

# Intercultural and Comparative Philosophy: Annotated bibliography of the studies in English

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## Bibliography of Intercultural and Comparative Philosophy

### Bibliography

1. Abe, Masao. 1975. "Non-Being and *Mu* - the Metaphysical Nature of Negativity in the East and the West." no. 11:181-192.

Reprinted in Masao Abe, *Zen and Western Thought*, London: Macmillan, pp. 121-134.

"In Volume I of his Systematic Theology, Paul Tillich says, 'Being precedes nonbeing in ontological validity, as the word "nonbeing" itself indicates.'(1) Elsewhere, he says 'Being "embraces" itself and non being' ,(2) while 'Nonbeing is dependent on the being it negates. "Dependent" points first of all to the ontological priority of being over nonbeing.(3) Tillich's statements reflect a tendency among some Christian thinkers to take God as Being itself. The same understanding of the relation of being to non-being can be discerned in major strands of Greek philosophy in the ideas of *to on* and *me on*.

(...)

An objection must be made to this understanding of being, however, for in reality there is no ontological ground on which being has priority over non-being. It is assumed that being embraces both itself and non-being. But the very basis on which both being and non-being are embraced must not be 'Being' but 'that which is neither being nor non-being'. That being has priority over" is somehow superior to, and more fundamental than, non-being, has been assumed, perhaps uncritically, not only by Tillich in particular but for quite some time by the West in general." (p. 121)

(1) Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. I, (The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 189.

(2) Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be*, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957), p. 34.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 40.

2. ———. 1985. *Zen and Western Thought*. London: Macmillan.

Edited by William R. LaFleur.

Foreword by John Hick.

"The selection of essays constituting this book were written at one time or another during the past eighteen years. The focus is on Zen, Buddhism, and the comparative study of Buddhism and Western thought. The essays were selected primarily to present my understanding of Zen, especially its philosophical and religious significance in its encounter with Western thought. Some address themes with which I was asked to deal, while others elucidate subjects I myself wanted to explore. Several were directed to Japanese readers and hence were originally written in Japanese. Others were directed to a Western audience and were written in English. The selection includes addresses which were originally delivered orally and are hence somewhat informal in comparison to the more academic articles. Accordingly, the book was not written systematically with a consistent intention. Heeding the advice of the editor, Professor William R. LaFleur, I have tried to select and compile the essays in such a way as to make the work as systematic as possible. The result is the book now before you." (p. XXI)

3. ———. 1997. *Zen and Comparative Studies*. London: Macmillan.

Edited by Steven Heine.

Part two of a two-volume sequel to *Zen and Western Thought*.

"The title of this collection of essays, which I wrote over a period of two decades, highlights the sharp contrast and conflict as well as the areas of compatibility and complementarity between Zen and comparative studies. In Part One, Fundamentals of Zen, I elucidate the meaning of Zen as a self-transmission of mind in its own terms. These essays take up the topics of 'ordinary mind is Tao,' life and death and good and evil, emptiness, selfhood, and education. On the other hand, in the essays in Part Two, Zen, Buddhism, and Western Thought, I situate Zen in a comparative philosophical context through discussions of the Aristotelian notion of Substance, Whitehead's notion of process, and Plato's idea of Form (*eidos*). Focusing on the problem of death, the article on 'The Problem of Death in the East and West' tries to elucidate the essential characters of Platonism, Christianity and Buddhism, especially Zen, through a systematic comparative approach.

In Part Three, Current Issues in Buddhism, I pick up a number of contemporary topics such as monotheism versus monism, time and self, human rights and religious tolerance from the angle of comparative studies. Finally, Part Four, Zen and Japanese Culture, attempts to clarify the role of Zen in terms of the intellectual history of Japan from ancient literature and Tokugawa Shinto thought to modern philosophy." (pp. XII-XIV)

4. Agbakoba, Joseph C. Achike, and Ajah, Anthony C., eds. 2016. *Universalism, Relativism, and Intercultural Philosophy*. Washington, D. C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.

Nigerian Philosophical Studies IV.

Contents: Joseph C.A. Agbakoba: Preface V-VI; Matthew C. Chukwuelobe & Anthony C. Ajah: Introduction 1;

Part I. On the Equality of Cultures and the Fear of Hegemony

1. Jibrail Bin Yusuf & Hashir A. Abdulsalam: Time, Knowledge and the Clash of Civilizations: An Islamic Approach 23;

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Part V. On the Possibilities of Intercultural Communication

11. William Sweet: *Migrating Texts and Traditions in Intercultural Philosophy* 211; 12. Anthony C. Ajah: *Communicative Rationality and Cross-Cultural Communication* 235;

Part VI. Hermeneutics as the Role of Philosophy, and as a Principle of Intercultural Encounters

13. Evaristus E. Ekweke: *Intercultural Philosophy in Consultation with a Hermeneutic Approach to Natural Science: An African Perspective* 259;

Index 273-276.

5. Allen, Douglas, ed. 1997. *Culture and Self: Philosophical and Religious Perspectives, East and West*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Edited with the assistance of Ashok Malhotra.

Contents: Preface IX; Douglas Allen: Introduction XI-XV;

Part 1: Multiple Asian and Western Perspectives

1. Douglas Allen: *Social Constructions of Self: Some Asian, Marxist, and Feminist Critiques of Dominant Western Views of Self* 3; 2. Alan Roland: *How Universal Is Psychoanalysis? The Self in India, Japan, and the United States* 27;

Part 2: Chinese and Western Perspectives

3. Mary I. Bockover: *Ethics, Relativism, and the Self* 43; 4. Henry Rosemont, Jr.: *Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self: Some Parallels and Their Implications* 63; 5. Kenneth K. Inada: *Buddho-Taoist and Western Metaphysics of the Self* 83;

Part 3: Indian and Western Perspectives

6. Ananyo Basu: *Reducing Concern with Self: Parfit and the Ancient Buddhist Schools* 97; 7. Ashok K. Malhotra: *Sartre and Samkhya-Yoga on Self* 111;

Part 4: Japanese and Western Perspectives

8. Graham Parkes: *Nietzsche and Nishitani on Nihilism and Tradition* 131; 9. Mara Miller: *Views of Japanese Selfhood; Japanese and Western Perspectives* 145; *Bibliography* 163; *About the Book and Editor* 173; *About the Contributors* 175;

Index 177-184.

"Traditional scholars of philosophy and religion, in both the East and the West, have often placed a major emphasis on analyzing the nature of self. But with a few significant exceptions, they have dismissed or devalued the role of culture in their specific formulations of "the self," arguing instead for some view of an objective, ahistoric, universal self. When they have cited cultural conditionings and variables, moreover, these scholars have usually described them as subjective, illusory, and distorting influences, thus obscuring the deeper, underlying, objective view of "the self" that transcends all such particular historical and cultural expressions." (Introduction, p. XI)

(...)

"The chapters of this book—with their primary emphasis on comparative philosophy, religion, and culture—have been divided into four parts: Multiple Asian and Western Perspectives, Chinese and Western Perspectives, Indian and Western Perspectives, and Japanese and Western Perspectives. Included among these analyses are Vedanta, Samkhya-Yoga, and other Hindu approaches; Buddhist, Confucian, Taoist, and other

Indian, Chinese, and Japanese perspectives; Cartesian and other dominant Western perspectives; and Marxist, Nietzschean, Sartrean, feminist, and other challenges to dominant Western interpretations of culture and self." (Introduction, p. XII)

6. Allinson, Robert E. 2001. "The Myth of Comparative Philosophy or the Comparative Philosophy *Malgré Lui*." In *Two Roads to Wisdom? Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Traditions*, edited by Mou, Bo, 269-291. La Salle, IL: Open Curt.

"Comparative philosophy" such as it has been practiced is normally "comparative-inclusive," "comparative-exclusive," or a mixed type.(8)"

(...)

Comparative exclusive philosophy, practiced as a discipline separate from philosophy proper can be classified into two streams.(10) One stream, represented by the positive comparativist, searches for likenesses and unlikenesses between the two traditions but normally shows a preference for the likeness. This stream, while searching for positive correlations, does not generally attempt to borrow from the content or the methodology of the other tradition or lend the content or the methodology of its own tradition to the other tradition. Generally speaking, the positive comparativist searches for analogues of Western concerns, issues, and methodology in Chinese philosophy. Normally, the positive comparativist does not first find issues, concerns, and methodologies in the Chinese tradition that are borrowed for use within the Western tradition.

The standpoint of the positive comparativist is a stand-alone standpoint in which parallel developments in each tradition may be noted, but normally there is no active expropriation of issues, concerns, or methods found originally the other tradition and consequent alteration of methods in one's own tradition.

Another stream, represented by the negative-exclusionist comparativist (for future reference, for convenience's sake these types will be referred to as negative or positive comparativists), possesses the tendency to find that the traditions or the terms compared are incommensurable. This stream also remains intact within the secure boundaries of its own philosophical heritage. Negative comparativists are not completely negative since, irrespective of the internal inconsistency in approach this implies, generally consider that Western categories are useful in understanding the other tradition even though the other tradition remains alien to one's own." (pp. 271-272, some notes omitted)

(8) This set of types is not intended to be an exhaustive classification of types but it does represent a good starting point for investigations. (...)

(10) This is not intended at an exhaustive classification of comparative philosophy but only as an identification of two tendencies. (...)

7. Ames, Roger T. 1990. "Directory of Comparative Philosophers." *Philosophy East and West* no. 40:73-97.

Second part: vol. 41, pp. 537-556.

"One important function of *Philosophy East and West* is to keep our readership informed on the progress of scholarly research in the field of Asian and comparative philosophy. In an effort to realize this objective, in the late summer of 1988 a letter was circulated to our active list of comparative philosophers in order to begin compiling a directory which will describe the ongoing research and the recent publications in our field. This compilation also provides the *Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy* with a resource from which to draw the themes and potential participants for future panels and programs.

In this issue, we are bringing to print the first installment of the *Directory of Comparative Philosophers*, and, at the same time, are again circulating a letter in preparation for the second installment, to be published at the beginning of next year. We encourage active comparative philosophers to provide us with the appropriate information on their research projects and publications to help us keep colleagues with similar interests informed.

Roger T. Ames, *Editor*" (p. 73)

8. Angle, Stephen C. 2006. "Making Room from Comparative Philosophy: Davidson, Brandom, and Conceptual Distance." In *Davidson Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement*, edited by Mou, Bo, 73-100. Leiden: Brill.

"Over the last three decades, one of the principal resources on which comparative philosophers could draw when they sought assurance has been the work of Donald Davidson." (p. 73)

(...)

"Davidson has argued convincingly that anything we can recognize as a language must, in principle, be translatable into any other language.

As I will elaborate below, this argument has sometimes been misunderstood, but it nonetheless stands as an important support for the enterprise of comparative philosophy.

As significant as Davidson's work has been, however, my thesis in this essay is that comparative philosophers need still more than Davidson's theory is able to provide. It is not enough to know that translation is possible in principle: we need to be able to talk about conceptual differences with more subtlety, and to reason about what is at stake in overcoming them." (p. 74)

(...)

"Davidson is not wholly without resources to explain the range of conceptual differences and the dynamics of language change. I will point to some promising ideas in his later work, as well as to some

elaborations of his basic theories proposed by others. But in the end, the best solution to these matters is to be found in the work of Robert Brandom. In many respects Brandom's views are Davidsonian; turning to Brandom is not to abandon Davidson's core insights, but to recast them in a framework that allows them fuller expression.

My goal will be to show why the creative philosophical projects of contemporary comparative philosophy are possible, even though they are often difficult." (p. 74)

9. ———. 2010. "The Minimal Definition and Methodology of Comparative Philosophy. A Report from a Conference." *Comparative Philosophy* no. 1:106-110.

Abstract: "In June of 2008, the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP) convened its third Constructive Engagement conference, on the theme of "Comparative Philosophy Methodology." During the opening speeches, Prof. Dunhua ZHAO, Chair of the Philosophy Department at Peking University, challenged the conference's participants to put forward a minimal definition of "comparative philosophy" and a statement of its methods. Based on the papers from the conference and the extensive discussion that ensued, during my closing reflections at the end of the conference I offered a tentative synthesis of the conference's conclusions. That summary has already been published on-line as part of the bi-annual ISCWP newsletter (Angle 2008). In this brief essay, I recapitulate the themes of my earlier summary and expand, in my own voice, on some of the key points."

## References

Angle, Stephen C. (2008), "Conclusions drawn from ISCWP's 2008 conference on comparative methodology", *ISCWPNewsletter* 6:2.

10. Bahm, Archie John. 1977. *Comparative Philosophy: Western, Indian and Chinese Philosophies Compared*. Albuquerque: Universal Publications.

Contents: Acknowledgments VIII; Preface IX; I. What is Comparative Philosophy? 1; II. Standards for Comparative Philosophy 25; III. Eastern and Western Philosophies Compared 45; Appendix 82; Index 95-98.

"Comparative philosophy is a relatively new field of study, research, achievement in understanding and teaching. The purpose of this work is to help clarify the nature of comparative philosophy; to survey views about the kinds of standards that may be used as bases for comparisons; and to propose an hypothesis comparing pervasive traits of the philosophies of Western, Indian and Chinese civilizations." (Preface, p. IX)

11. Balslev, Anindita N. 1997. "Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Conversation: Some Comments on the project of Comparative Philosophy." *Metaphilosophy* no. 28:359-370.

Abstract: "This paper seeks to highlight the East-West asymmetry in philosophical exchanges. It draws attention to the absence of Eastern thought in the curriculum of philosophy in the West and suggests that cliches and stereotypes about cultures in general and thought-traditions in particular are perpetuated in this manner. The aim of the paper is to encourage 'cross-cultural conversation' among philosophers. A critical review of the project of 'comparative philosophy' is made to disclose the fact that despite the difficulties of such an endeavor, it is an attempt to bring thought-traditions together and is thereby useful for promoting intercultural understanding."

12. Benesch, Walter. 1997. *An Introduction to Comparative Philosophy: A Travel Guide to Philosophical Space*. London: Macmillan.

"This travel guide to philosophical space in the broadest sense is a comparative introduction to philosophy and philosophizing as these are aspects of the human condition everywhere. It focuses in a more specific sense upon the concern for meaning and the corresponding development of thinking methodologies in certain Greco-European, Indian, and Chinese philosophical systems. The text introduces these Eastern and Western traditions in two unique ways:

Firstly: It addresses philosophical space as four different but related dimensions of human thought and experience: ( 1) the significance and nature of the objects of experience and their interrelationships about which we think; (2) the significance and nature of the thinking *subject* in whose awareness objects mean what they mean; (3) the significance and nature of the situations in which thinking subjects encounter both their own awareness and the objects of which they are aware; ( 4) the nature and significance of these subject, object and situational elements as aspects and perspectives within a human/nature continuum. These are the sources of the object, subject, situational, and aspect/perspective dimensions of philosophical space. They are introduced and explained using texts from various Eastern and Western philosophies.

Secondly: The guide is more than a compilation of information on various Eastern and Western views, for in each dimension, once it has been explained and explored, one or more of the thinking and reasoning techniques that have been developed within it, will be presented so that readers can incorporate these techniques into their own thinking processes. The travel guide is both an introduction to comparative philosophy and to comparative philosophizing.

The reader will encounter the object logics of the West, the subject logics of the Indian Jains, the situational logics of the Buddhists and Nyaya, and the aspective/perspective logics of the Taoists, Confucians and Mohists." (pp. 1-2)

13. ————. 2002. "Comparative Philosophy as Feedback Loops and Fractals of Philosophical Space: The Butterfly Effect Meets the Butterfly Dream." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:32-35.

"Conclusions

The physicist, Erwin Schroedinger once said that "...it may perhaps be possible for logical thinking to disclose at least this much: that to grasp the basis of phenomena through logical thought may in all probability be impossible, since logical thought is itself a part of phenomena, and wholly involved in them."(15) The molecular biologist, Friedrich Cramer in applying chaos theory and the idea of fractals to 'living systems'

maintains that "Systems are fundamentally complex if, despite deterministic initial conditions, they have indeterminate or chaotic solutions. In these systems, predictability fails not only for practical reasons but also for fundamental ones."(16) I would suggest that just as the discovery of chaos and fractals in physical spaces offers a new access to and awareness of the nature aspect of the nature/mind continuum, so do chaos and fractals as paradoxes in philosophical space offer a new access to and appreciation of the mind aspect of the continuum." (p. 35)

(15) Erwin Schroedinger, *My View of the World* (Cecily Hastings tran.), Ox Bow Press, Woodbridge, CT, 1983, p. 19.

(16) Friedrich Cramer, *Chaos and Order*, VCH Publishers, New York, 1993, p. 214.

14. Berger, Douglas, and Kramer, Eli. 2019. "Lessons from Intercultural Philosophy: Getting Over Reductive Comparisons and Attending to Others: Douglas Berger interviewed by Eli Kramer." *Eidos: A Journal for Philosophy of Culture* no. 1:134-140.

"EK: What are the most important tools for doing cross-cultural/comparative philosophy of culture in a responsible, thoughtful, and impactful way?

DB: I would say at this point that the three most important tools for doing intercultural philosophy responsibly and thoughtfully – impact can never be guaranteed by oneself – are:

1) an openness to learn the ideas, concepts, frameworks and assumptions of the tradition with which one is trying to engage;

2) either a solid comprehension of the language(s) of the tradition with which one is trying to engage or at least good translations of their source texts or narrative traditions and discourse and;

3) a community of mutually interested engagement.

The first tool is vital because, as the last four centuries or so of European colonial history have amply and tragically demonstrated, one all-too-easy but all-too-flawed way of approaching cross-cultural philosophy is to take the entire or partial European history of philosophy, with its stock of ideas, vocabulary and assumptions about the world, persons, ethics, and even of philosophy itself, as normative and judge other philosophical positions on those bases. This approach has led to a variety of more or less unfortunate consequences. The consequences range from merely distorting the ideas of a philosopher or tradition of thought, or in some cases an entire cultural heritage, by claiming they are pursuing the same ideals and ends as one's own, to claiming that other

cultural traditions are incapable of attaining the supposedly truly philosophical status of European cultures, to using one's knowledge and assessments of another cultural tradition in order to politically rule it or control it." (pp. 134-135)

15. Bilimoria, Purushottama, and Hemmingsen, Michael, eds. 2016. *Comparative Philosophy and J.L. Shaw*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Contents: 1. Purushottama Bilimoria and Michael Hemmingsen: Introduction 1;

#### Part I Language

2. Partha S. Das: J.L. Shaw on Meaning 9; 3. David Lumsden: Noun Phrases and Truth in the Nyāya and Western Pragmatics 19; 4. Amitabha Dasgupta: Controversy Over the Availability of Frege's Sense in Indian Philosophy of Language: The Case of J. L. Shaw and the Nyāya 27; 5. Fred Kroon: The Radical Emptiness of Empty Terms: Saving the Buddhists from the Nyāya 39; 6. Tamoghna Sarkar: The Nyāya on Identity Relation and Identity Statements 55;

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#### Part IV Ethics

16. Papia Mitra: Artificial Intelligences and Karma: An Evaluation of Information Technology in Light of J.L. Shaw's

Concept of Moral Free Will 247; 17. Gordon F. Davis: Conceptions and Intuitions of the Highest Good in Buddhist Philosophy: A Meta-ethical Analysis 263;

Index 277-279.

"This volume attests to the impact of Dr. Shaw's career, if in no other way than the extent and quality of the articles represented here from leading philosophers, thinkers and logicians from all over the world. Jaysankar Shaw has tirelessly worked to solve some of the pressing and key problems of contemporary philosophy of language, logic, epistemology, metaphysics and morals from the perspectives of classical Indian philosophers using comparative analytical approaches, as his 11 books and some 90 published papers testify. Thus the significance, in no small, measure, of Indian, especially Nyāya logic, epistemology, semantics and cognitive ontology has not escaped the attention of Western scholars who have seen the convergence or at least a point of fecundity with the long tradition of systematic thinking in these areas." (p. 2)

16. Blitstein, Pablo A. 2016. "Sinology: Chinese Intellectual History and Transcultural Studies." *The Journal of Transcultural Studies* no. 7:136-167.

"The guest editors of this journal issue have kindly asked me to provide a short overview of the relation between transcultural studies and Chinese intellectual history in Euro-American academia. There was a certain risk in accepting this request, as it might be either too small or too big a task. It would be too small if I narrowed it down to a review of explicit references to transcultural studies within Chinese intellectual history; but it would be too big if I extended it to a study of all the questions, approaches, and methods that the two fields have developed in the last few decades. To overcome these difficulties, I decided to focus on the legacy of one shared methodological point: the critique of so-called "methodological nationalism," that is, of the assumption (explicit or not) that the nation is the ultimate framework of research.(1) This critique has become a constitutive principle of transcultural studies, while it came to represent only a particular approach within Chinese intellectual history. Still, the two fields have developed a shared agenda in this regard. This essay limits itself to pointing out the presence of this critique in both fields—which might be as much a sign of open scholarly exchanges as evidence of the parallel adoption of common references—and offers an illustration of the complex relations that exist between institutional labels, methodological agendas, scientific communication, and actual scholarly practice."

(1) This concept, undoubtedly inspired by "methodological individualism," seems to have first been used in the 1970s. The term has become more widespread in the last few decades, partly because of its critical use in global history and transcultural studies. For a discussion of this methodological assumption and a brief history of the expression, see Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences," *Global Networks* 4, no. 4 (2002): 301–334.

17. Blocker, Gene H. 1999. *World Philosophy: An East-West Comparative Introduction to Philosophy*. New York: Prentice Hall.

Contents: Preface VII-XII; 1. Introduction: What is Philosophy? 1; 2 Logic and Language 42; 3. Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge 78; 4. Metaphysics 105; 5. Ethics 159; 6. Social and Political Philosophy 201; Bibliography 232; Glossary 235; Timelines 244-246.

"In this book, Chinese, Indian, and Western philosophers of roughly the same sort and of comparable stature are brought together on the same philosophical topics and issues (arranged, for convenience, in traditional clusters—logic in chapter 2, epistemology in chapter 3, metaphysics in chapter 4, ethics in chapter 5, and social and political philosophy in chapter 6)." (p. VII)

(...)

"In this book, I treat the strictly philosophical arguments as being roughly similar across cultures, while the larger cultural contexts in which they occur I present as being considerably different. The Indian background of karma, for example, is quite distinct from anything in the West (except, perhaps, Socrates's and Plato's belief in reincarnation), but karma raises serious questions about the nature of causality, and when Indian philosophers tackle the problem of causality, their analyses are very similar and certainly comprehensible to their Western counterparts (who also are interested in causality, but for different reasons). Thus, students will get a chance to learn something about the differences among Western and non-Western cultures, while at the same time recognizing some of the philosophical similarities." (p. XI)

18. Bonevac, Daniel, and Phillips, Stephen. 1993. *Understanding Non-Western Philosophy: Introductory Readings*. Mountain View: Mayfield.

Contents: Preface; Time Line;

PART I. AFRICA

Ancient Egypt: From The Instruction of Ptahhotep; The Song from the Tomb of King Intef; The Dispute Between a Man and His Ba; From The Instruction of Any; From The Book of the Dead; Enlightenment Ethiopia: Zera Yacob, from The Treatise of Zera Yacob; Walda Heywat: from The Treatise of Walda Heywat; Contemporary Perspectives: Frantz Fanon: from The Wretched of the Earth; Kwasi Wiredu: from Philosophy and an African Culture

## PART II. WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND SPAIN

Platonism: Philo: from Allegorical Interpretation; Philo: from On the Account of the World's Creation Given by Moses; Philo: from On Drunkenness; Philo: from On the Confusion of Tongues; Philo: from The Special Laws; Philo: from On Rewards and Punishments; Philo: from Concerning Noah's Work as a Planter; Origen: from On Principles; Augustine: from The Enchiridion; Augustine: from The City of God; Augustine: from Answer to Skeptics;

Creationism: Al-Kindi: from On First Philosophy; Saadia ben Joseph: from The Book of Beliefs and Opinions; Al-Ghazali: from The Incoherence of the Philosophers; Maimonides: from The Guide of the Perplexed; Maimonides: The Purpose of Man;

Rationalism: Al-Farabi: from Principles of the Views of the Citizens of the Best State; Avicenna: from A Treatise on Logic; Avicenna: On the Nature of God; Averroës: from The Incoherence of the Incoherence;

## PART III. SOUTH ASIA

Samkhya, Yoga, and the Bhagavad Gita: from the Katha Upanishad; From the Bhagavad Gita (Song of God); From the Yogasutra; Isvarakrsna: from the Verses on Analysis of Nature (Samkhya-karika);

Early Buddhism: The First Sermon; From the Majjhima-Nikaya; Buddhaghosa: from The Path of Purification (Visuddhi-Magga); From Questions to King Milinda (Milindapanha); Buddhaghosa: The Duration of Life;

Jainism: From the Acaranga Sutra; Vadi Devasuri: from The Ornament Illuminating the Means and Principles of Knowledge (Pramana-naya-tattvalokalankarah);

Nagarjuna and Madhyamika Buddhism: Nagarjuna: from Averting the Arguments; Candrakirti: from Reasoning into Reality;

Buddhist Idealism and Logic: From The Surangama Sutra; Dignaga: from The Investigation of the Object of Awareness (Alambanapariksa) With Extracts from Vinitadeva's Commentary; Dharmakirti: from The Pith of Right Thinking (Nyayabindu) With a Commentary by Dharmottara;

Mimamsa (Exegesis): Kumarila: from The Slokavarttika;

Carvaka Skepticism: From Madhava's Compendium of Philosophy;

Nyaya-Vaisesika Epistemic Logic and Ontology: From the Vaisesika Sutra; From the Nyaya-sutra With a Commentary by Vatsyayana; Udayana: from Proofs of the Existence of God; Gangesa: from The Jewel of Thought about Reality (Tattvacintamani);

Vedanta: From the Rg Veda; From the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad; From the Mundaka Upanishad; Sankara: from Brahmasutra Commentary; Sriharsa: Critique of Difference; Rupa Gosvami: The Mystical Theology of Passion; Vivekananda: Addresses at the Parliament of Religions; Aurobindo, from The Life Divine;

Modern Academic Philosophy: J. N. Mohanty: Gilbert Ryle's Criticisms of the Concept of Consciousness; B. K. Matilal: from Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge;

#### PART IV. EAST ASIA

Confucianism: Confucius: from The Analects; The Great Learning; Mencius: from The Book of Mencius; Hsun Tzu: from the Hsun Tzu;

Taoism: Lao Tzu, from Tao-te Ching; Chuang Tzu: from the Chuang Tzu; The Yang Chu Chapter;

Other Schools: Mo Tzu: from Universal Love; Wang Ch-ung: from Balanced Inquiries;

Chinese Buddhism: Hsuan-tsang: from The Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only; Fa-tsang: from Treatise on the Golden Lion; Fa-tsang: from Hundred Gates to the Sea of Ideas of the Flowery Splendor Scripture; The Recorded Conversations of Zen Master I-Hsuan;

Neo-Confucianism: Chu Hsi: from The Philosophy of Human Nature; Wang Yang-Ming: from Instructions for Practical Life; Wang Yang-Ming: from Record of Discourses; Wang Yang-Ming: from Reply to Ku Tung-Ch'iao; Wang Fu-chih: from The Surviving Works of Wang Fu-Chih;

Japanese Buddhism: Kitaro Nishida: from An Inquiry into the Good; D. T. Suzuki: from Zen Buddhism; Keiji Nishitani: from Science and Zen;

Pronunciation Guide; Glossary; Index.

19. ———. 2009. *Introduction to World Philosophy: A Multicultural Reader*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: "Ethics in the philosophical traditions of India -- Chinese ethics -- Ancient Greek ethics -- Medieval Christian, Jewish, and Islamic ethics -- Ethics in modern philosophy -- African ethics -- The self in Indian philosophy -- The self in Chinese Buddhism -- Ancient Greek philosophy of mind -- Mind and body in early modern philosophy -- African philosophy of mind -- Indian theories of knowledge -- Chinese theories of knowledge."

20. Bontekoe, Ron. 2017. "Some Opening Remarks on the Exclusionary Tendency in Western Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 67:957-965.

"There is a serious danger involved in taking the idea of the "philosophical tradition" too narrowly. Many readers of this journal will be familiar with the dangers of cultural exclusion — in particular with the long-standing tendency of many Western

philosophers to reject out of hand the legitimacy of Chinese, Indian, and Japanese philosophy, on the grounds that these Asian modes of thinking do not appear to address the same problems that Western philosophers are interested in, in the same kind of way that Western philosophers prefer to approach these problems. This culturally myopic view of what is entitled to be called "philosophy" is deplorable, and needs to be resisted, but it probably helps to remember in this regard that the Asian philosophical traditions have not been the only victims of this attitude.

It was not that long ago, no more than fifty or sixty years, in fact, that many Anglo-American analytic philosophers were adopting a similarly exclusionary attitude toward European Continental philosophy — declaring that Nietzsche and Heidegger, for example, were "not philosophers." This, it turned out, meant little more than that coming to understand these alien thinkers required more effort than the deniers of their

philosophical *bona fides* were willing to put in. In time influential thinkers emerged — William Barrett and Walter Kauffman come immediately to mind — who were willing to put in the effort required to understand what these seminal Continental figures were saying, and to explain their messages in terms that more typical Anglo-American analytic philosophers could grasp. And thus the legitimacy of the phenomenological and existential approaches to philosophy came gradually to be accepted even in the most die-hard analytical departments." (p. 957

21. Botz-Bornstein, Thorsten. 2006. "Ethnophilosophy, Comparative Philosophy, Pragmatism: Toward a Philosophy of Ethnoscapes." *Philosophy East and West* no. 56:153-171.

"In this essay I would like to reflect on the place of philosophy within a "globalized" world and reconsider its status as a phenomenon that is potentially linked to a "local" culture. Whenever we question the authority of "general" truths and we look for ways of integrating "local discourses" into the overall construction called "global philosophy," we come across the old idea of "ethnophilosophy." Far from suggesting ethnophilosophy as a model for the philosophy of the future, I intend to rethink certain themes of ethnophilosophy and contrast them with disciplines such as "comparative philosophy" and pragmatism. I will sketch an approach that I believe to be appropriate for the development of philosophy in times of globalization.

One of the negative undertones of the term "globalization" is that it is seen as a uniformizing and flattening power that eliminates existing cultural differences. On the other hand, there is an important side effect of globalization represented by those movements acting against it, stressing the importance of "localization" or "regionalization."

Ethnophilosophy, in spite of its outdated origin and its potential dangers, remains interesting as an intellectual model as long as it is not formulated in a radical fashion. When it is formulated in a radical fashion it has to face the reproach of relativism and of enclosing itself in a cultural sphere that it declares to be inaccessible to others." (p. 153)

22. Bradley, D. Park. 2006. "The Critical Presence of the Other: Comparative Philosophy, Self-Knowledge, and Accountability." *Journal of Philosophy and Culture* no. 3.

Abstract: "Western philosophy has traditionally taken justification as necessary for constituting genuine knowledge. On the contemporary scene, however, several influential epistemological theories (Gadamer, Polanyi, Kuhn, Sellars) see the project of epistemological transparency as undermined by the fact that implicit conditions necessarily underlie our explicit knowing. In this paper, I argue that "we" must engage non-Western traditions of thought, if we are to remain committed to justifying the conditions of our knowing. To put it differently, philosophical accountability requires discarding the delusion of self-critique and coming to recognize our dependence on the critical distance provided by Other traditions."

23. Brooks, Thom. 2013. "Philosophy Unbound: The Idea of Global Philosophy." *Metaphilosophy* no. 44:254-266.

Abstract: "The future of philosophy is moving towards "global philosophy." The idea of global philosophy is the view that different philosophical approaches may engage more substantially with each other to solve philosophical problems. Most solutions attempt to use only those available resources located within one philosophical tradition. A more promising approach might be to expand the range of available resources to better assist our ability to offer more compelling solutions.

This search for new horizons in order to improve our clarity about philosophical issues is at the heart of global philosophy. The idea of global philosophy encourages us to look

beyond our traditions to improve our philosophical problem solving by our own lights. Global philosophy is a new approach whose time is coming. This essay offers the first account of this approach and an assessment of its future promise."

24. Brown, Nahum, and Franke, William, eds. 2016. *Transcendence, Immanence, and Intercultural Philosophy*. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan.

Contents: Preface IX, Introduction XI;

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"What is still divisive in this question of transcendence and immanence is something like what makes the question of belief, especially religious belief or faith, so fractious. Our ability to reason critically and to attempt to persuade one another by logical argument has limits. Some of our conclusions and convictions seem to be not less firm and certain simply because of their being more difficult to explain and justify rationally to others. There are some things that we appear to know without knowing exactly how and why we know them. Even a strict Aristotelian logic of knowing allows for first principles that are self-evident and not subject to further grounding discourses. A decision to favor either transcendence or immanence is likely to presuppose some kind of unmediated assumption or presumed truth that implicitly excludes mediation by its opposite.

In an experiment to see whether forging such a mediation might not be possible after all, Nahum Brown and William Franke convened an international conference at the University of Macau under the auspices of the Programme of Philosophy and Religious Studies in March 2015 in order to explore this key issue in the area specifically of intercultural philosophy. We present the results of our investigation and exchange in the form of this collective volume of selected essays by participants in the conference combined with several supplementary invited contributions." (preface, p. X)

25. Bruya, Brian. 2017. "Ethnocentrism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 67:991-1018.

"In what follows, I will make a case for diversifying philosophy in regard to subject matter. I'll do this in several steps. First I will motivate the project by describing a certain generic model of ethnocentrism. Like the implicit bias project, this model of

ethnocentrism demonstrates a depressing fact about human decision making, but rather than leaving it at the level of the individual, it considers the effects of individual action at the level of the group. What is especially distressing about this model is that the decision-making mechanism leverages the strategy of cooperation to implement exclusionism, thereby masking discrimination beneath the self-congratulatory appearance of altruism. The second step will be to give a justification for the benefits of diversity in problem solving, drawing largely from the work of Scott Page, a specialist in political philosophy and complex dynamic systems. Next, I will highlight the benefits of multiculturalism at the individual level from the perspective of experimental psychology. For this, I will draw on the work of psychologist Ying-yi Hong 康瑩儀 among others. From these three mathematical and empirical resources, I will conclude that increasing diversity in philosophy by increasing its multicultural content is instrumentally desirable for students and for the profession. Having established the need for cultural diversity, I show how micromotives biased by ethnocentrism in philosophy are having macroeffects on the field. Finally, I suggest ways to act to help promote cultural diversity in the field of philosophy." (pp. 991-992)

26. ————. 2017. "Reply to Robert Neville." *Philosophy East and West* no. 67:1021-1022.

"First, a clarification. Professor Neville says that "the point is not to bring in more Chinese (and other ethnic groups with minority status in America) philosophers."

This is stated correctly in the sense that my main point is not about identity diversity, but the statement could be misconstrued as an opposition on my part to increasing identity diversity in philosophy programs. I want to prevent such a misconstrual by

stating plainly that I think the demographic makeup of American philosophy departments should more or less reflect the demographic makeup of American society." (p. 1021)

27. Burik, Steven. 2009. *The End of Comparative Philosophy and the Task of Comparative Thinking: Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"The idea of comparative philosophy which guides me in this book thus has the following characteristics: Comparative philosophy should focus on two things: similarities and differences between ways of thinking.

It should however not content itself with merely pointing to these similarities and differences but should instead seek to make them productive in the sense that through these similarities and differences we come to understand better first of all what we are comparing, and second the way in which we compare these philosophies, and that means also our contemporary philosophies and presuppositions of how we perceive our world. I do not believe in one overarching theory or methodology of comparative philosophy. In that sense my approach is hermeneutic, in that it recognizes the necessity of perspectives. There are however a couple of ideas which comparative philosophy should adhere to. It should seek a dialogue, between two different cultural perspectives (and it must be noticed that the Western philosophical tradition, although often one of the interlocutors, is not necessarily always involved), that is based on equivalence. This dialogic approach means that comparative philosophy should try as much as possible to position itself in-between the different cultures. How this in-between is to be perceived is addressed in this book." (p. 4)

28. ————. 2018. "Comment on "Comparative Philosophy: In Response to Rorty and Macintyre" by Rui Zhu." *Philosophy East and West* no. 68:266-270.

"The brief response by Rui Zhu provides an interesting take on the (by now) perennial problem of what comparative philosophy is or should be. While Zhu makes some interesting observations about and suggestions for comparative philosophy, he chooses contributions to the thinking about the possibilities and methodologies of comparative philosophy that are rather old, though, and my first wonder is: why these two papers, and not more recent contributions to the development of the methodology of comparative philosophy, as can be found in numerous recently published work? Such more recent publications tend to take a more nuanced approach to the idea of (in-)commensurability than the two essays from 1991, given the developments in comparative philosophy in the last twenty-five years."

(...)

"In my view, it is a definite advancement that recent comparative philosophy is trying to step away from essentialism, the concept of 'essence' not even being prominent in other traditions such as the Chinese in the first place. This means that postmodern thinkers who have actively challenged the dominant Western tradition provide a more fruitful platform for comparison, since they display the kind of openness often lacking in the 'stricter' philosophers.

Second and following up on this, using the term 'philosophy' is problematic for comparative philosophers since by the very nature of our profession we would then have to widen the scope of philosophy, which would inevitably result in disagreements about the limits and boundaries of what philosophy is in general." (pp. 266-267)

#### References

Zhu, Rui (2018).

29. ————. 2022. "Comparative Philosophy without Method: A Plea for Minimal Constraints." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 203-222. New York: Bloomsbury.

"When Robert, Ralph, and I first met to discuss this project, my first impression was that I would write a paper on what I thought was the methodology of comparative philosophy. Then I realized that what I thought was the method that I would employ in my work would only be one of the various possible methods. Then I thought that if this was the case, there may virtually be no limit to the number of methods of comparative philosophy. And that informs my claim here: that methodological constraints on comparative philosophy should be minimal and kept minimal." (p. 203)

30. Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W., and Weber, Ralph, eds. 2022. *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*. New York: Bloomsbury.

Contents: Steven Burik, Robert Smid, and Ralph Weber: Introduction 1;

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"This volume was brought to fruition out of a recognition that, while comparative philosophy is thriving, and while a number of texts within that field of study have been written in a manner that is explicit about its methodological commitments, very little work has been done to bring these many considerations on method and methodology in comparative philosophy together." (p.1)

(...)

"The intended audience for this book is intentionally broad. On the one hand, it is meant to serve as a primer for anyone looking to undertake the task of comparative philosophy. Because there are currently no clear and accessible resources laying out the variety of methodological considerations that are available, younger scholars should find this a valuable resource for weighing these considerations, making an informed choice among them, or perhaps even developing their own approach.

On the other hand, it is also intended to broaden the awareness of even seasoned veterans, who would benefit from a more concise, explicit, and recent account of these methods for use in their own work. Ultimately, then, this should be an important resource for anyone writing on comparative philosophy, since upon publication of this text there should be no excuse for any lack of methodological awareness in such works." (pp. 5-6)

31. ———. 2022. "Introduction." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 1-15. New York: Bloomsbury.

"In the early texts of *Philosophy East and West*, a lot of discussion revolved around world philosophical synthesis (Behuniak 2017) and the desire for world peace is palpable, given that the Second World War had just ended. One would have to assume that our own positionalities and political environments have similar impacts not only on the aims and purposes we attach to our work in comparative philosophy but also to discussions of method within it.

This book seeks to join ongoing efforts to remedy this situation by presenting, in a concise and accessible format, a diverse set of methodological considerations for

comparative philosophy. While it would not be possible to include all of the available alternatives within one volume, presenting a substantially diverse array of such alternatives is enough to challenge myopic understandings of comparative method and encourage a more informed consideration of method.

Accordingly, this book includes essays by scholars from East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and America, with representatives from a wide variety of philosophical traditions.

Each essay is meant to be cutting edge insofar as it reflects the authors' latest work in methodology, so that every chapter can serve as an up-to-date methodological resource and viable methodological alternative for any would-be philosophical comparativist." (p. 5)

#### References

Behuniak, Jim (2017), 'John Dewey and East-West Philosophy,' *Philosophy East and West*, 67 (3): 908-16.

32. ———. 2022. "Epilogue." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 241-255. New York: Bloomsbury.

"One of the primary purposes of this volume has been to capture the present methodological moment in the history of comparative philosophy. This collection of essays from a wide array of contemporary comparativists reflects on the methodological challenges of our day. Although hardly exhaustive, it provides a snapshot of the present moment, a collective record of sorts, representing many of the shared assumptions, live disagreements, and anticipated possibilities for our field of study in the early part of the twenty-first century. Yet in this century, such documentation is hardly enough:" (p. 241)

33. Burt, E. A. 1948. "How Can the Philosophies of East and West Meet?" *The Philosophical Review* no. 57:590-604.

With my own attempt to understand the philosophies of the East I found myself making little headway until a key idea which I had hitherto failed to appreciate dawned in my mind." (p. 590)

(...)

"The key idea which has brought considerable and steadily increasing illumination to my mind as I confront this situation is that which the modern West usually denotes by the word "context." It gradually became clear to me that when one approaches the philosophy of a different culture whatever success he achieves will be contingent on his pursuing the task in two ways: (1) making full use of such apparent linguistic equivalents as are already available for probing his way into the details of that culture and its specialized forms of thinking; and (2) catching, as soon as he can, something of the genius of its point of view toward life and the world as a whole, and using that insight to throw light on the ideas which have perplexed him and their pattern of relationships with others. Each of these approaches is necessary, because the second cannot be performed in any promising fashion apart from the first, while if the first dispenses with the second it may yield some understanding of the technology, art, and science of the culture studied, but it will not open the door to its philosophy. The indispensability of the second approach is naturally indicated by the term "context," in the special meaning of an all inclusive orientation conceived to be required for the understanding of this or that philosophically relevant detail." (p. 591)

34. Butnor, Ashby, and McWeeny, Jennifer. 2009. "Why Feminist Comparative Philosophy?" *APA Newsletters* no. 9:4-5.

"We see feminist comparative philosophy as a natural outgrowth of both comparative philosophy and feminist philosophy. East-West comparative philosophy and feminist philosophy already share much in terms of methodology: a hermeneutic of openness and respect for difference, a crossing of philosophical boundaries and traditions, a rejection of the dichotomy of theory and practice, and the pursuit of new ways of looking at the world. In our work, we seek to show how bringing diverse philosophical traditions into dialogue with each other can provide fresh insights on questions of specific interest to feminists and global theorists generally. We believe that what distinguishes feminist comparative philosophy from transnational/global/postcolonial feminist theories is that feminist comparative methodology engages an analysis of original and primary *philosophical* sources from the tradition in question. Most importantly, we wish to emphasize that feminist comparative methodology fosters the development of original, creative concepts and ideas that may not have emerged had the philosopher been thinking within the confines of one tradition only" (p. 5)

35. Chakrabarti, Arindam. 2002. "Analytic versus Comparative: A Bogus Dichotomy in Philosophy." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:39-42.

"In the rest of this paper, I propose to indicate a specific research-program in (what Mark Siderits, one of the finest practitioners of analytic comparative Indian philosophy has called) "fusion philosophy," that derives its inspiration from an in-depth study of Abhinavagupta's epistemology of self-consciousness.

Such fusion philosophy is nothing very new.

In a profoundly creative way, K.C. Bhattacharya practiced it when he wrote his "Subject as Freedom" although his writing style is more phenomenological than analytic. In our own times, besides J.N. Mohanty who combines analytic clarity with phenomenological concerns and deep roots in Indian philosophy, Mark Siderits, Jonardon Ganeri and Roy Perrett have published quite a lot of Indian-Western fusion-analytic

philosophy in the journals." (p. 40)

36. Chakrabarti, Arindam, and Weber, Ralph, eds. 2016. *Comparative Philosophy without Borders*. New York: Routledge.

Contents: Notes on Contributors VI; Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber: Introduction 1; 1. Tom J. F. Tillemans: Count Nouns, Mass Nouns, and Translatability: The Case of Tibetan Buddhist Logical Literature 35; 2. Barry Hallen: Translation, Interpretation, and Alternative Epistemologies 55; 3. Chien-hsing Ho: Resolving the Ineffability Paradox 69; 4. Laurie L. Patton: The Bowstring is Like a Woman Humming: The Vedic Hymn to the Weapons and the Transformative Properties of Tools 83; 5. Arindam Chakrabarti: How Do We Read Others' Feelings? Strawson and Zhuangzi Speak to Dharmakirti, Ratnakirti, and Abhinavagupta 95; 6. Masato Ishida: The Geography of Perception: Japanese Philosophy in the External World 119; 7. Ralph Weber: Authority: Of German Rhinos and Chinese Tigers 143; 8. Sari Nusseibeh: To Justice with Love 175; 9. Sor-hoon Tan: Justice and Social Change 205; Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber: Afterword/Afterwards 227; Index 241.

37. ———. 2016. "Introduction." In *Comparative Philosophy without Borders*, edited by Chakrabarti, Arindam and Weber, Ralph, 1-33. New York: Routledge.

"Three concepts need to be clarified before we can speak intelligibly about *Comparative Philosophy without Borders* avoiding calculated confusion or foreseeable misunderstanding: the concept of *philosophy*, the concept of *comparison* (from which the concept of "comparative" is derived), and the concept of *borders*. Everybody understands and agrees that "without" simply means lacking, which, in this context, must signify coming to lose or erase rather than never having had. Therefore, we need not dwell separately and tediously on the meaning of "without," although in some

branches of classical and contemporary Indian metaphysics, the meaning of the particular sort of negation that expresses that peculiar “absence” whereby one thing lacks or sheds another thing or property is also a hot topic. Of the three crucial concepts, then, let us start with the concept of a border, since the concept of philosophy is inexhaustibly controversial (two sides across a border often do not mean the same by “philosophy”) and paradox-generatively self-inclusive and we shall have much more substantial and provocative things to say about comparison." (p. 1)

38. ————. 2022. "Global Post-Comparative Philosophy as Just Philosophy." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 159-179. New York: Bloomsbury.

"This chapter revisits some recent controversies around the apparent difficulty of integrating comparative and "non-European philosophy" into philosophy departments in an attempt at distinguishing political from philosophical concerns. How to frame and label the philosophical concerns is important for the political discussion and crucial for achieving a more just philosophy. We argue for a global post-comparative approach, similar to what is also called fusion philosophy. But the results of such an approach should also constitute just-and nothing more than-philosophy, that is, amount to nothing qualitatively different from philosophy. The gist of the matter has to do with methodology, that is, with how to do philosophy. In this spirit, we offer two brief methodological arguments, one pertaining to a weak historicism, the other to the philosophical value of polyglotism, hopefully working toward facilitating the non-exclusionary inclusion of "non-European philosophy," no longer deserving of the label, in a future globally decentered philosophy."

39. Chakrabarti, Kisor K. 2002. "The Problem of Induction: A Comparative Approach." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:36-38.

"The classical problem of induction was introduced into Indian philosophy fairly early. The legendary figure commonly associated with this is Carvaka (6th century BCE?). His own writings are lost. But many later writers have carefully developed his views." (p. 36)

(...)

"We do not imply that Carvaka and Hume hold exactly the same views. [For example, one difference is that for Hume but not for Carvaka, memory is knowledge.] But the similarities are patent enough to merit a comparison. For Hume, the inductive leap from observed to unobserved cases cannot be justified unless one assumes the principle of uniformity of nature and that the future will resemble the past; this involves begging the question. For Carvaka induction cannot be justified by observation alone because the inductive leap invariably goes beyond observation. At the same time, induction cannot be justified by inference or any other non-observational means. The latter must depend on premises that go beyond observation and are themselves dependent on further premises that too go beyond observation. This is doomed to end in infinite regress or circularity; this is similar to Hume's argument. Both again hold that this has no bearing on practical activities that can go on from expectation or habit based on probable opinion rather than knowledge." (p. 36)

40. Chimakonam, Jonathan O., and Chimakonam, Amara E. 2022. "Two Problems of Comparative Philosophy: Why Conversational Thinking Is a Veritable Methodological Option." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 223-239. New York: Bloomsbury.

"This chapter will investigate what we take to be two of the most urgent comparative philosophy problems. These preceding discussions will pave the way for our proposal of

conversational thinking as a veritable methodological option for comparative philosophy. Part of our goal will be to offer "conversational thinking," a burgeoning cross-cultural method, as another veritable option besides Mou's proposal. Another goal would be to produce a conception of comparative philosophy that clearly delineates its boundary. And then, in aligning both our conception and the method of conversational thinking, we will plot a new but clear trajectory for the field of comparative philosophy." (p. 225)

41. Collins, Randall. 1998. *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press.

"The topic of this book is a sociology of philosophies, which is to say the abstract conceptions produced by networks of specialized intellectuals turned inward upon their own arguments. This network displays definite social dynamics over the expanse of world history. This topic is not the same thing as the production of popular culture, such as the advertising, pop stars, tourist industry, personal apparel, electronic networks, and their multiplex intercombinations that make up the topics for postmodernist sociology of culture." (p. 12)

(...)

"The first three chapters present the general theory. Chapter 1 lays out the theory of interaction ritual chains, which is the micro-core of the argument for the social predictability of intellectuals' thinking. Chapter 2 gives a theory of the network structure which determines the location of creativity, and compares the evidence of networks of Chinese and Greek philosophers over several dozens of generations. The subsequent chapters confront the theory with long-term segments of these intellectual networks and those of India, Japan, the medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian worlds, and the European West through the 1930s. Each chapter highlights a particular analytical theme. The chapters need not be read in any particular sequence, although Chapter 3, on ancient Greece, presents some central principles that figure in what follows. A

brief summary of the analytical model is given in "Conclusions to Part I: The Ingredients of Intellectual Life." Chapter 15 presents the conclusions of the entire analysis in a sketch of the pathways along which intellectuals through their debates drive the sequence of ideas during long periods of time. The reader may find it useful as a road map of the book. The Epilogue draws epistemological conclusions from the whole argument." (p. 15)

42. Connolly, Tim. 2015. *Doing Philosophy Comparatively*. New York: Bloomsbury.

"This book is divided into three parts. Part I covers the definition of comparative philosophy and its central concepts. Critics have challenged both the comparative and the philosophical aspects of the field, and we begin by considering whether these criticisms are justified, focusing first on the definition of "philosophy" in comparative philosophy (Chapter 1). From there we turn our focus to the meaning of "comparison," examining two main ways in which the study of thinkers and texts from culturally distinct traditions has been thought to be philosophically fruitful (Chapter 2). Finally, we look at the meaning of "culture" and "tradition" themselves and how they are related to the practice of comparative philosophy (Chapter 3).

Part II focuses on the central methodological problems of comparative philosophy. Because the thinkers or texts being compared have been formed according to the languages, concepts, and standards of justification of their distinctive cultures and traditions, there is the issue of whether it is possible for philosophers from one tradition to understand and evaluate those from another—the problem of incommensurability (Chapters 4 and 5). Even if it is possible, the forced or unequal application of one tradition's categories can lead to a distorted image of the other—the problem of one-sidedness (Chapter 6). Finally, there is the difficulty of situating the items compared within the larger cultural traditions of which they are part—the problem of generalization

(Chapter 7). We will consider the various challenges each problem poses as well as the main strategies that comparative philosophers have developed to overcome them.

Part III gives brief discussions of four approaches to comparative philosophy: universalism (Chapter 8), pluralism (Chapter 9), consensus (Chapter 10), and global philosophy (Chapter 11). While in reality there are as many approaches to comparative philosophy as there are comparative philosophers, I focus on these four because they illustrate basic orientations toward similarity and difference. Universalism emphasizes points of convergence between different philosophical-cultural traditions; pluralism, points of divergence; consensus, a means of balancing points of convergence and divergence; and global philosophy, a rejection of the convergence / divergence model of comparison in favor of creative interaction between traditions at specific points. I hope that this last section of the book not only gives readers some sense of the competing models under which productive work in comparative philosophy has taken place, but also encourages them to think about how to improve or go beyond these models." (p. 7)

43. Cooper, David E. 2002. *World Philosophies: A Historical Introduction*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Second revised edition (First edition 1996).

"The title of this book is ambiguous. 'World philosophies' might refer to philosophies from around the world, or it might mean something like 'world-views', theories on the grand scale about 'The World'. My title is intended to bear both senses, so it is a pun." (Introduction, p. 1)

(...)

"The present book, then, attempts to redress an imbalance: the 'world philosophies' it presents are indeed from 'around the world', sizeable chunks of it, at any rate: India, China, Japan, the Near and Middle East, and Africa, as well as Europe and North America." (p. 2)

(,,)

"Indeed, it is not only geographical comprehensiveness that the book lacks: for its subject is not philosophy at large, but *philosophies*. 'Philosophy', as the name of a very general intellectual activity, does not have a plural, no more than does 'music'; and philosophies no more exhaust the field of philosophy than music consists entirely in the outpouring of musicals. Philosophies, like musicals, are particular products of the more general activity." (p. 2)

44. Creller, Aaron B. 2016. "Introducing the World: Making Time for Islamic and Chinese Material alongside the Western Canon." *ASIANetwork Exchange* no. 23:124-138.

Abstract: "In this essay I consider the challenges faced by non-specialists in comparative philosophy. I address several familiar objections to incorporating non-Western material into standing philosophy courses (i.e., the view that the material is, indeed, not included in the category philosophy, or the worry that there simply is not enough time to cover such material). In answering these objections, I emphasize that what we today call the "Western" canon has historically been shaped by a plurality of cultures. I then conclude with several sample course modules, designed to help non-specialists incorporate sessions on Islamic and Chinese philosophy into introductory classes."

45. ———. 2018. *Making Space for Knowing: A Capacious Approach to Comparative Epistemology*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

"Contemporary mainstream epistemology suffers from an overly narrow focus on propositional knowledge." (p. X)

(...)

"In this book, I focus on illustrating not only how this narrow definition has prevented analytic epistemology from adequately integrating its own accounts of non-propositional knowledge (i.e. skill-based knowledge or interpersonal knowledge), but also on how it fails to adequately account for the structure of propositional knowledge itself. In response to this narrow definition, I construct an alternative using Western and non-Western resources that both solves this initial problem as well as addresses the problems of objectivity and cross-cultural, comparative approaches to knowledge. In this way, I seek to reopen the space closed by analytic epistemology in order to better account for knowledge in its various forms, especially across cultural divides." (p. XI)

46. Dallmayr, Fred. 1996. *Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-Cultural Encounter*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"This book is a collection of essays rather than a systematic treatise - for reasons having to do with the topic of inquiry. Proceeding in linear fashion from start to finish, a systematic treatise presupposes a standpoint outside or above the welter of competing cultures and life-forms, a standpoint permitting an objective and "totalizing" overview.

This assumption goes against the very grain of cross-cultural encounter, which has to start "from the ground up" and in a dialogical fashion, offering only the uncertain prospect of a learning experience. Coming from a European or Western background, I certainly cannot pretend to a superior or encompassing perspective; all I can claim is to have been sometimes the instigator and always the beneficiary of cultural learning-in a manner which hopefully will also be beneficial to readers. In the contemporary political climate, I definitely do not wish to give aid and comfort to a homogenizing globalism or universalism, which often is only a smokescreen for neocolonial forms of domination.

Although a collection of essays, this book is not simply a string of haphazardly linked vignettes. In a cautious and subdued manner, the sequence of chapters is held together by a line of argument which moves forward (without being coercively systematic). The opening chapter discusses the broad range of possible "modes" of cross-cultural encounter in a historical perspective. Following a path of normative-ethical ascent, the discussion ranges from strategies of conquest, conversion, and assimilation to more benign forms of Interaction, culminating in a model of dialogical reciprocity and exchange. Drawing its inspiration chiefly from Gadamer and Derrida, the book then develops as preferred option the notion of a 'deconstructive dialogue' or a 'hermeneutics of difference' where dialogical exchange respects otherness beyond assimilation. Concentrating on the relation between India and the West, subsequent chapters examine the work of several prominent bridge builders across cultures, primarily the Indian philosophers Radhakrishnan and J. L. Mehta and the German-American philosopher and Indologist Wilhelm Halbfass. Proceeding to a broader comparative level a centerpiece of the book juxtaposes Western thought and Indian thought along the lines of a distinction between decontextualized and context-bound modes of cultural discourse. The remaining chapters shift the accent to more concrete social-political problems, including the issues of social development (or "modernization"), multiculturalism, and the prospects of a globalized democracy." (Preface, pp. XI-XII)

47. Davidson, Donald. 1974. "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* no. 47:5-20.

Reprinted in D. Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984, pp. 183-198.

"Philosophers of many persuasions are prone to talk of conceptual schemes. Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene. There may be no translating from one scheme to another, in which case the beliefs, desires, hopes and bits of knowledge that characterize one person have no true counterparts for the subscriber to another scheme. Reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one system may not in another.

Even those thinkers who are certain there is only one conceptual scheme are in the sway of the scheme concept; even monotheists have religion. And when someone sets out to describe "our conceptual scheme," his homey task assumes, if we take him literally, that there might be rival systems.

Conceptual relativism is a heady and exotic doctrine, or would be if we could make good sense of it. The trouble is, as so often in philosophy, it is hard to improve intelligibility while retaining the excitement. At any rate that is what I shall argue." (p. 5)

48. Davis, Bret. 2009. "Step Back and Encounter: From Continental to Comparative Philosophy." *Comparative and Continental Philosophy* no. 1:9-22.

Abstract: "By drawing on the insights of a number of continental as well as Asian thinkers, this article reflects on the "significance" of comparative philosophy—both in the sense of discussing the "meaning" and in the sense of arguing for the "importance" of this endeavor. Encountering another culture allows one to deepen one's self-understanding by learning to "see oneself from the outside"; this deeper self-understanding in turn allows one to listen to what the other culture has to say. These two moments, or movements, are interdependent and mutually supportive. Without the step back to self-understanding, we unknowingly reduce the other to the unrecognized categories of our own thinking; but without encountering another culture, our understanding of our own culture remains shallow. This article argues that an engagement with non-Western philosophy, particularly with a set of traditions as rich and radically different as those of Asian thought, can and should take place as a hermeneutic circling between self-understanding and openness to encounter: the dialogical step back and step forward are mutually supportive endeavors. For only by way of such dialogue do we attain the concrete freedom and possibility for transformation and change, that is, the ability to critically and creatively develop old customs or modes of thought and to critically and creatively adopt new ones. Moreover, only through such dialogue can we learn to not only let others be, but to share insights with them, and to build together a global community which neither reifies nor abolishes cultural differences."

49. Daye, Douglas Dunsmore. 1976. "Language and the Languages of East-West Philosophy: An Introduction." *Philosophy East and West* no. 26:113-115.

"To continue the lineage of workshops sponsored by the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, there was held in the Spring, 1975, a series of four panels, which focused upon various aspects of the theme of this year's workshop, Language and the Languages of Philosophy: East and West. This workshop, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies on March 23 and 24, 1975, consisted of three major papers and three critics during each of four sessions."

(...)

"From the twelve excellent papers noted above, five were chosen to be included in this issue, since they illustrated many of the various philosophical directions exemplified in the four panels." (p. 113)

Papers included in in this issue:

Richard S. Y. Chi, *A Semantic Study of Propositions, East and West*, pp. 211-223.

Ashok K. Gangadean, *Formal Ontology and Movement between Worlds*, pp. 167-188.

Robert M. Gimello, *Apophatic and kataphatic Discourse in Mahāyāna: A Chinese View*, pp. 117-136.

Luis O. Gómez, *Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli Canon*, pp. 137-165.

Chad D. Hansen, *Mass Nouns and "A White Horse Is Not a Horse"*, pp. 189-209.

50. Defoort, Carine. 2001. "Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate." *Philosophy East and West* no. 51:393-413.

"It is certainly not my intention to solve the crucial question concerning the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy once and for all - this would be an impossible task given the indecision governing the definition of the concept of philosophy even in the West. Nor do I wish to call into question the legitimacy or value of two domains that are closely adjacent to the theme of this essay, namely philosophy in China - the philosophical activities of contemporary Chinese academics - and current Chinese philosophy, insofar as this refers to a purely geographical variant of something like contemporary Continental philosophy. The arguments presented here concern only the traditional Chinese body of thought, which is generally labeled as Chinese philosophy. A clear definition of our domain is thus our first task." (p. 394, a note omitted)

51. ———. 2020. "The Exclusion of Chinese Philosophy: "Ten Don'ts," "Three Represents," and "Eight Musts"." *Philosophy East and West* no. 70:214-225.

Book discussion of: *Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought*. By Eric S. Nelson. London, Oxford, New York, New Delhi, Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017.

Abstract: "The legitimacy of Chinese philosophy is a thorny topic that has returned in waves during the last decades. The high tides were 2003 and 2016. While the topic can and has been discussed from a wide variety of points of view, most debates focus on the Chinese side: either on the nature and quality of early Chinese master texts (e.g., "Do they fit the demands of philosophy?") or on current research at Chinese philosophy departments (e.g., "How should the Chinese intellectual heritage be studied?" "Is it philosophically interesting?"). Such reflections are important and deserve to be continued.

However, one side of the issue usually remains out of view: the Western philosophers themselves, who lay the burden of proof almost exclusively with the Chinese masters or scholars. Since when, where, and how have scholars denied Chinese masters the label of "philosophy"? How explicit has the debate been? What were the various views and their historical or intellectual contexts? How did the debate evolve? What are its current implications and future prospects? These historically inspired philosophical questions differ in orientation from the dominant approaches. Even though they may not necessarily solve the disagreement concerning the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy, they do throw a fascinating light on the nature of (Western) philosophy." (A note omitted)

52. Deng, Xize. 2010. "Problem and Method: The Possibility of Comparative Study—Using "Lun Liuji Yaozhi" as an Example." *Frontiers of hilosophy in China* no. 5:575-600.

Abstract: "On the basis of general characteristics, comparative studies can be restricted by cross-cultural comparison in a narrow sense. In this paper, I take "Chinese

philosophy” as an example to investigate the current problems within comparative studies. However, it is possible to embark on comparative study.

“Lun Liujia Yaozhi” 论六家要旨 (“Discussion on the Main Points of the Six Schools”) conducts a successful comparison, from which we can extract the comparative method of “Problem and Method,” and it points directly to the basic structure of survival activities, and furnishes the possibility for cross-cultural comparisons.”

53. Deutsch, Eliot, ed. 1991. *Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophics Perspectives*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

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"The essays in this volume from among many of the leading thinkers from numerous countries throughout the world were first presented at the Sixth East-West Philosophers' Conference, which was held in August 1989 in Honolulu, Hawaii, and which I had the honor to direct. While never forming a melody quite as lovely as any of Mozart's, the authors did address several common problems under the general theme "Culture and Modernity: The Authority of the Past" in a spirit which sought mutual cross-cultural understanding through careful interpretation and frank critical engagement. Many voices were heard and listened to artfully.

Although there is always something of a tension among philosophers engaged in comparative work between those who are disposed to look for, find, and announce similarities and those who seek, discover, and celebrate differences in modes of thought, styles of argumentation, basic ideas, and presuppositions among diverse cultures and different individuals within those cultures, the conference on the whole was concerned more with the plurality issuing from differences than with the singularity following from sameness—while all the time its participants being very much aware of a common human/natural/spiritual world that has emerged so suddenly in world history and whose very fate rests so largely on the success of cooperative undertakings by those who represent very different worlds within that common matrix." (Preface, pp. X-XI, a note omitted)

54. ———. 1997. *Introduction to World Philosophies*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

"This text presents a collection of readings - from classical and modern Western and Asian philosophical traditions. Explores basic problems and enduring issues in philosophical anthropology, ethics and political philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion."

55. ———. 2002. "Comparative Philosophy as Creative Philosophy." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:23-26.

"Comparative philosophy — or what we might today better call “cross-cultural,” “trans-cultural,” or simply “global” philosophy — has throughout its history and development exhibited a rich diversity of aims, methods and styles. Let me briefly sum-up a few of the most enduring of these and then set forth some features of what I take to be its most vital intentionality, namely to contribute to creative philosophical thinking." (p. 23)

56. Deutsch, Eliot, and Bontekoe, Ron, eds. 1997. *A Companion to World Philosophies*. Oxford: Blackwell.

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"The purpose of this work is to provide a sophisticated, one-volume companion to the study of select non-Western philosophical traditions. It has become increasingly evident to many teachers and students of philosophy as well as to general readers that philosophy is not the exclusive province of the West: that indeed other traditions have a depth and range comparable to Western thought and exhibit distinctive features, the knowledge of which can enrich philosophical understanding and creativity wherever it occurs. This volume will strive at once to introduce some of the finest thinking within and about non-Western traditions to teachers, students and general readers, and to offer interpretations and insights relevant to the work of other scholars in the field." (from the Introduction, p. XII)

57. Devaraja, N. K. 1967. "Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 17:51-59.

"The philosophical temper both in the East and in the West, being rooted in human nature, is more or less the same, the differences in the lines of development followed and results obtained being due largely to historical and cultural factors. In particular, I wish emphatically to deny the distinction that, as against the rational method employed by Western philosophers, Indian thinkers are inclined to use the method of intuition. Currency to such a view was given, during the latter half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, by some spokesmen of the Indian tradition who were unaccustomed to doing philosophy in a rigorous way, and had but passing acquaintance with the golden age of logico-epistemological development in Indian thought lying between the first and the tenth centuries A.D. I am more inclined to agree with the view of Dr. P. T. Raju that the Indian philosophical tradition is naturalistic and rationalistic." (pp. 58-59)

58. Dilworth, David A. 1989. *Philosophy in World Perspective: A Comparative Hermeneutic of the Major Theories*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

"In this work I will sketch the outline of the architecture of theories, East and West, by examining the implications of a series of comparative judgments. In essence, I will show that all the major theory-formations fall under four generic types, themselves systematically related—Sophistic, Democritean, Platonic, and Aristotelian. (This nomenclature refers to and is drawn from historical paradigms, for the principles of philosophy come to light in exemplary texts and can be known in their essential variety from no other source. But I will demonstrate that, while they are associated with classical Athenian philosophers, the four pure types transcend their historical models.)

All the other possible theory-formations are contractions of these four types. In a current economic idiom, the mixed types of philosophical texts are subsidiaries. While they seem to function independently, they still presuppose and ultimately rely on their parent companies. In this sense each of the four pure modalities of theory-formation has its own synoptic character." (p. 7)

59. Dorter, Kenneth. 2018. *Can Different Cultures Think the Same Thoughts? A Comparative Study in Metaphysics and Ethics*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

"The project of this book has two aims. One is to explore issues in metaphysics and ethics, including the way metaphysics can be foundational for ethics. I approach these issues through the works of major thinkers in the three main philosophical traditions—India, China, and the West— comparing philosophers from two traditions in each chapter. An advantage of this approach is that examining a subject from different directions gives us different perspectives and allows us to see limitations and assumptions that may be inconspicuous otherwise. The comparison may also provide us with a perspective that is more than the sum of its parts.

Each of the chapters addresses its theme through the work of a different pair or group of philosophers, while the Conclusion compensates for this diversity of voices with an overview of the book as a whole." (Preface, p. IX)

60. Du Oluwagbemi, Jacob. 2010. "Intercultural Philosophy, Africa's Predicament and Globalization: Finding the Missing Link." *Annals of Humanities and Development Studies* no. 1:301-312.

Abstract: "That the world has become a global community is no longer an issue. What has become an issue is the paradox in the midst of this globality. This paradox manifests in the clash between cultural identity and cultural diversity. Against the backdrop of particularism, as pursued by the vanguards of interculturality, I examine the essential ingredients of intercultural philosophy with a view to showing how this approach can be used by African philosophers to address the pressing issues of contemporary Africa. The thesis of this paper is: in light of the interdependence and intensification of inter-relations within the globe, no culture, African or non African can remain shut up in its cocoon or operate as a windowless monad because the globalizing dynamics call for mutual complementarity and enrichment. Within the universalizing phenomenon of globalization, Africa can find its missing link through interculturality. This will not only enable African philosophers to reflect and interpret other cultures but also appropriate what has enabled other cultures to excel in order to transform the African condition."

61. Dussel, Enrique. 2009. "A New Age in the History of Philosophy: The world dialogue between philosophical traditions." *Philosophy & Social Criticism* no. 35:499-516.

Abstract: "his article argues the following points. (1) It is necessary to affirm that all of humanity has always sought to address certain 'core universal problems' that are present in all cultures. (2) The rational responses to these 'core problems' first acquire the shape of mythical narratives. (3)

The formulation of categorical philosophical discourses is a subsequent development in human rationality, which does not, however, negate all mythical narratives. These discourses arose in all the great urban neolithic cultures (even if only in initial form). (4) Modern European philosophy confused its economic, political and cultural domination, and the resulting crises in other philosophical traditions, with a Eurocentric universality claim, which must be questioned. (5) In any case there are formal universal aspects in which all regional philosophies can coincide, and which respond to the 'core problems' at an abstract level. (6) All of this impels entry into a new age of inter-philosophical dialogue, respectful of differences and open to learning from the useful discoveries of other traditions. (7) A new philosophical project must be developed that is capable of going beyond Eurocentric philosophical modernity, by shaping a global trans-modern pluriverse, drawing upon the 'discarded' (by modernity) own resources of peripheral, subaltern, postcolonial philosophies."

62. Fleming, Jesse. 2003. "Comparative Philosophy: Its Aims and Methods." *Journal of Chinese philosophy* no. 30:259-270.

"My first answer to all such objections to the enterprise of comparative philosophy is that it is almost inevitable that we understand, or interpret, the new and unfamiliar by

comparing it with that with which we are already familiar. According to this phenomenological or hermeneutic principle, someone first encountering the *I Ching*, for example (or any other alien philosophical system), will always think about ways in which this unfamiliar philosophy is similar to the philosophical terrain that is our conceptual “home turf” so to speak. After first identifying what we take to be similarities between the two philosophical theories (or systems, concepts, or traditions), we naturally move on to identifying significant differences: similarities and differences in regard to logic and method of proof, in regard to values, assumptions, and aims. It is by identifying both similarities and differences that we can better understand the two (or more) things (here, theories) better. There is a natural, if logically and epistemologically unjustifiable, tendency to see similarity of different philosophical theories as somehow confirming each of them (insofar as they are similar), just as in science a theory or experiment gains credence if repeated elsewhere under similar but different circumstances.

At the very least, such comparisons (of say, the “Tao” with “Nature”) help shed light on how one concept or theory in comparison with others could have been proven differently from the way it was, or what its practical consequences might be, contrary to what one has usually assumed them to be. In fact, it seems obvious to me that highlighting similarities (and differences) between two philosophical theories or traditions helps us to notice assumptions we make without being aware of it—assumptions regarding how a theory can be proven to be true (or false), and what the theoretical and practical implications of a philosophical position are." (p. 2670)

63. Frazier, Jessica. 2020. "‘The View from Above’: A Theory of Comparative Philosophy." *Religious Studies* no. 56:32-48.

Abstract: "What if doing philosophy across cultures is always implicitly a matter of metaphilosophy – of articulating more clearly the nature of philosophy itself? What if it forces us to ‘stand back’ hermeneutically and map out a ‘view from above’ of the underlying fabric of ideas – in their constitutive concepts, their relations to other ways of thinking, and their potential to be configured in alternative fascinating and fruitful ways?"

This article incorporates existing approaches to comparative philosophy within a single scheme of complementary philosophical activities, and a single overarching metaphilosophical project. These approaches are (1) ‘archival’ (exploring parallel but separate philosophical traditions), (2) ‘equivalentist’ (comparing traditions in terms of analogies and contrasts), and (3) ‘problem-solving’ (using multiple traditions to provide philosophical solutions). I situate these within (4) the overarching hermeneutic project of ‘mapping’ concepts and their possibilities. This entails the theory that philosophies drawing on multiple perspectives are always implicitly engaged in mapping out the underlying eidetic structure upon which philosophy does its work, and charting the conceptual possibilities surrounding any idea."

64. Freschi, Elisa. 2022. "Thinking Along with Texts from Afar: Why One Doesn't Understand Texts without Philosophical Reflection and Can't Do Philosophy without Inspiration." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 97-117. New York: Bloomsbury.

"In this chapter, I will argue in favor of doing intercultural philosophy confronting philosophers of the past. I will start by discussing whether at all one needs to engage with other philosophers while doing philosophy and claim that comparisons are just the normal way we think, and that in this sense the real choice is not between comparing and not comparing but between comparing explicitly or implicitly, that is, between comparing while being aware of what one is doing and comparing while being unaware of the way one is accessing a new idea through the lenses of a familiar one. Next, I will argue in favor of the engagement with philosophical texts that are remote in time, space,

or other circumstances, in order to challenge our ideas and seeming intuitions. I will then move on to the constructive part of this paper, in which I will promote engaging with great thinkers of the past, since this engagement will sharpen one's understanding of them as well as one's philosophical acumen. The greatness of an author depends on what one is looking for and, for instance, an epistemologist might not recognize the greatness of Martin Buber and viceversa.

(...)

Last, I will speak in favor of the very unfashionable topic of translations as a philosophical exercise.

(...)

How do the topic of engaging with philosophers of the past and that of translations hold together? Because the latter is an indicative test of the effectiveness of the former and because both require a close engagement. In both cases, one needs to step out of one's comfort zone and move toward a confrontation with the other thinker." (pp. 97-98, notes omitted)

65. Freschi, Elisa, and Keating, Malcolm. 2017. "How Do We Gather Knowledge Through Language?" *Journal of World Philosophies* no. 2:42-46.

The present issue of *Journal of World Philosophies* will host a series of papers discussing the phenomenon of linguistic communication<sup>2</sup> from a philosophical point of view and from a cross-cultural perspective.

The papers' authors discussed the topic together with some other scholars in a workshop in Athens, 2015.

(...)

The present series of contributions will deal with these topics from different points of view, elaborating on materials from the classical Indian, ancient Greek, and medieval Arabic traditions. We hope to contribute to a debate whose foundations have been set by works such as Matilal and Chakrabarti's *Knowing from Words*,<sup>(6)</sup> which focused on the topic of testimony from the perspective of Indian Philosophy (especially Nyāya) and of analytic philosophy.

The contributions are organized around the following four issues:

1. What do we know?
2. How (through which instrument of knowledge) do we know it?
3. What is the role of language as a medium?
4. What is the role of the social context?" (p. 42, some notes omitted)

(6) *Knowing From Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony* ed. Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti (Dordrecht, Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1989).

66. Frisina, Warren G. 2016. "Thinking Through Hall and Ames: On the Art of Comparative Philosophy." *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 15:563-574.

Abstract: "With the publication of their first collaborative book *Thinking Through Confucius*, David Hall and Roger Ames launched a comparative philosophical project juxtaposing American pragmatism and Chinese Confucianism (Hall and Ames 1987).

This essay focuses on the role pragmatic assumptions play in Hall's and Ames's announced goal of opening a "new route" into Chinese intellectual history. Hall and Ames aim to teach scholars whose scholarly sensibilities have been formed in the West what they must acknowledge about their own traditions before they can engage Chinese thinkers constructively. After happily acknowledging my own debt to Hall and Ames and defending as hugely helpful the broad arc of their work, this essay raises questions about the way they deploy pragmatic assumptions as tools for "removing the useless lumber" that they claim "block" Western thinkers' access to Chinese intellectual history. Specifically it argues that the "useless lumber" metaphor is misplaced."

67. Ganeri, Jonardon. 2016. "Symposium: »Is Reason a Neutral Tool in Comparative Philosophy?«." *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies* no. 4:134-142.

149Abstract: "Is Reason a Neutral Tool in Comparative Philosophy? In his answer to the symposium's question, Jonardon Ganeri develops a »Manifesto for [a] Re:emergent Philosophy.« Tracking changes in the understanding of ›comparative philosophy,‹ he sketches how today's world of academic philosophy seems to be set to enter an »age of re:emergence« in which world philosophies will (and can) be studied through modes of global participation. In their responses, the symposium's discussants tease out implications of this Manifesto for different issues: While Mustafa Abu Sway suggests that comparative philosophy be understood as an intra-philosophical dialogue, whose aim depends on its participants, Paul Boghossian questions whether there can be conflicting, yet equally valid, ways of arriving at justified beliefs about the world. For her part, Georgina Stewart draws out the similarities between Ganeri's understanding of comparative philosophy and the ethical stance involved in studying Maori science. In his Reply, Ganeri fleshes out his understanding of a pluralistic realism. Only an epistemic culture, which is open to a plurality of epistemic stances, he contends, can propel polycentric modes of knowledge production."

Contents: Jonardon Ganeri: A Manifesto for Re:emergent Philosophy, 134; Responses: Mustafa Abu Sway: On the Possibility of Rational Neutrality in Comparative Philosophy: A Response to Jonardon Ganeri 144; Paul Boghossian: Is Comparative Philosophy Based Upon a Mistake? A Reply to Ganeri's ›Re:emergent Philosophy‹ 149; Georgina Stewart: What's In a Name? In Support of *A Manifesto for Re:emergent Philosophy* 154; Reply; Jonardon Ganeri: Reflections on Re:emergent Philosophy 164; References 183-186.

68. ———. 2022. "Why Philosophy Needs Sanskrit, Now More than Ever." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 139-158. New York: Bloomsbury.

"Let me begin by trying to identify the sources of the doctrine that European philosophical tradition, its classics and its canon, occupies a privileged position in the global intellectual history of humanity. I'll then review a different, Sanskritic, conception of classicity, and go on to describe the critique of European exceptionalism by anticolonial thinkers from the first half of the twentieth century.

That part of the chapter will be diagnostic, but I also want to say something constructive, and I'll move in the final third of the chapter to sketch an alternative model for philosophical practice to that which currently prevails, one grounded in a defense of pluralism, a pluralism about ways of interrogating the single reality we share, and a model itself retrieved from Sanskrit thinkers." (p. 139)

69. Gangadean, Ashok K. 1976. "Formal Ontology and Movement between Worlds." *Philosophy East and West* no. 26:167-188.

"In this article I shall focus on one aspect of a general problem of movement between worlds. The concept of a world is an ontological one. Different worlds involve different

ontologies. A world, an ontology, is reflected in a language.

Thus, from an ontological point of view, different languages are worlds apart.

When I speak of different languages in this article I do not mean different in terms of linguistic criteria but different from an ontological point of view. This means that movement between worlds involves movement between different languages.(1)"

(1) When I speak of different languages here I mean different in terms of ontological criteria.

Thus, although English and French are from a linguistic point of view different languages, from an ontological point of view they may well be the same language. Alternatively, although English may, from a linguistic point of view, be considered one language, it is possible that from an ontological point of view it involves more than one language. Criteria determining what is to count as one language is discussed in part II.

70. ———. 1980. "Comparative Ontology: Relative and Absolute Truth." *Philosophy East and West* no. 30:465-480.

"Perhaps the most important challenge for comparative thought is whether there can be univocal truth between different worlds. For if there is not an *interworld* concept of truth, a concept of truth which is prior to and independent of any particular world, an ontologically neutral truth which is common to all possible worlds, in short, an *absolute* truth, then the possibility of rational discourse between worlds is questionable. The urgency of this concern is seen when the radical difference between worlds is appreciated. A world, in the classical ontological sense, is a particular categorial structure which materially defines what is possible and intelligible for experience and human understanding as a whole. What makes sense in one world may fail to make sense in another. What is possible in one world may not be a possibility in another. This means that worlds differ in the most radical way-propositional content and ontological possibilities being radically incommensurable between different worlds. And since meaning and truth are relative to a given particular ontology (for an ontology or worldview defines the very possibility of meaning and truth for the world in question) this seems to preclude the possibility of an absolute truth which is univocal, ontologically neutral, and common to all worlds." (p. 465. a note omitted)

71. Garfield, Jay L., and Edelglass, William, eds. 2011. *The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: Jay L. Garfield and William Edelglass: Introduction 3;

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Index 611-633.

72. Gorong, Yang. 2008. "Being and Value: From the Perspective of Chinese-Western Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 58:267-282.

"When a human being begins to examine a thing, the following questions will always be asked: "What is it?" "What does it mean?" "What should it be?" The first question mainly concerns the inherent specifications or simply the features of the thing; the second, its meaning to the human being; and the third, the necessity and way of realizing such a meaning.<sup>1</sup> Both of the last two questions relate particularly to the issue of value. The inherent connection of the three questions is rooted in the close relationship between being and value and consequently the very concreteness of

being." (p. 267)

73. Graham, Angus Charles. 1989. "Conceptual Schemes and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese." *Synthesis Philosophica* no. 4:713-732.

Reprinted in in A. C. Graham, *Unreason within Reason: Essays of the Outskirts of Rationality*, La Salle, IL: Open Court 1992, pp. 59-83 and in Bo Mou (ed.), *Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement*, Leiden: Brill 2018, pp. 247-268.

"Philosophers discussing conceptual schemes seem generally to treat them as assumptions in propositional form behind the thought of different cultures, cosmologies, or phases in the history of science. On the one hand, conceptual schemes appear as conflicting systems of assumed truths which are only imperfectly testable by observation, and bring us uncomfortably near to epistemological chaos; on the other, suspicion arises that the notion of a conceptual scheme may not be coherent at all: As Donald Davidson argues in his paper, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", we seem to end up with nothing definite but "the simple thought that something is an acceptable conceptual scheme or theory if it is true."<sup>(1)</sup> For inquirers into the thought and language of other cultures, the issue is inescapable. That very idea is one of their indispensable tools, to which Davidson's objections do not directly apply, since their own tendency is to think of it in terms, not of propositions,<sup>(2)</sup> but of classification by naming, and perhaps of syntactic structures. I wish to argue that examination of their usage can open up a different perspective on the philosophical problems.

At the roots of the systems of propositions called 'conceptual schemes' by philosophers there are patterns of naming pre-logical in the same sense as patterns of perception are pre-logical, and I shall myself use the term exclusively of these." (p. 713)

(1) Davidson in *Post-Analytic Philosophy*, ed. John Rajchman and Cornel West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 139.

(2) For practical reasons I shall speak of 'propositions' where Davidson and others say 'sentences', reserving the latter for sentences in natural languages, English, Chinese.

74. Hackett, Stuart Cornelius. 1979. *Oriental Philosophy: A Westerner's Guide to Eastern Thought*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

"This book will attempt to explain, in language intelligible to the Western reader and with as few technical complications as possible, the main philosophical positions associated with the religious traditions of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism.

It is a real introduction to oriental thought directed to the level of the upperclass college student and therefore explicitly intended as a basic text for courses in this area. It is, however, not an exhaustive treatment of the subject, and its ideal function would be to provide an expository and critical framework to be supplemented both by class lectures and by supplementary readings in primary source materials, such as those listed in the bibliography.

As it stands, the book has numerous qualities that contribute to its usefulness: it contains not only expositions of the perspectives discussed, but also evaluative critical sections which attempt to assess these views along lines carefully explained in the introduction. A further distinctive feature is the marginal outline, which provides a basis both for understanding the text and for developing organized insight into the views discussed. There is also a glossary which briefly and clearly defines the principal special terms that are used, as well as a general bibliography which will guide the reader into accessible literature on the subject in the English language. A final unusual quality of the book is that each section ends with " (Preface, p. VII)

75. Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1985. "India and the Comparative Method." *Philosophy East and West* no. 35:3-15.

Reprinted in W. Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988, pp. 419-433.

"The expression "comparative philosophy" itself is ambiguous. It does not make it clear whether philosophy is the subject or the object of comparing.

Do we philosophize while we are comparing, i.e. in and through comparison, or do we just deal with philosophy or philosophies as objects of comparative historical or anthropological research? If "comparative philosophy" is supposed to be *philosophy*, it cannot just be the comparison of *philosophies*. It cannot be the objectifying, juxtaposing, synoptic, comparative investigation of historical, anthropological or doxographic data.

Comparative philosophy is philosophy insofar as it aims at self-understanding.

It has to be ready to bring its own standpoint, and the conditions and the horizon of comparison itself, into the process of comparison which thus assumes the reflexive, self-referring dimension which constitutes philosophy. And, of course, in applying the term and concept of philosophy cross-culturally and beyond the sphere in which it was created and originally used, we cannot be sure whether we are indeed comparing philosophies, or whether we are comparing the Western tradition of philosophy with other traditions which, in spite of all analogies, are ultimately not philosophical traditions. But this might be a deeper challenge to self-understanding than merely dealing with what is explicitly referred to as philosophy, i.e. with the history of philosophy under the secure and thoughtless guidance of the word "philosophy." (p. 433)

76. Hall, David L. 2001. "Just How Provincial Is Western Philosophy? 'Truth' in Comparative Context." *Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge* no. 25:285-297.

"I shall claim that the putative absence of speculations concerning 'truth' in the Chinese tradition is a direct consequence of quite different approaches the Chinese have taken to the three Western suppositions cited above—namely, the necessity to distinguish things as they appear from the way they really are; the belief that the cosmos or world is a one rather than a many, and the preference for substantive over processive understandings of the way of things. I would argue that these are necessary cultural requisites for the development of truth theories as we have come to think of them in the West.

In the following section I will provide some evidence that the cultural requisites for the development of Western-style truth theories were not effective in shaping the development of classical Chinese cultural sensibilities." (p. 288)

(...)

"In the West, truth is a knowledge of what is real and what represents that reality. For the Chinese, knowledge is not abstract, but concrete and specific. Truth is not

representational, but performative and participatory. It is a kind of know-how, a practical understanding of how to follow the proper path.

Truth-seekers begin with —a wide-eyed wonder at the natural world around them—and proceed to the development of theories of the way things are, and finally become well-nigh obsessed with discovering if their theories are *true*. This leads to a concern for propositional and doctrinal consensus, *orthodoxy*.

Way-seekers search out those forms of action that promote harmonious social existence. Theirs is a concern for orthopraxy. For the way-seekers, truth is a quality of persons, not of propositions. Truth as ‘way’ refers to the genuineness and integrity of a fully functioning person.

77. Hamminga, Bert, ed. 2005. *Knowledge Cultures: Comparative Western and African Epistemology*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Contents: Bert Hamminga: Introduction 7; Yoweri Kaguta Museveni: The Power of Knowledge 11; Kwame Anthony Appiah: African Studies and the Concept of Knowledge 23; Bert Hamminga: Epistemology from the African Point of View 57; Bert Hamminga: Language, Reality and Truth: The African Point of View 85; Leszek Nowak: On the Collective Subjects in Epistemology: The Marxist Case and a Problem for the African Viewpoint 117; Bert Hamminga: The Poznan View: How To Mean What You Say 129; Contributors 141; Index and Glossary 143-147.

78. Hengelbrock, Jürgen. 1996. "Some reflections on Aristotle's notion of time in an intercultural perspective." In *Time and Temporality in Intercultural Perspective*, edited by Tiemersma, D. and Oosterling, H.A.F., 43-52. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"It may be surprising to look back at Aristotle's way of thinking from an intercultural point of view. Aristotle is reputed as the thinker of the universals suppressing the differences, as the theorist of abstraction, neglecting particularities - natural particularities as well as those which are constitutive elements of culture.

Indeed Aristotelian philosophy aims at transgressing what we name cultural phenomena. It tries to constitute a universal science of being, beings and essences, valid for all people at all times.

On the other hand Aristotle's thought seems to have derived from the Greek language. The structure of Greek syntax: had it not been the model of his doctrine of categories? In his well-known book on the Hopi language (1956) B. J. Whorf even suggests that Aristotle was duped by his Greek mother tongue. From this point of view, the Aristotelian ontological substance is the equivalent to the subject of the Greek sentence, and the grammatical complement in the sentence is transformed into the ontological accident. Aristotle's ontology, in this context, is just the grammar of Greek language. From this point of view the Aristotelian assumption that there is a universal science appears as a grand illusion. Today someone might even consider this assumption as grand arrogance: by his pretention he imposes the Greek model of understanding on mankind as the only valid one." (p. 43)

#### References

Carroll John (ed.), *Language, Thought and Reality. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*, Cambridge, MA, The M.I.T. Press 1956.

79. Hershock, Peter D., and Ames, Roger T., eds. 2019. *Philosophies of Place: An Intercultural Conversation*. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press and East-West Philosophers’ Conference.

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Contributors 329; Index 339-344.

80. Hofmeyr, Murray. 2004. "The Promise and Problems of Intercultural Philosophy." *Phronimon* no. 5:51-76.

Abstract: "In this paper I sketch the main elements of Heinz Kimmerle's conceptualisation of intercultural philosophy: a new concept of difference that makes possible a new take on "different and equal" which is the foundation for real dialogue. I interrogate the concept of culture in intercultural philosophy, and argue that for the South African context sufficient emphasis must be placed on power relations as they impact on cultures and the legacy of a history of cultural domination. I try to show that Kimmerle's notion of the equality of cultures implies that a particular context is taken seriously as a valid instance of the human condition, and in that sense it is of equal status with all other situations. All "localities" are linked in some way or another. It thus belongs to adequately conceptualising the thoughts and feelings of a specific locality that the need for dialogue should be reflected. A philosophy that negates these shifts would be disqualified as inadequate. The fact that it seeks dialogue is indicative of the experience of an aporia.

It is lack, incompleteness, which is universal!. I also tentatively propose "contextual philosophy" as a more appropriate name for intercultural philosophy in South Africa."

81. Hongladarom, Soraj. 2019. "How to Understand the Identity of an Object of Study in Comparative Philosophy." *Comparative Philosophy* no. 10:119-126.

"Bo Mou has presented a list of methodological principles concerning how to maintain adequate methodological guiding principle in doing philosophy comparatively. Its main idea is that these principles should maintain rationality and objectivity of comparative philosophy. Perhaps the most important principle in his list is the first one: in Mou's words, "A methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if, given an object of study, it enables the agent to recognize that there is a way that the object objectively is such that it is not the case that "anything goes," and we can all talk about that same object even though we may say different things (concerning distinct aspects of the object) about it." (Mou 2018,1-2 [Mou 2016, 269-70]). In other words, an adequacy condition for a fruitful undertaking of comparative philosophy is that both sides recognize that there exists at least an object in common.

(...)

In this paper I would like to take up this argument and show that in some cases comparative philosophy and constructive dialogs between different philosophical traditions could indeed take place successfully even without sharing an objective individual thing that Mou argues for. This, however, does not imply that "anything goes" because both the traditions can engage in a common enterprise even though they don't share any individual object in common. My example will come from comparing Buddhist philosophy with Aristotle's philosophy on individuals. The Buddhist and the Aristotelian can, as I shall argue, engage in a very constructive dialogue with each other even though they don't share anything in common in their respective ontologies. Not sharing anything does not entail that anything goes because the Buddhist and the Aristotelian still can debate and understand each other's point through translations of their respective vocabularies." (pp. 119-120)

#### References

Mou, Bo (2018), "On Adequacy Conditions for How to Adequately Maintain Methodological Guiding Principles to Look at Distinct Approaches", presented at the 24th World Congress of Philosophy, 15th August 2018, Beijing, China. [Editorial note: the partial contents of this unpublished paper under the engaging discussion in this "Constructive-Engagement Dialogue" section previously appear in Bo Mou (2016), "How Constructive Engagement in Doing Philosophy Comparative is Possible", *Synthesis Philosophica* 62.2: 265-277; the interested reader can see them in this published article.]

82. Hoogland, Jan. 1996. "The necessity of intercultural philosophy." In *Time and Temporality in Intercultural Perspective*, edited by Tiemersma, D. and Oosterling, H.A.F., 25-41. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"In some of his writings Heinz Kimmerle states that there is a 'philosophical-historical necessity' (*philosophiegeschichtliche Notwendigkeit*) for an intercultural dialogue within philosophy (eg. Kimmerle 1994, 131f.). I think he is right. At the same time I have some critical questions about the meaning of this concept of necessity. In this essay I will make clear that a truly open dialogue between philosophers from different cultures can be hindered by a certain kind of dogmatism, which is characteristic for Western thinking. I will show this on the basis of the work of Herman Dooyeweerd. This does not mean that I will undermine the thesis that this dialogue is necessary as such. On the contrary, it is once again Dooyeweerd's philosophy which can illustrate how necessary such a dialogue is, because of the prejudices in his judgements about 'primitive' cultures.

In another essay I already investigated the meaning of the concept of 'necessity' in Kimmerle's argument.(1) In this essay I will consider the subject from a different perspective. In his *Die Dimension des Interkulturellen* Kimmerle illustrates his thesis by

means of the problem of time in Western thought (Kimmerle 1994). Starting from the critique of Derrida on the Western way of thinking about time, he pleads for an intercultural exchange of ideas about this subject to overcome the aporias within the Western concept of time." (p. 25)

(1) J. Hoogland 'Die Ansprüche einer interkulturellen Philosophie' (The claims of an intercultural philosophy); not yet published. [Heinz Kimmerle (ed.), *Das Multiversum der Kulturen: Beiträge zu einer Vorlesung im Fach 'Interkulturelle Philosophie' an der Erasmus Universität Rotterdam*, Leiden: Brill 1996, pp. 57-75]

83. Izutsu, Toshihiko. 1983. *Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Abstract: "In this deeply learned work, Toshihiko Izutsu compares the metaphysical and mystical thought-systems of Sufism and Taoism and discovers that, although historically unrelated, the two share features and patterns which prove fruitful for a transhistorical dialogue.

His original and suggestive approach opens new doors in the study of comparative philosophy and mysticism.

Izutsu begins with Ibn 'Arabi, analyzing and isolating the major ontological concepts of this most challenging of Islamic thinkers. Then, in the second part of the book, Izutsu turns his attention to an analysis of parallel concepts of two great Taoist thinkers, Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzi. Only after laying bare the fundamental structure of each world view does Izutsu embark, in the final section of the book, upon a comparative analysis. Only thus, he argues, can he be sure to avoid easy and superficial comparisons. Izutsu maintains that both the Sufi and Taoist world views are based on two pivots—the Absolute Man and the Perfect Man—with a whole system of ontological thought being developed between these two pivots. Izutsu discusses similarities in these ontological systems and advances the hypothesis that certain patterns of mystical and metaphysical thought may be shared even by systems with no apparent historical connection."

84. Jenco, Leigh Kathryn. 2007. "'What Does Heaven Ever Say?' A Methods-centered Approach to Cross-cultural Engagement." *American Political Science Review* no. 101:741-755.

Abstracty: "How can we conduct cross-cultural inquiry without reproducing the ethnocentric categories that prompt critique in the first place? Postcolonial and comparative political theorists have called into question the "universal" applicability of Western liberal political norms, but their critiques are drawn most often from competing Western discourses (e.g., poststructuralism) rather than from the culturally diverse traditions of scholarship whose ideas they examine. In contrast, I suggest attending to these culturally situated traditions of scholarship, especially their methods of inquiry, in addition to their substantive ideas. This method-centered approach reinterprets cross-cultural engagement, not as a tool for modifying existing parochial debates on the basis of "non-Western" cases, but as an opportunity to ask new questions through alternative frames of reference. Examining the interpretive methodologies of two Chinese classicists, I show how their methods offer not only new ideas but also new methods for the

practice of political and cross-cultural theory."

85. ———. 2012. "How meaning moves: Tan Sitong on borrowing across cultures." *Philosophy East and West* no. 62:92-113.

"This essay offers an attempt at a cross-cultural inquiry into cross-cultural inquiry by examining how one influential Chinese reformer, Tan Sitong (1865–1898), thought creatively about the possibilities of learning from differently situated societies." (p. 92)

(...)

"I center my discussion on a theory about the relationship between dao and qi that the radical reformer Tan Sitong formulated around 1895, in support of "total Westernization" (quanpan Xihua). Following but ultimately contesting the dominant ti/yong paradigm of the more conservative Foreign Affairs School, Tan parses the problem out in this way: how, if at all, are the particular concrete manifestations of the Western world that seem so brilliantly useful — steam engines, guns, tall buildings — related to the values or principles that Western people seem to uphold? How can they come not only to be imitated by Chinese but also to have meaning for them? Tan recognized that these meanings were related but irreducible to the ideas individuals held separately in their minds, or the values enforced by state institutions. In response, he produces an original and unusually metaphysical account of how values and meaning are produced and consumed across society, as well as how they work to support more observable external phenomena such as parliamentary government, technological development, and social practices of equality." (p.93)

86. Jiménez Estrada, Vivian M. 2005. "The Tree of Life as a Research Methodology." *Australian Journal of Indigenous Education* no. 34:44-52.

Abstract: "This paper is grounded on the premise that research, as a colonising practice, needs constant reconceptualisation and rethinking. I propose a methodology based on some of the values, visions and stories from my own Maya Indigenous culture and knowledge in addition to other Indigenous cultures across the world. I argue that researchers need to constantly acknowledge and change the negative impacts of ignoring multiple ways of knowing by engaging in respectful methods of knowledge collection and production. This paper contributes to the work Indigenous scholars have done in the area of research methodologies and knowledge production. First, a general overview of the values and concepts embedded in the Ceiba or the "Tree of Life" is presented; then, a discussion of what respectful research practices entail follows; finally, it concludes with a reflection on how the Ceiba is a small example of how researchers can adapt their research methodology to the local context."

87. Jung, Hwa Yol. 2011. *Transversal Rationality and Intercultural Texts: Essays in Phenomenology and Comparative Philosophy*. Athens: Ohio University Press.

"This book of thirteen selected essays spans almost half a century from 1965 (chapter 3) to 2009 (chapters 9 and 13). Many, if not all, of them are experimental and exploratory in nature." (Introduction, p. X)

(...)

"Chapter 2 advances the concept of transversality, which is central to the main themes of this book. It begins with a critique of the notion of universality in modern Western philosophy. It targets Hegel— the modernist incarnate— in particular, who had a dark view of the non- Western world, particularly China and India. His overarching Eurocentric universality is founded on the fallacious assumption that what is particular in the West is made universalized whereas what is particular in the non- West remains particular forever." (p. XII)

(...)

"Transversality means to overcome and go beyond ("trans") the clash of ethnocentrism both "Orientalist" and "Occidental" as a result of "essentializing" (to use Edward W. Said's phrase) the Orient or the Occident. We are warned not to take it simply as a middle point between bipolar opposites. Rather, it breaks through bipolarity itself (theory and practice, philosophy and nonphilosophy, mind and body, femininity and masculinity, humanity and nature, Europe and non-Europe, etc.). What must be recognized as important is the fact that transversality is the paradigmatic way of overcoming all

polarizing dichotomies and ready for the conceptualization of "world philosophy." The end product of transversality in the fusion of cultural (and disciplinary) horizons is hybridity or creolization. Viewed in this way, what is traditionally called "comparative philosophy" is not just a neglected and underdeveloped branch of philosophy, but *it is poised to transform radically the very conception of philosophy itself.*" (pp. XII-XIII)

88. Kaipayil, Joseph. 1995. *The Epistemology of Comparative Philosophy: A Critique with Reference to P. T. Raju's Views*. Rome: Centre for Indian and Inter-Religious Studies.

"Comparative philosophy has been in existence as an organized discipline with plausible aims and methods of its own for over the past fifty years. Its potential was well exploited to facilitate East-West understanding, exchange, and cooperation in philosophy. For all this, the debate about the philosophical rationale of comparative philosophy, i.e. its place and function in the wider context of philosophical enterprise, is far from over. Now it is time for us to do a "stocktaking" or a state of the art assessment of the subject, and this is what we intend to do by analysing P .T, Raju' s views on comparative philosophy. Raju is used as a case study because he, of all writers on/in comparative philosophy to date, is of singular importance and special consideration for both the theoretical contribution to the subject and the amount of literature produced in the field.

As for the format of our study, the work consists of a general introduction and four chapters. The first three expository chapters present Raju's views on comparative philosophy and his philosophical synthesis. As a rule these chapters contain Raju' s views only, excepting those comments and observations we make in the footnotes. The fourth chapter offers critiques of Raju' s comparative philosophy and calls for a paradigm shift in East-West studies in philosophy. While we question the justification for pursuing comparative philosophy as an independent discipline, we maintain the need and relevance of cross-cultural and comparative studies in philosophy and argue for a fresh perspective of philosophical studies and a new syllabus for history of philosophy." (From the Preface)

89. Kakol, Peter. 2002. "A General Theory of Worldviews Based on Madhyamika and Process Philosophies." *Philosophy East and West* no. 52:207-223.

Abstract: "The aim of this essay is to make a contribution to the emerging field of "cross-cultural analysis of worldviews" by showing how the basic insights of process philosophy and Madhyamika Buddhism can be combined into a comprehensive theory of worldviews that is both developmental and typological (or diachronic and synchronic). It is hoped that this theory of worldviews will enable cross-cultural analyses of worldviews to go beyond mere comparison of similarities and differences between worldviews by showing how worldviews can mutually transform one another through dialogue. I will begin by outlining the basic ideas of both process thought and Madhyamika Buddhism, their respective theories of worldviews, and how these relate to contemporary thought. I will then argue that these two theories are compatible with one another and that their combination can contribute to the development of a general theory of worldviews. Finally, I will show how such a general theory of worldviews- which is also necessarily a general theory of values-can be used in the evaluative analysis of worldviews.

90. Kalmanson, Leah. 2015. "Have We Got a Method for You! Recent Developments in Comparative and Cross-Cultural Methodologies." *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies* no. 3:205-214.

Abstract: "Recent developments in comparative and cross-cultural philosophy converge on the question of philosophical methods. Three new books address this question from different perspectives, including feminist comparative philosophy, Afrocentricity, and metaphilosophy. Taken together, these books help us to imagine interventions in the

methodologies dominant in Western academic philosophy through a fundamental reevaluation of how we think, reason, and argue. Such reevaluation underscores the problems that Eurocentrism poses for feminist discourse and the resources that comparative philosophy offers for addressing these problems."

#### References

J. McWeeny, and A. Butnor (eds.), *Asian and Feminist Philosophies in Dialogue: Liberating Traditions*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014;

A. Monteiro-Ferreira, *The Demise of the Inhuman: Afrocentricity, Modernism, and Postmodernism*, Albany: SUNY Press, 2014;

S. Mattice, *Metaphor and Metaphilosophy: Philosophy as Combat, Play, and Aesthetic Experience*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014.

91. ———. 2017. "The Ritual Methods of Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 67:399-418.

"In several recent articles, Leigh Kathryn Jenco questions the use of Eurocentric methodologies in conducting cross-cultural research within and about Chinese traditions. (3)" (p. 399)

(...)

"In what follows, I begin with Jenco's claim that we might look to several scholars of the Ming and Qing dynasties for examples of research practices that could be adopted widely today. These include meditation routines meant to prepare the mind for scholarly research, and memorization techniques aimed at internalizing texts to catalyze philosophical insight and, ultimately, self-transformation. As I show, these methods are part of a general "ritual methodology" evident across all the sanjiao 三教(8) traditions (i.e., the "three teachings" of Ruism,(9) Daoism, and Buddhism) and informed by a certain conception of the mirror-like functioning of the mind. From within this context, I consider both the viability and desirability of such a ritualized approach to scholarship for contemporary professional philosophers." (p. 400)

#### References

(3) In particular, see Jenco, "How Meaning Moves: Tan Sitong on Borrowing across Cultures," [Philosophy East and West 62, no. 1] pp. 92–113, and "What Does Heaven Ever Say? A Methods-centered Approach to Cross-cultural Engagement," [American Political Science Review 101, no. 4] pp. 741–755.

(8) Sanjiao or the "three teachings" is a term that goes back to at least the Sui dynasty; I use it here to emphasize certain methodological similarities that underlie these various East Asian traditions.

(9) Following Robert Eno in *The Confucian Creation of Heaven*, I use "Ruism" in place of "Confucianism" to better approximate the Chinese term rujia 儒家 or "scholarly lineage."

92. Kasulis, Thomas P. 2002. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

The 1998 Gilbert Ryle Lectures.

"This book is not a study of any particular culture, although I cannot deny I have often had specific cultures or subcultures in mind as I developed the theory. As the next chapter will explain, for example, I doubt that I would have developed the reiterative

patterns in this way if it had not been for my exposure to Japanese culture. Yet the book is not intended to be an analysis of any single culture, even Japanese culture. It is more like a thought experiment that raises fundamental issues about the nature of culture itself, especially the relation between culture and thought. One aim of this book is to present the case for understanding at least some cultural phenomena in terms of the reiterative or recursive analysis. The role of the philosopher is not just to analyze but also to give us better tools for analysis. My readers are therefore invited, indeed encouraged, to use the tools in relation to whatever cultures or subcultures they wish. It is unlikely that any culture is ever a perfect example of either an intimacy-dominant or integrity-dominant culture (generalities always have qualifications or exceptions), but the hope is that the analysis and critical tools presented here may help us see connections and differences we might have otherwise missed. If this hope is realized, communication and understanding across cultures will be assisted and the book will have served its ultimate purpose." (p. 11)

93. Kessler, Gary E. 2015. *Voices of Wisdom: A Multicultural Philosophy Reader*. Andover (Hamshire): Cengage Learning.

Ninth edition.

"Since the publication of the first edition of *Voices of Wisdom*, I am gratified to note that more introductory textbooks now incorporate a multicultural perspective, a perspective that was unique to this introductory reader when it was first published in 1992.

At that time the introductory readers that were available treated philosophy as if it were entirely an Anglo-European male phenomenon. Little or no attention was given to Hindu, Buddhist, Chinese, African, Native American, Latin American, and feminist philosophy. *Voices of Wisdom* helped to change that situation, offering to those who wished it the possibility of assigning significant readings that represent the global nature of philosophizing." (preface, p. XI)

94. Kimmerle, Heinz. 1996. "How can time become time (again)? How to repeat what never has been?" In *Time and Temporality in Intercultural Perspective*, edited by Tiemersma, D. and Oosterling, H.A.F., 11-23. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

"Time can never become what it essentially is: the pure openness of being and of becoming. But we can work on a way of understanding it, which is more open, less fixed into the opposition of time or no time, of being or not being.

We can do this if we opt for a pluriformity of time or Being as being experienced in different ways. I do not mean this in a highly speculative sense, rather in a more practical sense. How can we think and act in ways which are more adequate to the being of time? On the one hand we can follow the thinking of Heidegger, Derrida and Lyotard who deal with this difficult question. On the other hand we can find the pluriformity of being and of time directly and concretely in the pluriformity of cultures. And it is a very practical exercise to work on the maintenance of this pluriformity. Therefore, with regard to our present issue, we will first ask how time is thought of by Lyotard and also by Heidegger and Derrida and secondly how time is experienced in other cultures and how this experience is conceptualized. As an example I have chosen the concept of time in African thought. Thus a highly speculative and a more practical approach come together, for thinking is also a way of living and as philosophers we have to learn how we can to live by working out how we must think. This 'must', of course, is not a purely logical imperative; nor is it orientated to a certain direction: east or west, south or north, but to the openness of Being as happening to be." (p. 12)

95. ———. 2007. "Transdisciplinary research in the cooperation between intercultural philosophy and empirical sciences." *TD: The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa* no. 3:95-103.

Abstract: "This article will examine how philosophy and empirical sciences can cooperate in research. It is presupposed that in philosophy and in the empirical sciences different types of discourses are used. This difference causes a large gap between them, which has to be bridged. Intercultural philosophy is understood as a specific approach to philosophy as a whole. It is necessary to make philosophy fit into a world in which exchanges are happening on a global level in many fields. In the dialogues between the philosophies of different cultures, support is needed from certain empirical sciences for the understanding of the philosophy, which is based on the the participation of philosophers in everyday life and everyday language. Therefore, in addition to the the support by empirical sciences, living in a foreign culture, participating in its life, is necessary for intercultural philosophers."

96. ———. 2010. "My Way to Intercultural Philosophy." *Recerca. Revista de Pensament i Anàlisi* no. 10:35-44.

Abstract: "My way of philosophical thought led me from hermeneutics, via dialectics and philosophies of difference to intercultural philosophy with special attention for African philosophy. I studied hermeneutics with the theologians Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs at Tübingen, Philipp Vielhauer at Bonn and the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer at Heidelberg in the 1950ies. Reading Hegel and Marx I came to accept the position of materialist dialectics. My favorite author was Ernst Bloch who combines his position of materialist dialectics with a critical interpretation of religion, especially Jewish-Christian religion. Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of Hegelian dialectics brought me to the philosophies of difference. The concept of the Other in these philosophies formed the entrance to contribute to the foundation and the development of intercultural philosophy."

97. ———. 2011. "Respect for the Other and the Refounding of Society: Practical Aspects of Intercultural Philosophy." In *Intermedialities: Philosophy, Arts, Politics*, edited by Oosterling, Henk and Plonowska Ziarek, Ewa, 137-152. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

"The aim of "Intercultural" philosophy is to add a new dimension to Western philosophical traditions. From a Western point of view, this type of philosophizing is carried out by leading dialogues between Western and non-Western traditions of thought. The position that every culture has its own specific way or style of thought and of philosophy is taken as an important starting point. Or, to formulate it in a negative manner, Western philosophy is not chosen as the criterion for judging where philosophy can or cannot be found. If philosophy occurs in traditional African ways of thought, which is generally acknowledged since African philosophy is a regular section at the World Congresses of Philosophy, this means that philosophy can be found also in cultures that do not practice primarily written forms of communication and tradition. From here the step can be taken to ascribe philosophy to all cultures. The reflection of a culture on the right of its existence and its specific way of life among other cultures and in the middle of nature brings about philosophy in that particular culture. The dialogues between the philosophies of different cultures are treating topics, which are of common interest for them and/or of an importance that exceeds the problems of one of the cultures in

question. Intercultural philosophical dialogues presuppose that the philosophies of all cultures are equivalent in rank and different in style as well as in contents." (p. 137)

98. King, R. A. H., ed. 2015. *The Good Life and Conceptions of Life in Early China and Græco-Roman Antiquity*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Contents: I Methods

R.A.H. King: Introduction 3; G.E.R. Lloyd: Models for living in ancient Greece and China. A supplementary note on methodology and aims 21; Ralph Weber: On

## Comparing Ancient Chinese and Greek Ethics: The tertium comparationis as Tool of Analysis and Evaluation 29;

### II China

Paul R. Goldin: The Consciousness of the Dead as a Philosophical Problem in Ancient China 59; Guo Yi: The Ideas of Human Nature in Early China 93; Dennis Schilling: Cosmic Life and Human Life in the "Book of Changes" 117; Christoph Harbsmeier: Good Fortune and Bliss in Early China 145; Elisabeth Hsu: Bing-distress in the Zuo zhuan: the not-so-good-life, the social self and moral sentiment among persons of rank in Warring States China 157; Michael Nylan: Pleasures and Delights, Sustaining and Consuming 181;

### III Greece and Rome

William Charlton: Is the Concept of the Mind Parochial? 213; Jörg Hardy: Taking Thoughts about Life seriously. The existential dimension of Socratic Inquiry in Plato's *Apology* 227; Richard Stalley: Filial Piety in Plato 247; Hua-kuei Ho: The Good Life for Plato's Tripartite Soul 265; Thomas Buchheim: Good counsel and the role of logos for human excellence. On the rhetorical anthropology of "the measure of all things" 281; Michael Erler: Hedonê in the Poets and Epicurus 303;

### IV Comparisons

Lisa Raphals: Autonomy, Fate, Divination and the Good Life 321; R.A.H. King: Mencius and the Stoics – *tui* and *oikeiôsis* 341; Lee H. Yearley: The Role and Pursuit of the Virtue of Equanimity in Ancient China and Greece 363;

Index locorum 387; General index of subjects 395-402.

99. Kirloskar-Steinbach, Monika, and Kalmanson, Leah. 2021. *A Practical Guide to World Philosophies: Selves, Worlds, and Ways of Knowing*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

"As our subtitle indicates, this introduction to "world philosophies" is also a book about selves, worlds, and ways of knowing. As such, it accomplishes two interrelated tasks: (1) it not only brings a world philosophical approach to bear on these fundamental issues; but (2) it also shows how our very understanding of the meaning of the terms "selves;" "worlds;" and "knowing" is transformed in the process.

Although we intend for this volume to stand on its own as an exercise in world-philosophical practice, we have also designed it to serve as a guidebook to the Bloomsbury series *Introductions to World Philosophies*. The series is an educational resource that provides in-depth introductory texts in world-philosophical traditions appropriate for classroom use as well as accessible to a general audience. Each volume in the series responds to the thematic framework indicated in our subtitle, such that together the contributions provide a diverse array of philosophical perspectives on fundamental questions related to selves, world, and ways of knowing." (p. 1)

100. Kirloskar-Steinbach, Monika, Ramana, Geeta, and Maffie, James. 2014. "Introducing Confluence: A Thematic Essay." *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies* no. 1:7-63.

Abstract: "In the following thematic introduction, we seek to situate *Confluence* within the field of comparative philosophy and substantiate why we deem a new publication necessary. For this purpose, we reconstruct the salient stages in the development of comparative philosophy in Section I, and then proceed to expound the rationale underlying *Confluence* in Section II. Our reconstruction of these stages pursues an exploratory rather than a documentary approach."

101. Koller, John M. 2018. *Asian Philosophies*. New York: Routledge.

Seventh edition (First edition 1970).

"By studying the great philosophical traditions of Asia, it is possible for us to understand these traditions' carefully considered answers to these questions, answers that are supported by profound insights and good reasons. Because these answers have guided the thought and action of the peoples of Asia over the centuries, they provide the basic clues to the guiding ideas and values of Asian societies today. And in today's world, where the very future of humankind depends upon understanding and cooperation among people with diverse values and ideas, it is imperative that these values and ideas be understood.

As each of us tries to creatively develop our own personal philosophy, we can benefit enormously from an understanding of the different ways that the basic questions of life have been answered by the great thinkers in the Asian traditions." (from the Preface)

102. Kramer, Eli. 2021. *Intercultural Modes of Philosophy, Volume One: Principles to Guide Philosophical Community*. Leiden: Brill.

"This work is part of a larger project, a three-volume series entitled "Intercultural Modes of Philosophy". Each volume engages the reader in a different philodynamic image of a mode of the philosophical life. My method in this project is what I call radically empirical philosophy of culture, which transitions Cassirerian cultural phenomenology out of critical idealism and into a Jamesian and Whiteheadian inquiry into the higher thresholds of experience (human culture). In this first volume, I explore the neglected communal mode of philosophy (philosophical community) through meta-ethical principles that articulate what makes it robust, successful, and valuable. In the second volume, I will trace the enactments of philosophical wanderers. These philosophical wanderers enact reflective life as the force that, as an exercise in being obnoxious, awakens culture out of its settled dogmatisms and onto new and more ethically rich routes in the wider world. The third volume will meditate on and with philosophical speculators, as those who create and maintain philodynamic cosmic images for reconstructive contemplation. In other words, it will explore the structure of systematic philosophical inquiry both for creator and audience. Together, these three modes of philosophy can be thought of as the "three tripod legs" that support (ground) robust philosophical life within, and effective for, a culture." (Preface)

103. Krishna, Daya. 1988. "Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be." In *Interpreting Across Boundaries. New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, edited by Larson, Gerald James and Deutsch, Eliot, 71-83. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Reprinted in N. Bhushan, J. L. Garfield, D. Raveh (eds.), *Contrary Thinking. Selected essays of Daya Krishna*, New York: Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 59-67.

"To search for the distinctive philosophical problems seen as problems or for distinctiveness in the solutions offered to similar problems is not only to see the alien tradition in a new way but to enrich oneself with the awareness of an alternative possibility in thought, a possibility that has already been actualized.

The awareness of this alternative actualized possibility may, one hopes, free one's conceptual imagination from the unconscious constraints of one's own conceptual tradition.

Thus comparative philosophy has the chance to function as a mutual liberator of each philosophical tradition from the limitations imposed upon it by its own past, instead of being what it is at present, the imposition of the standards of one dominant culture upon

all the others and the evaluation of their philosophical achievements in terms of those alien standards." (p. 83)

104. Kupperman, Joel J. 2001. *Classic Asian Philosophy: A Guide to the Essential Texts*. New York: Oxford University Press.

"I came therefore to view this book, which is a generalist rather than a specialist project, as an extension of teaching. The organizing principle is simple. Each of the eight chapters focuses on one classic Asian text (or, in one case, cluster of texts), which is widely available in paperback, frequently in more than one translation. Each of these eight books, incidentally, is one that at some time or other I have used as one of the assigned books in an undergraduate course. The goal of each chapter is not only to explicate the text (or texts) but also to make it come alive. That is, we should be able to see Asian philosophers as struggling with important questions, ones that could matter to us too, and as offering answers that (even were we to find in the end that we cannot entirely accept them) would be plausible—in relation to those questions—to an intelligent person." (Preface, VI)

105. ———. 2002. "The Purposes and Functions of Comparative Philosophy." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:26-29.

"There are many reasons for comparative study of philosophies that represent different traditions and possibly originate in different cultures. The two that stand out are (1) appreciation, including deeper understanding of philosophical texts, and (2) the suggestiveness of philosophy in an unfamiliar tradition, providing new prompts for philosophical investigation. The first can grow out of fascination with great philosophy of a variety of kinds. The second can emerge in a working life, part of which is designed to create new philosophy." (p. 26)

106. Kwee, Swan Liat. 1951. "Methods of Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 1:10-15.

"Methodical evaluation goes farther than the formal preparatory stages of translation and collation. Comparative philosophy is a multiple and integral approach to the common issues of philosophy. In its historical development, from about the middle of the last century to the present, we see many phases." (p. 12)

(...)

"The comparative approach. This involves, as a next step, the schematic analysis of the total subject matter of philosophy, and may center about problems ( comparative metaphysics, comparative logic, comparative ethics, etc.) or about pervasive attitudes ( realism, idealism; monism, dualism, pluralism, etc.). This method of schematic comparison is the first stage in evaluation. Comparison involves the finding of analogies and, as a result, of specific differences. This process deepens our insight into the structural correlations in philosophy. Comparison may be considered as the most fundamental element in evaluation. The danger in attempts at comparison is that the starting point, the viewpoint of comparison, may be biased. Many Western scholars try to evaluate Eastern systems of thought by comparing them from a Christian standpoint, which tacitly is assumed as the only correct one. Comparison must do justice to every item compared both by stating the common analogical pattern and by relevating important specific differences. Both methods deserve equal attention. Comparison tends to overstress the analogy and to neglect the essential differences, often resulting in a false conviction that all philosophy or religion is essentially the same." (p. 13, notes omitted)

107. ———. 1953. *Methods of Comparative Philosophy*. Scheveningen - Leiden: Offsetdrkkerij Dorsman.

Contents: Preface V-IX; Part One: The Meaning of Comparative Philosophy. 1: Introduction 3; 2. Analysis of the phenomenon 18; 3. A historical perspective 30; Part Two: The Meaning of Philosophy. 4. Phenomenology of philosophy 61; 5. The function of philosophy 68; 6. The contents of philosophy 84; 7. The systematics of philosophy 92; Part Three: The Methods of Comparative Philosophy. 8. A triangulation of methods 111; 9. The historical and sociological approach 120; 10. The anthropological and psychological approach 139; 11. The linguistic and logical approach 154; 12. The transcendental re-evaluative approach 171; Bibliography 187; Index 207-217.

"The analysis of methods of comparative philosophy, originally intended to serve as a base for the design of a new program of applied philosophical studies in Indonesia, is presented here as a general survey of the phenomenon of comparative philosophy as such, without references to Indonesian thought. As a survey it strives after comprehensiveness rather than completeness. No such survey has been attempted yet. Those who are engaged in the study of comparative philosophy may have some knowledge of some of the other projects with analogous purposes, but a comprehensive and systematic treatment of comparative philosophy, covering the whole field of studies, is still lacking. The present study by no means pretends to fill up this gap completely. It does not attempt to give a detailed and accurate picture of the scene, but rather to indicate the main horizons. As in a usual triangulation some points of reference are marked off with some emphasis while inter mediate areas are left out of consideration. The only possible merit of such an undertaking lies in what has-not-yet-been-said rather than in what is actually propounded, It serves to stimulate to further, more systematic and more integral researches rather than to register objectively what has been achieved at the moment. It serves to link apparently disconnected projects and themes, and so to open unexpected vistas and to readjust and enlarge existent perspectives, When it succeeds to evoke some fertile criticism, to bring about more-effective co-ordination in the many contemporary projects of comparative philosophy, and to contribute to the growth of practical transcultural understanding, the author's main intentions have been amply rewarded.

Because this work is itself a survey it is impracticable to add a summary to it. The three parts of which it is composed, respectively dealing with a systematic analysis of the phenomenon of comparative philosophy, asystematic analysis of the phenomenon of philosophy itself, and the current methods of comparative philosophy, constitute a systematic whole." (pp. VI-VIII)

"This study is composed of three parts.

The first part will be an analysis of *the meaning of comparative philosophy*. A first mapping of the phenomenon is carried out in three sections. Some of the most significant recent studies are mentioned in this chapter. A second chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the main problems. Then, the phenomenon is viewed in a historical perspective.

The second part will contain an analysis of *the meaning of philosophy* itself. The phenomenon of philosophy being the formal object of study in comparative philosophy, a mapping of this phenomenon itself is indispensable for an adequate integration of the various fragmentary endeavours in comparative philosophy. On the base of a comprehensive phenomenology of philosophy the systematic study of comparative philosophy will be facilitated. The third and last part is a comprehensive survey of current *methods of comparative philosophy*. A triangulation of methods is an efficient means to reveal the actual character of comparative philosophy as a consistent discipline." (pp. 4-5)

108. Lacertosa, Massimiliano. 2017. "For a philosophy of comparisons: the problems of comparative studies in relation with Daoism." *Asian Philosophy* no. 27:324-339.

Abstract: This paper reflects on the problems of cross-cultural interpretations and translations analysing how these are rooted in theories and philosophical assumptions. Inquiring the concept of philosophy per se, the paper discusses key passages of Heidegger and the related problem of 有(you) and 無(wu). The conclusion is that to translate such terms, it is necessary to revise the coercive ontotheological assumptions of metaphysics. This can trigger a process of re-grounding grounds with the consequent possibility of language transformation, which, in turn, activates new relations between cultural diversities. Thus, philosophy itself becomes an eminently comparative dialogue between cultures. Without setting a single method for all these problems, the paper argues that comparisons themselves call for necessarily different methodological approaches. Hence, whilst Daoism helps to illuminate these issues defining one of the possibilities that a philosophy of comparisons entails, this same reasoning opens a way for another

reading of the *Daodejing*."

109. Larson, Gerald James, and Deutsch, Eliot, eds. 1988. *Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Contents: Preface VII-IX; Gerald James Larson: Introduction: The "Age-Old Distinction Between the Same and the Other" 3; Karl H. Potter: Metaphor as Key to Understanding the Thought of Other Speech Communities 19; Henry Rosemont, Jr: Against Relativism 36; Daya Krishna: Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be 71; Ben-Ami Scharfstein: The Contextual Fallacy 84; Charles Hartshorne: Sankara, Nagarjuna, and Fa Tsang, with Some Western Analogues 98; Raimundo Panikkar: What Is Comparative Philosophy Comparing? 116; Hajime Nakamura: The Meaning of the Terms 'Philosophy' and 'Religion' in Various Traditions 137; Frederick J. Streng: Mechanisms of Self-Deception and True Awareness According to C. G. Jung and the Eight-Thousand-Line Perfection of Wisdom Sutra 152; Eliot Deutsch: Knowledge and the Tradition Text in Indian Philosophy 165; Ninian Smart: The Analogy of Meaning and the Tasks of Comparative Philosophy 174; Sengfaku Mayeda: Sankara and Narayana Guru 184; Frits Staal: Is There Philosophy in Asia? 203; Wing-Tsit Chan: Chu Hsi and World Philosophy 230; Roger T. Ames: Confucius and the Ontology of Knowing 265; A. S. Cua: Reflections on Moral Theory and Understanding Moral Traditions 280; Wm. Theodore de Bary: Neoconfucianism as Traditional and Modern 294; Contributors 311; Index 313-316.

110. Leaman, Oliver. 1999. *Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy*. New York: Routledge.

"The premise on which I am working here is that Eastern philosophy is philosophy, and not something special and esoteric which we need special non-philosophical tools to operate. On the other hand, there is no doubt that Eastern philosophy is closely connected with the religions of the East, and it is impossible to understand that philosophy unless one also understands something of the religions. I have tried to explain enough about the relevant religion or culture to make the context of the philosophy comprehensible. For this reason I have included some material that is far more relevant to religion than to philosophy.

It is always difficult to know if one has gone into enough depth, and if one has spent too much time on the religion and not enough on the philosophy. This is a book on philosophy, and not on religion, and a book on religion would include far more discussion of the key religious concepts than I have done." (Introduction, p. XI)

111. Levine, Michael. 2016. "Does Comparative Philosophy Have a Fusion Future?" *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies* no. 4:208-237.

Abstract: "This essay challenges the claim that fusion philosophy is the successor to comparative philosophy. Comparative philosophy should find itself deeply at odds with the approach to various philosophical problems and traditions that fusion philosophy is taking, and comparative philosophers will surely deny Mark Siderits (2003: xi) claim that they have been superseded. The manner then in which fusion philosophy dismisses comparativist concerns and objections is to admit that such objections are valid in some case but to deny that they are intrinsic to good fusion philosophy. Comparativists however generally do not claim that fusion philosophy is necessarily or inherently bound to make the mistakes and contribute to misunderstandings that they claim it often does. Their claim is that from the start such philosophy often does make just these kinds of problematic errors and assumptions, and that this is what comparativist philosophy must seek to avoid. By the time fusionists are done defending – actually sanitizing – fusion philosophy from comparativist objections, one is left not with fusion philosophy but with what is – from the comparativist perspective – comparative philosophy. There is no succession from comparative philosophy to fusion philosophy and no segue from one to the other."

112. Li, Chenyang. 1999. *The Tao Encounters the West: Explorations in Comparative Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; Chapter 1. Being: perspective versus substance 11; Chapter 2. Truth: Confucius and Heidegger 35; Chapter 3. Pragmatic versus semantic 63; Chapter 4. Ethics: Confucian *Jen* and Feminist Care 89; Chapter 5. Family: duty versus rights 115; Chapter 6. Religion: multiple participation versus exclusionism 139; Chapter 7. Justice: Confucian values and democratic values 163; Concluding remarks 191; Notes 193; Bibliography 217; Index 229.

From the Introduction: "The book may be seen as a study of Chinese and Western versions Tao. "Tao", as the word is used in Chinese, is not limited to Taoism; in all major Chinese systems it refers to the right way (the Ways or cosmic order even though different schools have different interpretations.' Chinese philosophy, therefore, may be seen as studies of various aspects of the Tao. Neither Chinese nor Western philosophy is homogeneous. There are, however, certain philosophies and philosophers who have had a defining influence within their own cultures and traditions, and I believe that a comparative study of these philosophies and philosophers can be used to demonstrate different thought patterns of the two cultures. Such a study illuminates the Chinese harmony model of life, which serves as a cornerstone of my argument for the coexistence of Confucianism and democracy.

This book serves a dual purpose. While each chapter contributes directly or indirectly to the main thesis, each also stands on its own as a comparative study of a specific dimension of Western and Chinese philosophical and ethico-religious traditions.

Chapter 1, "Being: Perspective versus Substance," investigates the differences between Chinese ontology and Aristotelian ontology, which is the most influential in the West. Aristotle's view of being is a substance ontology, according to which the world is composed of various individual substances. The Chinese philosopher Zhuang Zi's ' ontology, which reflects on the background of Chinese thinking in general, is a perspective ontology. According to this ontology, the being or identity of an entity is always contextually situated and perspective-dependent. These ontological differences occur at a fundamental level and thus underlie many other philosophical positions that distinguish Chinese from Western views. Communication and mutual understanding can be enhanced with a clear understanding of these differences. For example, the Chinese "contextual perspective" ontology has profound implications for people's attitudes toward many other significant aspects of life, including truth, morality, and religious practice. Because of the significance of Chinese ontology for Chinese philosophy in general, this first chapter not only provides the basis for chapter 2, on truth, it also has

direct relevance to chapters 4 and 5 as the foundation of the Confucian understanding of 'personhood.'

Chapter 2, "Truth: Confucius and Heidegger," investigates various concepts of truth, which is a central value in the West and in China. In the West, truth is usually understood semantically; it is a relation between language and reality. The Chinese understand it primarily as a matter of being a good person, as a way of life; being true is the way to realize one's potential for becoming fully human. Different understandings of truth in Western and Chinese philosophies affect value judgments in significant ways. Heidegger is chosen here not because he represents a typical Western understanding of truth (he does not), but because he presents a root metaphor of truth that is shared by both the Chinese and the Westerner. Through exploring Heidegger's view on truth, this chapter demonstrates how the Chinese and Western notions of truth, although sharing the same common metaphor of "unveiling (*aletheia*)," lead in different directions. This understanding of Chinese truth as a way of life and self-realization provides further ground for discussion in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7." (pp. 2-3)

113. ———. 2002. "Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies. From the Editor." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:19.

"Comparative philosophy can be understood broadly as philosophizing across two or more philosophical systems or traditions. Today, when people say comparative philosophy they typically mean philosophizing across cultural traditions, even though the lines between cultures are not always easily drawn. We do not need a precise definition of comparative philosophy to see the value and benefit of doing comparative philosophy. Different philosophies may have different issues to deal with because of their respective understandings of the world and human society; they may also share same philosophical problems, even if they do not tackle these problems in the same way. As we compare, we see both differences and similarities. Seeing differences helps us better understand one another; seeing similarities makes us feel less distant from one another and enhances our human solidarity.

Comparative philosophy, however, is not merely about seeing differences and similarities across traditions. Drawing rich resources from other traditions can help one's own practice of philosophy become more fruitful. Philosophizing across traditions enables us to expand our horizons and to see things from different perspectives. In the contemporary world, philosophizing without looking beyond one's own philosophical system or tradition proves increasingly impoverished and parochial."

114. ———. 2016. "Comparative Philosophy and Cultural Patterns." *Dao. A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 15:533-546.

Abstract: "As a genus of philosophy, comparative philosophy serves various important purposes. It helps people understand various philosophies and it helps philosophers develop new ideas and solve problems. In this essay, I first clarify the meaning of "comparative philosophy" and its main purposes, arguing that an important purpose of comparative philosophy is to help us understand cultural patterns. This function makes comparative philosophy even more significant in today's globalized world."

115. Liang, Shuming. 2001. "The Cultures of the East and West and Their Philosophies." *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 1:107-127.

Translated by Andrew Covlin and Jinmei Yuan.

"Editor's note: This is the first installment of a series of translations of selected articles from the important debate on the Cultures of the East and West which took place in China during the early twentieth century. Generally speaking, this debate involved two groups of people: Proponents of Western Culture, and proponents of Eastern Culture. The former, represented by Hu Shi, believed that traditional Chinese culture was no

longer viable in the modern world and maintained that we should accept Western culture as a whole; the latter, represented by Liang Shuming, the author of the following selection, argued that Chinese culture is superior to Western culture and represents the future of world culture.

Translated below is chapter 2 of Liang's famous book, *The Cultures of the East and West and their Philosophies*. It can be seen in this chapter that although Dang is a proponent of Eastern Culture, he also tries very hard to incorporate into Chinese culture what he sees as valuable aspects of Western culture, particularly Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy. The section numbers are added by translators.."

116. Libbrecht, Ulrich. 2006. *Within the Four Seas... Introduction to Comparative Philosophy*. Leuven: Peeters.

"The purpose of Part I is not to deal with the problem of globalization in depth: this is far beyond my capacities. It intends only to prove that comparative philosophy must actually be the culmination of globalism, because it studies encounters between civilizations in depth, not as commercial or political strategies. Some scholars are of the opinion that comparative thinking is nothing more than an academic diversion alienated from political, economic and social reality. ActualJy, it is a project for the future, a revival of Erasmus' dream on a worldwide scale, free from traditional Eurocentrism, and also far removed from flat commercialism." (pp. 1-2)

(...)

"It is not the task of a comparative philosophy to blend these philosophies into a kind of world philosophy, but to bring them together in a model that enables global dialogue. Such a dialogue does not aim at a kind of ecumenism or mutual respect and tolerance in the first place, but at a philosophical act which brings out the similarities and especially the differences, because precisely the latter augment the spiritual wealth of mankind. In Part 2 we try to build a model which makes this comparison possible. In Part 3 we shall deal with the three main philosophies themselves, restricting our analysis to the most extreme world-views: Greek rationality, Buddhist mysticism and Taoist nature philosophy.

It is perhaps not superfluous to remind the reader that we are not dealing with religions, but only with philosophies." (p. 44)

117. Lin, Ma, and van Brakel, Jaap. 2018. "On the Interpreter's Choices: Making Hermeneutic Relativity Explicit." *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 17:453-478.

Abstract: "In this essay, we explore the various aspects of hermeneutic relativity that have rarely been explicitly discussed. Our notion of "hermeneutic relativity" can be seen as an extension, with significant revisions, of Gadamer's notion of *Vorurteil*. It refers to various choices and constraints of the interpreter, including beliefs concerning the best way of doing philosophy, what criteria are to be used to evaluate competing interpretations, and so on. The interpreter cannot completely eliminate the guidance and constraint originating from his/her "background." However, *in principle* the interpreter can "choose" to be guided by other constraints. Hence, we speak of "choices" or "commitments." Hermeneutic relativity is the major cause for the variation of competing interpretations."

118. Lloyd, G. E. R., and Zhao, Jingyi Jenny, eds. 2018. *Ancient Greece and China Compared*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

In collaboration with Qiaosheng Dong.

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13. Xinyi Liu, Evi Margaritis and Marin Jones: From th Harvest to the Meal in Prehistoric China and Greece: A Comparative Approach to the Social Context of Food 355; 14. Michael Nylan: On Libraries and Manuscript Culture in Western Han Chang'an and Alexandria 373;

Michael Lowe: Afterword 410;

Index 420-430.

119. Lott, Tommy L. 2011. "Comparative Aspects of Africana Philosophy and the Continental-Analytic Divide." *Comparative Philosophy* no. 2:25-37.

Abstract: "Critical engagement involving philosophers trained in continental and analytic traditions often takes its purpose to be a reconciliation of tensions arising from differences in style, or method. Critical engagement in Africana philosophy, however, is rarely focused on method, style, or orientation because philosophic research in this field, regardless of orientation, has had to accommodate its empirical grounding in disciplines outside of philosophy. I focus primarily on the comparative dimensions of three important strands of this research: (1) a history of ideas, (2) a problem-orientation, and (3) a sub-area specialization, to indicate why a need to reconcile tensions between continental and analytic orientations has very little currency in Africana philosophy. Socio-economic problems faced by African-descended people require multiple perspectives to accommodate the wide variety of diasporic social contexts for a given proposal. I employ a selection of cases to illustrate how Africana philosophy benefits from an interplay of many intersecting factors and that, as an interdisciplinary area of research with a commitment to the incorporation of multiple perspectives, it fosters cross-pollination and hybridization of continental and analytic traditions."

120. Loy, David. 1988. *Nonduality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Reprint: Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1997.

"This study divides naturally into two parts. Part I extracts various claims from the major nondualist traditions, Buddhism, Vedanta, and Taoism, in order to construct a "core doctrine" of nonduality largely consistent with all three. The process of selection is unsystematic, making use of assertions and arguments that provide helpful insights while ignoring most of the rest. This yields a theory about the nature of nondual experience that also explains the apparent "delusion" of our more usual way of understanding experience. But the disagreements among the nondualist systems—especially between Mahayana Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta—cannot be lightly dismissed. So part 2 works backward, using the core theory as a perspective from which to approach and resolve the disagreements. There we shall be able to understand how the same phenomenological experience may be subjected to different and even contradictory descriptions.

In this introduction, the term *nonduality* refers exclusively to the nonduality of (more narrowly) seer and seen, (more broadly) subject and object. Such nonduality is my main concern, but is by no means the only meaning of the term in the literature. At least five different meanings can be distinguished, all of them intimately related; three of those are of interest in part 1. Chapter I sets the parameters of the study by discussing the role of these three nondualities within Buddhism, Vedanta, and Taoism. It demonstrates their prevalence, importance, and relationships, dwelling particularly upon the third nonduality of subject and object, of self and nonself, of my consciousness and the world "I" find myself "in." Each of the following chapters of part 1 investigates what such nonduality might mean in one particular mode of our experience—perceiving, acting, and thinking, respectively. How can we understand the assertion that each of these is actually nondual?" Introduction, p. 9)

121. Lu, Mingjun. 2020. *Chinese-Western Comparative Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Topical Approach*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

"A primary objective of this project is to examine the wisdom of Chinese and Western sages through a comparative analysis of their philosophical discourses. By wisdom, I refer chiefly to the metaphysical knowledge of universality, a view that draws on Aristotle's (384–322BC) definition of wisdom in his *Metaphysics*. Aristotle calls metaphysics *philosophia prima*, the "first science" or "first philosophy" that takes "wisdom" or "truth" as its object of study (1026a28–30).<sup>2</sup> Unlike empirical study that aims at action, Aristotle observes, the end of metaphysical inquiry is "knowledge of the truth" (993b20–21). By wisdom or truth, he means "knowledge about certain causes and principles," especially "the first causes and principles of things" (982a1; 981b29). Since great wisdom "must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge," Aristotle remarks, "wisdom is a science of first principles" (982a20–21; 1059a18). In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, he declares that wisdom of universality is "the most finished of the forms of knowledge" (*NE* 1141a16)." (p. 2)

(...)

"It is a key argument of this project that Chinese wisdom or truth resides in its metaphysics of the first principle as well. As to be demonstrated in Chapter 1, the first principle also constitutes the primary hypothesis of Chinese originative metaphysics as represented in the Laozi of Laozi 老子 (c. 600–531 BC), founder of the Taoist philosophy, and the ten commentaries made by Confucius 孔子 (551–479 BC) and his followers on the Yijing 易经, *The Book of Changes*.

Laozi's work is also called *Daode Jing* 道德经, *The Dao and Its Virtue*. The ten Confucian commentaries or "wings" are collected and give rise to the *Yizhuan* 易传, which will be referred to as the Yi Commentaries. Like Aristotelian metaphysics, Chinese originative metaphysics as represented in the Taoist and Confucian classics

constitute the foundational framework for later philosophers to think about metaphysical and epistemological issues." (p. 3, a note omitted)

122. Ma, Lin, and van Brakel, Jaap. 2016. *Fundamentals of Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"The title of this book is "Fundamentals of Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy," but yet we often solely use the expression "intercultural philosophy" in a broad scope, including every intercultural philosophical activity that involves translation, interpretation, and exposition of the conceptual schemes of a certain philosophical tradition in terms of the conceptual schemes of another tradition. Sometimes, we shorten this long phrase to "cross-cultural interpretation" or "interpretation across traditions." Because intercultural and comparative have different semantic fields in philosophy, we use both in the title. However, except for a few cases,(1) we use the phrase intercultural philosophy to include comparative philosophy. In terms of "fundamentals" in the title, this book is concerned primarily with the necessary preconditions of intercultural philosophy. Occasionally we address the methodology of intercultural philosophy, but this is not our main subject. "Necessary preconditions" is more fundamental than "methodology." (p. 1)

(...)

"In the remaining part of this introduction we present an overview of all the chapters. In the first chapter, we provide preliminary explications concerning the central concepts of philosophy and language and introduce the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativism. After reviewing a number of views with respect to Western, Chinese, and African philosophy, we argue that philosophy is a family resemblance concept.

Interaction across traditions does not require that the two sides employ the same concept of philosophy. Similarly, no sharp boundaries between "philosophy" and other reflective practices are needed; partitions such as those among philosophy, history, religious studies, and literature are conventional, and classifications may be different, as in the history of the Chinese traditions." (p. 5)

(1) We may use the words compare or comparative when the author(s) whose work is discussed use such words. We use the words intercultural and cross-cultural as synonyms.

123. ————. 2016. "On the Conditions of Possibility for Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy " *Dao. A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 12:297-312.

Abstract: "In this essay, we present a theory of intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy, drawing on both hermeneutics and analytic philosophy.

We advocate the approach of "de-essentialization" across the board. It is true that similarities and differences are always to be observed across languages and traditions, but there exist no immutable cores or essences. "De-essentialization" applies to *all* "levels" of concepts: everyday notions such as green and *qing* 青, philosophical concepts such as emotion(s) and *qing* 情, and philosophical categories such as forms of life and *dao* 道. We argue that interpretation is a holistic multi-directional process constrained by the principle of mutual attunement. It is necessary to assume that "the other" is a human being, who, in most cases, is consistent and stating that which is true or right. This is the condition of possibility for intercultural philosophical dialogue and comparative philosophy. No more necessary conditions are needed.

There is no need to presuppose concepts or categories that are universal for all humans and their languages (such as emotion(s) and *qing* 情)."

124. ———. 2016. "A Theory of Interpretation for Comparative and Chinese Philosophy." *Dao. A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 15:575-589.

Abstract: "Why should interpretation of conceptual schemes and practices (forms of life) across traditions work at all? In this paper we present the following necessary conditions of possibility for interpretation in comparative and Chinese philosophy: the interpreter *must* presuppose that there are mutually recognizable human practices; the interpreter *must* presuppose that "the other" is, *on the whole*, sincere, consistent, and right; the interpreter must be committed to certain epistemic virtues. Some of these necessary conditions are consistent with the fact that interpretation is not thwarted by the "danger" of relativism or of incommensurability. Some other conditions are suggestive of reorientations of methodologies of comparative and Chinese philosophy.."

125. ———. 2018. "On the Interpreter's Choices: Making Hermeneutic Relativity Explicit." *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 17:453-478.

Abstract: "In this essay, we explore the various aspects of hermeneutic relativity that have rarely been explicitly discussed. Our notion of "hermeneutic relativity" can be seen as an extension, with significant revisions, of Gadamer's notion of *Vorurteil*. It refers to various choices and constraints of the interpreter, including beliefs concerning the best way of doing philosophy, what criteria are to be used to evaluate competing interpretations, and so on. The interpreter cannot completely eliminate the guidance and constraint originating from his/her "background." However, in principle the interpreter can "choose" to be guided by other constraints. Hence, we speak of "choices" or "commitments." Hermeneutic relativity is the major cause for the variation of competing interpretations."

126. MacDonald, Paul. 2013. "Palaeo-Philosophy. Archaic Ideas about Space and Time." *Comparative Philosophy* no. 4:82-117.

Abstract: "This paper argues that efforts to understand historically remote patterns of thought are driven away from their original meaning if the investigation focuses on reconstruction of concepts, instead of cognitive 'complexes'. My paper draws on research by Jan Assmann, Jean-Jacques Glassner, Keimpe Algra, Alex Purves, Nicholas Wyatt, and others on the cultures of Ancient Greece, Israel, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Etruria through comparative analyses of the semantic fields of spatial and temporal terms, and how these terms are shaped by their relation to the sphere of the sacred. It shows that there are three super-ordinate timeframes - the cyclical, the linear and the static - each of which is composed of lower-order cycles (days, lunar months, and seasons). These timeframes reflect their cultures' ideas about the nature, scope and power of the gods, and structure the common point-of-view about the present, the past and eternity. There are also super-ordinate spatial frames which reflect their cultures' ideas about the heavens and which structure both the sacred precinct and the profane field of action and exchange. Close analysis of texts that use words such as eternity, forever, past, present, and future, for example, do not reveal that there is anything like a general abstract concept of time in virtue of which some thing or event can be said to be in time or to have its own time. Archaic patterns of thought do not differ from our "modern" patterns in having different concepts, but in not having anything like concepts at all."

127. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1991. "Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation Between Confucians and Aristotelians about the Virtues." In *Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophical Perspectives*, edited by Deutsch, Eliot, 103-121. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

"We may compare Confucianism and Aristotelianism from a Confucian standpoint, or from an Aristotelian; or we may compare both or either with some third, different, equally incompatible and incommensurable standpoint, such as that of Buddhism or of

Kantianism, but we cannot find any legitimate standing ground outside the context of the points of view. And when we have undertaken comparative study in a manner which recognizes this, we shall soon find that our task is not so much that of comparing Confucianism and Aristotelianism as that of comparing Confucian comparisons of Confucianism and Aristotelianism with Aristotelian comparisons of Confucianism and Aristotelianism. The key to comparative studies is the comparison of comparisons." (p. 120)

128. Maffie, James. 2001. "Editor's Introduction: Truth from the Perspective of Comparative World Philosophy." *Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy* no. 15:263-273.

"What role does this issue of *Social Epistemology* play in the dialogue of comparative world philosophy? The issue's contributors address from a variety of perspectives the theme of truth. Do all philosophical traditions possess the concept of truth, and if so, do they incorporate truth into their conceptions of epistemology and knowledge? If not, what do they use in place of truth?"

Many Western philosophers view correspondence truth as occupying the centre stage of Western epistemology's conceptions of knowledge and justification since Plato and Aristotle." (p. 267)

(...)

"Contemporary Western philosophy, however, standardly regards truth as applying primarily and literally to propositions alone and only derivatively and metaphorically to persons and things. Smith and Deutsch point out that this emphasis is unique to Western philosophy. In non-Western traditions, truth is typically conceived primarily as a predicate of persons or things, not propositions. Smith situates contemporary Western philosophy in historical and what he calls 'spatial' context: 'To lift from the pool of truth's total, undifferentiated meaning a single referent—propositions—and develop its meaning in that direction is our Western contribution to the subject' (Smith, 1980, p. 425). There are different emphases in other cultures' conceptions of truth, differences that were originally subtle but have become gradually more pronounced as each culture developed its own distinctive identity. Over time South Asia has tied truth to things; East Asia, to persons; the West, statements. In sum, conceiving truth as a predicate of propositions is a historically novel development of post-Renaissance Western philosophy; one not shared by East and South Asia." (p. 268)

(10) Despite his prominence as a scholar of world religions, Huston Smith neglects to test the merits of his thesis regarding the threefold nature of truth beyond the pale of Europe, East Asia and South Asia.

#### References

Deutsch, E., 1979, *On Truth: An Ontological Theory* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).

Smith, H., 1980, Western and comparative perspectives on truth. *Philosophy East and West*, 30, 425–437.

129. Malhotra, Ashok. 1980. "Introductory Remarks on the Symposium "The Problem of Truth"." *Philosophy East and West* no. 30:421-424.

Abstract: "This article offers a brief summary of the main points raised in the four papers read in the Symposium on "East-West perspectives on truth" which was organized by the society for Asian and comparative philosophy from December 27-28, 1978 in Washington, d c. The papers covered the Chinese, Japanese, Indian and comparative perspectives on truth. The Symposium revealed that the time had come when a dialogue

between Eastern and Western philosophers was not only important but necessary. the Symposium achieved its aim of broadcasting this essential message."

130. Mall, Ram Adhar. 1998. "Philosophy and Philosophies – Cross-culturally Considered." *Topoi* no. 17:15-27.

"The central thesis proposed, discussed and defended here is this: There are different philosophical traditions of cultures which can make substantial contributions to philosophy in general and to the various philosophical disciplines in particular. This they may accomplish by drawing our attention to the philosophical questions put and to the philosophical answers suggested. This is where an intercultural philosophical orientation begins, and it leads us to consider the philosophies of other cultures with a view to their contributions to the general concept of philosophy which is always a response to a felt need in the face of the problems we are confronted with in our attempt to understand and explain the world of things and beings.

That we are all human beings makes one thing abundantly clear: in spite of cultural differences, there are fundamental similarities between different philosophical traditions. Philosophy in world context today, i.e. philosophy cross-culturally considered pleads for the thesis that the general applicability of the concept of philosophy remains unaffected by our recognition and acceptance of more than one genuine philosophical tradition. The naive dogmatism of identifying philosophy exclusively only with one particular philosophical convention amounts to some sort of ethnocentrism, and such a move is always suspect. One particular contextual and relative perspective is thereby put in an absolute universal position. The Western philosophy, backed by so many extra-philosophical factors e.g. social, economic, imperial, colonialistic and religious did universalize itself from the days of Diogenes Laertius up to say Husserl, Heidegger and even Gadamer and Rorty." (p. 15)

131. ———. 2014. "Intercultural Philosophy: A Conceptual Clarification." *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies* no. 1:67-84.

Abstract: "In this paper I would like to show how belonging to different cultures does not impede intercultural philosophizing and instead favors it. To that end, I will first pinpoint what exactly intercultural philosophy stands for in Section II. In Section III I will sketch certain crucial features of what is in fact a hermeneutical situation. In Section IV I will develop my own theory of an interculturally-oriented »analogous hermeneutic« and then try to show in Section V that it can furnish what is necessary to do comparative philosophy. A short conclusion will follow in Section VI."

132. Marchal, Kai. 2020. "A Few Thoughts on the Possibility of Intercultural Thinking in a Global Age." *Philosophy East and West* no. 70:238-246.

Book discussion of: *Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought*. By Eric S. Nelson. London, Oxford, New York, New Delhi, Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017.

"Until recently, most humanities scholars (including philosophers) in North America and Europe lived in a world where China was notable for its absence.

(...)

Only most recently, with the changed geopolitical situation, are Chinese thinkers starting to receive more attention. In this context, Eric S. Nelson's book *Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought* makes an important contribution to further opening up the West to Chinese discourses. Nelson's book is a historical study about the reception of Chinese philosophy by German-speaking philosophers in the early twentieth century.

The history of Western philosophy, Nelson writes programmatically in his introduction, "is historically already interculturally and intertextually bound up with non-Western philosophy" (p. 3)." (p. 238)

(...)

"Reviewers have already highlighted the numerous strengths of this volume. It is a landmark study in intercultural philosophy that will shape the research field for years to come. In my essay, I would like to describe a few difficulties that, in my understanding, still hamper a project like Nelson's. I want to focus on two aspects: (1) the relationship between philosophy and its history and (2) Heidegger and the "hermeneutic primacy of interpretation"." (p. 239)

133. Masson-Oursel, Paul. 1926. *Comparative Philosophy*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.

Reprint: London: Routledge, 2000.

Translated from the French edition: *La philosophie Comparée*, Paris: Alcan, 1923.

"Thus, although comparative philosophy ought to be universal, we have the right and the duty, by virtue of a methodological opportunity, to restrict it for the present to the study of those peoples already dowered with a history.

For the rest, little as we are able to illuminate the historic times by the dark earlier ages, the arcana of prehistory will only be reduced by the progress of history, gradually pursued from the more to the less known. And amongst the fractions of mankind susceptible of historical investigation, only three are met with whose development has taken place in strict parallel during some three millennia; these three are precisely those of which the past has been or can be best elucidated. We refer to Europe, India, and China." (pp. 35-36)

134. ———. 1951. "True Philosophy is Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 1:6-9.

Translated from the French by Harold E. McCarthy. [Editor's note.]

"Just as it is possible to compare religions, so it is possible to compare philosophies. Such a comparison will not take the form of a simple inventory, or the form of a pure theory, although we are familiar with both.

Rather, comparative philosophy will be the general examination of the ways in which human beings of all races and cultures reflect upon their actions and act upon their reflections.

The scope of comparative philosophy is universal history and the cosmos.

But each individual is situated within his own little sphere, and each people within its own historical tradition and its own habitat. Man's dependency upon the world does not have the same significance for primitive peoples that it had for Plato and Newton, because concrete consciousness is to be located elsewhere than in astronomical time and geometrical space. In like manner, each individual lives in society without being localized there as a physical object, for he delights in residing in himself-indeed, in God. Thus, comparative philosophy is neither psychology nor sociology, but the study of modes of action which are, at one and the same time, both individual and collective, capable of becoming stabilized in structures which are certainly not eternal but are, rather, temporal and changing." (pp. 6-7)

135. Matilal, Bimal Krishna, and Shaw, Jaysankar Lal, eds. 1985. *Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective: Exploratory Essays in Current Theories and Classical Indian Theories of Meaning and Reference*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Contents: Preface IX; Bimal K. Matilal: Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective: An Introduction 1; M. J. Cresswell: We Are All Children of God 39; Paul Gochet: The Syncategorematic Treatment of Predicates 61; William Lycan: The Paradox of Naming 81; Steven E. Boer: Substance and Kind: Reflections on the New Theory of Reference 103; Frank Jackson: The Easy Examination Paradox 151; Krister Segerberg: Models for Actions 161; Kalidas Bhattacharya: Some Problems Concerning Meaning 173; Sibajiban Bhattacharya: Abstraction, Analysis and Universals: The Navya-Nyāya Theory 189; J. N. Mohanty: Psychologism in Indian Logical Theory 203; Karl H. Potter: A Speech-Act Model for Understanding Navya-Nyāya Epistemology 213; Douglas D. Daye: Some Epistemologically Misleading Expressions: "Inference", and "Anumana", "Perception" and "Pratyaksa" 231; Mark Siderits: The Prabhakara Mīmāṃsā Theory of Related Designation 253; Arindam Chakrabarti: Plato's Indian Barbers 299; J. L. Shaw: Proper Names: Contemporary Philosophy and the Nyāya 327; Bimal K. Matilal: Awareness and Meaning in Navya-Nyāya 373; Index 393-406.

136. McDermott, Charlene, ed. 1983. *Comparative Philosophy: Selected Essays*. Lanham: University Press of America.

"By drawing on a wide variety of views and belief systems, the present volume makes available to the reader a rich stock of alternatives for purposes of comparison and contrast. Fundamental epistemological and metaphysical issues are introduced by means of selections from writers of the first rank — both Eastern and Western. Each selection is preceded by an explanatory essay, making it a self-contained unit. In addition, a bibliography of suggested readings is appended to each of the two principal subsections. Finally, a glossary of technical terms and a set of notes on each philosopher or philosophical school included in the anthology further serve to make the book useable with minimal burden on the reader. In this way, speculations from a far-off century of an exotic cultural milieu can be held up as a kind of "distant mirror"(2) in which to view critically the outline of more familiar theories and reflections with a freshness not otherwise possible." (Preface, pp. IX-X, a note omitted)

(2) The phrase is Barbara Tuchman's. See her *A Distant Mirror*. The Calamitous 14th Century. Alfred Knopf, New York, 1978.

137. McEvelley, Thomas. 2002. *The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies*. New York: Allworth Press.

"I will not telegraph now what my own methods and conclusions are. In the following twenty-five chapters of argument from evidence I will make a measured attempt to establish significant intrusions first from India to Greece in the pre-Socratic period, then from Greece back to India in the Hellenistic period. In addition I will continue to extend and refine the typological comparisons that scholars have been making since Jones in 1799. Perhaps other scholars will correct me on one point or another, an event which would be welcome, for this is a shared human project that deserves the involvement of many minds. Surely the relationship between ancient Greek and Indian traditions of thought is the foundational level of comparative philosophy." (From the Foreword)

#### References

William Jones, *The works of Sir William Jones*, London : G. G. and J. Robinson 1799.

138. McWeeny, Jennifer, and Butnor, Ashby, eds. 2014. *Asian and Feminist Philosophies in Dialogue: Liberating Traditions*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Contents: Eliot Deutsch: Foreword XI; Acknowledgments XIII; Ashby Butnor and Jennifer McWeeny: *Feminist Comparative Philosophy: Performing Philosophy Differently* 1;

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#### Part 3 Places of Knowing

6. Xinyan Jiang: What Would Zhuangzi Say to Harding? A Daoist Critique of Feminist Standpoint Epistemology 147; 7. Vrinda Dalmiya: "Epistemic Multiculturalism" and Objectivity: Rethinking Vandana Shiva's Ecospirituality 167;

#### Part 4 Cultivating Ethical Selves

8. Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee: Confucian Care: A Hybrid Feminist Ethics 187; 9. Erin McCarthy: The Embodied Ethical Self: A Japanese and Feminist Account of Nondual Subjectivity 203; 10. Ashby Butnor: Dōgen, Feminism, and the Embodied Practice of Care 223;

#### Part 5 Transforming Discourse

11. Namita Goswami: De-liberating Traditions: The Female Bodies of Sati and Slavery 247; Chela Sandoval: Philosophy Uprising: The Feminist Afterword 271; *Feminist Comparative Philosophy and Associated Methodologies: A Bibliography* 279; Contributors 301; Index 305.

139. ———. 2014. "Feminist Comparative Philosophy: Performing Philosophy Differently." In *Asian and Feminist Philosophies in Dialogue: Liberating Traditions*, edited by McWeeny, Jennifer and Butnor, Ashby, 1-33. New York: Columbia University Press.

"In this introduction, we provide an initial articulation of the scope, methods, content, and aims of feminist comparative philosophy with reference to three guiding questions: 1. What is the relationship between feminist comparative philosophy and each of its namesakes—feminist philosophy and comparative philosophy? 2. How can this new methodology overcome those patterns of exclusionary vision that have frustrated its predecessors' capacities for consistently recognizing privilege and difference? and 3. Why does it makes sense to think of feminist comparative philosophy as a liberatory practice, that is, as an activity that helps people politically and spiritually? After addressing these defining questions in the following three sections, we go on to provide summaries of the book's themes and chapters.

We conclude by considering the future of feminist comparative philosophy in terms of its potential for development and transformation." (p. 3)

140. ———. 2014. "Feminist Comparative Philosophy and Associated Methodologies: A Bibliography." In *Asian and Feminist Philosophies in Dialogue: Liberating*

*Traditions*, edited by McWeeny, Jennifer and Butnor, Ashby, 279-300. New York: Columbia University Press.

"The purpose of this bibliography is to provide readers with a sense of what has already been published in the emerging field of feminist comparative philosophy and to serve as an invitation to further explore its literature, history, and methodologies.

Consistent with our present desire to render visible those philosophical inquiries that emerge jointly from the insights of feminist and Asian traditions, we have limited our list of publications in feminist comparative philosophy to those that engage Asian philosophical texts. However, as explained in this book's introduction, we believe that many other pairings of cultural and social locations are consistent with feminist comparative practice and we hope that the future of this field will blossom with a diversity of fresh juxtapositions. In regard to this bibliography's sections on "Feminist Methodology" and "Comparative Methodology," we have sought to list only those resources that speak to these philosophical methodologies in general and have therefore not included publications on specialized methodologies like those used to address, for example, feminist ethics or Chinese-Greek comparisons. Moreover, our accounts of feminist methodology and comparative methodology respectively reflect those sources most relevant to the development and proliferation of feminist comparative practice, rather than to different or broader understandings of feminism and comparative studies." (p. 279)

141. Mizumoto, Masaharu, Ganeri, Jonardon, and Goddard, Cliff, eds. 2020. *Ethno-Epistemology: New Directions for Global Epistemology*. New York: Routledge.

Contents: Masaharu Mizumoto: Introduction 1; 1 Jonardon Ganeri: Epistemic Pluralism: From Systems to Stances 19; 2 Masaharu Mizumoto, Shun Tsugita, and Yu Izumi: Knowing How and Two Knowledge Verbs in Japanese 43; Yngjin Xu: 3 "The Rectification of Names" as a Confucian Theory of Epistemic Justification 77; 4 Shane Ryan, Chienkuo Mi, and Masaharu Mizumoto: Testimony, Credit, and Blame: A Cross-Cultural Study of the Chicago Visitor Case 94; 5 Elin McCready: Linguistic Strategies Against Epistemic Injustice 114; 6 Cliff Goddard: Overcoming the Linguistic Challenges for Ethno-epistemology: NSM Perspectives 130; 7 Julianne Chung: Skeptical Arguments, Conceptual Metaphors, and Cross-Cultural Challenges 154; 8 Dominic Murphy: Delusions Across Cultures 184; 9 Søren Harnow Klausen: Challenges for an Anthropology of Knowledge 201; 10 Satoshi Nakagawa: How to Buy Knowledge in Ende—An Ethnoepistemology from Eastern Indonesia 216; 11 Thomas Grundmann: Conceptual Construction in Epistemology: Why the Content of Our Folk Terms Has Only Limited Significance 227; 12 Anand Vaidya and Purushottama Bilimoria: Analytical and Experimental Philosophy in the Reflection of Comparative Philosophy 248; List of Contributors 272; Index 273-281.

142. Moeller, Hans-Georg. 2018. "On Comparative and Post-Comparative Philosophy." In *Appreciating the Chinese Difference: Engaging Roger T. Ames on Methods, Issues, and Roles*, edited by Behuniak, Jim, 31-45. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"In sum, four general forms of comparative philosophy as de-barbarization developed between the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries at a time when Europe modernized and globalized itself: (1) an approach of incorporation of and improvement by Oriental philosophy à la Leibniz, (2) a "primitivist" inclusion of Chinese thought into the development of the "world spirit" à la Hegel, (3) an interpolation of European religions and philosophy into ancient Chinese texts à la Richard Wilhelm, and (4) a syncretic embrace of Chinese Philosophy as a major source for the foundation of post-Christian modern "spirituality." (p. 36)

143. Moore, Charles Alexander, ed. 1946. *Philosophy - East and West*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Contents: Preface VII-IX; I. William Ernest Hocking: Value of the Comparative Study of Philosophy 1; II. George P. Conger: An Outline of Indian Philosophy 12; III. Chan Wing-tsit: The Story of Chinese Philosophy 24; IV. Junjiro Takakusu: Buddhism as a Philosophy of "Thusness" 69; V. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki: An Interpretation of Zen-Experience 109; VI. Shunzo Sakamaki: Shinto: Japanese Ethnocentrism 130; VII. Chan Wing-tsit: The Spirit of Oriental Philosophy 137; VIII. Filmer S. C. Northrop,: The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy 168; IX. George P. Conger: Eastern and Western Metaphysics 235; X. Charles A. Moore: Comparative Philosophies of Life 248; Who's Who of Contributors 321; Index 323-334.

144. ———. 1951. "Some Problems of Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 1:67-70.

"At the second East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii during the summer of 1949, a great deal was accomplished in directing the attention of the philosophical world to the important area of East-West philosophy. Those who participated in the proceedings of the Conference were convinced that philosophy is now entering upon a new stage of its development, a stage that will be characterized by trans-cultural co-operation and world perspective. Although the Conference members attempted to come to some tentative conclusions in the three fields of methodology, metaphysics, and ethical theory, everyone realized the difficulties involved in formulating any concrete conclusions at all, however tentative. It was realized in the first place that Eastern philosophies cannot be simply grouped together as a homogeneous unit compared as such with Western philosophies similarly grouped together. It was realized, moreover, that no characterizations of either the Eastern or the Western philosophical tradition could possibly indicate more than general, and sometimes rather vague, tendencies. It was also realized that where definite conclusions could be agreed upon by Conference members such agreement would sometimes be gained only by partially ignoring important variations of interpretation." (p. 67)

145. ———. 1951. *Essays in East-West Philosophy. An Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

"The report of the Second East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii from June 20 to July 28, 1949."

146. ———. 1952. "Keys to Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 2:76-78.

"The problems raised in this issue by Mr. Rosan in his paper "A Key to Comparative Philosophy" are important ones.

For the sake of better understanding, however, a few comments on behalf of the Second East-West Philosophers' Conference are in order, especially since my discussion note in this journal(1) appears to have given Mr. Rosan an incorrect impression of the work and conclusions of that Conference." (p. 76)

(...)

"In conclusion, may I say that there are surely many keys to the study of comparative philosophy. No one key will open all the doors. The important problem is not that of finding a key of universal applicability. The crucial task is, rather, that of constructing and applying various keys in the progressive investigation of the multiplicity of problems which inevitably arise in the study of comparative philosophy." (p. 78)

(1) "Some Problems of Comparative Philosophy," I, No. 1 (April, 1951), 67-70.

147. ———, ed. 1962. *Philosophy and Culture: East and West. East-West Philosophy in Practical Perspective*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

East-West Philosophy in Practical Perspective. Proceedings of the conference, held at the University of Hawaii under its sponsorship during the summer of 1959.

"The title of this volume, *Philosophy and Culture—East and West*, reflects the purpose and the work of the conference which it reports, that is, the effort to achieve mutual understanding of the practical aspects of the lives of the peoples of Asia and the West by reference to their basic and underlying philosophies, in the sense that "culture is the manifestation of the human mind in human behavior." This Preface deals exclusively with the text of the volume and not with the subject-matter or with the conference of which this is the official Report. The background of this volume, the conference itself, and its predecessors are dealt with in the Introduction.

This volume contains the proceedings of the Third East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii during the summer of 1959. It contains all the formal papers, in the order in which they were presented at the conference. It is divided into six major Sections, following the agenda of the conference.

Some of the discussion which took place at the conference meetings is included as "Questions" and "Answers" at the end of some of the papers—in those cases where the authors wished to include such discussion.

In an Appendix are included the five Public Lectures presented to general audiences during the period of the conference by representatives of the major traditions considered at the conference. (The style of these lectures, and the editing, are less formal and academic than in the case of the technical papers.)" (Preface, p. V)

148. Mou, Bo, ed. 2001. *Two Roads to Wisdom? Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Traditions*. Chicago: Open Court.

Donald Davidson: Foreword IX; Acknowledgements XI; Note on Transcriptions XIII; Introduction XV;

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1. Nicholas Rescher: Philosophical Methodology 3; 2. Robert Cummings Neville: Methodology, Practices and Discipline in Chinese and Western Philosophy 27; 3. Adam Morton: Philosophy as Engineering 45; 4. Lik Kuen Toug: The Art of Appropriation: Towards a Field-Being Conception of Philosophy 57;

Part Two: Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Analysis (I): Methodological Perspectives

5: Chung-ying Chen: Onto-Hermeneutical Vision and Analytical Discourse: Interpretation and Reconstruction in Chinese Philosophy 87; 6. Shu-hsien Liu: Philosophical Analysis and Hermeneutic: Reflections on Methodology via an Examination of the Evolution of My Understanding of Chinese Philosophy 131; 7. David L. Hall: The Import of Analysis in Classical China - A Pragmatic Appraisal 153; 8. You-zheng Li: Chinese Philosophy and Semiotics 169;

Part Three: Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Analysis (II): Test Cases

9. Chad Hansen: Metaphysical and Moral Transcendence in Chinese Thought 197; 10. Kwong-loi Shun: Self and Self-Cultivation in Early Confucian Thought 229; 11. Yin-ming Fung: Three Dogmas of New Confucianism: A Perspective of Analytic Philosophy 245;

## Part Four: Methodological Issues in Comparative Philosophy

12. Robert E. Allinson: The Myth of Comparative Philosophy or the Comparative Philosophy *Malgré Lui* 269; 13. Ji-yuan Yu and Nicholas Bunin: Saving the Phenomenon: An Aristotelian Method in Comparative Philosophy 293; 14. Bryan Van Norden: Mencius and Augustine on Evil: A Test Case for Comparative Philosophy 313; 15. Bo Mou: An Analysis of the Structure of Philosophical Methodology - In View of Comparative Philosophy 337;

Contributors 365; Index 371.

149. ———. 2002. "Three Orientations and Four 'Sins' in Comparative Studies." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:42-46.

"When comparative projects are critically evaluated, there seem to be four sorts of complaint. The alleged 'sins' are these: (1) over-simplification; 2) over-use of external resources; (3) exaggerated distinction; and (4) blurring assimilation. They, or some of them, are sometimes taken for granted in two senses: first, it is thought that any simplifying the object of study or using external resources to characterize it are doomed to be excessive and thus deserve to be charged with negative 'over'-character; second, it is assumed that the four complaints may be made indiscriminately in evaluating any comparative project without regard to the orientation and methodological strategy of that study. A metaphilosophical examination of the four 'sins' will help to effectively identify the distinct character and objectives of a variety of orientations and their approaches." (p. 42)

150. ———, ed. 2003. *Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Notes on Transcription VIII; Contributors IX; Editor's Introduction XV-XXII;

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1 Antonio S. Cua: Emergence of the History of Chinese Philosophy 3;

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2 Chang-ying Cheng: Inquiring into the Primary Model: *Yi-Jing* and Chinese Ontological Hermeneutics 33; 3 Robert Elliott Allinson: Hegelian, *Yi-Jing*, and Buddhist Transformational Models for Comparative Philosophy 60; 4 Bo Mou: Becoming-Being Complementarity: An Account of the *Yin-Yang* Metaphysical Vision of the *Yi-Jing* 86;

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5 Bryan W. Van Norden: Virtue Ethics and Confucianism 99; 6 Robin R. Wang: The Principled Benevolence: A Synthesis of Kantian and Confucian Moral Judgment 122; 7 Ruiping Fan: Social Justice: Rawlsian or Confucian? 144; 8 You-zheng Li: Towards a Minimal Common Ground for Humanist Dialogue: A Comparative Analysis of Confucian Ethics and American Ethical Humanism 169;

9 Robert Cummings Neville: The Project of Boston Confucianism 183;

## Part Four Philosophical Daoism

10 Chad Hansen: The Metaphysics of Dao 205; 11 Qingjie (James) Wong: "It-self-so-ing" and "Other-ing" in Lao Zi's Concept of *Zi Ran* 225; 12 Bo Mou: Eternal Dao. Constant Name, and Language Engagement: On the Opening Message of the *Dao-De-Jing* 13 Chenyang Li: Zhuang Zi and Aristotle on What A Thing Is 263; 14 JeeLoo Liu:

The Daoist Conception of Truth: Lao Zi's Metaphysical Realism vs. Zhuang Zi's Internal Realism 278;

Part Five Logic-Related Concerns

15 Chuang Liu: *Ming-Jia* (the Logicians) and Zeno: A Comparative Study 297; 16 Yiu-ming Fung: The Thesis of Antilogic in Buddhism 307;

Index 323-332.

151. ———. 2010. "On Constructive-Engagement Strategy of Comparative Philosophy: A Journal Theme Introduction." *Comparative Philosophy* no. 1:1-32.

Abstract: "In this journal theme introduction, first, I explain how comparative philosophy as explored in the journal *Comparative Philosophy* is understood and how it is intrinsically related to the constructive engagement strategy. Second, to characterize more clearly and accurately some related methodological points of the constructive-engagement strategy, and also to explain how constructive engagement is possible, I introduce some needed conceptual and explanatory resources and a meta-methodological framework and endeavor to identify adequacy conditions for methodological guiding principles in comparative studies. Third, as a case analysis, I show how the constructive-engagement reflective practice bears on recent studies of Chinese and comparative Chinese-Western philosophy, especially in the past decade, for two purposes: to illustrate the foregoing theoretic characterization of the constructive engagement strategy, and to identify and explain some constructive morals that might have general significance for comparative studies."

152. ———. 2016. "How Constructive Engagement in Doing Philosophy Comparatively Is Possible." *Synthesis Philosophica* no. 62:265-277.

Abstract: "In this article I intend, on the basis of some previous relevant works on the issue, to further examine a range of conditions for maintaining adequate methodological guiding principles concerning how to look at the relation between distinct methodological perspectives in comparative-engagement exploration in philosophy. The purpose of this paper is to explore how, in the global context, distinct approaches in philosophy can be engaged in order to constructively talk to each other and make a joint contribution to the development of philosophy and society."

153. Nakamura, Hajime. 1964. *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan*. Honolulu: East-West Center Press.

Revised English translation edited by Philip P. Wiener (Original Japanese edition 1960).

"If we are to hazard any conclusions about Eastern peoples as a whole, it must be as a tentative hypothesis in a comparative study of the data. Generalized conclusions drawn before such individual preparatory studies have been made will perforce be hasty and dogmatic. Thus, in order to deal with the ways of thinking of Eastern peoples, it is first necessary to examine the ways of thinking of each of the peoples individually. However, such a study of all the peoples of the East is, from a practical point of view, impossible at this time. | intend to concentrate on India, China, Tibet, and Japan. My reason is that among these four peoples alone did there exist—however imperfectly—a study of traditional Buddhist logic, which came first from India to the other three areas, and then developed independently in each.

I believe that the various other peoples of the East have nearly the same ways of thinking as one or another of these four. Specifically, one may say that Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, and western Indo-China (Cambodia and Laos) are akin to India. Central Asia and Mongolia are akin to pre-Communist Tibet. Manchuria, Korea, and eastern Indo-China (Vietnam) are akin to China. T'hus, an examination of the ways of thinking of these four

is, in effect, a study of the most influential peoples of the East. It is only after such a study, if at all, that a generalized view of the ways of thinking of Eastern peoples can emerge." (p. 4)

154. ———. 1975. *Parallel Developments: A Comparative History of Ideas*. New York: Harper & Row.

Second edition with the title: *A Comparative History of Ideas*, New Delhi: Kegan Paul International, 1986.

155. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. 1972. "Conditions for Meaningful Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 22:53-61.

"Finally, a comparative study in depth of Eastern doctrines and Western schools can help achieve an understanding between East and West based on immutable truths, whose attainment is made possible by the spiritual experience that is accessible to qualified men, Eastern or Western. It is only intellectual intuition and the spiritual experience, of which a metaphysical doctrine is in a sense the fruit, that can make possible the attainment of that Unity which in its transcendence comprehends both the East and the West. Today many men who have been exposed to the modern world, in a sense, carry both the Orient and the Occident as two poles and tendencies within themselves. A comparative study in depth can make possible, through the removal of those current errors which together comprise the modern world, the attainment of that "light that is neither of the East nor of the West,"(15) wherein alone the East and the West can be united. To seek this noble end, which would mean the rediscovery of the immutable nature of man generally forgotten in the modern world and which is the only way possible to correct the optical illusions to which the modern world is victim, must be the purpose of all serious comparative studies of Eastern and Western doctrines and philosophies. It is a goal whose achievement the truly contemplative and intellectual elite are urgently summoned to by the very situation of man in the contemporary world. (pp. 60-61)

(15) This is in reference to the light verse (*ayat al-nur*) in the *Qur'an* XXIV.35."

156. Needham, Joseph. 1969. *Within the Four Seas. The Dialogue of East and West*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

"Reprinted here are some of the most significant of his essays, lectures and broadcasts on these subjects, together with some more personal thoughts stimulated by his own travels and experiences in China, including a number of poems that he has on occasion felt moved to write there."

"For three thousand years a dialogue has been going on between the two ends of the Old World. Greatly have they influenced each other, and very different are the cultures they have produced. We have now good reason to think that the problems of the world will never be solved so long as they are considered only from a European point of view. It is necessary to see Europe from the outside, to see European history, and European failure no less than European achievement, through the eyes of that larger part of humanity, the peoples of Asia (and indeed also of Africa)." (*The Dialogue of East and West*, p. 11)

157. Nelson, Eric S. 2017. *Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought*. New York: Bloomsbury.

"The chapters of this book consist of a series of philosophically oriented historical case studies, focusing primarily on the intersection between Chinese and German philosophy. They explore instances of the encounter, dialogue, and exchange—and lack and failure thereof—between "Eastern" Chinese and "Western" German thinkers and discourses. "Eastern" and "Western," as Gihwa noted, are only relative situational concepts. The history of this already existing and ongoing communicative interaction and cultural

exchange compels us to consider, more seriously than hitherto, whether a more nuanced and historically appropriate conception of philosophy can emerge through critically engaging and reflecting on the modern encounter between Western and non-Western philosophy, and articulating its intercultural and intertextual dynamics; if it proves impossible to transgress these borders, the old reductive myths of the exclusivity, exceptionality, and isolation of Western philosophy and civilization will continue to hold sway." (Introduction, p. 2)

158. ————. 2020. "Intercultural Philosophy and Intercultural Hermeneutics: A Response to Defoort, Wenning, and Marchal." *Philosophy East and West* no. 70:1-13.

"Carine Defoort, Mario Wenning, and Kai Marchal offer three ways of engaging with *Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought* and the philosophical, hermeneutical, and historical issues it attempted to articulate and address. This work is historical with a contemporary philosophical intent: to reexamine a tumultuous contested epoch of philosophy's past in order to reconsider its existing limitations and alternative possibilities. One dimension of this book is the investigation of constellations and entanglements of historical forces and concepts for the sake of articulating critical models and alternatives for the present. In the book, I contested the modern self-image of philosophy as exclusively and intrinsically Occidental by genealogically tracing how philosophy is already intercultural through a series of case studies focusing primarily on early twentieth-century German philosophy in its broader historical context." (p. 1, notes omitted)

159. Netton, Ian Richard. 2006. *Islam, Christianity and Tradition: A Comparative Exploration*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

"This is not an Introduction to Islam, nor is it a textbook. There are many excellent introductions and textbooks in the marketplace already.

(...)

This book is a research monograph which aims to do much more than that. It operates generally within the sphere of comparative religion and is, specifically, a comparative exploration of the role of tradition/Tradition within two distinct faiths, Islam and Christianity. Specific leitmotifs include the roles of authority, fundamentalism, the use of reason, *ijtihad*, and original comparisons between Islamic Salafism and Christian Lefebvrism. 'Salafism' refers to that strain in Islam which looks backwards to the thought, practices and traditions of the Salaf (pious ancestors); 'Lefebvrism' is a reference to the traditionalist thought and practices of the schismatic Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre (1905–91) who rejected much of the teaching of the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) and what he perceived as that Council's overthrow of tradition/Tradition. It is recognised in my text that the word 'tradition/Tradition' in both Islam and Christianity has a variety of senses and definitions." (p. VII)

160. Neville, Robert Cummings. 2001. "Two Forms of Comparative Philosophy." *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 1:1-13.

"Two fundamental approaches to comparison now dominate the field. For convenience, and with the proviso that the names can be defined through the discussion below as terms of art, they can be called the objectivist and normative approaches, respectively. The objectivist approach treats the positions to be compared as finished objects, takes up a perspective of distance upon them, and measures its comparative judgments in empirical ways over against the evidence of the positions. The normative approach centers first on addressing contemporary philosophical problems and looks to the historical positions as resources for contemporary thinking, bringing them into comparative perspective against the contemporary background. The normative approach thus involves reconstructing the traditions, as any living tradition does in growing to

meet new philosophical situations, and does so by bringing them into comparative interaction. Just as a contemporary European philosopher can learn from both Plato and Aristotle in constructing a response to an issue neither Plato nor Aristotle imagined, so a contemporary philosopher in a global public can learn all the world's traditions to contribute to a philosophy for our time." (p. 2)

161. ———. 2002. "Beyond Comparative to Integrative Philosophy." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:20-23.

"The thesis of this essay is that vital and creative philosophy today needs to operate within a public that integrates reflections from as many of the world's philosophic traditions as possible. To support this thesis I shall first make some remarks about an appropriate philosophic public for vital philosophy. Then I shall comment on some of the kinds of comparative philosophy that are helpful for the integration of the world's philosophic traditions into a public. Finally, I shall suggest a two-tiered agenda for integrative philosophy." (p. 20)

162. ———. 2017. "Response to Brian Bruya's "Ethnocentrism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary Philosophy"." *Philosophy East and West* no. 67:1019-1021.

"So I would extend Professor Bruya's thesis in this way. He says that we should bring currently marginalized cultural approaches to philosophy into the center of the profession, both in our teaching and in our professional organizations. Right. Nevertheless, they might still be little balkanized in-groups within departments, curricula, and professional structures. This is not enough. I say that they need to be brought into conversation with one another, inventing new ways of carrying on that conversation.

The audience or public for our philosophical work should not be limited to those of our ethnocentric in-group. It should include considered address to anyone who might have an interest in the outcome of our work. If our work is not interesting to many different approaches to philosophy, once they get what it is about, chances are it is not interesting to any except those in our professional in-group — and there go the undergraduates, and with them go the jobs. To put the point less defensively, should we not make our work vulnerable to examination and correction by anyone from any tradition who might have something to contribute? Of course, none of us can do all that should be done in this regard. But we can build a global philosophical conversation into which each of us can enter and learn. To do so is to build the human beyond the evolutionary success, but humane limitations, of ethnocentrism." (pp. 1020-1021)

163. ———. 2022. "Reflections on Methods of Comparative Philosophy." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 17-30. New York: Bloomsbury.

Chapter summary: "Robert Neville asserts that "the critical problem for comparative philosophy is Western bias" (18). While bias is a problem more generally for comparison, Western bias is a particular problem because of the current predominance of Western philosophical traditions across the globe-including in many historically non-Western regions. Neville reviews and assesses several approaches to addressing bias, ultimately arguing in favor of what he calls "two-faced comparison," which attends to the development and ongoing correction of both comparisons and the categories that inform them. Comparative philosophy, he argues, has generally neglected the latter process, refusing to indicate explicitly the respects in which a comparison is made and rendering itself unable to assess whether the respect of comparison is appropriate to what is compared. As a result, it remains vulnerable to charges of excessive bias. However, if it attends adequately to the development and correction of those categories as well as how everything that is interpreted in terms of that category relates to each other, then it

can move toward what he calls "objective comparison," the truth-value of which can be assessed by the broader academic community."

164. Ng, On-cho, ed. 2008. *The Imperative of Understanding: Chinese Philosophy, Comparative Philosophy, and Onto-Hermeneutics—A Tribute Volume Dedicated to Professor Chung-ying Cheng*. New York: Global Scholarly Publications.

Contents: On-cho Ng: Preface;

The imperatives of understanding and reading

Chung-ying Cheng: On entering the 21st century: my philosophical vision and my philosophical practice; Richard E. Palmer: Gadamer's late turn: from heideggerian ontology to an anthropology-based philosophical hermeneutics; Vincent Shen; Metaphors, narratives, and existence; Lauren Pfister: The tenets and morals of onto-hermeneutics. A philosophical-biographical profile of Chung-ying Cheng; Jesse Flemming: The onto-hermeneutics of Guan; Robert Cummings Neville: Cheng chung-Ying's constructive philosophy; Joseph Grange: A passion for unity: the philosophy of Chung-ying Cheng; Jay Goulding: Cheng chung-Ying's onto-cosmology: Chinese philosophy and hermeneutic phenomenology; Galia Patt-Shamir: From Li to Li : a pragmatist implication of Cheng chung-Ying's onto-hermeneutics;

The dialectics of interpretations and exegeses;

Nicholas Bunnin: Situating Xunzi; Yong Huang: The Cheng Brother's onto-theological articulation of Confucian values; John Berthrong: Re-investigating the way; Kwong-loi Shun: Wholeness in Confucian thought : Zhu Xi on Cheng, Zhong, Xin, and Jing; Richard J. Smith: Divination in late imperial China : new light on some old problems; John Allen Tucker: Confucianism and human rights in Meiji Japan.

165. Nisbett, Richard E. 2003. *The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently . . . and Why*. London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing.

"I began a series of comparative studies, working with students at the University of Michigan and eventually with colleagues at Beijing University, Kyoto University, Seoul National University, and the Chinese Institute of Psychology. The research shows that there are indeed dramatic differences in the nature of Asian and European thought processes. The evidence lends support to the claims of nonpsychologist scholars and extends those claims to many surprising new mental phenomena.

In addition, surveys and observational research document differences in social practices that dovetail with the differences in habits of thought. The new research has provided us, as prior evidence could not, with enough information so that we can build a theory about the nature of these differences, including how they might have come about, what their implications are for perceiving and reasoning in everyday life, and how they affect relations between people from different cultures." (Introduction, p. XVIII)

166. Note, Nicole, Fernet-Betancout, Raúl, Estermann, Josef, and Aerts, Diederik, eds. 2009. *Worldviews and Cultures: Philosophical Reflections from an Intercultural Perspective*. Berlin: Springer.

Contents: Nicole Note, Raúl Fernet-Betancourt, Josef Estermann, and Diederik Aerts: Worldview and Cultures: Philosophical Reflections from an Intercultural Perspective. An Introduction 1; Jameleddine Ben Abdeljelil: Ways of the Intellect: Forms of Discourse and Rationalization Processes in the Arabic-Islamic Context 11; Ulrich Libbrecht: Comparative Philosophy: A Methodological Approach 31; Bo Mou: A Methodological Framework for Cross-Tradition Understanding and Constructive Engagement 69; Koen de Munter and Nicole Note: Cosmopraxis and Contextualising Among the Contemporary Aymara 87; Helen Lauer: A Worldly View of Worldview Metaphysics

103; Josef Estermann: Andean Philosophy as a Questioning Alterity: An Intercultural Criticism of Western Andro- and Ethnocentrism 129; Raúl Fornet-Betancourt: Intercultural Philosophy from a Latin American Perspective 149; Ricardo Salas: Hermeneutic Philosophy and Human Experience: An Intercultural Perspective of Worldviews and Life World in the Mapuche Culture 163; Dina V. Picotti C.: Towards an Intercultural Construction of Rationality 181; Rik Pinxten: Universalism and Relativism of Knowledge Dissipate. The Intercultural Perspective 181; Name Index 201; Subject Index 205-211.

167. Nylan, Michael, and Verhoeven, Martin. 2016. "Does Comparative Philosophy have a Fusion Future? Responses

Fusion, Comparative, "Constructive Engagement Comparative," Or What? Third Thoughts on Levine's Critique of Siderits." *Journal of World Philosophies* no. 1:119-127.

Invited responses to Michael Levine's discussion paper 'Does Comparative Philosophy Have a Fusion Future?' *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies*, 4 (2016): 208-37.

1. Michael Nylan, On Comparative, Constructivist, Fusion, and Diagnostic Philosophy;
2. Martin Verhoeven, Does Philosophy Have a Buddhist Future?

Abstract: "We have been invited to contribute a short assessment of Levine's response to Siderits' position in the emerging debate between "fusion philosophy" and "comparative philosophy." Perhaps a brief word is in order regarding our backgrounds: Michael Nylan is a student of early China, with strong interdisciplinary training and interests, who has attempted work in both philosophy and translation. Martin Verhoeven is a historian by training, a translator by avocation, and a Buddhist practitioner. Both of us have committed ourselves for decades to past traditions that can only be accessed through classical Chinese language, and that surely colors our views. At the same time, those views are not identical but stereophonic."

168. Nzegwu, Nkiru. 2016. "Symposium: How (If at All) is Gender Relevant to Comparative Philosophy?" *Journal of World Philosophies* no. 1:75-118.

Abstract: "The symposium, "How (if at all) is gender relevant to comparative philosophy," focuses on relevance of gender as an analytic and critical tool in comparative philosophical understanding and debate. Nkiru Nzegwu argues that gender as conceived by contemporary Euro-American feminism did not exist in pre-colonial Yorùbá as well as many Native American societies, and that therefore employing gender as a conceptual category in understanding the philosophies of pre-colonial Yorùbá and other non-gendered societies constitutes a profound mistake. What's more, doing so amounts to a totalizing Euro-American colonial imposition that does violence to nongendered societies that reject gender as an ontological category. Hence, gender is ill-suited as a universal comparative philosophical tool. Nzegwu's three co-symposiasts, Mary I. Bockover, Maitrayee Chaudhuri, and María Luisa Femenías enrich and complicate this question by bringing to bear both conceptual, ethical and empirical considerations drawn from the United States, India, and Latin America respectively."

169. Olberding, Amy. 2009. "Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies." *APA Newsletters* no. 9:3.

"In February of this year, the Committee on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies hosted a panel at the APA's Central Division meeting in Chicago. The focus of the panel concerned the intersections of Asian philosophies and feminism. While the essays and commentary delivered for the panel reflected the specific academic research foci of our participants, there are of course many ways to understand how Asian philosophies and feminism intersect, or fail to intersect. Consequently, this section of the *Newsletter* aspires to expand on the discussions of our panel, as well as to explore

additional territory. For it, some of our panel participants and several other scholars working in Asian philosophy reflect on a variety of related subjects. These include, for example, the search for affinities between feminist concerns and the concerns found in Asian materials; the state of the field of Asian philosophy as it pertains to incorporating feminist consciousness; the personal experiences of feminist scholars who seek to enliven their work with both historical sensitivity and feminist commitments; and the capacity of feminist readings of Asian philosophies to foster scholarly development and political progress. As the work presented here illustrates, there are many ways to frame and understand the import of feminism for Asian philosophies."

170. Oldmeadow, Harry. 2007. "The Comparative Study of Eastern and Western Metaphysics: A Perennialist Perspective." *Sophia* no. 46:49-64.

Abstract: "The comparative study of Eastern and Western philosophy has been hindered and/or distorted by Eurocentric assumptions about "philosophy", especially the overvaluation of rationality as an instrument of knowledge. The widespread discounting of Eastern thought derives, in large measure, from the modern Western failure to understand the nature of the traditional metaphysics of both the Occident and the East. This failure can be remedied by recourse to the work of a group of "traditionalist" or "perennialist" thinkers who expose the limitations of many approaches to the comparative study of philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular."

171. OuYang, Min. 2012. "There is No Need for *Zhongguo Zhexue* to be Philosophy." *Asian Philosophy* no. 22:199-223.

Abstract: "In this paper, I shall argue that philosophy proper is a Western cultural practice and cannot refer to traditional Chinese thinking unless in an analogical or metaphorical sense. Likewise, the Chinese idiom 'Zhongguo zhexue' has evolved its independent cultural meaning and has no need to be considered as philosophy in the Western academic sense. For the purpose of elucidating the culturally autonomous status of *Zhongguo zhexue*, as well as the possible counterparts of Western philosophy in other cultures, I contend that Davidsonian anomalous monism may provide a proper explanatory framework for the intercultural relationships between different 'sophias' from various traditions. As for the equivocal English term 'Chinese philosophy', I suggest replacing it with a more precise new word: 'sinosophy'."

172. Ouyang, Xiao. 2018. "Rethinking Comparative Philosophical Methodology: In Response to Weber's Criticism." *Philosophy East and West* no. 68:242-256.

"Ralph Weber's (2013, pp. 593–602) illuminating study of the recent works on "(meta-)methodology in comparative philosophy" shows that this trend has persisted well into contemporary studies and enhances its influence in the community —"all [authors] seem to rely to some degree on the presumption that comparative philosophy is best understood as 'intercultural philosophy'."(4) Weber argues, however, that this "contemporary dominance of cultures in comparative philosophy," namely the "rely[ing] on cultures as [a] philosophically relevant pre-comparative tertium," has been an "unwarranted assumption" and has caused problems concerning "reification" and "the effect of inclusionary exclusion."(5) He therefore calls for a "(self-)critical engagement with comparative philosophy" with the help of his "analytical tool" of comparison, which consists of five variables that are "distinguished in standard conceptualizations," namely "the comparer, the comparata, the pre-comparative tertium, the tertium comparationis, the result of the comparison."(6)" (p. 244)

(4) Weber's use of the term "intercultural" and Moore's preference "transcultural" are not essentially different. Both refer to interaction among multiple cultures.

Another synonym is "cross-culture." Therefore, in my argument I am using the terms interchangeably.

(5) It can be understood as a kind of “two-edged sword.” Weber (2013, p. 601) thinks that “the same factors that allow scholars of these cultures to claim a niche for themselves within philosophy can be and are used by others to (dis)qualify that area of scholarship as being about something other than philosophy proper.”

(6) Weber (2014, p. 162) defines the “tertium comparationis as the respect in which determined comparata are compared” and the “‘pre-comparative’ tertium” as “which is at work in the setting up of the comparison.”

## References

Weber, Ralph. 2013. “How to Compare?” — On the Methodological State of Comparative Philosophy.” *Philosophy Compass* 8, no. 7 : 593 — 603.

———. 2014. “Comparative Philosophy and the Tertium: Comparing What with What, and in What Respect?” *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* 12, no. 2 : 151–171.

173. ———. 2018. "Rejoinder to Ralph Weber." *Philosophy East and West* no. 68:261-263.

"Ralph Weber's reply to my comment, as we have come to expect from his writing, is both well articulated and instructive. His clarification has helped me to further grasp the consideration that underpins his methodological criticism. I am also encouraged to find agreement on the worth of a historical study of comparative philosophy as an established sub-discipline. In addition, Weber's attitude toward “disagreement” is thought-provoking. However, I would like to suggest that disagreement is positive and meaningful if and only if (1) it is not based on misunderstanding, and moreover if (2) disagreement itself should not be regarded as the purpose. The ideal intellectual exchange should be able to encompass both (1) the aim and endeavor to achieve a potential agreement, and (2) the possibility for an ongoing dialogue and disputation.

In this spirit, I will now respond to some points raised by Weber in his reply to my comment." (p. 261)

174. Pang-White, Ann A. 2009. "Chinese Philosophy and Woman: Is Reconciliation Possible?" *APA Newsletters* no. 9:3-4.

"The choice of transcending the facticity of masculine discourse shouldn't be limited to the Western canon but open to all, including Asian philosophy. One can dwell on the fact that most of what Confucius, Mencius, or Xunzi says has nothing to do with women's liberation, or well-being per se, or one can choose to suspend that limitation and extract the relevance of the ideas of *ren*, reciprocity, and relationality to a more wholesome vision of human society where gender oppression is a historical past, not an ongoing struggle. Much of the prejudice against the incorporation of, or just a sheer neglect of, the relevance of Asian philosophy to feminism in the West has been centered on the explicit sexist references found in the tradition. But this facticity of masculine discourse is common to all traditions, be they East, West, North, or South, so my question would be this: Why selectively exclude non-Western canons in feminist discourse?" (p. 4)

175. Panikkar, Raimundo. 1988. "What Is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?" In *Interpreting Across Boundaries. New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, edited by Larson, Gerald James and Deutsch, Eliot, 116-136. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

"Comparative studies are still fashionable today because they belong to the thrust toward universalization characteristic of western culture. The West not being able any longer to dominate other peoples politically, it tries to maintain—most of the time unconsciously—a certain control by striving toward a global picture of the world by means of comparative studies.

Yet, this very thrust toward homogenization and "global thinking" may boomerang into decentralization and pluralism once the wisdom of other cultures becomes better known.

Paradoxically enough, comparative philosophy, which has an inbuilt trend to overcome the plurality of cosmo-visions, may end by legitimizing mutually irreconcilable systems and becoming the stronghold of pluralism.

I shall offer a definition of comparative philosophy and argue that it is different from all other comparative studies by virtue of the subject matter under comparison. And this uniqueness finds its paradoxical expression in my thesis that, strictly speaking, comparative philosophy is an impossible independent discipline, which nevertheless thrives in the very recognition of its impossibility.(1)" (p. 116)

(1) This is the thesis of my paper "Aporias in the Comparative Philosophy of Religion," *Man and World* 3-4 (1980): 357-383.

176. Quintern, Detlev. 2017. "Beyond Cross-Cultural Philosophy: Towards a New Enlightenment." *Philosophical Investigations (University of Tabriz-Iran)* no. 11:191-204.

Abstract: "The acculturation of humanities from the late 1980ies onwards led not only to imagined different worlds (e.g. West / Islam), postmodernity overshadowed also common grounds of world's philosophies. Christianity and Islam share far more than what might separate them, and we find Islam in „the West “ as Christianity „in the East“. The Logos of Life Philosophy as developed by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (1923-2014) strives towards deciphering the deep layers of philosophy and its common grounds. Tracing back to Gnostic, Platonic (neo-platonic) and Islamic shaped philosophies - Ikhwan as-Safa will serve as an example - the Logos of Life / Aql Al-Kulli (universal reason) will be historicized in the following while introducing approaches towards a New Enlightenment (A.-T. Tymieniecka) as an alternative to the current crisis in meta-sciences."

177. Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, and Raju, Poolla Tirupati, eds. 1960. *Concept of Man: A Study in Comparative Philosophy*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Contents: P. T. Raju: Prologue to the second edition 9; S. Radhakrishnan: Prefatory remarks 23; P. T. Raju; Introduction 29; I. John Wild: The Concept of Man in Greek Thought 56; II. A.J. Heschel: The Concept of Man in Jewish Thought 122; III. W. T. Chan: The Concept of Man in Chinese Thought 172; IV. P. T. Raju: The Concept of Man in Indian Thought 220; V. P. T. Raju: Comparisons and Reflections 320; VI. Ernst Benz: The Concept of Man in Christian Thought 394; VII. Ibrahim Madhour: The Concept of Man in Islamic Thought 452; VIII. M. B. Milin: The Concept of Man in Marxist Thought 476; IX. P. R. Raju; Epilogue 536; Index 540-546,

178. Raju, Poolla Tirupati. 1947. "The Western and the Indian Philosophical Traditions." *Philosophical Review* no. 56:127-155.

"Without entering further into the principles of comparative philosophy, we may adopt, as a modus operandi for the comparison of the two traditions, the comparisons of their origins, of their developments, and of their endings. Their origins are of the past and can no longer change.

The endings, so far as we are concerned, are what they are in the present. In the future, the two traditions may blend ; and the future historian of philosophy may trace two origins for the philosophy of his time, just as European culture of the present traces its birth to both Greece and Rome. Or possibly the two traditions may continue without regard for each other, which is certainly not to be desired. And as the endings for us are what they are now, the modes of their respective developments are also of the past. A

careful understanding of the two traditions in these three aspects should enable us to determine the individuality of each with respect to the other." (pp. 128-129)

179. ———. 1955. "Idealisms: Eastern and Western." *Philosophy East and West* no. 5:211-234.

"Since World War II, humanity has become world-conscious. People have come to realize that every part of the world is now more closely knit with every other part than before. Events which previously would have been considered to be only of national importance are now of international importance. Even countries which are self-sufficient in every respect no longer think they can cut themselves off from the rest of the world. Great and rich nations are worried about the poverty of small nations. Economically and politically, the parts of the world have come closer and closer. But should they not also come close psychologically and reflectively? Or should we conclude that we are coming dangerously closer? Dangerously or helpfully, we are coming closer, and we have to spread the feeling of common humanity. We want mutual understanding of cultures; but cultures attain reflectiveness in their philosophies. So mutual understanding of cultures will be mere dilettantism without mutual understanding of philosophies. And mutual understanding of philosophies is not possible unless it is accepted that, essentially and in truth, man and his reason are the same everywhere. Hence the need for comparative philosophy, which will naturally lead to philosophies with broader outlook. Our sense of what is important will become truer." (p. 212)

180. ———. 1957. "Being, Existence, Reality, and Truth." *Philosophy East and West* no. 17:291-315.

"For philosophy the concepts of Being, Existence, Reality and Truth are very important, if not central; but no other concepts are more vague than they, and no other terms are more loosely used than theirs. For a student of comparative philosophy, the difficulty becomes all the greater in understanding them, because each is used in different senses by different philosophers and sometimes by the same philosopher in different places. Again, in some languages separate words are not found to mean the different concepts. Further, as will be shown in this paper, some of these words do not naturally express the meanings they are sought to express, and our understanding becomes vague and confused. Now that English is one of the languages for the intercommunication of philosophies and cultures, it is important to find out not only the distinct meanings of these words but also how English expresses these meanings clearly and naturally. And these words and concepts are of primary importance for philosophy in general and for comparative philosophy in particular, the study of which is being taken up seriously. Much confusion will be prevented if the meanings they can naturally express are delimited." (p. 291)

181. ———. 1962. *Introduction to Comparative Philosophy*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Reprint: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1977.

Contents: Preface V; General Introduction 3; 1. Western Philosophy and the Struggle for the Liberation of the Outward 13; 2. Chinese Philosophy and Human Mindfulness 93, 3. Indian Philosophy and Explication of Inwardness 169; 4. Comparisons and Reflections 249; Appendixes 337; Chronological Table 339; Glossary of Indian and Chinese Terms 352; Index 357.

182. ———. 1963. "Comparative Philosophy and Spiritual Values: East and West." *Philosophy East and West* no. 13:211-225.

"The tendency is strong to identify spiritual values with what we call intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic values, or Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.

But, when the reality of spirit is rejected, these values must be considered as relevant only to the physical body or the biological principle. It is not realized that by denying the reality of spirit we destroy the very foundation of these values. For whom are these values meant and on what are they based? Our physico-chemical and biological nature is what it is, and there is no question of its becoming something different from what it is: it does not strive for the realization of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. The originator of these values has, then, to be conceded to be spirit. But how are we to identify and locate it?" (p. 212)

183. ———. 1970. *Lectures in Comparative Philosophy*. Poona: University of Poona.

"For the meaning of " comparative philosophy " one should not go merely to its etymology and philology. Etymologically, the term may mean " any philosophical work that compares " or " any philosophy that is developed by comparing any other philosophies. " In either case, the philosophies compared may be any two philosophies of the same tradition or even of the same period of that tradition, as for instance the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. But such work is not called comparative philosophy, although it is comparison of two philosophies. Without restricting and defining the meaning of the term, we lose its true significance and importance.

Again, comparative philosophy is not a system of philosophy, just as comparative religion is not any established religion. But comparative philosophy may and ought to lead to a more comprehensive and adequate system of philosophy, just as comparative religion may and ought to produce a religious genius who can start a new and comprehensive and adequate religious outlook that meets the needs of modern man Comparative philosophy is a philosophical discipline and ought to be recognized as the most important philosophical activity of the present, in which the East and the West are both violently and non-violently merging with each other." (pp. 1-2)

184. Ramose, Mogobe B. 2015. "On the contested meaning of 'philosophy'." *South African Journal of Philosophy* no. 34:551-558.

Abstract: "The thesis to be defended in this essay is that the meaning, and by implication the use, of philosophy continues to be contested. I will focus primarily on philosophy in South Africa in order to elucidate this thesis. In doing so, I will argue that the future of philosophy in South Africa lies precisely in the willingness to contest its meaning and use. Such a contestation must be in the form of a dialogue predicated on the principle of the equality of all human beings and the openness to learn from one another without precluding the possibility of change in oneself and the existential conditions that prevail. My starting point is that the present is the child of the past and the present in turn is the parent of the future. I will therefore look back with the view to arriving at the present that is the field of contestation."

185. Raphals, Lisa. 1992. *Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Foreword by Gregory Nagy.

186. ———. 1994. "Skeptical Strategies in the "Zhuangzi" and "Theaetetus"." *Philosophy East and West* no. 44:501-526.

"Both the *Qi wu lun*[\*] and *Theaetetus* engage in extended discussions of the nature of knowing, language, explanation, perception, and perceptual judgment. Paul Woodruff asks a question about Plato that can also be applied to *Zhuangzi*: "Which came first, the sceptic or the epistemologist?" The epistemologist asks what knowledge is and how it can be acquired; the skeptic tries to detach her from that project. *Zhuangzi*, like Plato, may be doing something different from either of these, though it smacks of both.<sup>6</sup> The *Qi wu lun* is the major consideration of epistemology in Warring States writings; the *Theaetetus* is the only Platonic dialogue devoted to a discussion of episteme, knowing.

Yet we may observe that *Zhuangzi* never offers his own theory of knowing, and Socrates never reaches a definition of *episteme*. In this essay I compare several ostensibly skeptical elements in the *Qi wu lun* chapter of the *Zhuangzi* and the *Theaetetus* of Plato. I argue that the *Zhuangzi* and the *Theaetetus* use remarkably similar skeptical methods to explore epistemological problems in ways that are unique within their respective traditions.

My purpose in making this case is twofold. One, I want to show that methods of argument in China and Greece may have more in common than we may be predisposed to suppose. Two, the comparison allows us to reexamine our own understanding of what skepticism is and does." (pp. 501-502)

[\*] The second chaptet of *Zhuangzi*.

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Burnyeat, M. F., 1990. *The Theaetetus of Plato with a Translation of Plato's Theaetetus by M. J. Levett. revised by Myles Burnyeat*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Graham, Angus C. trans. 1986. *Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981. Reprint, Unwin Paperbacks.

187. ———. 2002. "Gender and Virtue in Greece and China." *Journal of Chinese philosophy* no. 29:415-436.

"This article concerns a particular aspect of gendered virtue, namely, the claim that women "think differently than men"—more specifically, the claim that men and women differ in intellectual and ethical capacities, including capacities for moral reasoning and political and ethical judgment. Claims of this kind are legion. They are the property of no one culture or tradition, and have been used—across cultures—to deny political and civil rights to women by the imposition of an epistemological and ethical double standard.

(...)

Even feminists engage in this debate: some hold that gender predisposes women toward certain virtues, and men toward certain vices; others attack that position with equal vehemence.

After a brief consideration of metaphorical and rhetorical uses of gender, I present two sets of gendered virtue controversies. The Greek arguments begin in Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, continue in Aristotle's *Politics*, and resume in the European Enlightenment in the works of Rousseau and his critics. The Chinese arguments begin with the Analects of Confucius, reappear in Han dynastic histories, and continue in contemporary debates about Confucianism, feminism, and the status of women in contemporary Asian societies. These comparative controversies show that arguments about gendered virtue and debates about the relative ability of women and men to make intellectual and ethical judgments are not the property of any one "tradition," Asian or Western, ancient or modern. In the final part of the article, I use these debates to consider some contemporary ramifications of the "Asian values" debate, including claims that Confucianism is "feminist," or "more" or "differently" benign or feminist than Western philosophy." (pp. 415-416, notes omitted)

188. Raud, Rein. 2006. "Philosophies versus Philosophy: In Defense of a Flexible Definition." *Philosophy East and West* no. 56:618-625.

"It is strange that no one has taken up Carine Defoort's clearly formulated and timely argument about the intercultural tensions in interpreting what philosophy is, although the issue deserves at least a roundtable, if not an international conference.(1)

I doubt that this is because there is a general consensus that the matter is now settled, and I would therefore like to develop the argument a bit further and offer a few additional factors to consider. It is also obvious that the problem is not limited to the subject of Chinese philosophy alone: all traditions of thought from all over the world, but most notably the Indian, Islamic, and Japanese heritages, are affected by the positions we adopt. As in most debates about the commensurability of cultural traditions, we can find differences when we look for them, and similarities if these are what we would like to see, so the “conflict of sensitivities”(2) is also a matter of attitudes.

My own position is that regardless of what we prefer to call the practice of deeper thought (and ‘philosophy’ is a very good name), it would be extremely useful for all of its participants, whatever their origin and upbringing, to find a common denominator for them to be able to exchange ideas and mutually enrich each other on its basis. In what follows I shall try to sketch a perspective from which this could, in my opinion, be theoretically grounded." (p. 618)

(1) Carine Defoort, “Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate,” *Philosophy East and West* 51 (3) (July 2001): 393–413.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 406.

189. Reding, Jean-Paul. 2004. *Comparative Essays in Early Greek and Chinese Rational Thinking*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"Comparing ancient Chinese to ancient Greek philosophical thinking is certainly a fascinating enterprise. But it is also a questionable one. What is the philosophical justification for such an undertaking? And why should we compare ancient Chinese to ancient Greek thought, rather than to Indian, Arabic or African ways of thinking? We might ask, further, if we have at our disposal a comparative method adaptable to a project of this scope.

Let me begin by trying to answer the last question first. The comparative method is firmly established in the natural sciences, where we have a number of comparative disciplines, such as comparative zoology and comparative anatomy. Historical linguistics, comparative law, religious studies and comparative mythology also deserve to be mentioned in this context. Comparative philosophy, however, is rather ill famed, and has never acquired the status of a unified and independent philosophical discipline. Even the very notion of comparative philosophy as a discipline distinct from pure philosophy is rejected sometimes.

Comparative philosophy is also seen very often as nothing more than a broader approach to the study of the history of philosophy, by including Indian, Chinese and African philosophies as appendices to standard histories of Western philosophy. The most common way of practising comparative philosophy, however, is to spot marked differences or similarities between specific doctrines or global attitudes of Western and Eastern philosophy. The goal I have set myself is to rehabilitate the comparative method as a more rigorous way of doing philosophy with a cross-cultural perspective." (Introduction, p. 1, notes omitted)

190. Rein'l, Robert L. 1953. "Comparative Philosophy and Intellectual Tolerance." *Philosophy East and West* no. 2:333-339.

"Comparative philosophy may be studied either for the purpose of determining the relations among the different systems, where the objects studied are the systems rather than the objects with which the systems profess to be concerned, or for the sake of obtaining wisdom. The second of these purposes implies the first, but only the second is philosophic inquiry in the fullest sense. In connection with the first, Mr. Kwee has indicated the necessity of approaching a philosophy through its historical and socio-cultural setting, and has suggested eight approaches to the problem of comparative

philosophy in general.(1) To these an addition is suggested, not in the sense of another method, but as an attitude that is required by all these approaches. The attitude is tolerance, specifically a variety that might be called intellectual. One must be intellectually tolerant if one is to reach out beyond the boundaries of one's own culture, and even more tolerant if one is to pursue investigations of a comparative nature." (p. 333)

(19 J. Kwee Swan Liat, "Methods of Comparative Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West*, I, No. 1 (April, 1951), 10-15. The eight approaches are: the philological, the historical, the comparative, the formal-evaluative, the psychological, the phenomenological, the sociological and anthropological, and the total-integrative." (p. 333)

191. Rivera Berruz, Stephanie, and Kalmanson, Leah, eds. 2018. *Comparative Studies in Asian and Latin American Philosophies: Cross-Cultural Theories and Methodologies*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

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192. Rorty, Richard. 1991. "Philosophers, Novelists, and Intellectual Comparisons: Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens." In *Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophical Perspectives*, edited by Deutsch, Eliot, 3-20. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Also published in R. Rorty, *Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Essays on Heidegger and Others*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991, pp. 66-82.

"When tolerance and comfortable togetherness become the watchwords of a society, one should no longer hope for world-historical greatness. If such greatness — radical difference from the past, a dazzlingly unimaginable future — is what one wants, ascetic priests like Plato, Heidegger, and Suslov will fill the bill. But if it is not, novelists like Cervantes, Dickens, and Kundera may suffice. The fact that philosophy as a genre is closely associated with the quest for such greatness — with the attempt to focus all one's thoughts into a single narrow beam and send them out beyond the bounds of all that has been previously thought — may help explain why it is among the philosophers of the

West that contemporary Western self-hatred is most prevalent. It must be tempting for Africans and Asians — the principal victims of Western imperialism and racism — to see this self-hatred as about what the West deserves. But I would suggest that we take this self-hatred as just one more symptom of the old familiar quest for purity which runs through the annals of the ascetic priesthood in both East and West. If we set these annals to one side, we may have a better chance of finding something distinctive in the West which the East can use, and conversely." (p. 20)

193. ———. 1996. "The Ambiguity of 'Rationality'." *Constellations* no. 3:73-83.

*Symposium on Critical Theory by David Hoy and Thomas McCarthy* (Malden: Blackwell 1994).

"It is tempting to describe Critical Theory as an American version of the Habermas-vs.-Foucault debate, a debate which has agitated Europe in the ten years since the publication of Habermas's *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. It is also tempting to read it as a contribution to the debate over postmodernism which is presently agitating the American academy.

But neither description is quite right." (p. 73)

(...)

"In his rejoinder to Hoy, Thomas McCarthy agrees that we need Foucauldian "critical histories of contingent regimes of rationality." But he disagrees with Hoy on the question of "whether there is anything universal at all to say about reason, truth, objectivity, and the like, or rather anything that would not be too 'thin' to be of any use" (223). McCarthy thus lays out what I take to be the central issue of the book: namely, whether these traditional topics of philosophical debate are relevant to socio-political deliberation." (p. 73)

194. Rosán, Laurence J. 1952. "A Key to Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 2:56-65.

"The present writer therefore wishes to suggest that the key to comparative philosophy is not the contrast of cultures but rather the contrast of basic philosophical *attitudes* or *types* of philosophy. There are certain philosophical attitudes that appear again and again at widely separated points in space and in widely separated periods of time, each of which is logically consistent within itself but in fundamental conflict with each of the others. Much further study would be required to determine the exact number and nature of these attitudes. But for the purposes of this article and in order to demonstrate the significance and value of this conception, let me arbitrarily speak of three such fundamental attitudes, understanding that this number represents undoubtedly a great simplification, although not, I hope, a falsification. The following paragraphs, therefore, are not intended to convey any new factual knowledge but rather to clarify and integrate the field of comparative philosophy. The examples offered as illustrations of each particular philosophical attitude are not meant to be exhaustive but merely suggestive, so that the reader will be able to think of many others which could have been used. Perhaps in certain cases there may be some disagreement about the classification of a particular author, but this, I imagine, will not affect the general validity of my approach. Of course, many writers cannot be clearly classified inasmuch as they mingle elements of two or more attitudes within themselves; since this would imply real inconsistency, however, I believe that the greatest philosophers will be those most amenable to classification." (pp. 56-57)

195. ———. 1961. "Are Comparisons between the East and the West Fruitful for Comparative Philosophy?" *Philosophy East and West* no. 11:239-243.

"In an earlier issue there appeared an article entitled "A Key to Comparative Philosophy," by the present writer.(2)"

(...)

"This article evoked a comment, printed in the same issue, entitled "Keys to Comparative Philosophy," by the editor of this Journal, Charles A. Moore.(3) Moore made good criticisms of some particular aspects of the typology that I suggested, but he did not attack the conception itself."

(...)

"But the purpose of the present article is not polemical, though the foregoing paragraph may seem somewhat contentiously phrased. On the contrary, I take seriously Moore's conclusion that there are probably several very different interpretations of comparative philosophy. What I would like to examine now is the question: Why are there these different "keys" to comparative philosophy? And I would like to suggest-neither facetiously nor pedantically, however the words may seem to strike the reader-that the reason there are different approaches to the problem of comparative philosophy is simply that there are different philosophies to begin with, and that each type of philosophy will, very naturally, offer a solution to this particular problem that will be consistent with the rest of its metaphysical and ethical views. In other words, whereas in my previous article I attempted a "typology of philosophies" as the key to comparative philosophy, I am here accepting the fact that there are several such "keys," but suggesting that there is a necessary reason for the variety of these "keys" themselves. In short, there is a "typology of the solutions to the problem of comparative philosophy," and this typology may be similar or even parallel to the typology of the philosophies themselves." (pp. 239-240)

(2) *Philosophy East and West*, Ibid., II, No. 1 (April, 1952), 56-65.

(3) Ibid., pp. 76-78.

196. Rosemont, Henry Jr. 2014. "Symposium: Does the Concept of »Truth« Have Value in the Pursuit of Cross-Cultural Philosophy?" *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies* no. 1:150-217.

Abstract: "The symposium »Does the Concept of >Truth< Have Value in the Pursuit of Cross-Cultural Philosophy?« hones on a methodological question which has deep implications on doing philosophy cross-culturally.

Drawing on early Confucian writers, the anchor, Henry Rosemont, Jr., attempts to explain why he is skeptical of pat, affirmative answers to this question. His co-symposiasts James Maffie, John Maraldo, and Sonam Thakchoe follow his trail in working out multi-faceted views on truth from Mexican, Japanese Confucian, and Tibetan Buddhist perspectives respectively. As these positions substantiate, the aforementioned non-Anglo-European traditions seem to draw on an integrated view of thinking, feeling, and living a human life. For their practitioners, truth is less of a correspondence with a given external reality.

In fact, it enables human beings to strike the right path in living good, social lives."

H. Rosemont Jr., *Introductory Statement* 151;

Responses;

J. Maffie: Reflections on Henry Rosemont's »Introductory Statement« 161; J. Maraldo: Truth is Truthfulness: The Japanese Concept of Makoto 168; S. Thakchoe: Tibetan Reflections on the Value of Truth in Cross-Cultural Philosophy 186; H. Rosemont, Jr.: Reply: Truth as Truthfulness 205-217.

197. Ross, Donald. 2019. *Introduction to World Philosophy*. London: Austin Macauley Publishers.

"About the Book: What would it be like to go back in time and converse with the great sages of China, of India, of classical Greece and Rome, of the Christian and Islamic worlds, of Europeans of the Enlightenment? This book, *Introduction to World Philosophy*, aims to communicate some of the excitement and "mind-stretchingness" that such an encounter would produce. It is intended to engage interested laypersons while remaining faithful to the standards of professional scholarship. It is written in an informal style yet does not talk down to the reader. Representatives from each of the five aforementioned periods are presented in pairs—one philosopher a more "head-in-the-clouds" thinker and the other a more "feet-on-the-ground" one. Besides demonstrating how each tradition offers a range of perspectives rather than a single, dominant one, such an approach achieves an optimum balance between breadth and depth. Ideas found in these texts range from mind-bending metaphysical speculation and the theory of knowledge, to questions of ethics and politics, to points of elementary logic. The whole discussion is prefaced by an extended exploration of what philosophy is. The author feels that it is important to reach out to the general public, to feed a genuine hunger out there for an accessible guide to the subject, and also acknowledge the relevance of non-Western, as well as Western, cultures to an increasingly globalized world."

198. Scharfstein, Ben-Ami. 1998. *A Comparative History of World Philosophy. From the Upanishads to Kant*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Contents: Preface XI; Acknowledgments XIII; Chapter 1. The three philosophical traditions 1; Chapter 2. The beginnings of metaphysical philosophy Uddalaka, Yajnavalkya, Heraclitus, Parmenides 55; Chapter 3. The beginnings of moral philosophy Confucius/Mencius, the Buddha, Socrates 79; Chapter 4. Early logical relativism, skepticism, and absolutism Mahavira, Chuang-tzu, Protagoras, Gorgias, Plato 113; Chapter 5. Early rational Synthesis Hsün-tzu, Aristotle 145; Chapter 6. Early varieties of atomism Democritus/Epicurus/Lucretius, "Gautama" and Nameless Buddhists 171; Chapter 7. Hierarchical idealism Plotinus/Proclus, Bhartrhari 205; Chapter 8. Developed skepticism Sextus Empiricus, Nagarjuna, Jayarashi, Shriharsha 233; Chapter 9. Religio-philosophical synthesis Udayana, Chu Hsi, Avicenna, Mairnonides, Aquinas 275; Chapter 10. Logic-sensitized, methodological metaphysics Gangesha, Descartes, Leibniz 329; Chapter 11. Immanent-transcendent holism Shankara, Spinoza 367, Chapter 12. Perceptual analysis, realistic and idealistic Asanga/Vasuhandu, Locke, Berkeley, Hume 407; Chapter 13. Fideistic neo-skepticism Dignaga/Dhamakirti, Kant 467; Afterword 517; Notes 531; Bibliography 655; Note on the Author 659; Index 661.

From the Preface: "Because I hope that newcomers to the history of philosophy will be among the readers of this hook, I have taken care to explain whatever I think they need to know. The book begins with the reasons for studying philosophy comparatively and with the difficulties raised by such study, and it ends with a view of philosophy that is personal but that rests on all of the preceding discussion The philosophers dealt with represent certain attitudes. schools. and traditions, but they are remembered most interestingly and accurately as individuals. So even though I have had to omit a great deal and make schematic summaries, I have in each instance tried to suggest the philosopher's style, density, and order of thought. In its later chapters the book tends to grow more difficult and elaborate, like the philosophies it deals with; but the early chapters prepare for the later ones. and, whatever the difficulty, I have always wittiest as simply and clearly as I can.

To avoid making a long book forbiddingly longer, I have limited not only the number of philosophers dealt with but also the range of thought by which each of them is represented Plato. for example, is limited to his theory of Ideas and Kant (except in the later discussion) to his Critique of Pure Reason. In keeping with the needs of a particular comparison. I have sometimes drawn a broad sketch and sometimes entered into details.

When it has seemed natural. I have shared my own views with the reader-there is no good reason to pretend that I am a neutral, disembodied voice. But however I judge each philosopher's thought, I have committed myself to expound it with a minimum of bias." (p. XI)

199. ———. 2001. "How important is truth to epistemology and knowledge? Some answers from comparative philosophy." *Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge* no. 15:275-283.

"What can I say in a few pages to persuade someone with philosophical interests but without prior experience in comparative philosophy that he or she is living an unreasonably restricted intellectual life? With respect to the present subject, I'm sure that the senses, implications and varieties of such an inescapable conception as that of the usefulness of truth will be grasped in a richer, more mature way if the field of inquiry is broadened beyond contemporary Western philosophy.

The so-called 'primitives' are the hardest to investigate for such a purpose because of their great variety, the uneven character of what evidence there is, and the fact that the presuppositions of their thought are of course not laid out and defended in treatises but remain for the most part implicit in their ways of life. I can do no better here than confine myself to a few hints, by way of examples that have for one reason or another interested me. I should add that I may refer to acts or attitudes in the present tense, though they may now be obsolete." (p. 276)

200. Schepen, Renate, and Graness, Anke. 2019. "Heinz Kimmerle's intercultural philosophy and the quest for epistemic justice." *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa* no. 15:1-7.

Abstract: "Since the 1990s epistemic (in)justice has been a central issue of post-colonial and feminist studies. But only during the last decade the term has become paradigmatic and new aspects of the issue have been addressed – particularly because of the works of De Sousa Santos (2012, 2014) and Fricker (2007). One of the pioneers of an intercultural approach to philosophy is the German philosopher Heinz Kimmerle (1930–2016), who in the 1980s began to focus his research on African philosophies. Intercultural philosophy aimed for more epistemic justice in the academy long before the term epistemic or cognitive injustice was coined and became a new paradigm in the social sciences and humanities. Kimmerle, for example, was one of the main proponents of a radical reform of the Eurocentric curricula in academic philosophy, and he called for the inclusion of philosophical traditions from various regions of the world. Similarities in the starting point of research and research questions in philosophy and post- or decolonial studies, and proposed solutions to epistemic injustice in these disciplines, give enough reason to combine the social sciences' theories of epistemic justice with the methods of intercultural philosophy for a reciprocal cultural enrichment between these disciplines. This article shows that theories of 'epistemic justice' could benefit from Heinz Kimmerle's method of dialogue and reflective listening. Similarly, insights derived from post-colonial, decolonial and feminist theory could strengthen an awareness of structural power inequalities in intercultural philosophy.

Therefore, we explore how theories of epistemic justice and intercultural philosophy can complement each other."

#### References

Fricker, M., 2007, *Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

De Sousa Santos, B., 2012, 'Public sphere and epistemologies of the south', *Africa Development* 37(1), 43–67.

De Sousa Santos, B., 2014, *Epistemologies of the south: Justice Against Epistemicide*, Routledge, New York.

201. Schiltz, Elizabeth. 2014. "How to Teach Comparative Philosophy." *Teaching Philosophy* no. 37:215-231.

Abstract: "This article articulates a range of possible pedagogical goals for courses in comparative philosophy, and discusses a number of methods and strategies for teaching courses intended to achieve those ends. Ultimately, it argues that the assignment to teach comparative philosophy represents an opportunity to design a course with remarkable freedom and tremendous potential. Comparative philosophy courses can engage students in unique ways that not only increase their understanding of the fundamental assumptions and beliefs of non-Western traditions, but also facilitate the development of the skills and dispositions that enable them to become better philosophers."

202. Seaford, Richard. 2020. *The Origins of Philosophy In Ancient Greece and Ancient India: A Historical Comparison*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"This book is devoted to a unitary argument, but over such a wide range of material that I offer the reader preliminary guidance in this chapter, beginning with an overview.

The next chapter (concluding Part A) presents explanations of the similarity between the earliest philosophy in India and Greece.

Part B describes the polytheist reciprocity that, among an elite, was replaced in both cultures by monism. Part C centres on the main factors behind this replacement in India: the individual *interiorisation* of what I call the cosmic rite of passage, and *monetisation*. Part D describes the similar factors behind the similar development of ideas in Greece. The conclusion (Part E) summarises and explores the variety of factors behind the new imagining of universe and inner self." (from the Summary, p. 3)

203. Selusi, Ambrogio. 2021. *Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception and the Exclusion*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

"The purpose of this work is to examine the European understanding of China and India within the histories of philosophy from 1600 to 1744. The year 1600 is the publication of *Barbaricae philosophiae antiquitatum* by Otto van Heurn and 1744 the year of release of the last book of the *Historia critica* by Jakob Brucker, which was entitled 'De Philosophia Exotica'. Heurn's book is our *terminus post quem*, since in this work it was introduced for the first time in a 'history of philosophy' a chapter about modern or contemporary Indians, together with a chapter about ancient Indians.

About Brucker, he provided a very long and detailed chapter on contemporary Asians in his widespread history of philosophy, while, after him, Asians were usually excluded from the histories of philosophy; that is the reason for choosing Brucker as our *terminus ante quem*. The two authors represent two opposite historiographical paradigms and the latter author openly rejected the method and the historical asset of the former. Therefore, we shall, on one side, investigate the description of these two Asian civilizations in a century and a half of 'histories of philosophy', on the other side, we shall try to understand the change of historiographical paradigms and appreciate the effects of these changes in the description of the two civilizations with which we are concerned" (p. 1)

204. Senghass, Dieter. 2002. *The Clash within Civilizations: Coming to terms with cultural conflicts*. New York: Routledge.

"Intercultural philosophy must face the realities of today's world, particularly when in pursuit of politico-theoretical and socio-philosophical issues.

This world is, however, completely different from the one that existed at the time when classical philosophy came into being. This is why all contemporary philosophies, and especially philosophies from non-European, non-Western cultures, must turn to the political, socioeconomic and cultural complexities emerging in their own environment.

Such a confrontation will inevitably lead to differentiation processes which in the light of such historic changes it will be hard to confine to any form of cultural-essentialist straitjacket. It is this issue that creates such inner turmoil within cultures and their characteristic philosophical profiles; as a rule, it is hardly possible to reduce the many solutions put forward to a common denominator. Cultures, in the current, holistic sense of the word, and in the sense of civilizations, disintegrate, some earlier, some later; for some the process is slow, for others it is more accelerated; ultimately, however, this disintegration is irreversible.<sup>30</sup> (p. 23, a note omitted)

205. Shaner, David Edward, Nagatomo, Shigenori, and Yasuo, Yuasa. 1989. *Science and Comparative Philosophy: Introducing Yuasa Yasuo*. Leiden: Brill.

"This book was written with a diverse group of readers in mind. We intended to serve the interests of both philosophers and scientists by introducing a broad conceptual framework in which different research methods can be shown to be mutually beneficial. An implicit theme running through the text is our belief that even an elementary understanding of complex patterns of human cognition and behavior requires that scholars employ several research strategies. Both scientific and phenomenological methods are constrained by their use of precisely defined—and therefore restrictive—sets of models, theories, laws, and patterns of explanation. Although these models, etc., constitute the pillars upon which sound research strategies are based, their employment requires embracing a \_ diversity of assumptions. While these methodological assumptions give direction to different research programs, the exclusive use of any single research strategy can systematically distort and oversimplify the complex subject matter of studies focusing upon 'human nature'." (Preface, p. XVII)

206. Shankman, Steven, and Durrant, Stephen W., eds. 2002. *Early China/Ancient Greece: Thinking through Comparisons*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Contents: Steven Shankman and Stephen W. Durrant: Introduction 1; 1. David L. Hall: What Has Athens to Do with Alexandria? or Why Sinologists Can't Get Along with(out) Philosophers 15; 2. Haun Saussy: No Time Like the Present: The Category of Contemporaneity in Chinese Studies 35; 3. Michael Puett : Humans and Gods: The Theme of Self-Divinization in Early China and Early Greece 55; 4. Steven Shankman: "These Three Come Forth Together, But are Differently Named": Laozi, Zhuangzi, Plato 75; 5. Roger T. Ames: Thinking through Comparisons: Analytical and Narrative Methods for Cultural Understanding 93; 6. C. H. Wang: Alluding to the Text, or the Context 111; 7. David N. Keightley: Epistemology in Cultural Context: Disguise and Deception in Early China and Early Greece 119; 8. David Schaberg: The Logic of Signs in Early Chinese Rhetoric 155; 9. Andrew Plaks: Means and Means: A Comparative Reading of Aristotle's Ethics and the Zhongyong 187; 10. Lisa Raphals: Fatalism, Fate, and Stratagem in China and Greece 207; 11. Anthony C. Yu: Cratylus and Xunzi on Names 235; 12. Michael Nylan: Golden Spindles and Axes: Elite Women in the Archaemenid and Han Empires 251; 13. Stephen W. Durrant: Creating Tradition: Sima Qian Agonistes? 283; List of Contributors 299; Index 303-305.

207. Sheldon, Wilmon H. 1956. "What Can Western Philosophy Contribute to Eastern?" *Philosophy East and West* no. 5:291-304.

"Notice that we are here treating of philosophy as a distinct pursuit, not as a phase of cultural differences between East and West.

True, indeed, the culture of a region, nation, race and its philosophy are deeply interwoven. But we are asking only what the individual philosophers as independent truthseekers of the Western arena can offer to the individual truthseekers of the East, giving them, if possible, truths in addition to what they already have. And if in the following we seem to dwell overlong on the weaknesses of Western thought, remember the old counsel: Set your own house in order first, then go out to help your neighbors." (p. 291)

208. Shen, Vincent. 2003. "Some Thoughts on Intercultural Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 30:357-372.

"It is an undeniable fact that philosophy was, and still is, culturally bound. Western philosophy was very much related to the long cultural heritage from ancient Greece, through Rome, to Medieval and modern Europe. In other cultural traditions, for example, in China, we find other traditions of philosophy, such as Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. As Martin Heidegger has well pointed out, Western philosophy has developed from a decisive choice made by the Western culture in the time of Parmenides and Plato. Until now, many works in the history of Western philosophy are still unjustly entitled "The History of Philosophy," yet it is regrettable for us to say that this kind of exclusiveness and arrogance does set aside arbitrarily many other possibilities.

In this context, to study intercultural philosophy means not to enclose one's own vision of philosophy within the limit of one's tradition, especially that of Western philosophy. This is particularly necessary today when the type of rationality that has been given foundation by Western philosophy and that has been essential for the development of modern Western science and technology is now much challenged and even collapsing. Now the world is open to other types of rationality, or better say, to more comprehensive function of human reason." (p. 357)

209. ———. 2003. "Some Thoughts on Intercultural Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 30:357-372.

"But what is an intercultural philosophy? This should not be limited to only doing comparative philosophy, as is in the cases of comparative religion, comparative linguistics, etc., which are often limited to the studies of resemblance and difference between different religions or languages. Although doing comparative philosophy in this manner could lead to a kind of relativism in philosophy, it could not really help the self/mutual understanding and practice of philosophy itself.

For me, the real target of doing intercultural philosophy is therefore to put into contrast between, rather than sheer comparison of, different philosophical traditions. I understand "contrast" as the rhythmic and dialectical interplay between difference and complementarity, continuity and discontinuity, which leads eventually to the real mutual enrichment of different traditions in philosophy.(3)" (p. 358)

(3) I have worked out a philosophy of contrast in my works, especially in my *Essays in Contemporary Philosophy*, (Taipei: Li-ming Publishing Company, 1985) and *Contrast, Strangification and Dialogue* (Taipei: Wunan, 2002).

210. Shi'er, Ju. 2010. "The Cultural Relativity of Logic: From the Viewpoint of Ethnography and Historiography." *Social Sciences in China* no. 31:73-89.

Abstract: "The concept of general argumentation has expanded the family of logic so that it incorporates the logic of other cultures besides modern culture. Based on reports of fieldwork among the Azande and the fruits of research on ancient Chinese logic and the logic of Buddhism, this paper attempts to provide a factual foundation for the proposition "the cultural relativity of logic" from a descriptive perspective. Adopting deductive argument as a meta-method, this paper argues for the existence of the cultural relativity of logic in modern culture and of the translated version of the logic of other

cultures in modern culture. With the aid of ethnography and the historical research findings, we show that the logic of other cultures also has its own cultural relativity. We also seek to show through the concepts of language games and life forms that deductive argumentation as a meta-method likewise possesses cultural relativity."

211. Siderits, Mark. 2017. "Comparison or Confluence In Philosophy?" In *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy*, edited by Ganeri, Jonardon, 75-92. New York: Oxford University Press.

"Later chapters in this volume will focus on particular figures or texts important to the history of Indian philosophy, and explore their approach to a given philosophical issue. They thus convey important information about the Indian philosophical tradition. The present essay concerns one of the uses to which that information might be put. The question to be addressed here might be put in the following way. It is currently standard practice to include a component on the history of philosophy in the undergraduate philosophy curriculum. But what is included there is almost always exclusively Western. Suppose the history of the Indian philosophical tradition were studied at a degree of depth comparable to that given the Western tradition in the typical undergraduate curriculum. What would be the point? How might this be thought to contribute to the practice of philosophy?

We think we know how to answer the comparable question when we are asked to defend the study of earlier periods of the Western tradition. The student working on the ontological status of abstract objects might, we think, benefit from knowing about the views of Plato, Aristotle, and Ockham on universals; work in meta-ethics would seem to require some knowledge of the varieties of ethical theories that have been proposed and worked out in the past; and so on. This explains why we are not shocked when Spinoza's name is casually dropped into a discussion of the grounding problem—a problem that only began to be discussed a few decades ago. When we see the practice of philosophy as chiefly concerned with trying to solve unresolved philosophical problems, we can see why it might prove useful to know the genealogy of the problem and how related issues were addressed in the past." (p. 75)

212. Silius, Vytis. 2020. "Diversifying Academic Philosophy: The Post-Comparative Turn and Transculturalism." *Asian Studies* no. 8:257-280.

Abstract: "The article asks why, in Western universities, the success of the academic field of comparative philosophy has so far failed to significantly diversify the curricula of academic philosophy. It suggests that comparative philosophy has mainly relied on the same approaches that have made academic philosophy Eurocentric, namely, on the history of philosophy as the main mode of teaching and researching philosophy. Further, post-comparative philosophy and transcultural studies are presented as providing tools to address the foundations of the institutional parochialism of academic philosophy, while preserving one of the most fundamental tenets of philosophy—the quest for universal knowledge that transcends cultural particularities."

213. Sjödin, Anna-Pya. 2011. "Conceptualizing Philosophical Tradition: A Reading of Wilhelm Halbfass, Daya Krishna, and Jitendranath Mohanty." *Philosophy East and West* no. 61:534-546.

Abstract: "This article takes as its point of departure the question of how Wilhelm Halbfass, Daya Krishna, and Jitendranath Mohanty have conceptualized tradition in relation to "Indian" philosophy. They have all reacted to, and criticized, homogeneous and static conceptions of Indian philosophies, and by articulating different ways of apprehending tradition they have tried to come to terms with such limiting images. My reading of their texts has been informed by a questioning of how they, in turn, conceptualize tradition. Most of all this is related to the tendency, on the one hand, to stress that tradition is open-ended and dynamic but at the same time to speak of tradition

as one singular and universalizable phenomenon, sometimes even as a reified phenomenon ("it"). This discussion is connected to a concern of mine regarding how to conceptualize a plurality and heterogeneity while avoiding a reifying, generalizing language. Toward the end I present a reading of the *Nyayasutra* and how the concept of *siddhanta* could be understood in the light of three of its commentaries. This reading is here framed as the practical and philosophical outcome of the reflections made in the analysis of Halbfass, Krishna, and Mohanty."

214. Skof, Lenart. 2008. "Thinking between Cultures. Pragmatism, Rorty and intercultural philosophy." *Ideas y Valores* no. 138:41-71.

Abstract: "The paper discusses Rorty's critique and special relation to intercultural thinking.

It looks into the history of both pragmatism and intercultural philosophy, discusses some of their possible points of convergence, and finally follows the implications of this encounter for our intercultural understanding of Rorty's version of pragmatism, especially in the context of a contemporary North-South intercultural dialogue."

215. Smart, Ninian. 2008. *World Philosophies*. New York: Routledge.

Revised second edition edited by Oliver Leaman (First edition 1999).

216. Smid, Robert W. 2009. *Methodologies of Comparative Philosophy: the Pragmatist and Process Traditions*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"This text examines one small but important source of such contributions: namely, comparative philosophers. While cross-cultural influence is hardly unprecedented in the study of philosophy, twentieth-century philosophers experienced this influence on a scale far beyond that of any previous century: more cultures converged in a greater variety of venues and to a greater extent than had ever done so before. The rise of comparative philosophy in the twentieth century represents the attempt of many of these philosophers to understand these cross-cultural influences and consider their philosophical implications. Perhaps as a validation of their efforts, comparative philosophy has grown in both interest and influence and now represents a vibrant subfield in the discipline of philosophy." (p. 2)

217. ———. 2022. "On the Taming of Comparison: Methodological Myopathy, Plurality, and Creativity." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 181-202. New York: Bloomsbury.

"My argument proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I offer a definition of comparison that underscores the role of difference in the comparative encounter and links the negotiation of that encounter with interest.

(...)

Yet both concepts have roots that go much deeper than that, reaching as far back as the initial encounter with difference, and the interests that inform that encounter can continue to affect the comparative process in often unacknowledged ways. In the second section, then, I identify two seams in the comparative process that provide an indication of some of these interests: namely, the question of what makes a comparison "interesting" and the close relation between philosophical commitments and comparative method.

(...)

In the third section, then, I offer three recommendations for becoming more critically aware of the interests driving method, each of which seeks to provide critical distance between comparativists and their methodological choices. The end result is an embrace of a provisional methodological pluralism, which represents not an underlying philosophical commitment but rather a methodological stance. Embracing methodological pluralism in this way, I argue, amounts to the reintroduction of invention at the level of methodology. In the conclusion, I offer some observations regarding the role of creativity in comparison and its relation to the methodological interests highlighted in this chapter." (pp. 183-184)

218. Smith, Huston. 1980. "Western and Comparative Perspectives on Truth." *Philosophy East and West* no. 30:425-437.

Abstract: "My article consists of four parts. Beginning with the comparative side of our symposium theme, I divide this into a temporal, historical comparison (Part I) and a geographical, spatial comparison (Part II). In Part III, I turn expressly to our Western handling of the truth issue, reserving Part IV for pulling these various strands together."

219. Soldatenko, Gabriel. 2022. "Reflections for Comparative Method from a Latin American Philosophical Perspective." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 119-138. New York: Bloomsbury.

"This brief introduction through Nietzsche gives us a general frame through which to take up and look more closely at the conceptual points where comparative and Latin American philosophy intersect; more specifically, through the concept of culture and crosscultural method; secondly, by way of the related and corollary goal of pushing back against Western philosophic universality and creating philosophy anew; and thirdly, through the metaphysical question of the overarching goal and purpose of philosophy. To that end, this chapter is divided into three sections: the first two offering close readings of essays that were foundational to Latin American philosophy and how they relate and contribute to thinking about comparative thought; and the third offering a brief review of useful signposts that Latin American philosophy offers for further reflection on comparative method." (p. 122)

220. Solomon, Robert C., and Higgins, Kathleen M., eds. 1995. *World Philosophy: A Text with Readings*. New York: McGraw Hill.

Contents in Brief: Timeline XV; Syllabus for a world civilization course XIX; Preface XXV; Introduction XXXI; 1. Graham Parkes: Japanese Philosophy 1; 2. Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall: Chinese Philosophy 30; 3. Steven H. Phillips: South Asian Philosophy 65; 4. Eric L. Ormsby: Arabic Philosophy 120; 5. Janet McCracken and Homayoon Sepasi-Tehrani: Persian Philosophy 145; 6. J. Baird Callicott and Thomas W. Overholt: American Indian Philosophy 188; 7. Jorge Valadez: Latin American Philosophy 219; 8. Jacqueline Trimier: African Philosophy 247; 9. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins: Western Philosophy 292; A Note on the Contributors 342; Index 344-350.

221. ———, eds. 2003. *From Africa to Zen: An Invitation to World Philosophy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Second expanded edition (First edition 1993).

Contents: Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins: Introduction; David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames: Understanding Order: The Chinese Perspective; 2 Graham Parkes: Ways of Japanese Thinking; 3 J. Baird Callicott and Thomas W. Overholt: Traditional American Indian Attitudes toward Nature; 4 Jorge Valadez: Pre-Columbian and Modern Philosophical Perspectives in Latin America; 5 Eric Ormsby: Arabic Philosophy; 6 Oliver N. Leaman: Jewish Philosophy; 7 Homayoon Sepasi and Janet McCracken:

Persian Philosophy; 8 Jacqueline Trimier: The Myth of Authenticity: Personhood, Traditional Culture, and African Philosophy; 9 Stephen H. Phillips: Indian Philosophies; 10 Peter D. Hershock: Buddhist Philosophy as a Buddhist Practice; 11 Roy W Perrett: Ngā Whakaaro Māori: Māori Philosophy; 12 Robert A. McDermott: Esoteric Philosophy; About the Contributors.

222. Soni, Jayandra. 1998. "Intercultural Relevance of Some Moments in the History of Indian Philosophy." *Topoi* no. 17:49-55.

"The history of Indian philosophy since ancient times has been characterized by its dialogic attitude. Discussion and debate, whether they were in a written form or actually conducted in public, were the hallmarks of any school of thought, because other views were first taken into account before presenting its own so-called established position. The history of the emergence of each of the different schools was generally based on a fundamental work which set forth its basic categories. Most of these basic works were compiled in a very cryptic and curt style, sometime in the four hundred years just before and after our common era. Commentators elaborated the basic philosophy from within their own tradition in order to make the basic views understandable to the uninitiated, whilst at the same time defending the tradition against attacks from opponents. This paper attempts to recall certain moments in the early development of Indian philosophy which directly or indirectly reflect an attitude to philosophizing relevant in an intercultural context. Two such interrelated moments will be mentioned here: 1. the significance of debate and the emergence of rules of debate which ultimately led to a discussion of logical issues when discussing an argument; 2. the significance of epistemology for the view of the world, the objects to be known, and the subject who knows. By way of an introduction and orientation to some of the issues in Indian philosophy a few presuppositions will be considered in order to show that the differences among the various schools are more important than certain generalities which in some cases may be drawn." (p. 49)

223. Sprung, Mervyn, ed. 1978. *The Question of Being: East-West Perspectives*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Each chapter in this book (except the first) originated at a symposium arranged by the philosophy department of Brock University, St. Catherines, Ontario.

Contents: Mervyn Sprung: The Question of Being as comparative philosophy 1; Some Western Perspectives: Joseph Owens: Being in early Western tradition 17; Charles H. Kahn: Linguistic relativism and the Greek project of ontology 31; Hans Georg Gadamer: Plato and Heidegger 45; Zygmunt Adamczewski: Questions in Heidegger's thought about Being 55; Robert C. Schaff: Heidegger's path of thinking and the Way of Meditation in the early Upanisads 67; Some eastern perspectives: Wilhelm Halbfass: On Being and What There Is: Indian perspectives on the Question of Being 95; J. G. Arapura: Some special characteristics of *Sat* (Being) in Advaita Vedanta 111; Mervyn Sprung: Being and the Middle Way 127; Jindra Nath Mohanty: Some aspects of Indian thinking on Being 141; Index 159-161.

224. Steineck, Raji C., and Wber, Ralph, eds. 2018. *Concepts of Philosophy in Asia and the Islamic World: Vol. 1: China and Japan*. Leiden: Brill.

Contents: Robert H. Gassmann, Elena Louisa Lange, Angelika Malinar, Ulrich Rudolph, Raji C. Steineck, Ralph Weber: Preface IX; Notes on Contributors XI;

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Index 713-742.

225. Stenger, Georg. 1998. "Structures of World-Oriented Encounter: The World Concept and the Intercultural Basic Situation." *Topoi* no. 17:37-47.

"Interculturally motivated thinking is increasingly becoming the crucial test of the general endeavours of thought and their being comprehended as categories.

Amongst other aspects, this is revealed in the fact that almost all spectres of philosophy deal with the topic of interculturality."

(...)

"All these aspects contribute to a situation which is philosophically and politically precarious, yet also challenging and exciting.

A possible attempt to, first of all, become conscious of this new overall situation, which I want to call "intercultural basic situation" (*interkulturelle Grundsituation*), could be to set the theme of world-concept (Weltbegriff) which has always appeared in philosophical tradition, but now, due to the intercultural discussion, moves towards the centre of attention in a different way. The basic concept of "world" is probably that with the largest dimension, i.e. it is able to embrace universal structures as well as regional or individual ones, even the microstructures of environmental and physiological-organical conditions. Of course I do not want to give a description of the history of the world-concept. Instead, the topic is to be examined in terms of its relevance for intercultural thinking. I want to present some thoughts about what is really meant by "world", how we can meet a world, and especially how its notion is to be seen in very different ways and circumstances. It is undergoing a change and transformation so that we can not start from a world-concept, but rather have to talk about a "World-lieness" (Welthaftigkeit) or, even more accurate, a "world-phenomenon". I want to suggest some steps, demonstrating the "structures of world-oriented encounter". (pp. 37-38)

226. Stepaniants, Marietta Tigranovna. 2002. *Introduction to Eastern Thought*. Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press.

Edited by James Behuniak. Translated from the Russian by Rommela Kohanovskaya.

Contents: Foreword by Eliot Deutsch XI; Preface XIII;

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1. The birth of philosophy 3; 2. The Universe: its origin and structure 11; 3. Human nature 35; 4. In search of the truth 63; 5. Tradition and modernity 87;

Part 2. Primary sources.

6. Indian tradition 107; 7. Chinese tradition 158; 8. Islamic tradition 233; Index 285; About the Author 293.

227. Struhl, Karsten J. 2010. "No (More) Philosophy Without Cross-Cultural Philosophy." *Philosophy Compass* no. 5:287-295.

Abstract: "Philosophy is a radical inquiry whose task is to interrogate the fundamental assumptions of some given activity, discipline, or set of beliefs. In doing so, philosophical inquiry must attempt to delineate a problem and to develop a method for resolving that problem. However, to be true to its intention, philosophy must be able to examine not only the object of its inquiry but also its own method of interrogation. To accomplish this task, philosophical inquiry must be able to create a distance not only from the assumptions under investigation but also from its own assumptions, which is to say, that it must be able to raise questions about its own method. This self-reflexivity requires that any given philosophical investigation must be examined from an alternative vantage point. Since the assumptions which inform the inquiry are deeply imbedded within a given culture, immanent critique is insufficient. The only way to step outside the boundaries of these cultural presuppositions is to reflect on the given problem from the vantage point of another culture's philosophical tradition. Thus, I argue that philosophical inquiry is unable to go beyond certain limits without being cross-cultural philosophy. I illustrate the way in which cross-cultural philosophy does this with respect

to the problem of the self by placing the Western philosophical approach to this problem in dialogue with the Indian Hindu-Buddhist narrative."

228. Sweet, William, ed. 2014. *What is Intercultural Philosophy?* Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.

Contents: William Sweet: Introduction: The Project of Intercultural Philosophy 1; Chapter I. Jānis (John) T. Ozoliņš: What in the World is Intercultural Philosophy? A Reflection 19; Chapter II. Wolfgang Kaltenbacher: Beyond the Cultural Turn: Intercultural Philosophy in its Historical Context 39; Chapter III. Edwin George: Interculturality: Some Philosophical Musings 51; Chapter IV. Hsueh-i Chen: What is Intercultural Philosophy? 67; Chapter V. Flavia Monceri: Taking Diversity Seriously: On the Notion of Intercultural Philosophy 81; Chapter VI. Joseph C.A. Agbakoba: Intercultural Philosophy and the Question of African Identity: An 'Afroconstructivist' Perspective 95; Chapter VII. Dorothy Nwanyinma Ucheaga Olu-Jacob: Interculturality in the Context of Africa's Colonial and Decolonization Experience 107; Chapter VIII. Helen Lauer: Global Economic Justice Defined Inter-Culturally: Alternatives that Emerge from the Neo-Colonial Cusp 121; Chapter IX. Gereon Kopf: Towards a Conception of Philosophy as Expression: Approaching Intercultural Philosophy from a Zen Buddhist paradigm 131; Chapter X. Yao Jiehou: Four Dimensions of Intercultural Philosophy 151; Chapter XI. Viktoria Lysenko: Comparative Philosophy or Intercultural Philosophy? The Case of the Russian Buddhologist Theodor Stcherbatsky 165; William Sweet: Afterword. The Prospect of Intercultural Philosophy 181; Contributors 195; Index 197-200.

229. ———. 2014. "Introduction: The Project of Intercultural Philosophy." In *What is Intercultural Philosophy?*, edited by Sweet, William, 1-18. Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.

"One response to the contact of different cultures and traditions during the past century has been the proposal of a comparative or of an intercultural philosophy. Such a response is not without precedent; we see similar responses, for example, in literary, religious, and political studies. In intercultural philosophy, however, we find an attempt to have philosophers from different cultures or traditions actively engage one another – and to do so in a way that shows not only mutual respect, but also the recognition that one's own philosophical views are not complete, that there are other, legitimate philosophical views, and that one's own views may need a rearticulation or even revision." (p. 1)

230. Tanak, Koji. 2016. "Ways of Doing Cross-Cultural Philosophy." In *Learning from the Other - Australian and Chinese Perspectives on Philosophy*, edited by Makeham, John, 59-67. Canberra: Australian Academy of the Humanities.

"That said, some scholars have claimed that there is, strictly speaking, no tradition of studying *logic* in the East, or if there is, that it fails to match the sophistication achieved in the West.<sup>(5)</sup> That is, it is claimed that even though philosophers of the Eastern traditions have taken debates and argumentation as important to topics of philosophical inquiry, they have nevertheless failed to reflect on and examine the principles that underly argumentation and rational reasoning. According to these scholars, argumentation has been put to use in elaborating on the nature of language, knowledge, reality and ethics; yet, there are no investigations of the principles underlying these modes of argument apart from the particular arguments that employ them. It is claimed that Eastern philosophers have not abstracted principles of reasoning and argumentation from particular instances and they have not formalised those principles in order to examine the features and properties of the principles.

This is often unified in the idea that there is no development of *formal* logic in the East. As we will see, this has been taken to imply that there is no tradition of logic in the East.

In this paper, I will first show that there is, indeed, no development of formal logic in the East. However, I will argue that the lack of the development of formal logic does not entail the lack of the development of logic *tout court*. I will use this point to show how to undertake a cross-cultural dialogue between Eastern and Western logicians.

My examination of the possibility of cross-cultural dialogue about logic will serve as a case study of showing how to do cross-cultural philosophy and how to use non-Western materials as part of contemporary philosophy." (p. 60)

(5) See Jay L. Garfield, *Engaging Buddhism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Chad Hansen, "Logic in China", *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1998); and Mark Siderits, "Deductive, Inductive, Both or Neither?", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 31 (2003), 303–21.

231. Tanaka, Koji. 2016. "Ways of Doing Cross-Cultural Philosophy." In *Learning from the Other: Australian and Chinese Perspectives on Philosophy*, edited by Markeham, John, 59-66. Canberra: Australian Academy of the Humanities.

"In this paper, I will first show that there is, indeed, no development of formal logic in the East. However, I will argue that the lack of the development of formal logic does not entail the lack of the development of logic tout court. I will use this point to show how to undertake a cross-cultural dialogue between Eastern and Western logicians.

My examination of the possibility of cross-cultural dialogue about logic will serve as a case study of showing how to do cross-cultural philosophy and how to use non-Western materials as part of contemporary philosophy." (p.60)

232. Tang, Yijie. 1983. "A Perspective on the Meaning of Comparative Philosophy and Comparative Religion Studies: The Case of the Introduction of Indian Buddhism into China." *Chinese Studies in Philosophy* no. 15:39-106.

Abstract: "In this essay I do not intend to analyze or study the entire history of the introduction of Indian Buddhism into China; rather, I wish simply to investigate a bit the relationships which existed between Buddhism, after it was introduced into China in the period of the Wei, the Jin, and the North and South dynasties, and the prior existing ideologies and cultures in China at the time, and use that to illustrate the meaning of studying comparative philosophy and comparative religions."

233. Tanner, Jeremy. 2009. "Ancient Greece, Early China: Sino-Hellenic Studies and Comparative Approaches to the Classical World: A Review Article." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 129:89-109.

"This review article offers an introduction to some of the major contributions and debates within Sino-Hellenic studies. It has two purposes. First, to demonstrate the intrinsic intellectual interest of Sino-Hellenic studies, and in particular to show how such studies enrich and deepen our understanding of the Classical world.

Second, to offer a critical overview of the highly varying styles of comparison which characterize the different sub-fields within Sino-Hellenic studies, and thus offer a model of some of the range of ways in which fruitful comparative Classical studies might be conducted. Correspondingly, my review is organized by fields: science and medicine; philosophy; comparative literature." (p. 90)

234. Tartaglia, James. 2014. "Rorty's Thesis of the Cultural Specificity of Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 64:1018–1038.

"Given the central importance he placed on dialogue between independent discourses, then, it does seem frankly amazing that in his few explicit statements on dialogue with

non-Western philosophy (Rorty 1989, Rorty 1991, Balslev 1991), Rorty's attitude was almost entirely dismissive.

(...)

What brought Rorty around to this apparently anomalous view? The underlying reason, I shall be arguing, is that non-Western philosophy presents the most glaring counterexample possible to a thesis that is central to Rorty's critique of philosophy, and hence to his thought as a whole, namely his thesis of the cultural specificity of philosophy. To defend this thesis required him to reject any extension of the philosophical "conversation" beyond the Western world, despite the fact that this rejection was at odds with many other aspects of his thinking. The cultural specificity thesis is false, however, which is one of the main overall problems with Rorty's case for pragmatism.<sup>4</sup> This essay will continue as follows. In the next two sections I consider and reject Rorty's various reasons for disparaging dialogue with non-Western philosophy. Then, in section IV, I sketch an alternative to the cultural specificity thesis, according to which it is no more surprising that different cultures have independently developed philosophy than that they have independently developed mathematics or astronomy." (p. 102)

#### References

Balslev, Anindita Niyogi. 1991. *Cultural Otherness: Correspondence with Richard Rorty*. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press.

Rorty, Richard. 1989. Review of *Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, edited by Gerald James Larson and Eliot Deutsch. *Philosophy East and West* 39 : 332–337.

———. 1991. "Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens." In his *Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

235. Taylor, Charles 1995. "Comparison, History, Truth." In *Philosophical Arguments*, 146-164. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

"What seems to be emerging here is a hazy picture of history in which our understanding will be embedded. It rejects altogether the Hegelian single line of development, but it retains something like the notion of potentiality.

This structures at least local history into a before and after, and allows us to speak of advance. But because potentialities are diverse and frequently, at least by our present lights and capacities, incompatible, the gains will also involve losses, and the goods of different cultures will clash.

But this shouldn't frighten us into a relativization of goods, or into a disclaimer of the universal relevance of our own goods, about which we could never be sincere anyway.

It does point us to a future of humanity in which the kind of undistorted understanding of the other aimed at by "the comparativist enterprise" will be increasingly valuable. Not only to avoid political and military conflict where possible, but also to give people of every culture some sense of the immense gamut of human potentialities. This will serve not only to enlighten our judgments where goods clash, but will help where imagination and insight are capable of mediating the clash, and bring two hitherto warring goods to some degree of common realization. We can hope to advance in this direction, to the extent that the community of comparativists will increasingly include representatives of different cultures, will in effect start from different home languages." (pp. 163-164)

236. Tuck, Andrew P. 1990. *Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna*. New York: Oxford

University Press.

"Rather than contributing one more theoretical discussion of hermeneutics, or offering one more attempt at textual exegesis, this study examines the degree to which specific interpretations of a specific text have/been determined by factors often apparent only from the standpoint of another interpretive era or perspective. Furthermore, this study demonstrates the often stated principle that, rather than an ahistorical search for a preferred method or philosophy of interpretation, the enterprise of interpretation is inherently historical. Every reading of a text including, of course, the most carefully contextualized and historicised readings - will, in some ways, be unavoidably determined by some set of prejudgments. The choice is, therefore, not between good readings, undetermined by irrelevant considerations, and bad readings, rendered inaccurate by interpretive prejudice. The choice between one reading and an even better reading is a difference in degree and not in kind.

Within any set of rules for what counts as a desirable interpretation, choices between more and less preferable readings of texts can and will be made. And a study such as this suggests that our conventionally agreed - on rules of interpretation - the rules that tell us what is relevant, and what sorts of judgments are harmfully prejudiced - are anything but constant. Our preferences in regard to what constitutes a good interpretation are just as determined as our readings themselves." (Preface, pp. VI-VII)

237. Udoidem, Iniobong S. 1987. "Wiredu on How Not to Compare African Thought with Western Thought: A Commentary." *African Studies Review* no. 30:101-104.

"Kwasi Wiredu, a prominent African philosopher from Ghana, recently published an essay entitled "How Not To Compare African Thought to Western Thought" (1984) in which he criticized the prevalent method of comparing what is regarded as African philosophy with Western philosophy. Wiredu begins the essay with the assertion that all cultures are characterized by two levels of thought, namely, the traditional non-scientific and the theoretical or scientific thought (p. 149-50). He also notes, although without examples, that some contemporary philosophers both in Africa and the West are in the habit of comparing the traditional non-scientific thought of the African people with the highly theoretical and scientific thought of the Western world. He sees this type of comparison as improper and argues that since there is traditional folk thought in Africa as well as in the West, if there is to be any comparison at all, it must be with folk thought to folk thought and scientific thought to scientific thought (p. 157).

Wiredu's essay is an excellent academic treatise in its own right, but as an African who is attempting to reflect philosophically and possibly attempting to provide leadership for the thrust of African philosophical search, there are some pitfalls in the essay which need to be pointed out. The purpose of this commentary is to highlight and hopefully clarify some of the misleading innuendoes in contemporary literature about African philosophy and the role of an African philosopher within the world of philosophy." (p. 101, a note omitted)

238. van Binsbergen, Wim. 1999. "'Cultures does not exist': Exploding self-evidences in the investigation of interculturality." *Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy* no. 13:37-114.

"The structure of my argument is as follows. To begin with, I shall indicate how the concept of 'culture' has taken root as a key concept in our contemporary social experience and in philosophy. Precisely because it has done so, it is of the greatest importance to subject to empirical and philosophical scrutiny such self-evidences as attach to 'culture'.

(...)

As a next step, I shall explore the conditions under which my claim that ‘cultures do not exist’ may acquire meaningfulness. Since in this connection I put forth the social sciences as an example for philosophy, I am compelled to discuss the place of empirical knowledge within philosophy. I shall stress that intercultural philosophy ought to take into account such knowledge as the empirical sciences have gathered through explicit and well-tried methods; and here I am thinking particularly of the empirical discourse on African ethnicity, and of the neo-diffusionist arguments in favour of extensive cultural connections in space and time informing Africa’s cultural history and its place in the world as a whole. But as a next step I shall argue — by reference to my own complex itinerary through Africanist cultural anthropology — how this particular empirical science, despite its unmistakable relevance for intercultural philosophy, is yet so philosophically naïve, and so disposed towards a North Atlantic epistemological perspective from an epistemological point of view, that cultural anthropology can at best constitute a mere point of departure for our theoretical explorations of interculturality. Finally I posit that intercultural mediation ideally situates itself beyond any specific cultural orientation, which allows me to characterise intercultural philosophy as the search for a transgressive and innovative, metacultural medium for the production of knowledge. It is the quest itself which makes this a commendable undertaking, even though its metacultural goal is unlikely to be ever reached." (p. 38)

239. van Brakel, Jaap. 2006. "De-essentialising Across the Board: No Need to Speak the Same Language." *Rechtstheorie & Rechtspraktijk* no. 35:263-284.

"Let me repeat and stress that on my view there are no linguistic, cognitive, emotional, etc. universals. I admit that there may be a few cultural universals, but these universals are contingent (not genetically fixed for all times and places) and they are not sufficient to support communicative interaction for any length of time. And it remains the case that a rich or ‘thick’ interpretation and understanding of them is different in different lifeforms. Note, for example, that trading may take place, while both sides may have their own banking system and different reactions in case of undue performance." (p. 284, a note omitted)

240. ———. 2014. "Heidegger on Zhuangzi and Uselessness. Illustrating Preconditions of Comparative Philosophy." *Journal of Chinese philosophy* no. 41:387-406.

Abstract: "In this article, I look at those passages in the *Zhuangzi* usually associated with “uselessness.” I discuss in what way these passages may have been suggestive to Martin Heidegger to explain his ideas of the necessity of the other thinking and of the “waiting people” being entirely unusable to others. Then I make some brief comments concerning basic conditions of interpretation, using examples taken from the *Zhuangzi* passages discussed. These conditions include family resemblance across the board, a principle of agreement, and the issue of “planetaryization” (Heidegger’s term)."

241. van Brakel, Jaap, and Ma, Lin. 2015. "Extension of Family Resemblance Concepts as a Necessary Condition of Interpretation across Traditions." *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 14:475-497.

Abstract: "In this paper we extend Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance to translation, interpretation, and comparison across traditions. There is no need for universals. This holds for everyday concepts such as green and qing 青, philosophical concepts such as emotion(s) and qing 情, as well as philosophical categories such as form(s) of life and dao 道. These notions as well as all other concepts from whatever tradition are family resemblance concepts. We introduce the notion of quasi-universal, which connects family resemblance concepts from a limited number of traditions. The possibility and necessity of extending family resemblance concepts across traditions dissolves the false antinomy of universalism versus relativism."

242. ———. 2022. "Necessary Preconditions of the Practice of Comparative Philosophy." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 31-53. New York: Bloomsbury.

"In this contribution, we embrace a rather broad notion of comparative philosophy. We consider that it involves such a wide range of activities as translation, interpretation, exposition of the conceptual schemes of an "alien" philosophical tradition in terms of the conceptual schemes of the interpreter's "own" tradition, as well as comparison of these conceptual schemes in a learnable meta-language constructed by the interpreter. Our use of the word "interpretation" includes translations and any other form of interpretation of human actions, experiences, and utterances/inscriptions (including comparative philosophy). We ask: What are the necessary conditions and/ or unavoidable constraints of interpretation practice, in particular comparative interpretation of philosophical traditions? In clarifying more abstract considerations, we shall draw our examples from comparison of classical Chinese texts and their interpretations in modern languages (including modern Chinese)." (p. 31, notes omitted)

243. van der Wesfhuizen, Jacob. 2005. "One more time: Views on Aristotle's philosophy and Intercultural Philosophy." *Phronimon* no. 6:71-79.

Abstract: "In my view a philosopher is a person of wisdom who produces a guide to life, providing us with some tools for dealing with practical problems and survival issues on at least five adaptation domains. These are a) metaphysics: man's relationship to the cosmos; b) politics: man's relationship with others; c) ethics: man's relationship with himself and his behaviour toward others; d) epistemology: man's relationship with his mind and his method of thinking,. and e) aesthetics: man's relationship with and appreciation of beauty. This paper is destined to mainly present an unshackled response to the informed and well-versed papers by Anastasios Ladikos titled *Revisiting the virtue of courage in Aristotle*,. and Murray Hofmeyer: *The Promise and Problems of Intercultural Philosophy*; (*Phronimon - Journal of the South African Society for Greek Philosophy and the Humanities* -Volume 5(2) 2004). My concern with Aristotle's ideas stems from the fact that his propositions are connected to ancient battlefield circumstances and conditions, as well as the Spartan Culture of his time. If juxtaposed with scenes of violence in our time we can draw many parallel behavioral patterns that can pass as valid and reliable characteristics of modern-day soldiers in mortal face-to-face combat or victims of crime in violent confrontation with rapists, murderers and assaulters."

244. van Hensbroek, Pieter Boele 2013. "Beyond Crossing Borders. Beyond Intercultural Philosophy." In *Hegel's Twilight: Liber Amicorum Discipulorumque Pro Heinz Kimmerle*, edited by Ramose, Mogobe B., 31-41. Leiden: Brill.

"Heintz Kimmerle is the exemplary philosopher of crossing borders and of cross-border dialogues in

Philosophy.

(...)

What concerns us in this article is the mission of Kimmerle in relation to Philosophy and Intercultural Philosophy. In its broadest meaning this mission concerns reshaping the western tradition in Philosophy by making it move beyond its Eurocentric heritage. Kimmerle argues that the western tradition in philosophy is not equipped to face the new realities of a globalised world in which there is no hegemonic place for western culture. There is a real need for Philosophy to renew itself and to go intercultural. Such a move is not just a matter of adding a new branch of Intercultural Philosophy to mainstream Philosophy, but one of groping for an intercultural idea of Philosophy. In Kimmerle's words, it involves a "Annäherung du einen interkulturellen philosophie Begriff"

(Kimmerle 1994, 15)." (p. 31)

(...)

"In sum, the idea that philosophy is basically western philosophy is not well substantiated.

This provides space for Intercultural Philosophy as an attempt at elaborating an 'intercultural dimension' which can lead the discipline of Philosophy into the age of globalization. I will now proceed to a critical discussion of this argument." (p. 37)

245. Van Norden, Brian W. 2017. *Taking Back Philosophy: A Multicultural Manifesto*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Foreword by Jay L. Garfield.

"Jay Garfield and I did not anticipate the storm of controversy that would result when we published "If Philosophy Won't Diversify, Let's Call It What It Really Is" in *The Stone* column of the *New York Times* blog (May 11, 2016). Perhaps we should have: after all, we were calling upon ethnocentric philosophy departments to rename themselves "departments of Anglo-European philosophy" to reflect their intentional disregard of everything outside the mainstream philosophical canon.

However, it immediately became obvious that our challenge to the chauvinism of US philosophy departments had struck a nerve. This book is an effort to develop in detail the case for a multicultural approach to philosophy.

Like the original editorial, this book is polemical and intentionally provocative in the hope that it will incite discussion and raise awareness. This work is also intended to be interesting and accessible to general readers. Since the point is to get nonspecialists excited about the issues so they will want to read more and gain a deeper understanding, my argumentation is less guarded and less detailed than I would produce in a work intended solely for my fellow scholars." (Preface, p. XXIII)

(...)

"To assist those who want to learn more about philosophy outside the Anglo-European canon, I maintain a bibliography, "Readings on the Less Commonly Taught Philosophies," at <http://bryanvannorden.com>. I am grateful to James Maffie and Sean Robin for suggestions of some titles to include related to Native American thought, and to Travis W. Holloway for advice about readings in Continental thought." (Preface, p. XXIV)

246. Wang, Xinli. 2018. "Incommensurability and Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 68:564-582.

"My challenge to the viability of comparative philosophy between two disparate cultural traditions, such as the Western and Chinese philosophical traditions, concerns the two most prevailing forms of comparative philosophy: as cross-cultural philosophic understanding and as cross-cultural philosophic communication, which I will call the Gadamerian model of comparative philosophy (section 4). Based on my presuppositional interpretation of the thesis of incommensurability as cross-language communication breakdown (section 2), effective cross-cultural language communication between Chinese and Western cultural-language communities (section 3) is inevitably partial due to substantially distinct cultural schemes embedded within both cultural traditions. More precisely, there are two special forms of incommensurability faced by comparative philosophers: the failure of mutual understanding (the radical form of incommensurability) and effective communication breakdown (the modest form of incommensurability). Consequently, a comparative philosophy that predicates on mutual

understanding and communication between the two cultural-language communities is severely compromised. Cultural relativism based on the incommensurability thesis continues to impede the effort of comparative philosophy (section 5). However, this does not mean that no meaningful semantic comparison is possible between two distinct cultural-philosophic traditions, as some radical relativists claim. A different kind of comparability, namely the presuppositional comparison at the cultural-schemes level, will be discussed as a promising

solution (section 6)." (pp. 564-565)

247. Wawrytko, Sandra A. 2009. "Feminism and/in Asian Philosophies." *APA Newsletters* no. 9:5.

"Feminism has much to gain from a close reading of Asian philosophies. Stereotypical views of Asian cultures as irretrievably misogynist obscure both the constructive and deconstructive contributions Asian philosophies can make to feminist discourse. I will briefly outline doctrines found in key schools that can support and further feminist aims: 1) Daoism's radical reassessment of the "feminine" (Yin), 2) Confucianism's advocacy of the universal potential for self-cultivation, and 3) Mahayana Buddhism's deconstruction of sexism as one among many forms of discrimination. Since I have already discussed points two and three elsewhere, my main focus here will be Daoism." (p. 5)

248. Weber, Ralph. 2013. "'How to Compare?'" – On the Methodological State of Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy Compass* no. 8:593-603.

Abstract: "From early on, comparative philosophy has had on offer a high variety of goals, approaches and methodologies. Such high variety is still today a trademark of the discipline, and it is not uncommon of representatives of one camp in comparative philosophy to think of those in other camps as not really being about 'comparative philosophy'. Much of the disagreement arguably has to do with methodological problems related to the concept of comparison and with the widely prevailing but unwarranted assumption that comparative philosophy should be about comparing 'culturally different philosophies'.

This paper seeks to problematize this assumption by clarifying conceptually the notions of 'comparative philosophy' and of 'comparison', by showing the prevalence of the assumption in recent second-order discussions of methodology in comparative philosophy and its restraining implications in a randomly selected contribution of 'Chinese philosophy'. At the end, a rallying call for a (self-)critical comparative philosophy is issued."

249. ———. 2013. "A Stick Which may be Grabbed on Either Side: Sino-Hellenic Studies in the Mirror of Comparative Philosophy." *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* no. 20:1-14.

Abstract: "Recently, Jeremy Tanner has published a highly informative review article in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, in which he introduces and advertises "Sino-Hellenic Studies" as a new and upcoming subfield in academic inquiry. Tanner particularly focuses on what he terms "Sino-Hellenic comparative philosophy," while developing his perspective clearly from within contemporary Classicists' academic parameters. In this paper, I approach the matter precisely from the other end, i.e. from within contemporary comparative philosophy, distinguishing four different approaches in comparative philosophy, pointing out some pitfalls in comparison and offering a perhaps provocative conclusion by provincializing and politicizing "Sino-Hellenic Studies". The paper not only seeks to supplement Tanner's review, but also and more importantly to introduce some fundamental methodological problems to be dealt with in any comparative inquiry."

250. ———. 2014. "Comparative Philosophy and the *Tertium*: Comparing What with What, and in What Respect?" *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 13:151-171.

Abstract: "Comparison is fundamental to the practice and subject-matter of philosophy, but has received scant attention by philosophers. This is even so in "comparative philosophy," which literally distinguishes itself from other philosophy by being "comparative."

In this article, the need for a philosophy of comparison is suggested. What we compare with what, and in what respect it is done, poses a series of intriguing and intricate questions. In Part One, I offer a problematization of the *tertium comparationis* (the third of comparison) by examining conceptualizations of similarity, family resemblance, and analogy, which it is sometimes argued can do without a *tertium comparationis*. In Part Two, I argue that a third of comparison is already required to determine what is to be compared, and insofar as that determination precedes the comparison that tertium may be called "pre-comparative." This leads me to argue against incomparability and to show how anything can indeed be compared to anything.

In Part Three, I relate my arguments to what is today commonly labelled "comparative philosophy." Finally, I raise some questions of ontology and politics in order to demonstrate the relevance of a philosophy of comparison."

251. ———. 2018. "Reply to Xiao Ouyang." *Philosophy East and West* no. 68:256-261.

"I read Xiao Ouyang's comments on "Rethinking Comparative Philosophical Methodology" as a contribution to these important discussions in methodology and particularly regarding the aims of comparative philosophy. That he has chosen my work on comparison and criticism of comparative philosophy as a springboard to articulate these larger issues honors me, and I shall of course take the opportunity to clarify some of my views and respond to some of the criticism from Ouyang's side.

Nonetheless, I should also like to engage with some of the more encompassing thoughts offered by Ouyang. There is much that he writes that I can agree with, and I am especially thankful for his revisiting the early methodological debates published in the first few volumes of *Philosophy East and West*. These earlier contributions to comparative philosophy are important not only in terms of what they have to say, but also in terms of raising awareness that there is a history to the discipline. Critical reflections on the history of comparative philosophy, as well as other aspects, are in my view still fundamentally lacking. Further professionalization of the discipline would mean that we start writing local and global histories of the discipline, posing questions pertaining to the sociology of comparative philosophy and investigating the broader intellectual and political contexts that have influenced the formation and development of the discipline. Many key figures featured in the first volumes of *Philosophy East and West* and writing about methodology spoke out firmly in favor of a plurality of approaches, which is as sound an intellectual position as it is necessary for the flourishing of any discipline." (p. 257)

252. ———. 2021. "Comparative Philosophy and Comparison." In *Comparative Methods in Law, Humanities and Social Sciences*, edited by Adams, Maurice and Van Hoecke, Mark, 149-174. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

"This chapter discusses comparative philosophy and some of its theoretical insights into comparison. Like every academic discipline, comparative philosophy is a practice that has its own history, sociology, politics, economy, and so forth. This is why understanding the past and present practice is important to contextualize theoretical insights." (p. 149)

(...)

"This diversity in voices and approaches is why this chapter begins with an overview of the discussion around the subject of comparative philosophy.

It starts by introducing some of the dominant views that are currently being advocated in the discipline or sub-discipline. This will help readers new to the subject with starting points from which to read further, as well as orient them in the field. The chapter also deals with the present conceptualization of the logic of *comparison* and offers distinctions that may be useful in discussing *comparing* from the point of view of comparative philosophy and traverse other related disciplinary and interdisciplinary areas. Against this backdrop, the chapter concludes with some of the other theoretical issues being discussed in the field of comparative philosophy and comparative studies more generally at the present." (p. 153)

253. Weber, Ralph, and Kahteran, Nevad. 2021. "Towards Post-Comparative Philosophy: Interview with Ralph Weber." *Asian Studies* no. 9:211-221.

[Question:] "*Comparative Philosophy without Borders* (written together with Arindam Chakrabarti, currently at Stony Brook University in New York) speaks about four phases of Comparative Philosophy in a Pluralistic World. According to your best insights and knowledge, in which phase are we right now?"

[Answer:] "Now, in our book, *Comparative Philosophy without Borders*, Arindam Chakrabarti and I wanted to put a spin on the practice of comparative philosophy at the third, current stage, which eventually might lead us to a fourth stage. The spin would take us beyond comparative philosophy to what I prefer to call "post-comparative" philosophy, but others, who work towards similar ends like, for example, Jonardon Ganeri, call by various different names. It would amount to just doing philosophy as one thinks fit for getting to the truth about an issue or set of issues, by appropriating elements from all philosophical views and traditions one knows of but making no claim of "correct exposition", and instead just addressing hitherto unsolved problems and possibly raising issues that have never been considered before, anywhere. The crucial point is one about epistemic authority. An argument is not persuasive because it is one made, say, from within Indian philosophy, but it is persuasive because it is a good argument." (pp. 214-215)

254. Wen, Haiming. 2010. "A Survey of Roger Ames's Methodology on Comparative Philosophy." *Contemporary Chinese Thought* no. 41:52-63.

"This article discusses Roger Ames's methodology of comparative philosophy.

The crux of Ames's philosophy is to correct Western thought, especially Western misinterpretations of Chinese philosophy. His academic career is based on two themes that surround this central problem. The first is traditional Western philosophy's misunderstanding of Chinese philosophy, and the other is illustrating and advancing the profundity of Chinese philosophy. The thrust of his method is achieved through three academic fields of research: classical translations of Chinese philosophy, commentaries on Chinese philosophy and thought, and English and Chinese works on comparative philosophy. These three fields of research draw from four theoretical frameworks: neo-Confucian interpretations of Chinese philosophy, Western Sinological training, American pragmatism, and important theoretical questions in contemporary Chinese-Western comparative philosophy. This article discusses his methodology of comparative philosophy from these multiple angles." (p. 53)

255. Wenning, Mario. 2020. "Intercultural Encounter in the Age of Hybridity: A Response to Eric S. Nelson." *Philosophy East and West* no. 70:225-237.

Book discussion of: *Chinese and Buddhist Philosophy in Early Twentieth-Century German Thought*. By Eric S. Nelson. London, Oxford, New York, New Delhi, Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017.

"In short, the book is more ambitious than its historical theme and modest tone suggest. In broad agreement and sympathy with the hermeneutic vistas and normative pillars of this attempt at a rescuing critique that combines the best of immanent and external critique, this essay will suggest two dimensions to complement Nelson's narrative: (1) the role of the imagination in the Sino-German philosophical encounter and (2) the need to self-critically question the extent to which the models of intercultural understanding developed a century ago can be relevant given the contemporary situation.<sup>2</sup> In particular, the challenge of increasing forms of cultural hybridity for intercultural hermeneutics will be highlighted. The conclusion of this essay will briefly draw on Karl Löwith, who has anticipated the task of rethinking the challenge of the East-West entanglement of cultural traditions in his reflections on Japanese modernity." (P. 227)

(2) From a different perspective, Kai Marchal has formulated a related doubt concerning the applicability of the early twentieth-century reception of Asian traditions in Germany for current debates in East-West philosophy (see in this issue of *Philosophy East and West*).

256. White, David. 1956. "Translation and Oriental Philosophy: An Introductory Study." *Philosophy East and West* no. 6:247-255.

"It is the purpose of this introductory study to demonstrate briefly a method for reading Asian texts in translation. This method is not original with the writer; it has been well practiced by A. K. Coomaraswamy, Heinrich Zimmer, D. T. Suzuki, Arthur Waley, and many others. But its application to the problem at hand is perhaps sufficiently unfamiliar to warrant this effort." (p. 248)

(...)

"This completes the effort to show that a little general knowledge makes it possible to read Indian texts in translation with understanding. Of course, an Indian philosopher would find the explication incomplete. The positive content of the term "mokṣa" has not been developed, for example; and such important presuppositions as those provided by Atman (Self) and Brahman ("undifferentiated Absolute" or Godhead) have not been mentioned.

These and many other omissions are due to the limited purpose of the study. If the Western philosopher objects, however, that, though this exercise has demonstrated a method for reading in translation, it has scarcely shown much of philosophic import, it might similarly be pointed out that one does not get much of the detailed essence of Descartes' thought from a first acquaintance with a single short section of the *Discourse on Method* (in translation). What we have seen here is simply that it is possible to get accurate initial understanding of an Indian text in translation by employing that general knowledge of Indian thought and culture which is available to any Western reader who is interested in taking advantage of it." (p. 255)

257. Wimmer, Franz Martin. 1998. "Introduction." *Topoi* no. 17:1-13.

"Intercultural philosophy is dealing with the question of whether it is possible and necessary to develop new ways of philosophizing because of the present condition of humankind. We are living in a global world, while we are still thinking in frameworks conditioned by regionally bound cultural traditions. The answer to our question therefore shall be: problems of philosophy can and ought to be made clear by way of interculturally orientated polylogues. What that means and why it is the answer to the question can only be sketched here.

Recently the subject of interculturality has been discussed in growing intensity within several academic disciplines. Thereby it is not primarily concerned with problems of multicultural societies; i.e. not questions concerning the necessary and sufficient conditions to be fulfilled in a society in which the members are rooted in different and

sometimes even incompatible traditions. Further, the question is not about a theory of the foundations and the origin of cultures, nor about their mutual relationships. The question is about nothing but philosophy itself." (p. 1)

258. ———. 1998. "Intercultural Philosophy – a New Orientation in Philosophy." In *Philosophie et démocratie en Europe*, 165-182. Sofia: Commission nationale de la Bulgarie pour l'UNESCO.

Summary: "Probably every human culture has developed typical ways of philosophising in the sense that there were given explanations of the world, of what man is, and of the right relationships between human beings.

Some of the cultures of the past have invented systems of writing and documentation, thereby establishing long lasting traditions of thought. Amidst a period of globalisation of many aspects of human life, the problem now arises, whether there will be one single form or method of philosophy in the future. If so: what then will be the role of the different traditions in shaping this future thinking? If not: must we give up the idea that philosophy ever can argue for universally acceptable truths or insights?

This paper deals with some aspects of these questions by discussing the role of (Euro-)centrism in the historiography of philosophy, and by analysing the impact of the different languages of philosophy on thinking itself."

259. ———. 2002. *Essays on Intercultural Philosophy*. Chennai: Satya Nilayam Publications.

"I am quite sure about the necessity of intercultural dialogues and polylogues in a global society. And I am also sure about the inevitability for a global philosophy with such dialogues. Perhaps, this will happen beside academic philosophy. If they turn out to be fruitful, that would not be the first case in the history of philosophy when something necessary and fruitful was not primarily dealt with by institutionalised discourse.

Wherever such dialogues are initiated, we can ask what probably will be the topics and the possible outcomes of intercultural philosophy in the future. We can only guess from the past and present. It can be expected that encounters of philosophers from different regions will intensify in the future, that there will be discussions of values and norms as well as on logical and epistemological questions, where the different traditions may criticise each other. Of course, there can be a broader understanding of the varieties of human reasoning during the ages, together with increased knowledge about particularities and about possible universality. Hopefully, such encounters and discourses can contribute establishing peace and humanity. That can only be the case, if philosophical discourse is practised in the spirit of mutual interest and esteem, encountering one another on an equal footing in spite of differences." (p. 4)

260. ———. 2007. "Cultural Centrisms and Intercultural Polylogues in Philosophy." *International Review of Information Ethics* no. 7:1-8.

Abstract: "A "dilemma of culturality" for philosophy, tending to universality, is given with the fact that there is not one and the definitely adequate language or tradition of philosophy. There are many, each of them being cultural, not natural. The question is about the possibility of systematic philosophy with the presupposition that there are different cultural coinages in every philosophical thinking which can be influential on every level of reflection and argumentation. Intercultural philosophy is bound to reflect on this problem. In the following text, I propose to distinguish four different types of centrism being influential in intercultural encounters: expansive, integrative, separative, and tentative centrism. Then some examples are given for certain types of centrism in the fields of history and philosophy. Finally, I shall argue for dialogical or rather: polylogical interactions, in the field of philosophy."

261. ———. 2013. "Intercultural Philosophy - Problems and Perspectives." *Cirpit Review* no. 4:115-124.

Abstract: "This article aims to describe some basic questions and challenges of the project of an interculturally orientated philosophy. Firstly, the challenges of historiography of philosophy in a global perspective is discussed, which is not restricted to comparisons.

Further there are questions of a theory of culture, particularly with regard to the dilemmatic situation of philosophy between cultural conditionality and intended universality. Concepts of different types of centrism and polylogic interaction are discussed in view of extra-philosophically conditioned inequalities of philosophical discourses on a global scale."

262. ———. 2015. "Symposium: How Are Histories of Non-Western Philosophies Relevant to Intercultural Philosophizing?" *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies* no. 3:125-161.

Abstract: "The view that philosophy is a uniquely and essentially European endeavor rooted in ancient Greece became dominant in Europe only in the late eighteenth century, eclipsing several centuries during which Europeans had denied this proposition. Advocates of intercultural philosophy aim to integrate Western and non-Western philosophical histories and traditions in hopes of better addressing the crucial questions facing global humankind. A Native American standpoint charges this project with being exploitative, and disrespectful."

F.-M. Wimmer: How Are Histories of Non-Western Philosophies Relevant to Intercultural Philosophizing? 125; R. Bernasconi: The Kantian Canon: Response to Wimmer 133; P. Hountondji: Franz Wimmer's Statement: A Comment 139; T. Norton-Smith: A Shawnee Reflection on Franz Wimmer's »How Are Histories of Non-Western Philosophies Relevant to Intercultural Philosophizing?« 145; F.-M. Wimmer: Reply 151-161.

263. Wiredu, J. E. [Kwasi]. 1997. "How Not to Compare African Traditional Thought with Western Thought." *Transition: A Journal of the Arts, Culture and Society* no. 75/76:320-327.

Reprinted in K. Wiredu, *Philosophy and an African Culture*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980 and in Albert G. Mosley, *African Philosophy: Selected Readings*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1995, pp. 159-171.

"Many Westerners have been puzzled by the virtual ubiquity of gods and spirits in traditional African explanations of things. Robin Horton, the Western anthropologist, has suggested that this failure of understanding is partly attributable to the fact that many Western anthropologists "have been unfamiliar with the theoretical thinking of their own culture."(1) I would like to suggest that a much more significant reason is that they have also been unfamiliar with the folk thought of their own culture. Western societies, too, have passed through a stage of addiction to spiritistic explanations of phenomena. What is more, significant residues of this tradition remain a basic part of the mental makeup of a large mass of the less sophisticated sections of Western populations. More importantly still, elements of the spiritistic outlook are, in fact, deeply embedded in the philosophical thought of many contemporary Westerners: philosophers and even scientists. Obviously, it is a matter of first-rate philosophical importance to distinguish between traditional, that is, prescientific, spiritistic thought and modern scientific thought by means of clearly articulated criteria. It is also of anthropological and psychological interest to try to understand how traditional modes of thought function in the total context of life in a traditional society. Since African societies are among the closest approximations in the modern world to societies in the pre-scientific stage of intellectual development, the interest anthropologists have shown in African thought is understandable." (p. 320)

(1) Robin Horton, "African Traditional Thought and Western Science," reprinted in *Rationality*, edited by Bryan Wilson (Oxford, Basil Blackwell) from *Africa*, vol. 3 7, nos. I-2 (1967).

264. Wiredu, Kwasi. 1998. "Can Philosophy Be Intercultural? An African Viewpoint." *Diogenes* no. 46:147-167.

"Actually, the question of whether philosophy can be intercultural must sound highly redundant to contemporary African academic philosophers, most obviously because their philosophical discourse is generally in the language of some foreign culture, either English, French, German, Spanish, or possibly Portuguese.

One direct implication of this is that the philosophies of our own cultures, as expounded in such languages must, in principle, be intelligible to the people who own the languages concerned." (p. 147)

(...)

"What do these considerations show? They show not only that philosophy can be, but also that it has sometimes been and sometimes still is, intercultural. This is obvious but sometimes denied by implication. Thus it is sometimes thought to be sufficient proof of error to comment that somebody is using Western intellectual canons to evaluate some African conception. No, that can never be sufficient. One must go further to show that there is something wrong with the specific canons in question or that they are inapplicable for specific reasons. This law of criticism would apply also to someone criticizing another for using some canons of reflection deriving from African thought in evaluating some doctrine in Western philosophy. The point now is that one can only go beyond such parochialism by a mode of reasoning intelligible to both the African and Western sides, in other words, by what I have called independent considerations." (p. 148)

265. Wong, David B. 2003. "Comparative Philosophy." In *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy*, edited by Cua, Antonio S., 51-58. New York: Routledge.

"Doing comparative philosophy compels one to examine one's deepest assumptions about value, knowledge, the structure of reality, and the proper way to do philosophy itself. The comparison of Chinese and western traditions has yielded fresh and illuminating perspectives on the basic assumptions of each tradition. Comparative philosophy, however, presents special pitfalls as well as special benefits. The desire to draw an interesting and dramatic contrast between traditions often leads to overgeneralization and oversimplification of each tradition, making both appear more different than they are. On the other hand, the desire to make another tradition speak to the problems of one's own tradition often leads to a blurring of genuine differences." (p. 51)

266. Xiao-ming, Wu. 1998. "Philosophy, Philosophia, and Zhe-xue." *Philosophy East and West* no. 48:406-452.

"In other words, is it possible to treat philosophy not from philosophy's own point of view, but from another point of view, the point of view of the other? Indeed, one may want to separate oneself from philosophy, in order to describe and decry its law from "the absolute exteriority of another place," a place that might as well bear the name "China." Is China not one of the names synonymous with exteriority and alterity in (Western) philosophical discourse? "But," Derrida says, "exteriority and alterity are concepts which by themselves have never surprised philosophical discourse. Philosophy by itself has always been concerned with them" (*M*, p. xiii). Thinking that one can treat philosophy from outside philosophy is to ignore the logic of the philosophical logos and to be reappropriated by it. Setting oneself up in direct opposition to philosophy, one plays into the hand of philosophy and loses the game." (p. 407)

## References

M = Derrida, Jacques. *Margins of Philosophy*. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982

267. Xie, Ming. 2011. *Conditions of Comparison: Reflections on Comparative Intercultural Inquiry*. New York: Continuum.

"This book explores, and seeks to offer new ways of thinking about, the epistemological conditions of what I would like to call "comparative intercultural inquiry." It is a critical-comparative study of the epistemes, or presuppositional perspectives, of intercultural discourse. By focusing on how conceptual resources of cultures (such as underlying assumptions, implicit categories of thought and belief, and unconscious or semiconscious social imaginaries) may prefigure our perspectives and predetermine our habits of mind, the book argues for the *cognitive, conceptual, and epistemological* nature of comparative intercultural inquiry, alongside with and apart from its historical, social, political, and ethical dimensions. Cultural exchange or dialogue may sometimes seem to be merely an ideal or even an illusion, but it is real in the impact of encounters between cultures." (p. 1)

268. ———, ed. 2014. *The Agon of Interpretations: Towards a Critical Intercultural Hermeneutics*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

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269. Xu, Keqian. 2010. "Chinese "Dao" and Western "Truth": A Comparative and Dynamic Perspective." *Asian Social Science* no. 6:42-49.

Abstract: In the Pre-Qin time, pursuing "Dao" was the main task in the scholarship of most of the ancient Chinese philosophers, while the Ancient Greek philosophers

considered pursuing "Truth" as their ultimate goal. While the "Dao" in ancient Chinese texts and the "Truth" in ancient Greek philosophic literature do share or cross-cover certain connotations, there are subtle and important differences between the two comparable philosophic concepts. These differences have deep and profound impact on the later development of Chinese and Western philosophy and culture respectively. Interestingly, while the modern Chinese philosophy has gradually accepted and established the Western conception of "Truth" on its way towards modernization, the "post-modern" Western philosophy is just undergoing a process of deconstructing its traditional concept of "Truth", thus, in a certain sense, going closer to the traditional Chinese "Dao". From a comparative, relative and dynamic perspective, there could possibly be a fusion of horizon between the Chinese "Dao" and the Western "Truth"."

270. Yancy, George, ed. 2007. *Philosophy in Multiple Voices*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; George Yancy: Introduction: No Philosophical Oracle Voices 1; 1 Nancy Tuana: What Is Feminist Philosophy? 21; 2 Sarah Lucia Hoagland: What Is Lesbian Philosophy? (A Misleading Question) 49; 3 Randall Halle: What Is Queer Philosophy? 81; 4 Lucius T. Outlaw Jr.: What Is Africana Philosophy? 109; 5 Lewis R. Gordon: What Is Afro-Caribbean Philosophy? 145; 6 Jorge J. E. Gracia: What Is Latin American Philosophy? 175; 7 Dale Turner: What Is American Indian Philosophy? Toward a Critical Indigenous Philosophy 197; 8 David Haekwon Kim: What Is Asian American Philosophy? 219; About the Contributors 273-276,

271. Yang, Guorong. 2005. "Knowing, Being, and Wisdom: A Comparative Study." *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* 57-72.

"Knowing and being are often regarded as the respective subject-matters of epistemology and ontology." (p. 57)

(...)

"In this article, drawing on the rich resources from both Chinese and Western philosophical traditions, I attempt to make a general but concrete examination of the ontological dimension of knowing. I will first investigate the known with its metaphysical implication as the unity of things-in-themselves and things-for-us and their internal order that makes it possible for us to understand them. I then move to the knower to bring to light the significance of human existence in the process of knowing. I argue that, as the subject of knowing, the knower cannot be reduced to abstract reason; instead, the knower possesses various cognitive faculties; it is the union of cognition and evaluation and the union of reason, emotion, and will. Third, I turn to the ontological foundation of objective knowledge. In opposition to Kant and Locke, I argue that the relationship between the known and the knower is both intrinsic and extrinsic, which makes interaction between them possible and provides a concrete ontological foundation for the objectivity of knowledge. Finally, by disclosing the interaction of knowledge and wisdom, I analyze the fusion of the horizon of epistemology and that of ontology, which will manifest, on a deeper level, the unity of being and knowing." (P. 58)

272. Yang, Xiaomei. 2011. "Do Differences in Grammatical Form between Languages Explain Differences in Ontology between Different Philosophical Traditions?: A Critique of the Mass-Noun Hypothesis." *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 10:149-166.

Abstract: "It is an assumed view in Chinese philosophy that the grammatical differences between English or Indo-European languages and classical Chinese explain some of the differences between the Western and Chinese philosophical discourses. Although some philosophers have expressed doubts about the general link between classical Chinese philosophy and syntactic form of classical Chinese, I discuss a specific hypothesis, i.e., the mass-noun hypothesis, in this essay. The mass-noun hypothesis assumes that a

linguistic distinction such as between the singular terms and the predicates is sufficient to justify or necessarily leads to a specific ontological distinction such as the distinction between the particular and the universal. I argue that one cannot read off semantic properties simply from syntactic ones and hence the syntactic differences do not automatically translate into the semantic differences between languages, that the syntactic features of Chinese nouns do not have explanatory significance in explaining why the particular-universal problem does not arise in the classical period of Chinese philosophy, and that the part-whole ontology allegedly informed by the mass-noun-like semantics does not provide a natural or intuitive picture of the language-world relation."

273. Zene, Cosimo. 2015. "World Philosophies in Dialogue: a Shared Wisdom?" *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies* no. 2:11-32.

Abstract: "Martin Heidegger's lecture in 1964 ›*The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*‹ signalled a crisis and the acknowledgement of substantial changes within Western philosophy. Reflecting upon the concept of critical dialogue among World Philosophies (WP) can be seen as a corrective of this crisis and a novel advancement. I aim to substantiate this by referring to the work of three authors: i) Jean-Luc Marion's reflections on Heidegger will give us the chance to overcome a narrow understanding of ›philosophy‹ and the possibility of discovering »new horizons« for the discipline which are revealed as a »donation« towards »wisdom«; ii) Reyes Mate's considerations on ›*Thinking in Spanish*‹ will offer, aided by Walter Benjamin, a concrete example for renegotiating the space and the place for those »excluded from thinking«; and iii) Paul Ricoeur's meditation *On Translation* puts forward the ethical element of »linguistic hospitality« and transformation of the self when encountering alterity. While it is impossible to do justice to these authors in a short article, I maintain that their work deserves close attention because it depicts the struggle within Western philosophy on its way towards maturity: still entangled with so many challenges derived from its troubled history, this maturity appears only faintly, on the horizon, precisely, in the form of ›traces‹. On these grounds, I believe that Anglo-European philosophy can no longer postpone opening up to an indispensable dialogue with other systems of thought wherein the presence of WP and the renewed effort of many philosophers committed to this endeavour is recognised."

274. Zhang, Ji. 2012. *One and Many: A Comparative Study of Plato's Philosophy and Daoism Represented by Ge Hong*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

"Why does this book compare Ge Hong (AD 284–344?) with Plato (428–347 BC)? Reasons of personal intellectual history are involved. When I encountered Platonism in the field of Christian systematic theology, I admired its persistent search for inner coherence of truths and was deeply impressed by its transcendentalism and its unshakable influence on two streams of Western thought, philosophy and theology. Although I resonated with its idealism, over the years it became increasingly clear to me that this intellectual tradition imposed on me a demand that restricts the development of my own thought rooted in Chinese tradition. In contrast, Daoism has provided me with the free space that I was looking for in the formation of my intellectual identity. I first encountered Ge Hong when I attended a seminar at Harvard University in 1998. Since then I have felt that I was coming home to something that had unconsciously shaped my thought yet had not been properly named. Eagerness to come to terms with Daoism and Ge Hong's religious philosophy in particular has become the inner drive for the current study." (introduction, p. XIII, anote omitted)(1)

275. Zhang, Longxi. 2007. *Unexpected Affinities: Reading across Cultures*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

"Since this book contains the first set of Alexander Lectures to discuss a wide range of texts from the perspective of East-West studies, the opening chapter tries to lay the ground for such broadly comparative work through a critique of cultural

incommensurability, that is, the idea that East and West are mutually exclusive and have nothing in common. By showing the inherent difficulty of the incommensurability argument and the ironic commonality of this argument in both East and West, the first chapter makes the case that we need the broad cross-cultural perspective to understand and appreciate different literary and cultural traditions. The remaining three chapters build on that ground to show the validity and significance of cross-cultural understanding through a discussion of specific themes and textual details.

(...)

All these chapters are conceptually linked by images and ideas, and they all demonstrate the thematic patterns of textual encounters, the similarities in conception and expression, and the unexpected affinities between literatures and cultures East and West." (preface, pp. XIII-XIV)

276. ———. 2016. "Comparison and Correspondence: Revisiting an Old Idea for the Present Time." *Comparative Literature Studies* no. 53:766-785.

Abstract: "Analogical thinking that relates everything to everything else in a complicated system of correspondences was common in ancient Mesopotamia, ancient Greece, early modern Europe, as well as ancient China. Such premodern theories of knowledge about correspondences between the cosmos and the human world are discredited in modern scientific thinking, but by revisiting some of the old ideas, of which the value has not been sufficiently recognized in modern scholarship, we may find them helpful in rethinking the disciplinary compartmentalization of knowledge and the possibilities of dialogues between different disciplines in comparative studies."

277. ———. 2017. "East-West Comparative Studies: A Challenge and an Opportunity." *Know: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge* no. 1:45-65.

"There is always so much to learn and to know. Today we have a much better condition for East-West comparative studies as the world has become more connected as a "global village" and also as there is much more interest in the non-Western world and its literatures and cultures among Western scholars and students. At the same time, our world today is also suffering from much conflict and regional wars, humanitarian crises, massive numbers of displaced people as exiles and migrants, the rise of religious fundamentalism, the threat of terrorism, and many other disasters stemming from the lack of tolerance and understanding, especially understanding across cultures, histories, and traditions. In a real sense, East-West comparative studies is not just an academic pursuit of knowledge but has particular relevance to our world and the way we live our lives.

It is my strong belief that when the world pays more attention to the value of cross-cultural understanding beyond the fundamental differences of East and West, we will have a world that is not just better in understanding, but better in every sense." (pp. 61-62)

278. Zhang, Xianglong. 2010. "Comparison Paradox, Comparative Situation and Inter-Paradigmaticity: A Methodological Reflection on Cross-Cultural Philosophical Comparison." *Comparative Philosophy* no. 1:90-105.

Abstract: "It is commonly believed that philosophical comparison depends on having some common measure or standard between and above the compared parts. The paper is to show that the foregoing common belief is incorrect and therewith to inquire into the possibility of cross-cultural philosophical comparison. First, the "comparison paradox" will be expounded.

It is a theoretical difficulty for the philosophical tendency represented by Plato's theory of Ideas to justify comparative activities. Further, the connection of the comparative

paradox with the obstacles met by cross-cultural philosophical comparisons will be demonstrated. It will be shown that to attribute the difficulty of cross-cultural comparisons to incommensurability of traditions is irrelevant and misleading. It is to be argued that the original possibility of comparison depends on the "comparative situation", i.e., the mechanism of meaning-production that functions in a non-universalistic and anonymous way. A philosophical paradigm does facilitate the attendance of such a situation, but it is also possible for the situation to emerge between paradigms in a gamesome way. Accordingly, the genuine comparison at issue will not originate primarily and merely on the level of concepts and propositions, but can only be achieved through inter-paradigmatic conditions, where we have the sharp awareness of a paradigm's boundary from which we can attempt to achieve situational communication with another paradigm. In light of this, the perspective of a philosophical comparison differs not only from the traditional or universalistic one, but also from Gadamer's hermeneutics, such as the doctrine of "fusion of horizons". The new perspective finds an illustration in Heidegger's relations with Daoism."

279. Zhu, Rui. 2018. "Comparative Philosophy: In Response to Rorty and MacIntyre." *Philosophy East and West* no. 68:264-266.

"In my view, comparative philosophy, done either through the comparison of life experiences or through the comparison of comparisons, in order to be genuinely philosophical, must cultivate irony, especially an insider's irony. The point of comparison lies neither in the search for mutual understanding or a common ground, which may or may not be found, nor in the final adjudication of winners and losers, which, though happening all the time, shall never constitute a proper philosophical concern. Instead, comparative philosophy, conducted with a uniquely alert intercultural consciousness, not aimed at striking a dialogue or taking still shots of various comparable historical answers to satisfy curiosity, may represent an object-centered self-reflection.

(...)

In other words, comparative philosophy, as philosophy, is perhaps best conducted by a specialist of a foreign culture who not infrequently casts a backward glance at one's own culture, as opposed to by a specialist of one's own culture looking out into an exotic foreign culture for similarities and differences that may be used to confirm some preferred transcultural wisdoms or character types. In brief, what comparative philosophy ought to do to philosophy may resemble something like what Michael Taussig's symbolic anthropology has done to anthropology — it teases and criticizes one's own culture, aiming to unself one's own deep-entrenched illusions, to expose the limit of one's consciousness, as opposed to strengthening and expanding it at the expense of the rivals'."

#### References

Richard Rorty (1991) and (1996), Alasdair MacIntyre (1991).

280. Zhu, Rui, and Beckford, Corey. 2018. "Reply to Steven Burik." *Philosophy East and West* no. 68:271-276.

"Important objections are raised by Steven Burik in his comment on Rui Zhu's response to Rorty and MacIntyre. We will try to address them without proceeding in an eristic, point-by-point manner. In general, it seems that at least some of Burik's objections are based on his misreading of Zhu's response. Burik is not to blame, however.

Zhu's response was short and many of the points made there were not sufficiently explained or developed. By way of his generous commentary Burik has provided us a much needed opportunity to offer some remedies.

A key distinction in Zhu's response was its reference to comparative philosophy as a form of intercultural studies and as philosophy. The former compares philosophies and the latter does philosophy. It goes without saying that the two are difficult to separate. Nevertheless, the distinction is real and can be felt by any comparative philosopher through the tension between scholarly expositions and creative philosophizing. In this reply to Burik we will recalibrate the distinction in terms of that between understanding and thinking, even though the profile drawn here might be a bit too sharp for our comfort. But such is the risk we have to bear for the sake of heuristics." (p. 271)

#### References

Burik (2018)

281. Zong, Desheng. 2010. "A New Framework for Comparative Study of Philosophy." *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 9:445-459.

Abstract: "The aim of this essay is to outline a conceptual framework for a type of philosophy (or approach to philosophy) to be herein called "non-sentential philosophy."

Although I will primarily concern myself with the conceptual coherence of the framework in this essay, illustrations will be provided to show that the notion has rich implications for comparative studies. In particular, I believe this theoretical framework will be of interest to those looking for a way to capture the differences between certain non-Western philosophical traditions—such as Chinese philosophy—and Western philosophy, a tradition in which the sentential approach is dominant."