view.(6)"
 (6) Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* [1924; originally 1874 and 1911, edited by Oskar Kraus; English edition by Linda L. McAlister,

- translated by Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, xxvii. (...))
171. ———, ed. 2004. *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: List of contributors XIII; Acknowledgments XVII; List of abbreviations XVIII; Chronology XX-XXII; 1. Dale Jacques: Introduction: Brentano's philosophy 1; 2. Rolf George and Glen Koehn: Brentano's relation to Aristotle 20; 3. Peter Simons: Judging correctly: Brentano and the reform of elementary logic 45; 4. Kevin Mulligan: Brentano on the mind 66; 5. Dale Jacques: Brentano's concept of intentionality 98; 6. Joseph Margolis: Reflections on intentionality 131; 7. Linda L. McAlister: Brentano's epistemology 149; 8. Charles Parsons: Brentano on judgment and truth 168; 9. Arkadiusz Chrudzinski and Barry Smith: Brentano's ontology: from conceptualism to reism 197; 10. Wilhelm Baumgartner and Lynn Pasquerella: Brentano's value theory: beauty, goodness, and the concept of correct emotion 220; 11. Susan F. Krantz Gabriel: Brentano on religion and natural theology 237; 12. Robin D. Rollinger: Brentano and Husserl 255; 13. Karl Schuhmann: Brentano's impact on twentieth-century philosophy 277; Bibliography 298; Index 316-322.
172. ———. 2012. "Brentano on Aristotle's Categories: First Philosophy and the Manifold Senses of Being." In *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology*, edited by Tănăsescu, Ion, 53-94. Bucharest: Zeta Books.
"Brentano's 1862 dissertation, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, is a scholarly historical study and philosophical consideration of Aristotle's theory of categories.(1)
The categories in Aristotle's first philosophy, as Brentano interprets them, are the mutually independent predicates of being at the highest levels of generality, in the variety of ways in which we speak about being. If correctly identified, the categories should correspond exactly to the multiple modes of existence or ways of being that are available to primary substances in the actual world as Aristotle conceptualizes them. As such, they are the categories not only of our predicative thoughts, but of the real existence of primary substances.
Aristotle's categories accordingly constitute the rock bottom of his first philosophy. They are his *ontology*, built on the Greek word "ontos" for "being"; or, better, melding "ousia" as Aristotle's Greek term for 'substance', they are the fundamental concepts of his *ousiology*." (pp. 53-54)
(1) Brentano, Franz (1862): *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder'sche Verlagshandlung; (ed. and trans.) George, Rolf (1975): *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*. Berkeley: University of California Press (all parenthetical page references to this translation).
173. ———. 2016. "Brentano's Signature Contributions to Scientific Philosophy." *Brentano Studien* no. 14:127-157.
Abstract: "Brentano's agreement with the discovery of inner sensation or perception and the faculty of active intellect in Aristotle reflects the exact meaning by which both thinkers regard philosophy and philosophical psychology or philosophy of mind as (externally and internally) empirical and by extension (externally and internally) scientific. Brentano's psychology is scientific in an Aristotelian sense directly inspired by the arguments of *De Anima*. It recognizes and builds its explanations on inner as well as outer sense and perception in establishing empirical experiential foundations for knowledge. Aristotelian-Brentanian philosophical psychology avails itself of the mind's active as well as passive cognitive capabilities in taking the first steps toward a scientific proto-phenomenology. It is in his combined expansively outer and inner empirical psychology of passive and active intellect that Brentano's signature contributions to an Aristotelian sense of scientific philosophy are most instructively ascertained."
174. ———. 2019. "Brentano on Aristotle's Psychology of the Active Intellect." In *Aristotelian Studies in 19th Century Philosophy*, edited by Hartung, Gerald, King,

Colin Guthrie and Rapp, Christof, 149-177. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Abstract: "One of the battlefields of Aristotelian studies in the 19th century is Aristotle's theory of the intellect. Franz Brentano's famous *Habilitationschrift* on this topic became very much contested among Aristotle scholars of this time.

In this chapter Dale Jacquette argues that by this treatise Brentano provides a lasting systematic contribution to a precise problem in the theory of mind: the problem of how the mind generates abstractions from subjectively experienced sense impression and perceptions. One of the surprising results of studying Brentano's work in this connection is the manner in which his interpretation of Aristotle engages mind-theoretical themes and assumptions from British Empiricism, all while defending Aristotelian metaphysics against such a tradition."

175. Janoušek, Hynek. 2017. "Consciousness of Judging: Katkov's Critique of Marty's State of Affairs and Brentano's Description of Judgement." In *Mind and Language – on the Philosophy of Anton Marty*, edited by Taieb, Hamid and Fréchette, Guillaume, 241-260. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Abstract: "This study presents Katkov's critique of Marty's theory of meaning and Brentano's description of judgemental consciousness. Katkov, a student of Oskar Kraus in Prague, developed an interesting account of a reistic reduction of states of affairs. This reduction is based on Katkov's transformation of Marty's theory of the secondary intention of statements (linguistically expressed judgements) and on a further development of Brentano's theory of judgements. According to Katkov's theory, all linguistically expressed judgements have to manifest two independent judgements if they are to fulfil the communicative goal of a speaker. The first judgement is a basic acceptance or negation of an object. The second is a higher-order belief in the correctness of the acceptance or negation. Katkov then reduces states of affairs to the consciousness of objective validity, which consists in such a belief in correctness. In this article I first present some features of Katkov's critique of Marty's theory of linguistic communication of statements.

I then offer my own short reply to Katkov's questions.

The study concludes by presenting Katkov's reduction of states of affairs to a complex of beliefs and by questioning Katkov's description concerning the difference between sensory perception and rational judgement. This difference motivates Katkov's separation of a basic acceptance or negation on the one side and a separate belief in the correctness of the acceptance or negation on the other."

References

Katkov, G. (1930), 'Bewußtsein, Gegenstand, Sachverhalt. Eine Brentanostudie', *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie* 75(3/4), p. 459–544.

Katkov, G. (1978), 'The World in which Franz Brentano Believed He Lived', *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 5, p. 11–27.

176. Kamitz, Reinhard. 1962. "Acts and Relations in Brentano: A Reply to Prof. Grossmann." *Analysis* no. 22:73 - 78.

"In the very interesting article by Prof. Reinhardt Grossmann about Brentano's theory of relations(1) there are, in my opinion, some serious errors concerning Brentano's theory which, I feel, ought to be rectified.

Such a correction first of all calls for a short summary of Brentano's semiotic ideas." (p. 73)

(...)

"Recapitulating what I said about Mr. Grossmann's argument in regard to Brentano's confusion of two different questions, one can finally put it shortly thus; Mr. Grossmann would be quite right, if words such as 'relation', etc., were autosemantica, i.e. words with a meaning-function of their own, so that one could legitimately demand a definition of the term 'relation'. This, however, is, according to Brentano, not the case. Therefore Mr. Grossmann's argument fails to convince."

(p. 78)

(1) 'Acts and Relations in Brentano', *Analysis* 21.1, 1960.

177. ———. 1963. "Acts and Relations in Brentano: A Second Reply to Professor Grossmann." *Analysis* no. 24:36-41.
 "In a recent article "Brentano's Ontology: A Reply to Mr. Kamitz" (*Analysis* 23.1, October 1962) Prof. Grossmann tries to prove that my arguments, expressed in *Analysis* 22.4, are for the most part not only based on a misrepresentation of his own criticism of Brentano, but also on a erroneous representation of Brentano's teaching itself.(2) I now wish to consider Prof. Grossmann's new arguments.
 (...)
 "Brentano never denied the existence of relational acts, but only—as a result of critical linguistic researches—the existence of *Koexistenzrelationen*. Prof. Grossmann has overlooked this distinction (as well as the ambiguity of the word 'object') and has therefore been led to false conclusions regarding Brentano's theory of acts and relations." (p. 40, a note omitted)
 (3) For this reason I especially appreciate Prof. Mayer-Hillebrand's willingness to join the discussion in a last word to this article.
 Prof. Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand, of the University of Innsbruck, writes:
 "I cannot here discuss Prof. Grossmann's misinterpretations, nor is it necessary, because Dr. Kamitz has already done so.
 It is because of the great importance of this point that I was ready to add a postscript to this article by Dr. Kamitz, whose opinions on this matter I fully share." (p. 41)
178. Katkov, George. 1978. "The World in Which Brentano Believed He Lived." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:11-27.
 Abstract: "The first part of this paper gives a summary of some philosophical discoveries of Brentano which affected his outlook on the world in which he lived. The other, lesser part, contains reminiscences of how the philosophical thinking of the man affected his behaviour to the world around him."
179. Kavanaugh, Leslie. 2008. "Brentano on Space." *Footprint* no. 3:39-50.
 "At the end of the nineteenth century, Franz Brentano developed a philosophical method that would be a sort of middle way between the idealism inherited from Kant, the ontological gap inherited from Descartes, and a brute materialism advocated primarily by the emerging hegemony of scientific procedure. The question was (and is): What is my relation to the world? Is the world completely 'out there' and then a matter of discovery? If this is the case, then a philosophical account needs to be constructed that explains how we can know the world. Is the world, on the other hand, completely 'in here', in my mind – the world being a mere representation of sense data? If this is the case, then a philosophical account would still need to explain how the world is constituted in my mind. Both accounts had failed historically. Furthermore, both accounts could not explain the relationship between my 'mind' and other 'minds'. This impasse, this aporia, was the birthplace of phenomenology. (pp. 40-41)
180. Körner, Stephan. 1987. "On Brentano's Objections to Kant's Theory of Knowledge." *Topoi* no. 6:11-17.
 Abstract: "The main purpose of this essay is to examine Brentano's rejection of Kant's theory of a priori concepts and synthetic a priori judgments. The essay begins by recalling the views of Descartes and Locke about the acquisition of knowledge, since Brentano regards them as on the whole correct or, at least, as pointing in the right direction and since he regards Kant's epistemology as obscurantist and reactionary (Section 1). There follows a brief characterization of Brentano's conception of knowledge as based on self-evident inner perception and analytic propositions, i.e. propositions which are true *ex terminis* (Section 2). Next some aspects of Kant's epistemology are compared with corresponding features of Brentano's doctrine (Section 3). In the light of this comparison the validity of Brentano's criticisms is examined (Section 4). In conclusion an independent view of the function of concepts and of their relation to perception is briefly outlined and contrasted with the views of Kant and Brentano (Section 5)."

181. Kotarbinski, Tadeusz. 1976. "Franz Brentano as Reist." In *The Philosophy of Brentano*, edited by McAlister, Linda L., 194-203. London: Duckworth. Translated from the French by Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schättle. Reprinted from the *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* vol. 20, no. 78 (1966), pp. 459-76.
- "The term 'reism' was coined when I wrote my book on formal logic and the methodology of science entitled *Gnosiology*, which first appeared in 1929.(2)" (p. 194)
- (...)
- "At the time I wrote this I was unaware that the scope and substance of this reism had already been formulated and put forth earlier by Franz Brentano, especially in the appendices to the supplement to his major work *Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint*. This supplement, entitled *The Classification of Mental Phenomena* appeared in 1911 together with the above-mentioned appendices. In 1924 (Vol. I) and 1925 (Vol. II), after the death of the author the second edition of the complete work appeared, supplemented by new additions, notably by a number of dictations by the author between 1915 and 1917, after he had lost his sight. How is it possible that I did not know of Brentano's thought when I wrote my *Gnosiology*? I was, after all, a student of Professor Kazimierz Twardowski, who was himself a student of Brentano's. There is a very simple explanation of this puzzle. Brentano was not a very faithful follower of his own doctrines; on the contrary, in his later years he completely changed his whole point of view. Therefore his followers went in two different directions: one group continued to work on the typology and the structural analysis of so-called intentional entities which are intangible objects perceived only through the act of thinking; the other group (by adopting the essential sense of the word 'exist') was converted to the belief that things are the only existing objects and, at the same time, are the only things that can be the objects of thought. The second group, Brentano's reist followers, consisted, among others, of Oskar Kraus, editor and annotator of the above-mentioned second edition of the *Psychology*, and also the editor and annotator of numerous posthumous writings of the master. The first group consisted of Meinong, Husserl and many others, among them Twardowski; his treatise on 'acts and products' shows, above all, that Twardowski firmly maintained a nonreist point of view in the controversy between logic and ontology." (p. 195)
- (2) *Elements Teorii Poznania, Logiki Formalnej i Metodologii Nauk* (Lvov, 1929; 2nd ed. Wrocław, Warsaw and Cracow, 1961). English translation, *Gnosiology. The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge*, trans. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, translation ed. G. Bidwell and C. Finder (Oxford and New York, 1966).
182. Krantz Gabriel, Susan. 2004. "Brentano on religion and natural theology." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacqueline, Dale, 237-254. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- "Although Brentano broke with organized religion in the late 1870s, he remained a traditional theist all his life and was still writing (by dictation) on subjects in natural theology in 1917."
- (...)
- "The best way to understand Brentano's natural theology is to see it in the context of Aristotelian empiricism as modified by the somewhat Cartesian outlook of Brentano's philosophical psychology." (p. 237)
183. ———. 2006/2009. "Brentano on Albert the Great's *Summa de creaturis*, Concerning the Substantiality of the Soul." *Brentano Studien* no. 12:357-367. Abstract: "Though Brentano's lectures on medieval philosophy belong to his early period (1864-1873), it is possible to find evidence in them of abiding interests that later developed into his mature thought. The thesis that the soul is a substance, which Brentano noted in the philosophy of Albert the Great, clearly forms the core of Brentano's later reism. I show how both Brentano's presentation of the topic, and his interpretation of Albert, as well as his reliance on 19th century historians of philosophy, lead to this conclusion."

184. ———. 2017. "Brentano on Darwin I: Teleology." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:361-372.
 Abstract: "In his *On the existence of God: Lectures given at the Universities of Würzburg and Vienna (1868–1891)*, Brentano's version of the teleological proof of God's existence receives more attention than his three other proofs do, and within its presentation an analysis of the Darwinian theory of evolution is the main focus. Brentano objected, not to the fact of the evolution of species, but rather to the Darwinian explanation of evolution in terms of random mutation and natural selection. In analyzing Brentano's objection to Darwin's explanation of evolution, this article examines his distinction between apparent teleology and real teleology, his commentary on the theory of random chance, and, apart from the question of God's existence, the difficulty in general of accounting for biological phenomena without recourse to some concept of purpose."
185. ———. 2018. "Brentano on Darwin II: Science." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:143-156.
 Abstract: "In his *On the existence of God: Lectures given at the Universities of Würzburg and Vienna (1868-1891)*, Brentano offers several proofs of God's existence, of which the teleological proof gets more attention than any other, and within this presentation an analysis of the Darwinian theory of evolution is decidedly prominent. Although Brentano was critical of certain aspects of Darwinism, in particular the apparent denial of purposes in nature, it would be a mistake to conclude that he rejected the science behind the theory of evolution. Rather, in this, as in other areas of scientific research, Brentano was an interested and well-informed student, conversant in and respectful of the scientific developments of his era. This article examines Brentano's views on the science of evolution, including some of the specific scientific discoveries with which he was familiar, and some of the contemporary scientists whose views he discussed, as these are to be found in his lectures on the existence of God."
186. ———. 2021. "Brentano on Kant's Transcendental Idealism." In *The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller*, edited by Antonelli, Mauro and Binder, Thomas, 50-70. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.
 "Franz Brentano did not admire Kant's philosophy. In fact, it would not be overstating the case to say that he held transcendental idealism in contempt. At the same time, it can be persuasively argued that Brentano was indebted to Kant, namely, that some of his views involve or lead to a kind of phenomenological realism. In what follows I shall first examine Brentano's critique of Kant as it is to be found in his lectures on the existence of God (Brentano, 1987). Then I shall address the question of Brentano's fairness to Kant. Finally, I shall venture a resulting account of Brentano's realism." (p. 50, notes omitted)
 References
 Brentano, F. (1987). *On the existence of God: Lectures given at the Universities of Würzburg and Vienna (1868–1891)*, ed. and trans. by S. F. Krantz. The Hague: Nijhoff.
187. Krantz, Susan. 1988. "Brentano's argument against Aristotle for the immateriality of the soul." *Brentano Studien* no. 1:63-74.
 Abstract: "The Aristotelian conception of the soul as Brentano understood it is examined, with respect to the nature of the soul and mainly to what Aristotle called the sensitive soul, since this is where the issue of the soul's corporeity becomes important. Secondly the difficulties are discussed which Brentano saw in the Aristotelian semimaterialistic conception concerning the intellectual, as distinct from the sensitive soul from Brentano's reistic point of view which claimed that the entire human soul is a substance in its own right and that it is an immaterial substance. Finally there follows a presentation of what is taken to be Brentano's conception of the soul as it appears from a reistic interpretation of his analyses of the act of sensation and of the subject of sensation in order to shed some light on the reistic ontology that may be taken to underlie Brentano's psychology."

188. ———. 1993. "Brentano's Revision of the Correspondence Theory." *Brentano Studien* no. 3:79-88.
 Abstract: "Franz Brentano took exception to the classic statement of the correspondence theory of truth, the thesis: *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*. His reasons for objecting to it, and his proposed revision of the thesis, are interesting considered in themselves as well as for the light they shed on Brentano's view of the relation between the thinker and the world. With regard to the former, it is shown how Brentano analyzes the *adaequatio* thesis word by word in order to demonstrate what he takes to be its fundamental incoherence. With regard to the latter, it becomes apparent, by contrast with the Thomistic understanding of the *adaequatio* thesis, that Brentano's revision of it in the direction of a phenomenological theory of truth also involves a revised understanding of the nature of the thinker or knower."
189. ———. 1993. "Brentanian unity of consciousness." *Brentano Studien* no. 4:89-100.
 Abstract: "Brentano's thoughts on unity of consciousness are of central importance to an understanding of his psychology and of his ontology. By means of a reistic interpretation of his views on unity of consciousness, and in contrast with the Aristotelian approach to unity of consciousness, one begins to see the paradoxically objective and realistic spirit of Brentano's subjectivism in psychology."
190. Kriegel, Uriah. 2013. "Brentano's Most Striking Thesis: No Representation Without Self-Representation." In *Themes from Brentano*, edited by Fisette, Denis and Fréchette, Guillaume, 23-40. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
 "Section 8 of Chapter 2 of Part II of the *Psychology* reads: "A Presentation and the Presentation of that Presentation are Given in One Mental Act." Thus Brentano appears fully committed, in a considered way, to the idea that there could be no representation without self-representation. To my mind, this is Brentano's most striking thesis: that the very possibility of representing an apple, say, depends on the possibility of self-representing to represent an apple.
 In what follows, I want to argue that this claim, which sounds odd to our modern sensibilities, is actually deeply insightful.
 (...)
 "The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In §2, I will argue that there could be no representation-of without representation-to.
 There can be token representations-of that are not representations-to, but they must betoken a type of representation some tokens of which are both representations-of and representations-to. In §3, I will offer
 an analysis of "x represents y to z" according to which it means (more or less) that z has a representation of x representing y. In §4, I will note that this generates a regress of representations which can only end with self-representing representations. If my thought of the Sydney Opera House represents both the Opera House and itself, then it is both a representation-of and a representation-to without requiring the postulation of any further representation. The upshot is that there could be no representation without self-representation: in a world without self-representing representations there would be no representation at all. Brentano's most striking thesis is true." (pp. 24-25)
191. ———. 2015. "How to Speak of Existence: A Brentanian Approach to (Linguistic and Mental) Ontological Commitment." In *Themes from Ontology, Mind, and Logic: Essays in Honor of Peter Simons*, edited by Lapointe, Sandra, 81-106. Leiden: Brill.
 Summary "To a first approximation, ontology is concerned with what exists, metaontology with what it means to say that something exists. So understood, metaontology has been dominated by three views: (i) existence as a substantive first-order property that some things have and some do not, (ii) existence as a formal first-order property that everything has, and (iii) existence as a second-order property of existents' distinctive properties. Each of these faces well-documented difficulties.

- In this chapter, I want to expound a fourth theoretical option, which unfortunately has remained ‘under the radar.’ This is Franz Brentano’s view, according to which to say that X exists is not to attribute a property at all (first- or second-order), but to say that the correct attitude to take toward X is that of accepting or believing in it."
192. ———. 2015. "Thought and Thing: Brentano's Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 90:153-180.
"Introduction
The ontological theory of the later Franz Brentano is often referred to as ‘reism.’ But what exactly is reism, and how is it related to modern-day nominalism? In this paper, I offer an interpretation of Brentano’s reism as a specific variety of nominalism. This variety, although motivated by distinctly modern concerns about truthmakers, adopts a strategy for providing such truthmakers that is completely foreign to modern nominalism. The strategy rests on proliferation of coincident concrete particulars. For example, ‘Socrates is wise’ and ‘Socrates is Greek’ are made true, respectively, by wise-Socrates and Greek-Socrates, where wise-Socrates and Greek-Socrates are two coinciding but numerically distinct concrete particulars (which also coincide with Socrates)." (p. 153)
193. ———. 2016. "Brentano's Latter-day Monism." *Brentano Studien* no. 14:69-77.
Abstract: "The recent literature on the metaphysics of material objects has featured extensive discussion of monism, the thesis that the world as a whole – the cosmos – is the only material object, or at least the only fundamental material object. A notable byproduct of the growing interest in monism has been a rather energetic reexamination of historical forms of monism. Philosophers whose monist metaphysics has earned serious reconsideration include Parmenides (Rea 2001), Spinoza (Goff 2012, Guigon 2012), the British idealists (Schaffer 2010b) and some of the latter’s American counterparts (Zimmerman forthcoming). One philosopher whose monistic musings have not yet been excavated as part of this general movement, however, is Franz Brentano. In a single known document – a dictation from 30 January 1915 (when he was 77 and completely blind) – Brentano develops what appears to be a version of monism about the material world. This brief note offers a presentation of Brentano’s specific version of monism, and of his master argument for it."
194. ———. 2016. "Brentano’s Mature Theory of Intentionality." *Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy* no. 4:1-15.
Abstract: "The notion of intentionality is what Franz Brentano is best known for. But disagreements and misunderstandings still surround his account of its nature. In this paper, I argue that Brentano’s mature account of the nature of intentionality construes it, not as a two-place relation between a subject and an object, nor as a three-place relation between a subject’s act, its object, and a ‘content,’ but as an altogether non-relational, intrinsic property of subjects. I will argue that the view is more defensible than might initially appear."
195. ———, ed. 2017. *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*. New York: Routledge.
Contents: Uriah Kriegel: Introduction 1;
Part I: Brentano’s Philosophy
1. Thomas Binder: Franz Brentano: Life and Work 15; 2. Uriah Kriegel: Brentano’s Philosophical Program 21;
1.1: Mind
3. Denis Seron: Brentano’s Project of Descriptive Psychology 35; 4. Tim Crane: Brentano on Intentionality 41; 5. Mark Textor: Brentano on Consciousness 49; 6. Barry Dainton: Brentano on the Unity of Consciousness 61; 7. Guillaume Fréchette: Brentano on Time-Consciousness 75; 8. Olivier Massin: Brentano on Sensations and Sensory Qualities 87; 9. Uriah Kriegel: Brentano’s Classification of Mental Phenomena 97; 10. Uriah Kriegel: Brentano on Judgment 103; 11. Michelle

- Montague: Brentano on Emotion and the Will 110; 12. Gianfranco Soldati: Brentano on Self-Knowledge 124,
1.2: Metaphysics
13. Werner Sauer: Brentano's Reism 133; 14. Susan Krantz Gabriel: Brentano on the Soul 144; 15. Wojciech Żelaniec: Brentano on Time and Space 150; 16. Hamid Taieb: Brentano on Properties and Relations 156;
17. Johannes L. Brandl: Brentano on Truth 163; 18. Denis Seron.: Brentano on Appearance and Reality 169; 19. Alessandro Salice: Brentano on Negation and Nonexistence 178;
1.3: Value
20. Jonas Olson: Brentano's Metaethics 187; 21. Lynn Pasquerella: Brentano's Normative Ethics 196; 22. Wolfgang Huemer: Brentano on Beauty and Aesthetics 202; 23. Ion Tănăsescu: Brentano on Genius and Fantasy 210; 24. Richard Schaefer: Brentano's Philosophy of Religion 216;
Part II: The Brentano School
25. Arnaud Dewalque: The Rise of the Brentano School 225; 26. Arnaud Dewalque: The Unity of the Brentano School 236;
2.1: Brentano's Students
27. Laurent Cesalli and Kevin Mulligan: Marty and Brentano 251; 28. Denis Fisette: Stumpf and Brentano 264; 29. Johann Christian Marek: Meinong and Brentano 272; 30. Maria E. Reicher: Ehrenfels and Brentano 283;
31. Dermot Moran: Husserl and Brentano 293; 2.2: Arianna Betti: Twardowski and Brentano 305;
2.2: Students' Students and Further Influences
33. Hynek Janoušek and Robin Rollinger: The Prague School 313; 34. Guillaume Fréchette: Bergman and Brentano 323; 35. Arianna Betti: Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School 334; 36. Wilhelm Baumgartner: The Innsbruck School 341; 37. Maria van der Schaar: Brentano, Stout and Moore 349; 38. Dale Jacquette: Chisholm and Brentano 358;
Notes on Contributors 365; Brentano Bibliography 368; Brentano Bibliography—Archival Material 371; References 372; Index 395-399.
196. ———. 2017. "Brentano's Philosophical Program." In *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*, edited by Kriegel, Uriah, 21-32. New York: Routledge.
"Franz Brentano was not a systematic writer, but he was very much a systematic thinker.
Through his manuscripts, lecture notes, letters, dictations, and occasional published writings, one can discern a systematic, unified approach to the true, the good, and the beautiful. My goal here is to articulate explicitly this approach, and the philosophical program it reflects. The exercise requires going over big stretches of terrain with some efficiency; I will go just as deep into Brentano's approaches to the true, the good, and the beautiful as is required to make explicit their structural unity. The basic idea behind Brentano's program is that there are three distinctive types of mental act that proprietarily target the true, the good, and the beautiful. To understand the true, the good, and the beautiful, we must obtain a clear grasp (i) of the distinctive mental acts targeting them and (ii) of success in such targeting. According to Brentano, the true is that which it is correct, or fitting, or appropriate to believe; the good is that which it is correct/fitting to love or like or approve of; and the beautiful is that with which it is correct/fitting to be delighted.(1) The next three sections develop and (do the minimum to) motivate each of these claims." (p. 21)
(1) The term Brentano prefers in this context is *Richtig*, most naturally translated as "correct" or "fitting." But in one place he offers a number of synonyms—*konvenient*, *passend*, and *entsprechend* (Brentano 1969: 74)—which are more or less interchangeably translatable as "appropriate," "suitable," "fitting," and "adequate."
References

- Brentano, Franz (1969). *The Origins of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*. Trans. R. M. Chisholm and E. H. Schneewind. London: Routledge.
197. ———. 2017. "Brentano's Classification of Mental Phenomena." In *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*, edited by Kriegel, Uriah, 97-102. New York: Routledge.
 "In Chapter 3 of Book I of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Brentano articulates what he takes to be the four most basic and central tasks of psychology. One of them is to discover the "fundamental classification" of mental phenomena. Brentano attends to this task in Chapters 5–9 of Book II of the *Psychology*, reprinted (with appendices) in 1911 as a standalone book (Brentano 1911a). The classification is further developed in an essay entitled "A Survey of So-Called Sensory and Noetic Objects of Inner Perception," published posthumously in Brentano 1928/1981b, as well as in a 1907 dictation entitled "Loving and Hating," reprinted in Brentano 1969." (p. 97)
 References
 Brentano, Franz (1911a). *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. All references are to the 1924 edition.
 Brentano, Franz (1969). *The Origins of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*. Trans. R. M. Chisholm and E. H. Schneewind. London: Routledge.
 Brentano, Franz (1981b). *Sensory and Noetic Consciousness*. Trans. M. Schättle and L. L. McAlister. London: Routledge.
198. ———. 2017. "Brentano on Judgment." In *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*, edited by Kriegel, Uriah, 103-109. New York: Routledge.
 " "Judgment" is Brentano's term for any mental state liable to be true or false. This includes not only the products of conceptual thought, such as belief, but also perceptual experiences, such as seeing that the window was left open. "Every perception counts as a judgment," writes Brentano (1874: II, 50/1973a: 209). Accordingly, his theory of judgment is not exactly a theory of the same phenomenon we today call "judgment" but of a larger class of phenomena, one (perhaps the main) species of which is what we call "judgment". Even if we keep this in mind, though, the profound heterodoxy of Brentano's theory of judgment is still striking.
 (...)
 Here I present this unified core of this highly original theory of judgment, which can be captured in terms of three main theses. The first is that, contrary to appearances, all judgments are existential judgments (§1). The second is that the existential force of judgment is indeed a force, or mode, or attitude—it does not come from the judgment's content (§2). The third is that judgment is not a propositional attitude but an "objectual" attitude (§3)."
 References
 Brentano, Franz (1874). *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
199. ———. 2017. "Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental." In *Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy*, edited by Lapointe, Sandra and Pincock, Christopher, 197-228. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
 "1 Introduction
 Perhaps the philosophical thesis most commonly associated with Brentano is that intentionality is the mark of the mental. But in fact Brentano often and centrally uses also what he calls 'inner perception' to demarcate the mental. In this chapter, I offer a new interpretation of Brentano's conception of the interrelations among mentality, intentionality, and inner perception. According to this interpretation, Brentano took the concept of mind to be a natural-kind concept, with intentionality constituting the underlying nature of the mental and inner-perceivability serving as the concept's reference-fixer." (p. 197)

200. ———. 2017. "Brentano's Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Will and Emotion." *Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger* no. 142:529-558.
 "Brentano's theory of will and emotion is less widely discussed, even within the circles of Brentano scholarship. In this paper, I want to show that this is a missed opportunity, certainly for Brentano scholars but also for contemporary philosophy of mind.
 Brentano's accounts of the will and of emotion are, I will argue, both insightful and creative, on the one hand, and strikingly plausible, upon reflection, on the other. The contemporary literature on emotion is considerably larger and more contentious than that on the will. Accordingly, I will start with Brentano's theory of the will, and demonstrate its plausibility against the more peaceful background of current-day discussions of desire (§1). Importantly, however, Brentano offers a somewhat unified account of will and emotion, so I will attempt to leverage the apparent plausibility of his account of will to argue for a similar plausibility in his account of emotion (§2). This will lead to the question of how will and emotion should be distinguished within the unified account – something Brentano has very interesting things to say about (§3)." (p. 529)
201. ———. 2018. *Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value*. New York: Oxford University Press.
 "This is a book about the late-nineteenth-century/early-twentieth-century Austro-German philosopher Franz Brentano. It attempts to present Brentano's philosophical system, especially as it pertains to the connection between mind and reality, in terms that would be natural to contemporary analytic philosophers; to develop Brentano's central ideas where they are overly programmatic or do not take into account philosophical developments that have taken place since Brentano's death a century ago; and to offer a partial defense of Brentano's system as quite plausible and in any case extraordinarily creative and thought-provoking.
 Why write a book about Brentano? For me personally, the primary motivation to study Brentano in detail has been the combination of creativity and plausibility I have found in his work. It seems to me filled with gems that are not so much under-appreciated as virtually unknown by contemporary analytic philosophers. To convince the reader of this is the mandate of the bulk of this book." (p. 1)
202. ———. 2018. "Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis?" In *Non-Propositional Intentionality*, edited by Gzrankowski, Alex and Montague, Michelle, 192-213. New York: Oxford University Press.
 "On the face of it, some of our psychological attitudes are propositional and some are objectual.
 (...)
 Very few philosophers have held that in fact no attitudes are propositional—that all are objectual. Perhaps Hume held this view. One philosopher who certainly did is Franz Brentano. Brentano explicitly writes that 'All mental references refer to things' (Brentano 1911, 291), where a 'thing' is an individual object or concrete particular.
 His argument for this cannot be appreciated without a detailed account of his entire philosophy of mind. Short on space, here I will restrict myself to his case for the thesis that judgment is an objectual attitude. This thesis would already be of first importance, since judgment and belief are customarily taken to be the paradigmatic propositional attitudes. This seems antecedently very plausible: you can love Jane, but you cannot judge Jane (in the relevant sense) or judge that Jane. And yet, I will argue, Brentano's case for an objectualist account of judgment is surprisingly compelling.
 Although the case has some local holes in it, I will argue that they can be filled reasonably satisfactorily.
 I start, in section 2, with some background on Brentano's notion of judgment, as it emerges from his classification of mental states. In section 3, I offer an initial exposition of his objectualist account of judgment for analytic philosophers. In

- section 4, I reconstruct and tighten Brentano's case for the objectualist account. In section 5, I consider some key objections." (pp. 192-193)
- References
 Brentano, F. C. (1874) *Psychology from Empirical Standpoint*, ed. O. Kraus, tr. A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and L. L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).
 Brentano, F. C. (1911) *Appendix to the Classification of Mental Phenomena*. In Brentano 1874.
203. ———. 2018. "Brentano's Dual-Framing Theory of Consciousness." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 97:79-98.
 Abstract: "Brentano's theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind (Thomasson 2000, Caston 2002, Hossack 2002, 2006, Kriegel 2003a, 2003b, 2009, Thomas 2003, Smith 2004, Zahavi 2004, Drummond 2006, Textor 2006, 2013). Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano's theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano's theory, as interpreted here, a conscious experience of a tree is a mental state that can be simultaneously thought of, or framed, equally accurately as (i) an awareness of a tree or (ii) an awareness of an awareness of a tree."
 References
 Caston, V. 2002. 'Aristotle on Consciousness.' *Mind* 111: 751–815.
 Drummond, J. J. 2006. 'The Case(s) of (Self-)Awareness.' In U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
 Hossack, K. 2002. 'Self-Knowledge and Consciousness.' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 102: 163–181.
 Hossack, K. 2006. 'Reid and Brentano on Consciousness.' In M. Textor (ed.). *The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy*. London: Routledge.
 Kriegel, U. 2003a. 'Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument.' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 33: 103–132.
 Kriegel, U. 2003b. 'Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles.' *Synthese* 134: 477–504.
 Kriegel, U. 2009. *Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
 Smith, D. W. 2004. 'Return to Consciousness.' In his *Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology* (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Textor, M. 2006. 'Brentano (and some Neo-Brentanians) on Inner Consciousness.' *Dialectica* 60: 411–432.
 Textor, M. 2013. 'Brentano on the Dual Relation of the Mental.' *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 12: 465–483.
 Thomas, A. P. 2003. 'An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness.' *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 2: 161–185.
 Thomasson, A. L. 2000. 'After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness.' *European Journal of Philosophy* 8: 190–209.
 Zahavi, D. 2004. 'Back to Brentano?' *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 11: 66–87.
204. ———. 2022. Franz Brentano: An Invitation to Philosophy.
 Available for download at PhiArchive: <https://philpapers.org/rec/KRIFBC>
 "The article is written to be understood without any background in philosophy, and in fact may double as an introduction to the various branches philosophy itself. Each section covers Brentano's core ideas in one branch of philosophy, starting with the briefest exposition of the branch itself. This exposition occurs before the subsections of each sections begin, and may be skipped by more advanced readers. Note also that the sections are fairly modular, so the article need not be read in its entirety to make sense. For instance, sections 2-5 constitute something of a self-standing text, as do sections 5-8." (p. 4)

205. ———. 2022. "The Epistemology of Intentionality: Notional Constituents vs. Direct Grasp." *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Published online: 07 May 2021.
Abstract: "Franz Brentano is well known for highlighting the importance of intentionality, but he said curiously little about the nature of intentionality. According to Mark Textor, there is a deep reason for this: Brentano took intentionality to be a conceptual primitive the nature of which is revealed only in direct grasp. Although there is certainly textual support for this interpretation, it appears in tension with Brentano's repeated attempts to analyze intentionality in terms of 'notional constituents' – aspects of intentionality which cannot come apart in reality but which can be conceptually distinguished. After bringing out this tension, I explore some options for resolving it, ultimately offering my own favored interpretation."
206. ———. 2023. "Précis of Brentano's Philosophical System." *European Journal of Philosophy*:455-457.
"The purpose of my book *Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value* (henceforth, BPS) is to reconstruct Brentano's attempt to answer his question, present a partial defense of the answer, offer some potential improvements on it, and also point to persistent difficulties it faces.
Below, I (a) speed-explain Brentano's self-imposed constraint and its motivation, (b) reconstruct Brentano's account of the real in light of it, and (c) reconstruct Brentano's corresponding account of the valuable. These three tasks correspond roughly to BPS's three parts: 'Mind,' 'Being,' and 'Value.'"(p. 455)
207. Kroon, Frederick. 2013. "Intentional Objects, Pretence, and the Quasi-Relational Nature of Mental Phenomena: A New Look at Brentano on Intentionality." *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* no. 21:377-393.
Abstract: "Brentano famously changed his mind about intentionality between the 1874 and 1911 editions of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (PES). The 1911 edition repudiates the 1874 view that to think about something is to stand in a relation to something that is within in the mind, and holds instead that intentionality is only like a relation (it is 'quasi-relational').
Despite this, Brentano still insists that mental activity involves 'the reference to something as an object', much as he did in the 1874 edition of PES. The question is what Brentano might have meant by this, given that he rejects a relational account of intentionality. The present paper suggests an answer. It draws on recent work on pretence theory to provide a model of Brentano's notion of the quasi-relational nature of mental phenomena, as well as of the notion of mental reference to an object, and argues that the model helps to explain why Brentano might have been able discern a clear continuity between the views of the 1874 and 1911 editions of PES, despite the differences."
208. Kujundzic, Neb. 2012. "The Power of Abstraction: Brentano, Husserl and the Göttingen Students." *Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale* no. 16:191-200.
Abstract: "A quick look into the index of Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* reveals that all references to "abstract terms" occur only in the appendix (taken from Brentano's "Nachlass" essays).
What should we make of this? Was it the case that the inquiry into abstract, as well as non-existent, objects came as an afterthought to Brentano? Or was he all too aware of the consequences of such investigations?
Furthermore, was it largely the absence of such inquiry that prompted Husserl and his early students in Göttingen, such as Daubert and Reinach, to develop a deep ontological commitment to entities he refers to as "abstract" or "ideal"?"
209. Küng, Guido. 1986. "Brentano and Ingarden on the Experience and Cognition of Values." *Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University)* no. 10:57-67.
210. Land, J. P. N. 1876. "Brentano's Logical Innovations." *Mind* no. 1:289-292.

- "It will hardly be necessary to mark the passages of Mill's writings which may have led the Austrian Professor to his starting-point.
Let me observe at once that the main feature of his reconstruction of logical doctrine consists in reducing all categorical propositions to what he calls existential propositions, doing away with the familiar distinction between subject and predicate terms. Where we say *Some man is sick*, he gives as a substitute, *There is a sick man*.
Instead of *No stone is alive*, he puts *There is not a live stone*. On the other hand, he proposes to improve on the statement *Some man is not learned* by welding together the negative and the predicate term, and asserting *There is an unlearned man*.
Finally, *All men are mortal* is to be expressed in his system *There is not an immortal man*. That is to say, he simply affirms or denies the existence of some object having either two positive qualifications, or one positive together with one negative." (p. 289)
211. Leclercq, Bruno. 2020. "Foundational Mereology as a Logical Tool for Descriptive Psychology." In *Franz Brentano's Philosophy after Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism*, edited by Fisette, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Janoušek, Hynek, 125-148. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Abstract: "Franz Brentano maintains that consciousness is experienced as a whole and can only be analyzed into "components" through theoretical distinctions. And he claims that some mereology provides the conceptual tools required by such a holistic conception of mind. But of course, this cannot be classical extensional mereology, for which wholes are nothing but the sum of their parts. Brentano's conception of mind requires some "foundational mereology" like the one Husserl sketched in his third *Logical investigation*. In the present paper, we use Gilbert Null's formalization of this foundational mereology in order to investigate the possible relations between what Brentano names the "primary" and "secondary" acts and distinguish thereby several theoretical stands that can be taken on this point, some of them being close to Brentano's own views and some of them challenging it."
References
Null, G. 2007a. The Ontology of Intentionality I. *Husserl Studies* 23: 33–69.
———. 2007b. The Ontology of Intentionality II. *Husserl Studies* 23: 119–159.
212. Leung, Ka-Wing. 2021. "Intra-mental or intra-cranial? On Brentano's concept of immanent object." *European Journal of Philosophy* no. 29:1039-1059.
Abstract: "The aim of this paper is to elucidate Franz Brentano's concept of immanent object through his own words and from his own perspective. The prevalent account of Brentano's revival of intentionality, his initial failure to distinguish between object and content, and his wrong-headed immanentism, is largely derived from his students. Brentano's objection to it, although well known, is seldom heeded. In fact, plenty of guidelines have been provided by Brentano himself in his writings on how his concept of immanent object is to be understood. I begin with his distinction between two senses of "object," which, I argue, must be clearly set apart from distinction between two modes of object. I then examine three different interpretations of the term "in-existence": the locative, the inherentist, and the objective interpretation. In the end, after dismissing the first two interpretations, I argue that Brentano is best understood as maintaining an objective and deflationary account of mental in-existence."
213. Libardi, Massimo. 1996. "Franz Brentano (1838-1917)." In *The School of Franz Brentano*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 25-79. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"Still today, reconstruction of Brentano's thought is haphazard and incomplete. A first difficulty arises because so little of his work has found its way into print; a lack of source material exacerbated by the fact that much of his vast Nachlaß has never been published. (14)

- One reason for the comparative neglect of Brentano's thought is that he concentrated on questions which the text-books on nineteenth-century philosophy dismiss as minor, focusing their attention instead on theories and thinkers who drew their inspiration from the dissolution of the idealist systems or from the intricacies of neo-Kantianism. Brentano stands at the confluence of currents of thought - such as the Aristotelian Renaissance or, at least in certain respects, Italian pragmatism - which have been pushed into the background by the current interpretation of the history of philosophy.
- When Brentano was engaged in writing the two volumes of *Psychologie*, his intention was to follow it with four further books giving more detailed treatment to the properties of and the laws pertaining to the three fundamental classes of psychic phenomena, and to the relationships between psychic and physical phenomena. His project never came to fruition, however, and today commentators use *Psychologie 1* to denote Oskar Kraus's 1924 edition of *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, which includes volume 1 and chapters 1-4 of volume 2 of the 1874 *Psychologie*. *Psychologie 2* denotes *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene*, the second edition by Oskar Kraus, which contains published and unpublished essays from *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene* of 1911 and chapters 5-9 from the second volume of the 1874 *Psychologie* plus some appendixes. *Psychologie 3* is used to denote *Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewusstsein* (taken from the *Nachlass*) in its 1968 edition by Mayer-Hillebrand." (p. 29)
214. Łukasiewicz, Dariusz. 2007. "Brentano's theory of judgment and the Lvov-Warsaw School." *Ruch Filozoficzny* no. 1:33-47.
"I will discuss the reception of Franz Brentano's philosophy in Poland, in particular, the reception of Brentano's ideas among representatives of the Lvov - Warsaw School. However, I would like to confine myself to some Brentano's ideas: his conception of judgment and its philosophical consequences. I will do this, firstly, because it might be perhaps interesting to find in Brentano's heritage one idea which is on the one hand the most characteristic to Brentano and, on the other hand, exerted wide and essential influence on the Polish philosophy. Secondly, the conception of judgment in itself assumes, or implies, theories of truth, values, knowledge, theories of objects, and it also has importance for philosophical foundations of logic." (p. 33, a note omitted)
215. Macnamara, John. 1993. "Cognitive psychology and the rejection of Brentano." *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* no. 23:117-137.
"In *Psychology from an empirical standpoint* Franz Brentano presented a concept of cognitive psychology that contrasts sharply with present day concepts of the subject. It is my theme that Brentano came much closer than modern psychologists to a true understanding of cognition. The psychological community turned its back on Brentano partly because it failed to comprehend him and partly because Brentano's cognitive psychology did not fit in with strong positivist currents that swept psychologists in a different direction. Besides there was a concerted effort by the next generation of psychologists to make psychological research fit the model of biological research. As a result much of what has passed and still passes as cognition misses the heart of the matter. One way forward is to re-examine Brentano's ideas and contrast them with those which at present hold sway. This will, I believe, not only lead to a juster appreciation of the situation but it will also indicate how cognitive psychology ought to be studied. Here I will concentrate on the first part of this task, on an examination of Brentano's thought, and only adumbrate the implications for the study of cognition." (p. 117)
216. Marchesi, Andrea. 2019. "Brentanian Inner Consciousness and the Infinite Regress Problem." *Dialectica* no. 73:129-147.
Abstract: "By "Brentanian inner consciousness" I mean the conception of inner consciousness developed by Franz Brentano. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, to present Brentano's account of inner consciousness; second, to discuss this account in light of the mereology outlined by Brentano himself; and third, to decide

- whether this account incurs an infinite regress. In this regard, I distinguish two kinds of infinite regress: external infinite regress and internal infinite regress. I contend that the most plausible reading of Brentano's account is the so-called fusion thesis, and I argue that internal infinite regress turns out to be inherent to Brentanian inner consciousness."
217. ———. 2022. "A Systematic Reconstruction of Brentano's Theory of Consciousness." *Topoi* no. 41:123-132.
Abstract: "In recent years, Brentano's theory of consciousness has been systematically reassessed. The reconstruction that has received the most attention is the so-called identity reconstruction. It says that secondary consciousness and the mental phenomenon it is about are one and the same. Crucially, it has been claimed that this thesis is the only one which can make Brentano's theory immune to what he considers the main threat to it, namely, the duplication of the primary object. In this paper, I argue that the identity reconstruction is untenable, and I defend an alternative, which I name the unity reconstruction. According to the unity reconstruction, secondary consciousness is a real part of the mental phenomenon it is about, and hence is distinct from it. I contend that this thesis does not in itself lead to the duplication of the primary object, and that what should be blamed is rather a controversial thesis about the intentional structure of secondary consciousness—a thesis which Brentano ultimately abandoned."
218. Margolis, Joseph. 2001. "Reflections on intentionality." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 131-148. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"In fact, Brentano provides a masterly clarification of his account of intentional "activities" in the Appendix to *The Classification of Mental Phenomena* (in effect, the new title for Book Two of the *Psychology*), which was prepared for inclusion in the 1911 edition (and is included in the English translation of the *Psychology*). This was the principal source, for instance, on which Tadeusz Kotarbinski was led to affirm (in his generous way) that "Brentano was the first to develop a reistic philosophy, more than a decade before the system had a name."⁽⁷⁾ Kotarbinski was right in what he says here: the matter is quite important, as we shall see, in simplifying Brentano's general account in the best sense, as well as in distinguishing Brentano's best view (by my own persuasion) from the views of a bewilderingly diffuse army of subsequent discussants who have taken the notion into extravagant conceptual thickets." (pp. 132-133).
(7) Tadeusz Kotarbinski, "Franz Brentano as Reist," in, ed., Linda L. McAlister, *The Philosophy of Brentano* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976), p. 200.
219. Marques de Carvalho, Joelma. 2015. "Franz Brentano's higher-order theories of consciousness." *Argumentos* no. 7:77-84.
Abstract: "This article aims at giving a brief comment on Denis Fisette's interpretation of Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness by Franz Brentano, where consciousness has been seen as a form of intransitive self-consciousness being intrinsic to the agent. In agreement with that interpretation, I want to present a few more basic arguments in order to support that assumption such as, for example, some epistemic thoughts by Brentano given in his books *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte* (1874) and *Die Deskriptive Psychologie* (1982). The present paper has been divided into five sections. The first section deals with the initial understanding of psychology in Brentano. Section two deals with the concepts of consciousness and intentionality. In the third section, the classification of mental phenomena will be presented. Section four refers to the concept of descriptive psychology or phenomenology and finally, I will show the consequences of Brentano's epistemic and ontological arguments related to his concept of consciousness."
220. Marras, Ausonio. 1974. "The Scholastic roots of Brentano's conception of intentionality." *Rassegna di Scienze Filosofiche* no. 1:213-226.

Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, pp. 128-139.

"The aim of this paper is to show, contrary to Spiegelberg's contention, that there is in fact a very intimate connection between the two conceptions of psychological phenomena contained in Brentano's previously quoted passage[*], although no attempt shall be made here to determine the extent to which Brentano was actually aware of this connection. I shall hold, essentially, that the idea of reference to an object not only is not incompatible with the scholastic idea of intentional inexistence, but is in fact constitutive of that very idea. I shall also attempt to discredit an assumption which I believe underlies Spiegelberg's comments in the quotation before the last quotation, and that is that the doctrine of intentional inexistence commits scholastic thought to some form of immanentistic epistemology (opposed, at least in spirit, to Brentano's 'realistic' epistemology), in that it fails, allegedly, to give a coherent account of the independent existence of the object known." (pp. 129-130)

[*] *Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint*, English edition edited by Linda L. McAlister, trans. D.B. Terrell, Antos C. Rancurello, and Linda L. McAlister (London and New York, 1973), p. 88.

221. Martin, Wayne M. 2008. *Theories of Judgment: Psychology, Logic, Phenomenology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3 § 5: *Thetic logic*, pp. 63-73.

"We shall return below to consider the contribution of the phenomenological tradition to the problems of judgment, but our interest here is rather in Brentano's work as a logician. Brentano's logical doctrines have not been widely discussed, and the neglect is in retrospect explicable. His most detailed logical writings were published only posthumously in 1956, and his influence and accomplishment in this area, though significant, were doubly eclipsed: first by his role in the emergence of a distinctively phenomenological school, and then by the broader logical revolution to which Brentano had contributed but which ultimately overswept him.

(Brentano's main logical doctrines were first set out in 1874, and his calculus was elaborated in detail by 1877; Frege's *Begriffsschrift* was published in 1879.)

Nonetheless, Brentano's logical accomplishments merit our attention. Why?

Because in Brentano's logic the dispute over the logical representation of existential judgments turns subversive, directly challenging the longstanding characterization of judgment as synthesis.

Brentano and his collaborators formulated the first modern system of inference that systematically eschewed any appeal to judgment as a synthesis of representational content." (p. 63, a note omitted)

(34) For some exceptions to the general neglect of Brentano's logic, see Chisholm 1982, and important discussions by Simons 1984 and 1987, and the Italian logician Roberto Poli 1993, 1998. By contrast, important studies of the reform of logic in this period leave Brentano entirely out of account (Dummett 1993, Willard 1984), and Barry Smith's account of Brentano's contributions to the tradition he calls "Austrian Philosophy" (1994) skims over Brentano's logical contributions. Two essays by Burnham Terrell (1976, 1978) deal with Brentano's treatment of quantification; for replies see Fischer and Miller 1976 and Chisholm 1976. Perhaps the most intriguing appropriation of Brentano's logical proposals is Kuroda 1972, which uses Brentanian logic in the analysis of Japanese syntax, and is still regularly cited in linguistics research. See, e.g., Sasse 1987, Ladusaw 1994, McNally 1997, 1998.

References

Brentano, Franz. 1870–77: *Die Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil*, published posthumously in an edition edited by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand (Bern: Francke, 1956)

_____ 1874: *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Leipzig: Dunker und Humblot); citations refer to the pagination of the English translation by L. McAlister et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973)

222. ———. 2010. "Fichte's Logical Legacy: Thetic Judgment from the *Wissenschaftslehre* to Brentano." In *Fichte and the Phenomenological Tradition*, edited by Waibel, Violetta L., Breazeale, Daniel and Rockmore, Tom, 379-406. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- "It is not usual to think of Fichte as a logician, nor indeed to think of him as leaving a legacy that shaped the subsequent history of symbolic logic. But I argue here that there is such a legacy, and that Fichte formulated an agenda in formal logic that his students (and their students in turn) used to spark a logical revolution. That revolution arguably reached its culmination in the logical writings of Franz Brentano, better known as a founding figure of the phenomenological movement. In logical writings that were published only posthumously, but that were fully elaborated in the decade prior to the publication of Frege's *Begriffsschrift*, Brentano (together with his collaborator Anton Marty) developed a radically innovative logical calculus that was explicitly designed to overthrow the orthodox logical analysis of judgment and inference. At the center of this revolution was the notion of thetic judgment [thetische Urteil], a form of judgment upon which Fichte had insisted in the first published version of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, and which his students subsequently set out to accommodate within the framework provided by Kant's general logic. But thetic judgment proved resistant to such assimilation, and it was left to Brentano to use the analysis of thetic judgment in his attempt to topple a long-standing logical tradition.
- In what follows I reconstruct the main episodes in this century-long drama in the logical theory of judgment. My discussion is divided into four sections. I begin with a review of Fichte's most explicit call for logical revolution, together with his introduction of the notion of thetic judgment, set against the backdrop of an anomaly within Kant's logical commitments. In the second section I trace the logical treatment of this anomaly among Fichte's philosophical progeny, in particular Johann Friedrich Herbart and Moritz Drobisch. The third section explores Brentano's position, and his more radical solution to the anomaly bequeathed by Kant. In the final section I return to Fichte, to consider to what degree these subsequent developments remained faithful to the logical agenda Fichte had projected." (pp. 379-380)
223. Massin, Olivier. 2018. "Brentanian Continua." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:229-276. Abstract: "The paper presents, criticizes and proposes some fixes to Brentano's theory of continuity (that is, absence of gaps). Brentano's key idea is that continua consists of boundaries (and not of points) and that their continuity is guaranteed by the coincidence of these boundaries. After having presented Brentano's account, I argue that it is beset by two main problems. First, if continua consist only of coinciding boundaries, continua can never be extended. Second, if continua involve coinciding boundaries, there must be some underlying continua in which such a coincidence takes place. But then the continuity of such underlying continua remains unaccounted for.
- To fix these two problems, I argue that we should distinguish the question of the continuity of what is in space and time, from the question of the continuity of space and time themselves. While the continuity of what is in space and time is correctly explained by boundary-coincidence (along Brentano's lines), I suggest that the continuity of space and time themselves is explained not by boundary-coincidence but by a primitive relation of continuity (at which Brentano appears to hint in more neglected places)."
224. Massin, Olivier, and Hämmerli, Marion. 2017. "Is Purple a Red and Blue Chessboard? Brentano on Colour Mixtures." *The Monist* no. 100:37-63. Abstract: "Can we maintain that purple seems composed of red and blue without giving up the impenetrability of the red and blue parts that compose it? Brentano thinks we can. Purple, according to him, is a chessboard of red and blue tiles which, although individually too small to be perceived, are together indistinctly perceived within the purple. After a presentation of Brentano's solution, we raise two objections to it. First, Brentano's solution commits him to unperceivable intentional

- objects (the chessboard's tiles). Second, his chessboard account fails in the end to explain the phenomenal spatial continuity of compound colours. We finally sketch an alternative account of compound colours, which, while holding fast to their phenomenal compoundedness and to the impenetrability of colours, avoids introducing inaccessible intentional objects and compromising on the continuity of the purple. According to our proposal, instead of being indistinctly perceived spatial parts of the purple, red and blue are distinctly perceived nonspatial parts of it."
225. Mayer-Hillebrand, Franziska. 1963. "Remarks Concerning the Interpretation of the Philosophy of Franz Brentano: A Reply to Dr. Szrednicki." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 23:438-444.
 "I feel it necessary to comment upon Dr. J. T. Szrednicki's article in the March, 1962, issue of *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, in which he sets forth his interpretation of the correct way of editing Franz Brentano's scientific manuscripts and of making the philosopher's teachings known in wider areas. Szrednicki criticizes in particular the way in which A. Kastil and I have attempted to reproduce Brentano's trains of thought; he refers to Kastil's *Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos* (Francke-Verlag, Bern 1951) and to my edition of Brentano's *Die Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil* (Francke-Verlag, Bern 1956)."
 (...)
 "As editor of the Brentano manuscripts since Kastil's death in 1950, I believe it to be my duty to place the merits of my revered teacher, A. Kastil, into the proper light, as well as to explain the method which I, in referring to Brentano's explicit wish, used in *Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil*, and to reject Szrednicki's criticisms." (p. 438)
226. McAlister, Linda Lopez. 1970. "Franz Brentano and intentional inexistence." *Journal of History of Philosophy* no. 8:423-430.
 "Franz Brentano, in his important early work *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874), maintains that all human experience is divided into two classes: mental phenomena and physical phenomena,(1) It is then incumbent upon him to show how these two classes of phenomena are to be distinguished one from another. In Book II, Chapter 1, of the *Psychologie*, he devotes himself to this task, and in the course of the chapter he surveys several different ways of making out the distinction.
 After enumerating examples of mental phenomena and of physical phenomena, he searches for defining characteristics of mental phenomena. He finds several characteristics which he thinks all mental phenomena have and all physical phenomena lack or vice versa, but far and away the most important of these, in Brentano's estimation, and the one which has aroused the most interest on the part of later philosophers, is what he calls "intentional inexistence,"(2) (or merely "intentional existence"; the prefix "in-" does not indicate negation but rather location, indicating existence in the mind)." (p. 423)
 (1) i Oskar Kraus, e.d., 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1924), I, 109.
 (2) *Psych.* I, 137.
227. ———. 1975. "Chisholm and Brentano on intentionality." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 28:328-338.
 Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), *The Philosophy of Brentano*, pp. 151-159.
 "I believe, however, that Chisholm's interpretation of Brentano's intentionality doctrine is not wholly accurate, and that while the doctrine he sets forth as Brentano's is an interesting and provocative one, it gives a misleading impression of what Brentano's views actually were, by obscuring almost entirely the specific nature of the question Brentano was trying to solve, and by misreading the answer Brentano gave. If only for the sake of historical accuracy a corrective should be given, but of course, taking another look at Brentano's particular way of construing the mind/body problem and the solution he put forth may also prove to be suggestive in its own right.

- In this paper I will first show that there is no textual basis for the interpretation of Brentano's intentionality doctrine that Chisholm gives, and I will discuss briefly how, in light of that fact, Chisholm might have thought that there was. Then I will point out instances in which the version of intentionality that Chisholm attributes to Brentano conflicts with other views that Brentano held at the time. Out of these discussions emerges a different interpretation of Brentano's intentionality thesis, and, I hope, a more accurate one." (p. 152)
228. ———, ed. 1976. *The Philosophy of Brentano*. London: Duckworth.
Contents: Editor's Introduction VII-IX; Oskar Kraus: Biographical sketch of Franz Brentano 1; Carl Stumpf: Reminiscences of Franz Brentano 10; Edmund Husserl: Reminiscences of Franz Brentano 47; Étienne Gilson: Brentano's interpretation of medieval philosophy 56; Lucie Gilson: Franz Brentano on science and philosophy 68; E. B. Titchener: Brentano and Wundt: empirical and experimental psychology 80; Roderick Chisholm: Brentano's descriptive psychology 91; Thomas De Boer: The descriptive method of Franz Brentano: its two functions and their significance for phenomenology 101; Herbert Spiegelberg: Intention and intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl 108; Ausonio Marras: Scholastic roots of Brentano's conception of intentionality 128; Roderick Chisholm: Intentional inexistence 140; Linda McAlister: Chisholm and Brentano on intentionality 151; Roderick Chisholm: Brentano's theory of correct and incorrect emotion 160; George Edward Moore: Review of Franz Brentano's *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong* 176; Gabriel Franks: Was G. E. Moore mistaken about Brentano? 182; Tadeusz Kotarbinski: Franz Brentano as Reist 194; D. B. Terrell: Brentano's argument for Reismus 204; Hugo Bergmann: Brentano's theory of induction 213; Oskar Kraus: Toward a phenomenology of time consciousness 224; Bibliography of the published writings of Brentano: 240; Bibliography of works on Brentano: 248; Index of names 255; General Index 259-262.
229. ———. 1979. "A Quasi-Brentanian Theory of Objects." *The Journal of Philosophy* no. 76:662-663.
"Recently there has been renewed interest in developing theories of nonexistent objects from such people as the Routleys and Terence Parsons. They often say they are reviving or reconstructing Meinong's Theory of Objects. What they then proceed to do is to reconstruct only a small fragment of his theory. Parsons, for example, calls his a "quasi-Meinongian" theory, but then says, "The theory I want to discuss here is expressly limited to *concrete* objects, some of which exist and some of which do not" (655)."
(...)
"Parsons offers no justification for this limitation. If he did, he might want to argue that concrete objects are the only possible objects of mental acts. Such arguments were developed by Brentano in reaction against Meinong's theory of objects in the early part of the century. In fact, Parsons' theory seems to me more accurately described as a "quasi-Brentanian theory" than as a "quasi-Meinongian" one. That is because Brentano's later philosophy, which is called Reism, can be viewed, like Parsons', as a theory of objects which is limited to concrete objects, both existent and nonexistent." (p. 662)
References
Terence Parsons, The Methodology of Nonexistence, *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 76, No. 11, (Nov., 1979), pp. 649-662.
230. ———. 1982. *The Development of Franz Brentano's Ethics*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"There are two major periods in the philosophical thought of Franz Brentano (1838-1917)."
(...)
Similarly, there are two distinct discernible periods in Brentano's thought concerning ethical theory. Unfortunately, Brentano's ethical writings have never been presented in such a way that this development from the earlier to the later period would be apparent. On the contrary, the manner in which Brentano's ethical

works have been edited serves to obscure the fact that there was such a development rather than exhibit this fact. Only one work on ethics was published during Brentano's lifetime, his lecture *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*,⁽²⁾ wherein he expounds what I shall call his earlier ethical theory. His later moral philosophy, which began to evolve around the turn of the century, and which reflects the changes taking place in his philosophical thought generally, was not set out by Brentano in any published or polished form. It can, however, be pieced together from references in letters and in papers from his extensive *Nachlass*.⁽³⁾ It is also reflected in a work published posthumously under the title *Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik*.⁽⁴⁾ It is the form of editing adopted for this book which does so much to obscure the development of Brentano's ethics. The text is basically that of Brentano's lectures on ethics delivered at the University of Vienna between 1876 and 1894, and so it represents in a more detailed form than does *Ursprung* Brentano's early ethical philosophy. But Professor Mayer-Hillebrand and Professor Alfred Kastil, who worked on this material before her, have chosen to incorporate into this early text Brentano's later ethical views as well, and they have apparently tried to edit out all those sections of the early text which do not agree with these later views. In short they have tried to turn an early text into a later one by virtually reworking it in places. The resulting book is, needless to say, somewhat misleading, for it gives the impression that Brentano had expounded the same ethical theory throughout his life.

In this dissertation I shall try to erase this impression by tracing the development of Brentano's ethics from the earlier to the later period. For the early period my main sources are *Ursprung* and microfilms of the early ethics lectures. I have used *Grundlegung* when its text has not been altered significantly by the editors to conform to Brentano's later views. This entailed checking the entire text against the microfilms of the original lecture notes.⁽⁵⁾

When the text had been altered in *Grundlegung*, I relied on the original texts. For Brentano's later ethical theory I relied mostly on the materials from the *Nachlass* especially upon a recently published selection of later letters and essays entitled *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen*, edited by Professor Mayer-Hillebrand.⁽⁶⁾

In addition to tracing the development of Brentano's ethics and trying to analyze the reasons behind this development, I have tried to present background information concerning his methodology, psychology, epistemology, etc. sufficient for an understanding of his philosophy. I give interpretations of those passages which seem to me to call for further elucidation and I include critical commentary on the major ethical positions Brentano espouses and on some other points as well." (pp. 1-3)

(2) (Leipzig, 1889) - hereafter cited as *Ursprung*. All references are to the 3rd edition, Oskar Kraus, ed. (Leipzig, 1934).

(3) The papers, fragments, dictations, etc. left unpublished by Brentano at his death have been preserved on twenty-seven rolls of microfilm by the philosopher's son Dr. J.C.M. Brentano and the Franz Brentano Foundation. See Dr. Brentano's article "The Manuscripts of Franz Brentano", *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, XX, No. 78 (1966), 476-484.

(4) Ed. Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand (Bern, 1952)--hereafter cited as *Grundlegung*. Translated as *The Foundation and Construction of Ethics*, Elizabeth Huges Schneewind (London, 1973).

(5) I am indebted to the Franz Brentano Foundation for making these films available to me by presenting them as a gift to the Olin Library, Cornell University.

(6) (Bern, 1966).

231. ————. 2004. "Brentano's epistemology." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacqueline Dale, 149-167. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"In this chapter, I will set out what I take to be the basic tenets of Franz Brentano's epistemology. This seemingly simple task is a crucial one because virtually every other aspect of Brentano's philosophy uses his epistemology as a starting point and

is structured in the same way. As the title of his major published work, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, suggests, Brentano saw himself as an empiricist; his account of knowledge, belief and other epistemological concepts is therefore constructed from the building blocks, so to speak, of the phenomena of experience." (p. 149)

232. McDonnell, Cyril. 2006. "Brentano's Revaluation of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality into a Root-Concept of Descriptive Psychology." *Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society*:124-171.
 Abstract: "It is generally acknowledged that it is principally due to Brentano and his students, in particular Husserl, that the medieval-scholastic terminology of 'intentional act' and 'intentional object' re-gained widespread currency in philosophical circles in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. This paper examines Brentano's original re-introduction and revaluation of the Scholastic concept of intentionality into a root-concept of descriptive psychology. It concentrates on (1) Brentano's modification of the Scholastic concept of object-relatedness of the will to depict the object-relatedness of all psychical-act experiences in consciousness, (2) Brentano's modification of the Scholastic concept of the abstracted form of sense residing intentionally in the soul of the knower to depict the directly intended object of consciousness, and (3) the significance of these modifications for understanding what commentators now call 'Brentano's thesis'. It notes that Brentano develops not one but two descriptive-psychological theses of intentionality both of which are entirely unScholastic. It also notes, however, that part of the original meaning of the metaphysical distinction that the Scholastics drew between 'intentional indwelling' (*inesse intentionale*) and 'real being' (*esse naturale*) continues to play a critical role in Brentano's revision of the concept of intentionality in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) and in his lecture courses delivered at Vienna University on *Descriptive Psychology* (1887-91), and that this part of the original meaning of the Scholastic concept of intentionality remains both alive and intact in Brentano's 1874 study and in Husserl's (in)famous transcendental reduction of *Ideas I* (1913). Thus the paper argues that identifying what Brentano accepts, rejects, and adds to the original Scholastic concepts of 'intentional act' and 'the intentional indwelling of an object' cannot be evaded in the proper elucidation and evaluation of 'Brentano's thesis'."
233. ———. 2006. "Brentano's Modification of the Medieval-Scholastic Concept of 'Intentional Inexistence' in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874)." *Maynooth Philosophical Papers* no. 3:55-74.
 Abstract: "Brentano is perhaps most famously renowned for his re-deployment of Scholastic terminology of 'intentional act' and 'intentional object' in the elaboration of his novel science of 'descriptive psychology' in the mid-1870s and 1880s. In this re-deployment, however, Brentano adapted the original Scholastic meanings of both of these terms. Thus Brentano advanced not one but two descriptive-psychological theses of intentionality.(1) These theses, however, are often not properly distinguished, and consequently they are more often confused. Nevertheless, once the two theses are distinguished, Brentano's basic descriptive-psychological tenet of the intentionality of consciousness is more readily understandable on its own terms. Whether Brentano's descriptive-psychological tenet is entirely acceptable philosophically, or not, of course, is another matter but this presupposes understanding in a straightforward sense what Brentano's doctrine is. In this article, I will be concerned mainly with Brentano's re-introduction of 'what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object' in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874),(2) even though it is Brentano's (second) thesis on 'intentional act', one that he developed after his 1874 publication, that is more generally well known and examined. While acknowledging that many versions of 'Brentano's thesis', as it is usually (and loosely) referred to by commentators today, have been re-worked in modern philosophy of mind, this article focuses attention on some of the main points of

- convergence and deviance between the original Scholastic concept and Brentano's 'new' concept of intentionality in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*."
- (1) According to Herbert Spiegelberg: 'It is true that when he [Brentano] uses the adjective "intentional" [in his 1874 *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, qualifying the kind of existence characteristic of the objects of consciousness, as is evident from the context] he still betrays traces of the scholastic doctrine about the immanence of the object known within the soul. But it was this very doctrine about the immanence of the object of knowledge in the soul which Brentano came to reject during what Brentano scholars call the crisis of immanence ("Immanenzkrise") of 1905.' *The Phenomenological Movement: a Historical Introduction* (3rd revised and enlarged edition, with the collaboration of Karl Schuhman, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), p. 48, note 19. Thus it is possible for Brentano, whilst rejecting the immanent object theory of intentionality, to still defend the 'intentional acts' of consciousness after 1905, though 'as far as I [Spiegelberg] can make out, even the term "intentional" disappears from Brentano's psychological vocabulary (*ibid.*).'
- (2) *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. by Antos. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell & Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973; Routledge, 1995), p. 88—henceforth abbreviated as *PES* in notes; *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Leipzig, 1874).
234. ———. 2015. "Understanding and Assessing "Brentano's Thesis" in Light of His Modification of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality." *Brentano Studien* no. 13:153-181.
Abstract: "This paper investigates Brentano's modification of the Scholastic concept of intentionality in his elaboration of his thesis on the intentionality of consciousness. It argues that though 'Brentano's thesis' cannot be fully understood without reference to the original Scholastic concept, Brentano also gives this concept new meaning in his elaboration of not one but two descriptive-psychological theses of intentionality, one concerning the intentional indwelling of an object in consciousness and another concerning the relatedness of psychical-act experiences to their objects, both of which are entirely unscholastic."
235. ———. 2017. "Brentano's New Understanding of Psychology in Light of His Reading of English Empiricists." *Brentano Studien* no. 15:263-290.
"In this article, I wish to examine some of the main ideas that Brentano borrowed in part or in full from those 'most eminent English psychologists of the empiricist school'(8) that are of most relevance to an understanding and evaluation of Brentano's new view of 'psychology' 'from an empirical standpoint'. Of pivotal importance to the 'investigations' which Brentano unfurls in *PES* [*Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*] is a distinction which he draws between the 'inner perception of physical phenomena' and 'outer perception of physical phenomena', a distinction, as we shall see, he found in the 'English empiricists' whom he read. This has an important bearing on understanding Brentano's famous re-introduction and appeal to 'what the Scholastics of the Middle-ages called the intentional (or mental) in-existence of an object' as the mark of 'our own psychical phenomena' in Book II 'Psychical Phenomena In General' of *PES* because, as Brentano explicitly remarks, 'no physical phenomenon [by comparison to our own psychical phenomena] exhibits anything like it'.(9) In this article, therefore, I will first address the main reasons for Brentano's general change of views about the science of psychology and then assess the significance of the 'English empiricists' in understanding and evaluating his use of the concept of intentionality to distinguish 'psychical phenomena' from 'physical phenomena'." (p. 265)
(8) *PES*, p. 145. See, also, pp. 13–14, p. 80, and p. 94.
(9) *PES*, pp. 88–89.
236. Melandri, Enzo. 1987. "The 'Analogia Entis' according to Franz Brentano: A Speculative-Grammatical Analysis of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'." *Topoi* no. 6:51-58.

- "It is to Brentano's credit that he, developing a well-known thesis of Trendelenburg, radicalized the indirect way in which Aristotle addresses the ontological problem, to repropose it in terms which it is not abusive to define of speculative grammar. Trendelenburg(4) would have been the first one to notice, among the moderns, that in Aristotle if one thing is essentially predicated of another so that name and concept of the predicate applies to it, then this occurs in a grammatically different form than if the predicate merely gives its name to the subject without being of the essence of the subject. (5)
- And it is Brentano himself who speaks of Trendelenburg's peculiar ability to exploit the "speculative content" of the ancient thinkers by starting with the affinity that such content often has with the grammatical peculiarities of "linguistic forms". (6)" (p. 52)
- (4) 4 A. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, I, Berlin 1846, in F. Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1862, Ch. V, § 15.
- (5) F. Brentano, op. cit., p. 185. F. Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, ed. and transl, by R. George, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London, University of California Press, 1975 pp. 123-24.
- (6) Op. cit., ib.
237. Mendelovici, Angela. 2021. "Brentano on Phenomenal and Transitive Consciousness, Unconscious Consciousness, and Phenomenal Intentionality." *European Journal of Philosophy* no. 1:1-10.
Abstract: "In *Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value*, Uriah Kriegel argues that Brentano's work forms a "live philosophical program" (p. 14, italics omitted) that contemporary philosophy has much to learn from and that is promising and largely correct. To this end, Kriegel argues that Brentano's notion of consciousness is the contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness, that Brentano's rejection of unconscious mentality is a grave mistake that can be fairly neatly excised from his overall view, and that Brentano's notion of intentionality is the contemporary notion of phenomenal intentionality. This paper raises some doubts about these claims, suggesting that Brentano's notion of consciousness might more closely align with the contemporary notion of transitive consciousness than with that of phenomenal consciousness, that Brentano's rejection of unconscious mentality cannot be so easily excised from his overall view but that it is not such a grave mistake, and that Brentano's notion of intentionality may not be that of phenomenal intentionality but rather that of generic aboutness. I wrap up by considering the extent to which we might agree with Kriegel that Brentano's work forms a live philosophical program that contemporary philosophy has much to learn from."
238. Méndez-Martínez, Jorge Luis. 2020. "Sound Ontology and the Brentano-Husserl Analysis of the Consciousness of Time." *Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology* no. 9:184-215.
Abstract: "Both Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl addressed sound while trying to explain the inner consciousness of time and gave to it the status of a supporting example. Although their inquiries were not aimed at clarifying in detail the nature of the auditory experience or sounds themselves, they made some interesting observations that can contribute to the current philosophical discussion on sounds. On the other hand, in analytic philosophy, while inquiring the nature of sounds, their location, auditory experience or the audible qualities and so on, the representatives of that trend of thought have remained silent about the depiction of sound and the auditory phenomena in the phenomenological tradition. The paper's intention is to relate both endeavours, yet the perspective carried out is that of analytic philosophy and, thus, I pay special attention to conceptual analysis as a methodological framework.
In this sense, I first explain what sound ontology is in the context of analytic philosophy and the views that it encompasses—namely, the Property View (PV), the Wave View (WV) and the Event View (EV)—. Secondly, I address the problems

it entails, emphasising that of sound individuation. In a third section, I propose the possibly controversial conjunction of a “Brentano-Husserl Analysis of the Consciousness of Time” (for short “Brentano-Husserl analysis”) and outline the commonalities of both authors, without ignoring its discrepancies. My main focus is Husserl’s 1905 *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins*. While addressing the Brentano-Husserl analysis, I elaborate on the problem of temporal and spatial extension (*Raumlichkeit* and *Zeitlichkeit*, respectively) of both consciousness and sound. Such comparison is a key one, since after these two developments, one can notice some theoretical movements concerning the shift of attention from sounds to the unity of consciousness, and how they mirror each other. After examining the controversial claims concerning the temporal and spatial extension of both consciousness and sound, I argue in the concluding paragraphs that while considering the accounts of sound ontology, the Brentano-Husserl analysis would probably endorse a Property View and that this could have interesting consequences for the issue of Sound Individuation."

239. Mezei, Balasz. 2000. "Brentano and Husserl on the History of Philosophy." *Brentano Studien* no. 8:81-94.
Abstract: "A particular subject-matter in Franz Brentano's philosophy is his approach to the history of philosophy. I shall consider the evolution of his concept of the history of philosophy, the sources of this concept, and, finally, its relationship to Edmund Husserl's understanding of the history of philosophy. Brentano's scheme of the four phases of the history of philosophy can serve as a principle of evaluation of what comes after Brentano's era in the history of philosophy."
240. Mezei, Balasz, and Smith, Barry. 1998. *The Four Phases of Philosophy*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
With an Appendix: *The Four Phases of Philosophy and Its Current State* by Franz Brentano, pp. 81-111.
"In what follows we shall introduce the English translation of what is perhaps Brentano's most important text on the history of philosophy. In our introduction, we shall analyze Brentano's conception of what he called "the four phases of philosophy"; we shall show the origin of his theory and the problems it was designed to address; and we shall demonstrate that Brentano's theory can be applied to at least one line in the history of philosophy *after* Brentano's time.
That Brentano developed his own theory of the history of philosophy is not widely known. This theory is summarized in a short essay entitled "The Four Phases of Philosophy", published in 1895 and translated here as an Appendix. Brentano believed that the history of philosophy displays a regularly recurring pattern and can thus be divided into successive periods, each of which can be considered as an organic whole of a precisely determined form.
Such periods are for instance the period of classical Greek philosophy ending with Aristotle, the medieval period up to but not including Descartes, and the period of modern philosophy beginning with Descartes and ending with Hegel and other classical 'German idealist' thinkers. In each such period, Brentano argues, four phases can be distinguished: the first phase is that of intensive philosophical development, of scientific results and scientific interest; the second phase is dominated by practical interest; the third phase is that of increasing scepticism which gives way, in the end, to a last phase, in which philosophy becomes a mere branch of literature which has no scientific relevance at all." (pp.1-2)
241. Milkov, Nikolay. 2023. *Hermann Lotze's Influence on Twentieth Century Philosophy*. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Chapter 4: *Lotze and Brentano*, p. 77-91.
"That the roots of Brentano's "revolution in philosophy" are deeper than has commonly been recognized is further evidenced by what he took for granted in his writings. This is most notably seen when spelling out the ways his positions on various topics related to the views of leading 19th-century German philosophers whose doctrines were so widely familiar in the literature of the time that he felt it

unnecessary to identify them by name. A telling example is Jakob Friedrich Fries, who anticipated Brentano's—and, actually, also Lotze's—rejection of the widely held notion that perception consists in a combination of ideas. Fries also anticipated Brentano by identifying “assertions” with perception, a consequential epistemological move that Alfred Kastil first pointed out over a century ago (1912, pp. 52 f.), and one we shall take up in due course (in § 3.1 below). It was evidently Lotze again, who was the medium of Fries' influence on Brentano on this count. Such shared thought-determinations and theoretical outlooks attest to the interrelations among the various currents in 19th-century German philosophy. Multiple lines of influence enabled Kastil, who edited three volumes of Brentano's writings (1921, 1925, and 1933), to trace a variety of similarities between Fries and Brentano, findings which he presented in a book of 352 pages published in the neo-Friesian journal *Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule*, New Series (1912)."

References

Kastil, Alfred (1912): “Jakob Friedrich Fries' Lehre von der unmittelbaren Erkenntnis”. In: *Abhandlungen der Fries'schen Schule* Neue Folge 4. No. 1, pp. 5–336.

Brentano, Franz (1921): *Die Lehre Jesu und ihre bleibende Bedeutung*. Alfred Kastil (Ed.) Leipzig: Felix Meiner.

Brentano, Franz (1925): *Versuch über die Erkenntnis*. Alfred Kastil (Ed.) Leipzig: Felix Meiner.

Brentano, Franz (1933): *Kategorienlehre*. Alfred Kastil (Ed.) Leipzig: Felix Meiner.

242. Moder, Gregor. 2019. "Ontology of touch: from Aristotle to Brentano." In *The Language of Touch: Philosophical Examinations in Linguistics and Haptic Studies*, edited by Komel, Mirt. New York: Bloomsbury.

"Before presenting an attempt at an ontology of touch, I want to point out that ontology has always been closely related to the study of language. This is not simply the claim that any ontological consideration must necessarily be expressed by some language and within some language, and is therefore inevitably limited by that particular language. That would define the relationship between language and being only by way of negation. On the contrary, metaphysics, both ancient and modern, has consistently acknowledged that language determines being in an affirmative, productive, or constructive manner."

(...)

"Within Aristotle's body of work, the relation between language and ontology is perhaps even more clear in his logical work, *Categories*, which is preoccupied to an extent with categorizing things that are (*ta onta*). In concordance with *Metaphysics*, the central category of being is substance; it is the only independent one, and all other categories—like quality and quantity—are relative to substance." (pp. 55-56, a note omitted)

(...)

"At this point, we shall depart from Aristotle's ontology. In order to explain movement, he had to give up the mathematical concept of a point, which seems a very high price to pay. Instead, we will look to Aristotle scholars, particularly to Franz Brentano, who revisited the problem and proposed a solution that bridges the gap between a plenist ontology and the mathematical representation of movement in dimensionless points. In effect, what Brentano suggests is nothing short of a miracle: a concept of a point-in-movement, of a continuous point, and therefore of a point capable of touch." (p. 67)

243. Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1972. *The Concept of Intentionality*. St. Louis: Warren H. Green.

Part One, Chapter 1. *Brentano's Concept of Intentionality*, 3; 2. *Chisholm and the Brentano Thesis* 25-35.

"Whatever might have been the history of the concept of intentionality before Brentano(1), there is no doubt that modern philosophy owes it to him to have both drawn attention to the centrality of this concept for philosophy of mind and given it a formulation which is essentially original. However, since Brentano gave his

- historic formulation, philosophy has moved ahead; and his concept has been criticised, refined and amended, sometimes beyond recognition, by those who profess allegiance to him. The history of this concept after Brentano is a fascinating story, and forms part of the theme of this book: though the main purpose of this study is not historical survey but systematic understanding. I begin, in this chapter, by taking a close look at the first chapter of the second Book of Brentano's *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (2)." (p. 3)
- (1) For the history of the concept of intentionality, see: Spiegelberg, F. "Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl," *Philosophische Hefte*, Vol. V, 1936, 75-91; and Moreau, J. "The Problem of Intentionality and classical thought," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. I, 1961, 215-234.
- (2) Brentano, F. *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, Vol. 1, Leipzig, 1924.
244. Montague, Michelle. 2017. "A Contemporary View of Brentano's Theory of Emotion." *The Monist* no. 100:64-87.
Abstract: "In this paper I consider Franz Brentano's theory of emotion. I focus on three of its central claims: (i) emotions are sui generis intentional phenomena; (ii) emotions are essentially evaluative phenomena; (iii) emotions provide the basis of an epistemology of objective value. I argue that all three claims are correct, and I weave together Brentano's arguments with some of my own to support them. In the course of defending these claims, Brentano argues that 'feeling and will' are united into the same fundamental class. I summarize two of his arguments for this claim, what I call 'the nature of desire' argument and 'the transition' argument. I show how a central plank of these arguments relies crucially on Brentano's epistemology of value."
245. ———. 2023. "Brentano's theory of intentionality." *European Journal of Philosophy*:445-454.
Abstract: "Chapters Five through Nine of Book Two of Brentano's 1874 *Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint* were republished in 1911 with a substantive Appendix of Brentano's remarks. In the Appendix Brentano makes a significant addition to his theory of intentionality. In particular, he introduces new modes within the mode of presentation itself. These new modes are needed to account for our thinking about anything in a relational structure (in recto and in obliquo modes) and for our thoughts about time (the temporal mode). I want to suggest that in the end Brentano simply takes relations to be different kinds of modes."
246. Moore, George Edward. 1903. "The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong." *International Journal of Ethics* no. 14:115-123.
Reprinted in: Linda McAlister (ed.), *The philosophy of Brentano*, pp. 176-181.
"This is a far better discussion of the most fundamental principles of ethics than any others with which I am acquainted. Brentano himself is fully conscious that he has made a very great advance in the theory of ethics. 'No one', he says, 'has determined the principles of ethics as, on the basis of new analysis, I have found it necessary to determine them' (p. X); and his confidence both in the originality and in the value of his own work is completely justified. In almost all points in which he differs from any of the great historical systems, he is in the right; and he differs with regard to the most fundamental points of moral philosophy. Of all previous moralists, Sidgwick alone is in any respect superior to him; and Sidgwick was never clearly aware of the wide and important bearings of his discovery in this one respect. Brentano is both clearer and more profound; and he avoids Sidgwick's two fundamental errors. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of his work. His main proposition is that what we know, when we know that a thing is good in itself, is that the feeling of *love towards* that thing (or *pleasure* in that thing) is 'right' (*nichtig*). Similarly, that a thing is bad, is merely another way of saying that *hatred* of that thing would be 'right'." (p. 176 of the reprint)
247. Moran, Dermot. 1996. "Brentano's Thesis." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* no. 70:1-27.

"t seems appropriate in an Address to the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association to revisit Franz Brentano's much-quoted and oft-misunderstood account of intentionality, particularly since Brentano himself refers to Aristotle as his source and since intentionality is now a cornerstone of much contemporary philosophy of mind.(1)" (p. 1)

(...)

"Since I believe there is philosophical value in getting things right historically, it is worthwhile returning to Brentano's own conception in its original setting with a view to unpacking its key elements. We shall see that Brentano's version of intentionality is deeply embedded in a complex of broadly Cartesian, internalist and-though one must be very careful-introspectionalist assumptions. He did accept the reality of psychological states and their evident nature, they are as they appear to be, psychology does reveal our mental natural kinds. But, I shall argue, Brentano never held that mental events were ontologically irreducible to the physical; or that materialism was false; or that intentionality related people to propositions. Nor did he claim to have 'discovered' intentionality. For him, intentionality merely served as the most satisfactory criterion (among several other candidates, such as non-spatiality and inwardness) for initially identifying the domain of the mental, indeed a criterion to which, in his view, traditional philosophy (i.e., Aristotle-Aquinas-Descartes) subscribed.

Brentano did claim that all and -less emphatically- only mental states were intentional. He did see intentionality as the best 'mark of the mental', but it is not at all clear, as we shall see, just what is being marked off from what. In particular, his definition of the physical refers only to a certain phenomenal properties of our conscious states, and his understanding of the psychical is precisely that which is grasped reflexively in inner perception." (pp. 2-3)

(1) Brentano refers to Aristotle's *De Anima*: 'Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence', *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed Oskar Kaus, English ed. Linda L. McAlister, trans. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell and L.L. McAlister (London: Routledge, 1973; 2nd English Edition with introduction by Peter Simons, 1995), p. 88 note †. [Hereafter PES]. Elsewhere he cites *Metaphysics* Book 5, ch. 15, 1021a29, which speaks of certain things whose nature includes a reference to something else, see F. Brentano, *The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, trans. R. Chisholm and Elizabeth Schneewind (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 14. [Hereafter RW].(...)

248. ———. 2000. "Heidegger's critique of Husserl's and Brentano's accounts of intentionality." *Inquiry* no. 43:39-65.

"Inspired by Aristotle, Franz Brentano revived the concept of intentionality to characterize the domain of mental phenomena studied by descriptive psychology. Edmund Husserl, while discarding much of Brentano's conceptual framework and presuppositions, located intentionality at the core of his science of pure consciousness (phenomenology). Martin Heidegger, Husserl's assistant from 1919 to 1923, dropped all reference to intentionality and consciousness in *Being and Time* (1927), and so appeared to break sharply with his avowed mentors, Brentano and Husserl. Some recent commentators have sided with Heidegger and have endorsed his critique of Husserl and Brentano as still caught up in epistemological, representationalist approaches to intentionality. I argue that Heidegger is *developing* Husserl, focusing in particular on the ontological dimension of intentionality, *not reversing or abandoning* his account. Heidegger's criticisms of representationalism merely repeat Husserl's. Furthermore, I argue that Husserl's account of cognitive intentionality, which recognizes the importance of the disinterested theoretical attitude for scientific knowledge, has been underestimated and misunderstood by Heidegger, who treats scientific cognition as a deficient form of practice. In short, Heidegger is more dependent on Husserl than he ever publicly acknowledged."

249. ———. 2000. *Introduction to Phenomenology*. New York: Routledge.
Chapter 1: *Franz Brentano: descriptive psychology and intentionality*, pp. 23-59.

"In his initial phase of expressing this relation, Brentano emphasised it was possible to be intentionally related to all kinds of objects, imagined, possible, impossible, and so on. Roughly from 1874 to 1904, Brentano frequently expresses intentionality in terms of the intentional inexistence of the object. 'Inexistence' (*Inexistenz*) is, in fact, Brentano's translation of the Latin term *in-esse*, the verb meaning 'to be in', which was used by the Scholastics to characterise the manner in which an accident is said to be in a substance (e.g. knowledge is *in* a man), and specifically with regard to epistemology, the manner in which a form is in the mind. By 'inexistence' Brentano does seem to intend that the object of an act of consciousness is something *immanent* in consciousness, whether or not there is also a real object or 'reality' (*Realität*) outside of consciousness."

(...)

"Later, in his 1911 *Classification of Mental Phenomena*, the revised edition of Book Two of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, reissued at the request of his students, Brentano admitted his use of the phrase 'intentional inexistence' (*PES* 180 n.) had been misunderstood and he would have been better to have avoided it altogether. He says he even considered replacing the term 'intentional' with another Scholastic term 'objective', but this would have given rise to more misunderstandings by those who did not appreciate the Scholastic meaning of *esse obiectivum*, the manner in which things are 'objectively' in the mind.(84)Brentano is referring to the Cartesian distinction between 'formal' and 'objective reality' in the Third Meditation, where Descartes distinguished the meaning-content (*realitas obiectiva*) which belongs to the idea of God from the 'formal reality' (*realitas formalis*) of the cause of the idea, namely the actual being, God. According to Brentano's employment of this distinction, when I believe something actively, or when I am actually making an error, the belief or error is *formally* in me; when I *remember* believing something or making an error, then that belief or error is *objectively* in me (*The True*, 15–16). These distinctions between the 'presented object' and the 'mode of presentation', the formal and the objective, are efforts by Brentano to accommodate a conceptual distinction which his students were forcing on him, namely the distinction between the content and the object of the act." (pp. 48-49)

250. ———. 2013. "Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present." *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* no. 21:317-358.

Abstract: "Intentionality ('directedness', 'aboutness') is both a central topic in contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, and one of the themes with which both analytic and Continental philosophers have separately engaged starting from Brentano and Edmund Husserl's ground-breaking *Logical Investigations* (1901) through Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel C. Dennett's *The Intentional Stance*, John Searle's *Intentionality*, to the recent work of Tim Crane, Robert Brandom, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, among many others. In this paper, I shall review recent discussions of intentionality, including some recent explorations of the history of the concept (paying particular attention to Anselm), and suggest some ways the phenomenological approach of Husserl and Heidegger can still offer insights for contemporary philosophy of mind and consciousness."

251. ———. 2020. "Brentano's Concept of Descriptive Psychology." In *Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy*, edited by Fiset, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Stadler, Friedrich, 73-100. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

Abstract: "In this paper, I begin by outlining Franz Brentano's connections with John Henry Newman (on issues of faith) and then explore in detail Brentano's evolving conception of descriptive psychology from *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) to his *Descriptive Psychology* lectures (1887–1891). Brentano was developing a descriptive, "empirical" science of mental phenomena (in opposition to Wundt's physiological psychology and to Fechner's psychophysics), and his focus was on a priori necessary laws that are given directly to intuition. Brentano developed his psychology from Aristotle and from the then contemporary

psychology (especially British psychologists, such as Alexander Bain, John Stuart Mill, Henry Maudsley, and others). Husserl's descriptive phenomenology was deeply influenced by Brentano's descriptive psychology, although, in his mature works, Husserl abandoned all of Brentano's main distinctions and developed a new intentional analysis that identified consciousness as a self-enclosed domain governed by a priori eidetic laws. In this paper I will explore Brentano's and Husserl's conceptions of descriptive psychology but I shall also examine Wilhelm Dilthey's account of descriptive psychology that was based on 'motivation', a concept adopted by Husserl. Husserl's mature phenomenology advanced far beyond Brentano's descriptive psychology. But, despite their differences, I shall show that both Brentano and Husserl were committed to a non-reductive sui generis exploration of the 'life of consciousness' (*Bewusstseinsleben*) understood as a dynamic complex of essential features that can be apprehended by reflective analysis."

252. Morrison, James C. 1971. "Husserl and Brentano on Intentionality." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 31:27-46.
 "It is the purpose of this essay to attempt to show that Husserl's phenomenological views are very different from and far more developed than Brentano's, and that he even rejects (wholly or in part) many of the latter's most important doctrines. In order to clarify this problem I propose to discuss Brentano's well known attempt to distinguish mental and physical phenomena in which he introduces the notion of "Intentional Inexistence." I will then take up Husserl's views on both the general problem of mental vs. physical phenomena and on the more specific one of Intentionality. No attempt will be made to give a complete account of Husserl's own views on Intentionality, since to do so adequately would imply a discussion of his whole philosophy. Also, I will concentrate almost exclusively on material from the *Logische Untersuchungen*, since it is here that he makes most explicit and detailed reference to Brentano." (p. 27)
253. Morscher, Edgar. 1978. "Brentano and His Place in Austrian Philosophy." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:1-10.
 "The first part of this paper summarizes what I take to be the most important doctrines of Brentano's philosophy. The second part investigates the possible meanings of the term 'Austrian philosophy'. The third part attempts to say something about Brentano's place in Austrian philosophy -- whatever that may be --, while the fourth part focuses on a problem in which I am especially interested. The paper closes with a proposal for what the expression 'Austrian philosophy' could mean."
254. Mulligan, Kevin. 2004. "Brentano on the mind." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacqueline Dale. Cambridge University Press.
 "After a survey of the main claims and distinctions made by Brentano in his account of the mind, I consider in some detail what he says about what he takes to be the groundfloor and the top floor of the mind – time-consciousness and the emotions. I then set out his accounts of the self. In view of the difficulties involved in navigating amongst Brentano's texts, changing views, and opinionated editors, I indicate the main developments of Brentano's views about the mind. In spite of the fact that, in 1889, he seems to have thought that descriptive psychology was almost complete (KRW, p. ix, USE, p. 3), these developments ended only with his death." (p. 69)
 Abbreviations
 KRW = *The Origins of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong*
 USE = *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*
255. ———. 2017. "Brentano's Knowledge, Austrian Verificationisms, and Epistemic Accounts of Truth and Value." *The Monist* no. 100:88-105.
 "What can we know? What is it to know? What roles does knowledge play? Brentano gives answers to each of these questions. The objects of knowledge, Brentano thinks, are of two kinds. I have knowledge of my own mental states and

acts and I may have knowledge of noncontingent truths. To know is to judge correctly and with evidence.

Three central roles for knowledge, according to Brentano, are that truth, existence, and value must be understood in epistemic terms.

His answers to the first two questions come near the end of a long and venerable tradition. His answer to the third question marks the beginning of a family of theories which were to play an important role in twentieth-century philosophy. For Brentano's epistemic account of truth was the first of many Austrian verificationisms about truth and meaning.⁽¹⁾ And his epistemic account of value led to the development of a variety of alternatives to naive realism à la Moore and Scheler about value.

Brentano's answers to all three questions led to substantial modifications of his framework by some of his students. His answers also provoked a violent rejection of the framework itself by some of his heirs and other philosophers which culminated in the defence of the view that to know is not to judge or to believe with evidence because it is not to judge or believe.

In what follows, I have three goals. First, to expound and understand Brentano's views about knowledge and his epistemic accounts of truth and value. Secondly, since a hundred years have now passed since Brentano's death, it seems appropriate to try and show just what roles his epistemology has played over the last hundred years; I shall therefore concentrate on six major developments of his epistemology ranging from substantial modifications and developments to outright rejection, as well as a number of minor developments. Finally, I hope that the panorama of developments I present will help to illuminate the details of Brentano's own ideas. In §§2–4, I concentrate on Brentano's account of theoretical knowledge and its developments. Not until §5 do I turn to the details of his account of axiological knowledge and its fate." (pp. 88-89)

(1) Kastil (1934) refers to Brentano's "gnoseological" conception of truth.

References

Kastil, A. 1934. "Ontologischer und gnoseologischer Wahrheitsbegriff," in O. Engländer et al., eds. *Zur Philosophie der Gegenwart*, Prague: Calve, 23–34.

256. ———. 2017. "Incorrect emotions in ancient, austrian & contemporary philosophy." *Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger* no. 142:491-512. "Brentano often refers to ancient predecessors of his distinction between correct and incorrect non-intellectual states or acts. In 1907, he ascribes to Meinong the view that it is nonsense to say of anything but judgments that they are correct or "characterised as correct" and says that the view rejected by Meinong is that of "the greatest thinkers of the distant past" and Brentano's own view. Unsurprisingly, some of Brentano's pupils, followers and heirs, such as Kastil and Kraus, devoted a lot of attention to the roles of non-intellectual correctness in Aristotle. (...). In contrast, the enormous secondary literature on intellectual correctness and right reason in ancient philosophy and later seems to have paid little attention to non-intellectual correctness. In what follows, I first look briefly at what Plato and Aristotle say about what I have called non-intellectual correctness. I then consider a series of questions about non-intellectual correctness and outline and evaluate some ancient, Austrian and contemporary answers." (pp. 491-492 notes omitted)
257. Mulligan, Kevin, and Smith, Barry. 1985. "Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 45:627-644. "Franz Brentano's 'philosophy of mind' still means, as far as most philosophers are concerned, no more than a peculiarly influential account of intentionality. In fact, in his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Brentano has provided an account of mental phenomena which ranks with any to be found in the literature of philosophy. It differs as much from the concept-centered Kantian approaches to 'reason' or 'understanding' as from more recent approaches, centred on the language used to report or to express 'propositional attitudes', in being an ontology of mind,

- concerned with the description of the entities which are involved in mental experience and of the relations between them.
- With the posthumous publication of a series of lectures given in Vienna in 1890-911 we now possess a clear account of the ontology, and of the methods, underlying Brentano's numerous and subtle descriptions of mental phenomena, at least at one highly fruitful stage in his career. What follows is a detailed exposition of this work, together with a brief critical coda." (p. 627)
258. Münch, Dieter. 1989. "Brentano and Comte." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 36:33-54.
- "In his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (PES, 1874) Brentano seeks to lay the foundation of psychology as a science. Surprisingly, he rejects the obvious idea that psychology is the science of the 'mind' or 'soul', and he agrees instead with Lange's claim that we need a "psychology without a soul" (PES I, p. 16; Engl., p. 11)." (p. 33)
- (...)
- "But why, then, does Brentano not follow Aristotle in stating that there is a soul, and that it is this which is the subject of psychology?
- To answer this question I want to show that it is not only Aristotle who is centrally relevant for an understanding of Brentano's *Psychology*. We have to keep in mind that Brentano here is trying to solve a specific problem, namely to lay the foundation of psychology as a science. The study of Aristotle made Brentano accustomed to a philosophy in a scientific spirit and prepared him therefore for an understanding of the contemporary empirical philosophy and especially the so-called 'positive philosophy' as developed by Auguste Comte. It is the influence of this positive philosophy, I want to claim, which makes it understandable why we miss the soul in the published volumes of Brentano's *Psychology*. For Brentano's theory of psychical phenomena is in fact an answer to the question: how can we deal with psychical phenomena in the framework of positive philosophy? This will mean that the influence of Comte - in contrast to that of Aristotle (and Descartes) -, concerns not so much the content as the methodology of the theses put forward in the *Psychology*." (p. 36)
259. Nathan, N. M. L. 1971. "Brentano's Necessitarianism." *Ratio* no. 13:44-55.
- "Brentano held that there is a sense of 'necessary', on which whatever exists, exists necessarily, i.e. it is necessary that it should come into existence when it does so, and that it should remain in existence as long as it does so."
- (...)
- "But in what follows I shall presuppose rather than defend the intelligibility of Brentano's claim.
- Brentano supports his claim with a variety of arguments, some designed to show that it is infinitely improbable that whatever exists does not exist necessarily, others to show that the claim that anything that exists does not exist necessarily is self-contradictory; some starting from the temporal character of existing things others from their spatial character.(6)" (pp. 44-45)
- (6) For arguments from the spatial character of existing things see *Versuch über die Erkenntnis*, ed. A. Kastil (Leipzig, 1925), pt. IV, Anhang D, pp. 154-6; *Vom Dasein Gottes* ed. A. Kastil (Leipzig, 1929), pp. 451-3.
- Brentano's earliest arguments for necessitarianism from the temporal character of existing things were meant to show only that it was infinitely probable that all changing things existed necessarily. Later he tried to show that it was logically necessary that all existing things whatsoever existed necessarily. (See Kastil's remarks in *Versuch*, pp. 196-7.) Part IV of the *Versuch* (pp. 108-57) contains various versions of both kinds of arguments from temporality.
- Particularly clear versions of the temporal argument for Brentano's stronger claim can be found in *Vom Dasein Gottes*, pp. 414-16; 446-8. For other versions of both kinds of arguments from temporality see *Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik*, ed. F. Mayer-Hillebrand (Bern, 1952), pp. 281-9; *Religion und Philosophie*, ed. F. Mayer-

- Hillebrand (Bern, 1956), pp. 120-6; *Die Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil*, ed. F. Mayer-Hillebrand (Bern, 1956), pp. 299-309.(...).
260. Niel, Luis. 2019/20. "Brentano and Intentionality: or How to Break Immanence from Within." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:69-98.
Abstract: "The article focuses on Brentano's conceptions of intentionality as developed throughout the different periods of his thought: first, in his early works on Aristotle and its operating notion of 'intentional' as something objective in sensations; second, in his 'intentionality passage', which, based on a psychological approach, presents an immanentist account (likely Cartesian) of intentionality as a two-term relation between the mind and the immanent (or intentional) object; third, in his late 'reistic phase', where, due to the ontological flaws of the psychological approach, a strong ontological commitment to the 'real thing' is presented which leads to a new conception of intentionality as a one-term relation (as something 'relativlich') or as the directedness of the mind towards real things. I will first argue that Brentano's early theory supports a form of intentional immanentism, which his later reistic account vainly attempts to break by introducing the 'real thing' into the intentional equation; this leads to many unsolved problems and flaws, expressed by the conceptual tension of an unclear differentiation of the concepts of thing, real, existence, and object. I will also argue that his first psychological-descriptive conception, which methodologically leaves aside existent things by inner perception, presents a more consistent account of intentionality which, based on the concept of an in-existing object in the mind, breaks its immanence as it understands this object as something different from the mind itself."
261. Niemeck, Maik. 2020. "Current Accounts of Subjective Character and Brentano's Concept of Secondary Consciousness." In *Franz Brentano's Philosophy after Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism*, edited by Fisette, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Janoušek, Hynek, 55-71. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Abstract: "There is widespread agreement among many contemporary philosophers of mind that, in addition to their qualitative character, phenomenally conscious states contain some kind of subjective character. The subjective character of experience is most commonly characterized as a subject's awareness that it is currently undergoing a specific experience. This idea is nothing new, of course, and something similar has been proposed quite some time ago by Franz Brentano, among others, under the name of "secondary consciousness". That fact hasn't remained unnoticed.
Indeed, a number of competing contemporary accounts of subjective character refer to Brentano as an early proponent of their particular view. This article pursues two objectives. First, it argues that the so-called self-mode account of subjective character is, for systematical reasons, superior to self-representational and pre-reflective accounts. Second, the article briefly suggests a novel interpretation of Brentano's concept of secondary consciousness that sets it in relation to the previously introduced self-mode account and bears some similarities with Thomasson's adverbial interpretation of Brentano's concept of secondary consciousness."
262. Nuñez Erices, Gonzalo. 2019. "Boundaries and Things. A Metaphysical Study of the Brentano-Chisholm Theory." *Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy* no. 33:15-48.
Abstract: "The fact that boundaries are ontologically dependent entities is agreed by Franz Brentano and Roderick Chisholm. This article studies both authors as a single metaphysical account about boundaries. The Brentano-Chisholm theory understands that boundaries and the objects to which they belong hold a mutual relationship of ontological dependence: the existence of a boundary depends upon a continuum of higher spatial dimensionality, but also is a *conditio sine qua non* for the existence of a continuum. Although the view that ordinary material objects and their boundaries (or surfaces) ontologically depend on each other is correct, it does not grasp their asymmetric relationship: while the existence of a surface rigidly depends upon the existence of the very object it belongs to, the existence of a

- physical object generically depends upon having some surface. In modal terms, both are two kinds of de re ontological dependence that this article tries to distinguish."
263. Olivier, Massin. 2017. "Brentano on Sensations and Sensory Qualities." In *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*, edited by Kriegel, Uriah, 87-96. New York: Routledge.
 "The term "sensation" (*Empfindung*) famously displays an act/object ambiguity. It might be used to refer
1. To our sensing of something: a sensory act (e.g. a hearing);
 2. To what we sense: a sensory object (e.g. a sound);
 3. To some mental episode of ours having no object distinct from itself. Pain is sometimes said to be such a "subjectively subjective" mental episode, some sensing which is its own *sensa*.(1)" (p. 87)
- (...)
 "Sensations have two kinds of features. Some, such as their intentional mode or their temporal features, cannot be explained away by looking at their object. Others, such as their intensity or the difference between senses, are features that sensations inherit from their objects.
 Accordingly, this chapter has three sections. The first introduces Brentano's view of sensations by presenting the intentional features of sensations irreducible to features of the sensory objects. The second presents Brentano's view of sensory objects—which include sensory qualities—and the features of sensations that such objects allow to explain, such as their intensity. The third section presents Brentano's approach to sensory pleasures and pains, which combines both appeals to specific modes of reference and to specific sensory qualities." (p. 88)
264. Olson, Jonas. 2017. "Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism: Brentano's and Reid's." *The Monist* no. 100:106-119.
 Abstract: "This paper explores Franz Brentano's metaethics by comparing it to Thomas Reid's.
 Brentano and Reid share a commitment to moral realism and they are both aptly classified as intuitionists concerning moral knowledge and the nature of moral judgment. However, their respective versions of intuitionism are importantly different, in ways that reflect more general differences between their respective epistemological views. Sections III and IV of the paper focus more exclusively on Brentano's metaethics and some of its unorthodox features. These features tie in with notorious difficulties for moral realism concerning the nature of moral truth and the relation between moral judgment and motivation to act."
265. Parsons, Charles. 2004. "Brentano on judgement and truth." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacqueline, Dale, 168-196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 "In its original form, Brentano's view of judgment implies that in a sense all judgments are existential judgments or negations of existential judgments. This peculiarity of his view of judgment influenced his thought on truth at an early point and led to a particular line of questioning of the traditional idea of truth as *adaequatio rei et intellectus*, the root of what has come to be called the correspondence theory of truth, already adumbrated in the 1889 lecture that is the opening essay in the compilation *Wahrheit und Evidenz*. Brentano was not the only or even the most influential philosopher to question the correspondence theory at the time, but his criticisms had distinctive features. In late writings he sketched as a positive view an epistemic conception. The discussion below of Brentano's views on truth will concentrate on these aspects." (p. 171)
266. Pasquerella, Lynn. 1985. "Brentano and Organic Unities." In *From Bolzano to Wittgenstein*, edited by Nyiri, J. C., 128-131. Wien: Holder/Pichier/Tempsky.
267. ———. 1987. "Intensional logic and Brentano's non-propositional theory of judgment." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 29:117-119.

- "The reism Brentano adopted in the later stages of his philosophy led him to reject such entia irrealia as properties, judgmental contents (or states of affairs) and to advocate a non-propositional theory of judgment. While non-propositional theorists may, through certain linguistic maneuvers, eliminate reference and to some extent avoid commitment to propositions, many philosophers believe the nonpropositional theorist cannot escape the use of propositions altogether. George Bealer levels such an attack in his book *Quality and Concept*.(1)" (p. 117) (...)
- "Bealer contends that "on the non-relational non-propositional theory of judgment there is no credible way even to express the above intuitively valid arguments ... ". (2) Thus, Bealer rejects Brentano's approach because, as he sees it, the theory "falters at the earliest possible stage: it collides with logic itself.(3)
- I will show that Bealer is mistaken when he claims that Brentano's non-propositional theory cannot offer an adequate rendering of the first two arguments. While I grant that Brentano cannot provide an adequate translation of the third argument, I do not grant its intuitive validity." (p. 60)
- (1) George Bealer, *Quality and Concept*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press), 1982, pp. 223-224
- (2) *Ibid.*
- (3) *Ibid.*
268. ———. 1988. "Brentano and the Direct Attribution Theory." *Brentano Studien* no. 1:189-197.
- Abstract: "According to Brentano, what is characteristic of every mental act is the reference to something as an object. The exact nature of an object of our mental acts has, however, been first the subject of steady discussion in Brentano's writings and consecutively gave rise to controversy for contemporary philosophers of mind; e.g. Chisholm, Castañeda. What follows is an elucidation of the relationship between Brentano's final theory of sensation and its interpretation in Chisholm's Direct Attribution theory as a consideration of a recent challenge by Castañeda: that while the Brentanian-Chisholmian account is exemplary in dealing with tacit self-reference at the level of unreflective consciousness, this theory needs to be developed even further to be adequate to those cases of self-reference involved in reflective consciousness."
269. ———. 1989. "Kotarbinski and Brentano on Truth." *Topoi Supplement* no. 4:98-106.
270. ———. 1993. "Brentano and aesthetic intentions." *Brentano Studien* no. 4:235-249.
- "Introduction. Brentano's philosophy of art, contained primarily in his book, *Grundzuge der Ästhetik*, is the result of an original theory of intrinsic value that was derived from Brentano's philosophical psychology. In his aesthetics, Brentano endeavored to find an objective ground for the value of aesthetic contemplation through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. The lack of attention Brentano's aesthetics has received is surprising, given that two of the many students Brentano influenced, Husserl (through the development of the phenomenological movement) and Ehrenfels (through the development of Gestalt psychology) have had an extraordinary influence on twentieth century perceptions of art. In this paper I will attempt to redress some of this neglect by outlining Brentano's analysis of aesthetic intentions and the relationship his aesthetics bears to his overall philosophical system." (p. 235)
271. ———. 2002. "Phenomenology and Intentional Acts of Sensing in Brentano." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 40 (Supplement):269-279.
- "In his paper "Intentionality of Phenomenology in Brentano," Matjaž Potrč endeavors to provide a Brentanian analysis of how it is possible for phenomenal objects to become the contents of intentional acts of sensing.' Potrč contends that while Brentano stands as an "origins philosopher" at the crossroads of analytic and continental philosophy, subsequent philosophers from both traditions have failed to adequately address the nature of phenomenological experiences. He speculates that

their explanatory insufficiency results alternatively from attempts to account for intentionality without phenomenology or from efforts to provide an analysis of phenomenology without intentionality. Potrč seeks to redress this oversight by highlighting the intimate relationship Brentano proposes between intentionality and phenomenology. In the process, he exposes a variety of contemporary metaphysical and epistemological controversies related to intentionality, reference, and phenomenology. Responding to these controversies, Potrč reinforces Brentano's thesis of the irreducibility of intentionality to the referential and the necessary distinction between what he terms "physical and experiential space."

Potrč's analysis embodies a broad range of intriguing philosophical questions. Too many, in fact, to be addressed in a single response. The focus of my commentary, therefore, will be to provide an outline of Brentano's theory of sensation as background to Potrč's important project and to evaluate and develop his thesis of Brentano as an "origins philosopher". (p. 269)

References

Potrč, Matjaž. Intentionality of Phenomenology in Brentano, *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* (2002) Vol. XL, pp. 231-267.

272. Pavlik, Jan. 1991. "Brentano's theory of intentionality." *Brentano Studien* no. 3:63-70.
 Abstract: "Brentano's intentional psychology is an attempt at overcoming the Humean tradition characterized by probabilistic empirism, subjectivism and psychologism. Intentional psychology enables restoration of the autonomy of human psyche with reference to natural laws as well as overcoming the reduction of specific subject-object relations to object-object relations realized in associationist psychology. In contrast with speculative approaches of German classical philosophy, Brentano's theory enables empirical, non-metaphysical inquiry of subject-object relations."
273. Pietersma, Henry. 1978. "Brentano's Concept of the Evident." *Analecta Husserliana* no. 7:235-244.
 Abstract: "It is well known how much E. Husserl's original project of phenomenology has been inspired by Brentano's epistemology, which may be characterized as a search for firm foundations. At the foundation of all that we know, or think we know, there must be matters which we know with unshakable certainty. Such a certainty is not merely a characteristic attitude adopted by an epistemic subject who may none the less be in the dark as to what his status is and where he stands in the whole of reality, so that his certainty might quite conceivably be shaken. On the contrary this subject, now that he has dug down to the foundations, need not fear that somewhere an evil genius might still be hiding and frustrate even his very best epistemic efforts. For there is now no longer any darkness or mystery shrouding his place in reality and his capacities to know. Husserl has developed this objective ground for certitude to the point that Brantano himself could no longer understand him."
274. Płotka, Witold. 2020. "From psychology to phenomenology (and back again): A controversy over the method in the school of Twardowski." *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* no. 19:141-167.
 Abstract: "This paper seeks to define the main trends, arguments and problems regarding the question of method formulated by Twardowski and his students. In this regard, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, I situate Brentano's project of descriptive psychology within the context of disputes in the school of Twardowski concerning the method of both psychology and phenomenology, arguing that descriptive-psychological analysis was dominant in this respect. Second, the study explores the notion of eidetic phenomenology, as founded on a methodological procedure, which supposed to guarantee infallibility of its descriptions. To show this, I first reconstruct Brentano's concept of descriptive psychology, its object, its method and aims. Second, I track the changes and reinterpretations provided by Twardowski in his view of descriptive psychological

- analysis. Third, I explore Witwicki's and Bandrowski's—both early students of Twardowski—discussions of the descriptive approach. I try to show that the former accepted psychologism, while the latter overcame it by means of logical analysis. Fourth, I suggest that the only student of Twardowski who renounced the Brentanian method was Ingarden, who developed eidetic phenomenology. Finally, I present Blaustein's—one of the last students of Twardowski—reappraisal of descriptive psychology and his critique of Ingarden's method. This controversy over the method of descriptive psychology reveals how one can situate Twardowski's legacy within early phenomenology in Poland."
275. Poli, Roberto. 1993. "The Dispute over Reism: Kotarbinski - Ajdukiewicz - Brentano." In *Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School*, edited by Coniglione, Franco, Poli, Roberto and Wolenski, Jan, 339-354. Amsterdam: Rodopi. "I wish now to propose a possible embedding of the reist theses by drawing on certain elements in the thought of Franz Brentano. Brentano's philosophical opus falls, as is well known, into two distinct phases. Here I wish to explore the doctrine that he developed during his last years, a doctrine that can properly be defined as reist(18). To do so, I shall use Chisholm's reconstruction of Brentano's position on the problem of substance and accident.(19) The two main presuppositions of Brentano's reism are the thesis of the primacy of inner perception and the theory of concrete predication. For Brentano, the primary use of the copula occurs in phenomena of inner perception. Strictly speaking, we can only paradigmatically comprehend the being of things when they are apprehended by inner perception. By contrast, we can understand things that are not apprehended by inner perception only by analogy - by relating them to our experience as thinking beings. In terms of our discussion here, this dimension of Brentano's theory does not seem to be immediately relevant, however fundamental it may be to his ontology. Entirely relevant, instead, is his theory of concrete predication. with its requirement that all the predicates of the language should be transformed into concrete terms. In this sense, one cannot say, for example 'roses are red' but 'roses are red-things'. All the predicates of the language, and in particular all its abstract terms, must undergo a similar translation process. From such a perspective, the traditional position that a judgement attributes properties to things is replaced by one where a judgement connects things with things(20)." (p. 348)
- (18) The principal reference texts are *Kategorienlehre*, (Hamburg: Neiner, 1969) and *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen* (Hamburg: Neiner, 1966).
- (19) R. Chisholm, "Brentano's Theory of Substance and Accident", in *Brentano and Meinong Studies*, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982).
- (20) As Chisholm points out in the essay cited in note 19, this proposal derives from the Aristotelean conception of simple judgements, where affirmative judgements combine things and negative judgements separate them. Cf. *De interpretatione*, 16a11.
276. ———, ed. 1998. *The Brentano Puzzle*. Aldershot: Ashgate. Contents: List of Contributors VII; Roberto Poli: Foreword IX-X; Roberto Poli: The Brentano puzzle: an introduction 1; Dallas Willard: Who needs Brentano? The wasteland of philosophy without its past 15; Claire Ortiz Hill: Introduction to Paul Linke's 'Gottlob Frege as philosopher' 45; Paul F. Linke: Gottlob Frege as philosopher 49; John Blackmore: Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938 73; Alf Zimmer: On agents and objects: some remarks on Brentanian perception 93; Liliana Albertazzi: Perceptual saliences and nuclei of meaning 113; Jan Srzednicki: Brentano and the thinkable 139; Claire Ortiz Hill: From empirical psychology to phenomenology. Edmund Husserl on the 'Brentano puzzle' 151; Serena Cattaruzza: Brentano and Boltzmann: the *Schubladenexperiment* 169; Karl Schuhmann: Johannes Daubert's theory of judgement 179; Evelyn Dölling: On Alexius Meinong's theory of signs 199; Robin Rollinger: Linguistic expressions and acts of meaning: comments on Marty's philosophy of language 215-225.

"The papers collected in this volume arise from the conference "The Brentano Puzzle," organized in Bolzano / Bozen, Italy, on the 14th and 15th of November 1996 by the Central European Institute of Culture.

The conference's aim was to analyse the following puzzle. Even if the width and the depth of Brentano's intellectual legacy are now well known, those asked to list the principal philosophers of the nineteenth century very rarely mention his name. We may call this puzzle the problem of Brentano's 'invisibility.'

It is obvious that Brentano's invisibility has serious consequences on assessment of his philosophical theory. The reconstruction of Brentano's thought is still flawed and incomplete. Moreover, Brentano's emphasis on oral teaching, and the meagreness of his published work, compared with the enormous quantity of his manuscripts and correspondence, are also of theoretical importance because they are rooted in Brentano's method of 'doing' philosophy. We know that the distinguishing feature of his philosophy was its empirical bias, its insistence on rigorous and partial answers rather than on the construction of systems. Given these features, it comes as no surprise that the same problem should be examined on several separate occasions and that different solutions should be proposed for it. This procedure has a certain amount of inner coherence. Although Brentano always began his analysis with specific topics and problems, he proposed solutions which then reverberated through the entire edifice of his philosophy. This is a manner of philosophising which takes the natural sciences as its model. These factors also account for the different solutions that Brentano proposed for the problems he addressed. His thought, in fact, displays a continuity of method and a permanence of problems, but not a univocity of solutions. It is this aspect that allows one to talk of a school of Brentano among his pupils, to detect a 'family resemblance' among philosophers and scholars belonging to different disciplines. That is to say, the school is defined more by problems and the method used in their analysis than by their solutions in the strict sense. Accordingly, his heterodox followers, such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and Kazimierz Twardowski, were more faithful to their master's thought than the orthodox Brentanians like Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand.

One further component of the Brentano puzzle is that a number of Brentano's outstanding pupils achieved their own success and founded their own schools. Suffice it to mention Husserl's phenomenology, Twardowski's Lvov-Warsaw school and Meinong's Graz school. The personal success and academic recognition attained by these exponents of Brentano's school (in the broad sense) have come to obscure their common thematic origins. The subsequent split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology generated, as a side-effect, the oblivion into which Franz Brentano's thought then fell.

Nevertheless, Brentano and his school display surprising affinities with Frege and the tradition that he inspired. Perhaps the most interesting reconstruction of these connections is that accomplished by a number of works in German by Paul Linke. It was thought that a survey of Linke's thought might prove useful to English readers. For this reason the book also contains the English translation of his 'Gottlob Frege als Philosoph,' published in 1947, with an introduction by Claire Ortiz Hill.

Last but not least, analyses of the relevance of Brentano's and his followers' theses for contemporary philosophical and scientific debate are also considered."

(Foreword by Roberto Poli)

277. ———. 2000. "Brentano in Italy." *Brentano Studien* no. 8:233-257.
278. ———. 2004. "Approaching Brentano's Theory of Categories." In *Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 285-322. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
- "In this paper I shall begin with analysis of the core of Brentano's ontology, namely his theory of categories." (p. 288)
- (...)

"Brentano's theory of "what exists" can only be properly understood if we recall that, for him, everything that exists is an individual: "And we also say, of things that exist in the strict sense, that they are individuals"(TC, 26 – 1916). We will see in the section devoted to wholes and parts that "individual" does not mean "one".

Brentano rejected the Aristotelian identification between individual and one as the source of numerous errors.

He retained the concept of "individual", but with the meaning of "determined". This is a major departure from the mainstream understanding of the concept of an individual. If 'individual' means determined, then both collectives and parts can be taken as real individuals. As far as I know, Brentano does not explicitly address the entities referred to by mass terms, but obviously nothing precludes their inclusion in the set of individuals, understood as (fully) determinate reality. On the other hand, what in itself is fully determined can be thought by us without all its determinations." (p. 295)

(...)

"Summing up, one main conclusion is apparent. Brentano used the theory of wholes and parts as the main component of his conceptual framework. This choice runs counter to deeply ingrained beliefs of the mainstream twentieth-century scientific ideology. To provide but one example: a theory of wholes and parts grounds the thesis that wholes govern parts. This entails acknowledging the ontological difference between the relations of part to whole and those going the other way round from the whole to its parts. These relations are not symmetric. Moreover, the latter family of relations may proceed not only from wholes to parts, but from whole to "something else" (e.g. boundaries) as well. All this amounts to paving the way for systems and levels of reality.

It is fair to conclude by saying that Brentano performed an enormous amount of preparatory work, recovering and furthering the best philosophical theories, and lighting many blind allies. It is our task to take a step forward." (p. 320)

References

Franz Brentano. TC. *The Theory of Categories*, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981.

279. ———. 2012. "Modes and Boundaries." In *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology*, edited by Tănăsescu, Ion, 397-418. Bucharest: Zeta Books.
- "Brentano's ontology is sophisticated and difficult to assess. An obvious problem is the unfinished state of the different versions of his theory of categories (to wit, the three drafts of the theory of category). Perhaps less obvious but no less important are the tensions arising from the continuous dialogue that Brentano develops with Aristotle and his conclusive departure from the theories of the Stagirite. Finally, a major difficulty is the originality and mutual interdependences of the many theories that Brentano developed in the last decades of his life, including the theories of parts and wholes, categories, modes, continua and boundaries.
- (...)
- The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main aspects of the Aristotelian theory of parts and wholes; Section 3 distinguishes things in the proper sense from things in an extended sense; Sections 4 introduces time and space; Section 5 substance and accident. Section 6 discusses boundaries and Section 7 continua. Finally, Section 8 presents Brentano's theory of parts and wholes and Section 9 his theory of categories." (pp. 397-398)
280. Potrč, Matjaž. 1993. "Grades of intentionality." *Brentano Studien* no. 3:71-78. Abstract: "Intentional inexistence is to be understood via directedness to an internal object which may but needs not exist. As far as the relation to the object exists, it is infallible - contrary to the fallible directedness at an external object. Brentanian intentionality is based on the evidence, and does not allow for degrees. Brentano has been careful to delimit his project of 'Psychognosie' from the physical and from the physiological. The thesis of intentional gradation is discussed, which allows for three degrees. The first form of intentionality involves simple tropisms. The second

- grade of intentionality is the one of generality, as opposed to specificity and particularity. The third intentional grade would enable directness to the singular. As human organisms only are able to entertain directness to the singular, Brentanian intentionality would fall under the second kind of directedness, the one involving generality. Supposition that this thesis is right might lead to the question whether Brentano really described intentionality specific for human organisms. "
281. ———. 2002. "Intentionality of Phenomenology in Brentano." *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 40:231-267.
 Abstract: "Phenomenology is intrinsically intentional for Brentano. Qualitative conscious experiences are individuated by their phenomenal space. Phenomenal space does not include just an experiential space. Physical phenomenal space is also needed. This invites the kinds of examples concerning the phenomenal that take account of both spaces. Physical space is analyzed because it assures the intentionality of phenomenology.
 The thesis concerning intentionality of phenomenology is compared to the overall project of grounding intentionality or directedness at a content or at an object. Besides being directed at an object, an intentional act is also reflexively directed at itself. This reflexive directedness includes qualitative phenomenal experience. As directedness at an object and reflexive directedness of the act at itself become interwoven, there is the intrinsic phenomenology of intentionality. Both intentionality of phenomenology and phenomenology of intentionality present the wholes with mutually pervading and only logically distinguishable parts. In the above theses, balance is established between phenomenology and intentionality. It is conjectured that this balance was disrupted in both analytical and continental traditions, to which Brentano was a precursor and an origins figure."
282. Puglisi, Mario. 1924. "Franz Brentano: A Biographical Sketch." *The American Journal of Psychology* no. 35:414-419.
 "In the preface to one of his posthumous works, recently published, *-Die Lehre Jesu und ihre bleibende Bedeutung-*, Brentano alludes to his religious crisis; it is the first and only time that he refers to it. "Born of a Catholic family," he writes, "I was led to accept the ecclesiastical life; but later I was obliged to separate myself from the church. My sole reason for taking this step was my wish to serve the higher interests of mankind; and my mature convictions made me realise that such service would be impossible if I followed the path upon which I had originally entered. For me, research has always been a vital necessity; and from the very first I tried, again and again, to resolve, in a satisfactory way, certain apparent contradictions of reason and what is called supernatural revelation. The failure of every effort to resolve these contradictions gave rise, little by little, to grave doubts regarding the truth of religious dogmas. But religious belief had been presented to me as a sacred duty, whose disregard meant eternal punishment; and a doubt regarding the obligation of belief thus appeared to me as a temptation to evil.... All this struggle was repeated over and over; and I should never have come to a decision if it had not been for a certain extraordinary event, -the assembling of the Vatican Council to discuss the infallibility of the Pope. Here a doctrine was at issue which I could still doubt without thereby falling into sin, and over against which I therefore was still free from any bondage that might disturb my conscience and prevent an impartial examination of the subject. I studied it, and the result of my study was the firmest possible persuasion of the untenability of that dogma." (p. 416)
283. Rancurello, Antos C. 1968. *A Study of Franz Brentano: His Psychological Standpoint and His Significance in the History of Psychology*. New York: Academic Press.
 Foreword by Edwin G. Boring.
 "In justification of the claim that Brentano "had the rightness of the obvious on his side," Boring very appropriately called attention to his doctrine that "mind is intentional." The present study aims to show that this doctrine acquires an even

deeper meaning and significance when it is viewed within the context of Brentano's broader conception of man himself as an intentional being. Brentano was very well aware that in many respects man is "reactive"—the product of hereditary and environmental influences. At the same time, he insisted that, as a "psychically active subject," man is "pro-active," self-actualizing, self-enhancing, and self-transcending. The student of psychology will easily see reflected in these descriptive terms the orientation of many leading authors throughout the history of psychology as a science, and especially the orientation of the "third force" movement in American psychology.

Another goal of the present study is to show that many other views of Brentano bearing upon more specific theoretical, methodological, and applied issues in psychology have gained increasing acceptance in the history of this science since the 1880's and again parallel closely the overall stand of (he "third force" movement. Although the evidence that will be provided in support of these claims is selective rather than comprehensive, it should be sufficient to bring out both the essential elements and the historical significance of Brentano's standpoint in psychology.

In terms of general organization, the present study comprises three closely interrelated sections. The first section offers a portrait, as against a mere composite picture, of Brentano's life, personality, and works, and as such paves the way, in the second section, for a synopsis of his orientation on psychological issues. There logically follows, in the third section, a general appraisal of Brentano's significance in the history of psychology.

An annotated bibliography of Brentano's writings and of works bearing upon his thought is included in this study both as a supplement to the text proper and as an independent contribution." (pp. XI-XII)

284. Raspa, Venanzio. 2020. "Brentano on Aristotle's Categories." In *Franz Brentano's Philosophy after Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism*, edited by Fiset, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Janoušek, Hynek, 185-203. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
 Abstract: "Brentano's dissertation *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle)* (1862) is examined in the light of the nineteenth-century debate on the Aristotelian categories. After providing an exposition of the conceptions of the main representatives of this debate, Adolf Trendelenburg and Hermann Bonitz, this paper assesses Brentano's point of view on the meaning and origin of the Aristotelian categories. It shows (i) that Brentano assumes non-Aristotelian elements in his reading of the Aristotelian categories, (ii) that this depends on the fact that he shares Bonitz's thesis, and (iii) that his reading is incomplete in the light of certain Aristotelian statements about non-being."
285. Rauch, Leo. 1968. "Brentano's Psychology and the Problem of Existential Import." *Philosophical Studies (Dublin)* no. 17:121-131.
 Abstract: "Franz Brentano has often been considered guilty of the 'psychologism' which Edmund Husserl, his pupil, attacked. The charge is justified in only a limited sense: Brentano is dealing not with intentional acts but rather with intentional objects. His concern is directed, among other things, to certain logical and ontological problems such as those raised by Meinong, even if Brentano makes use of psychological insight in order to shed light on them."
286. Richardson, Robert. 1983. "Brentano on intentional inexistence and the distinction between mental and physical phenomena." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 65:250-282.
 "Aquila, Chisholm, McAlister, and Szrednicki have made marked strides in furthering our understanding of Brentano. There is no doubt that any interpretation must incorporate their insights. Relying on the work already done in elaborating and defending their respective interpretations of the doctrine of intentional

- inexistence, or intentionality, we are now in a position to reach a definitive resolution of their differences.
- After first providing a fuller statement of the two available alternatives we will proceed to provide a critique of each in turn, isolating their weaknesses as well as their strengths. This will enable us to reach a synthesis capable of explaining intentional inexistence and its place in Brentano's psychology; moreover, we can do it in a way which combines the attractions of both the orthodox and reformed interpretations while shedding the inadequacies of each." (p. 251)
287. Röck, Tina. 2017. "Brentano's Methodology as a Path through the Divide: On Combining Phenomenological Descriptions and Logical Analysis." *Axiomathes* no. 27:475-489.
 Abstract: "In this paper, I will describe how Brentano was able to integrate descriptive philosophy and logical analysis fruitfully by pointing out Brentano's concept of philosophy as a rigorous science. First I will clarify how Brentano attempted to turn philosophy into a rigorous descriptive science by applying scientific methods to philosophical questions. After spelling out the implications of such a descriptive understanding of philosophy, I will contrast this descriptive view of philosophy with a semantic-analytic understanding of philosophy as proposed by Frege. After having thus set the stage I will argue that (1) the current separation of philosophy into the seemingly antithetical strands of (continental) phenomenology and analytic philosophy may be seen as a consequence of how the term 'rigorous science' in 'philosophy as a rigorous science' is interpreted: Does a rigorous science grasp its object with as much exactitude as possible? Or is a science rigorous when its theories are expressed unambiguously, and their implications are drawn with precision? In the course of this investigation I will also point out (2) how Brentano's integrative use of descriptive philosophy (a precursor to phenomenology) and analysis can provide a suitable starting point for an equally successful integration of these methods in contemporary philosophy."
288. Rojczack, Artur. 2005. *From the Act of Judging to the Sentence: The Problem of Truth Bearers from Bolzano to Tarski*. Dordrecht: Springer.
 Edited by Jan Wolenski.
 Chapter 3. Descriptive psychology: the theory of judgement as the theory of cognition and knowledge: 1. Franz Brentano (I): The Act of Judging as the Truth Bearer 33-41;
 Chapter 4. Judgment, psychology, and language: 1. Franz Brentano (II): Linguistic Analysis 57-65;
 Chapter 6. Reism: 1. Franz Brentano (III): The Judger as the Truth Bearer 103-106;
 Chapter 7. The objectivity of truth: 2. Franz Brentano (IV): Identity and Evidence 116-121.
 "Artur left behind an English translation of his PhD dissertation. This work is the culmination of Artur's thinking on topics already dealt with, both historically and systematically, in his earlier writings, and it reflects his philosophical interests in Austrian philosophy from Bolzano to the present day and in particular in the Polish wing of the Austrian tradition established by Kazimierz Twardowski. The present book is the first monograph in the literature of philosophy entirely devoted to the problem of truth-bearers. It focuses primarily on ontological, rather than on semantic and logical, problems, and perhaps its main virtue lies in its careful and detailed investigation of the issue of whether a physicalist conception of truth-bearers is possible." (From the *Preface: In memoriam of Artur Rojczack*, by Barry Smith and Ja Wolesski, p. XV)
289. Rojczak, Artur, and Smith, Barry. 2003. "Theories of Judgment." In *The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945*, edited by Baldwin, Thomas, 157-173. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 "It was Franz Brentano who was responsible for the first major break with the combination theory of judgement through the doctrine of intentionality set forth in his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Brentano 1874/1924 [1973: 77-100,

esp. 88–9]). Knowledge, for Brentano, is a matter of special types of judgement. The psychological description and classification of judgements in all their modes of occurrence is thus in his eyes a necessary precursor to the theory of knowledge as a branch of philosophy. First, however, it is necessary to find a firm foundation for the science of psychology itself, and this requires a coherent demarcation of the proper object of psychological research. For this we need some unique property which would distinguish mental from other types of phenomena. Hence Brentano's much-mooted principle of the intentionality of the mental, which states that each and every mental process is of or about something.

Brentano distinguishes three basic types of mental or intentional phenomena: presenting, judging, and phenomena of love and hate. Each of these three types of mental phenomenon is determined by its own characteristic intentional relation or intentional directedness. A presentation is any act in which the subject is conscious of some content or object without taking up any position with regard to it. Such an act may be either intuitive or conceptual. That is, we can have an object before our mind either in sensory experience (and in variant forms thereof in imagination), or through concepts – for example when we think of the concepts of colour or pain in general. Presentations may be either (relatively) simple or (relatively) complex, a distinction inspired by the British empiricists' doctrine of simple and complex ideas. A simple presentation is for example that of a red sensum; a complex presentation that of an array of differently coloured squares (Brentano 1874/1924 [1973: 79f., 88f.])." (pp. 159-160)

References

Brentano, F. (1874). *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, Leipzig: Duncker and Humboldt. Trans. 1973 A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and L. L. McAlister, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, London: Routledge.

290. ———. 2003. "Truthmakers, Truthbearers and the Objectivity of Truth." In *Philosophy and Logic in Search of the Polish Tradition: Essays in Honour of Jan Wolenski on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday*, edited by Hintikka, Jaako, Czarnecki, Tadeusz, Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna, Placek, Tomasz and Rojszczak, Artur, 229-268. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- "The aim of this paper is to show that the account of objective truth taken for granted by logicians at least since the publication in 1933 of Tarski's 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages' arose out of a tradition of philosophical thinking initiated by Bolzano and Brentano. The paper shows more specifically that certain investigations of states of affairs and other objectual correlates of judging acts, investigations carried out by Austrian and Polish philosophers around the turn of the century, formed part of the background of views that led to standard current accounts of the objectivity of truth! It thus lends support to speculations on the role of Brentano and his heirs in contemporary logical philosophy advanced by Jan Woleński in his masterpiece on the *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School* of 1989."
291. Rollinger, Robin D. 1993. "Husserl and Brentano on Imagination." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 75:195-210.
- Revised version with the title: *Brentano and Husserl on Imagination* in: R. D. Rollinger, *Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object*, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 29-50.
- "4. Conclusion
- The differences between Husserl and Brentano on imagination may briefly be summarized as follows. While Brentano is willing to characterize the contents of perceptual presentations as more intense than those of phantasy presentations, Husserl has misgivings about this characterization. Even if the various distinctions which he makes in his theory of presentations are kept in mind, the ascription of more intense contents (sensations) to perceptual presentations inadequately differentiates such presentations from imagining. For however intense the contents of a presentation may be, this presentation cannot be an instance of perceiving, on Husserl's view, unless a unique form of apprehension is present. Nor does it appear

- to him that the concept of intensity applies to all contents without difficulty. Moreover, Brentano's claim that phantasy presentations are improper ones which merely approximate proper presentations is subject to further doubt from Husserl. As long as "proper presentations" is a term that refers to intuitive presentations, he regards both phantasy presentations and perceptual presentations as proper. Finally, while Brentano characterizes the presentation of temporally extended objects such as melodies and motions in terms of phantasy presentation and attributes a further impropriety (i.e. modification) to presentation of this kind, Husserl rejects such a characterization and adheres to the view that temporally objects can actually be perceived and that the "primary memory" involved in such perception in no way involves modification." (pp. 48-49)
292. ———. 2004. "Austrian Theories of Judgment: Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl." In *Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy*, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 257-284. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Reprinted in: R. D. Rollinger, *Austrian Phenomenology. Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object*, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2009, pp. 233-262.
- "3. Brentano
The notion of judgment is already present early in Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* [1874]. In his attempt to identify a criterion for distinguishing between physical phenomena (such as tones and colors) and psychical ones, the first suggestion he considers is that the latter are "presentations as well as those phenomena for which presentations are the foundations".(1) "As we use the word 'present'", he elaborates, "'being presented' is the same appearing".(2) While physical phenomena certainly appear and are thus presented, they are certainly neither acts of presentations nor phenomena which have such acts as their foundation.
Judgments and certain other phenomena, however, are identified as phenomena founded on presentations. "Nothing can be judged, nor can anything be desired, hoped, or feared unless it is presented".(3) The thesis that a judgment is based on a presentation remains a principle throughout Brentano theory of judgment." (p. 242 of the reprint)
1 Brentano (1874), p. 104.
2 Brentano (1874), p. 106.
3 Brentano (1874), p. 104.
293. ———. 2004. "Brentano and Husserl." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacqueline Dale, 255-276. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"In the present chapter the relationship between Brentano and Husserl will be discussed as follows. Brentano's philosophical orientation will be explicated only insofar as this was familiar to Husserl.
This is not to say that only Brentano's views during the period from 1884 to 1886 will be taken into account here. Husserl was indeed an enthusiastic collector of notes from Brentano's lectures. Moreover, Husserl took special interest in his mentor's "psychognostic investigations," as Brentano indicates in a letter to Husserl (circa May 1891).(4) Developments that occur in Brentano's thought in the later 1890s and especially his reism of the last couple of decades of his life, however, fall outside Husserl's sphere of familiarity." (p. 255)
(4) Husserl, *Briefwechsel I*, p. 6.
294. ———. 2005. "Meinong and Brentano." *Meinong Studies* no. 1:159-197.
Revised version with the title "Brentano and Meinong" in R. D. Rollinger, *Austrian Phenomenology: Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Object*, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2008, pp. 157-187
Summary: "Meinong, like other noteworthy philosophers from central Europe, began his career in philosophy under the guidance of Franz Brentano. Though Meinong's philosophical investigations from early on were very Brentanian in

character, he came to develop views that diverged from certain doctrines of his mentor. In epistemology Meinong introduced the notion of immediate evidence of surmise in his views on memory and perception, whereas Brentano found this notion unacceptable. In descriptive psychology Meinong regarded feelings and desires as two distinct classes and introduced an additional class of mental phenomena called "assumptions". Thus he opposed Brentano's classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate. In ontology Meinong allowed for non-real objects. In value theory he even introduced the notion of special irrealia corresponding to feelings and desires. Brentano, however, came to reject irrealia altogether. Such differences are discussed here, but attention is also given to the underlying and enduring philosophical affinity between Meinong and Brentano, namely their commitment to the ideal of scientific philosophy as attainable through descriptive psychology (what might be called "descriptive phenomenology"), which is concerned with intentionally directed consciousness as its subject matter and does not in any way differ methodologically from natural science."

295. ———. 2006. "Brentano's Logic and Marty's Early Philosophy of Language." *Brentano Studien* no. 12:77-98.

296. ———. 2008. "Brentano's Psychology and Logic and the Basis of Twardowski's Theory of Presentations." *The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication* no. 4:1-23.

"1. Introduction

It is widely known that Kasimir Twardowski was a student of Franz Brentano. In view of the fact that Brentano generally had great impact through his lectures, especially during his Vienna period (1874-1895),(2) and consequently became one of the towering figures of Austrian philosophy,(3) it is a matter of no small interest to determine how he influenced Twardowski. There are, however, difficulties in examining the relationship of Twardowski to his teacher, as there are in the case of the relationships between Brentano and his students generally. The main obstacle to this endeavor lies in the fact that Brentano published very little during his lifetime. Moreover, what has been published posthumously is far from adequate in terms of both the quantity of texts and the quality of editing. For this reason it is highly desirable to discuss Brentano in relation to his students by drawing upon his hitherto unpublished manuscripts. This is the strategy that I will pursue in the following analysis of Brentano and Twardowski on the topic of presentations (*Vorstellungen*)." (p.1, some notes omitted)

(2) For a list of lecture courses that Brentano gave in Vienna, see Werle (1989), pp. 157-162.

(3) Brentano Y 4/13: "In Austria nothing had been accomplished in the domain of philosophy in earlier times. Things have become different in recent times. [In Österreich wurde in früherer Zeit auf dem Gebiete der Philosophie nichts geleistet. In neuerer Zeit ist das anders geworden]"

297. ———. 2012. "Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*: its Background and Conception." In *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology*, edited by Tănăsescu, Ion, 261-309. Bucharest: Zeta Books.

"Scholarly and philosophical literature on Brentano is of course hampered by a restriction to published and often poorly edited materials. Here I shall attempt to provide the means for circumventing the danger just mentioned and thus for gaining an appreciation for the *Psychology* as it was originally planned in its entirety. This appreciation may, to be sure, be primarily philological in nature at this stage of Brentano scholarship. It can, however, be the basis for further explorations which may in the future be more properly philosophical. Before we philosophize with Brentano, we must trouble ourselves with what he actually wrote, especially what he wrote in unpublished manuscripts." (p. 263, a note omitted)

(...)

"Conclusion

Brentano's *Psychology* was thus meant to be a work which was to meet both of Aristotle's requirements for an inquiry into the soul. It was to be both exact and concerned with important and remarkable objects. The published part exhibits great exactness in the treatment of seemingly rather small issues, such as the unconscious consciousness, the classification of psychical phenomena, and the unity of consciousness. From this basis, however, Brentano had plans to proceed – in a strictly scientific fashion – to a treatment of a most important and remarkable issue, namely immortality. Along the way, the applications of psychology to the practical branches of philosophy, at least logic and ethics, were to receive attention. At the same time concepts from metaphysics were to come into play as well. His abandonment of this ambitious project was by no means motivated by a loss of his earlier convictions or a growing indifference to the issues (large or small) as conceived of in his original plan, but rather by a deeply felt need to revise his views concerning both the method as well as the subject matter of psychology. If we understand "psychology from an empirical standpoint" as an ongoing project rather than merely the title of a work consisting of the published volume and even including the projected second one (in outline or in draft), this title may be taken as applicable to almost all of Brentano's philosophical efforts from start to finish. While his conception of psychology underwent revision, he retained the conviction that psychology was the core of philosophy and therefore destined to prove the most interesting and most important truths. From a practical point of view, it is to give us the means for treating the good, the true, and the beautiful as the highest human goals. From a theoretical point of view, it encompasses within its range of topics: freedom, immortality, and even the existence of God. The truths about such matters were in essence to remain constant in spite of all revisions and reformulations. They are indeed the motivation that lies behind Brentano's statement that psychology is the science of the future.(116) Until the unpublished materials pertaining to this statement are examined, Brentano's significance in the history of psychology and philosophy cannot be properly assessed." (p.303-304) (116) Brentano (1874), p. 32.

298. ———. 2020. *Concept and Judgment in Brentano's Logic Lectures: Analysis and Materials*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- "The first part of the present volume is an analysis of Franz Brentano's lectures on logic, primarily on the basis of the notes contained under the signature EL 80 (among his manuscripts as these are preserved in the Houghton Library at Harvard University). Brentano repeatedly used and revised these notes, at first in Würzburg (as early as 1870) and then in Vienna (probably as late as 1877 or later), though they were superseded by another, very different set of notes on logic (EL 72), some of which he used for the winter semester 1878/79, but with considerable revisions and additions for 1884/85 and for an (unannounced) continuation into the summer semester 1885. While EL 80 provides us with an alternative term-logic of his own making, the latter notes are much more remote from what we ordinarily call "logic" in either traditional or contemporary terminology. The former include such staples of logic as a treatment of both deductive and inductive inference. (Brentano's views on induction and the closely related theory of probability are topics that would better receive treatment in a separate study and are accordingly not subjected to analysis in the present volume.)
- The second part of the present volume includes a German edition and English translation of notes that Franz Hillebrand took from Brentano's lectures on logic in 1884/85, though not from the summer semester 1885. I shall give further details regarding Hillebrand's notes below. Belonging also to the second part of the present volume is an English translation of Hillebrand's *Die neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse*, in which he elaborates on Brentano's syllogistic logic in connection with the theory of judgment, as he also defends this logic against contemporaneous rivals regarding the same issues.
- This short work by Hillebrand involves elaborations on some points that are not made focal in the first part of the present volume and vice-versa." (Preface, p. VII)

299. ———. 2021. "Brentano and von Ehrenfels on Emotion, Desire, and Absolute Value: An Extreme Contrast in Austrian Phenomenology." In *The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller*, edited by Antonelli, Mauro and Binder, Thomas, 312-327. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.
 "Conclusion.
 Thus we find in Austrian phenomenology a most outstanding contrast in ethics: Brentano's view that desire and emotion belong to a single class, love and hate, which includes acts of consciousness which can be characterized as correct (or incorrect), and von Ehrenfels' view that only emotions belong to the class designated by "love" and "hate", which arise through dispositional desires, and that neither acts of this kind nor the desires that naturally go with them absolutely guarantee values. This is of course not the only important contrast among the Austrian phenomenologists with respect to value theory and ethics, for Alexius Meinong, Edmund Husserl, and Anton Marty also have something to say on this matter. However, all of these three ultimately shared in Brentano's cognitivist position, whereas von Ehrenfels (at least in his great ethical work of the nineteenth century) does not. Moreover, they complicate the picture by objectifying value, whereas Brentano and von Ehrenfels stay on the psychological plane in their ethical inquiries. The extreme contrast that results from them is well worth noting, for extreme contrasts are often quite helpful as a starting point for investigations. Hopefully the one I have elaborated on here will provide a renewed starting point for further research on this extremely important topic." (pp. 325-326)
300. Runggaldier, Edmund. 1989. "On the Scholastic or Aristotelian roots of 'Intentionality' in Brentano." *Topoi* no. 8:97-103.
 Abstract: "The early Brentano identifies intentionality with "intentional inexistence", i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian—Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of 'being' (to on legetai pollachos). The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano."
301. Russo, Antonio. 2014. "Franz Brentano and Cornelio Fabro: A Forgotten Chapter of the Brentanian Reception." *Axiomathes* no. 24:157-165.
 Abstract: "In celebration of the centenary of the Italian philosopher Cornelio Fabro's birth (1911–1995), this paper investigates the essential theoretical traits that undergird the framework of Fabro's 1941 texts, by comparing them with Franz Brentano's (1838–1817) project of renewing Thomism through a new understanding of Aristotle. The secondary literature concerning the comparison of both these authors is almost nonexistent. Our goal is to clarify some of the central issues regarding the relation between Fabro and Brentano through direct textual analysis of unpublished letters exchanged between Fabro and Agostino Gemelli about Brentano and his pupil Carl Stumpf."
302. Rutte, Heiner. 1986. "On the Problem of Inner Perception." *Topoi* no. 6:19-23.
 "The assumption that there are processes of 'inner perception' is something which comes quite naturally to the epistemologist: consciousness not only consists in intentional acts referring to or directed upon an object, it is not only consciousness of certain contents or objects, but it also consists in a consciousness of these acts themselves -- there is no consciousness which could be ignorant of its acts."
 (...)
 "In his 'Psychologic vom empirischen Standpunkt', Brentano provides us with a thorough discussion of the problem of this regress, coming to the unequivocal conclusion: there are no specific acts (= activities) of inner perception; rather, inner perception resembles a permanent accompanying phenomenon (Brentano here

- invokes Aristotle: "Das Wissen und die Empfindung und die Meinung und das Nachdenken scheinen immer auf etwas anderes zu gehen, auf sich selbst aber nebenbei"). (2) Inner perception is a secondary consciousness of something; hence, a primary consciousness of something always has to be presupposed. When somebody hears a sound, this sound will be a primary object for him, and he himself, as somebody hearing the sound, will be a secondary object for himself; that is, he perceives himself as hearing a sound. This does not mean for Brentano that we are dealing with two acts; rather, we are confronted with one act having two "things" for its object: the sound (as the primary object) and the act of hearing itself (as the secondary object).
 These two aspects of the act cannot be separated, not even in thought: there can be no secondary consciousness without primary consciousness.(3)" (p. 19)
 (2) Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, Bd. I (ed. Oskar Kraus), Philosophische Bibliothek Band 192 (Hamburg 1973), p. 185.
 (3) Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 180.
303. Sánchez-Migallón, Sergio, and Martí-Sánchez, Miguel. 2019/20. "The Originality of Franz Brentano's Description of 'Correct Love' and its Aristotelian Nexus." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:117-136.
 Abstract: "One of Brentano's most original and influential theses is his description of the knowledge of the good in the immediate experience of correct love, encompassing voluntary acts as well as feelings. In that union of will and feelings in a more fundamental class of psychical experiences, Brentano sees a coincidence with Aristotle's doctrine of *órexis*. Yet, on Brentano's account, while Aristotle accurately perceived correct love or desire, he did not correctly set out the knowledge of the good on this basis. The paper discusses this discrepancy and shows that the concurrence is more than merely assumed. Indeed, it is demonstrated that for both thinkers, moral knowledge is deeply rooted in the virtuous or good person."
304. Sanford, David. 1997. "Chisholm on Brentano's thesis." In *The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm*, edited by Hahn, Lewis. Chicago: Open-Court.
 "My purpose in this paper is neither to defend nor to refute Brentano's thesis. Nor shall I address the importance and implications of Brentano's thesis, except to comment that its incompatibility with physicalism depends on what you mean by "physicalism." Brentano's thesis does not imply dualism.(3) It does seem to imply that intentional psychology is conceptually autonomous from pure physics. In this paper I attempt the following: to distinguish proposals about intentionality that are often confused, both by those who support and those who oppose Chisholm's project; to generalize the notion of logical independence; and, based on this notion of independence, to revise some of Chisholm's criteria of intentionality." (p. 202)
 (3) See Chisholm 1955-56, where he denies that the linguistic thesis about intentionality indicates "that there is a ghost in the machine" (p. 50).
 "Anyone who wants to understand what I have been up to in trying to formulate criteria of intentionality, should read Sanford's paper." R. M. Chsiholm, "Reply to David H. Sanford", p. 215.
 References
 Chisholm, Roderick M. 1955-56. "Sentences about Believing." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56: 125-48. Reprinted with revisions in Feigl 1958, pp. 510-20. Page references are to the version reprinted in Marras 1972, pp. 31-51.
 Feigl, Herbert, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell, eds. 1958. *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*. Vol. 2, *Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
 Marras, Ausonio, ed. 1972. *Intentionality, Mind, and Language*. Urbana, ILL: University of Illinois Press.
305. Sauer, Werner. 2013. "Being as the True: From Aristotle to Brentano." In *Themes from Brentano*, edited by Fisette, Denis and Fréchette, Guillaume, 193-226. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

- "Attentive readers of Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle's being as the true, *on hōs alēthes*, in his dissertation of 1862, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*, will not fail to notice therein rather peculiar, if not perplexing features. The central aim of this paper is to show that to understand what Brentano's account of being as the true is actually concerned with in its overall intention, it must be read in light of Thomas Aquinas' views on the topic. This paper consists of six sections. In section 1, the stage is set. Section 2 presents in brief outline an exposition of Aristotle's own account of being as the true in *Metaphysics* Δ.7. In section 3, we consider Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on the Δ.7 passage regarding being as the true insofar as it provides Brentano with an important premise for his own interpretation of that passage. Section 4 turns to Aquinas, and focuses in particular on his reading of the Δ.7 passage in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*. Then in section 5, Brentano himself comes into the picture, and it will be shown that what in his interpretation of Aristotle's being as the true strikes the reader as rather peculiar is due to his attempt to defend Aquinas' account in the context of contemporary Aristotle scholarship. Finally, section 6 attempts to show that the conception of being as the true in Brentano's dissertation already prefigures, so to speak, the doctrine of judgments which he then presents in the *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* of 1874." (p. 193, a note omitted)
306. Schaar, Maria van der. 1999. "Evidence and the Law of Excluded Middle: Brentano on Truth." In *The Logica Yearbook 1998*, 110-120. Prague: Filosofia.
- "Introduction
- The central question of my paper is whether there is a coherent logical theory in which truth is construed in epistemic terms and in which also some version of the law of excluded middle is defended. Brentano in his later writings has such a theory.(2) My first question is whether his theory is consistent. I also make a comparison between Brentano's view and that of an intuitionist at the present day, namely Per Martin-Löf. Such a comparison might provide some insight into what is essential to a theory that understands truth in epistemic terms." (p. 110)
- (2) It is inevitable to elaborate strongly on what is published of Brentano's later ideas. On the one hand, because these ideas were in progress, and not formulated in any definitive and authorized publication. On the other hand, what is published of Brentano's later writings is very unreliable. Therefore I have checked the passages which are central for my paper by comparing them with the typoscripts of Brentano's manuscripts at the Husserl Archives at Leuven. I wish to thank the Archives for this possibility. In these passages I found no important deviations from the typoscripts.
307. ———. 2003. "Brentano on Logic, Truth and Evidence." *Brentano Studien* no. 10:119-150.
- Abstract: "Does the criticism raised against the use of judgemental evidence in logic and epistemology still stand, or is the notion crucial in our understanding of truth? First, Brentano's account of truth and evidence is expounded. Then, the different kinds of criticism that may be raised against Brentano's account of truth and evidence are presented. Finally, it is argued that, although there is a serious problem with this account of truth and evidence, a modification of the theory can be of importance for philosophy today. In Brentano's account of truth and evidence, a first-person perspective plays a crucial role, and it is precisely this aspect we need in epistemology and in logic today."
308. ———. 2016. Brentano, Twardowski and Stout: From Psychology to Ontology. Available at <https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/42642/chapter/358145298>
- Abstract: "This article was commissioned as a supplement to the *Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, edited by Michael Beaney. It focuses on the psychological origins of analytic philosophy. Analytic psychology influenced the emergence of a new method in philosophy and the crucial changes to the notions of judgement and intentionality at the end of the nineteenth century. In particular, G. F.

- Stout's analytic psychology played an important role in the formation of Moore's and Russell's early analytic philosophy. Through Stout, the account of judgement and intentionality given by Brentano and Twardowski also had a significant influence on the development of early analytic philosophy."
309. ———. 2018. "Brentano on Truth and Evidence. Understanding Truth from a First-Person Point of View." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:187-206.
Abstract: "Does the criticism raised against the use of judgemental evidence in logic and epistemology still stand, or is the notion crucial in our understanding of truth? First, Brentano's account of truth and evidence is expounded. Then, the different kinds of criticism that may be raised against Brentano's account of truth and evidence are presented. Finally, it is argued that, although there is a serious problem with this account of truth and evidence, a modification of the theory can be of importance for philosophy today. In Brentano's account of truth and evidence, a first-person perspective plays a crucial role, and it is precisely this aspect we need in epistemology and in logic today."
310. ———. 2023. "Judgement and intentionality in early Brentano." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 100:151-172.
Abstract: "There are two notions of intentionality: the first contains the thesis that our acts of thinking, judging and loving have a content; the second that our mental acts are about something external to the act. Brentano uses the term 'intentionality' only in relation to the first notion; for him, intentionality does not function as a bridge between the mind and the external world. Is it possible for a phenomenologist like Brentano to give an account of the second notion of intentionality? It is argued that this is possible, but not without introducing the notion of judgement. A comparison with Mill's distinction between connotation and denotation, and with Frege's distinction between sense and reference shows how original Brentano's theory is."
311. Schaefer, Richard. 2013. "The Madness of Franz Brentano: Religion, Secularisation and the History of Philosophy." *History of European Ideas* no. 39:541-560.
Summary. "In recent decades, scholars have shown a distinct new willingness to concede the important place of religion in the life and thought of the philosopher Franz Brentano. However, these studies are still dominated by the presumption that Brentano's life and thought are best understood according to a model of secularisation as a progressive waning of religion. This essay asks whether such a presumption is the best way of understanding the complex interconnections between various elements of his philosophical and religious ideas. It posits that a better appreciation of his position entails a confrontation with Brentano's historical imagination, and especially the structuring role of his approach to the history of philosophy as one manifesting regular cycles of decline and regeneration. Brentano's theory of the four phases of philosophy, though not the final word on how he viewed history, was nevertheless an exercise in thinking about the ways history accommodates various forms of progress and repetition. It was therefore a salutary means for thinking about the evolution of religion in ways that challenge any simple understanding of secularisation."
312. ———. 2018. "Hopes and Dreams in *Fin-de-Siècle* Vienna: Brentano, History and the Jews." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:157-185.
Abstract: "This essay attempts a fresh interpretation of Franz Brentano's life and career in Vienna between 1874 and 1895. But rather than ask how Vienna was significant to the evolution of his philosophy or assess his influence in the Austrian capital and beyond, this essay explores some of the circumstances surrounding controversial *Meine letzten Wünsche für Österreich*, which recounts his battle with the Austrian government to have him reinstated as a full professor of philosophy. The failure to regain his professorship was more than a career setback that embittered Brentano. It was the occasion for him to publicly declare the backwardness of Catholic Austria. I will try to show how this condemnation was

- shaped by Brentano's specific experience as an apostate priest at the intersection of Catholic and Jewish segments of Viennese society, and nourished by his views on the course of history. In this way, this essay seeks to enrich our understanding of the interplay between Brentano's life and thought, and add another chapter to our understanding of the Viennese fin-de-siècle."
313. Schnieder, Benjamin. 2006. "Particularised attributes: an Austrian tale." In *The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy*, edited by Textor, M., 130-158. New York: Routledge.
- "For philosophers interested in ontological issues, the writings of the important figures of Austrian philosophy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contain many buried treasures to rediscover. Bernard Bolzano, Franz Brentano, Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl, to give just four grand names of that period, were highly aware of the importance of a feasible ontology for many of the philosophical questions they addressed throughout their works.
- In this chapter, I will discuss some ideas that these philosophers had with respect to the ontological category of *particularised attributes*; the discussion is intended to be a contribution both to the history of ontology, and to ontology itself. In the first part of the chapter I will review three arguments to the effect that we should allow particularised attributes into our ontology. In the second part, I will discuss certain problems for the idea that particularised attributes have a *unique bearer* and present two alternative solutions to them." (p. 130)
314. Schuhmann, Karl. 2004. "Brentano's impact on twentieth-century philosophy." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacquette, Dale, 277-297. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- "A detailed and complete picture of Brentano's courses can emerge only from the comprehensive shorthand notes taken by his students on the spot. This too, however, is problematic. The most extensive notes were taken by Brentano's immediate pupils Anton Marty, Carl Stumpf, and Edmund Husserl, who donated their treasures to the Brentano Archives in Prague.(1) All these materials were, however, lost in 1939 when the Archives were hastily evacuated to England. As a result, it is very difficult – and I will not attempt it here – to describe in detail the role Brentano's ideas played among his immediate followers and heirs. This is why people have spoken of a certain "invisibility" that Brentano has had in twentieth-century philosophy(2) Since his impact on this philosophy, for the reasons just mentioned, was often channeled through that of his direct disciples, it is worth looking at them first. Brentano's problems and questions went through many metamorphoses and to a large extent determined the agenda of twentieth century philosophy, but philosophers are often unaware of the fact that they do indeed originate with him." (pp. 277-278)
- (1) Husserl in 1935 gave the Archives no less than 28 notebooks. Cf. Oskar Kraus, "Brentano-Gesellschaft in Prag," *Philosophia*, 2, 1937, pp. 402–5.
- (2) Cf. Roberto Poli, "The Brentano Puzzle: an Introduction," in, ed., Roberto Poli, *The Brentano Puzzle* (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate, 1998), p. 1.
315. Seron, Denis. 2014. "Brentano's "Descriptive" Realism." *Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique* no. 10:1-14.
- Abstract" "Brentano's metaphysical position in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* is usually assumed to be metaphysical realism. I propose an alternative interpretation, according to which Brentano was at that time, as well as later, a full-fledged phenomenalist. However, his phenomenism is markedly different from standard phenomenism in that it does not deny that the physicist's judgments are really about the objective world. The aim of the theory of intentionality, I argue, is to allow for extra-phenomenal aboutness within a phenomenalist framework."
316. ———. 2018. "Intentionality and Epistemological Relativity." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:207-228.

Abstract: "I will adopt two assumptions without further discussion. First, I take for granted that Brentano's epistemology, in 1874, was not only empiricist, but also phenomenalist. This view is controversial, but it has some support in the literature (Tolman 1987; Bell 1990: 8–9; Pacherie 1993: 13; Simons 1995; Crane 2006; Seron 2014; Seron forthcoming). Secondly, I assume that Brentano's aim in the *Psychology* was to make phenomenalism less problematic by distinguishing two things which standard phenomenalism does not distinguish, namely reference and intentional aboutness. Now, there are good reasons to think that this distinction is the cornerstone of his theory of intentionality (Cayla 1993; Sauer 2006; Fréchette 2012: 330).

Therefore, it is plausible to say that Brentano's theory of intentionality has as its heart an epistemological concern.

In the first three sections, I examine Brentano's rejection of epistemological realism and its phenomenalist implications. In sections 4 to 6, I argue that Brentano's theory of intentionality is better seen as a more sophisticated variant of William Hamilton's "theory of the relativity of knowledge". My underlying hypothesis is that the notion of intentionality — the distinction between real and intentional existence, direct and oblique modes — functions primarily as a means for overcoming some of the inherent limitations of standard phenomenism."

References

Bell, D. (1990). *Husserl*. New York: Routledge.

Cayla, F. (1993). *Husserl, Brentano et la psychologie descriptive*. *Philosophiques*, 20/2, 347–361.

Crane, T. (2006). Brentano's concept of intentional inexistence. In: *The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy* (M. Textor, Ed.). New York: Routledge, p. 20–35.

Fréchette, G. (2012). Deux aspects de l'intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano. In: *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology* (I. Tanasescu, Ed.). Bucarest: Zeta Books, p. 310–343.

Pacherie, E. (1993). *Naturaliser l'intentionnalité: Essai de philosophie de la psychologie*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Sauer, W. (2006). Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption bei Brentano. *Grazer philosophische Studien*, 73/1, p. 1–26.

Seron, D. (2014). Brentano's "descriptive" realism. *Bulletin d'analyse phénoménologique*, 10/4, p. 1–14.

Seron, D. (forthcoming). Brentano on appearance and reality. In: *Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School* (U. Kriegel, Ed.). New York: Routledge [2017]

Simons, P. (1995). Introduction. In: F. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Engl. trans. by L. McAlister et al. New York: Routledge

Tolman, C.W. (1987). Intentionality, meaning, and evolution. In: *Current Issues in Theoretical Psychology* (W.J. Baker, M.E. Hyland, H. Van Rappard, A.W. Staats, Eds.). Amsterdam: Elsevier (North-Holland), p. 365–377.

317. ———. 2020. "Franz Brentano's Critique of Free Will." In *The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency*, edited by Keiling, Tobias and Erhard, Christopher, 7-14. New York: Routledge.

"Brentano intended to investigate free will in the fifth of the six planned books of the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, devoted to emotion and will (Brentano 1924: 1, engl. trans.: xxvii, 1925: 110, ftn., engl. trans.: 254) – a book which, unfortunately, he never wrote. Most of Brentano's reflections on this topic are found in Part 3 of his 1876–1894 Vienna lectures on practical philosophy that were posthumously published as *The Foundation and Construction of Ethics* by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand. Other relevant sources include the second volume of the *Psychology* and the 1889 lecture *The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*." (p. 7)

(...)

"Concluding remarks

- To conclude with, Brentano presents his determinism as fully compatible with both the law of causality and the view that we are morally perfectible and responsible for our actions. In fact, his claim is even stronger, since he maintains that determinism is the only way to make sense of our moral perfectibility and responsibility. Brentano proposes an interesting variant of virtue ethics based on the idea of self-improvement. Opposing the view that moral life consists in resisting inclinations that would otherwise cause the agent to act badly, he asks us to conceive of the will as being necessarily determined by inclinations and having to strive actively to improve them through self-discipline." (p. 12)
318. ———. 2020. "Consciousness and Representation." In *Franz Brentano's Philosophy after Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism*, edited by Fiset, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Janoušek, Hynek, 41-53. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Abstract: "In this chapter, the author raises new objections to the self-representational reading of Brentano. This reading, he argues, is untenable simply because Brentano regards a representational perception as conceptually impossible. He then provides a new construal of Brentano's theory of intentionality, based on a phenomenological approach to intentionality and consciousness. In his view, the main purpose of Brentano's theory of intentionality is to account for mental acts that are not (inner) perceptions, that is, for acts in which something appears without existing."
319. ———. 2021. "Psychology first!" In *The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller*, edited by Antonelli, Mauro and Binder, Thomas, 141-155. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.
"Franz Brentano's aim in his masterpiece, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, as is clearly indicated in the title, was to develop an epistemology of psychology (Seron, 2017a). It is the contention of this chapter, however, that this book is much more than this. In my view, it is not merely about psychology, but about scientific knowledge in general. In his *Psychology*, Brentano seeks to create not merely an epistemology of psychology, but a general epistemology which assigns the first role to psychology.
Psychology is accorded a preeminent place in the epistemology of Brentano and his pupils—with some notable exceptions like the transcendental Husserl. My purpose in this chapter is to show that Brentano's privileging of psychology over the natural sciences is a consequence of his empiricism. Brentano's version of empiricism involves a certain view of what experience is, and this view of experience entails that psychological knowledge enjoys some sort of priority." (p. 141)
References
Seron, D. (2017a). Brentano's project of descriptive psychology. In U. Kriegel (Ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School* (pp. 35–40). London: Routledge.
320. ———. 2021. "Brentano and the ideality of time." *Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea* no. 9:35-49.
Abstract: "How is it possible to have present memory experiences of things that, being past, are no longer presently experienced? A possible answer to this long-standing philosophical question is what I call the "ideality of time view," namely the view that temporal succession is unreal. In this paper I outline the basic idea behind Brentano's version of the ideality of time view. Additionally, I contrast it with Hume's version, suggesting that, despite significant differences, it can nonetheless be construed as broadly Humean."
321. ———. 2021. "Brentano and Mauthner on Grammatical Illusions." In *Philosophy of Language in the Brentano School. Reassessing the Brentanian Legacy*, edited by Dewalque, Arnaud, Gauvry, C. and Richard, Sebastian, 77-94. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave.

- "In the current literature Brentano's name is usually associated with British empiricism, the Aristotelian tradition, and the so-called 'Austrian semantic turn'. This paper seeks to suggest a convergence with another tradition within Austrian philosophy—namely the critique of language developed, among others, by Mach, Mauthner, Karl Kraus, the German Vaihinger, and Wittgenstein. My starting hypothesis is that, despite significant differences, the late Brentano's approach to grammatical illusions has a great deal in common with Fritz Mauthner's critique of language." (p. 77)
322. ———. 2023. "Experiencing the a priori." *European Journal of Philosophy*:371-379.
Abstract: "Brentano clearly asserts, in his Vienna lectures of 1887–1888, that his descriptive psychology is an a priori or "exact" science. Since he rejects Kant's idea of a synthetic a priori, this means that the descriptive psychologist's laws are analytic. My aim in this paper is to clarify and discuss this view. I examine Brentano's epistemology in the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* and then its later developments. I conclude with a difficulty inherent in Brentano's psychological approach to a priori knowledge."
323. Sheredos, Ben. 2016. "Brentano's Act Psychology was not Aristotelian (or at least, not empirical)." *Brentano Studien* no. 14:157-189.
Abstract: "Brentano's *Psychology* constantly refers to mental phenomena as "mental acts," yet there has been surprisingly little effort devoted to discerning the significance of the term "act" in this context. A widespread implicit view is (1) that it is merely a technical term, and does not literally invoke any connotations of action at all. But since many regard the *Psychology* as riddled with Aristotelian assumptions, some also suggest (2) that Brentano's talk of "mental acts" is a significant holdover from his Aristotelian pedigree. Here I argue, negatively, that both claims are deeply problematic. First, traditional readings of Brentano (by, e.g., Oskar Kraus) in terms of (1) are incapable of supporting some of Brentano's most central commitments regarding inner perception and the method of psychology. Second, Brentano's own conception of Aristotelianism is such that if (2) were true, (1) would be false. Finally, if (2) were true in any significant sense, then Brentano would simply fail to do what he sets out to do in his empirical psychology. I thus call for renewed attention to Brentano's conception of "mental acts." "
324. Siewert, Charles. 2023. "Why we need descriptive psychology." *European Journal of Philosophy*:341-357.
Abstract: "This article defends the thesis that in theorizing about the mind we need to accord first-person ("introspective" or "reflective") judgments about experience a "selective provisional trust." Such an approach can form part of a descriptive psychology. It is here so employed to evaluate some influential interpretations of research on attention to conclude that—despite what conventional wisdom suggests—an "introspection-positive" policy actually offers us a better critical perspective than its contrary. What supposedly teaches us the worthlessness of introspection actually shows us why we need to take it seriously."
325. Simons, Peter M. 1984. "A Brentanian basis for Lesniewskian logic." *Logique & Analyse* no. 27:297-308.
"Brentano can effectively handle, if not the singular terms of natural languages, then at least something *very like* them, the singular names of a logical language which boasts a form of singular copula and is closer to traditional and Brentanian logic than is Frege-Russell predicate logic, namely the language of Lesniewski's *Ontology*.(4) What we show is that it is possible to base *Ontology* jointly on two primitives employed by Brentano in his reduction: an expression for existence and nominal conjunction. This not only provides (yet) another basis for *Ontology*: it shows that Brentano's claims for the existential form are considerably stronger than orthodox predicate logic is able to admit. We then sketch how a system of *Ontology* with extensionality allows even existence to be defined using conjunction, making this the sole undefined notion." (p. 300)

- (4) Cf. my "On Understanding Leśniewski", *History and Philosophy of Logic* 3 (1982), 165-191.
326. ———. 1986. "Brentano's Reform of Logic." *Topoi* no. 6:25-38.
 Reprinted in: Peter Simons, *Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected Essays*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992, pp. 41-69.
 "This forgotten reform of the logic of terms is based on Brentano's theory of judgement, according to which the basic form of judgement is an affirmation or denial of existence.
 Brentano uses term-conjunction and -negation, and recognizes several logical relations among concepts (terms). While, like Boole, Brentano abolishes the requirement of existential import, the reform extends beyond this to the rules of inference, which allow syllogisms and other inferences to be elegantly derived. By treating propositions as fictions, following a suggestion of Brentano, and employing Brentano's rules with minor extensions, it is possible to develop a propositional logic within the term logic. The algebra of Brentano's logic, which interestingly mixes intensional and extensional components, is reconstructed.
 While the algebra of extensions of concepts is of course Boolean, concepts themselves form a quasi-Boolean algebra.
 1. Introductory.
 In his Würzburg logic lectures of 1870/1 Brentano proposed a reform of logic which he believed was an essential improvement on the traditional view. His ideas were mentioned in the *Psychologie* of 1874, where they became known to a wider public. The basic idea of his theory of judgment was that the logical form of simple judgments is that of an assertion or denial of existence, rather than the subject-predicate form of the tradition.
 His reform consists in part of drawing the consequences of this theory of judgment. Detailed presentation of the reform was confined to his lectures on logic, which were continued and modified throughout the period (1874-95) when he was teaching in Vienna, where they influenced a number of notable thinkers, notably Twardowski, who took Brentano's ideas to Poland and introduced them to the first generation of Polish analytic philosophers and logicians. The material of the lectures themselves was not published until 1956 under the title *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil* (hereafter LrU), although more of Brentano's views were made accessible through the work of Hillebrand (1891)." (p. 41 of the reprint)
 References
 Hillebrand, F.: 1891, *Die neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse*, Vienna.
327. ———. 1986. "Tractatus Mereologico-Philosophicus? A Brentanian look at Wittgenstein, and a moral." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 28:165-186.
 Reprinted in P. M. Simons, *Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 1992, pp. 339-359.
 "The philosophies of late Brentano and early Wittgenstein can be brought closer in two ways. One way discovers a surprising amount of part-whole theory in the *Tractatus* if we see states of affairs (not wholly wilfully) as thing-like rather than fact-like. This throws up a modal analogue to Chisholm's *entia successiva* in the form of situations. The other way sees all propositions as truth-functions of existential propositions, supporting Brentano's view that existentials are primary, and incidentally yielding a reistic semantics for the *Tractatus*. I draw a quick moral, that we should beware of excessive simplicity in metaphysics, and apply it to Chisholm's views on part and whole." (p. 339 of the reprint)
328. ———. 1988. "Brentano's Theory of Categories: a Critical Reappraisal." *Brentano Studien* no. 1:47-61.
 Abstract: "In his doctoral dissertation *Von der mannigfaltigen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Anstoteles*, Brentano tried to show that (against criticism of this) one could indeed give a principle defense of Aristotle's table of categories as a coherent system. In later texts, Brentano appears sharply critical of Aristotle, mainly in

- respect to Aristotle's mereology, or theory of part and whole, and to his theory of substance and accident.
It is argued that Brentano hadn't observed that Aristotle's belief that there are as many predicative senses of 'be' as there are categories of being is based not on his mereology but on his theory of definition. Overlooking this, Brentano was led to far reaching inadequate ontological consequences."
329. ———. 1989. "Tree Proofs for Syllogistic." *Studia Logica* no. 48:539-554.
Abstract: "This paper presents a tree method for testing the validity of inferences, including syllogisms, in a simple term logic. The method is given in the form of an algorithm and is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the obvious denotational semantics. The primitive logical constants of the system, which is indebted to the logical works of Jevons, Brentano and Lewis Carroll, are term negation, polyadic term conjunction, and functors affirming and denying existence, and use is also made of a metalinguistic concept of formal synonymy. It is indicated briefly how the method may be extended to other systems."
330. ———. 1996. "Logic in the Brentano School." In *The School of Franz Brentano*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 305-321. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
"The term 'the Brentano School' will here be understood to comprise Brentano and his immediate students, that is, those who studied with him either in Würzburg or in Vienna. In practice, those whose contributions to logic I shall consider in any depth number precisely three: Brentano himself, Meinong, and Husserl. I shall not consider students of students of Brentano, for although some of these, in particular Ernst Mally and Jan Łukasiewicz, contributed to logic, they cannot be reckoned among the Brentano School: Mally belongs to Meinong and Graz, Łukasiewicz to Twardowski and Lvov (later to Warsaw).
However, I shall briefly survey the influence of the Brentano School at the end. I shall consider contributions to deductive logic, the methodology of logic, and the philosophy of logic. I shall not consider inductive logic, the logical structure of scientific theories or the theory of probability, except where they are germane to deductive logic (in the work of Meinong).
The format of the paper is that in each of the three major sections (Brentano, Husserl, Meinong) I first survey the primary literature sources and mention one or two useful works of secondary literature, before proceeding to a summary of the relevant aspects of the work in question. I prefer this to an elaborate system of page references which is out of place in an introductory survey article.(1)" (p. 305)
(1) There is no general monograph on the logic of the Brentano School. More of the individual papers I have written on various aspects of this topic are collected in my 1992.
References
Simons 1992. P.M. Simons, *Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski*. Dordrecht, Kluwer.
331. ———. 1999. "Bolzano, Brentano and Meinong: Three Austrian Realists." In *German Philosophy Since Kant*, edited by O'Hear, Anthony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"Although Brentano generally regarded himself as at heart a metaphysician, his work then and subsequently has always been dominated by the *Psychology*. He is rightly celebrated as the person who reintroduced the Aristotelian-Scholastic notion of *intentio* back into the study of the mind. Brentano's inspiration was Aristotle's theory of perception in *De anima*, though his terminology of intentional inexistence was medieval. For the history of the work and its position in his output may I refer to my Introduction to the reprinted English translation. Alongside Aristotle the work shows influences of Descartes, Comte and the British empiricists. The theory of intentionality presented in the *Psychology* is much less modern and less plausible than almost all recent commentary would have it, and was in any case not where Brentano's main interest lay. Intentionality simply served to demarcate mental

phenomena from physical, in Book One, but the main aim was a classification of the mental, outlined in Book Two. Books Three to Five were to have dealt in detail with the three main classes of presentations, judgements and feelings, with the final book considering the metaphysics: mind-body and the immortality of the soul. Brentano's shifting views, recently documented in English with Benito Muller's translation of *Descriptive Psychology*, a work from the transitional 1890s, made the original plan obsolete. The role of an *a priori*, philosophical or descriptive psychology, methodologically prior to empirical-experimental genetic psychology, foreshadowed and influenced Husserl's notion of phenomenology, and Brentano's Comtean methodological *epoché* of desisting from controversial metaphysical statements in favour of an examination of the phenomena likewise presaged Husserl's more ponderous phenomenological reductions.

Brentano's other work covers most areas of philosophy, notably ethics, where he upheld a form of *a priori* intuitionism much admired by G. E. Moore, the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, philosophy of language, deductive and inductive logic, and the history of philosophy. I shall mention just two areas. In his logic lectures from 1866 onwards (a compilation published 1956) Brentano rejected the subject-predicate analysis of simple judgements and proposed instead (for which he apparently secured written assent from Mill) that all judgements are logical compounds of positive and negative existential judgements. For example the universal judgement *All men are mortal* becomes the negative existential *There are no immortal men*. On this basis Brentano radically simplified the inference rules of deductive logic. While unlike de Morgan, Frege and others he does not go beyond logic's traditional scope by recognising relations, within its bounds his reformed-term logic is simple, elegant and easily teachable. Some of his ideas in logic influenced the young Husserl. Unfortunately Brentano took against mathematical logic, which he wrongly associated exclusively with Hamilton's confused doctrine of the quantification of the predicate. His inductive logic, which takes up by far the greater part of his logic lectures, remains unresearched to this day." (pp. 118-119)

332. ———. 2000. "The Four Phases of Philosophy: Brentano's Theory and Austria's History." *The Monist* no. 83:68-88.
 Abstract: "From the beginning of the nineteenth century to the present day, philosophy in Austria has progressed through four phases. The particularities of the first three of these phases have prompted a number of commentators rightly to distinguish a characteristic Austrian, as distinct from German, way of doing philosophy. The main figure of the second phase was Franz Brentano, and his distinctive theory of the four-phase cycle of philosophical development is outlined, and critically compared to other views of the development of philosophy. In Austria itself the caesuras between the phases were marked as much by political as by philosophical events, and the paper shows how philosophy in Austria has been notable in all its phases for the high level and overwhelmingly negative effect of political interference in intellectual life, a doleful saga which continues to this day."
333. ———. 2004. "Judging correctly: Brentano and the reform of elementary logic." In *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, edited by Jacqueline Dale, 45-65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 "In this chapter I outline the simple but effective reforms Brentano proposed for elementary deductive logic, basically syllogistic plus; I then discuss briefly how they can be made the basis of a sensible and pedagogically accessible approach to term logic even today, and finally mention their subtle but important influence on logic in the twentieth century." (p. 46)
 (...)
 "Brentano himself never published his reforms of logic, which is the main reason why historiographers of the subject have passed them by. The reducibility of judgments to the existential form is argued for in chapter VII of the *Psychology* (PES-E, pp. 201–34) and there are some remarks in the appendix prepared for the 1911 second edition of parts of that book, published as *On the Classification of*

- Mental Phenomena*. These remarks appear in the English PES-E, pp. 291–301, and Brentano's negative comments on mathematical logic at pp. 301–6." (p. 47)
334. ———. 2015. "How to Do Things with Things: Brentano's Reism and its Limits." In *Objects and Pseudo-Objects: Ontological Deserts and Jungles From Brentano to Carnap*, edited by Seron, Denis, Richard, Sebastien and Leclercq, Bruno, 3-16. Berlin: de Gruyter.
 "From about 1904 until the end of his life in 1917, Franz Brentano held an ontological view which has come to be called reism. This is the view that the only things that exist are concrete things (*res*). The list of objects that this view denies existing is long indeed, and includes: properties and relations, whether considered as individual accidents or as universals; events and processes; facts and states of affairs; numbers, sets and all other mathematical objects; space and time as entities in their own right; intentional contents and objects; propositions, and other abstract senses or meanings. The objects that Brentano does accept as *entia realia* or things include as individuals mental souls, physical bodies and their parts and lower-dimensional boundaries, and collections of individuals. Brentano conceives it as possible that the primary physical things be of more than three dimensions: he calls such things *topoids*." (p. 3)
335. Simons, Peter M., and Wolenski, Jan. 1989. "De Veritate: Austro-Polish contributions to the theory of truth from Brentano to Tarski." In *The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, edited by Szaniawski, Klemens, 391-442. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 Abstract: "Tarski's essay on truth is the single most important work from the Lw6w-Warsaw school. But it did not come from nothing: its philosophical pedigree goes back to earlier philosophy in Vienna. This paper traces in detail the influences from Brentano, through his pupils and their pupils to Tarski, noting the fluctuating nature of Austro-Polish obsession with truth. An examination of the characteristics inherited from this tradition by Tarski's theory enables us to correct several misconceptions about his work."
336. Smith, Barry. 1987. "The Substance of Brentano's Ontology." *Topoi* no. 6:39-49.
 "The literature on Brentano of recent times has manifested an unmistakably deflationary tendency, often presenting Brentano as little more than a forerunner of analytic philosophy, and rarely taking account of more than those few passages in which Brentano talks about something called 'intentionality'. (1) The present paper is an attempt to redress this balance. It seeks to demonstrate that Brentano is to be classified not with the dry logic-and-language-choppers of modern times, but rather with the great metaphysical visionaries of the past, from Leibniz and Spinoza to Bergson and Lord Kelvin. Only in these terms, it may be argued, is it possible to explain the tremendous influence exerted by Brentano on so many of his pupils and disciples.
 The paper is a study of Brentano's ontology, and more specifically of his theory of substance and accident, particularly as put forward toward the end of his life in the materials collected together as the *Kategorienlehre*." (p. 39)
 (1) A notable and heroic exception to this general trend is of course provided by Roderick Chisholm, who is almost single-handedly responsible for the fact that a wider spectrum of Brentanian ideas is at last beginning to make itself felt in certain circles. My indebtedness to him -- and particularly to his classic paper of 1978 [*] which first awakened my interest in Brentano's ontology -- is I hope obvious. He should not, of course, be held responsible for what follows.
 [*] *Brentano's Conception of Substance and Accident*.
337. ———. 1988. "The Soul and its Parts. A Study in Aristotle and Brentano." *Brentano Studien* no. 1:75-88.
 Abstract: "The attempt is made to show that the key for a correct interpretation of Brentano's writings can be derived from an examination of his very early dissertations. The overarching context of all Brentano's writings is the psychology of Aristotle and the ontology of material and immaterial substance that goes

- together therewith. The present remarks will accordingly consist in an account of Aristotle, and more specifically of Aristotle's conception of the soul, as reflected by Brentano in his *Psychology of Aristotle*, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* and *Descriptive Psychology*."
338. ———. 1989. "The primacy of place: an investigation in Brentanian ontology." *Topoi* no. 8:43-51.
 "1. Introduction
 What follows is an investigation of the ontology of Franz Brentano with special reference to Brentano's later and superficially somewhat peculiar doctrine to the effect that the substances of the material world are three-dimensional places. Taken as a whole, Brentano's philosophy is marked by three, not obviously compatible, traits. In the first place, his work is rooted in the metaphysics of Aristotle, above all in Aristotle's substance-accident ontology and in the Aristotelian theory of categories. In the second place, Brentano embraced a Cartesian epistemology. He saw the source of all knowledge as residing in our direct awareness of our own mental phenomena and in our capacity to grasp evident incompatibilities in the realm of concepts.(1)
 Thirdly, he regarded the existence of an external world as at most probable, and denied outright the existence of a world similar to the world that is given in experience.
 Finally, and in some sense linking together these opposing strands, he propagated an idea of what he called "descriptive psychology", a discipline which would on the one hand yield exact knowledge of the structures and categories of mental life, and on the other hand provide an epistemologically sure foundation for other branches of philosophy. As we shall see, it is this psychological aspect of Brentano's philosophy which leads him to his conception of the substantiality of place. Surprisingly, however, the psychological considerations which underlie Brentano's thinking will be shown to raise a series of questions strictly ontological in nature, questions which are not without a systematic interest of their own."
 (1) Knowledge of the first sort he called "empirical"; knowledge of the latter sort "analytic".
339. ———. 1990. "On the Phases of Reism." In *Kotarbinski: Logic, Semantics and Ontology*, edited by Wolenski, Jan, 137-184. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 "The paper will consist of a critical survey of Kotarbinski's development from his early nominalism and 'pansomatistic reism' to the later doctrine of 'temporal phases'. It will be shown that the surface clarity and simplicity of Kotarbinski's writings mask a number of profound philosophical difficulties, connected above all with the problem of giving an adequate account of the truth of contingent (tensed) predications. The paper will examine in particular the attempts to resolve these difficulties on the part of Lesniewski. It will continue with an account of the relations of Kotarbinskian reism to the ontology of things or *entia realia* defended by the later Brentano.
 Kotarbinski's identification of Brentano as a precursor of reism is, it will be suggested, at least questionable, and the paper will conclude with a more careful attempt to situate the Brentanian and Kotarbinskian ontologies within the spectrum of competing ontological views." (pp. 137-138)
340. ———. 1990. "Brentano and Marty: An Inquiry into Being and Truth." In *Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics: The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty*, edited by Mulligan, Kevin, 111-149. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 "Aristotle, as is well known, distinguished in his ontology between *being in the sense of the categories* and *being in the sense of being true*. (*Met.*, 1017 a 31ff.) The early Brentano, correspondingly, distinguished between things or *ens reale* on the one hand, and *entia rationis* or irrealia on the other. *Ens reale* are for example a soul and its constituents (or 'divisives'), the various mental acts of presentation, judgment, love and hate. *Entia rationis* are entities such as the existence of A and

the non-existence of A, entities which have a role to play in making true our judgments about *entia realia*.

In the course of time, however, Brentano changed his mind, and his later ontology is an ontology of things alone. Hence there are no entia rationis, and there are no divisives or other non-thingly parts of things. We should talk not of mental acts or psychic phenomena but of 'thinkers' or 'thinking things', all of whom relate exclusively in their thinking to other things (or to themselves) as their objects. 'Thinking' is in this sense univocal. Things are divided into psychic things (minds, presenters, judges, lovers, haters, and so on) and spatial things (places, hard places, red places, hard red places, and so on)." (p. 111)

341. ———. 1993. "The Soul and its Parts II: Varieties of Inexistence." *Brentano Studien* no. 4:35-52.
 "A Brentanian might criticize contemporary philosophy of mind on at least the following counts:
 i. its taxonomy of types of mental act and state is too narrow (thus its repertoire consists, on many standard accounts, in little more than 'beliefs' and 'desires');
 ii. its treatment of mental acts and states is too slavishly oriented around linguistic factors (thus for example it is standardly suggested that the philosophy of mind is most properly concerned with the so-called 'propositional attitudes');
 iii. its treatment of the temporal structures of mental acts and states is overly crude (thus in many standard accounts punctual and episodic acts are not distinguished from enduring states and dispositions);
 iv. it presupposes an over-crude theory of the internal structures of mental acts and states and of the corresponding types of parts and unity.
 It is with this last that we shall be principally concerned in what follows, and more precisely with Brentano's own account of the part-whole structures obtaining in the mental sphere." (p. 35)
342. ———. 1994. *Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano*. Chicago: Open Court.
 Chapter One: Austrian Philosophy and the Brentano School, 7; Chapter Two: Franz Brentano I: On Mind and Its Objects 35; Chapter Three: Franz Brentano II: On Substance and Accident 61.82.
 "This book is a survey of the most important developments in Austrian philosophy in its classical period from the 1870s to the Anschluss in 1938." (Preface, p.1)
 (...)
 "1. Brentano's Metaphysics
 Much of the literature on Brentano has manifested a certain deflationary tendency, often presenting Brentano as little more than a forerunner of Husserl or of analytic philosophy, and rarely taking account of more than those few passages in which Brentano talks about his doctrine of intentionality. Here, in contrast, I shall seek to do full justice to the metaphysical aspects of Brentano's thinking. At the centre of our concern, as always with Brentano, will be the philosophy of Aristotle, and more specifically Aristotle's theory of substance and accident, which is given detailed treatment by Brentano in the materials collected together as the *Theory of Categories*." (p. 61)
343. ———. 2000. "Boundaries: a Brentanian Theory." *Brentano Studien* no. 8:107-114.
 "According to Brentano's theory of boundaries, no boundary can exist without being connected with a continuum. But there is no specifiable part of the continuum, and no point, which is such that we may say that it is the existence of that part or of that point which conditions the boundary. - An adequate theory of the continuum must now recognize that boundaries be boundaries only in certain directions and not in others. This leads to consequences in other areas, too."
344. Smith, David Woodruff. 2020. "Descriptive Psychology and Phenomenology: From Brentano to Husserl to the Logic of Consciousness." In *Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy*, edited by Fisette, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Stadler, Friedrich, 49-71. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

Abstract: "In his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) Franz Brentano launched the discipline of phenomenology as descriptive psychology. Drawing on Brentano's work, Edmund Husserl developed a conception of phenomenology founded on an enhanced theory of intentionality as a distinctive property of consciousness.

Husserl expanded Brentanian descriptive psychology with an ontology of meaning or content influenced by logical theory, from Bolzano to Frege and beyond.

Here I shall outline an evolving line of phenomenological analysis of the structure of consciousness and its intentionality. This lineage draws key factors from first Brentano and then Husserl with further explication through subsequent forms of ideal meaning and modal ontology. The resulting model of intentional consciousness is a direct legacy flowing from Brentano's work, though it goes beyond Brentano's more purely empiricist constraints.

On Brentano's analysis, an act of consciousness is "directed" primarily toward an object: an object existing "intentionally in" the act. And the act is also directed secondarily, "incidentally", toward itself: in "inner consciousness". The primary form of directedness leads into Husserl's theory of intentionality via phenomenological content or "noematic" meaning. The secondary form of directedness leads into Husserl's theory of awareness-of-consciousness in "inner time-consciousness".

Thus, phenomenal intentional consciousness features the way the object is presented in consciousness modified by the way that presentation itself is carried out.

These two features of an act of consciousness define the fundamental form of consciousness.

These features can be further explicated in terms of the way the act is directed via phenomenological content toward the object in "intentionally possible" situations ("in" consciousness) and the way the act itself is executed phenomenally (with "inner consciousness"). The result is a "modal" model of precisely intentionality cum inner awareness.

Recent philosophers of mind have gradually come to focus on features of phenomenological content and inner consciousness that were sharply characterized in Brentano and pursued further in Husserl. The modal model affords a theory of the ideal "logical" structures that define the Brentanian forms of "intentional in-existence" and "inner consciousness".

345. ———. 2021. "Structures of inner consciousness: Brentano onward." *Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*.

Published online: 26 Apr 2021.

Abstract: "For Brentano, an act of consciousness features a *presentation of an object* joined with an *inner presentation* – an 'inner consciousness' or inner awareness – of that object-presentation. On Mark Textor's articulation of Brentano's model, the act has the structure of a single experience directed upon a *plurality*, viz.: the object and the experience itself. I consider an alternative development of this Brentanian model. Drawing on Husserl's part-whole ontology, I submit, the act itself has the structure of a whole formed from two *co-dependent parts*, viz., the object-presentation and inner awareness of that presentation. Looking to Husserl's analysis of inner time-consciousness, Textor proposes an enhancement of Brentano's model of inner consciousness. On Textor's model, inner awareness is such that one may be aware of one's experience, in the stream of one's consciousness, 'without grasping any adumbrations [of the experience], but temporal ones'. I dig into Husserl's doctrine of 'adumbration' (as where a tree is given visually with adumbrations of its shape on the back side, of its color in gradations, etc.). On my reconstruction, inner awareness of an experience presents the experience within a *manifold* of 'adumbrated' *temporal* retentions and protentions that place the experience in its stream of consciousness."

346. Soldati, Gianfranco. 2005. "Brentano on Inner Perception, Intrinsic Truth and Evidence." In *Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International*

Wittgenstein Symposium, edited by Reicher, M. E. and Marek, J. C., 63-73.
Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.

"§ 1. Preliminaries

Brentano's theory of inner perception, evidence and truth upsets some widespread assumptions in contemporary philosophy. It rests on an unusual notion of inner perception and on a nominal theory of judgement; it attributes a central role to evidence in epistemology and treats mental states as being intrinsically true. The present contribution aims first at presenting and elucidating some of Brentano's views on these matters. In some crucial points Brentano's position will be modified and hopefully enhanced in a way that is compatible with the overall picture.(1) Considerable space will be devoted to the examination of some of the most important objections that have been or might be raised against the position presented on Brentano's behalf. If by far not invulnerable, the position under scrutiny should hopefully appear more challenging than what it is often taken to be." (p. 63)

(1) References to the passages on which the suggested interpretation of Brentano's position is based will be provided. The discussion of more problematic texts in Brentano's work will have to be left for another occasion.

347. Sorabji, Richard. 1991. "From Aristotle to Brentano: the Development of the Concept of Intentionality." In *Aristotle and the Later Tradition*, edited by Blumenthal, Henry and Robinson, Howard, 227-259. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reprinted as Essay IV in R. Sorabji, *Perception, Conscience and Will in Ancient Philosophy*. Variorum collected studies series, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Variorum, 2013.
348. Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1960. *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Second revised edition 1978; Third expanded edition with the collaboration of Karl Schuhmann 1982.
Chapter I. *Franz Brentano (1838-1917) forerunner of the phenomenological movement* - pp. 27-50.
"Brentano's first concern in psychology was to find a characteristic which separates psychological from non-psychological or 'physical' phenomena. It was in connection with this attempt that he first developed his celebrated doctrine of intentionality as the decisive constituent of psychological phenomena. The sentence in which he introduces the term 'intentionality' is of such crucial importance that I shall render it here in literal translation: Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or sometimes the mental) inexistence of an object, and what we should like to call, although not quite unambiguously, the reference (Beziehung) to a content, the directedness (Richtung) toward an object (which in this context is not to be understood as something real) or the immanent-object quality (immanente Gegenständlichkeit). Each contains something as its object, though not each in the same manner. In the representation (Vorstellung) something is represented, in the judgment something is acknowledged or rejected, in desiring it is desired, etc. This intentional inexistence is peculiar alone to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything like it. And thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain objects in themselves by way of intention (intentional). (1)Actually, this first characterization of the psychological phenomenon makes use of two phrases: 'intentional inexistence' and 'reference to a content.' It is the first of these phrases which has attracted most attention, and it has even given rise to the view, supported by both anti-scholastics and neo-scholastic critics, that this whole doctrine was nothing but a loan from medieval philosophy. While a quick reading of the passage may seem to confirm this view, it is nevertheless misleading. 'Intentional inexistence,' which literally implies the existence of an 'intentio' inside the intending being, as if imbedded in it, is indeed a Thomistic conception. But it is precisely this conception which Brentano himself did not share, or which in any case he abandoned, to the extent of finally even

dropping the very term 'intentionality.' Thus, the second characterization of the psychic phenomenon, 'reference to an object,' is the more important and the only permanent one for Brentano; it is also the one listed exclusively in the Table of Contents, beginning with the first edition. What is more: as far as I can make out, this characterization is completely original with Brentano, except for whatever credit he himself generously extends to Aristotle for its 'first germs' in a rather minor passage of the *Metaphysics* (1021 a 29). It was certainly none of Brentano's doing that this new wholly unscholastic conception came to sail under the old flag of 'intentionality.' Reference to an object is thus the decisive and indispensable feature of anything that we consider psychical: No hearing without something heard, no believing without something believed, no hoping without something hoped, no striving without something striven for, no joy without something we feel joyous about, etc. Physical phenomena are characterized, by contrast, as lacking such references. It also becomes clear at this point that Brentano's psychological phenomena are always acts, taking this term in a very broad sense which comprises experiences of undergoing as well as of doing, states of consciousness as well as merely transitory processes. Here, then, Brentano for the first time uncovered a structure which was to become one of the basic patterns for all phenomenological analysis." pp. 36-37

(1) *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt I*, Buch II, Kapitel I § 5 (pp. 125 f.; English translation p. 88).

349. ———. 1976. "Intention' and 'Intentionality' in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl." In *The Philosophy of Brentano*, edited by McAlister, Linda L., 108-127. London: Duckworth.
Translated from the German by Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schättle. The present translation is based on a reprinted version of the German original which appeared in *Studia Philosophica*, vol. 29 (1970), pp. 189-216.
"The attempt at a more thorough investigation of what is designated by the expressions 'intention' and 'intentional' in present-day philosophy needs no special justification at the present stage of philosophy. Brentano and Husserl discovered the strategic role of these phenomena within all mental life, and brought it to the fore. Nevertheless, one can hardly claim that the subject and its context have been sufficiently explored. In several respects more clarity is needed. In many cases unexamined or insufficiently examined preconceptions and anticipations are obstructions to the real understanding of the situation. In part these harken back to conscious or unconscious historical recollections by which one is guided or, rather, misguided, in the study of the phenomena. It is the main purpose of this essay to render them harmless and at the same time to work out more clearly the systematic problems that stand behind the historical development.
Not everything, however, that goes by the name 'intention' will be dealt with, but only extra-practical intention. 'Intention' is commonly understood in the sense of an intention to do something or a purpose. That is the original practical meaning of the term and it has been preserved in ordinary language. This meaning will not be discussed here. By contrast, the extra-practical is secondary; it has been limited to academic philosophy, and is demonstrably derived from the Scholastics of the Middle Ages." (pp. 108-109)
350. ———. 1978. "On the Significance of the Correspondence Between Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:95-116.
"This correspondence, still unpublished, extends over forty years. Its significance is both biographical and philosophical. Biographically it shows Brentano's tolerant friendship for his emancipated student and Husserl's unwavering veneration for his only philosophical teacher. The philosophical issues taken up are Euclidean axiomatics, Husserl's departure from Brentano in the *Logical Investigations* by distinguishing two types of logic as the way out from psychologism, and the possibility of negative presentations, but not Husserl's new phenomenology. Few agreements are reached, but the dissents were clarified."

351. Spinicci, Paolo. 1988. "Some Observations on the Concept of Descriptive Psychology in the Philosophy of Franz Brentano." In *La Scuola di Brentano*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- "In an oft-quoted passage of *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*(1) Husserl characterize descriptive psychology as the mature fruit of Brentano's philosophy, and the most vital part of his thought. Brentano, then fore, is seen by him primarily as a descriptive psychologist: this opinion could be shared, but it leads to several problems of interpretation. The term 'descriptive psychology' is too vague, and can be applied to very different philosophies.
- (...)
- Of course some suggestions as to the real meaning of the term 'descriptive psychology' can be found in the literature on Brentano (...), but it is only since the recent publication of Brentano's university courses (1887/88; 1888/89; 1890/91) on psychognosy (*Psychognosie*)(3) that we are in a better position to resolve the theoretical problem, which is of such importance in Brentano's philosophy. In the pages of *Deskriptive Psychologie*, Brentano points out that pure psychology is in principle independent from considerations of a physiological-genetic nature, and indicates what he regards as the essential features of psychognosy. According to Brentano, descriptive psychology is a conceptual formulation of our psychic experience which must result in necessarily valid propositions. One can go from here to clarify Brentano's concept of descriptive psychology, pointing out its connection with Husserl's phenomenology, so confirming earlier statements of this relationship(4). Brentano speaks of psychognosy as a pure psychology (*reine Psychologie*) and as an exact science (*exakte Wissenschaft*) (see *DP*, p. 1), and from the beginning he explicitly compares psychognosy with mathematics in order to bring out clearly that its assertions are necessarily true, which leads us inevitably to the pages of *Ideen III* where Husserl explains the meaning and nature of pure eidetic phenomenology.
- Such a relationship does indeed exist, but an evaluation of the historical significance and the theoretical importance of psychognosy should not be limited to this assertion: it must try to clarify exactly what Brentano means by 'pure psychology' and 'exact science' and to what extent these definitions can explain the nature of his work. In my opinion Brentano really goes beyond the boundaries of such definitions, and a full understanding of his project for a descriptive psychology must take this into account." (pp. 82-83, a note omitted)
- (1) E. Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*, (1910 11), edited by W. Szilasi, Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M., 1971, p. 26.
- (3) F. Brentano, *Deskriptive Psychologie*, edited by R. Chisholm and W. Baumgartner, Meiner, Hamburg, 1982. Abbrv.: *DP*.
- (4) The presence of this relationship - revealed by O. Kraus in his Preface to *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* - has been emphasized mainly by R.M. Chisholm.
352. Szrednicki, Jan. 1962. "Remarks concerning the interpretation of the philosophy of Franz Brentano." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 22:308-316.
- "Most of the editors of Brentano's works and his commentators have a tendency to attempt to arrest his thought at a given moment and then to try to work out, in a systematic way, his views concerning most problems.
- So, for instance, Alfred Kastil (in *Die Philosophie Franz Brentano's*, Salzburg, 1951) "...attempted to represent Brentano's teaching in its final form . . ." 1 The same tendency is clearly evident in, e.g., F. Mayer-Hillebrand's edition of *Die Lehre vom Richtigen Urteil* (Bern, 1956). In order to attain this objective the editor used Brentano's own writings and some writings of Hillebrand, and produced a systematic whole by skillful arrangement, subtle changes and additions. The effect is one of detailed and systematic theory represented as Brentano's final views."
- (...)
- "Despite a certain sympathy with the attitude, and some respect for the justification produced, I am of the opinion that the treatment does not suit Brentano's philosophy

- really well; that it is not likely to bring out the best in his work; and finally that it possibly rests to some extent on a misunderstanding of his advice." (p. 308)
353. ———. 1963. "A reply to Professor F. Mayer-Hillebrand." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 23:445-446.
 "In this brief comment upon Professor Mayer-Hillebrand's reply to my article, I shall not contest the points concerning Brentano's own earnest permission to have his papers edited in the Kastil Mayer-Hillebrand way. I have already admitted its existence and I was doubtful merely because I did suspect that his modesty might have led him to be unwilling to have his pupils spend most of their ability and energies editing his papers. I admit also that this type of edition is often very acceptable. I have great admiration for the painstaking work both of A. Kastil and Mayer Hillebrand, notwithstanding which, I am under the impression that they might have, to say the least, underemphasized some important aspects of Brentano's philosophy. It was the purpose of my article to re-emphasize them. As to the point of pure scholarship, even if one would agree that EL. 67 belongs firmly to a transitory and formative period, would not the fact that Brentano's philosophy was in this stage after about forty years of active professional life support my general contention? Further, I find it unlikely that Brentano would ever produce a *systematic presentation* if it meant *system-building*. The fact that impresses one here is not so much Brentano's late blindness and dictating difficulties, but that he was engaged in new research, as shown by his discussion, admittedly late, of evidence. The open-mindedness with which he approached the subject appertaining to one of the main problems that occupied him for a long time is also significant. Is it really consonant with a system-building attitude? However, I have not denied that Brentano was a systematic philosopher, even if he was not a system-builder." (p. 445)
354. ———. 1965. *Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
 "Brentano has established many points and provided a number of important suggestions. Let us now survey briefly those of his observations that appear to be of more importance for the future research into the matter. Brentano has shown that the correspondence theory is not acceptable. His detailed reasoning concerning the nature of the relation itself and the nature of its termini is quite conclusive. The relation itself cannot be properly explained: If it is discussed in general terms it soon degenerates into a mere metaphor. However, if an attempt is made at giving it a more definite meaning, we find that there are grave objections to each suggested solution. None of the suggested particular determinations can account for all past, future and negative assertions. We are in difficulties whether we assume that both termini of the relation must exist or not. It is impossible to characterise sufficiently well the thing with which our judgement is to correspond.
 If it is outside the mind, we cannot give a consistent picture of it; even *entia rationis* will not help because they would naturally correspond to affirmative judgements only. Should they correspond also to negative judgements, then how could the same situation correspond closely enough with both? Further difficulties arise with regard to intellectus, etc.(5) In view of all these difficulties, it is quite clear that it is impossible to resurrect the correspondence theory. We must therefore investigate other possibilities." (p. 112)
 (5) See Chapter I, Section I and Chapter V, Sections I and 2; also Chapter IV, Sections 3.
355. ———. 1966. "Some Elements of Brentano's Analysis of Language and Their Ramifications." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 20:434-445.
 "Brentano's departure from the traditional correspondence theory of truth was precipitated by his qualms about Aristotle's account of judgement as the combination or separation of ideas. We can see it very clearly in his early: *Über den Begriff der Wahrheit* (1889) (1). He maintains there that the basic form of judgement is not "A is B", as Aristotle would have it, but "A is", what he calls an existential judgement.

- It will be clear that this must put serious strain on Aristotle's theory of truth where he characteristically says: (2)
 ... he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error (tr. W. D. Ross)." (p. 434)
 (1) Cf. *Wahrheit und Evidenz*, F. Meiner, 1930, also translation by R. M. Chisholm, *The True and the Evident*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966 (W & E).
 (2) *Metaphysica*, IX, 10, 1051, b, 3.
356. ———. 1998. "Brentano and the Thinkable." In *The Brentano Puzzle*, edited by Poli, Roberto, 139-150. Aldershot: Ashgate.
 "Our original puzzle was that thinkability constituting a common umbrella of consideration tended to reduce all our proposals to questionbegging; this is now resolved at least in principle.
 The picture suggested here, without at the moment supplying many details, is that the parameter of 'thinkable' provides us with the possibility of having something as 'the given.' Having that much, we can envisage how object-level choices arise on some natural basis. The parameter of compatibility perspectives can then supply an interconnected matrix that in turn supports various: operations, systems, structures, etc.
 This does not deal sufficiently with the whole problem of preferencecompatibility without referring to work beyond what could be presented today. What has been said constitutes, I hope, a demonstration of the importance of the sub-level of the thinkable. That level permits us to make moves capable in principle of resolving a difficult situation sketched above, for it enables us to side-step the main difficulty of questionbegging. Short of it every possible proposal seemed subject to it. I conclude by suggesting that Brentano's doctrine of *Doppelurteile* can be developed and applied very usefully in this direction." (p. 150)
357. Taieb, Hamid. 2015. "Relations and Intentionality in Brentano's Last Texts." *Brentano Studien* no. 13:183-209.
 Abstract: "This paper will present an analysis of the relational aspect of Brentano's last theory of intentionality. My main thesis is that Brentano, at the end of his life, considered relations (Relatives) without existent terms to be genuine relations (Relatives). Thus, intentionality is a non-reducible real relation (the thinking subject is a non-reducible real relative) regardless of whether or not the object exists. I will use unpublished texts from the Brentanian Nachlass to support my argument."
358. ———. 2017. "Brentano on Properties and Relations." In *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*, edited by Kriegel, Uriah, 156-162. New York: Routledge.
 "Brentano wrote his doctoral dissertation on Aristotle's ontology (Brentano 1862/1975a).
 However, the books and articles that Brentano published during his lifetime do not contain much information about his own theory of properties and relations. His main texts on this topic can be found in the posthumous volumes *The True and the Evident* (Brentano 1930/1966b), *The Theory of Categories* (1933/1981a), and *The Renunciation of the Unreal* (1966a), which mainly contain documents from after his reistic turn of 1904 (see Chapter 13). The manuscripts "About the Theory of Categories" (Brentano 1992-3), "On Substance" (1993), and "Abstraction and Relation" (2013a/c), all from approximately 1900, are Brentano's most important published pre-reistic texts on properties and relations.
 Some information is also present in Brentano's logic lectures, given from 1869-1870 until 1877 in Würzburg and Vienna (Brentano, EL 80).(1)(1) Much information on the young Brentano's theory of properties and relations can be found in the metaphysics lectures given in Würzburg from 1867 onward (ms. M 96), but these lectures are unpublished.
 In this chapter, I will focus on Brentano's theory of properties and relations as established during his mature period, from *Psychology from an Empirical*

Standpoint (Brentano 1874) until his death in 1917, and indicate the most important changes that his reistic turn entailed for his theory of properties and relations.(2) First, I discuss the ontological features common to properties and relations (§1); then I deal with relations in particular (§2)." (p. 156)

(1) For the dating of these lectures, see Rollinger 2011.

(2) I will briefly outline the young Brentano's theory of properties and relations in the footnotes. For the recognition of three periods in Brentano's ontology, namely "conceptualism" (1862–1874), "ontology of intentionality" (1874–1904), and "reism" (1904–1917), see Chrudzimski 2004, Chrudzimski and Smith 2004.

References

Brentano, Franz (1862). *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*. Freiburg: Herder.

Brentano, Franz (1975a). On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle. Trans. R. George. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Brentano, Franz (1930). *Wahrheit und Evidenz*. Leipzig: Felix Meiner.

Brentano, Franz (1966b). *The True and the Evident*. Trans. R. M. Chisholm, I. Politzer, and K. R. Fischer. London: Routledge.

Brentano, Franz (1933). *Kategorienlehre*. Leipzig: Felix Meiner.

Brentano, Franz (1981a). *The Theory of Categories*. Trans. R. M. Chisholm and N. Guterman. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Brentano, Franz (1966a). *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen*. Bern: Francke.

Brentano, Franz (1993). "Von der Substanz." *Axiomathes* 4: 2–40.

Brentano, Franz (2013a). "Abstraktion und Relation," in Denis Fisette and Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), *Themes from Brentano*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Chrudzimski, A. (2004). *Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Chrudzimski, A. and B. Smith (2004). "Brentano's Ontology: From Conceptualism to Reism," in D. Jacquette (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Franz Brentano*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

359. ———. 2017. "Intentionality and Reference: A Brentanian Distinction." *The Monist* no. 100:120-132.

Abstract: "Brentano distinguishes between intentionality and reference. According to Brentano, all mental acts are intentionally directed toward something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. For Brentano, such acts, besides their intentionality, have a peculiar relation of similarity to their object. However, there is no mention of Brentano's distinction between intentionality and reference in the literature. Drawing on some lesser known texts, this paper aims both at showing that Brentano makes such a distinction and at underscoring the philosophical significance of his position."

360. ———. 2018. *Relational Intentionality: Brentano and the Aristotelian Tradition*. Dordrecht: Springer.

"Indeed, though Brentano's monograph on Aristotle may have helped to produce some confusions, especially as regards the assimilation of intentionality with causality, nevertheless, in his later works he draws a distinction between the intentional relation, the causal relation and the relation of reference. Moreover, he finds this tripartition already in Aristotle, specifically in *Metaphysics* Δ.15, which is about the different classes of relation. Similar distinctions were made by authors in antiquity and the Middle Ages, precisely in the context of the reception of Aristotle's texts on relations. This might make it possible to clear up the confusions mentioned above, in Brentano and perhaps in Aristotle, but also in medieval thinkers and the Aristotelian tradition more generally. The present work is intended to meet these desiderata: from its point of departure in Brentano, it goes back to Aristotle, then considers Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonist commentators, before proceeding to the scholastic philosophers of the late Middle Ages and Suárez in the early modern period; it aims at analyzing these authors' accounts of intentionality, and the way they distinguish it from the relations of causality or reference. This is, in broad strokes, the topic of this work. From the point of view of method, it will aim to

harmonize scholarship over the *longue durée* with systematic analysis in the history of philosophy." (Preface, pp. VI-VII)

361. ———. 2020. "A Paleo-Criticism of Modes of Being: Brentano and Marty against Bolzano, Husserl, and Meinong." *Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy* no. 7:849-876.
 Abstract: "Brentanians defend the view that there are distinct types of object, but that this does not entail the admission of different modes of being. The most general distinction among objects is the one between realia, which are causally efficacious, and irrealia, which are causally inert. As for being, which is equated with existence, it is understood in terms of "correct acknowledgeability." This view was defended for some time by Brentano himself and then by his student Anton Marty. Their position is opposed to Bolzanian, Husserlian, and Meinongian ontologies, in which a distinction in the (higher) types of object implies a distinction in their mode of being. These Austro-German discussions anticipate much of the contemporary debate between Quineans, who accept only differences in objects, and neo-Meinongians or other ontological pluralists, who accept different modes of being. My paper first presents the Brentanian view in detail and then evaluates its philosophical significance."
362. ———. 2020. "Brentanian Association of Ideas." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 97:203-222.
 Abstract: "This paper presents and evaluates the Brentanian theory of association of ideas. The topic of association usually brings to mind British Empiricism, which is often thought to have a monopoly on the matter. Brentano, however, adopts an original, alternative account of association.
 He argues that all cases of association can be placed under a single general law, that of "habit".
 His explicit account of the topic is rather brief; however, his most faithful pupil, Anton Marty, thoroughly developed his master's views. Marty presents Brentano's account of association in detail, and endeavours to defend it against rival theories, notably those which hold that the laws of "similarity", or of what is called "reintegration", are able to explain all cases of association. First, the paper presents the information found in Brentano himself on association of ideas. Then, it turns to Marty to analyze his developments of the Brentanian view. Finally, the paper evaluates Brentano and Marty's account by tackling some objections that it may face."
363. ———. 2020. "Husserl on Brentanian Psychology: A Correct Criticism?" In *Franz Brentano's Philosophy after Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism*, edited by Fisette, Denis, Fréchette, Guillaume and Janoušek, Hynek, 87-108. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
 Abstract: "Husserl often pays tribute to his teacher Brentano for having opened the path towards phenomenology. However, the praise is systematically followed by a criticism: Brentano failed to draw all the consequences from his ground-breaking rediscovery of intentionality, and remained stuck in inadequate psychological research.
 For Husserl, there are three ways to study mental acts: empirical, eidetic, and transcendental.
 What is objected to Brentano is his adherence to empirical psychology. Husserl himself focuses on the second and third levels. It is clear that Brentano never entered into transcendental considerations. However, it seems also clear that he was doing eidetic-like research in psychology in a way similar to Husserl. In the paper, I first present Husserl's criticism of empirical and, thus, Brentanian psychology. I then turn to Brentano's and the psychology of his heirs and try to show that Husserl's criticism is unjustified. In the course of the discussion, I treat the crucial epistemological question of eidetic vs empirical knowledge, both in Husserl and in Brentano."

364. ———. 2020. "Ordinary language semantics: the contribution of Brentano and Marty." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 28:777-796.
Abstract: "This paper examines the account of ordinary language semantics developed by Franz Brentano and his pupil Anton Marty. Long before the interest in ordinary language in the analytic tradition, Brentanian philosophers were exploring our everyday use of words, as opposed to the scientific use of language. Brentano and Marty were especially interested in the semantics of (common) names in ordinary language. They claimed that these names are vague, and that this is due to the structure of the concepts that constitute their meaning: concepts expressed by such names are themselves vague, based on typicality, and have more or less similar items within their extension. After presenting the views of Brentano and Marty, this paper compares them to later accounts of meaning and concepts, notably Wittgenstein's theory of family resemblances and the prototype theory of concepts, and emphasizes the originality of the Brentanian position."
365. ———. 2021. "Brentano and the Medieval Distinction Between First and Second Intentions." *Topoi* no. 41:143-158.
Abstract: "Brentano's account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being—namely, “intentional inexistence” (*intentionale Inexistenz*)—and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” (*intentionale Beziehung*) to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of *esse intentionale*, which is a mode of being, and of *intentio*, which is a “tending towards” (*tendere in*) of mental acts. However, within the lexical family of *intentio* there is another distinction that plays an important role in medieval philosophy—namely, the distinction between first and second intentions (*intentio prima* and *intentio secunda*), which are, roughly speaking, concepts of things and concepts of concepts respectively. What is less well-known is that Brentano explicitly borrowed this distinction as well, and used it in his account of intentionality. This paper explores this little-known chapter in the scholastic-Austrian history of intentionality by evaluating both the historical accuracy and the philosophical significance of Brentano's borrowing of the scholastic distinction between first and second intentions."
366. ———. 2021. "Brentano on the Characteristics of Sensation." In *The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller*, edited by Antonelli, Mauro and Binder, Thomas, 192-208. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.
"In this paper, I present Brentano's account of sensation and the way he distinguishes this type of psychic phenomenon from other types. After introducing the three main classes of psychic phenomena in Brentano, I focus on his positive account of sensation. I then address in turn each of the other candidates with which sensation may be confused, and I explain how Brentano distinguishes sensation from them." (p. 193)
367. ———. 2023. "Brentano on the individuation of mental acts." *European Journal of Philosophy*:431-444.
Abstract: "This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano's account of the individuation of mental acts. In his early works, Brentano assimilated mental acts to tropes; however, he encountered difficulties in explaining their individuation, since the usual solutions for the individuation of tropes were not readily applicable to his theory of mental acts. In a later period, Brentano introduced into his psychology what he called the “soul,” and this allowed him to explain the individuation of mental acts. Finally, after his “reistic” turn, he excluded mental acts from his ontology, for he rejected abstracta of any kind, including abstract particulars, and admitted only things, or *res* (in Latin), that is, concrete particulars; in his late philosophy, there are no “thinkings,” but only “thinkers.” However, he still needed to explain what individuates different thinkers, and this was again the soul. In the

- conclusion, the paper critically compares the different theoretical options considered by Brentano."
368. Taieb, Hamid, and Cesalli, Laurent. 2018. "Brentano and Medieval Ontology." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:335-362.
Abstract: "Since the first discussion of Brentano's relation to (and account of) medieval philosophy by Spiegelberg in 1936, a fair amount of studies have been dedicated to the topic. And if those studies focused on some systematic issue at all, the beloved topic of intentionality clearly occupied a hegemonic position in the scholarly landscape. This paper considers the question from the point of view of ontology, and in a twofold perspective: What did Brentano know about medieval ontology and what kind of access did he have to that material (section 1)? What kind of use did Brentano make of medieval material in his own philosophy, and with what kind of results (section 2)?"
369. Tănăsescu, Ion. 2012. "Franz Brentano's Dissertation and the Problem of Intentionality." In *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology*, edited by Tănăsescu, Ion, 154-179. Bucharest: Zeta Books.
"It is well known that Franz Brentano's dissertation *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* (1862) played a decisive role in the genesis of the problem of being for the young Heidegger." (p. 154, a note omitted)
(...)
"Against this background, the thesis of this study is that in Brentano's dissertation two phenomenological veins through which Aristotle influenced the phenomenology of the XXth century can be identified: the polysemy of being expressly featured by Heidegger, and Brentano's analysis of Aristotle's being in the mind. Though this latter vein did not receive any attention from Heidegger, convincing arguments can be made in favour of the idea that the analysis of being in the dissertation leads to the problem of intentionality in Brentanian psychology and his School, including the Husserlian phenomenology. For that reason I consider the analysis of being in the mind from the dissertation as the Husserlian phenomenological vein, while the polysemy of being belongs to the Heideggerian phenomenological vein." (p. 155)
370. ———, ed. 2012. *Franz Brentano's Metaphysics and Psychology: Upon the Sesquicentennial of Franz Brentano's Dissertation* Bucharest: Zeta Books.
Contents: Foreword 7; Edoardo Fugali: Trendelenburg, Brentano und die Aristoteles-Renaissance in der deutschen Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts: die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Kategorien 13; Dale Jacquette: Brentano on Aristotle's Categories: First Philosophy and the Manifold Senses of Being 53; Klaus Hedwig: „...Eine gewisse Kongenialität“ Brentanos Rückgriff auf Thomas von Aquin in seiner Dissertation 95; Susan Krantz Gabriel: Heidegger's Question and the Fundamental Sense of Being in Brentano 132; Ion Tanasescu: Franz Brentano's Dissertation and the Problem of Intentionality 154; Josef Seifert: Über das notwendige Dasein Gottes Eine kritische Antwort auf Franz Brentanos Kritik des ontologischen Gottesbeweises 180; Paul Janssen: Die Gottesrede bei Brentano 225; Robin D. Rollinger: Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint: its Background and Conception 261; Guillaume Fréchet: Deux aspects de l'intentionnalité dans la Psychologie de Brentano 310; Denis Seron: The Fechner-Brentano Controversy on the Measurement of Sensation 344; Carlo Ierna: Brentano and Mathematics 368; Roberto Poli: Modes and Boundaries 397; Federico Baccaccini: La vérité efficace: l'origine du concept de vrai chez Brentano entre *Evidenzphilosophie* et pragmatisme 419; Thomas Binder: Franz Brentanos philosophischer Nachlass. Eine historische Annäherung an einen schwierigen Fall 452-514.
371. ———. 2014. "Categorial relations as truth-makers in Franz Brentano's dissertation." *Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie* no. 76:247-260.
"...I shall further understand by the term 'truth-maker' the categorial relations between substance and its accidents, considered as relations by virtue of which the

judgments concerning them are true or false. This position allows me to specify the perspective from which the term 'truthmaker' is approached in this essay: this study is not in any way intended to provide a contribution to the contemporary research devoted to this problem. Instead, it will provide an interpretation of categorial relations as being what the term 'truth-makers' designates in the statement concerning the neglect of their role in Brentano's reading and aimsto provide arguments on behalf of the opposite thesis.(8) Therefore what follows is only an exegetical contribution, the goals of which are carefully limited to the way in which Brentano understood Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth in his first work. Also, I am specifying that in order to formulate the ideas that follow I accepted from the beginning the assumption on which the position I call into question relies, namely, that the Aristotelian correspondence theory of truth analysed by Brentano can be discussed in the specific terms of the truth-maker account.

In accord with this, I shall present further arguments in favour of the thesis that, in his dissertation, Brentano did not neglect but, on the contrary, placed a particular emphasis on the role of categorial relations as truth-makers in Aristotle." (pp. 249-250, a note omitted)

(8) See A. Chrudzimski, *Die Ontologie Franz Brentanos*, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2004,, p. 60; p. 62.

372. ———. 2015. "The two Theories of Intentionality in Brentano and the Program of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*." *Brentano Studien* no. 13:211-231. Abstract: "The paper defends the following thesis: the intentionality passage from Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874) can be interpreted from two perspectives: intentionality as the most salient distinguishing feature separating the mental from the physical, and intentionality as a theory of the way in which mental acts, with their contents, are related to extra-mental objects. Fundamentally, the theory of intentionality from 1874 is an example of the former. Its role is that of allowing the establishment of psychology as a science. However, it can also be understood as a theory of intentionality in the second sense through a clarification of the relations it entails between the content and the object of the act. For this reason, it could be said that the act–content–extra-mental object distinction was already achieved in the 1874 work, at least at the level of sensory acts. The distinction between the psychical act, the content, and the object presented through this content was already made in the EL 80 *Logik* manuscript from 1869/70 at the level of nominal presentation, which provides a further argument for the above thesis."
373. ———. 2017. "The Intentionality of Sensation and the Problem of Classification of Philosophical Sciences in Brentano's empirical Psychology." *Axiomathes* no. 27:243-263. Abstract: "In the well-known intentionality quote of his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Brentano characterises the mental phenomena through the following features: (1) the intentional inexistence of an object, (2) the relation to a content, and (3) the direction toward an object. The text argues that this characterisation is not general because the direction toward an object does not apply to the mental phenomena of sensation. The second part of the paper analyses the consequences that ensue from here for the Brentanian classification of mental phenomena: in Brentano's psychology one can distinguish two concepts of mental phenomena—the mental phenomenon in a broad sense and the mental phenomenon in a narrow sense; the former concept allows the separation of the mental from the physical, while the narrow concept allows the distinguishing of the main classes of mental phenomena. The third part of the paper shows that, with respect to sensation, the absence of a direction toward an object is compatible with both Brentano's early taxonomies of philosophical sciences, and his early program for the establishment of a new, empirical and non-speculative philosophy. For this reason, I hold that intentionality is important for the foundation of both psychology, and empirical philosophy."

374. ———. 2019. "Monism and Particularism: Methodology in Brentano's Psychology." *Axiomathes* no. 29:397-412.
 Abstract: "The paper argues that Brentano was the exponent of a methodological monism, which is based on the requirement that science should be grounded on experience, and not on a speculative-idealistic principle, as in the case of German idealism. In Brentano's psychological writings, this methodological requirement concretized in two different theses: (T1) The method of psychology is *identical with* the method of natural science; (T2). The method of psychology is *inspired by* the method of natural science. The thesis of this study is that an important part of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* is elaborated in accordance with T1. By contrast, Brentano's *Descriptive Psychology* illustrates the subsequent decision to give up this idea. In its place, the aforementioned requirement is elaborated in the spirit of a methodological particularism that recommends the scientist elaborate his methods according to the specificity of the phenomena under investigation and to the difficulties that need to be overcome when approaching them."
375. ———. 2020. "The two Theories of Intentionality in Brentano and Chisholm's Ontological and Psychological Theses." *Revue Roumaine de Philosophie* no. 42:341-350.
 Abstract: "R. M. Chisholm interprets Brentano's theory of intentionality through the lens of two theses: the ontological thesis, according to which the intentionality of the mental designates the fact that there is an immanent object in the act; and the psychological thesis, according to which intentionality consists of the direction of the mental act toward the extra-mental object. In my paper I interpret Chisholm's and Brentano's theses on intentionality from two perspectives: intentionality as the most salient distinguishing feature separating the mental from the physical (Chisholm's ontological thesis), and intentionality as a theory of the way in which mental acts with their content are related to extra-mental but theoretically-constructed objects of physics (Chisholm's psychological thesis). Thus, an important issue of my paper is also to show that Chisholm's well-known ontological and psychological theses on Brentanian intentionality rest on presuppositions that do not fit the program of Brentanian psychology."
376. ———. 2021. "Franz Brentano and Anton Marty: Two Versions of Descriptive Psychology?" In *The Philosophy of Brentano: Contributions from the Second International Conference Graz 1977 & 2017, in Memory of Rudolf Haller*, edited by Antonelli, Mauro and Binder, Thomas, 179-191. Leiden: Brill Rodopi.
 "In the following, I attempt to clarify the relation between Anton Marty's descriptive psychology and Brentano's empirical and descriptive psychology. In this respect, I shall start by describing the structure of PDP [see Note] and by distinguishing two concepts of descriptive psychology. I want to specify from the very beginning that what follows addresses only the relationship between the published versions of Brentano's and Marty's lectures on descriptive psychology. A full assessment of this issue will be possible only after the two manuscript versions of Brentano's lectures on descriptive psychology become available, and after determining if and to what extent Anton Marty was familiar with them. Given that hitherto specialist literature has highlighted mostly the common features of Marty's and Brentano's psychologies (Antonelli, 2011, pp. xxixf.; Marek & Smith, 1987, pp. 38ff.), I shall focus mainly on their differences." (pp. 180-181, notes omitted)
 Note: For the sake of brevity, I shall use the following abbreviations: PES for *Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint* (1874), DP for Franz Brentano's *Descriptive Psychology* (1982) and PDP (Prague Descriptive Psychology) for Anton Marty's *Descriptive Psychology* (2011).
 References
 Antonelli, M. (2011). Die deskriptive Psychologie von Anton Marty. Wege und Abwege eines Brentano-Schüler. In A. Marty, *Descriptive Psychology*, ed. by M. Antonelli & J. C. Marek (pp. xi–lxxviii). Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
 Marek, J.C., & Smith, B. 1987. Einleitung zu A. Martys "Elemente der deskriptiven Psychologie". *Conceptus*, 53/54, 33–47.

377. Tănăsescu, Ion, Bejinariu, Alexandru, Krantz Gabriel, Susan, and Stoenescu, Costantin, eds. 2022. *Brentano and the Positive Philosophy of Comte and Mill*. Berlin: de Gruyter.
With Translations of Original Writings on Philosophy as Science by Franz Brentano.
Contents: List of Abbreviations IX; Ion Tănăsescu: Introduction 1; Nicholas Capaldi: Comte, Mill, and Brentano on the Intellectual Status of Philosophy and Its Relationship to History 9; Michel Bourdeau: Comte on Psychology: The Criticism of "Inner Observation" and the Constitution of the "Systematic View of the Soul" 31; Ion Tănăsescu: Franz Brentano and Auguste Comte: The Theory of Stages and the Psychology 45; Bianca Savu: Comte and Brentano: Elements for a Theory of Decline 139; Susan Krantz Gabriel: Can We Have Scientific Knowledge About God? Brentano on Comte's Metaphysical Skepticism 165; Michel Bourdeau, Ion Tănăsescu: Intentionality and the Classification of Phenomena and Sciences in Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive* and in Brentano's Empirical Psychology 185; Constantin Stoenescu: Brentano's View about Natural Science and Methodological Phenomenalism. A Comparison with John Stuart Mill's Approach 223; Arnaud Dewalque: The Reception of Positivism in Whewell, Mill and Brentano 245; Andreea Eșanu: Franz Brentano's Multifaceted View of Induction in Empirical and Genetic Psychology 265; Cyril McDonnell: Hume's "Bundle of Perceptions" and the "Problem of the I" in Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* 279; Carlo Ierna: Brentano's Mathematical Foundation of Science 309; Robin D. Rollinger: Franz Brentano on the Errors of Mach's Positivism: Psychology, Metaphysics, Logic 331; Witold Płotka: On the Brentanian Legacy in Twardowski's Views on Psychology 351; Alexandru Bejinariu: Descriptive and Intentional Contents. Considerations on Husserl's *Logical Investigations* from Brentano's Empirical Point of View 371; Wolfgang Huemer: Brentano's Four Phases and the Rise of Scientific Philosophy in the Light of His Relation to His Students 401; Thomas Binder: Brentano in Exile: The Brentano Institute at Oxford 415; Appendix: The Idea of Philosophy as Science in Brentano Habilitation Theses 1866 433; Auguste Comte and Positive Philosophy 1869 437; Introduction to the Concept of the History of Philosophy 457; On the Law of Historical Development 475; Philosophy of the History of Philosophy 485; On the Reasons for a Loss of Confidence in the Area of Philosophy 489; On Schelling's Philosophy 501; On the Future of Philosophy 523; My Parting Wishes for Austria 1894 571-590.
Index 591; Authors 591; Subject 598-616.
378. Tassone, Biagio G. 2011. "Franz Brentano's Phenomenological Transformation of Aristotle's Theory of Judgment." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 42:305-328.
"In what follows Brentano's early reading, adoption and reformulation of selected, central Aristotelian doctrines pertaining to philosophy of mind and ontology will be examined. Here it will be shown how the epistemological and ontological grounds for the theory of intellectual judgment found in Aristotle's writings strongly influenced the early Brentano. Nonetheless, for various reasons, Brentano critically rejected certain aspects of the Aristotelian theory of judgment and developed what can be called his phenomenological theory of judgment as an alternative. To better understand Brentano's phenomenological theory of judgment and its significance, special emphasis will be placed on two related areas: philosophy of mind and the theory of truth. Focusing on selected passages in Brentano's and Aristotle's writings that discuss mental reference, representation, semantic content and the nature of truth claims, the implications and consequences of Brentano's phenomenological transformation of Aristotelianism will be spelled out. The most important consequence of Brentano's transformation of Aristotle's theory of judgment will be seen to be the articulation of a new and different understanding of the nature of truth." (p. 305)

379. ———. 2012. *From Psychology to Phenomenology: Franz Brentano's 'Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint' and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

"The following book presents an outline and critical reading of Franz Brentano's philosophy of mind focusing closely on the system outlined in his magnum opus *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*.(1) In this 1874 text Brentano articulates a teleological and neo-Aristotelian framework for understanding the mental as representational. Brentano's earlier development of Aristotelian metaphysics and ontology in an empirical direction set the stage for the articulation of his philosophical psychology and new theory of the mental. Nonetheless Brentano's philosophical psychology still forms one of the overlooked alternatives in contemporary philosophy of mind. This is not to deny that the philosophical system of the PES has not had a strong, albeit indirect, influence on subsequent philosophy of mind. Many isolated aspects of Brentano's thought have been critically examined and commented on in the existing literature, yet the actual position put forth in the PES is almost never examined in itself as a whole and within its historical context. (2)" (p. 1)

(1) *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*, originally published in 1874 by Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig. The Second expanded edition *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* appeared in 1924 and was published by Felix Meiner, Leipzig. The standard and only widely available English translation is by A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, & L. McAlister, first published in 1973; the latest edition, edited with an introduction by Peter Simons, is published as *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, London: Routledge Press, 1995.

Henceforth the English edition will be referred to simply as Psychology or PES, the German text will be cited as PES-G. Where the available English translation has been changed or altered in any way, this will be noted, following, the quoted text.

(2) Although there are always exceptions, in the case of Brentano's PES they do seem to prove the rule. That is, while there have been many full length studies of Brentano's descriptive psychology and analyses of its philosophical import, such as those by Antos Rancurello (1968), Liliana Albertazzi (2001 & 2006), Robin Rollinger (1999), Arkadiusz Chrudzinski (2001), etc., many of these studies either view the PES as merely a stepping stone in Brentano's development or read contemporary or non-Brentanian interests into the system he introduces there. Thus, while valuable, they do not make any sustained effort to evaluate the importance of Brentano's 1874 work as a systematic framework for understanding philosophy of mind.

References

- Albertazzi, Liliana, *Introduzione a Brentano*, Rome-Bari: Editori Laterza, 1999.
 ———, *Immanent Realism: An Introduction to Brentano*, Synthese Library, studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science Vol. 333, Springer: Dordrecht, 2006.
 Chrudzinski, Arkadiusz, *Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano*, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001.
 Rancurello, Antos, *A Study of Franz Brentano: His Psychological Standpoint and His Significance in the History of Psychology*, New York: Academic Press, 1968.
 Rollinger, Robin, *Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999.

380. Tegtmeier, Erwin. 1989. "Individuation, identity and sameness. A comparison of Aristotle and Brentano." *Topoi Supplement* no. 4:117-126.

381. ———. 2018. "Epistemological realism and correspondence in Brentano." *Paradigmi* no. 1:21-30.

Abstract: "Brentano is to be credited with overcoming representationalism originating mainly from Descartes. He arrived at direct realism while giving up the correspondence theory of truth which is wrongly equated with epistemological realism. Crucial is Brentano's intentional relation specific to mental acts and relating directly to objects. Moreover, his view that mental acts have objects but no

- content is also relevant because it excludes that the content can play the role of representative of the object. Brentano not only dropped the correspondence theory of truth, he throws out truth altogether and substitutes it with evidence. This is in line with direct realism which focusses on the object."
382. Terrell, Dailey Burnham. 1966. "Brentano's Argument for Reismus." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 20:446-459.
Reprinted with revisions in: Linda McAlister, *The Philosophy of Brentano*, pp. 204-212.
- "Various sorts of considerations can be advanced in support of such a doctrine as reism. Since it is intended to exclude from the world and from our thought certain alleged entities,(3) Ockham's razor (or the principle of *Denkökonomie*, as German idiom puts it) can be called upon directly. But the razor is never by itself sufficient. It can cut only what has been shown to be unnecessary. This is the typical role of *Sprachkritik* in Brentano's later philosophy. Even though language appears to contain names that designate all sorts of irreal objects, we can show by linguistic analysis that our thought can afford to do without them. All such references can be eliminated by translation into a language containing only the names of *realia*, i.e. persons and physical things.
- Brentano also attempts to support reism by arguments independent of either Ockham's razor or linguistic analysis. Most of them are indirect arguments in which an absurdity or an infinite regress is shown to be implied by the assertion of an irreal entity of some sort. There is only one general and direct argument for reism, as Reinhard Kamitz acknowledges in his painstaking study of Brentano's attempts to establish his position.(4)
- Professor Mayer-Hillebrand also gives priority to the same argument on which Dr Kamitz places such emphasis, the proof from the univocal significance of *vorstellen*.(5) Both Professor Mayer-Hillebrand and Dr Kamitz attribute to me certain objections to this argument.(6) In the remainder of this article I shall expand upon these objections and explore some of the features of Brentano's theory which are brought to our attention by them." (p. 205 of the reprint)
- (3) Brentano, unlike Kotarbinski, who coined the expression *Reismus*, was never a physicalist Both persons and physical things are *realia*. Excluded are objects of thought as such (e.g. Lockean ideas), abstractions formed by hypostasising adjectives, the existence or the possibility of anything, and so on. For brief accounts of the distinction between *realia* and *irrealia*, see Professor Mayer-Hillebrand's Introduction to *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen* (pp. 92ff) and Professor Chisholm's Introduction to *The True and the Evident* (pp. vii-viii).
- (4) Part II of Franz Brentano's *Lehre vom Wahren Urteil*. Dissertation (Innsbruck, 1961).
- (5) *Abkehr*, p. 37: Unter den Argumenten gegen die Vorstellbarkeit nichtrealer Gegenstände überhaupt nimmt die erste Stelle das aus der Einheit des Begriffs des Bewusstseins geschöpfte ein.
6. *Abkehr*, pp. 399-400, note 69, and Franz Brentano's *Lehre vom Wahren Urteil*, pp. 188-97.
383. ———. 1976. "Franz Brentano's Logical Innovations." *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* no. 1:81-91.
- "A comparison with the approach that was taken by Frege provides the spark. Brentano's devoted follower, Anton Marty of the German University in Prague, briefly commented on the relationship between the two in one of a series of articles published five years after the *Begriffsschrift* had appeared.(10)" (p. 82)
- (...)
- "In Marty's comparison between Brentano's and Frege's account of the nature of judgment, we come closer to the nerve of Brentano's theory than Flint or Land did. Their attention was still fixed on the comparison with the traditional logic, i.e. the categorical forms and the rules of the syllogism. And is curiosity not somewhat enlivened by Marty's claim that Brentano's scheme represents a more thoroughgoing and fundamental innovation than Frege's?"

These are the points that emerge from Marty's comments:

1. A sharp distinction must be drawn between the content or material of judgment, which is by itself neutral, and the judgmental function itself. This is the point of agreement between Brentano and Frege.

2. The content of a judgment may be simple, i.e. it need not be either a) a propositional content, as in Frege, nor b) a combination of ideas, as in the categorical forms and their existential equivalents. Furthermore even when the content is compound, the distinction between subject and predicate is of no logical significance.

3. The judgmental function may be either affirmative or negative, according to Brentano, whereas for Frege the assertion sign is sufficient and negation is assigned to the propositional content.

In sum. the basic description of a judgment within Brentano's scheme is that it is an affirmation or denial of something; the something, what is affirmed or denied, may be but need not be a "combination of ideas." (p. 83)

(10) Marty, Anton, *Gesammelte Schriften*, II, ed. Alfred Kastil (Halle, 1918), 56 ff. The article in which these comments occur originally appeared as the second of a series of articles under the general title "Über subjektlose Sätze and das Verhältnis der Grammatik zu Logik and Philosophie;" published in *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*. The second article appeared in Volume 8 (1884).

384. ———. 1978. "Quantification and Brentano's Logic." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:45-66.
 "Brentano's innovations in logical theory are considered in the context of his descriptive psychology, with its distinction between differences in quality and in object of mental phenomena. Objections are raised to interpretations that depend on a parallel between *Urteil* and assertion of a proposition. A more appropriate parallel is drawn between the assertion as subject to description in a metalanguage and the *Urteil* as secondary object in inner perception. This parallel is then applied so as to suggest a reinterpretation of substitutional quantification, rendering the substitutional interpretation immune to problems that often arise as to the relation between substitutional range and referential range."
385. ———. 1983. "Brentano's philosophy of mind." In *Contemporary Philosophy: A New survey - Vol. 4: Philosophy of Mind*, edited by Fløistad, Guttorm, 223-247. The Hague: Nijhoff.
 "Despite fluctuations of doctrine and style and the apparent fragmentation of the philosophical enterprise into discrete fields of specialization, topical or temporal boundaries within philosophy continue to be arbitrary. The purpose to be served by this volume establishes at least a rough definition of the period to be covered. My report on Brentano's philosophy of mind will consider books and articles that have appeared in print during the years 1966 through 1978." (p. 223)
 (...)
 "So far as the philosophy of mind is concerned, Vol. III of the *Psychology*, titled *Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewusstsein* [5], is especially important. Its principal subject is the distinction between sensory and noetic consciousness. Most of the themes of Brentano's philosophy of mental phenomena are represented: inner and outer perception, perception and apperception, modes of presentation and perception, the theory of abstraction and the thesis that the intentional reference characteristic of all mental phenomena is always a general reference, varying in degree of generality, never reference to a specific individual." (p. 224)
 Brentano, F. [5] *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, Vol. III: *Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewusstsein*. Hamburg 1974. Revised edition with introduction by F. Mayer-Hillebrand.
386. Textor, Mark. 2006. "Brentano (and some neo-Brentanians) on inner consciousness." *Dialectica* no. 60:411-432.
 Abstract: "Brentano's theory of inner consciousness has recently had a surprising comeback. However, it is still an open question how it is best understood. It is

- widely held that according to Brentano a mental act is conscious iff it is self-presenting. In contrast, I will argue that Brentano holds that a mental act x is conscious iff it is unified with an immediately evident cognition ('Erkenntnis') of x . If one understands Brentano's theory in this way, it promises to shed light on standard problems for theories of inner consciousness."
387. ———. 2007. "Brentano on the Doxastic Nature of Perceptual Experience." *History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis* no. 10:137-156.
Abstract: "Brentano, the founder of phenomenology, argues in his manuscript "Von der Natur der Vorstellungen" [1903] that perception involves the belief in the object presented. The argument from revealed perceptual illusions argues that a perceptual experience can rationally persist even if one knows that it represents the world incorrectly, while the corresponding belief cannot rationally persist in this situation. For this reason, perceptual experiences cannot be beliefs or intrinsically connected to them. Brentano and Marty have responded to this argument by arguing that a revealed perceptual illusion involves manifestly contradictory beliefs. In this paper I will discuss whether Brentano's controversial response can be defended and supported by independent reasons.."
388. ———. 2013. "Brentano on the dual relation of the mental." *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* no. 12:465-483.
Abstract: "Brentano held that every mental phenomenon has an object and is conscious (the dual relation thesis). The dual relation thesis faces a number of wellknown problems. The paper explores how Brentano tried to overcome these problems.
In considering Brentano's responses, the paper sheds light on Brentano's theory of judgement that underpins his philosophy of mind."
389. ———. 2013. "Unity Without Self: Brentano on the Unity of Consciousness." In *Themes from Brentano*, edited by Fisette, Denis and Fréchette, Guillaume, 67-86. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"Brentano's marks of the mental have been received differently. The thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental was and still is central to discussions in the philosophy of mind. By contrast, the view that only mental phenomena are real and that we are infallible about them has not had many supporters. Finally, Brentano's thesis that a particular kind of unity is a mark of the mental has been neglected in discussions. In this paper I will expound and assess Brentano's view that mental phenomena exhibit a distinctive kind of unity. Brentano attempts to explain the unity of consciousness without assuming the existence of an owner of mental phenomena, that is a soul, self or mental substance.(4) What does the unity of consciousness consist in if it does consist in the fact that one and the same self has the mental phenomena? After outlining the Humean background of this question I will develop and assess Brentano's answer." (p. 69)
(4) Brentano will later change his view and acknowledge the existence of a mental substance. See his manuscript 'Von der Seele'. In this paper I am only concerned with the position articulated in his *Psychologie*.
390. ———. 2017. *Brentano's Mind*. New York: Oxford University Press.
"0.3 Aim of the Book
The primary aim of this book is not historical. I will engage with two philosophical questions-'What is the nature of mind?' and 'What is the structure of consciousness'-through Brentano's work. My interest is not so much to find a plausible reading of Brentano's often dense and difficult texts, but to evaluate the arguments and views that can be distilled from them for truth. I will argue that Brentano gave a defensible and illuminating answer to the second question, while his answer to the first question is in interesting ways wrong. Intentionality is not the mark of the mental. I will argue that Brentano's student Husserl succeeded where Brentano failed: he developed a mark of the mental.
My overall goal is to bring out something true and philosophically illuminating in Brentano's thinking about the mind, in a historically informed way. I don't aim to

- capture and defend every detail of his philosophy of mind or reconstruct the historical development of his views. I will set aside those aspects of Brentano's thought that don't contribute to a viable philosophical view. The philosophical view that will emerge in this book will, I hope, preserve the spirit and often enough the letter of Brentano's work." (pp. 6-7)
391. ———. 2017. "Towards a Neo-Brentanian Theory of Existence." *Philosophers' Imprint* no. 17:1-20.
- "In analytic philosophy the concept of existence has been approached by investigating the logical grammar of 'exists' and its synonyms. Grammatically, 'exists' seems to be a first-order predicate that is true of objects. It occurs in predicate position in subject-predicate sentences such as 'Pluto (the planet) exists' and in quantified sentences such as 'No tame tigers exist.'" (p. 1, a note omitted)
- (...)
- "Only if we illegitimately assume that the sense of 'self-identical' has been independently fixed can we hold on to the view that the sense of 'self-identical' and 'exists' are different. According to the satisfaction clause, 'exists' and 'is self-identical' have the same sense.(...).
- This is a serious drawback. For intuitively the senses are different. I can have reason to think that *A* might not have existed. I can have no reason to think that *A* might not have been identical with itself.
- This leaves the proponent of the first-order view with the task of removing "philosophical perplexity" about the concept expressed by 'exists'. Its sense cannot be articulated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Yet it is desirable to articulate it in some way in order distinguish the sense of 'exists' from the sense of other universal first-order predicates. I will tackle this task in this paper by drawing on Franz Brentano's work.(16) Brentano aims to shed light on the concept of existence by appealing to a non-propositional attitude and when it is right to have it. In this paper I will defend the core of Brentano's approach to existence, but criticise his implementation of it. The proposed Neo-Brentanian view agrees with Brentano that the attitude of acknowledgement grounds our mastery of the sense expressed by 'exists'.
- It disagrees with Brentano in that it does not give an analytic definition of existence in terms of correct acknowledgement."
- (16) Schlick 1925, 39–41, and Stumpf 1939, 81–2, are early critical discussions of Brentano's theory of existential judgement. However, Schlick seems to throw out the baby with the bathwater: while Brentano's theory may not be a general theory of judgement, it may nonetheless be a promising theory of a particular kind of judgement. Schlick's criticism, it seems to me, has informed the reception and rejection of Brentano's ideas in analytic philosophy. The analytic literature on Brentano on existence is therefore sparse. An exception is Prior 1976, 111ff. Vallicella 2001 focuses on Brentano's treatment of existence, and Kriegel 2015 on the attitude of acknowledgement. Brandl 2002, section 5, gives a helpful overview of Brentano's view of judgement and its connection with existence. I will discuss Vallicella and Kriegel's contributions briefly in section 4.
- References
- Brandl, J. 2002. Brentano's Theory of Judgement. Online: *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- Kriegel, U. 2015. How to Speak of Existence: A Brentanian Approach to (Linguistic and Mental) Ontological Commitment. *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 91, 81–106.
- Prior, A.N. 1976. *The Doctrine of Propositions and Terms*. London: Duckworth.
- Schlick, M. 1925. *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*. Second edition. Berlin: Julius Springer.
- Stumpf, C. 1939. *Erkenntnislehre*. Reprint Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers 2011.
- Vallicella, W.F. 2001. Brentano on Existence. *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 18, 311–27.

392. ———. 2017. "From Mental Holism to the Soul and Back." *The Monist* no. 100:133-154.
Abstract: "In his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* Brentano proposed a view of consciousness that neither has room nor need for a subject of mental acts, a soul. Later he changed his mind: there is a soul that appears in consciousness. In this paper I will argue that Brentano's change of view is not justified. The subjectless view of consciousness can be defended against Brentano's argument and it is superior to its predecessor."
393. ———. 2017. "Brentano on Consciousness." In *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*, edited by Kriegel, Uriah, 49-60. New York: Routledge.
"Consider a perceptual activity such as seeing a colour, hearing a tone, tasting a flavour.
How are these activities related to one's awareness of them? I will use Brentano's struggle with this question to guide the reader through the development of his view on consciousness.
My starting point will be Brentano's book *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles* (Brentano 1867), in which he developed an inner sense view of consciousness (§§1–2). Brentano's early view is underexplored in the literature but is crucial for understanding the development of his thought on the matter. In his major work *Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt* (1874), he rejected the existence of an inner sense: the exercises of our five senses yield awareness of the world (or at least of intentional objects) as well as awareness of these perceptions. This same-level view of consciousness has been explored and developed by contemporary philosophers of mind. I will discuss the arguments that moved Brentano to change his mind, outline the view, and, finally, respond to Husserl's influential criticism of Brentano's view (§§3–5)."
394. ———. 2018. "Newton's Intellectual Joy. Or A New Look at Brentano on Intellectual and Sensory Pleasure." *Brentano Studien* no. 16:277-304.
Abstract: "The paper gives a reconstruction of Brentano's distinction between intellectual and sensory pleasures. I will argue that for Brentano a sensory pleasure is a non-propositional liking of a sensory and an intellectual pleasure a non-propositional liking of an intellectual activity. In addition, these likings are only conceptually distinct from the activity liked. Sensory pleasures are supposed to be fundamentally different from intellectual ones in that the former have, while the latter lack intensity. I will deal with a philosophical and exegetical problem that arises from this distinction and use it to shed light on Chisholm's reading of Brentano's remarks on intellectual pleasure. The so-called 'Brentano-Chisholm view of Pleasure' has it that intellectual pleasure is, roughly, a propositional attitude of being pleased that p which causes sensory 'pleasure. I use my reconstruction of Brentano's view to argue that the 'Brentano-Chisholm-line' is not Brentano's and that Brentano even theorized about a different phenomenon."
395. ———. 2019. "How a Statement Has Meaning by Expressing a Judgement—Brentano Versus Marty on Utterance Meaning." In *Anton Marty and Contemporary Philosophy*, edited by Bacigalupo, Giuliano and Leblanc, H el ene, 33-57. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan.
"In this paper, I will focus on the second commitment of intentionalist semantics: meaning facts supervene on facts about someone doing something with a communicative intention. My aim is to explore an alternative view of meaning according to which not speaker, but utterance meaning is the basic notion of a theory of meaning. The alternative is suggested in the work of Marty's philosophical teacher Franz Brentano (1838–1917). In his lectures on logic, Brentano took some utterances to have meaning in the relevant sense of 'meaning' independently of whether they are made in order to influence the thought of others. Brentano therefore prioritized utterance meaning over speaker meaning: the primary

source of meaning is not a speaker meaning something by doing something, but what she does has meaning.

Brentano's proposal constitutes a welcome alternative to meaning intentionalism, and I will argue that it solves a number of problems that plague the intentionalist view of Marty and Grice. Hence, while Brentano seems to endorse later elements of meaning intentionalism in unpublished work, he shouldn't have.(4)

I will start with some scene setting (Sect. 2) and then argue that non-communicative utterances pose a problem for the meaning intentionalism of Marty and Grice (Sect. 3). I will use the problem to expound Brentano's theory of meaning and argue that it has the potential to solve the problem of non-communicative utterances (Sect. 4). However, the Brentano's view faces a different problem (Sect. 5). The remainder of the paper (Sects. 6–11) is devoted to answering the problem and thereby to show that Brentano's original idea can be defended and developed to yield an insight into speaker meaning." (p. 35)

(4) In unpublished manuscripts, Brentano endorsed also an intentional view of utterance, see his MS ('Die Sprache' Sp 4d).

396. ———. 2019. "Correctness first: Brentano on judgment and truth." In *The Act and Object of Judgment: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives*, edited by Ball, Brian Andrew and Schuringa, Christoph, 129-150. New York: Routledge.
- "1. Introduction
- Truth is one of our most central concepts. Many philosophers tried to get clear about truth by giving definitions of this concept that decompose it into its marks. Franz Brentano took this approach to be of limited value. According to him, the primary question about any concept is how we acquire it, not how to define it. He argued that the concept of truth is derived from our awareness of correct judging, where correctness is a notion prior to truth. Truth stands to judgment as goodness to love: x is good if, and only if, x is correctly loved; x is true if, and only if, x is correctly judged. In current philosophy, Brentano's correctness is often called 'fittingness'. (1) In this terminology, Brentano proposed that fittingness is the primitive notion that allows us to understand value in general and truth in particular. In this paper, I will use an objection made by Moore to develop and defend Brentano's story of how we come to acquire the concept of correctness. In particular, I will argue that we need to revise our conception of self-evident judgment if we want to be a fittingness-first theorist like Brentano." (p. 129)
397. ———. 2019. "Brentano's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 98:50-68.
- Abstract: Brentano's Thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental is central to analytic philosophy of mind as well as phenomenology. The contemporary discussion assumes that it is a formulation of an analytic definition of the mental. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. According to Brentano, many philosophical concepts can only be elucidated by perceiving their instances because these concepts are abstracted from perception. The concept of the mental is one of these concepts. We need to understand Brentano's Thesis accordingly: It is a piece of advice on how to become introspectively aware of the distinctive feature of mental phenomena. On this understanding of Brentano's Thesis standard objections to it no longer arise."
398. Thomasson, Amie. 2000. "After Brentano: a one-level theory of consciousness." *European Journal of Philosophy* no. 8:190-209.
- "I will argue that the presence of an early one-level theory in Brentano's work is not merely of historical interest, for it can show the way to develop an alternative one-level view of consciousness. Although certain modifications from his original view are required, I will argue that a phenomenologically sensitive one-level view developed along the lines he suggests can provide a better analysis of what consciousness consists in, and what distinguishes conscious from unconscious states, than either higher-order or current one-level representational views of consciousness." (p. 190)

399. Tomasi, Pietro. 2007. "The unpublished "History of Philosophy" (1866-1867) by Franz Brentano." *Axiomathes* no. 17:99-108.
 "There are many difficulties with the existing interpretation of Brentano's works. The problem stems from the fact that Brentano's works, letters, manuscripts, memoirs, etc. remain unpublished or undiscovered. Moreover some Brentano's scholars, namely Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrandt, were incorrect in their method in publishing the philosopher's works. Namely, they misinterpreted his earlier works by incorporating numerous interpolations from different time periods as being the philosopher's final thoughts. More importantly, as evidenced by Antonio Russo's recent discovery (*), they also failed to realise the fact that Brentano's own theoretical views or works were mostly based on Aristotle and Thomas thoughts on metaphysics, that Brentano's main intention was to develop a scientific demonstration on this topic, and that this issue occupied his mind until his death. It is hoped that this paper goes some way in resolving the said errors and coupled with the continue discovery of new material that the jigsaw of Brentano's works and thinking shall someday be correctly completed."
 (*) [See: Russo Antonio (2003)]
400. Torrijos-Castrillejo, David. 2020. "The early Brentano and Plato's God." *Brentano Studien* no. 17:137-156.
 Abstract: "The interest of the young Brentano for the philosophy of Plato is linked to his Aristotelian studies. Brentano understands Aristotle's philosophy in deep continuity with Plato's one. This continuity is clear in one of the most controversial points of Brentano's interpretation of Aristotle: the nature of God and the status of human soul. Brentano finds in both Plato and Aristotle a personal, monotheistic and creationistic God who also creates human soul, which is immortal. This approach is explained in some texts from the youth of Brentano, although there are signs indicating that he sustained it until the end of his life. In his interpretation of Plato's God, we see that Brentano identifies Him with the Idea of Good and the Demiurge. The Idea of Good would have even created the other Platonic Ideas, which should be understood as gods."
401. Tucker, Miles. 2020. "Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon: a defense of indefinability." *Philosophical Studies* no. 177:2261-2276.
 Abstract: "Mooreans claim that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual primitive. Fitting-attitude theorists object: they say that goodness should be defined in terms of what it is fitting for us to value. The Moorean view is often considered a relic; the fitting-attitude view is increasingly popular. I think this unfortunate. Though the fitting-attitude analysis is powerful, the Moorean view is still attractive. I dedicate myself to the influential arguments marshaled against Moore's program, including those advanced by Scanlon, Stratton-Lake and Hooker, and Jacobson; I argue that they do not succeed."
402. Twardowski, Kazimierz. 1999. "Franz Brentano and the History of Philosophy." In *On actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy*, edited by Brandl, Johannes and Wolenski, Jan, 243-253. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
 Translation by Arthur Szylewicz of a review of F. Brentano, *Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand* (1895) published in: *Przelom*, 11 (II) August 3 1895, Vienna, pp. 335-346.
 "By defending Brentano's views in this fashion, I by no means wish to claim that his "four phases" are the last word in the historiosophy of philosophy. I am convinced that even these sorts of investigations advance only gradually, and cannot be made complete and perfect all at once. We should also remember that from a different vantage point, say, one which takes into account the relation of philosophy to religion, other historiosophical laws can be formulated, as Professor Straszewski has done in the work cited in our introduction. It seems to me, however, that as far as philosophy itself is concerned, rather than its relation to other realms in the intellectual evolution of mankind, the philosophy of the history of philosophy that

- Brentano offers may, for the time being, pass for the relatively best solution to the problems that are mounting in this growing field." (p. 250 of the reprint)
- References
M. Straszewski, *Dzieje filozofii w zarysie*, vol. I [Outline of the History of Philosophy], Kraków: Księgarska Spółka Wydawnicza Polska, 1912, p. 67 n.
403. Valentine, Elizabeth. 2003. "The relation of Brentano to British philosophy." *Brentano Studien* no. 10:263-268.
"Brentano's work has had its greatest influence in Austria, Germany, Poland and Italy, but its importance for an understanding of British analytical philosophy is increasingly being recognised.
Brentano visited England in 1872, meeting with Herbert Spencer amongst others; he had a preference for British philosophy, regarding Kant and Hegel as the height of decadence. Despite this, English editions of his work were slow to appear. For a long time the only work to be translated into English was *Our knowledge of right and wrong* (1902). The first English edition of *Psychology from an empirical standpoint* did not appear until 1973. A new edition has recently been prepared (1995).
It could be argued that Brentano's work set the agenda for much twentieth century British philosophy, with regard to method (analysis); topic (reference, intentionality and meaning); and, to some extent, doctrine (the shift from idealism to realism). A key figure in the mediation of this influence was G.F. Stout." (p. 263)
404. Vallicella, William. 2001. "Brentano on Existence." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 18:311-327.
"Franz Brentano is an important transitional figure in the history of philosophy. Although he was steeped in Aristotle and the scholastics, his deflationary linguistic approach to metaphysical questions anticipates twentieth-century analytic treatments.
Indeed, Gustav Bergmann calls him "the first linguistic philosopher."(1) A good example of Brentano's deflationism is his theory of existence, which in some ways anticipates the influential theories of Frege and Russell. My aim here is to present and evaluate Brentano's theory of existence. Although I will be arguing that it is fatally flawed, there is much to learn from it." (p. 311)
405. Vasyukov, Vladimir L. 1993. "Antidiodorean logics and the Brentano-Husserl's conception of time." *Axiomathes* no. 4:373-388.
Abstracty: "In [Vasyukov 1993] some systems of Legniewskian Ontology were introduced as a toolkit for Husserl's and Meinong's theory of objects. Here such consideration is extended to Brentano-Husserl's theory of time. So-called antidiodorean logics are used as the foundations of the approach undertaken."
References
[Vasyukov 1993] V.L. Vasyukov, "A Leśniewskian Guide to Husserl's and Meinong's Jungle", *Axiomathes* 1, 59-74.
406. Velarde-Mayol, Victor. 2002. *On Brentano*. Belmont: Wadsworth.
"Brentano is in the crossroads between the two major philosophical traditions in Western philosophy, namely, Continental and Analytic philosophy. He resurrected the notion of intentionality, which was pervasively used by both philosophical traditions with very different outcomes and applications. In Continental philosophy, phenomenology is a development of Brentano's ideas on intentionality, in such a way, that without this, phenomenology would be impossible. In Analytic philosophy, one of the few notions shared with Continental philosophy is precisely the intentional character of mental acts, but with different application and interpretation. Here, in this book, we will dedicate to Brentano's psychology more attention than to other topics, not only because of its historical influence but also because it plays an essential role in his whole philosophy.
There are some subjects that are missing here: aesthetics and the relations between philosophy and religion. The reason of this lack is only the constraints of space. A

- decision was made in favor of some topics over others that could illustrate better Brentano's philosophy." (p. 1)
407. Vendrell Ferran, Ingrid. 2020. "Brentano and the Birth of a New Paradigm in Philosophy of Emotion." In *Franz Brentano's Philosophy after Hundred Years: From History of Philosophy to Reism*, edited by Fisette, D., Frechette, Guillaume and Janoušek, Hynek. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Abstract: "This chapter argues that the view of the emotions put forward by Brentano, and the modifications and refinements of his claims undertaken by his followers, led to the birth of new paradigm in the philosophy of emotion. The paper is structured as follows. After the introduction, section 2 presents the context in which Brentano's theory emerged. Section 3 is devoted to Brentano's three main claims on the emotions, focusing on their intentionality, their dependency on cognitions, and their relation to values. Section 4 offers an overview of the main debates surrounding these claims among the authors belonging to Brentano's school. Section 5 underlines the parallels between views on the emotions put forward by Brentano and his followers and similar claims defended in contemporary analytic philosophy."
408. Vinogradov, Evgeni G. 1998. "The Rationalistic Paradigm of Franz Brentano and Kazimierz Twardowski." In *The Lvov-Warsaw School and Contemporary Philosophy*, edited by Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna and Wolenski, Jan, 101-104. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"In the philosophical heritage of Kazimierz Twardowski the comparatively small work 'Franz Brentano and the History of Philosophy' is probably not very important.
But the breath of a new day and new ideas make it available nowadays, a hundred years after its first publication in Vienna.(1) This work is a summary or a detailed review of Franz Brentano's paper 'The Four Phases of Philosophy and Its Contemporary Stage', in which the Brentanian historical-philosophical conception is put forward.(2)" (p. 101)
(1) K. Twardowski, 'Franciszek Brentano a historia filozofji' (Franz Brentano and the History of Philosophy), *Przelom* 1, No. 11, 1895, pp. 335--346. Our examination of Twardowski's work is based on B. Dombrowski's translation of K. Twardowski's *Rozprawy i artykuły filozoficzne* (Philosophical Dissertations and Articles), Lvov, 1927.
(2) F. Brentano, 'Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand', Verlag der J.G. Gotta'schen Buchhandlung, Stuttgart, 1895.
409. Volpi, Franco. 1989. "The experience of temporal objects and the constitution of time-consciousness by Brentano." *Topoi Supplement* no. 4:127-140.
410. Weingartner, Paul. 1978. "Brentano's Criticism of the Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Principle '*Ens et verum convertuntur*'." *Grazer Philosophische Studien* no. 5:183-196.
"This paper investigates Brentano's criticism of the correspondence theory of truth within the context of a discussion of his ontological assumptions. Brentano's interpretation of the formula *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus* and of the principle *ens et verum convertuntur* is shown to fit into the history of these principles and into modern interpretations like that of Tarski."
411. Werner, Sauer. 2017. "Brentano's Reism." In *The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School*, edited by Kriegel, Uriah, 133-143. New York: Routledge.
"On January 7, 1903, Brentano wrote to Anton Marty that by now he thought it to be "impossible that factuality (*Tatsächlichkeit*) should belong to an irreale except in dependence on something real" as "concomitantly" occurring (Brentano 1966a: 106). For instance, when someone is thinking of a reale or thing (*Ding*) A, say the sun or a centaur, there exists concomitantly to the A-thinker (who is a thing) also an

irreale, namely, a thought-of thing (*Gedankending*) which is the thought-of A (Brentano 1930: 31, 48).

Thus, when writing this letter, Brentano still held the view that the realm of beings comprises besides *entia realia* or things also *entia irrationalia*.⁽¹⁾ But then on September 10, 1903, he tells Marty that now he "is making a new attempt to understand all *entia rationis* [i.e., irrationalia] as fictions, viz., to deny that they are" (1966a: 108). So it was during the time between these two letters that there occurred what has been dubbed the "reistic turn" in Brentano's ontological thinking. In the following, we will, first, give a rough outline of the scope of the *entia realia*; second, what we may call Brentano's master argument for reism will be discussed; and third, we will attempt to sketch a way out Brentano might have taken in the face of the difficulties inherent in his brand of reism." (p. 133)

(1) Albeit in a restricted way, since before he had acknowledged also irrationalia that are entirely independent of realia: see Brentano 1930: 26.

References

Brentano, Franz (1930). *Wahrheit und Evidenz*. Leipzig: Felix Meiner.

Brentano, Franz (1966a). *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen*. Bern: Francke.

412. Willard, Dallas. 1998. "Who Needs Brentano? The Wasteland of Philosophy without its Past." In *The Brentano Puzzle*, edited by Poli, Roberto, 15-43. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"In the volume of studies which forms the immediate background for this conference,⁽¹⁾ we read of "the oblivion into which the figure and thought of Brentano have fallen," and of his current 'invisibility' (pp. xv, 9, etc.). I believe Brentano to be someone of great philosophical value in his own right. But it seems to me that the state of affairs thus described with reference to Brentano is much greater than Brentano, and is of profound significance for the understanding of philosophy as a practice and a field of inquiry. Brentano's invisibility is chiefly a matter of what has come to be regarded as 'good philosophical work' in the course of the 20th Century. And this is especially true from the viewpoint of current North American Analytic philosophy, which I shall almost exclusively have in mind with my comments. If we are concerned about the fate of Brentano's thought, it is essential to deal with prevailing assumptions about how philosophy is done and when it is well done.

I think that similar points as I shall make here with reference to current Analytic philosophy in North America and Brentano could also be made with reference to, say, Hermeneutical philosophy from Heidegger on and Brentano, or to the various other forms of what, in the United States, tends to be called 'Post-Structuralism,' or sometimes 'Post-Modernism,' and Brentano. But I cannot cover all these areas, of course, and am most familiar with how 'Analytic' philosophy is now actually practiced in the United States. And it is philosophical practice that lies at the heart of my concerns." (p. 15)

(1) Albertazzi, L., Libardi, M. and Poli, R. (eds) (1996). *The School of Franz Brentano*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.

413. Wolenski, Jan. 1989. "Brentano's criticism of the correspondence conception of truth and Tarski's semantic theory." *Topoi* no. 8:105-110.
- "This paper is a sequel to Simons and Wolenski [*De Veritate: Austro-Polish contributions to the theory of truth from Brentano to Tarski*, 1989], which contains a short discussion of Brentano's arguments against the theory of truth based on the concept of a correspondence between truth-bearers and reality (or its appropriate portions). In that paper we attempt to show that Tarski's conception successfully meets Brentano's objections. Here I should like to extend as well as, in some points, improve what we said in Simons and Wolenski [1989]. There are several reasons for doing this. First, the renaissance of Brentano's own philosophy and Brentanism in general requires that his arguments deserve considerable attention. Secondly, Brentano's arguments against the correspondence theory of truth have become part of philosophical folklore.

- Thirdly, Tarski's semantic truth-definition, despite the reservations raised by several authors, is often considered as a possible modern interpretation of the classical theory of truth. Fourth, Tarski's theory of truth is deeply rooted in the Brentanian theoretical tradition, independent of Tarski's own philosophical consciousness. It is further interesting to see how, if at all, his definition of truth is affected by critical arguments of his philosophical great-grandfather (*via* Twardowski, Lukasiewicz, Lesniewski and Kotarbinski)." (notes omitted)
414. ———. 1994. "Brentano, the Univocality of Thinking, 'Something', and 'Reism'." *Brentano Studien* no. 5:149-166.
 "Brentano's argument for Reism from the univocality of 'thinking' is examined. Firstly, Brentano's original formulation is given. Secondly, comments on the argument made by Marty, Kamitz, Teller and Farias are summarized and briefly discussed. The univocality argument is then embedded into the frameworks of two logical systems: predicate calculus and Lesniewskian ontology; the latter system is shown as a more effective basis for reism than the former. Finally, it is argued that a distinction between formal-ontological reism and metaphysical reism should be made."
415. Woleński, Jan. 1996. "Reism in the Brentanist Tradition." In *The School of Franz Brentano*, edited by Albertazzi, Liliana, Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto, 357-375. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 "The term 'reism' was introduced by Tadeusz Kotarbinski to denote the philosophical view that the category of things is the sole ontological category.(1) Shortly after *Elementy* went in print, Kazimierz Twardowski pointed out in a letter to Kotarbinski, that a similar ontological theory has been elaborated by Franz Brentano in the last period of his life. In 1930, Kotarbinski delivered a lecture at 7th International Philosophical Congress in Oxford. After the congress, he received a letter from Georg Katkov with further information on Brentano's reism.(2)" (p. 357) (...)
 "The later course of Brentano's ontology may be seen as a constant departure from his early view.(7)
 Brentano became a reist around 1904 but earlier he restricted the categories of irrealia which can be objects of presentations to four kinds, namely immanent objects, contents of mental acts (Gudging, loving, hating), relations, and *collectiva*. Especially, he rejected universals (genera, differentiae specificae) as genuine objects." (p. 358)
 (1) Kotarbinski 1929, 67. This letter was published in Kotarbinski's 1966. The term 'reism' appears on p. 57 of the English edition.
 (2) Kotarbinski mentions letters from Twardowski and Katkov in his 1930-1931. This paper contains a brief comparison of his views with those of Brentano. In Kotarbinski 1935 (his review of Kraus 1934) and in Kotarbinski 1976 one finds more comprehensive comparisons written by Kotarbinski himself. See also Smith 1990, 170-174.
 (7) Mayer-Hillebrand 1966, 1-99, 399-403 gives extensive treatment to Brentano's ontological development (page-numbers henceforth according to Meiner's edition, Hamburg 1977); see also Srzednicki 1965.
- References
 Brentano 1966a F. Brentano, *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen*, ed. by F. Mayer-Hillebrand, Bern, A. Francke Verlag.
 Kotarbinski 1929 T. Kotarbinski, *Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk* [Elements of the theory of knowledge, formal logic and the methodology of sciences], Lvov, Ossolineum. Eng!. trans!. in Kotarbinski 1966a.
 Kotarbinski 1930-1931 T. Kotarbinski, "Uwagi na temat reizmu" [Remarks on reism], *Ruch Filozoficzny* 12, 7-12.
 Kotarbinski 1935 T. Kotarbinski, review of O. Kraus, *Wege und Abwege der Philosophie*, *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 38, 163-168.
 Kotarbinski 1966a T. Kotarbinski, *Gnosiology. The scientific approach to the theory of knowledge*, tr. by O. Wojtasiewicz, Oxford / Wrocław, Pergamon Press

- Ossolineum.
- Kotarbinski 1966 T. Kotarbinski, "Franz Brentano as reist", in McAlister 1976, 194-203.
- Mayer-Hillebrand 1966 F. Mayer-Hillebrand, "Einleitung der Herausgeberin", in Brentano 1966a, 1-99, 399-403 (pagination according to second edition, Hamburg, McAlister 1976 L. McAlister (ed.), *The philosophy of Franz Brentano*, London, Duckworth.
- Smith 1990 B. Smith, "On the phases of reism", in Woleński 1990a, 137-183.
- Srzednicki 1965 J. Srzednicki, *Franz Brentano's analysis of truth*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
- Woleński 1990a J. Woleński (ed.), *Kotarbinski: Logic, semantics and ontology*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
416. Zahavi, Dan. 1998. "Brentano and Husserl on Self-Awareness." *Études Phénoménologiques* no. 27/28:127-168.
 "Brentano now continues his analysis by turning to self-awareness, or as he calls it inner consciousness (*inneres Bewußtsein*). As we have just seen, Brentano takes consciousness to be characterized by a reference to an object, namely to the object that it is conscious of. But as he then points out, the term 'conscious', can be used in a twofold sense. On the one hand, we say of an act that it is conscious, insofar as it is aware of an object. On the other hand, we say of an object that it is conscious, insofar as one is aware of it. All psychical acts are characterized by their being conscious of something. The question is whether they are also conscious in the second sense, that is, whether one is also aware of them, or whether one must deny this and consequently admit the existence of unconscious psychical acts.(15)" (p. 5) (15) Brentano 1874, pp.142-143.
 References
 Brentano, F.: *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt I* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1874/1973).
417. ———. 2004. "Back to Brentano?" *Journal of Consciousness Studies* no. 11:66-87.
 Abstract: "For a couple of decades, higher-order theories of consciousness have enjoyed great popularity, but they have recently been met with growing dissatisfaction. Many have started to look elsewhere for viable alternatives, and within the last few years, quite a few have rediscovered Brentano. In this paper such a (neo-)Brentanian one-level account of consciousness will be outlined and discussed. It will be argued that it can contribute important insights to our understanding of the relation between consciousness and self-awareness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some problems, and that it will ultimately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the lookout for promising alternatives to the higher-order theories, than to return all the way to Brentano."
418. Zelaniec, Wojciech. 1996. "Franz Brentano and the Principle of Individuation." *Brentano Studien* no. 6:145-164.
 Abstract: "In this article I discuss a view on individuation exposed by Brentano in his *Theory of Categories*. According to this view, it is the spatial location of a physical thing that is its principle of individuation. I put forward hypotheses concerning the assumptions on the force of which Brentano might have arrived at this view. I also assess the 'price' that has to be paid for making such assumptions."
419. ———. 1997. "Disentangling Brentano: why did he get individuation wrong?" *Brentano Studien* no. 7:455-463.
420. Zimmer, Alf. 1998. "On Agents and Objects: Some Remarks on Brentanian Perception." In *The Brentano Puzzle*, edited by Poli, Roberto, 93-112. Aldershot: Ashgate.
 "Introduction: the 'invisibility' of Brentano in modern psychology
 From my point of view, the Brentano puzzle (Albertazzi, Libardi and Poli, 1996) has two aspects: (i) The quantitative *Zeitgeist* of psychological science during the

second part of the nineteenth century was incompatible with Brentano's genuinely qualitative approach and (ii) the open-mindedness of modern psychology for qualitative analysis can not refer to Brentano because the mental avenue to his Psychology from an empirical point of view is blocked by Husserl's reinterpretation and his rebuttal of psychologism. While the latter part of the puzzle has been analyzed in detail, the first aspect remains unaddressed because the exclusively quantitative orientation of psychological science at the end of the last century appears alien in the light of today's psychology where the most stringent tools of experimentation and mathematics are used to build formal models of qualitative change (see Kruse and Stadler, 1995)." (p. 93)

References

Albertazzi, L., Libardi, M. and Poli, R. (1996). introduction. Brentano and His School: Reassembling the Puzzle, in L. Albertazzi, M. Libardi and R. Poli (eds), *The School of Franz Brentano*, Kluwer, Amsterdam, pp. 1-23.

Kruse, P. and Stadler, M. (1995). Ambiguity' in *Mind and Nature*, Springer, Berlin.

421. Zimmerman, Dean W. 1996. "Indivisible Parts and Extended Objects: Some Philosophical Episodes from Topology's Prehistory." *The Monist* no. 79:148-180. "*Brentano and Whitehead - last heroes of the old debate*. There are, broadly speaking, three doctrines about physical boundaries to be found in the medieval and modern debate; I shall call them "indivisibilism", "moderate indivisibilism", and "anti-indivisibilism". In section II I describe these views, and mention some of their better-known proponents. Then indivisibilism, moderate indivisibilism, and anti-indivisibilism each receives a section of its own. Although this paper will not pretend to offer a decisive answer to the question which of these three (if any) is in fact correct, it is intended to serve as a sort of historical propaedeutic to the consideration of this question. Along the way, I shall try to show that the most promising version of moderate indivisibilism was being developed by Franz Brentano at the same time Alfred North Whitehead was providing mortar to fill the holes remaining in earlier versions of anti-indivisibilism. Whitehead's contribution to anti-indivisibilism is his famous method of extensive abstraction, first developed in a series of papers written between 1914 and 1917. Curiously enough, these were the very years during which Brentano - near the end of his life and by then completely blind - dictated his works on boundaries and continua. Brentano admits physical points, lines, and surfaces as real parts of extended bodies; and, just as Whitehead's work advances the anti-indivisibilist cause, Brentano's is a step forward for moderate indivisibilism. Brentano's work on boundaries trickled out ever so slowly, the lion's share remaining unpublished until 1976. Furthermore, although Whitehead discussed the philosophical problems about boundaries in his first exposition of the method of extensive abstraction, he did not realize that the method contributed to their resolution; and his better known later works omit discussion of these problems altogether. For these reasons, the continuity between the older debate and the contributions of Whitehead and Brentano is easy to miss." (pp. 149-150, notes omitted)