

Plato's *Sophist*: Annotated bibliography of the studies in English

Last update: June 9th, 2025

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2. Ackrill, John Lloyd. 1955. "ΣΥΜΠΛΟΚΗ ΕΙΔΩΝ." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* no. 2:31–35.

Reprinted in J. L. Ackrill, *Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997, Chapter 4, pp. 72-79.

"It is the purpose of this short essay• to consider the meaning and implications of a sentence in Plato's *Sophist*. At the end of the section on μέγιστα γένη (the combination of kinds) the Eleatic visitor is made to speak as follows (259e4-6): τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων: διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν (the isolation of everything from everything else is the total annihilation of all statements; for it is because of the interweaving of Forms with one another that we come to have discourse). I shall be mainly concerned with the second half of this remark, and shall refer to it, for brevity, as sentence or statement S." (p. 72 of the reprint)

(...)

"I have gradually passed from talking about Forms to talking about concepts, and I have taken these to be, in effect, the meanings of general words. Correspondingly, I have implied that the task assigned in Plato's later dialogues to the dialectician or philosopher is the investigation and plotting of the relations among concepts, a task to be pursued through a patient study of language by noticing which combinations of words in sentences do, and which do not, make sense, by eliciting ambiguities and drawing distinctions, by stating explicitly facts about the interrelations of word meanings which we normally do not trouble to state, though we all have some latent knowledge of them in so far as we know how to talk correctly. To justify all this, and to add the many sober qualifications which it evidently demands, would take a volume." (p. 78 of the reprint)

3. ———. 1957. "Plato and the Copula: *Sophist* 251-9." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 77:1–6.

Reprinted in: R. E. Allen (ed.), *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1965, pp. 207-218, G. Vlastos (ed.), *Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology*, Notre Dame: Indiana University Press 1971; J. L. Ackrill, *Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, New York: Oxford University Press 1997, pp. 80-92.

"My purpose is not to give a full interpretation of this difficult and important passage, but to discuss one particular problem, taking up some remarks made by F. M. Cornford (in *Plato's*

Theory of Knowledge) and by Mr. R. Robinson (in his paper on *Plato's Parmenides*, *Class. Phil.*, 1942)." (Allen 1965, p. 207)

(...)

"This examination of Plato's use of some terms, though far from exhaustive, is, I think, sufficient to discredit Cornford's claim that the 'blending' metaphor is the one safe clue to Plato's meaning, and to establish that μετεχειν and its variants, μεταλαμβανειν and κοιννειν (with genitive), are not used by Plato as mere alternatives for μειγνυσθαι. It may be admitted that in 2.5 5d, the passage Cornford exploits, μετεχειν is used in an exceptional way; but one passage cannot be allowed to outweigh a dozen others.(1)

To sum up: I have tried to argue firstly, that the verb μετεχειν, with its variants, has a role in Plato's philosophical language corresponding to the role of the copula in ordinary language; and secondly, that by his analysis of various statements Plato brings out - and means to bring out - the difference between the copula (μετεχει . . .), the identity-sign (μετεχειν ταυτου ...) and the existential εστιν (μετεχειν του οντος)." (Allen 1965, p. 218)

(1) This is rather a cavalier dismissal of the passage on which Cornford relies so heavily. But it is not possible in the space available to attempt a full study of the perplexing argument of 255c 12-e 1, and without such a study no statement as to the exact force of μετεχειν in 25 5c 4 is worth much. My own conviction is that even in this passage μετεχειν does not stand for the symmetrical relation 'blending'; but it is certainly not used in quite the same way as in the other places where it occurs in 2 5 1-9.

4. Adomėnas, Mantas. 2004. "'They are telling us a myth': a curious portrait of the presocratic philosophers in Plato's *Sophist*." *Literatura* no. 46:8–14.

"Philosophical implications of the dialogue-form have been, for quite some time, all the buzz in Platonic studies. One need not enumerate all the advantages and productive insights that this approach has generated. One facet of Plato's philosophical method, however, remains insufficiently explored so far: namely, Plato's reflections on the question of genre and form of philosophical discourse which could be gleaned from his judgments on his philosophical predecessors, the Presocratics.

What I propose to do here is to offer a close reading of a couple of Platonic passages where Plato's protagonists' engagement with the Presocratic doctrines is described or dramatised. In doing that, I shall seek to highlight Plato's position and judgments concerning the form, or genre,(1) of Presocratic discourse, and to trace the implications of those judgments with one question in view: what is the nature, in Plato's view, of Presocratic teaching qua intellectual enterprise or 'genre'?(2)" (P. 8)

(1) The notion of 'intellectual genre' here is considerably indebted to Alasdair MacIntyre. Though he was not the first to interpret various types of philosophical enquiry in terms of their genre of discourse, each of which presupposes a certain distinct type of validity for its statements, I found MacIntyre's observations in his *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* particularly rewarding.

(2) This is an aspect of larger project of reconstructing Plato's reception of the Presocratic thinkers, addressed in my doctoral thesis.

5. Aguirre, Javier. 2011. "Plato's *Sophist* and Aristotelian being." *Czech and Slovak Journal of Humanities* no. 1:74–81.

Abstract: "In the chapter M 4 of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle criticizes the dialectics practiced by Socrates. Aristotle attributes to Socrates the lack of "dialectical power". In the same way, in N 2, Aristotle criticizes the dialectics practiced by "the dialecticians" imputing the archaic way in which the problem about being is posed. There are many signs that make us think that Aristotle refers to Plato and the Platonics with the term "dialecticians", to whom he attributes the "dialectical power". Therefore, Aristotle is aware of the merits and shortcomings of Platonic dialectics, more specifically of the dialectics practiced by Plato in the *Sophist*. In the development of his own conception of the being (*to on*), in the middle books of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle bears in mind the contents of this dialogue and makes the attempt to overcome the difficulties stated in the Eleatist, such as the deficiencies of the Platonic way of understanding the being."

6. ———. 2011. "Plato's *Sophist* and the Aristotelian being." *Czech and Slovak Journal of Humanities Philosophica*:74–81.

Abstract: "In the chapter M 4 of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle criticizes the dialectics practiced by Socrates. Aristotle attributes to Socrates the lack of "dialectical power". In the same way, in N 2, Aristotle criticizes the dialectics practiced by "the dialecticians" imputing the archaic way in which the problem about being is posed. There are many signs that make us think that Aristotle refers to Plato and the Platonics with the term "dialecticians", to whom he attributes the "dialectical power". Therefore, Aristotle is aware of the merits and shortcomings of Platonic dialectics, more specifically of the dialectics practiced by Plato in the *Sophist*. In the development of his own conception of the being (*to on*), in the middle books of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle bears in mind the contents of this dialogue and makes the attempt to overcome the difficulties stated in the Eleatist, such as the deficiencies of the Platonic way of understanding the being."

7. Albury, W. H. 1971. "Hunting the Sophist." *Apeiron* no. 5:1–12.

"The Stranger from Elea is asked by Socrates, at the outset of Plato's dialogue, the *Sophist*, to distinguish between the Sophist, Statesman, and Philosopher — "not so short and easy a task," as the Stranger tells us (217 b).

To Theaetetus, his joint inquirer, the Stranger says, "We had better, I think, begin by studying the Sophist and try to bring his nature to light in a clear formula" (218 b-c).

But being brought to light is, of course, the very thing which the Sophist most resists, for he is a creature who "takes refuge in the darkness of not-being, where he is at home and has the knack of feeling his way" (254 a).

Thus, the Stranger warns Theaetetus, "it is not so easy to comprehend this group we intend to examine or to say what it means to be a Sophist" (213 c). Now since the Sophist is such a "troublesome sort of creature to hunt down" (212 d) : it seems reasonable to ask why the Stranger has decided to begin with him instead of with the Statesman or the Philosopher." (p. 1)

8. Alieva, Olga. 2010. "Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's *Sophist*." *Hermatena* no. 189:71–91.

"The well-known sixth definition of the sophist in the homonymous dialogue contains a discussion of the elenchus (230b4-e3) which is often referred to as a manifestation of the late Plato's attitude towards this method of argumentation. It is generally assumed that the definition of the sophist 'of noble lineage' given here should be applied to Socrates as represented in earlier Platonic dialogues."

(...)

"The scope of this paper is to demonstrate that the mention of the elenchus at 230b4-e3 is not merely retrospective, and to draw attention to the elenctic dimension of the whole dialogue. This, in its turn, enables us to reconsider also the method of diairesis and its methodological potential." p. 71)

9. ———. 2016. "Ὀρθολογία περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν: Heidegger on the Notion of Falsehood in Plato's *Sophist*." In *Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25)*, edited by de Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 143–155. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

"A crucial question Plato poses in the *Sophist* is how it is possible to say falsehoods: it involves the assumption that non-being exists (τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι), for otherwise falsehood could not come into existence (236e–237a). Plato's solution to this problem has been explored mainly in terms of the modern philosophy of language with an emphasis on the meanings of the verb 'to be' existential/copulative/veridical),(1) types of predication (ordinary/definitional),(2) the character of false statements (affirmative/negative)(3) etc. It has been generally acknowledged that to understand the solution Plato offers to the so called "falsehood paradox" we must focus mainly on the propositional dimension of *lógos*, on its subject-predicate structure. In sharp contrast, Heidegger endeavours to "get rid of propositions" (*GA* 19, 594/411)(4) while interpreting the *Sophist*,(5) and this endeavour will be our topic in what follows." (p. 143)

(1) Ackrill (1957), 1–6; Kahn (1966), 245–265, and others; a useful overview can be found in Fronterotta (2011), 35f.

(2) Crivelli (2012), 9 and *passim*.

(3) Owen (1978), 223f; McDowell (1982), 115f; Brown (2008), 437f, etc.

(4) 4 Hereinafter the number after the slash refers to the English translation by Rojcewicz and Schuwer (1997)

(5) There are extremely few references to Heidegger in the vast literature on Plato's *Sophist*. See, e.g.: Cordero (1993), 224; 227; Notomi (1999), 7. It has been repeatedly noted that Heidegger fails to do justice to the dialogical form of the writing because he reads Plato "through Aristotle". See, e.g.: Gonzalez (2009), 60; Rosen (1983), 4f.

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- Rosen, Stanley. *Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983.
10. Allred, Ammon. 2009. "The Divine Logos: Plato, Heraclitus, and Heidegger in the *Sophist*." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 14:1–18.
- Abstract: "In this paper, I address the way in which Plato's *Sophist* rethinks his lifelong dialogue with Heraclitus. Plato uses a concept of logos in this dialogue that is much more Heraclitean than his earlier concept of the logos. I argue that he employs this concept in order to resolve those problems with his earlier theory of ideas that he had brought to light in the *Parmenides*. I argue that the concept of the dialectic that the Stranger develops rejects, rather than continues, the idea reached at the end of the *Theaetetus* that knowledge has to be grounded in a *nous aneu logou* (a non-logical, divine intellect) even while the Stranger appropriates the concerns that lead to his conclusion. Ultimately, I suggest that my differentiation of the later Plato's appropriation of the tradition from Aristotle's appropriation of that tradition is closely related to the re-thinking of the full sense of logos in the later Heidegger on Heraclitus and on Parmenides. I end by suggesting that the question that Plato and Heraclitus pose to us is to ask what such a divine logos tells about human ways of knowing."
11. Altman, William H. F. 2016. *The Guardians on Trial. The Reading Order of Plato's Dialogues from Euthyphro to Phaedo*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- See Chapter 2: Plato's Trilogy: *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Apology of Socrates* 69-169.

"In the traditional retelling of the outworn story of Plato's Development, *Parmenides* marks its author's abandonment or modification of the views of his "middle period," especially as presented in *Republic* 5-7 and *Phaedo*. By configuring *Timaeus*, *Philebus*, *Sophist*-*Statesman*, and *Laws* as "late dialogues," that story suggests that Plato has, in some meaningful ways, outgrown Socrates; I am challenging that story on the basis of Reading Order, an alternative paradigm for ordering and reading his dialogues. Looking back to *The Guardians in Action* [*], the indisputable fact that Plato joined *Republic* to *Timaeus-Critias* in a dramatic sense has not been given its due, and the parallel fact guiding *The Guardians on Trial* is that Plato, once again indisputably, has joined *Sophist*-*Statesman* to the trial and death of Socrates, primarily by means of *Euthyphro*." (p. 9, a note omitted)

[*] W. H. F. Altman, *The Guardians in Action. Plato the Teacher and the Post-Republic Dialogues from Timaeus to Theaetetus*, Lanham: Lexington Books 2016.

12. Álvarez, Lucas. 2022. "The Eleatic Stranger in Sophist dialogue: A Continuation of the Socratic Legacy." *Plato Journal* no. 23:7–21.

Abstract: "Within the framework of the discussion about the existence of a spokesman in the Platonic dialogues, we look, in the first part, into the possible transfer of this spokesman's function from Socrates to the Eleatic Stranger, identifying the contact and divergence points between both characters. In the second part, we try to show that this transfer has a dramatic staging at the beginning of the *Sophist* dialogue, where Socrates makes a demand that enables the Stranger to demonstrate his genuine philosophical condition."

13. Ambuel, David. 2005. "On What is Not: Eleatic Paradox in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*." In *Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Ales and Karfik, Filip, 200–215. Prague: Oikoymenh.

"The following argument undertakes to show one positive thesis implied by the thicket of interrelated contradictions that is the *Parmenides*. There may well be others. In particular, it is proposed here that, as a consequence of the multiply contradictory conclusions and the methods that lead to them, any analysis of the kind of unity that we find in the world - namely, that of composites, of wholes of parts - demands that being is not a form, but form the principle of being.

To accomplish this, the following thoughts look into parallels linking the *Sophist* with the *Parmenides*. Emphasis is directed especially to the concept of not-being as it appears in the second part of *Parmenides* and in the *Sophist*, 237a-244d. Both dialogues reveal inadequacies of *Parmenides*' metaphysics by employing the logic of Eleatic metaphysics to examine form - being is and is intelligible (like the ideas), not-being is its opposite, their opposition is that of simple contradictories, i.e. between being and not-being lies nothing - with the result that the real is either empty, transcendent and inaccessible, or that being, all of reality, is reduced to the manner of existence of sensibles (i.e. having the being of wholes and parts), which, subsequently, upon analysis, leads to contradiction and unintelligibility." (p. 200)

14. ———. 2007. *Image and Paradigm in Plato's Sophist*. La Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

Second edition; first edition Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991.

"The *Sophist* is a rather technical piece. The myth and drama are at their minimum, and Plato introduces a set of plodding definitions that evolves into a discussion of terms of highest abstraction: 'being,' 'rest,' 'motion,' 'sameness,' 'otherness.'

And yet it is not only a technical piece. This volume aims to give an interpretation of the *Sophist* as a whole, with sensitivity to its subtleties and implications. The philosophical commentary is followed by a translation. As R. E. Allen remarked on translating Plato, "Plato, as a writer, stands with Shakespeare, but his translators do not, so this task is all but impossible." There have been several translations of the *Sophist*, and I have learned from them all. The goal here is not to add one to their number, but to add clarity to the interpretation. Those familiar with other interpretations will quickly apprehend that the reading presented here sets out with an approach distinct from many. The intent is not to make a definitive statement of doctrine; where there is such philosophical richness, there is no finality. Instead, the intent is to overcome the barriers that keep us from the *Sophist's* philosophical depths. As the *Philebus* states, discussing analysis and definition by divisions, when improperly done, is the cause of impasse; properly done, it is the entry to an open path. The *Sophist* presented here is not an artifact of our intellectual past or a notable historical point marking the ancestry of later developments; it is living philosophy." (Preface, pp. XI-XII)

(...)

"It has been observed that "all Platonic scholars hold that in the *Sophist* and subsequent works the protagonist expresses Plato's own views."⁽²⁾ By now, it will not have escaped the attention of the reader familiar with the literature on the *Sophist* that I share neither this assumption that the Eleatic speaks straight Platonic doctrine nor other related presuppositions about the text. The reasons I find these absurd should become clear to the reader who persists. For the reader who does hold to what "all Platonic scholars" hold, and has both the kindly indulgence and diligence to persevere, let this be a dialectical exercise to discover what this dialogue might uncover, on the hypothesis that it is, after all, a work of metaphysics." (Introduction, P. XVII)

(2) Richard Robinson, *Essays in Greek Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969, p. 21.

15. ———. 2011. "The Coy Eristic: Defining the Image the Defines the Sophist." In *Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 278–310. Praha: Oikoymenh.

"The argument of this paper is informed by two observations about the *Sophist's* dramatic structure: in contrast to the denial in all other Platonic depictions of the sophist, here the sophist is assumed to have an art. That assumption is never relinquished, even though the reason given elsewhere for declaring him artless is explicitly voiced when he is described as a kind of magician (233b–c). Secondly, the discussion is led, not by Socrates, but by an Eleatic philosopher, and is conducted following a process that adheres to an Eleatic ontology that admits no intermediate between being and absolute not-being.

Without an ontological intermediary, every image is as real as any reality, and every practice an art." (p. 278)

16. ———. 2013. "Difference in Kind: Observations on the Distinction of the *Megista Gene*." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 247–268. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"In short, the nominalism of an Eleatic metaphysics (or of a Heraclitean metaphysics, as they are interpreted in the *Sophist* and the *Theaetetus*) cannot state what anything "is," which would require the means to conceive of a character that is universal, distinguishable from things that are characterized by it, and attributable in the same or in related senses to a plurality. Consequently, what a thing "is" becomes what it is not.

The analysis of combinations furnishes the abstract, if contradictory, logic underpinning the method of division used to pursue the sophist.

The irony is that, by setting aside the ontological inquiry into the opposite of "being" and identifying "not-being" (in one sense) with "other," the being and nature of anything as a result is constituted entirely by its difference from what it is not. Being, in effect, is nothing other than not-being." (p. 267)

17. Andic, Martin, and Brown, Malcolm. 1973. "False Statement in the "Sophist" and Theaetetus' Mathematics." *Phoenix* no. 27:26–34.

"The purpose of this paper is to call attention to a parallel between Plato's account of false statement in the *Sophist* and Theaetetus' study of incommensurables, substantially preserved for us in Euclid's *Elements*, Book 10." (p. 26)

(...)

The main parallel to which we are calling attention gives rise to the following question. We have emphasized that the proportions into which we analyze assertions that a given statement is true or false put the same objects on both sides of the division between statement and being: does this not collapse the true statement with the fact it states? Readers of Russell's *Problems of Philosophy* (London 1912), Chapter 12, are often vexed by a similar puzzle in his doctrine of false belief, which is in many ways like the doctrine of the *Sophist*. If and only if it is true what Othello believes, i.e., that Desdemona loves Cassio, then there exists such a complex as Desdemona's love for Cassio (or, that Desdemona loves Cassio), and this, though its actual existence is independent of Othello's mind, is composed of the very objects which also go to compose his belief. But how, one wonders, can the objects of the world be the very objects in the believer's mind? In reply, one might ask, how can they fail to be the very objects concerning which he has belief? It seems a reasonable answer to this question simply to say that it is the same thing that can be believed and can be. More fully, the same relation which is believed to hold among objects, or holds among them in a picture, can also hold among them in reality, and does so just when the belief or picture is true to reality. Similarly, it is the same thing that one states to be the case with certain objects and which is the case when the statement is true, or not the case when it is false. Finally, a point about the Academy in the mid-fourth century. If we are right in finding a strict parallel between these philosophical and mathematical researches into "not-being in *logos*" at the Academy, we would have found some confirmation of the familiar Platonic thesis that mathematics prepares the way for philosophy. Nor would it be any surprise if Plato, admiring Theaetetus' work on incommensurability, should have developed his own treatment of false statement so as to run parallel to it, and accordingly had good reason for assigning to this mathematician a central role in the *Sophist*." (p. 34)

18. Anscombe, G.E.M. 1966. "The New Theory of the Forms." *The Monist* no. 50:403–420.

Reprinted in *The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Volume One: From Parmenides to Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1981, pp. 21-33.

"I want to suggest that Plato arrived at a revised theory of forms in the later dialogues. Or perhaps I might rather say that he constructed a new underpinning for the theory. This can be discerned, I believe, in the *Sophist*, taken together with certain parts of the dialectic of the *Parmenides* which use the same language as the *Sophist*." (p. 21)

(...)

"If I am right, then the idea of some forms as having parts is of extreme importance.

In the *Sophist* (1158d-e) it is especially stressed that *the other* is divided up into many bits and parcelled out among all things in relation to one another, and we hear of the part of the other that stands over against the *being* of each, or, if we follow Simplicius, of each part of the other that stands over against being. I prefer the MSS reading, but on my interpretation it makes no difference to the sense. For the language of being divided up and parcelled out occurs also in the *Parmenides* in relation to *one* and to *being* (144), and it seems immensely unlikely that this part of the argument there was not also part of Plato's final view. This gives us three points: (1) the being and unity of each form are parts of being and of the one respectively; (2) the one being is a whole of parts, among which are the existent unitary forms of the early theory; (3) each existent form is a whole composed of the form and its being. Thus there will be a part of the other (the bottom right hand layer in my diptych as it lies open) which is a part of being that stands over against being. This part of the other will itself be divided into parts each of which stands over against part of being, i.e. the being in one of the forms of the early theory. We may add that *one* will, like being, same and other, "run through" everything, and *same*, like being, one and other, will be "parcelled out" among all things." (p. 30)

19. Baltzly, Dirk C. 1996. "'To an Unhypothetical First Principle" in Plato's *Republic*." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 13:149–165.

"This paper argues that we may find examples of two unhypothetical principles in *Parmenides* and *Sophist*. But, in the *Republic*, Plato speaks only of an unhypothetical principle. Moreover, commentators almost universally identify the unhypothetical principle of the *Republic* with the Form of the Good, or some account of the Form of the Good. My unhypothetical principles-One has a share of Being, some of the kinds blend-do not look like they have much to do at all with the Form of the Good. How, then, can these passages from *Sophist* and *Parmenides* be illustrations of the method described in Book VII in the ascent to an unhypothetical starting point?" (p. 157)

20. Barry, Conor. 2022. *Paradigm, Logos, and Myth in Plato's Sophist and Statesman*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

"My approach in this study is to focus on the concepts of paradigm, logos and myth, and their methodological use in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. By also showing how these three terms are used in associated dialogues, this study will explain how Plato's dialogues should be regarded as a unified whole. That is to say, my argument about the significance of paradigm, logos and myth in the *Sophist* and *Statesman* will take the form of a critique of

developmental interpretations of Plato. The methodological discussion of paradigm, logos and myth in the *Sophist* and *Statesman* does not depart from the early and middle period dialogues. Rather it sheds greater light on the so-called earlier and middle period dialogues. Miller, Ambuel, Lane and Notomi offer recent efforts to interpret the *Sophist* or *Statesman*. This present work benefits greatly from the framework that these recent studies provide, both in methodology and content. Gonzalez and Kahn's studies on the nature of the Platonic dialogues have also been instrumental in helping me to articulate the unitary approach this book advocates. At the same time, this book provides a reading of the later dialogues that departs in many ways from those which Gonzalez and Kahn defend." (From the Introduction)

21. Becker, Alexander. 2024. "Structure in the *Sophist*." In *Platonism: Proceedings of the 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium*, edited by Hrachovec, Herbert and Mácha, Jakub, 71–87. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Abstract: "In a structural ontology, relations are given priority over their relata throughout. The paper presents, firstly, an interpretation of a central passage of Plato's *Sophist* (251d–256b) showing that Plato there presents the fundamentals of a structural ontology of forms. The type of structure at issue is that of diairetic trees. It results that such structures need two structural relations, subsumption and difference. Secondly, the paper argues that identity, as a binary relation an entity has to itself as well as a unary property in the sense of an entity's identity,

should be understood as a feature of such a structure. In this way, the priority of relations over relata can be given a precise meaning in that the identity of an entity is structurally articulated."

22. Beere, Jonathan. 2019. "Faking Wisdom: The Expertise of Sophistic in Plato's *Sophist*." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 57:153–189.

"How should we understand the *Sophist*'s definition of sophistic?"

We tend to assume that the problem with sophistic is that sophists use bad arguments in the logical sense that the arguments are either invalid or unsound. Sophistic is either some special facility in the use of fallacious forms of argument or it is a character defect, the willingness to use such arguments, or both. But the concept of a logical fallacy distorts Plato's view of sophistry, which is both stranger and more interesting, as I will argue. Indeed, perhaps the most interesting and, in its own way, puzzling aspect of the definition of sophistic has been neglected: the Eleatic Visitor defines sophistic as an expertise (τέχνη, *Soph.* 221 d 1–6).(1)" (p. 153)

(1) While I originally drafted this paper some time before the appearance of L. Brown, 'Definition and Division in Plato's *Sophist*' ['Definition'], in D. Charles (ed.), *Definition in Greek Philosophy* [Definition] (Oxford, 2010), 151–71, the two papers are antitheses to one another. Brown claims, 'Sophistry, the sophist: these are not appropriate terms to be given a serious definition . . . there is no such genuine kind as sophistry—especially not under the genus of *technē*, skill, art, or expertise' (Brown, 'Definition', 153). I attempt here to vindicate the seventh and final definition of sophistic by vindicating the claim that sophistic is an expertise.

23. Benardete, Seth. 1960. "Plato *Sophist* 223 b1-7." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 5:129–139.

Reprinted in S. Benardete, *The Archaeology of the Soul: Platonic Readings of Ancient Poetry and Philosophy*, Edited by Ronna Burger and Michael Davis, South Bend, IN: St. Augustine Press, 2012, pp. 110-111.

"We must now ask what bearing this distinction between the hunter and the hunted has on the dialogue as a whole. Suppose all hunters were different, while all the things hunted were of the same kind. Art would then be definable exclusively in terms of its procedure. There would be no separable classes of beings in so far as they were beings, but only in so far as there were different ways of hunting them. There would be no εἶδη. Suppose, on the other hand, all the things hunted were different, while all the hunters were the same. Art would then be definable only in terms of its single subject. It would have no procedure, for an art presupposes a differentiable class of beings on all of which the same procedure can be applied; and a lack of procedure would entail no distinction between knowledge and ignorance. An art, then, must be defined both by its objects - the art of something - and by its way to that something." (p. 131)

24. ———. 1963. "The Right, the True, and the Beautiful." *Glotta* no. 41:54–62.

Reprinted in S. Benardete, *The Archaeology of the Soul: Platonic Readings of Ancient Poetry and Philosophy*, Edited by Ronna Burger and Michael Davis, South Bend, IN: St. Augustine Press, 2012, pp. 93-100.

"Whenever a Platonic character says ναί in answer to a question, we know that his "yes" is the same as ours; and if he answers πῶς γάρ; or πῶς γάρ οὐ; he is confirming a negative or positive statement; but when one of them says ὀρθός, αληθής, χαλώς is not self-evident that he means the same as we do in saying "right", "true", "fine". These answers hardly look except for their greater rarity more significant than ναί." (p. 54)

(...)

"Were there a gap in our manuscripts between two questions of Socrates, we should not now be able to say which stereotyped phrase was most suitable. Was Plato equally perplexed?

Are his "rights", "trues", and "fines" as arbitrary and interchangeable as Homeric formulae, or are they, as we shall try to show, dependent on and prompted by the form the previous question takes?" (p. 54)

(...)

"To bathe the reader in enough examples and yet not drown him, I have chosen to explain καλώς (κάλλιστα), ὀρθός (ὀρθότατα) and αληθής (αληθέστατα) in two dialogues only, the *Sophist* and *Politicus*.

As the "dramatic" element in them is not so prominent as elsewhere, the propriety of each word for the course of the argument appears more distinctly. The danger, however, of using them lies in the similarity of their themes, style, and speakers, which may be thought to exclude any inference about other dialogues; but these very similarities allow us to check them against one another: to see how a similar remark in each provokes the same answer.

And yet to indicate that our definitions are not too parochial, further examples from other dialogues have been added, though without explanation the force of these words is easily missed." (p. 55)

(...)

"If our interpretation of these passages is correct, we should not conclude that it holds everywhere. There may be cases where it would be impossible for us to make any discrimination, and we could go no farther than the almost-empty "fine", "right", and "true"; and possibly Plato did not always keep to the same usage throughout his writings. But the consistency of our results in two dialogues and their agreement with the other passages cited (from a much larger store), put out of court the possibility of accident and randomness. They show Plato's ability even in small things to imitate and sharpen the distinctions of ordinary speech). They further suggest that every context would have to be as thoroughly analyzed before we could decide on the scope and accuracy of our tentative definitions. It is not, however, a project that can be published. Complete lists, without explanation, would be almost useless, and with them, too tedious to be valuable. They would be as long as the Platonic corpus itself. We only offer this paper as a specimen and challenge: the reader of Plato must work out the rest for himself." (p. 62)

25. ———. 1986. *Plato's Sophist: Part II of 'The Being of the Beautiful'*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Contents: Introduction IX; Guide for the Reader XVII; *Sophist* II.1; *Sophist* Commentary II.69; Notes II.168; Selected Bibliography II.178-180.

"The *Sophist's* dialogic form presents us with another riddle: Either Socrates is just another sophist, or all philosophers prior to Socrates were sophists. The first half of the dialogue, in which the stranger traps Socrates in progressively narrower definitions until the sophist can be only Socrates, is balanced by its second half, in which the stranger proceeds to condemn all earlier philosophers for not understanding the necessity of Socrates' so-called second sailing. Inasmuch as the second sailing is inseparable from Socrates' discovery of political philosophy, the *Sophist's* companion dialogue, the *Statesman*, in which the stranger brings about a complete identity of dialogic form and argument, needs to be put together with the *Sophist* before the *Sophist* can be understood by itself. It is because the *Statesman* is essentially prior to the *Sophist* that it follows it of necessity. The *Sophist* then requires a double reading. But even such a double reading does not suffice, for its problem is initiated by the *Theaetetus*, in which the joint failure of Socrates and Theaetetus to answer the question, *What is knowledge?*, prompts them to appeal to the Eleatic stranger. His answer is contained in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*; it is not contained in either of them separately. It is therefore another question whether his twofold answer differs from the answer to be found in the *Theaetetus*." (p. 210)

26. ———. 1993. "On Plato's *Sophist*." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 46:747–780.

Reprinted in: S. Benardete, *The Argument of the Action: Essays on Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000, pp. 323-353.

"It seems at first as if the Stranger's analysis of *λόγος* into agent and action is designed solely for finding truth or falsity in the correct or incorrect attachment of an action to a known agent; by his restriction of imitation to impersonation, however, the agent becomes

significant in himself and independent of what he does.(13) The sophist embodies virtue as it is understood in opinion, despite his suspicion that he does not know what his *σχῆμα* declares he knows.

Gorgias exemplifies this perfectly, but what he does is to contradict and refute the opinions about virtue the interlocutor himself maintains and believes he sees represented in the sophist. The sophist impersonates the opinions he refutes. What, then, of Socrates?

He is not an impersonator. Theodorus at any rate found him pokerfaced, and could not figure out what Socrates believed from his totally convincing presentation of a Protagorean position (*Theaetetus* 161a6). Socrates, however, is ironical. Does his claim to ignorance come across as knowledge in light of his capacity to show up the ignorance of others? More particularly, does the incoherence in opinion about a virtue, once Socrates has exposed it, induce the impression that Socrates himself possesses that virtue? It would seem impossible that Socrates could display popular virtue without its inconsistencies while bringing to light its inconsistencies, but Socrates the logic-chopping moralist seems to be doing exactly that.

Λόγος as dialogue thus comes to light as the problem of Socrates the agent in his action. We can say that the *Sophist* ends at that point where the problem has been uncovered, and the *Statesman* is designed to treat Socratic agency. Socrates the agent, however, cannot show up in himself; instead, he shows up in the patient, young Socrates." (pp. 779-780)

(13) In the summary the Stranger gives of the sophist's genealogy (268c8-d4), all but one of his lines of descent can be rephrased as a verb: the difference between divine and human imitation resists such a rephrasing.

27. Benitez, Eugenio. 1996. "Characterisation and Interpretation: The Importance of Drama in Plato's *Sophist*." *Literature & Aesthetics* no. 6:27–39.

"I confess that I would not recommend the *Sophist* to anyone as a work of literature. But I deny that the dramatic form is ever unimportant in Plato. In my own work on Plato I have found that the drama and the philosophy are not separable.(10) to At the very least, the drama complements, supplements, and augments the philosophy. Let me cite what should be an uncontroversial example from the *Sophist*.

Theodorus innocently uses the word '(γένος ('kind') in his first speech: the Stranger, he says, belongs to the γένος of Elea (i.e. he is Eleatic by birth). Socrates, who has a nose for ambiguity, picks up the term in his second speech, claiming that the kind called 'philosopher' is scarcely easier to discern than the kind 'god'. The discussion then turns to a consideration of three '(γένη ('kinds') - sophist, statesman and philosopher [216c3, 217a7] - but ultimately even this topic yields to discussion of the five μέγιστα γένη ('greatest kinds'), namely being, sameness, difference, motion and rest. An innocent remark leads to the most extraordinary inquiry. This progression is the dramatic complement of the Stranger's own remark that: 'one must practise first on small and easy things before progressing to the very greatest' [218d1-2]." (p. 28)

(10) For a discussion of the importance of the dialogue form see E. Benitez, 'Argument, Rhetoric and Philosophic Method: Plato's *Protagoras*', *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 25 (1992): 222-252.

28. Berger, Fred R. 1965. "Rest and Motion in the *Sophist*." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 10:70–77.

"In a recent article,(1) Professor Julius M. E. Moravcsik has attempted an interpretation of a very difficult passage in Plato's *Sophist* (255 a4-b 6), in which Plato sought to prove that neither the Same nor the Other is identical with either Rest or Motion. The interpretation which Moravcsik puts forth aims at making Plato's argument sound and consistent with other points made in the dialogue. Unfortunately, Moravcsik's presentation is not always clear itself. It is one of the chief purposes of this paper to clarify Moravcsik's argument. In addition, it will be argued that his interpretation of the passage in the *Sophist* fails to save Plato's argument, and that it rests on a subtle logical distinction which there seems little reason to assume Plato intended to use. Indeed, it will be argued that an interpretation which Moravcsik rejects seems better suited to Plato's passage." (p. 70)

(1) Julius M. E. Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the 'Sophist'," *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, Fasc. XIV (1962), pp. 23-78. I am indebted to Professor Jürgen Mau who first called my attention to some of the problems in Moravcsik's interpretation.

29. Berman, Brad. 2015. "The Secret Doctrine and the Gigantomachia: Interpreting Plato's *Theaetetus-Sophist*." *Plato Journal* no. 14:53–62.

Abstract: "The *Theaetetus*' 'secret doctrine' and the *Sophist*'s 'battle between gods and giants' have long fascinated Plato scholars. I show that the passages systematically parallel one another.

Each presents two substantive positions that are advanced on behalf of two separate parties, related to one another by their comparative sophistication or refinement. Further, those parties and their respective positions are characterized in substantially similar terms. On the basis of these sustained parallels, I argue that the two passages should be read together, with each informing and constraining an interpretation of the other."

30. Berman, Scott. 1996. "Plato's Explanation of False Belief in the *Sophist*." *Apeiron* no. 29:19–46.

"Introduction. In this paper, I will reconstruct Plato's explanation of false belief as it emerges from his *Sophist* and suggest why it is explanatorily better than the principal contemporary account. Since Frege, the received view in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and philosophy of language is that human cognition of the world is always mediated through some sort of intensional object.(1) Moreover, the identity conditions of such intensional objects have been assumed to be ontologically independent of their relation to the world. This theory of human cognition is worse ontologically as compared with a theory which does not require any mediary objects because the former commits itself to a larger ontology than the latter. However, the larger ontology is allegedly justified by gains in explanatory power. If that is the case, then the postulation of such further entities is justified. On the other hand, if the alleged gain in explanatory power is, as I shall suggest, illusory, then Plato's theory of human cognition, which makes no reference to intensional objects which are ontologically independent of their relation to the world, will be a better explanation insofar as it will commit itself to a smaller ontology in that explanation and further, will actually explain something we want explained." (p. 19)

(1) I owe a great debt, both here and elsewhere, to Penner, Terry. (1988). *Plato and the Philosophers of Language*. Unpublished manuscript.

31. Bernabé, Alberto. 2013. "The Sixth Definition (*Sophist* 226a-231c) : Transposition of religious language." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 42–56. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"Plato defines the sophist, in the sixth definition of the dialogue of the same name (226a – 231c), as one who purifies the soul of wrong opinions through the technique of refutation. In so doing, however, he ends up in an awkward position: the result of applying the method of *diairesis* seems to result rather in a definition of the philosopher Socrates (1), or, what is worse, a definition valid for both the sophist and the philosopher, and likely to produce confusion between them. So the sixth definition looks a little bizarre, and is difficult to understand.

My aim is to make a contribution to the solution of the problem from the point of view of a philologist. I shall be looking at the use of certain words which in Plato's time were as pertinent to the religious sphere as they were to the philosophical. I shall pay particular attention to those that had been used by him in dialogues antecedent to the *Sophist*.

This analysis will allow me to introduce a number of facts into the discussion from a point of view which is different from the usual, and to open up new possibilities for the understanding of this section of the dialogue." (p. 41)

(...)

"The art of the sophist, like the practices of Orpheus and his followers, is deceptive, false, and lies in the realm of δόξα. The philosopher alone is a true educator, physician and purifier, who effects a genuine liberation. And philosophy alone can be placed on the level of genuine religion." (p. 56)

(1) Cf. N. Notomi, *The Unity of Plato's 'Sophist'. Between the Sophist and the Philosopher*, Cambridge 1999, 65 n. 72, for those who take it that it is Socrates who is represented here.

32. Berrettoni, Pierangiolo. 2008. "A Metamathematical Model in Plato's Definition of Logos." *Histoire Épistémologie Langage* no. 30:7–19.

Abstract: "The definition of *logos* given by Plato in the *Sophist* is investigated together with its (meta) mathematical background.

Terminological resonances found in philosophical and mathematical authors are pointed out in order to show the generalization of an epistemic model based on the concept of generation."

"In a recent article (Berrettoni, forthcoming) I observed that Plato's definition of *logos*, noun and verb in the *Sophist* makes use of a set of terms and of a phraseology which had a wide range of use in mathematical sciences, in many cases acquiring the status of technical terms; this might lead us to the hypothesis that the definition had a (meta)mathematical background. By this I understand a conceptual frame and mental map ultimately derived from mathematical sciences, which gave Plato the model and the form for his definition of *logos*, according to the apt expression with which Starobinski (1966), in his study on the

history of the concept of “nostalgia”, characterizes the cultural hegemony of a discipline inside a particular historical epistēme, as in the case of the generalization of an epistemic model derived from psychoanalysis in the culture of the 20th century.

I am fully aware that this hypothesis is very strong and difficult to demonstrate on a strictly textual and philological basis. I am not claiming that Plato was consciously and deliberately applying mathematical concepts to the definition of logos, but simply that he was conditioned by his view of knowledge as based on a hierarchy of sciences, where the central role was attributed to mathematics." (p. 7)

References

Berrettoni, Pierangiolo (forthcoming). « Un modello matematico nella definizione platonica di nome e verbo », *Atti del XXXI Convegno della Società Italiana di Glottologia, Categorie del verbo. Diacronia, teoria, tipologia* (26 - 28 ottobre 2006, Scuola Normale Superiore) [2008, pp. 31-51].

Starobinski, Jean (1966). « The Idea of Nostalgia », *Diogenes* 54, 81-103.

33. Berry, John M. 1986. "A Deconstruction of Plato's “Battle of Gods and Giants”." *Southwest Philosophy Review* no. 3:28–39.

"The Eleatic Stranger's extremely problematic refutation of materialism in Plato's "battle of gods and giants" (*Soph.* 246-48) is an instance of what Heidegger terms an 'ontology,' a 'theoretical inquiry explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities' - in this case, living things, souls, wisdom, justice, and the like. Every such *explicit* inquiry into beings, Heidegger claims, "has its foundation" in the implicitly presupposed "pre-ontological understanding of being" that characterizes the inquirers themselves - in this case, the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus (as a surrogate materialist). For all inquirers into being "fall prey to the tradition" from which they have "more or less explicitly" received their "pre-ontology." The Stranger's and Theaetetus's pre-ontology, that is, dictates the direction and scope of their inquiry without their being aware of it. To understand the *Sophist* inquiry, then, "this hardened tradition must be loosened up and the concealments ... dissolved." My thesis is that, to a point, Heidegger is correct: The Eleatic Stranger's and Theaetetus's ontology, their explicit inquiry into being, is controlled ('mastered') by their traditional "pre-ontological" understanding of being. To understand them we must "destroy [i.e., unstructure or deconstruct their] ancient ontology' to reveal what it conceals." (p. 28)

34. ———. 1988. "Plato's Forms. A text that self-destructs to shed its light." *Southwest Philosophy Review* no. 4:111–119.

"Heidegger would call Plato's problematic revision of his theory of forms in "the Battle of Gods and Giants" (*Soph.* 246-48) an "ontology," a "theoretical inquiry explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities."

(...)

"On its surface, then, the text is incoherent. It can be coherent only if beneath its surface the Stranger's charge of inconsistency is somehow on target, and his move to conform the theory to his own ontology is somehow relevant.

I will show that the attack is on target and the revision relevant. For though the Stranger and the friend of forms cannot know it, their startling conclusion that being is nothing but power turns out to be the Heideggerian "preontology" that has controlled their inquiry from the outset, the subsurface upon which the theory of forms itself rests. Real being is "power either to affect anything else or to be affected," the Stranger concludes, "I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing but power" (247de). This explicit ontology is the surfacing of the implicit "pre-ontology" which underlies and supports this text and the theory of forms wherever it is found. When on the surface the Stranger irrelevantly forces the theory of forms to conform to his apparently alien ontology, beneath the surface he is in fact forcing it to conform to its own presupposition. The text, that is, and the theory of forms which it attacks both make sense only if understood as presupposing the text's conclusion. The argument turns a perfect Heideggerian circle: its surface anomalies are the barely decipherable indications that within its depths its presupposition is twisting itself into position to surface disguised as the argument's conclusion." (p. 111)

35. Bestor, Thomas Wheaton. 1978. "Plato on Language and Falsehood " *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* no. 9:23–37.

"In a recent article in this journal entitled "Plato and the Foundations of Logic and Language,"(1) William B. Bondeson makes several acute points about Plato's philosophy of language, particularly as it relates to the so-called "paradox of false judgment." On one point he is almost certainly right, and importantly right. On another, however, he is almost certainly wrong, and importantly wrong. Both points deserve a certain amount of amplification, I believe, and that is what I want to give them here. The details provide us with a much clearer perspective on Plato's basic picture of how language works. They also provide a rather nice illustration of the relevance of analytic philosophy to Platonic scholarship today." (p. 23)

(1) *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 6 (1975): 29-41.

36. Blondell, Ruby. 2002. *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Preface IX; 1. Drama and dialogue 1; 2. The imitation of character 53; 3. The elenctic Sokrates at work: *Hippias Minor* 113; 4. A changing cast of characters: *Republic* 165; 5. Reproducing Sokrates: *Theaetetus* 251; 6. Putting Sokrates in his place: *Sophist* and *Statesman* 314; Bibliography 397; General index 428; Index of passages cited 438-452.

"My first two chapters are devoted to clarifying certain preliminary matters that underlie this way of approaching Plato. I begin, in this chapter, with some general questions about "dramatic" form and literary" interpretation, which will help to clarify my methodology.

Chapter 2 explores issues surrounding literary and philosophical notions of character and its interpretation in ancient texts generally, and in Plato in particular, with special attention to the figure of Sokrates.

Subsequent chapters offer readings of a select number of individual dialogues: *Hippias Minor*, *Republic*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman*. These works were chosen in part to exemplify a broad range of Platonic styles and methods, and in part because most of them have received relatively limited "literary" study, but also because their discursive content

connects with my particular concerns, especially in their focus on the representation and use of literary character." (p. 3)

(...)

"The last chapter was concerned with *Theaetetus* on its own terms. But it is also the first of a triad of dialogues, completed by *Sophist* and *Statesman*, which are linked by a variety of thematic and structural connections.(1)

These three works are also bound together by formal features, in a way that is unparalleled among Plato's works. These features include dramatic sequencing, explicit cross-references, and an overlapping cast of characters. At the end of *Theaetetus* Sokrates looks forward to continuing his conversation with Theaitetos and Theodoros the next day (210d); at the beginning of *Sophist* Theodoros alludes to "yesterday's agreement" to continue (216a); and in *Statesman*, Sokrates refers back explicitly to his first meeting with Theaitetos and the previous day's discussion (257a, 258a).

The explicitness and the dramatic character of these links distinguish them from other forms of Platonic intertextuality, and invite us to read these three works together, in a certain sequence, and in each other's light." (p. 314)

37. Bluck, Richard Stanley. 1957. "False Statement in the "Sophist"." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* no. 77:181–186.

"Various attempts have been made to find a satisfactory alternative to Cornford's explanation of what the *Sophist* has to say about false statement, and in particular to his interpretation of the passage in which the statements 'Theaetetus is sitting' and 'Theaetetus is flying' are discussed. The difficulty with Cornford's view is that he wants to find the explanation of truth and falsity entirely in the 'blending' or incompatibility of Forms, but that in the examples Sokrates chooses, while Sitting and Flying may be Forms, Theaetetus cannot be. Hence Cornford has to say, 'It is not meant that Forms are the only elements in all discourse. We can also make statements about individual things. But it is true that every such statement must contain at least one Form'. Unfortunately, when talking about the εἶδων συμπλοκή at 259e, the Stranger seems clearly to envisage a blending of εἶδη with each other:. How can this be reconciled with an 'example' in which only one term stands for a Form?

I do not propose to discuss in detail the various solutions that have been offered, but to set forth my own interpretation of the whole passage. This may be regarded as to some extent a 'blending' of what has been said by Professor Hackforth and Mr. Hamlyn, but a number of points arise which deserve further discussion, and it may perhaps be hoped that such a σύνθεσις as this may prove to be ." (p. 181)

38. ———. 1975. *Plato's Sophist: A Commentary*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Edited by Gordon Neal.

"The problems raised by the *Parmenides* being extremely complicated, and the date of the *Timaeus* being a matter of dispute, studying the *Sophist* is perhaps the most promising way of trying to discover whether, and if so in what manner, Plato's philosophy—and in particular his theory of Forms—developed or changed after the writing of the *Republic*.

(...)

No doubt the dialogue is capable, and is meant to be capable, of being interpreted without reference to Platonic Forms. The arguments of the unconverted sophist against the possibility of saying or thinking what is false must be controverted with arguments that he will accept as valid. Yet at the same time it is most unlikely that Plato would repeatedly use the term εἶδη; without bearing in mind that readers acquainted with his earlier works would at once think of his Forms; and it is therefore highly probable that what is said is meant to be capable of being interpreted in terms of Forms. This is all the more likely, as a great deal is said about one Kind (λέγῳς) or Form (εἶδος) partaking of another, and the question was raised in the *Parmenides*, clearly with reference to the theory of Forms, whether one εἶδος could partake of another. It is therefore a reasonable working hypothesis that the arguments are intended to be interpreted in terms of Platonic Forms by those acquainted with Platonic doctrine, while at the same time being capable of being interpreted without special reference to such doctrine by those who rejected it or had no knowledge of it. The aim in what follows is to try to determine the most natural significance of each argument from the Platonist's point of view, taking the γένη or εἶδος; as Forms, and to see whether these arguments and the dialogue as a whole will, after all, make good sense when so interpreted. A positive answer to this question will emerge as the book proceeds. The reader must judge whether the case is proved.

Those who have never doubted that the Kinds can be taken as Forms may consider such an enquiry unnecessary. But there are many passages, as has already been mentioned, where difficulties raised have never been satisfactorily met, and the precise nature of the Platonic doctrine implied is still far from clear. New interpretations are here offered, for example, of the arguments for the separateness of the Kinds (chapter VII), of what is meant by a vowel Form (chapter VI), and of the argument against the monists (chapter III)" (pp. 1-2).

39. Bolton, Robert. 1975. "Plato's Distinction between Being and Becoming." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 29:66–95.

Reprinted in: N. D. Smith (ed.), *Plato. Critical Assessments, Vol. II: Plato's Middle Period: Metaphysics and Epistemology*, London: Routledge 1998, pp. 116-141.

"The guiding questions to which I refer are familiar ones. First: What is the fate of the theory of paradigm forms of the *Phaedo* and *Republic* in view of the apparent criticism of the theory found in the *Parmenides*? And second: What is the fate of the distinction of the *Phaedo* and *Republic* between being (οὐσία) and becoming (γένεσις) in view of the apparent criticism of the adequacy of that distinction found in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*? Lately, the first of these two questions has received the greater share of the attention of philosophers and scholars. I want here to redirect attention to the equally important and equally intriguing second question." (p. 66, note omitted)

(...)

"The conclusion of our investigation is that Plato's theory of reality was neither subject to as much or to as little flux as some have believed. There were important modifications in his view of becoming and also in his view of being. In each case the changes were based on important philosophical developments. But Plato retained a version of the being-becoming distinction strong enough to sustain his theory of degrees of reality and of sufficient conceptual power to make that theory intelligible.

In the light of the history of Platonic scholarship it would be foolish to claim that no other theory of the development of Plato's views on being and becoming could be defended. All that is here claimed is that the theory which is here offered is the one which best accommodates all the available evidence. It accounts for Aristotle's testimony, for the explicit statements of the *Phaedo* and *Republic* and the argument of *Republic V*, for the explicit changes in Plato's way of characterizing being and becoming after the *Theaetetus*, and for the changes in Plato's view of the epistemic status of becoming. On this account none of these matters need be explained away or given any interpretation other than the most straightforward one. That constitutes the strongest argument in favor of this account." (p. 95)

40. Bondeson, William. 1972. "Plato's "Sophist": Falsehoods and Images." *Apeiron* no. 6:1–6.

"The chief arguments of the *Sophist* occur in what is sometimes called its "inner core". The core is that large section which begins after the dichotomies employed to catch the sophist come to an impasse about "nonbeing" and falsehoods, and which ends with the return to dichotomous division after the account of "logos" in the sense of "statement" has been given. This inner core runs from 232B to 263E. The relations between shell and core depend upon how seriously Plato is thought to have regarded the method of "division" (διαίρεσις). Such problems are not relevant to the questions discussed here, nor does Plato's attempt to catch the sophist appear to be entirely serious.

Rather, I want to discuss the puzzles about falsehood and how these puzzles are connected with the hunt for the sophist." (p. 1)

41. ———. 1973. "Non-Being and the One: Some Connections between Plato's "Sophist" and "Parmenides"." *Apeiron* no. 7:13–21.

"The purpose of this paper is to point out some similarities between a part of Plato's treatment of non-being in the *Sophist* and two hypotheses of the *Parmenides*. I shall first discuss a small section of the *Sophist* and try to show what Plato means by the phrase το μηδαμῶς ὄν. I shall then, by an analysis of the first and sixth hypotheses of the *Parmenides*, try to show that Plato wants to make virtually the same points as he made in the *Sophist*.

The conclusions reached here should be helpful for a more comprehensive interpretation of these two dialogues." (p. 13)

See the reply by Paul D. Eisenberg, "More ou'uon-being and the one". *Apeiron*, 10, 1976, pp. 6-14.

42. ———. 1974. "Plato's *Sophist* and the Significance and Truth-Value of Statements." *Apeiron*:41–48.

"The greater portion of Plato's *Sophist* deals with a number of issues in what might be called the philosophy of language. It also deals with a series of metaphysical and ontological views and attempts to show how language and reality are related. Thus one way of organizing the views of Plato in the *Sophist* is to view much of the material up to and including 260E as concerned with topics centring around the question: how is discourse possible? Thus Plato talks about Being, Non-being, Sameness and Otherness and makes the claim that it is the τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκή which makes discourse possible (259E). The interpretation of this

important passage and what precedes it in the dialogue must be left aside for the purposes of this paper because it is concerned with what follows 260E rather than with what precedes it.

(...)

In this paper I want to do four things. First, it will be necessary to discuss and evaluate Plato's answer to the "nature" question about statements and their parts. Second, I want to determine the relation between statements and truth or falsehood, and to determine how statements can be true or false.

Third, I want to determine whether Plato has adequately discussed and answered the *Sophist's* difficulties and confusions about falsehoods (these will be also discussed as the topics in the first two parts are developed), and fourth, to point out the propositional character of belief which will indicate some important connections between the *Sophist* and the *Theaetetus*." (p. 41)

43. ———. 1975. "Plato and the Foundations of Logic and Language." *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* no. 6:29–41.

"Whatever Plato's philosophy of language and his logical theory might be, they are backed by a metaphysics and an ontology. Or, to put the claim more strongly, Plato's philosophy of logic and language implies a metaphysics and an ontology, and the elaboration of these is his primary goal, even in those dialogues, i.e., the later ones, where linguistic considerations might seem to be predominant. Or, as one recent interpreter of Plato, Julius Moravcsik, has put it, Plato constructs an elaborate metaphysics and ontology in order to make our ordinary ways of thinking, talking, and knowing intelligible.(14)

Thus, in this paper, the concern shall be with a variety of topics in Plato's philosophy of logic and language, but there is not the space here for developing many of the metaphysical implications of those views.

Probably the most fundamental question in interpreting Plato, and in terms of which most questions concerning Plato's views are settled, is the question of whether, and to what extent, the views in the dialogues are cut from the same cloth and form a single philosophic whole. Most analytic interpreters do not hold such a view; rather, they maintain that there are important differences in the doctrines of the various dialogues. Other interpreters have maintained that there are differences in the angle of approach to a problem or that there are differences in topic without real change in the overall doctrine. It will be shown that this will not work for at least some of the logical and linguistic problems with which I am concerned." (p. 30)

(...)

"Many distinctions and clarifications need to be made before the "object" view and its resultant paradoxes can be laid to rest; senses of "is" and "is not" need to be distinguished, negation and negative predication need to be understood, and how the forms and their interrelations make discourse possible needs to be shown. But all of these problems can be solved only if there is a clear awareness of the nature and function of statements in accounts of stating, believing, and knowing.

It seems to me that Plato realized that the "object" view is confused and contradictory and that in the *Theaetetus*, and even more so in the *Sophist*, he attempts to dispel it. Thus, the concept of a λόγος is the fundamental notion which ties the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* together." (p. 39)

(14) *Being and Meaning in the Sophist*, *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, fasc. 14 (1962).

44. ———. 1976. "Some Problems about Being and Predication in Plato's *Sophist* 242-249." *Journal of The History of Philosophy* no. 14:1–10.

"One of the central tasks which Plato sets for himself in the *Sophist* is to say what being (τὸ ὄν) is. In doing this he makes a variety of philosophical moves. The first is to show that non-being in a very restricted sense of the term (τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν) is an impossible and self-contradictory concept. (1) This occupies the first part (237A ff.) of the central section of the *Sophist*. After discussing some puzzles concerning deceptive appearances (240 B) and falsehoods (240 D), Plato turns to a discussion of being at 242B. In this section of the dialogue Plato claims to show that the attempts of previous philosophers to define being have failed and he makes his own first attempt in the dialogue to define being (cf. 242C and 247E). 2 In this paper I am concerned only with this section of the *Sophist* (242-249), and I want to show first that Plato's notion of being here is ambiguous, the term τὸ ὄν shifting between "being" and "what has being," between the form and those things which participate in it. Second, I want to show that the definitions of being at 248C and 249D are not only compatible with one another but also that, when properly understood, they make sense of Plato's use of motion and rest in the *Sophist*. And finally, I want to show that Plato is caught in the snares of self-predication when he talks about being and other Forms of the same ontological level. This is due to the way in which he formulates the difference between statements of identity and predication in the argument against Parmenides in this section of the *Sophist*." (p. 1)

(1) Cf. my "Non-being and the One: Some Connections between Plato's *Sophist* and Parmenides," forthcoming in *Apeiron* [1973]. My view is somewhat different from that of G. E. L. Owen's "Plato on Not-Being" in *Plato, A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1971), vol. I.

(2) Cf. Owen, *ibid.* p. 229, n. 14. Owen presents a convincing case that Plato is giving a definition (as opposed to a mark or sign) of being. However, Owen also seems to take the view, for example against Moravcsik in *Being and Meaning in the Sophist* (*Acta Philosophica Fennica*, XIV [1962]), that little of philosophical significance happens in 242-249. I hope to show in this paper that this is not the case.

45. Booth, N. B. 1956. "Plato, *Sophist* 231 a, etc." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 6:89–90.

"Mr. G. B. Kerferd, in *Classical Quarterly* XLVIII (1954), 84 ff. writes of 'Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry'. He suggests that Plato thought there was a 'Noble Art' of sophistry, other than philosophy itself; and he seeks to find this Art in the better and worse arguments of *Protagoras*. This suggestion is, unfortunately, based on a mistranslation of Plato, *Sophist* 231 a (...). Mr. Kerferd supposes that this can mean: 'For I do not think there will be dispute about distinctions which are of little importance when men are sufficiently on guard in the case of resemblances.'

(...)

But further, what are these distinctions which, if we accept Mr. Kerferd's view, are 'of little importance'? They are distinctions on the one hand between tame and fierce, and on the other hand between the cathartic process of dialectic and sophistry. The 'tame' and 'fierce' distinction is not between tame and fierce merely; it is a distinction between the very tamest and the very fiercest of animals (Plato uses superlatives at the beginning of 231 a). How Plato could have in the same paragraph stressed the vastness of the difference by means of superlatives and then spoken of 'small distinctions', is more than I can see. I also fail to see how Plato could ever have thought the distinction between sophistry and healing dialectic to be a small one; that would be saying that there was little to choose between Socrates and Thrasymachus. No: Plato is saying here that there is a certain superficial resemblance between healing dialectic and sophistry, but we must beware of that resemblance; in fact the one is a tame watch-dog, the other a ravening wolf, and 'we shall find in the course of our discussion, once we take adequate precautions, that there is no small distinction between the two.'" (p. 89)

46. Bossi, Beatriz. 2013. "Back to the Point: Plato and Parmenides – Genuine Parricide?" In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 157–173. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"Famous scholars in the XXth century (1) understood that Plato really does refute Parmenides' absolute condemnation of not-being as unthinkable and unutterable by his demonstration that 'not-being' 'is' in the sense of 'is different from'. Though this goal is made explicit and is almost claimed to have been achieved by the Stranger in the *Sophist*, Plato offers certain clues that show there is enough evidence for a different reading that admits of some nuances. The Stranger begs Theaetetus not to suppose that he is turning into some kind of parricide (241d3). Yet Plato does toy with a potential parricide, which the Stranger claims he will never commit. The attitude might be regarded as a literary trope inserted for dramatic purposes, but in the context it could be merely rhetorical.

In my view, the person the Stranger really fights and kills is, not Parmenides himself but the ghost of a ridiculous Parmenides character dreamed up by the sophist, who will shelter his own 'relativistic' view beneath his cloak by denying the possibility of falsehood." (p. 158)

(1) Guthrie (1978) 151; Diès (1909) 7; Taylor (1960) 389; Ross (1966) 115; Cornford (1970) 289–294 quoted by O'Brien (1995) 43 n.1. Also Notomi: 'The two extreme philosophical positions of Parmenides and Protagoras converge on the denial of the possibility of falsehood' (1999) 182.

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"The papers included fall into three broad categories: a) those dealing directly with the ostensible aim of the dialogue, the definition of a sophist; b) a number which tackle a specific question that is raised in the dialogue, namely how Plato relates to Heraclitus and to Parmenides in the matter of his understanding of being and non-being; and c) those discussing various other broad issues brought to the fore in the dialogue, such as the 'greatest kinds', true and false statement, difference and mimesis." (Preface, p. V)

48. Bostock, David. 1984. "Plato on 'Is Not' (*Sophist*, 254-9)." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 2:89–119.

"According to the received doctrine, which I do not question, the uses of the Greek verb 'to be' may first be distinguished into those that are complete and those that are incomplete. In its incomplete uses the verb requires a complement of some kind (which may be left unexpressed), while in its complete uses there is no complement, and it may be translated as 'to exist' or 'to be real' or 'to be true' or something of the kind. What role the complete uses of the verb have to play in the *Sophist* as a whole is a vexed question, and one that I shall not discuss. For I think it will be generally agreed, at least since Owen's important article of 1971, (1) that in our central section of the *Sophist* it is the incomplete uses that are the centre of Plato's attention. Anyway, I shall confine my own attention to these uses, and accordingly my project is to elucidate and evaluate Plato's account of 'is not' where the 'is' is incomplete. I might also add here that, for the purposes of the *Sophist* as a whole, I am in agreement with Owen's view that what Plato himself took to be crucial was the account of 'not', and what he has to say about 'is' is, in his own eyes, merely ancillary to this. But I do not argue that point, partly because Owen has already done so, and partly because it is not needed for my main contentions. As we shall see, one cannot in fact understand what Plato does say about 'not' without first considering his views on the incomplete 'is'.

Reverting to the received doctrine once more, the incomplete uses of 'is' may be divided into two. In one sense the verb functions as an identity sign, and means the same as 'is the same as', while in the other it functions merely as a sign of predication, coupling subject to predicate, and cannot be thus paraphrased. The vast majority of commentators on the *Sophist* seem agreed that Plato means to distinguish, and succeeds in distinguishing, these two different senses of the verb.(2) This I shall deny. In fact I shall argue not only that Plato failed to see the distinction, but also that his failure, together with another ambiguity that he fails to see, wholly vitiates his account of the word 'not'. The central section of the *Sophist* is therefore one grand logical mistake." (pp. 89-90)

(1) *Plato on Not-Being in Plato I*, ed. G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), 223-267.

(2) One may note P. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago, 1933), 298; J. L. Ackrill, 'Plato and the Copula', *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, LXXVII (1957), 1-6 esp. 2; J. M. E. Moravcsik, 'Being and Meaning in the Sophist', *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, XIV (1962), 23-64 esp. 51; W. G. Runciman, *Plato's Later Epistemology* (Cambridge, 1962), 89; I. M. Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines*, vol. II (London, 1963), 449; R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Sophist* (Manchester, 1975), 151; J. Malcolm, 'Plato's Analysis of *to on* and *to me on* in the Sophist', *Phronesis*, XII (1967), 130-46 esp. 145; Owen, above n. 1, 256; G. Vlastos, 'An Ambiguity in the Sophist' in his *Platonic Studies* (Princeton, 1973), 287; and I would add J. McDowell, 'Falsehood and not-being in Plato's Sophist' in *Language and Logos*, ed M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (Cambridge, 1982), 115-34 (discussed below). But the older commentators do not always agree, e.g. F. M. Comford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1935), 296, and A. E. Taylor, *Plato, the Sophist and the Statesman* (London, 1961), 82. More recently J. C. B. Gosling, *Plato* (London, 1973), 216-20, has put the case for scepticism, and F. A. Lewis, 'Did Plato discover the *estin* of identity?', *California Studies in Classical Antiquity*, VIII (1975), 113-43, has argued it at length.

49. Braga da Silva, André Luiz. 2024. "Does Plato Revise His Ontology in *Sophist* 256a? Notes on the "being" of the Ideas." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth*

Symposium Platonicum, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 341–348.

Abstract: "In the *Republic*, Socrates affirms that the Good causes the "being" of the other Ideas (*R.* 509b7-8). It is to some extent noteworthy, however, that the Visitor, in the *Sophist*, establishes that the "being" of each Idea is caused by participation in Being (256a1-2). Apparently, the same predicate of the Ideas is explained in two works by different causes. To assess that scenario, this paper faces three questions: i) Does "being" have the same meaning in both dialogues? ii) Is it possible to establish a rule for the causation of the predicates within the so-called Theory of the Ideas? iii) Is Plato changing or revising his ontology in *Sophist* 256a?"

50. Brisson, Luc. 2011. "Does Dialectic Always Deal with the Intelligible? A Reading of the *Sophist* 254d5-e1." In *Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfik, Filip, 156–172. Praha: Oikoymenh.
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Reprinted with revisions in G. Fine (ed.), *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), pp. 455–478.

"Plato's *Sophist* presents a tantalizing challenge to the modern student of philosophy. In its central section we find a Plato whose interests and methods seem at once close to and yet remote from our own. John Ackrill's seminal papers on the *Sophist*, (1) published in the fifties, emphasized the closeness, and in optimistic vein credited Plato with several successes in conceptual analysis. These articles combine boldness of 'argument with exceptional clarity and economy of expression, and though subsequent writers have cast doubt on some of Ackrill's claims for the *Sophist* the articles remain essential reading for all students of the dialogue. I am happy to contribute an essay on the *Sophist* to this volume dedicated to John Ackrill.

Among the most disputed questions in the interpretation of the *Sophist* is that of whether Plato therein marks off different uses of the verb *einai*, 'to be'. This paper addresses one issue under that heading, that of the distinction between the 'complete' and 'incomplete' uses of 'to be', which has usually been associated with the distinction between the 'is' that means 'exists' and the 'is' of predication, that is, the copula." (p. 49)

(1) *Symploke Eidon* (1955) and *Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-59* (1957), both reprinted in *Plato I*, ed G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), 201-9 and 210-22.

53. ———. 1994. "The Verb 'To Be' in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks." In *Companions to Ancient Thought: Language*, edited by Everson, Stephen, 212–236. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The existence of at least these three distinct uses of 'is' was taken for granted by commentators and assumed to apply, by and large, to ancient Greek, though with some salient differences. These include the fact that Greek can and regularly does omit *esti* in the present tense, though not in other tenses, and that the complete 'is' is still very much a going concern, though more or less defunct in modern English. The fact that the *esti* of the copula can be omitted means that a predicative use of *esti* can convey a nuance over and above that of the mere copula (for instance connoting what really is F rather than merely appearing F, or what is enduringly F).

And the fact that current English has more or less abandoned the use of the complete 'is' to mean 'exist' (as in Hamlet's 'To be or not to be), while in Greek it is very much a going concern, may lead us to question whether the complete *esti* really shares the features of the 'is' which means (or used to mean) 'exist'." (p. 215)

(...)

"I cannot offer here a full account of what I take to be the results of the *Sophist*, far less a defence of such an account, but confine myself to a few points. To the question whether the dialogue distinguishes an 'is' of identity from an 'is' of predication, I have indicated my answer: that it does not, but it does draw an important distinction between identity-sentences

and predications (see section I and n. 2 above). Here I focus on the question whether and if so how it distinguishes complete from incomplete uses. I shall suggest that Plato developed a better theory about the negative 'is not' than his argumentation in the *Republic* suggests, while continuing to treat the relation between the complete use (X is) and the incomplete (X is F) in the way I have described in section IV, that is, by analogy with the relation between 'X teaches' and 'X teaches singing'." (p. 229)

54. ———. 2001. "Innovation and Continuity: The Battle of Gods and Giants, *Sophist* 245-249." In *Method in Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Gentzler, Jyl, 181–207. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In Greek mythology, Zeus and the other Olympian deities were challenged in a mighty battle by the race of giants, a battle which, with the help of Herakles, the gods won. Unlike the earlier battle of the Titans, in which Zeus' party defeated and supplanted their own forebears, the Titans, the *Gigantomachia* ended with the preservation of the old order in the face of the newcomers' challenge.

(...)

Here I focus on the section of the *Sophist* whose high point is represented by Plato, through his chief speaker, the Stranger, as a *Gigantomachia*, a debate about being between materialists and immaterialists, or so-called Friends of the Forms. The materialists, cast in the role of 'giants', hold that only the material (what is or has a body) is or exists.

Their opponent the 'gods', labelled 'Friends of the Forms', take the opposite view; they accord the title 'being' only to the immaterial, to 'certain intelligible Forms', and relegate to the status of *genesis* (coming to be) those material, changing things the giants champion. In this section, in which the Stranger takes on each party in turn and aims at a rapprochement between them, Plato takes what may be thought of as first steps in ontology. in reflective discussion and argument about what there is and about how one should approach the question of what there is. There is considerable disagreement over the upshot of the whole debate, and especially over whether the discussion of the Friends of the Forms' views concludes with the Stranger advocating a radical departure from the treatment of Forms in the middle dialogues: both Owen and Moravcsik advocate a reading whereby the immutability of the Forms is abandoned.(1) Here I re-examine the *Gigantomachia*, asking what philosophical moves and results it contains. In doing so, I consider what use Plato makes of two innovations in approach which can be detected in the later dialogues, and in particular in the *Sophist*." (pp. 181-182)

55. ———. 2008. "The *Sophist* on Statements, Predication, and Falsehood." In *The Oxford Handbook of Plato*, edited by Fine, Gail, 383–410. New York: Oxford University Press.

"This essay focuses on two key problems discussed and solved in the Middle Part: the Late-learners problem (the denial of predication), and the problem of false statement. I look at how each is, in a way, a problem about correct speaking; how each gave rise to serious philosophical difficulty, as well as being a source of eristic troublemaking; and how the Eleatic Stranger offers a definitive solution to both. As I said above, the *Sophist* displays an unusually didactic approach: Plato makes it clear that he has important matter to impart, and he does so with a firm hand, especially on the two issues I've selected." (p. 438)

56. ———. 2010. "Definition and Division in Plato's *Sophist*." In *Definition in Greek Philosophy*, edited by Charles, David, 151–171. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In Plato's late dialogues *Sophist* and *Politicus (Statesman)*, we find the chief speaker, the Eleatic Stranger, pursuing the task of definition with the help of the so-called method of division.

(...)

However, there are major and well-known problems in evaluating the method as practised in the two dialogues, but especially so in the *Sophist*.

(...)

I investigate below some of the many scholarly responses to this bewildering display of the much-vaunted method of division. I divide scholars into a 'no-faction', those who hold that we should not try to discern, in any or all of the dialogue's definitions, a positive outcome to the investigation into what sophistry is (Ryle, Cherniss), and a 'yes-faction': those who think an outcome is to be found (Moravcsik, Cornford, and others).(2) I shall conclude that in spite of the appearance of many answers (Moravcsik) or one answer (Cornford, Notomi), the reader is not to think that any of the definitions give the (or a) correct account of what sophistry is. But while I side with the no-faction, my reasons differ from those of Kyle and Cherniss, who, in their different ways, located the failure in the nature of the method of division. In my view the failure lies not, or not primarily, in the method of division itself; but in the object chosen for discussion and definition. Sophistry, the sophist: these are not appropriate terms to be given, a serious definition, for the simple reason that a sophist is not a genuine kind that possesses an essence to be discerned.(3) If we try to carve nature at the joints, we cannot hope to find that part of reality which is sophistry, for there is no such genuine kind as sophistry-especially not under the genus of *techne*, art, skill, or expertise." (pp. 151-153).

(2) The views of Moravcsik, Cornford, and Notomi are discussed in the text of section III; those of the 'no-faction' in note 17.

(3) I use 'genuine kind' to indicate something with a wider extension than that of 'natural kind' familiar from Locke, Putnam, etc. I use it to mean the kind of entity which Plato would allow to have an *ousia* (essence) or *phusis* (nature) of its own (cf. *Tht.* 172b). Virtues, senses like hearing and sight, and crafts like angling would be recognized as genuine kinds in the intended sense."

57. ———. 2012. "Negation and Non-Being: Dark Matter in the *Sophist*." In *Presocratics and Plato: Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn*, edited by Patterson, Richard, Karasmanis, Vassilis and Hermann, Arnold, 233–254. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

"My aim is to try to understand what I regard as the most difficult stretch of the *Sophist*, 257–259. In responding to a particularly impenetrable claim made by the Eleatic Stranger (ES), Theaetetus announces at 258b7 that they have found τὸ μὴ ὄν (not being), which they have been searching for on account of the sophist. He is thinking, of course, of what sparked the long excursus into not being and being: the sophist's imagined challenge to the inquirers' defining his expertise as involving images and falsehood. Here's that challenge: speaking of images and falsehood requires speaking of what is not, and combining it with

being, but to do so risks contradiction and infringes a dictum of Parmenides. This heralds the puzzles of not being, and of being, which are followed by the positive investigations of the *Sophist's* Middle Part. So Theaetetus' *eureka* moment ought to signal some satisfying clarification and closure to the discussions. But in fact the stretch it is embedded in is singularly baffling, and the subject of continuing debate among commentators.(2) There is little agreement about what issues Plato is discussing in this section, let alone about any supposed solutions.

My strategy is to try to read the passage without preconceived ideas about what it ought to contain." (pp. 233-234)

(2) I list here and in the next two notes some of the major discussions. I have learned from them all, and from many others not mentioned: M. Frede, *Prädikation und Existenzaussage*. Hypomnemata 18 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967). G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-being," in *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays I*, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1971), 223–267. Owen's essay is reprinted in *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology*, ed. G. Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). E. N. Lee, "Plato on Negation and Not-being in the Sophist," *The Philosophical Review* 81.3 (1972): 267–304. D. Bostock, "Plato on 'Is Not'," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984), 89–119. M. Ferejohn, "Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and Semantic Fragmentation," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 71 (1989), 257–282. M. Frede, "Plato's Sophist on False Statements," in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, ed. R. Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 397–424.

(3) J. van Eck, "Falsity without Negative Predication: On Sophistes 255e–263d," *Phronesis* 40 (1995), 20–47 (...).

(4) J. Kostman, "False Logos and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist," in *Patterns in Plato's Thought*, ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1973) (...).

58. ———. 2018. "Aporia in Plato's *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*." In *The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Karamanolis, George and Politis, Vasilis, 91–111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Abstract: "The chief aim of this essay is to examine the development of Plato's use of philosophical puzzles to guide his enquiries. Labelled *aporiai*, they are prominent in *Sophist*, but already found in *Theaetetus*. Section 2 identifies common features in such puzzles, and explores how in *Theaetetus* they are presented but left unsolved. In both dialogues the young Theaetetus is characterised as an ideal interlocutor, quick to appreciate a philosophical puzzle, and to respond appropriately. By these means Plato links the otherwise very disparate dialogues: *Theaetetus*, a formally aporetic attempt to define knowledge conducted by Socrates, and *Sophist*, whose new protagonist, the Stranger from Elea, confidently announces results both in the Outer Part's search for the sophist and in solving the problems of the Middle Part.(1) Section 3 traces how the *Sophist's* Middle Part is explicitly structured around a series of philosophical puzzles, and notes the plentiful terminology of aporia that signposts this. Plato shows his readers the philosophical payoffs of a serious attempt to diagnose the source of a given aporia: herein (I suggest) lies the real difference between the sophist and the philosopher.

But first Section I explores the famous image in *Theaetetus* of Socrates as a midwife, where Plato offers what I read as a new approach to the respondent's subjective aporia."

(1) I follow Szaif's classification of a formally aporetic dialogue, Chapter 2 [same volume], Section 2. Like other formally aporetic dialogues, This has been the subject of many doctrinal readings, cf. Sedley 2004.

References

Jan Szaif, "Socrates and the Benefits of Puzzlement", G. Karamanolis, V. Politis (eds.), *The Aporitic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy*, 2018.

David Sedley, *The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

59. ———. 2024. "Sixty-five years of the communion of kinds: a reappraisal of Ackrill's 'Plato and the Copula'." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 401–415.

Abstract: "I offer a reappraisal of Ackrill's classic 1957 article 'Plato and the Copula' in the light of subsequent scholarship, and celebrate its lasting achievement. In a coda I defend the semantic continuity thesis of *einai* from some recent objections."

60. Brown, Ryan Michael. 2024. "Plato on the Goodness of Difference: The Convertibility of the Transcendentals in the *Sophist*." *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* no. 38:373–390.

Abstract: "This article argues that Plato's *Sophist* can be understood as promoting a rudimentary version of the medieval notion of the "convertibility of the transcendentals," that is, that there are certain properties of being, such as unity and truth, that have the same extension as being but add conceptual content to being. Histories of the doctrine of the transcendentals tend to trace transcendental thought back no earlier than Aristotle and thus ignore the relevance of Plato generally and the *Sophist* specifically. This article argues that the Eleatic Stranger's discourse on the five "greatest kinds" (*megista genē*) indicates that Sameness and Otherness fulfill the criteria of transcendentalism. The article uses this analysis to provide an avenue for further study of Platonic metaphysics in the hope that the notion of "convertibility of the transcendentals" will aid interpreters in understanding how to bring together Plato's various accounts of what is metaphysically ultimate. This article suggests that, in addition to sameness and otherness, unity, goodness, truth, and beauty are also transcendentals within Platonic metaphysics. The article concludes by implying that difference (i.e., Otherness) must be ontologically good in Platonic thought, contrary to the common criticism that Platonism both denigrates difference and subordinates it to sameness."

61. Brumbaugh, Robert S. 1983. "Diction and dialectic. The language of Plato's Stranger from Elea." In *Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy*, edited by Robb, Kevin, 266–276. LaSalle: Open Court.

Reprinted in R. S. Brumbaugh, *Platonic Studies of Greek Philosophy: Form, Arts, Gadgets, and Hemlock*, Albany: State University Press, 1989, pp. 103-111.

"An interesting effect of Eric Havelock's discussion has been the constant reminder of the location of Plato at the end of a dominant oral tradition, without which there might be the temptation to take Platonic dialogue as a discontinuous leap into literacy, thus leading a modern reader to misread the texts. For example, we easily assume, because we have not

thought about it, that reading was done silently in Plato's time; that there were equivalents of our copyrights and publishers; even -in some cases- an axiom that "mature" thought must be expressed in clear, monochrome treatise. All of this helps misunderstand the dialogue form.

(...)

The purpose of my present comments is to relate this framework to the interpretation of Plato's *Sophist*, with a passing glance at the *Statesman*. In particular, I want to follow up a suggestion I made earlier, that the principal speaker, the Eleatic Stranger, is an imported bounty-hunter, brought in to shoot the *Sophist* down (or, more exactly in the absence of the rifle, to catch him in a net). The "weapons" are, perhaps, new (or old) techniques of method and language. (For this simile, compare Socrates' remark in the *Philebus* that he will now require "weapons of a different kind" to resolve a shifted point under debate.)⁽²⁾ (p. 103)

(2) *Philebus* 23B5

62. Brunschwig, Jacques. 1994. "The Stoic Theory of the Supreme Genus and Platonic Ontology." In *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy*, 92–157. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

English translation by Janet Lloyd of *La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et l'ontologie platonicienne* (1988).

"The discussion upon which I shall now embark is divided into six parts. In the introduction (i), I shall make a few observations on various structural problems which spring to mind once one examines the TSG doctrine [the doctrine of the *τί* as the supreme genus]. In part II, which is devoted to the chronology of the TSG doctrine, or more precisely to a kind of chronological topology of this doctrine, I shall be analysing a number of texts which could have been and/or were used as arguments to support the adoption of the TSG doctrine at a relatively late date in the history of Stoic thought, and I shall try to show that these texts do not justify such a conclusion. In the next two parts, I shall try to establish the role that may have been played by the reading of Plato's *Sophist* (III) and that possibly played by critical reflection upon the Platonic theory of Forms (IV) in the elaboration of the TSG doctrine. In the last two parts, finally, I shall try to put together two kinds of arguments that confirm my general thesis: to refute the idea that the TSG doctrine is the fruit of an induction based upon an analysis of the canonical incorporeals, I shall try to bring to light the disparities that those incorporeals present and the discrepancies between the various arguments used by the Stoics to fix their ontological status (V). To confirm the role played by the mediation of Platonism in the construction of the TSG doctrine, I shall examine some of the objections put to the Stoics by their adversaries on the subject of this doctrine and the varying degrees of attention that the Stoics paid to those objections (VI)." (pp. 95-96)

63. Bruseker, George. 2018. "The Metaphor of Hunting and the Method of Division in the *Sophist*." In *Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy Volume 2, Section II: Classical Greek Philosophy*, edited by Boudouris, Kostantinos, 55–60. Athens: Greek Philosophical Society.

Abstract: "This paper examines the metaphor of hunting as used in Plato's dialogue, the *Sophist*. In it, we explore the idea that the example of the 'angler' given at the start of the dialogue is no throw-away example, but opens up the metaphor of hunting as an important element of understanding how to use the method of division introduced for coming to

definitional knowledge. I argue that the use of the metaphor of hunting is a pedagogical tool that transforms the attentive student's understanding of the method of division from a dry science of definition, to a manner of approaching the search for truth. Applied reflexively to the search for the definition of the sophist, it helps reveal that the search for knowledge is a non-linear, iterative process which requires passing-through, and abides no shortcuts. It leaves open the suggestion that the true image of knowledge and the philosopher may finally be found in a version of acquisitive rather than productive or separative arts (as they are classified within the dialogue)."

64. Buckels, Christopher. 2015. "Motion and Rest as Genuinely Greatest Kinds in the *Sophist*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 35:317–327.

"The blending of the greatest kinds (γένη) or forms (εἶδη) is one of the central topics of Plato's *Sophist*. These greatest kinds, or *megista gene*, which seem to be either Platonic Forms or very similar to Platonic Forms, are Being, Motion, Rest, Sameness, and Otherness; I take them to be properties that are predicated of other things, for reasons we will examine. Why these five kinds are greatest is not made explicit, but immediately before taking up his investigation, the Eleatic Visitor, the main speaker of the dialogue, says that some kinds are 'all-pervading', such that nothing prohibits them from blending with every other kind, i.e., from being predicated of every other kind (254b10-c1). One might think, then, that these five are examples of all-pervading kinds. Almost immediately, however, the Visitor and his interlocutor, Theaetetus, agree that Motion and Rest do not blend with each other, which seems to cut off this explanation of their greatness (252d9-11). For this reason, many commentators suggest that Motion and Rest are simply convenient examples of kinds, garnered from discussions earlier in the text, and only Being, Sameness, and Otherness are special, all-pervading kinds. On this reading, Hot and Cold, which are also examples from earlier in the text (243d6-244b4), would seem to do the job just as well as Motion and Rest, since both pairs are opposites that do not blend with each other but which are (by blending with Being), are self-identical (by blending with Sameness), and are distinct (by blending with Otherness).

I think this reading is incorrect; Motion and Rest are carefully selected as *megista gene*, greatest kinds, and are not just convenient examples (Reeve [*Motion, Rest, and Dialectic in the Sophist*] 1985, 57 holds a similar position). In fact, I think the kinds are greatest because they are all-pervading; the Visitor intends us to question the agreement that Motion and Rest do not blend, as is suggested when Theaetetus agrees, later, that *if* Motion shared in Rest, there would be nothing strange about saying that Motion is at rest (255b6-8). Thus, I argue, Motion and Rest can blend, i.e., they can be jointly predicated of one subject and can be predicated of each other, just as Sameness and Otherness can. While Sameness and Otherness are opposites, a single subject may be the same in one respect, namely, the same as itself, and other in another respect, namely, other than other things. Thus they can be predicated of a single subject, and they can be predicated of each other, as well, since Sameness is other than other things and Otherness is the same as itself." (p. 317)

65. Campbell, Ian J. 2021. "Plato, the Eristics, and the Principle of Non-Contradiction." *Apeiron* no. 54:571–614.

Abstract: "This paper considers the use that Plato makes of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in his engagements with eristic refutations. By examining Plato's use of the principle in his most detailed engagements with eristic—in the *Sophist*, the discussion of "agonistic" argumentation in the *Theaetetus*, and especially the *Euthydemus*—I aim to

show that the pressure exerted on Plato by eristic refutations played a crucial role in his development of the PNC, and that the principle provided him with a much more sophisticated means of demarcating philosophical argumentation from eristic than he is generally thought to have. In particular, I argue that Plato's qualified formulation of the PNC restricts the class of genuine contradictions in such a way that reveals the contradictions that eristics produce through their refutations to be merely apparent and that Plato consistently appeals to his qualified conception of genuine contradiction in his encounters with eristics in order to demonstrate that their refutations are merely apparent. The paper concludes by suggesting that the conception of genuine contradiction afforded by the PNC did not just provide Plato with a way of demarcating genuine from eristic refutations, but also with an answer to substantive

philosophical challenges that eristics raised through their refutations."

66. Candiotta, Laura. 2011. "The Children's Prayer: saving the Phenomena in Plato's *Sophist*." *Anais de Filosofia Clássica* no. 5:77–85.

Abstract: "Plato builds an ontology capable of saving the Phenomena in the *Sophist*. By doing so, he distances himself from Parmenides. This article analyses the children's prayer (*Soph.* 249 d 5) in order to sustain this thesis and evaluate the platonic proposal, along with the role of the negation and the *heteron* in the communication of the Kinds."

67. ———. 2016. "Negation as Relation: Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's *Sophist* 257 b3-259 d1." In *Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25)*, edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 75–94. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

"The aim of the present chapter is to discuss and evaluate chapters 78 and 79 of Heidegger's Lectures on Plato's *Sophist*, which deal with *Sph.* 257b3-259dl. To this purpose, I will compare these chapters with the more established interpretations concerning the role played by the *heteron* in Plato's dialogue. Providing my own reading, my main claim is that negation is understood by Heidegger as the foremost shape of relationality.

Moreover, negation as relation is not a dialectical tool but the disclosive power able to show the "things themselves".

My argument will proceed by: 1) providing a short introduction of the major themes within the *Sophist*; 2) presenting Heidegger's thesis; 3) analyzing the main threads within the Platonic text by referring to the more established interpretations; 4) evaluating Heidegger's interpretation with a special emphasis on where it has to be situated with regard to the text and to other interpretations, thus pointing out the innovative elements proposed by Heidegger." (p. 75)

68. ———. 2018. "Purification through emotions: The role of shame in Plato's *Sophist* 230b4–e5." *Educational Philosophy and Theory* no. 50:576–585.

Abstract: "This article proposes an analysis of Plato's *Sophist* (230b4–e5) that underlines the bond between the logical and the emotional components of the Socratic elenchus, with the aim of depicting the social valence of this philosophical practice. The use of emotions characterizing the 'elenctic' method described by Plato is crucial in influencing the audience and is introduced at the very moment in which the interlocutor attempts to protect his social

image by concealing his shame at being refuted. The audience, thanks to Plato's literary strategy, realizes the failures of the interlocutor even as he refuses to accept them. As a result, his social image becomes tarnished. Purification through shame reveals how the medium is strictly related to the endorsement of specific ethical and political goals, making the Platonic dialogues the tools for the constitution of a new *paideia*."

69. Caplan, Jerrold R. 1995. "The Coherence of Plato's Ontology." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 65:171–189.

"In light of the so-called theory of Forms presented in earlier dialogues and the communion of the greatest kinds in the later dialogues, it has been argued that Plato abandoned his earlier ontology in favor of the more sophisticated scheme of his later period. The criticism is then made that the so-called later ontology is inconsistent with the earlier one and that the two accounts do not cohere.

I argue, to the contrary, that Plato's presentation has been consistent throughout. One might say that the discussion in the *Sophist* (236-259) is a revision or a refinement or expansion of the theory as found, for example, in the *Phaedo* (78-9). Although this may suggest that there has been some sort of development in the treatment of the Forms from early to late, it by no means implies any wholesale abandonment of the first formulations nor any inherent inconsistency. The fact that Plato himself raises questions about the Forms indicates the need for a clearer articulation of the relationship between thought and being, which is precisely what is undertaken in the later dialogues." (p. 171)

70. Carolina, Araujo. 2024. "Power of Connection as the Mark of Beings." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 257–264.

Abstract: "This chapter argues that in the battle of gods and giants (*Soph*, 246a4-249d5) the Visitor proposes to both corporealists and formalists that the mark of being is the power of connection. It has two kinds: (i) the power to be added to or separated from something else causing difference according to its nature and (ii) the power to bear such a difference. In neither case does the power of connection entail motion, but it can cause stable states. One substantive outcome of this argument is that ontology must begin with an inclusive concept of being as existence. Another conclusion is that to exist is to have a nature that determines a peculiar set of rules regarding connection to other things. Statements express such connection by the copulative use of the verb "to be", either saying that "X is Y" or that "X is not Y." This point paves the way to argue that, as a mode of connection, non-being is also a mark of things that exist. Therefore, in the *Sophist*, the Visitor is doing more than displaying the distinction between the existential and copulative meanings of being; he is building an ontology in which to exist is to connect. The proposal of such an ontology begins with the battle of gods and giants."

71. Casadesús Bordoy, Francesc. 2013. "Why Is It so Difficult to Catch a Sophist? Pl. *Sph.* 218d3 and 261a5." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 15–27. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"Suffice it, therefore, in conclusion to this presentation, to return to the passage from the *Republic* in which the lines of the *Odyssey* which begin the *Sophist* are commented on in negative terms, and to ask once again the question Socrates poses in justification of his criticism of the lines of Homer:

‘Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another...?’

In order to answer this question in the negative, Plato has to undertake the writing of the *Sophist*, in an attempt to expose one who, due to his protean and mimetic character, adopts all kinds of forms, even the most divine. Equipped with his philosophical hunting weapon, the dialectical method and diarexis, he attempts, like Menelaus, to catch the sophist.

Nonetheless, the possibility of success remains in doubt, given Socrates’ disturbing observation that the hard-working hunter, the Stranger from Elea himself, could be yet another of the multiple and polymorphous manifestations of the Sophist ...” (p. 27)

72. Casper, Dennis J. 1977. "Is There A Third One and Many Problem in Plato?" *Apeiron* no. 11:20–26.

"In a recent article (1), M.J. Cresswell points out that the problem of the one and the many "gets a new twist in three of Plato's later dialogues (*Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*) where we discover not one problem but apparently two."(2) The first problem (I) concerns particulars, things subject to generation and perishing (*Philebus*, 14D-15A); it is " the problem of how the same thing can have many characteristics."(3) The second problem (II) concerns forms, things not subject to generation or perishing; it is the problem how a unitary form can be in many things which come into being (*Philebus*, 15B). The first problem is "childish and easy", the second serious and difficult.

Cresswell points out that the formal structure of (I) does not require that it concern particulars. In a sense, forms have "characteristics" — each is one, the same as itself, and so on. So a parallel one and many problem (III) might be raised: How can the same form have many characteristics? Here Cresswell remarks, "However, when Plato actually sets out the one and many problem about the forms it doesn't have the structure of (I) at all."

Rather, it is (II) above. So Cresswell believes apparently that Plato does not set out (III) in the passages he mentions or elsewhere in the *Philebus*, *Parmenides*, and *Sophist*. I shall argue, however, that Plato does raise (III) in these works and that he takes it as seriously as he does (II). " (p. 20, some notes omitted)

(1) M.J. Cresswell, "Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems in Plato?", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. XXII (1972), pp. 149-154.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 149.

(3) *Ibid.* In stating (1) in this way, Cresswell takes his cue from *Sophist*, 251A-B. In the *Philebus* and at the opening of the *Parmenides* (127E; 129A-E), the problem concerning particulars is how the same thing can have opposite characteristics.

73. Cassin, Barbara. 2017. "The Muses and Philosophy: Elements for a History of the *Pseudos*." In *Contemporary Encounters with Ancient Metaphysics*, edited by Greenstine, Abraham Jacob and Johnson, Ryan J., 13–29. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

"Barbara Cassin's "The Muses and Philosophy: Elements for a History of the 'Pseudos'" (1991; translated by Samuel Galson), investigates Plato's attempt in the *Sophist* to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist. Cassin pinpoints the slippery operation of the

pseudos through the texts of Parmenides and Hesiod. Yet Parmenides' rejection of not-being allows the sophist to claim infallibility. Plato's Eleatic Stranger shows that Parmenides' rejection of notbeing is self-refuting (thus the Stranger's famous parricide is just as much Parmenides' suicide). Further, although the Stranger ultimately fails to find a criterion for truth or falsity, he nevertheless establishes a place for the *pseudos* in the distinction between *logos tinos* (speech of something) and *logos peri tinos* (speech about something). Ultimately, Cassin argues that reality of *pseudos* is a condition for the possibility of language, and indeed involves the very materiality and breath of language." (p. 5)

74. Cataldo, Peter J. 1984. "Plato, Aristotle and *προς εν* equivocity." *The Modern Schoolman* no. 61:237–247.

"One of the brilliant features of Father Joseph Owens' commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* [*] is the way that he traces the integration of the *προς εν* equivocity of being in Aristotle's work. But Aristotle's concept of *προς εν* equivocity is not linked with his predecessor Plato in this classic commentary.

The aim of this essay is to indicate such a link, and one in which Plato's contribution is more than just an anticipation; for, it will be argued that all of the elements which constitute *προς εν* equivocity *per se* are also present in Plato's doctrine of being found in the *Sophist*.

The nature of this project requires that several texts be presented from both thinkers, but this in no way presumes to be a comprehensive analysis of the texts. I only wish to show that Aristotle's concept of *προς εν* equivocity is traceable to Plato in some definite ways, all the while assuming, of course, that their doctrines of being are essentially opposed." (p. 237)

[*] *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought*, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951, Third revised edition 1978.

75. Chang, Han-Liang. 2012. "Plato and Peirce on Likeness and Semblance." *Biosemiotics* no. 5:301–312.

Abstract: "In his well-known essay, 'What Is a Sign?' (*Collected Papers* 2.281, 285) Peirce uses 'likeness' and 'resemblance' interchangeably in his definition of icon. The synonymity of the two words has rarely, if ever, been questioned. Curiously, a locus classicus of the pair, at least in F. M. Cornford's English translation, can be found in a late dialogue of Plato, namely, the *Sophist*. In this dialogue on the myth and truth of the sophists' profession, the mysterious 'stranger', who is most likely Socrates' persona, makes the famous distinction between *eikon* (likeness) and *phantasma* (semblance) (236a,b). For all his broad knowledge in ancient philosophy, Peirce never mentioned this parallel; nor has any Peircean scholar identified it. There seems to be little problem with *eikon* as likeness, but *phantasma* may give rise to a puzzle which this paper will attempt to solve. Plato uses two pairs of words: what *eikon* is to *phantasma* is *eikastikén* (the making of likeness [235d]) to *phantastikén* (semblance making [236c]). In other words, icons come into being because of the act of icon-making, which is none other than indexicality. Witness what Peirce says about the relationship between photographs and the objects they represent: "But this resemblance is due to the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to nature." (*Ibid.*) Thus the iconicity which links the representamen (sign) and its object is made possible not only by an interpretant, but also by indexicality. Their possible etymological and epistemological links aside, the

Peircean example of photographing and the Platonic discussion of painting and sculpturing in the *Sophist*, clearly show the physio-pragmatic aspect of iconicity. The paper will therefore reread the Peircean iconicity by closely analysing this relatively obscure Platonic text, and by so doing restore to the text its hidden semiotic dimension."

76. Chappell, T. D. J. 2011. "Making Sense of the *Sophist*. Ten Answers to Ten Questions." In *Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 344–375. Praha: Oikoymenh.

"One notable feature of the method of division is this: every determination in a well-performed division is a positive determination.

See *Statesman*, 262c9–d7, on an attempted definition by division of *barbaros*:

"[Our division went wrong because we did] the same sort of thing as those who are trying to make a twofold division of the human race, and do what most of those do who live here: they distinguish on one side the race of Greeks as separate from all others, and then give the single name 'barbarians' to all the other races, though these are countless in number and share no kinship of blood or language.

Then because they have a single term, they suppose they also have a single kind."

A good division will not divide Greeks from non-Greeks, but Greeks from Romans, Britons, Gauls, Teutons, Slavonic tribes, Hyperboreans, islanders of the utmost west, etc. etc. etc. To put it another way, every step of a well-performed division will use "other than" and not "is not". More about this in due course." (pp. 344-345)

(...)

"In all these ways making sense of the *Sophist*, and (come to that) making sense of the sophist, is very literally a matter of watching Plato making sense: creating a theory of how, alongside the changeless world of the Forms, there can and must be a changing world of interweavings of those Forms. Not only the gods' interweavings, which constitute the world, but also our interweavings, which constitute *logoi* about – representations of – that world: either misleading and false images of it, like the sophist's, or faithful and accurate images, like those created by the person whom above all the sophist aspires to imitate: the philosopher." (p. 375)

77. Charlton, William. 1995. "Plato's Later Platonism." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 13:113–133.

"And although on some interpretations the analyses of negation and false statement in the *Sophist* call precisely for quantification over abstract objects, those passages have also been interpreted as requiring quantification over concrete objects like Theaetetus.

(...)

"But the passages themselves are brief and the issues clear. In what follows I first explain (Section I) why I prefer a Platonizing interpretation, and (Section II) question whether Plato is willing to quantify over concrete objects at all. I then (Section III) consider how he would wish us to understand existential claims to the effect that 'there is' something or that

something 'shares in being'. Next (Section IV) I show how, using quantification over abstract but not over concrete objects, and also using the five Greatest Kinds mentioned in the *Sophist*, Plato could analyse various kinds of statement. He did not, of course, have the concept of quantification logicians have today. But he had strong logical instincts, and the suggestions he throws out lend themselves to development with the aid of quantifiers in a perspicuous and intriguing way. Finally (Section V), I suggest that his analysis of negation in terms of otherness reveals a sort of Platonism that is itself other than that defined by Quine: he believes that the difference between being and not being is independent of our thought in a way it would not be on an analysis similar to that proposed for change in Section IV." (pp. 113-114)

78. Cherubin, Rose. 1993. "What is Eleatic about the Eleatic Stranger?" In *Plato's Dialogues: New studies and Interpretations*, edited by Press, Gerald A., 215–235. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

"In this paper I would like to pose and to explore the following questions: Why is there an Eleatic Stranger in Plato's *Sophist*? What if anything does this character say or imply or do that only a "companion of those around Parmenides and Zeno" (216a) would?

I would also like to propose that central to these concerns is the question of how Plato read Parmenides' poem. Did Plato take the *daimon's* speech as a direct and literal statement of Parmenides' views? What we can discover about this issue could be instructive in our considerations of how we might best read Parmenides.

The Stranger's speeches and behavior include much that seems sophistic, as well as a number of reasons to suspect that he is not, or not only, a sophist. We are led, then, to ask what if any the differences are between Eleatic and sophist, and especially what if any differences between them appear in Plato. (For the latter I will focus on the *Sophist*.) What would account for the differences, or the lack thereof? And if there are differences, into which group—Eleatic or sophist—does the Stranger fall?" (p. 215)

79. Chrysakopoulou, Sylvana. 2010. "Heraclitus and Xenophanes in Plato's *Sophist*: The Hidden Harmony." *Ariadne. The Journal of the School of Philosophy of the University of Crete* no. 16:75–98.

"The principal aim of the present article is to shed light on Heraclitus' intellectual kinship with Xenophanes. Although the overlap of fundamental patterns and themes in both thinkers' worldview could be partly due to the osmosis of ideas in the archaic

era, the intertextual affinity between them, as transmitted by the history of reception, cannot be regarded as a mere accident of cultural diffusion. Our primary intention is to focus on the common grounds of their criticism against the authority of the epic poets on the theological education of the Greeks and more particularly on its platonic appropriation." (p. 75)

(...)

"In conclusion, Plato in the *Sophist* uses Xenophanes' and Heraclitus' theological affinity as a *trait d'union* between the latter and Parmenides, inasmuch as Plato's ontology is presented as a response to Parmenides' account on being." (p. 85)

80. ———. 2018. "Xenophanes in Plato's *Sophist* and the first philosophical genealogy." *Trends in Classics* no. 10:324–337.

Abstract: "In this article I intend to show that Plato in the *Sophist* provides us with the earliest doxographic material on pre-Platonic thinkers. In his account on his predecessors, Xenophanes emerges as the founder of the Eleatic tribe as opposed to the pluralists, while Heraclitus and Empedocles are presented as the Ioanian and the Italian Muses respectively. This *prima facie* genealogical approach, where Plato's predecessors become the representatives of schools of different origins paves the way for Plato's project in the *Sophist*. In other words the monistic account Xenophanes introduces, prepares for the synthesis between the one and the many set forth by Heraclitus and Empedocles, which is thus presented as a further step towards the 'interweaving of forms' (σμπλοκίην ειδῶν) Plato proposes in the *Sophist*."

81. Clanton, J. Caleb. 2007. "From Indeterminacy to Rebirth: Making Sense of Socratic Silence in Plato's *Sophist*." *The Pluralist* no. 2:37–56.

"I argue here that, in the *Sophist*, Plato opens up possibilities for philosophy that lie beyond Socrates's style of discourse. Plato does so by introducing indeterminacy as a way of salvaging determinate discourse itself. In the first section of this article, I explore what the problem of the *Sophist* seems to be. It appears that in order to preserve discourse, the characters within the dialogue must try to make sense of non-being, which clearly is a problematic undertaking. In the second section, I follow the characters as they try to resolve this issue of not-being. Third, I argue that in saving determinate discourse through resolving the issue of not-being, the characters in the dialogue incorporate indeterminacy into the very enterprise of philosophy. With this reading of the *Sophist* in mind, I try to make sense of a crucial element that Plato adds -- namely, Socrates's absence in the dialogue. In doing so, I mean to stay closely attuned to the dramatic features of the dialogue as they generate the questions I focus on. Finally, in light of this reading of the *Sophist*,

I suggest a way to rethink what it means to do philosophy, following Plato's lead in carrying out a philosophical project that is often deemed foreign to Plato." (p. 37)

82. Clarke, Patricia. 1994. "The Interweaving of the Forms with One Another: *Sophist* 259e." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 12:35–62.

"At *Sophist* 259 E the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus agree that 'The loosening of each thing from everything [else] is the complete wiping out of all λόγοι for it is because of the interweaving of the forms with one another that we come to have λόγος. My chief aim in this paper is to air a possible solution to the problem of how this remark might apply to such statements as 'Theaetetus sits' and 'Theaetetus flies', (1) in each of which only one form is referred to. The solution turns on the claim that neither statement could be true unless forms could mix with one another in the sense of being instantiated together in *Theaetetus*. I do not positively endorse it. I wonder whether there is any definite solution to the problem; Plato does not seem to give sufficiently clear indication of how he is thinking. However, I wish to argue that a solution along the lines indicated cannot be dismissed as easily as has sometimes been supposed. In the first part of my paper I give some general consideration to the remark at 259 E, and examine briefly some alternative solutions to the problem of its application to 'Theaetetus sits' and other such statements." (p. 35)

(1) I use these translations, rather than the more idiomatic 'Theaetetus is sitting', 'Theaetetus is flying', to reflect the fact that in the original at 263 A each example is expressed by means of a two-word sentence composed of proper name and verb. However, even for a statement of the form 'Theaetetus is F', expressed with copula and predicate, a problem arises if for Theaetetus to be F is simply for Theaetetus to partake directly of F, for then again only one form might seem to be involved."

83. Cordero, Nestor-Luis. 2013. "The relativization of "separation" (*chorismos*) in the *Sophist*." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 187–201. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"It is a commonplace among historians of ancient thought to refer to the "separation" (*chorismos*) which characterizes Platonic philosophy, and which Aristotle criticized severely. It is true that, like any commonplace, this separation, which is at base a type of dualism, can be the subject of very different understandings, including that of being minimized." (p. 187)

(...)

"All *aporiai* stem from separation. So, one has to try to suppress it, or at any rate relativize it, and that is going to be the task the *Sophist* sets itself.

Why the *Sophist*? Because, as we saw, *chorismos* separated two modes of being, and the *Sophist* is a dialogue about being. Steering clear of interpretation, the dialogue's subtitle is *peri tou ontos*. And it is normal, if he is going to undertake an in-depth analysis of the figure of the sophist, that he should see himself as obliged, for the first time on his philosophical voyage, now that he is over seventy, to confront his father Parmenides, the venerable and fearsome monopolizer of being, and the confrontation concerns sophistry. This is not the time to expatiate on the "amitiés particulières" that Plato establishes between Parmenides and sophistry. In criticizing the great master all things are allowed, including taking literally images in the poem which are didactic, such as the sphere, and in particular characterizing him as a fellow traveller of sophistry, which is, all in all, a joke in poor taste. But it is undeniable that his changing of porte-parole, in which he replaces Socrates with the Stranger, allows Plato to take certain liberties, and to face problems that his Socrates had never faced, among them precisely the necessity of refuting Parmenides." (p. 191)

84. ———. 2023. The reality of the untrue in Plato's *Sophist*.

English translation of "La réalité du non-vrai dans le Sophiste de Platon", *Archai*, 33, 2023, pp. 1-16, available on Academia.edu.

Abstract: "The definition of the sophist as "image-maker" allows Plato to add to the novelties he presents in the *Sophist* two topics he hadn't deepened in his previous dialogues: (a) a "definition" of being (247e) and (b) the influence this position will have on the relationship between image and truth. From a first definition of the image proposed by Theaetetus in 240a we deduce that, even if it is not true, it is "really" (ὄντως) an image, which does not coincide with the devalued or secondary reality that Plato had always attributed to this notion, from which all truth was absent. This conclusion, indeed, astonishes Theaetetus, attached to the Platonic "orthodoxy". This astonishment is not present in the orthodox version of the text of the passage 240a-c of the *Sophist*, which inherits from a modification of the widespread text from 1851. Once the original version is restored, the

definition of the fact of being proposed in 247e justifies the "really real" character of the image, which respects the condition required to everything that "possesses" being: the possibility of acting or being affected. Indeed, the image is "affected" by the model, that it tries to imitate, because the model "affects" it. The image, even if it is not true, is real."

85. ————. 2024. "The Stranger of the Sophist: A Citizen of Elea “Different” from the Eleatic Philosophers." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 173–181.

Abstract: “In 1561, the protagonist of the *Sophist*, a citizen of Elea, became a member of the ‘Eleatic school’. This intrusion had an author: the German philologist J. Cornarius. Indeed, in 1561 J. Cornarius proposed his own version of some passages of Plato’s *Sophist*. In this version Theodorus presents the Eleatic Stranger as ‘a companion (*hetairos*) of Parmenideans and Zenonians’ (216a). Since then, this cliché is accepted by all translations. However, when the possibility of justifying the existence of images and appearances is considered, the Stranger himself proposes ‘testing’ Parmenides’ thesis. His remarks are rather those of an adversary than of a friend or companion of Parmenides. In fact, in spite of Theodorus’ presentation, the Stranger, albeit citizen of Elea, does not seem to share the theses of the ‘Eleatics’. These anomalies invited us to question the character of ‘companion’ of the ‘Parmenideans’ credited to the Stranger. The questioning is possible if we exploit some valuable greek manuscripts of Plato’s *Sophist*, neglected by J. Burnet, like Vindobonensis 21 (Y). This manuscript, among others, has the lecture ‘heteros’, 'different', instead of ‘hetairon’, “companion”. This manuscript permits to maintain the formula ‘tôn hetairôn’, transmitted by all the manuscripts after the first ‘hetairon’, and removed in modern editions. The translation we propose is: the Eleatic Stranger is ‘different (*heteros*) from the companions (*tôn hetairôn*) of Parmenides and Zenon’.”

86. Corey, David D. 2015. *The Sophists in Plato's Dialogues*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Chapter Eight: Plato's Critique of the Sophist?

"In this chapter, I consider four such accounts of the sophists: those of Anytus speaking to Socrates in the *Meno*, Socrates speaking to Adeimantus in the *Republic*, Socrates speaking to Polus in the *Gorgias*, and the Eleatic Stranger speaking to *Theaetetus* in the *Sophist*. Although all these appear to stand as general critiques of the sophists, none is successful as such, nor, I argue, does Plato mean for us to accept them as such. These accounts are obviously defective both in their own terms and in light of what we know of the sophists from other dialogues. At the same time, however, I want to argue that these passages of general criticism have a broader scope than merely attempting to criticize the sophists. They also call into question the very lines of demarcation between such categories as “sophistry,” “philosophy,” and “good citizenship,” thus leading inevitably to the possibility of self-reflection, whether one understands oneself to be a philosopher or merely a citizen.

In other words, what is usually taken rather facilely to be “Plato’s critique of the sophists” in fact cuts more deeply into common thinking and doing than readers may like to admit. Widely accepted and even cherished political, philosophical, and pedagogical practices are implicated in these accounts. " (pp. 202-203)

87. Cornford, Francis Macdonald. 1935. *Plato's Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato translated with a running commentary*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.

Contents: *The Theaetetus*, pp. 15-163; *The Sophist* pp. 165-332.

"My object was to make accessible to students of philosophy who cannot easily read the Greek text, two masterpieces of Plato's later period, concerned with questions that still hold a living interest. A study of existing translations and editions has encouraged also the hope that scholars already familiar with the dialogues may find a fresh interpretation not unwelcome. A commentary has been added because, in the more difficult places, a bare translation is almost certain, if understood at all, to be misunderstood.

This danger may be illustrated by a quotation from a living philosopher of the first rank: It was Plato in his later mood who put forward the suggestion "and I hold that the definition of being is simply power". This suggestion is the charter of the doctrine of Immanent Law.'⁽¹⁾

Dr. Whitehead is quoting Jowett's translation. If the reader will refer to the passage (p. 234 below), he will see that the words are rendered: 'I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they be nothing but power.'⁽²⁾ A mark of real things may not be a 'definition of being'. This mark, moreover, is offered by the Eleatic Stranger to the materialist as an improvement on his own mark of real things, tangibility. The materialist accepts it, 'having for the moment no better suggestion of his own to offer'. The Stranger add that Theaetetus and he may perhaps change their minds On this matter later on. Plato has certainly not committed himself here to a 'definition of being'. So much could be discovered from an accurate translation; but the word 'power' still needs to be explained. It has been rendered by 'potency', 'force', 'Möglichkeit', 'puissance de relation'. Without some account of the history of the word *dynamis* in Plato's time and earlier, the student accustomed to the terms of modern philosophy may well carry away a false impression.

To meet difficulties such as this, I have interpolated, after each compact section of the text, a commentary which aims at discovering what Plato really means and how that part of the argument is related to the rest. There are objections to dissecting the living body of a Platonic dialogue. No other writer has approached Plato's skill in concealing a rigid and intricate structure of reasoning beneath the flowing lines of a conversation in which the suggestion of each thought as it arises seems to be followed to an unpremeditated conclusion. In these later dialogues the bones show more clearly through the skin; and it is likely that Plato would rather have us penetrate his meaning than stand back with folded hands to admire his art. An interpolated commentary, giving the reader the information he needs when and where he needs it, may be preferred to the usual plan of stowing away such information in an introduction at the beginning and notes at the end. It is not clear why we should be forced to read a book in three places at once. This book, at any rate, is designed to be read straight through." (Preface, pp. VII-VIII)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, (1933), p, 165. I am not suggesting that Dr. Whitehead fundamentally misunderstands the master who has deeply influenced his own philosophy, but only pointing out how a profound thinker may be misled by a translation.

(2) This rendering is itself doubtful, the construction of the words, as they stand in the MSS, being obscure and difficult.

88. Cresswell, M. J. 1972. "Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems in Plato?" *The Philosophical Quarterly* no. 22:149–154.

"How can one thing be many and many things one? This perennial in Greek philosophy gets a new twist in three of Plato's later dialogues (*Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*) where we discover not one problem but apparently two. More interestingly, although one of them is a serious and perplexing problem demanding the full insight of the rigorously disciplined philosopher, the other problem is described in the *Philebus* (14d, e) as commonplace and one such that "almost everyone agrees nowadays that there is no need to concern oneself with things like that, feeling that they are childish, obvious and a great nuisance to argument". And in the *Sophist* (251b) it is relegated to providing a banquet for the young and for "late learners of old men" who are "poorly endowed with intelligence and marvel at such things, thinking themselves to have come upon all wisdom".

What is the difference between this trivial form and the serious form of the problem of how one thing can be many? In the *Philebus* (15a) Socrates says that the trivial problem occurs when the one in question is the sort of thing which can come into being and pass away, i.e., is something which belongs to the physical world. The serious problem is when the one is an eternal existent." (p. 149)

89. Crivelli, Paolo. 1993. "Plato's *Sophist* and Semantic Fragmentation." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 75:71–74.

"In this journal, Band 71, Heft 3, pp. 257-282, Michael T. Ferejohn [*] proposed to apply to the interpretation of certain parts of Plato's *Sophist* a methodological principle which I shall call 'principle of joint explanation': given the close relationship between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, in particular circumstances it's possible to use Aristotelian texts to interpret obscure or vague Platonic passages. In this paper I shall criticize Ferejohn's application of the 'principle of joint explanation' to the *Sophist* and his interpretation of Plato's analysis of negation and of its philosophical aims."

[*] *Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and Semantic Fragmentation*.

90. ———. 2012. *Plato's Account of Falsehood: A Study of the Sophist*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Abbreviations of titles of Plato's works X; Note on the text XI; Introduction 1; 1. The sophist defined 13; 2. Puzzles about non-being 28; 3. Puzzles about being 71; 4. The communion of kinds 102; 5. Negation and not-being 177; 6. Sentences, false sentences, and false belief 221; Appendix: The *Sophist* on true and false sentences: formal presentation 261; References 275; Index of names 290; Index of subjects 294; index of passages cited 296-309.

"In the *Sophist* Plato presents his mature views on sentences, falsehood, and not-being. These views have given an important contribution to the birth and growth of the subjects now identified as ontology and philosophy of language. I have two main objectives: to offer a precise reconstruction of the arguments and the theses concerning sentences, falsehood, and not-being presented in the *Sophist* and to gain a philosophical understanding of them. In this introduction I offer an overview of the main problems addressed in the *Sophist* and their solutions and then discuss the methodology whereby I pursue my primary goals." (Introduction, p. 1)

"*Almost a commentary*. The close interconnection of themes and concepts invited by the dialogue-form makes it difficult to address a Platonic dialogue by examining some of its

themes and concepts in isolation from the others: if an operation of this sort is attempted, the impression arises that some factor essential for the understanding of the issues under consideration is ignored. Mainly for this reason I decided to have my examination of the *Sophist* unfolding in parallel with the development of the dialogue. So the present study covers most of the dialogue and follows its progression, almost as a running commentary.

Nevertheless, my examination of the *Sophist* is selective: not all the themes and concepts emerging from the dialogue are discussed with the same care or depth. The approach I have privileged is that of philosophy of language (in the comprehensive sense in which it addresses also ontological matters). In particular, I ask Plato some of the questions that a modern philosopher of language would regard as important and I consider what answers Plato is committed to offering. Establishing what answers Plato is committed to offering requires an accurate historical reconstruction of what he actually does say: modern questions, Plato's answers. The present study therefore combines exegetical and philological considerations with a philosophically minded attitude." (p. 11)

91. ———. 2019. "The Sophist's Appearance in Plato's *Sophist*." In *L'éristique: Définitions, Caractérisations et Historicité*, edited by Delcomminette, Sylvain and Lachance, Geneviève, 217–266. Bruxelles: Ousia.

"This study has four objectives, all related to the concept of appearing used in the definition of the sophist in the dialogue's frame section. First, the Visitor and Theaetetus, who are the dialogue's main speakers, pave the way for their definition of the sophist by describing him as someone who has apparent knowledge. The first objective of the present study is to show that this description had a wide-ranging and long-lasting historical impact. Secondly, the Visitor and Theaetetus develop their account of the sophist's apparent knowledge by treating false speeches as spoken images (εἰδῶλα λεγόμενα) analogous to painter imitations that often deceive their viewers into judging that they are what they imitate. This study's second objective is to shed light on the connection between images, imitations, and deception. Thirdly, the Visitor and Theaetetus flesh out their examination of the sophist as a maker of spoken images by distinguishing two kinds of images (εἰδῶλα), namely likenesses (εἰκόνες) and apparitions (φάντασμα). The third objective of the present study is to clarify this distinction and to reject a widespread interpretation of it. Fourthly, there is something awkward about the way in which the Visitor and Theaetetus think that the sophist is hard to define. For, shortly before the beginning of the dialogue's core section, they wonder whether the sophist should be subsumed under the likeness-making or the apparition-making one; but later on, after solving the falsehood paradox, they have no qualms about subsuming the sophist under the apparition-making art. The present study's fourth objective is to explain this behaviour." (pp. 217-218)

92. ———. 2023. "The Analysis of False Judgement According to Being and Not-Being in Plato's *Theaetetus* (188c10–189b9)." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 105:509–566.

Abstract: "The version of the paradox of false judgement examined at *Tht.* 188c10–189b9 relies on the assumption that to judge falsehoods is to judge the things which are not. The presentation of the argument displays several syntactic ambiguities: at several points it allows the reader to adopt different syntactic connections between the components of sentences. For instance, when Socrates says that in a false judgement the cognizer is "he who judges the things which are not about anything whatsoever" (188d3–4), how should the clause "about anything whatsoever" be construed? In common with "he who judges" and

“the things which are not” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not about it”), or exclusively with “he who judges” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not”)? The most plausible answer is that both construals are envisaged. Accordingly, the argument has two branches corresponding to these two alternative construals. In particular, it attempts to show that in both cases the cognizer will address what does not exist – an impossibility.

The idea that a false judgement is concerned with what is not about its reference has a clear echo in the *Sophist*. The way in which the problem is handled in the *Theaetetus* provides a hint that can help to find a solution for the hotly debated issue of the interpretation of the *Sophist*'s account of false statement."

93. ———. 2024. "The *Sophist* on Truth and Falsehood: Between Aristotle and Frege." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 445–459.

Abstract: "In the *Sophist*, the Visitor and Theaetetus agree that to judge (or state) falsehoods is to judge (or state) the things which are not. It is because judging (and stating) the things which are not is allegedly impossible that the dialogue's central section embarks on a painstaking examination of not-being. It is therefore puzzling to realize that at the point of the dialogue where they examine false judgement (and false statement) as an episode of judging (and stating) the things which are not, the two inquirers agree that falsehood can also be present in a judgement (or statement) that judges (or states) the things which are: in an affirmative false judgement (or statement), the cognizer (or speaker) posits that the things which in fact are not, are; but in a negative false judgement (or statement), the cognizer (or speaker) posits that the things which in fact are, are not. The puzzlement has two reasons: first, one gets the impression that the account of false judgement (or statement) as judging (or stating) the things which are not is supposed to cover all cases (rather than, roughly, half of them); secondly, if, at least in some cases, a false judgement (or statement) judges (or states) the things which are, the possibility of false judgement (and statement) is not threatened by the difficulties that bedevil not-being so that much of the central section of the *Sophist* turns out to be pointless. A passage of the *Parmenides* solves the puzzle by showing that the cases of false judgement (or statement) which in the *Sophist* are described as judging (or stating) the things which are should also be regarded as judging (or stating) the things which are not. It is likely that the reasoning explicitly presented in the *Parmenides* lies behind the puzzling argument of the *Sophist*: in the latter dialogue, Plato moves very quickly and offers only scarce signposts of the argumentative route fully expounded in the former one."

94. Crombie, Ian M. 1962. *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Vol. 2: Plato on Knowledge and Reality; Chapter 3: Metaphysical Analysis. § V: The *Sophist*, pp. 388-421; Chapter 4: Logic and Language § III: The Paradox of False Belief pp. 486-497; § IV: Some Further Problems arising out of the *Sophist*: the Copula and Existence, etc., pp. 498-516.

"The doctrine of the *Sophist* is continuous with that which we have been examining. The fact that I have relegated the *Sophist* to a section of its own must not be allowed to give a contrary impression.

I have given the *Sophist* a section on its own partly because it is very difficult, and partly because it adds something to the doctrine sketched in the *Cratylus* and common to the *Phaedrus*, *Statesman* and *Philebus*. There are two parts to this additional material. One of these parts deals with matters which are perhaps more properly called logical than metaphysical, namely the meaning of the verb *einai* or "to be", and the nature of negation. The discussion of these topics is entangled with that of the others and can only be separated by violence. I shall use violence, however, and postpone the detailed consideration of these topics to the next chapter. The other part of the additional material can perhaps be described as follows. So far the "kinds" whose "sharing" we have been considering have been, on the whole, material or limiting properties. I call, for example, animality a limiting property, because there are certain limits which cannot be transgressed by anything which is to have the property.

We recall however that the discussion in the *Parmenides* was concerned with the formal or non-limiting property unity—non-limiting in the sense that to be told that X is one is to be told nothing whatever about the nature of X. It is clear that the relation of non-limiting to limiting properties was an important question in Plato's latest phase, and it is in the *Sophist* that this is first discussed in connection with the sharing of kinds. This is the special material with which this section will be primarily concerned. I may add that it will be impossible in a discussion of this—perhaps of any—length to justify an interpretation of the *Sophist*." (p. 388)

95. Curd, Patricia Kenig. 1988. "Parmenidean Clues in the Search for the Sophist." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 5:307–320.

"Does the *Parmenides* hold clues to a proper understanding of the *Sophist*? It seems to me that it does; in this paper I shall explore a number of issues that link the two dialogues, arguing that understanding Plato's treatment of these issues in the *Parmenides* can help us correctly interpret the arguments of the *Sophist*.

Influential interpretations of Plato's later work hold that there are serious confusions about identity and predication in that work. According to these interpretations some of the arguments in the antinomies of Part II of the *Parmenides* exhibit this confusion; further, according to these views, it is not until the *Sophist* that Plato sees his way to distinguish identity and predication adequately, and that it is this that allows him finally to solve the problems of Being and Not Being in that dialogue.(1)

In this paper I want to challenge this view: I shall claim that the arguments of Part II of the *Parmenides* are not infected with an identity/predication (I/P) confusion. Further, I shall argue that in the second part of the *Parmenides* Plato explores and investigates certain ideas that are crucial to his solution of the problem of Not-Being in the *Sophist* (a solution that does not depend on distinguishing identity and predicative "senses" or "uses" of the verb "to be"). (2) I shall begin with some preliminary remarks about the I/P confusion and the earlier dialogues before turning to the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*." (p. 307)

(1) The interpretations I have in mind are primarily those of G. E. L. Owen (in "Notes on Ryle's Plato," in *Logic, Science and Dialectic*, ed. G. E. L. Owen and M. C. Nussbaum (Ithaca, 1986), pp. 85-103; hereafter NRP; and in "Plato on Not-Being," in LSD pp. 104-137; hereafter PNB); and Malcolm Schofield (in "The Antinomies of Plato's *Parmenides*," *Classical Quarterly*, vol. 21 [1977], pp. 139-158). See also M. Frede, *Prädikation und Existenzaussage* (Göttingen, 1967).

(2) Here I shall follow the interpretation of the arguments of the *Sophist* suggested by Jean Roberts in "The Problem about Being in the Sophist," *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, vol. 3 (1986), pp. 229-243 (hereafter PBS). What I shall say here about the *Sophist* is based on an acceptance of Roberts' arguments (which I shall not repeat here) and owes much to her work.

96. Dancy, Russell M. 1999. "The Categories of Being in Plato's *Sophist* 255c-e." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 19:45–72.

"*Sophist* 255c-e contains a division of beings into two categories rather than a distinction between the "is" of identity, existence, and/or predication; this emerges from an analysis of the argument that employs the division. The resulting division is the same as that ascribed to Plato in the indirect tradition among the so-called "unwritten doctrines"; there the two categories are attached to the One and the Indefinite Dyad." (p. 45)

(...)

"*Conclusion*. Perhaps it is not so bad if the later Plato sounds more like Aristotle. But there remains an enormous difference of ontology between Plato and Aristotle, if any of the reports of Plato's 'unwritten doctrines' can be believed.

We have already noticed that Plato thinks the distinction between *beings* and *others* can be put by saying that while *beings* partake of both the Forms Standalone and Relative, *others* partake only of the Form Relative. The partition of *beings* into Standalone ones and Relative ones, as I have construed it, is a categorial scheme: the scheme of Old Academic Categories adverted to in the introductory section of this article. Hermodorus (or whoever) was there quoted as saying that Plato says 'of the beings, some are by virtue of themselves, and some are relative to something'; that much we have the Eleatic Stranger saying in 255c13-14. But Hermodorus gives us examples, where the Stranger does not: a man and a horse are by virtue of themselves; large and small [things] are relative to things. If we unpack these examples, we presumably find ourselves saying: Bucephalus is a horse by virtue of himself; it is because he is Bucephalus that he is a horse, or, perhaps better, it is not because of some other thing that Bucephalus counts as a horse, whereas the fact that Bucephalus is large is something whose explanation requires us to introduce other, relatively smaller, horses which are the norm for horses as far as size goes. This then leads to categorizations of the terms *man* and *horse* under the heading Standalone and *large*, *small*, *good*, and *bad* under the heading Relative. And it seems a sound conjecture that where I am speaking of 'terms', Plato would speak of 'forms': the division is a division of forms, if that is right.

But that is not the end of the story. The Hermodorus text, along with other texts, (1) would have us believe that Plato rooted the two categories Standalone and Relative in two super-Forms that stood above all the others: the mysterious entities known as the One and the Indefinite Dyad, from which the more ordinary Forms derived as numbers. I think this, too, should be taken seriously. But that is a large undertaking, not to be entered on here." (pp. 69-70)

(1) Including, besides the others quoted in I, many in Aristotle, and also the rather strange and somewhat garbled stretch of text in Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* X 257-276 purporting to report on the views of 'Pythagoras and his circle'.

97. De Brasi, Diego, and Fuchs, Marko J., eds. 2016. *Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25)*. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Table of Contents: Acknowledgements VII; Diego De Brasi and Marko J. Fuchs: Introduction. Heidegger's Lectures on Plato's *Sophist* and their Importance for Modern Plato Scholarship 1; Jens Kristian Larsen: Plato and Heidegger on Sophistry and Philosophy 27; Catalin Partenie: Heidegger: Sophist and Philosopher 61; Laura Candioto: Negation as Relation: Heidegger's Interpretation of Plato's *Sophist* 257b3–259d1 75; Nicolas Zaks: Is the 'In-Itself' Relational? Heidegger and Contemporary Scholarship on Plato's *Sophist* 255c–e 95; Argyri G. Karanasiou: The Term *symplokē* in *Symposium* 202b1 and in *Sophist* 240c1ff, 259d-261c: Heidegger's Interpretation of the Concept of "Interconnection" in Platonic Thought 113; Maia Shukhoshvili: *Tékhnē* in Plato's *Sophist* (Discussing Heidegger's Opinion) 131; Olga Alieva: Ὁρθολογία περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν: Heidegger on the Notion of Falsehood in Plato's *Sophist* 143; Contributors 157.

"This volume offers a selection of papers presented at the international Symposium "Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924–25)" held at the University of Marburg in April 2013. At that meeting young classicists and philosophers discussed the possibility of a re-evaluation of Heidegger's hermeneutics of the *Sophist*, and argued for a more nuanced reconstruction of his relationship with Plato." (p. VII)

98. ———. 2016. "Introduction. Heidegger's Lectures on Plato's *Sophist* and their Importance for Modern Plato Scholarship." In *Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25)*, edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 1–26. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

"This introductory essay hence focuses on four aspects. First of all, it will offer an overview on the current state of research. Second, it will argue for a relativization of Heidegger's alleged misunderstanding of Plato. This will be achieved by arguing against some of the criticism expressed by Werner Beierwaltes [*] towards Heidegger's reading of Plato. Third, it briefly examines the "Transition" in the 1924 Marburg Lectures between Heidegger's analysis of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the interpretation of Plato's *Sophist*, the "Preliminary Remarks" and the "Introduction" to the actual interpretation of the dialogue, describing Heidegger as a somehow unconscious 'forerunner' of the modern dialogical approach. Finally, it will present an overview of the contributions in the volume and suggest further possible research developments." (p. 2)

[*] Beierwaltes, Werner. "EPEKEINA. A Remark on Heidegger's Reception of Plato." Trans. Marcus Brainard, *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 17, no. 1-2 (1994): 83–99 (orig.: "EPEKEINA. Eine Anmerkung zu Heideggers Platon-Rezeption." In *Transzendenz: zu einem Grundwort der klassischen Metaphysik. Festschrift für Klaus Kremer*, edited by Ludger Honnefelder and Werner Schüßler, 39–55. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1992).

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The three essays are reprinted in:

Beierwaltes, Werner. *Fußnoten zu Platon*. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 2011.

99. De Garay, Jesús. 2013. "Difference and Negation: Plato's *Sophist* in Proclus." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 225–245. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"We do not have a specific commentary on the *Sophist*, and it is doubtful whether he ever wrote one. What we do have is the *Commentary on the Parmenides*, from which some have hypothesized that he also wrote one on the *Sophist*. Whatever the case, the explicit references to this dialogue are many, and they affect crucial issues in Proclus' thought. In particular, *The Elements of Theology* aside (which, because of its axiomatic treatment does not include textual references of any kind), allusions to the *Sophist* are very frequent in his three most relevant systematic works: the *Commentary on the Parmenides*, the *Platonic Theology*, and the *Commentary on the Timaeus* (9)." (p. 227)

(...)

"However, as has been pointed out by Annick Charles-Saget, to understand Proclus' interpretation of the *Sophist* we cannot pay attention solely to explicit quotations from the dialogue; but we must also consider his silences and significance shifts. In other words, on the one hand there are important questions in the dialogue which Proclus hardly adverts to: for example, the sophist as deceiver, and purveyor of falsehood in general; on the other hand, there are matters which Proclus presents in a different way, such as the vindication of poetic production in light of the definition of the sophist. Also significant is the way in which a number of very short passages from the *Sophist* are adduced over and over and again in support of his thesis." (p. 228)

(9) An exhaustive documentation of references to the *Sophist* can be found in Guérard (1991). My own exposition will focus strictly on the *Commentary on the Parmenides* and *Platonic Theology*.

References

Charles-Saget, A., "Lire Proclus, lecteur du Sophiste", in P. Aubenque (éd.), *Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon* (1991), 475 – 494 = Charles-Saget (1991).

Guérard, Ch., "Les citations du Sophiste dans les oeuvres de Proclus", in P. Aubenque (éd.), *Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon*, 1991, 495 – 508 = Guérard (1991).

100. de Harven, Vanessa. 2024. "Something Stoic in Plato's *Sophist*." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 63:237–298.

Abstract: "The Stoics have often been compared with the earthborn Giants in the Battle of Gods and Giants in Plato's *Sophist*, but with diverging opinions about the lessons they drew in reaction to Plato. At issue are questions about what in the *Sophist* the Stoics were reacting to, how the Stoics are like and unlike the Giants, the status of being for the Stoics, and the extent to which they were Platonizing with their incorporeals. With these open questions in mind, this paper re-examines the *Sophist* from the Stoic perspective, finding eight distinct challenges that are likely to have been salient to the Stoics, and offers a new account of the

Stoics as responding to these challenges with an innovative ontology that prises apart something from being to make room for what is not, and a sophisticated one-world metaphysics that grounds everything there is in two fundamental bodies."

101. de Vries, Willem. 1988. "On "Sophist" 255B-E." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 5:385–394.

"At *Sophist* 255b7-e the Eleatic Stranger gives two arguments, one to show that being and identity are not the same, and one to show that being and otherness are not the same. Scholars have not paid them particularly close attention, but it seems generally agreed that the two arguments are quite different. In this paper I shall offer an interpretation which shows that the two arguments, though superficially quite different, are intrinsically and importantly related. Specifically, in the first argument the Stranger elicits an obvious falsehood from the hypothesis that being and identity are the same. I claim that in order to distinguish being and otherness an exactly parallel argument could have been given instead of the second argument we actually find. However, there are sound dramatic reasons why this was not done, for in this case the falsehood would not be obvious.

Instead, the argument we are given takes us deeper and analyzes the source of the falsehood by introducing a distinction between absolute and relative uses of "being." This distinction, which has been misinterpreted in the literature, is then applied to the problem at hand and is used to distinguish being from otherness. Thus the fuller and apparently different argument to distinguish being and otherness succeeds by giving the deeper reasons for the success of the argument to distinguish being and identity.

As a corollary to my interpretation, we can see that in these arguments other senses of "is," whether the "is" of existence or the "is" of identity, do not come into play, as other commentators have held.

The first section will discuss the first argument of our text, along with a recent interpretation of it. In the second section I shall introduce the argument to distinguish being and otherness and argue against Owen's interpretation.

The third section contains my interpretation of this argument, and is followed by a summary fourth section." (p. 385)

102. ———. 1988. "On "Sophist" 255B-E." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 5:385–394.

"AT *Sophist* 255b7-e the Eleatic Stranger gives two arguments, one to show that being and identity are not the same, and one to show that being and otherness are not the same. Scholars have not paid them particularly close attention, but it seems generally agreed that the two arguments are quite different. In this paper I shall offer an interpretation which shows that the two arguments, though superficially quite different, are intrinsically and importantly related. Specifically, in the first argument the Stranger elicits an obvious falsehood from the hypothesis that being and identity are the same. I claim that in order to distinguish being and otherness an exactly parallel argument could have been given instead of the second argument we actually find. However, there are sound dramatic reasons why this was not done, for in this case the falsehood would not be obvious. Instead, the argument we are given takes us deeper and analyzes the source of the falsehood by introducing a distinction between absolute and relative uses of "being." This distinction, which has been

misinterpreted in the literature, is then applied to the problem at hand and is used to distinguish being from otherness. Thus the fuller and apparently different argument to distinguish being and otherness succeeds by giving the deeper reasons for the success of the argument to distinguish being and identity.

As a corollary to my interpretation, we can see that in these arguments other senses of "is," whether the "is" of existence or the "is" of identity, do not come into play, as other commentators have held." (p. 385)

103. Delcomminette, Sylvain. 2014. "Odysseus and the Home of the Stranger from Elea." *Classical Quarterly* no. 64:533–541.

"Not very long ago, Plato's *Sophist* was often presented as a dialogue devoted to the problem of being and not-being, entangled with limited success in an inquiry into the nature of the sophist. Thanks to the renewal of interest in the dramatic form of Plato's dialogues, recent works have shown that this entanglement is far from ill conceived or anecdotal.⁽¹⁾ However, the inquiry into the sophist is itself introduced by another question, concerning the nature of the Stranger from Elea himself. I would like to show that this question and the way in which it is raised in the prologue may themselves shed light on the relations between the many threads which run across this very complex dialogue."

(1) See especially N. Notomi, *The Unity of Plato's Sophist* (Cambridge, 1999).

104. Denyer, Nicholas. 1991. *Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy*. London: Routledge.

"How can one say something false? How can one even think such a thing?

Since, for example, all men are mortal, how can one either say or think that some man is immortal? For since it is not the case that some man is immortal, how can there be any such thing for one to say or think? That, in a nutshell, is the problem of falsehood. It, and some of its many ramifications in ancient philosophy, will be the topic of this book." (p. 14)

(...)

"In the *Sophist* Plato sorts out, once and for all, the problems about falsehood that still lingered in the *Theaetetus*. His strategy is one of unite and conquer. What has made falsehood so problematic hitherto is, he suggests, the fact that it has been treated in isolation. We have thought that not being was uniquely difficult to understand, not realising how wrong we are to think that we understand being (243 b 7 - c 5, 245 e 8 - 246 a 2). Once however we realise that both being and not being should by rights be found equally difficult, we will be able to make progress (250 e 5 - 251 a 3). Plato thus examines all the many and diverse questions and answers about being that were bequeathed him by his philosophical predecessors. How many things are there? Just one? Just two? Or more? What sorts of things are there? Only changing and tangible things? Only changeless and intangible ones? Or are there things of both sorts? If we are to speak and think at all, argues Plato, we must acknowledge the existence of many things, both tangible and intangible.

Above all, we must acknowledge the existence of the five Greatest Kinds: Change, Rest, Being, Same and Other. By the end of *Sophist* 255 those kinds have been isolated and distinguished from one another. Plato thereupon puts them to work. He starts to explore

some of the connections between them, and in so doing solves the problem of how we can speak of that which is not." (Chapter 8, p. 147)

(...)

"Plato has explained how we can negate both predications and identifications. He has explained how both those ways of speaking about what is not are perfectly legitimate and free from paradox. His explanations seemed plausible enough, so far as they went. But did they go far enough? In particular, did they go far enough to solve our problem about falsehood? Plato thought not. By *Sophist* 258 b 7 he has legitimated talk of what is not. It is not however until *Sophist* 263 d 4 that he takes himself to have legitimated talk of falsehood. In the meantime, much other work is done; and even though the problem of falsehood was that to charge someone with falsehood requires talk of what is not, nevertheless the eventual solution to that problem is not a simple application of the earlier result that talk of what is not can make perfectly good sense. Why does Plato proceed in this way? Why does he not declare the problem of falsehood solved the moment he has given his account of negation?" (Chapter 9, p. 166)

105. Desmond, William. 1979. "Plato's Philosophical Art and the Identification of the Sophist." *Filosofia oggi* no. 2:393–403.

Summary: "The author starts from an interpretation of continuity in the dramatic character of Plato's dialogue (a trait to be found in the *Sophist* as well, also in account of those images helpful to outline the nature of the philosopher), thus bringing forward a reading of the dialogue based on the statement that Plato's philosophical purpose cannot be either dried up or fulfilled on the range of logical analysis."

106. Di Iulio, Erminia. 2023. "Gorgias and Plato's *Sophist*." *Rhizomata* no. 11:208–226.

Abstract: "My aim is to investigate the link between Plato's *Sophist* and Gorgias's treatise *On What Is Not*. This relationship is worth examining because Gorgias's treatise constitutes an essential, but insufficiently studied stage in the intellectual journey leading from Parmenides to the *Sophist*. My claims are that 1) Plato's agenda in the *Sophist* perfectly meets the challenges Gorgias raises in the first thesis of his treatise, that 2) this becomes clear once we focus on Gorgias's and Plato's respective use of the verb 'to be' and, finally, that 3) Plato is able to overcome Parmenides's impasse precisely because he deals with Gorgias's treatise."

107. Diggle, James. 2020. "Two Conjectures in Plato (*Laches* 183e, *Sophist* 261a)." *Hermes. Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* no. 148:381–382.

108. Dinan, Matthew. 2013. "On Wolves and Dogs. The Eleatic Stranger's Socratic Turn in the *Sophist*." In *Socratic Philosophy and Its Others*, edited by Dustin, Christopher and Schaeffer, Denise. Lanham: Lexington Books.

"I argue that in adopting a kind of Socratic "virtuosity," the shortcomings of the Eleatic alternative to Socrates are put in dramatic relief. Not only does the Stranger's appropriation of Socratic elenchos ultimately fail to produce clarity with respect to the sophist, but the drama of the dialogue suggests that the Stranger is critically lacking in self-knowledge. We see this most clearly in the Stranger's philosophical parricide of "Father" Parmenides; certainly, it is through this parricide that the Stranger is able to produce an internally consistent account of being and logos, but the Stranger's consistency only serves to

attenuate his abstraction from a satisfactory account of the human things. At the end of the dialogue the Stranger thus produces a conclusion no more satisfying than the Athenian jury of the Apology—that Socrates looks awfully similar to a sophist. The specific ways in which Plato problematizes the Stranger's investigation and conclusions, however, provide us with some insights into why Plato made Socrates the philosophical hero of the dialogues, particularly insofar as the Stranger seems lacking in Socrates' characteristic self-knowledge. In the last analysis, while Plato opens the *Sophist* by dividing philosophy like from like, he closes it by dividing it better from worse, vindicating Socrates." (p. 117)

109. Dominick, Yancy Hughes. 2018. "The Image of the Noble Sophist." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 22:203–220.

Abstract: "In this paper, I begin with an account of the initial distinction between likenesses and appearances, a distinction which may resemble the difference between sophists and philosophers. That distinction first arises immediately after the puzzling appearance of the noble sophist, who seems to occupy an odd space in between sophist and philosopher. In the second section, I look more closely at the noble sophist, and on what that figure might tell us about images and the use of images. I also attempt to use the insights provided by the noble sophist in an investigation of the kind of images that Plato the author produces. This raises the question of the general notion of image as it appears in the *Sophist*, and especially of the dual nature of all images, which in turn invites reflection on certain features of the examination of being and non-being late in the dialogue. Finally, I return to the deception inherent in images, and I argue that this dialogue does not present the possibility of completely honest images. Nevertheless, I hope to show that some uses of deceptions and images are better than others."

110. Dorion, Louis André. 2012. "Aristotle's definition of elenchus in the light of Plato's *Sophist*." In *The Development of Dialectic from Plato to Aristotle*, edited by Fink, Jakob L., 251–269. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Translated from the French by Michael Chase.

"There are certainly several ways to approach the question of the relations between the Platonic and Aristotelian dialectic.(1) They can be compared from the angle of their objects, their method, their functions, the relations they maintain with opinion, science, the truth, rhetoric, and so on. I have chosen to compare and confront them on a precise point, which does not seem to me to be less essential, viz. the conception of the elenchus, more precisely the conception of the elenchus found in the *Sophist* and the definition set forth in the *Sophistici Elenchi*. I think it is possible to show that the Aristotelian definition of the elenchus is directly inspired by a passage from the *Sophist*, of which it nevertheless retains only one part and one dimension. The close parallel between these two texts establishes an unquestionable continuity between Plato and Aristotle, but this continuity is also accompanied by a significant discontinuity, as I shall try to demonstrate.(2)" (p. 251)

(1) Cf., *inter alia*, the studies by Pater 1965; Moreau 1968; Narcy 2000; and Brunschwig 2000.

(2) Fait 2007: xliv–xlv also deals with the relation between the *Sophist* and the *Sophistical Refutations*, but he offers no detailed comparison between the conception of elenchus in the Sixth definition of the *Sophist* (226a–231c) and the definition of elenchus found in the *Sophistical Refutations*.

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- Fait, P. (2007) *Aristotele. Le confutazioni sofistiche*, Introduzione, traduzione e commento, Rome/Bari.
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- Pater, W. A. De (1965) *Les Topiques d'Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne*, Fribourg.
111. Dorter, Kenneth. 1990. "Diairesis and the Tripartite Soul in the *Sophist*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 10:41–61.
- "It has not generally been observed that there are remarkable differences between the way that the Eleatic stranger defines the sophist in the dialogue of that name, and the way that Socrates had characterized him in the earlier dialogues. These differences entail some serious consequences, and by paying attention to these we will be able to notice important implications of the *Sophist's* treatment of its theme. More generally, it will help us evaluate the claim that the dialogue represents a fundamental departure from Plato's earlier thinking." (p. 41)
112. ———. 1994. *Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues: the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- "The four dialogues examined here form a natural group with sequential concerns. Since the aim of the present study is to try to understand the group as a whole, I have sacrificed the advantage of greater detail that book-length commentaries would provide, in order to present a more synoptic picture. But although the treatment of individual dialogues will not be as extensively detailed as in book-length studies, I have tried to pay careful attention both to the conceptual arguments and to the dramatic and literary events, and have tried to ensure that the lessening of detail would not mean a lessening of attentiveness." (from the *Preface*, p. IX)
- (...)
- "In the middle dialogues such as the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, Plato defines reality with reference to the criterion of rationality. Reason apprehends what is universal and unchanging, but not what is particular and in flux. The senses apprehend what is particular and in flux, but not what is universal and unchanging. Since reason is a more trustworthy guide to truth than are the changeable and deceptive senses, true reality is to be identified with "being" (the universal and unchanging) rather than "becoming" (the particular and fluid). This is the dichotomy represented later in the *Sophist* by the gods (friends of the forms) and giants (materialists), respectively. The former maintain against the materialists that "through the body we have intercourse with becoming by means of the senses, and by means of reason through the soul we have intercourse with real being, which always remains

the same in the same respects, whereas becoming is different at different times" (248a). The leader of this dialogue is not Socrates but an unnamed stranger from Elea, who apparently is proposing to give up this dichotomy by neutralizing the difference between the gods and giants—in which case he would destroy the theory of forms in one of its most fundamental features.

Consequently it is more important in the case of the *Sophist* than with most other dialogues to consider its standpoint in relation to that of its predecessors. There are in fact notable differences between the way sophistry—the defining focus of the present dialogue—is portrayed here and in the Socratic dialogues." (pp. 121-122)

113. ————. 2013. "The Method of Division in the *Sophist*: Plato's Second *deuteros plous*." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 87–99. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"I have suggested that the trilogy [*Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*], like the *Phaedo*, approaches the good indirectly, by a *deuteros plous*. The reason the good cannot be presented directly is indicated in the final definition. The visitor concedes that it is difficult to know in which of the two species of images – distorted "semblances" or accurate "likenesses" – the sophist's products belong (*Sophist* 236c – d). He goes on to locate that difficulty in the problem that to say what is false is to attribute existence to "what is not", and although at first he raises this point with regard to semblances rather than likenesses (236e– 239e), he proceeds to broaden the problem: since any image (ειδωλον) differs from the true thing (ἀληθινον) that it imitates, it must be not true (μή ἀληθινον), which means *it really is not* (οὐκ ὄντος). When Theaetetus points out that it "*really is* a likeness (εἰκόν)," the visitor replies, "Without really *being*, then, it really is what we call a likeness (εἰκόνα)?" (239d – 240b). Although the passage began as if only semblances were problematic, the problem was eventually extended to images in general, and by the end even likenesses were expressly included." (p. 97)

114. Driscoll, John. 1979. "The Platonic Ancestry of Primary Substance." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 24:253–269.

"In this paper I will *not* examine the three-sided relationship between the Receptacle, primary substance, and primary matter. Such an examination would afford an interesting perspective from which to study the development of Aristotle's theory of substance from the *Categories* to the *Metaphysics*, but it would raise many difficult issues not easily resolved in a short paper. I will instead simply list the properties shared by the Receptacle and primary substance and discuss one important consequence of the link thereby established between *Timaeus* 49-52 and *Categories* V: that the well-known controversy between G. E. L. Owen and Harold Cherniss over the dating of the *Timaeus* must be decided in favor of Owen, at least with respect to the relative dating of the *Timaeus* and the *Sophist*. I propose to show, in other words, that *Categories* V owes a much greater debt to Plato than is usually thought and that an examination of this debt increases our understanding not only of Aristotle's theory of substance but also of the development of Plato's later philosophy." (pp. 253-254)

115. Duerlinger, James. 1988. "The ontology of Plato's *Sophist*: I. The problems of falsehood, non-being and being." *The Modern Schoolman* no. 65:151–184.

Second part: *The Modern Schoolman*, LXV, March, 1988, 170-184.

"This is the first part of a two-part article in which Plato's discussion of the problems of falsehood, non-being and being, as presented in his *Sophist*, 236D9-25908, is explained from an ontological perspective. A new, unifying account of Plato's discussion is introduced that place it squarely within the framework of his theory of forms as it was understood by Aristotle and the ancient Platonists instead of the linguistic frameworks in which it has been placed by modern scholars. Because these linguistic frameworks have dominated both the modern translations and interpretations of Plato's text, readers will need to take special care not to presuppose the correctness of one or another of them when assessing this explanation. In particular to understand what is said here readers must free themselves of the habit of assuming that we are concerned with interpretations of "is" in positive statements of existence, predication, or identity, or with interpretations of "is not" in negative statements of existence, predication, or identity. The result of their effort, I believe, will be a clearer understanding of the novelty of my account, and consequently, a better understanding of the place of Plato's discussion within the history of ancient Greek ontology.

In the first part of this article I shall explain Plato's presentations of the problems of falsehood, non-being, and being, and in the second I shall explain his solutions to these problems in the context of his reply to those who deny that something can be both one and many. As Plato presents the problems of falsehood and non-being, I claim, he intends that we should realize that they rely on the assumption that because non-being is the contrary of being nothing can be both a being and a non-being. For this reason his solution to these problems is to argue, first of all, that non-being is not the contrary of being, but instead the form of otherness than another being, and secondly, that because every being, including being itself, partakes of this form, something can be both a being and a non-being." (p. 151)

116. Duncombe, Matthew. 2012. "Plato's Absolute and Relative Categories at *Sophist* 255c14." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 32:77–86.

"Beginning at *Sophist* 255c9 the Eleatic Stranger attempts a proof that 'being' (τὸ ὄν) and 'other' (τὸ ἕτερον) are different very great kinds. The key step in this proof is to group beings (τῶν ὄντων) into those that are themselves in themselves (αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά) and those that are in relation to other things (πρὸς ἄλλα). Much effort has been made to understand this distinction between αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά and πρὸς ἄλλα. The prevailing approach takes the former to name the class of 'absolute' terms and the latter to name the class of 'relative' terms, categories described in Diogenes Laertius' Life of Plato. Some, however, have argued that this category approach fails because it cannot say into which class some terms, such as 'sameness', fit. This represents a longstanding interpretive impasse. In this paper I show that an alternative manuscript reading can preserve the general category approach, whilst allowing 'sameness' to fit into the scheme, and thereby end the interpretive deadlock. I then defend my alternative reading against the possible objection that certain terms do not fit into the new scheme by appealing to a range of texts where Plato discusses relative terms." (p. 77, notes omitted)

"For a good overview of the literature on this distinction, see John Malcolm, "A Way Back for *Sophist* 255c12-13", *Ancient Philosophy* 26: 275-289. 2006, p. 276."

117. Eisenberg, Paul D. 1976. "More on Non-Being and the One: A Response to Bondeson." *Apeiron* no. 10:6–14.

"In a recent issue of this journal, Prof. William Bondeson has argued(1) that previous translations of το μηδαμῶς ου will not do (or, in some cases, are even seriously misleading);

and he proposes to translate that phrase by 'that which has no characteristics at all'. In the second section of his paper, he seeks to show that there is "a close resemblance" (p.17) — indeed, "a direct parallel" (p. 18)—between the *Sophist's* το μηδαμῶς ὄν and the ostensible subject of the first and sixth hypotheses of the second part of the *Parmenides*. Although, to be sure, he raises a number of other points as well—and although I am inclined to agree with much else that he says or suggests in his paper—what I have just indicated seem to me to be the principal theses in his paper. In any case, in this paper I shall deal almost exclusively with them—and I shall take issue with both of them. Or, more exactly, I shall argue that Bondeson's proposal for a new translation is quite untenable; and, while agreeing that there is indeed a "direct parallel" between the materials in the two dialogues that he considers, I shall question what seems to be his interpretation of the significance of those materials or arguments." (p. 13)

(1) "Non-Being and the One." *Apeiron*, Vol. VII, No. 2 (1973). 13-21.

118. El Murr, Dimitri. 2006. "Paradigm and Diairesis: A Response To M.L. Gill's 'Models In Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*'." *Plato: The Internet Journal of the International Plato Society* no. 6:1–9.

"In her interesting and stimulating paper, Mary-Louise Gill addresses one of the central issues in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*: what is a model (*paradeigma*) and how does one become useful in a dialectical inquiry? Gill's main thesis is clear: a *paradeigma* becomes truly useful when not only the sameness between the example and the target but also their difference are recognized ("the inquirers need to recognize, not only the feature that is the same in the example and the target, but also the difference between the two embodiments and the procedural difference those different embodiments entail")." (p. 1)

119. El_Bizri, Nader. 2004. "ὄν και κῶρα. Situating Heidegger between the *Sophist* and the *Timaeus*." *Studia Phaenomenologica* no. 4:73–98.

Abstract: "In attempting to address the heideggerian *Seinsfrage*, by way of situating it between the platonic conception of ὄν in the *Sophist* and of κῶρα in the *Timaeus*, this paper investigates the ontological possibilities that are opened up in terms of rethinking space. Asserting the intrinsic connection between the question of being and that of space, we argue that the maturation of ontology as phenomenology would not unfold in its furthestmost potential unless the being of space gets clarified. This state of affairs confronts us with the exacting ontological task to found a theory of space that contributes to an explication of the question of being beyond its associated temporocentric determinations. Consequently, our line of inquiry endeavors herein to constitute a prolegomenon to the elucidation of the question of the being of space as "ontokhorology."

120. Ellis, John. 1995. "Δύναμις and Being: Heidegger on Plato's *Sophist* 247d8-e4." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 3:43–78.

"This definition of being is proposed by the Stranger in the course of his discussion of the "gigantic battle."

One side maintains that only tangible, visible bodies have being (οὐσία), while the other claims that being is limited to only incorporeal, invisible Forms, the bodies of the opponents being relegated to the realm of becoming (δύναμις)." (p. 43)

(...)

"There is hardly a line in the above summary of the setting for 247d-e that is uncontroversial. The crux of the controversy is of course whether Plato is offering a *definition* of being as δύναμις;. Should we take this seriously, or is it merely a mark of being, used to refute the corporealists? After all, it looks as if the Stranger merely suggests that the known is changed by the knower-it is in fact one of three options mentioned so the friends of the Forms may not be forced to accept it. And if we do take the definition seriously, this surely entails that Plato has radically altered his view on the nature of the Forms.

The issue still divides scholars. Heidegger's interpretation of this passage in his lecture course on the *Sophist* is one that takes the definition seriously.

(...)

What is most interesting, however, is his relation to an unnamed interpreter, whom, as we shall see, Heidegger no doubt wants to take issue with, but who also fundamentally shaped Heidegger's own reading. This kind of problematic relationship is even more so because he remains unnamed. He is none other than Paul Natorp, whose name explicitly occurs only one other time in the course of the lecture (with the obvious exception of the eulogy at the very beginning), and that is with respect to his article on Antisthenes [*]." (p. 44)

(...)

"The essay is divided into three subsequent sections. I will give a review of Natorp's interpretation in section II. In section III, we shall turn to Heidegger's reading in the *Sophist* lecture, pointing out, along the way, influences of, and divergences from, Natorp. And in section IV, we will briefly consider the issue of destruction." (p. 45)

References

[*] Natorp, *Antisthenes*, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft I 2, (1894), 1538-1545.

Natorp, Paul. *Platos Ideenlehre*. 1903. Reprint of the 2nd (1921) edition. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1961

121. Esposti Ongaro, Michele. 2009. "The Ontological Ground of Syntax: An Analysis of Plato's *Sophist*, 262c2-5. A Reply to Bruno Centrone." *Les Études Platoniciennes* no. 6.

"In his most recent translation of the dialogue, B. Centrone(1) argues that the expressions οὐσία ὄντος and οὐσία μὴ ὄντος can be interpreted in different ways, according to how we interpret the noun οὐσία, either as an indication of what a thing is or as an indication of the fact that it is.

Therefore, Centrone remarks that the meaningful λόγος can assert (a) that a thing which is, or a thing which is not, are (the horse is; the chimera is); (b) what a thing which is (exists) is, or what it is not (the horse is a quadruped, it isn't a biped); (c) what a thing which is (exists) is, or what a thing which is not (doesn't exist) is (a swallow is winged; a chimera is winged); or (d) that a particular nature is or is not.

Centrone suggests that the first is the right interpretation. Nevertheless I am not sure that he really gives a complete range of choices. I don't believe that the expression οὐσία μὴ ὄντος could refer to a non-existing entity like "a chimera", for the simple reason that Plato had previously excluded not being as an entity: "not being" is rather an expression which means the idea of Difference, in relation to a subject. I will therefore try to demonstrate that the expressions ὄντος and οὐσία μὴ ὄντος aren't equivalent and that the first refers to a particular entity, while the second has a completely different function." (p. 178)

(1) Platone, *Sofista*, Translation of B. Centrone, Torino, Einaudi, 2008, note 146 p. 223.

122. Esses, Daniel. 2019. "Philosophic appearance and sophistic essence in Plato's *Sophist*. A New Reading of the Definitions." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 39:295–317.

"Why does the Eleatic Visitor present so many definitions of sophistry in Plato's *Sophist*? Is the final definition complete, or should it be qualified and supplemented with further research? These are long-standing questions in scholarship on Plato's *Sophist*, and they have been the subject of lively debate.(1) I develop a new reading of the dialogue's definitions and provide fresh answers to these questions.

The distinguishing features of my reading are the following. First, I read the *Sophist* as a drama, paying special attention to how the dialogue's participants are portrayed and its place in a trilogy that also includes the *Theaetetus* and the *Statesman*. Second, rather than simply casting aside the first six definitions of sophistry as erroneous and irrelevant due to the success of the seventh definition, I examine what they each contribute to the search for the sophist. The multiple definitions not only help highlight the sophist's deceptiveness and manifold appearances, but they also subtly and gradually turn our attention to the challenge of distinguishing Socrates and sophists. Last, I strike a middle course in my assessment of the Visitor's final definition. I accept it as an adequate disclosure of the sophist's essence, but I also grapple with the possibility that it fails to provide adequate guidance for differentiating between Socratic philosophizing and sophistry." (p. 295)

(1) See Rickless 2010 for a recent intervention in this debate. Brown 2010 and Gill 2010 are also notable for their focus on the dialogue's divisions and definitions. Though studies focusing on this particular aspect of the dialogue are relatively recent, interpretations of the dialogue as a whole generally address the status and significance of the definitions, with varying conclusions.

References

Brown, Lesley 2010. "Definition and Division in Plato's *Sophist* ." In *Definition in Greek Philosophy* , edited by Charles, David, 151-171. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gill, Mary Louis. 2010. "Division and Definition in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman* ." In *Definition in Greek Philosophy*, edited by Charles, David, 172-199. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rickless, Samuel C. 2010. "Plato's Definition(s) of Sophistry." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 30:289-298.

123. Ferber, Rafael. 2024. "The Overt Argument Against Conceptualism in the *Parmenides* and the Covert Argument for Conceptualism in the *Sophist* (with a Particular

Focus on the Being of Not-Being)." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 373–380.

Abstract: "This contribution begins by analysing the argument against conceptualism in the *Parmenides* and then extends it to "the not-being" (*to mê on*) in the *Sophist*, or that which "is what is not" (258c2-3). It concludes with the puzzle that, in this case, the being of "the not-being" also has "understanding (*nous*), life (*zôê*) and soul (*psychê*)" (249a9). The main new points are (1) if "the not-being" has understanding (*nous*), "the not-being" – according to the ontological argument of the *Parmenides* – also has thought (*noêma*), which has a second "not-being" as its object and (2) the question of whether Plato would have interpreted Fragment 3 of *Parmenides*, *to gar auto estin noein te kai einai*, not only in the sense that thinking implies being, but also in the sense that being implies thinking".

124. Ferejohn, Michael T. 1989. "Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and Semantic Fragmentation." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 71:257–282.

"This paper opened with the proposal of a somewhat unorthodox approach to reading the *Sophist* (as a close companion to certain Aristotelian texts), to which can now be added a further methodological prescription which needs no apology whatsoever. Simply put, it is that the *Sophist* should be read as a single and continuous whole. This may not seem to need saying, but in fact it is all too tempting (and has been too common) to think of the dialogue almost as if it were two separate works: an "outer shell" (216 — 36 and 264 — 8) in which Plato is concerned primarily to show off his method of division (and secondarily to continue his sustained invective against the sophists), and a more philosophical "inner core" (237 — 64) where the aim is to vindicate the possibility of false thought and speech against Eleatic attack. This bifurcation is an excessive reaction to an unexceptionable fact.

For one can quite readily agree that there is a vast difference in philosophical content between the two parts of this alleged division without committing the correlative errors of regarding the "inner" section as self-contained, and dismissing the "outer" sections as so much optional reading when trying to puzzle out the discussion of negation, falsity, and related topics which occurs at 237 — 64.

Besides the general point that this false partition denies justice to Plato both as a philosopher and as a master of the dramatic craft, there are very powerful reasons pertaining to the specific issues involved for suspecting that the parts in question must be more connected than the explicit transitions at 236,7 and 264 make it seem.

Chief among these is the fact that whereas the particular application of the method of division to the very special case of the sophist might depend on the intelligibility of false statement, Plato's very conception of the method itself presupposes the coherence of negative predication." (pp. 264-265)

125. Ferg, Stephen. 1976. "Plato on False Statement: Relative Being, a Part of Being, and Not-Being in the *Sophist*." *Journal of The History of Philosophy* no. 14:336–342.

"Recently Plato's account of not-Being in the *Sophist* has received considerable attention, notably in papers by David Wiggins, (1) G. E. L. Owen, (2) and Edward N. Lee. (3)

Lee's discussion is especially important because it emphasizes (in my opinion, correctly) the analogy of the partitioning of Knowledge at 257c-d. Nevertheless even Lee seems to me to fail to give a correct explanation of the Sophist's discussion of this matter." (p. 336)

(1) David Wiggins, "Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of Non-Being," in *Plato, A Collection of Critical Essays*, Vol. I: *Metaphysics and Epistemology*, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 268-303.

(2) G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," also in Vlastos, pp. 223-267. (Henceforth referred to as "Owen.")

(3) Edward N. Lee, "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist," *Philosophical Review*, LXXXI, 3 (July, 1972), 267-304. (Henceforth referred to as "Lee.")

126. Ferreira, Fernando. 2001. "A Two-Worlds, Two-Semantics Interpretation of Plato's *Sophist*." In *Greek Philosophy and Epistemology. Vol. II*, edited by Boudouris, Costantin, 61–68. Athens: Ionia Publications.

"The avowed purpose of Plato's *Sophist* is to characterize the sophist. In the first part of his book, Plato employs the method of divisions to obtain this characterization, and eventually arrives at the conclusion that the sophist is an imitator and that "there is an art, concerned with speeches, by which it is possible to beguile the young" (234c). From here it is short shrift to arrive at the problem of falsity. This problem is, I claim, the philosophical *leitmotiv* that drives the discussions in the second part of Plato's *Sophist* (after 236d). One should be clear about what exactly this problem consists of. In the *Sophist*, Plato is not concerned with the problem of the meaningfulness of false statements concerning some high-minded realm of objects (e.g., forms) - quite to the contrary (see the epilogue). Plato is concerned with falsity in *ordinary statements*. This is worth emphasizing: Plato's main problem in the *Sophist* is to account for the meaningfulness of such simple and prosaic (false) statements as 'Theaetetus is flying' (263a)." (p. 61)

127. Figal, Gunter. 2000. "Refraining from Dialectic: Heidegger's Interpretation of Plato in the *Sophist* Lectures (1924/25)." In, edited by Scott, Charles E. and Sallis, John, 95–109. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"We should begin with a general characterization of the *Sophist* and Heidegger's reading of the dialogue. The aim of the long and extremely difficult discussion between the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetos is to find out how something like sophistry is possible. To find an answer to this question is equivalent to investigating the human way of being in the world. In this way Plato's dialogue is a contribution to ontology. Nearly needless to say that it is an ontology of a very special kind and that the ontological investigation also turns out to be very special because of the nature of its subject. As Heidegger puts it, from the attempt to hold up a mirror "to the sophist's concrete *Dasein* within Greek life" (GA, 19:189) soon arises the suspicion, that sophists are connected with "deception and fraud," and so the investigation has to determine the status of deception and fraud. A quite simple reflection makes clear that every deception makes a pretense of being something that it is not, it passes off "non-being for being." Accordingly, the question of the being of the sophist's form of life is the question of the being of non-being. And, as Heidegger stresses, this means "a revolution in the previous way of thinking, even in the previous way in which Plato himself put forward the meaning of being"; the demonstration of non-being in being "is nothing less than the more radical conception of the meaning of being itself" (GA, 19: 192)." (pp. 96-97)

References

GA 19 = Martin Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, edited by Ingeborg Schübler, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992.

128. Fine, Gail. 1977. "Plato on Naming." *The Philosophical Quarterly* no. 27:289–301.

"Plato is sometimes criticized for having failed to distinguish names and sentences, and naming and stating, until the Sophist, and this failure is thought to underlie both his supposed perplexity about false belief in the Cratylus, Theaetetus, and elsewhere, and his claim, in the Cratylus, that names can be true and false" (p. 289)

(...)

"This does not imply that Plato is clear about the differences between names and sentences; but we shall at least find that there is no evidence committing him to any confusion here. Nor, as we shall see, does Plato conflate stating and naming, in either of the alleged ways. Finally, we shall see that neither his account of true names nor his account of false belief in the Cratylus rests on the crude views ascribed to him. The account of true names says no more than that names are true or false of things, and that correct assignments of names depend upon the descriptive content of names. The account of false belief, so far from depending on the atomist "hit or miss" model, in fact matches the Sophist's later, supposedly more mature, account." (pp. 290-291)

129. Flower, Robert. 1980. "G. E. L. Owen, Plato and the Verb *To Be*." *Apeiron* no. 14:87–95.

"When it comes to Plato, the question which Aristotle tells us has plagued philosophers from the beginning — namely, "What is being?" (1) — has been reduced by certain contemporary commentators to the question, "How many syntactically distinct uses of the verb "to be" can be discerned in Plato's *Sophist*." (2) Over this latter question there has arisen something of a controversy of interpretation between two camps, so to speak. The first camp, from which I have chosen as representative, J.L. Ackrill (3), claims to have discerned three distinct uses: the "is" of identity, the "is" of the copula, and the "is" of existence. The second camp, represented here by G.E.L. Owen, (4) claims that there are only two uses of the verb "to be" in the *Sophist*: the "is" of identity and the "is" of the copula. To quote Professor Owen,

"The *Sophist* will turn out to be primarily an essay in problems of reference and predication and in the incomplete uses of the verb associated with these. The argument neither contains nor compels any isolation of an existential verb." (5)

I should like to argue in this paper that both camps are mistaken. There is only one use of the verb "to be" in the *Sophist* — namely, the "is" of participation — and it is this and this use alone that constitutes Plato's answer to Aristotle's question.

Being, for Plato of the *Sophist*, is participation or, perhaps better, the "power of participating". Thus, while Owen is, I shall argue, quite correct when he inveighs against discerning a substantive, existential use of the verb "to be" in the *Sophist*, his own account (and the arguments he offers in favor of it) warrants, shall we say, a "friendly amendment".

Whether one has adopted Ackrill's position or been persuaded by Owen, the evidence in question is minimally two-fold. Either interpretation must account for, first, the various passages wherein Plato either employs or seems to imply the expression, "participates in being" and, second, the passage from 255b7 to 255e where the Eleatic Stranger distinguishes Being from the Same and the Other."

(1) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z 1.7, 1028b3-8.

(2) While this is not the time to argue about the advisability of such a "reduction". I must admit to the suspicion that the approach to Plato inherent in such a reduction does generate certain confusions; if only because it fails to preserve the issue of the initial question.

(3) J.L. Ackrill, "Plato and the Copula: *Sophist* 251-259", *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology* ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, 1971), pp. 210-222. For further representatives of Ackrill's position see P.M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1935),

p. 296; P. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago, 1933), p.298; M.K. Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the *Sophist*", *Acta Philosophica Fennica* xiv (1962), pp. 23-78; I.M. Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines* (London, 1962), vol. II, pp. 498-499.

(4) G.E.L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being", Vlastos, pp. 223-267. See also Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology", *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle* ed. R. Bambrough (London, 1965), pp. 69-95. For others who tend to share Owen's position see J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of $\tau\omicron$ ν and $\tau\omicron$ $\mu\eta$ $\delta\nu$ in the *Sophist*", *Phronesis* xii (1967), pp. 130-146; M. Frede, "Prädikation und Existenzaussage" *Hypomnemata* xviii (1967), pp. 1-99; W.O. Runciman, *Plato's Later Epistemology* (Cambridge, 1962), ch. iii; C. Kahn, "The Greek Verb "To Be" and the Concept of Being", *Foundations of Language* ii (1966), p. 261.

(5) Owen, op. cit., p. 225.

130. ————. 1984. "The number of being." *The Modern Schoolman* no. 62:1–26.

"It is to my mind no accident that the primary interlocutor of both the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*, is the young mathematician, Theaetetus. In the former dialogue Theaetetus inroads into a theory of proportion that would include incommensurables constitute the model in terms of which Plato would have us understand the "fluid" logic of "maieutic" inquiry. I should here like to argue that the "object" of Theaetetus' own mathematical studies - namely incommensurables - offer Plato, if not the literal truth with regard to Being, at least a revealing metaphor in terms of which the nature and logic of Being can be articulated." (p. 1)

131. Foley, Sean. 2022. "Sophistic Speech and False Statements in Plato's 'Sophist'." *Illinois Classical Studies* no. 47:383–405.

Abstract: "Plato's *Sophist* features a discussion of false statements, the literal sense of which has been the source of much scholarly controversy. Two readings of the discussion, the Oxford Interpretation and the Incompatibility Range Interpretation, seem especially plausible. This essay enters the exegetical debate by placing the discussion of false statements in the broader context of the dialogue, which is principally concerned with sophistic speech, not false statements. When the discussion of false statements is understood

as contributing to an inquiry into sophistic speech, the Incompatibility Range Interpretation—with slight modification—emerges as the clear favorite."

132. Foshay, Raphael. 2017. "Plato at the Foundation of Disciplines: Method and the *Metaxu* in the *Phaedrus*, *Sophist*, and *Symposium*." *IAFOR Journal of Arts & Humanities* no. 4:15–23.

Abstract: "This paper situates the interpretation of Plato in its 2500-year trajectory toward a significant change in the mid-twentieth century, away from the attempt to establish Plato's metaphysical doctrines to a recognition of the intrinsic value of their literary-dramatic dialogue form. I discuss the lingering presence of doctrinal interpretation in the Nietzschean-Heideggerian tradition of Plato interpretation as it manifests in Derrida's reading of Plato's *Phaedrus*. I then give two examples of the transformative power of attention to the literary-dramatic structure of the dialogues in the work of two quite different but mutually confirming kinds of contemporary Plato interpretation, those by Catherine H. Zuckert and William Desmond, respectively. The Plato that emerges from their work confirms the growing recognition that the tradition of Platonism does not represent the thinking embodied in Plato's dialogues."

References

Desmond, W. (1979). Plato's philosophical art and the identification of the sophist. *Filosofia Oggi*, 11, 393–403.

Zuckert, C. H. (2009). *Plato's philosophers: The coherence of the dialogues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

133. Fossheim, Hallvard J. 2013. "Development and Not-Being in Plato's *Sophist*." *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* no. 13:318–327.

Abstract: "Plato's dialogue the *Sophist* seems to contribute to two separate projects that are not easily reconciled: on the one hand, defining the sophist, and, on the other hand, developing a theory of being and process. In this article, it is argued that the two undertakings come together in what is a main focus for the dialogue's interlocutors and a major issue in Plato's writings overall, namely, education or development. This is an issue which in the *Sophist* finds expression in two separate but intimately interconnected questions, concerning the "who" and "how," respectively, of the educational process."

134. Foster, Bennett. 2018. "Platonic Agonism: A Dialogical Addendum to Plato's *Sophist*." *Sophia and Philosophia* no. 1:1–28.

"The following addendum to Plato's *Sophist* was fabricated as a kind of experimental answer to a specific contextual question: What is the relation of Plato's conception of philosophy to the practice of the *agōn* in Ancient Greece? For the "contest-system,"(1) to adopt Gouldner's phrase, has long been recognized as one of the salient features of Greek culture in the centuries leading up to Plato's time.(2)" (p. 1)

(...)

(1) By "contest-system," Gouldner means to convey the sense that the *agōn* is a systematic cultural entity, almost on the level of a formal institution. By *agōn* there is certainly meant

more here than the sum of the various types of contests in Ancient Greece, let alone a particular type or instance of contest. Alvin Gouldner, "The Greek Contest System," in *Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965), 41-77.

(2) Jacob Burkhardt is credited with popularizing the notion of the "Agonal Age" of Greek history, during which the *agōn* was a "motive power ... capable of working on the will and potentialities of each individual and indeed became the paramount feature of life." While the *agōn* was on the wane in Plato's time, its influence was formative and lasting, and it was still a live issue whether traditional values such as the *agōn* represented should be retained. [Jacob Burkhardt, *The Greeks and Greek Civilization*, trans. by Sheila Stern, ed. by Oswyn Murray (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 162, 166.]

135. Frank, Daniel H. 1985. "On What there Is: Plato's Later Thoughts." *Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 6:5–18.

136. Frede, Michael. 1992. "Plato's *Sophist* on False Statements." In *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, edited by Kraut, Richard, 397–424. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"...I want in what follows to focus on the discussion of false statements. Hence I will, only very briefly, comment on the remarks about being, and, in somewhat more detail, consider the remarks about what it is to be not being, to the extent that this seems necessary to understand Plato's resolution of the difficulty concerning false statements." (p. 399)

(...)

"Conclusion. In fact one thing that is striking about the *Sophist*, in comparison to the earlier dialogues, is its "dogmatic" and systematic character. It sets out carefully constructing a series of puzzles, *aporiai*. In this respect its first half resembles the early dialogues or even its immediate predecessor, the *Theaetetus*. But then it turns toward a resolution of these *aporiai*. In this regard the procedure of the dialogue reminds one of the methodological principle Aristotle sometimes refers to and follows, the principle that on a given subject matter we first of all have to see clearly the *aporiai* involved before we can proceed to an adequate account of the matter, which proves its adequacy in part by its ability both to account for and to resolve the *aporiai* (cf. *De An.* I, 2, 403b20-21; *Met.* B1, 995a27 ff.). And the *Sophist* proceeds to resolve these difficulties in a very systematic and almost technical way. By careful analysis it tries to isolate and to settle an issue definitively. In this regard it does stand out among all of Plato's dialogues. And because of this it also is more readily accessible to interpretation. If, nevertheless, we do have difficulties with this text, it is in good part because in his day Plato was dealing with almost entirely unexplored issues for whose discussion even the most rudimentary concepts were missing. Seen in this light, Plato's solution of the difficulty presented by false statements is a singular achievement." (p. 423)

137. ———. 1996. "The Literary Form of the *Sophist*." In *Form and Argument in Late Plato*, edited by Gill, Christopher and McCabe, Mary Margaret, 135–152. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

"If one considers the literary form of the *Sophist*, one is primarily interested in what is characteristic of, or distinctive about, the literary form of this particular dialogue, as opposed to other Platonic dialogues. But this should not make us overlook the fact that the *Sophist*,

first of all, is a dialogue, and that, in the case of the *Sophist*, there is something particularly puzzling about this. So I will first consider the question why Plato wrote the *Sophist* as a dialogue, and then turn to two other literary features of the text.

The puzzle is this. If we look at the early aporetic dialogues, we have a number of readily available explanations why Plato wrote them as dialogues. But, as we proceed to the middle and then the late dialogues, these explanations become less and less plausible. And they seem to be particularly implausible in the case of the *Sophist*. For the *Sophist*, in a way, is the most dogmatic of all of Plato's dialogues. And it might seem that Plato could as well have written at least the central part of this dialogue as a treatise on falsehood." (p. 135)

138. Friedländer, Paul. 1969. *Plato. Vol. III: The Dialogues, Second and Third Period*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Second edition, with revisions (First edition 1958) Chapter XXVI: *Sophist*, pp. 243-279.

Translated from the German *Platon: Seinswaheheit und Lebenswirklichkeit*, 3 vols. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1954 by Hans Meyerhoff.

Publisher's note: "The first volume of this work, *Plato: An Introduction* (1958), contains seventeen chapters, each an independent study of an aspect of Plato's thought, his creative work, and his relation to modern thinkers, and a chapter on Plato as jurist by Huntington Cairns. A new edition is in preparation, with revisions and additional annotation.

The second volume, *Plato: The Dialogues, First Period* (1964), contains Chapters I-XIX, which interpret the works of Plato's early creative period, the "ascent."

The third volume, *Plato: The Dialogues, Second and Third Periods*, contains Chapters XX-XXXI. These take up the central and late dialogues, the works of Plato's major creative periods. At the end of this final volume, there is an Afterword, "On the Order of the Dialogues."

"We know that the task of clarifying the meaning of pseudos— falsehood, deception, and lie—occupied Plato from his beginnings as a philosopher. It did not grow out of a special interest in a difficult logical problem. It occupied him because (to speak in the concrete imagery of the *Sophist*) both sophistic and eristic hide in this darkness and confusion— everything, in other words, that is hostile to philosophy and that, because of its dangerously similar appearance, jeopardizes the reputation of philosophy and the life of the philosopher. Even one of the earliest of Plato's works, the *Hippias Minor*, deals with the problem of deception, involuntary and voluntary, sophistic and Socratic deception. Then, with the *Cratylus*, language becomes the instrument of positive enlightenment. There (*Cratylus* 431bc; cf. 385bc) discourse is explained as the "juxtaposition" of noun and verb. In the *Sophist*, it is the "combination" of the two, and this change is more than a mere difference in expression. In the *Cratylus*, we are shown that just as the elements of a sentence, the "names," may be used wrongly, so may the juxtaposition of these elements. The *Sophist* derives discourse not simply from "naming"; discourse has a new and autonomous structure. As a unique kind of being it has the structure of being itself, characterized by "communion." In the *Cratylus*, the "names" have the function of revealing (δήλωμα, 433b et seq.); in the *Sophist*, it is the statement that has this function. Hence, the *Cratylus* seeks to discover falsehood in the elements of language; the *Sophist* seeks it more deeply, in the structure of language."

139. Fronterotta, Francesco. 2011. "Some Remarks on the Senses of Being in the *Sophist*." In *Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 35–62. Praha: Oikoymenh.

Abstract: "In this paper I examine the question of the different senses of the verb "to be" and the notion of "being" in Plato's *Sophist*, discussing the relevant passages and bibliography."

140. ————. 2013. "Theaetetus sits - Theaetetus flies. Ontology, predication and truth in Plato's *Sophist* (263a-d)." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 205–223. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"After solving the problem of "what is not" (259a–b) by elucidating the relations between the γένη that give rise to their reciprocal κοινωνία (259d–e), the next step, before getting back to hunting the sophist, is to clarify whether this also helps disentangle the difficulty connected with the possibility of falsehood in λόγοι, as the examination of what is not was introduced for precisely this purpose: once the logical aporia of falsehood has emerged from the ontological paradox of what is not, solving the latter would also solve the former. So, if what is not, whose form the Stranger has succeeded in identifying, "blends with thinking and discourse" (δοξη και λογω μειγνυται), there will be no contradiction in allowing falsehood in λόγοι, thus making approachable the dark place of images and appearances that are only similar to the truth, where the sophist has taken refuge; but if this were not the case, any λόγος would always have to be considered necessarily true and the inaccessibility of falsehood would make the sophist's refuge safe from any threat (260d–261b). The section of the dialogue that opens in this way contains some of the fundamental premises of what can fairly be seen as Plato's philosophy of language (259e–264b)." (p. 205)

141. Gacea, Alexandru-Ovidiu. 2019. "Plato and the "Internal Dialogue": An Ancient Answer for a New Model of the Self." In *Psychology and Ontology in Plato*, edited by Pitteloud, Luca and Keeling, Evan, 33–54. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

"The theme of the dialogic relationship that the ψυχή entertains with itself appears explicitly in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*.(10) Naturally, one could argue that "dialogicity" represents one of Plato's main concerns throughout the dialogues.

However, I prefer to isolate the way the issue is treated in these two dialogues, because stating explicitly that thought is the "dialogue of the soul with itself" appears to be indicative of a particular Platonic outlook on thought and selfhood. I claim that Plato is subtly moving away from a descriptive perspective, the way thought has always been conceived in Greek culture, toward a prescriptive one, the philosophical appropriation and reinterpretation of this cultural trait. I thus propose not to treat this notion as being self-explanatory." (p. 35, a note omitted)

(...)

"In the *Sophist*, the description is couched in different terms, making the distinctions more explicit and adding some other elements: "Thought (διάνοια) and speech (λόγος), says the Visitor, are the same, except that what we call thought (διάνοια) is dialogue (διάλογος) that occurs without the voice (διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς), inside the soul (ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς) in conversation with itself. [...] And the stream of sound from the soul that goes through the mouth is called speech (λόγος)" (263e3–8). We find out that dialogic thought and speech are not identical but of the same kind, namely, λόγος. Διάλογος is a type of λόγος but not in the

same way uttered speech is λόγος, i.e., doxic λόγος. The dialogue “placed inside the soul” occurs “without sound or voice,” but speech is always uttered, it is something that is “breathed out.”

Not all speech is thought or dialogue, but all thought can become speech when it is accompanied with sound or when it is exteriorized. Furthermore, the λόγος that is exteriorized, “breathed out,” is not the dialogue but its “conclusion,” i.e., the δόξα.

The belief marks the cessation of the conversation, the moment when the soul doesn't doubt anymore." (p. 40)

(10) There is a third passage about the “internal dialogue” in the *Philebus* (38c-e), but this is more of an example than a description of dialogic thought.

142. Galligan, Edward M. 1983. "Logos in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*." In *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Volume Two*, edited by Anthon, John P. and Preus, Anthony, 264–278. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"In this paper I am concerned with the *Theaetetus*' dreamed theory [(201d-206b)] and its refutation in that dialogue. From the vantage point of the *Sophist*, I ask (1) whether and how Plato changed the theory's view of logos and (2) whether and how he might have been able to loosen the dilemma that refutes the theory." (p. 265)

(...)

"The dreamed theory and the *Sophist* differ about logos in rather much the way they differ about syllables. Though the *Theaetetus* contains a distinction of letters into kinds, not much was made of these distinctions. But according to the *Sophist*, vowels make non-vowels pronounceable. The latter dialogue claims part-part asymmetry for syllables. As for *logos*, the dreamed theory does not clearly have any part-part asymmetry, whereas the *Sophist* articulates just such a distinction. On the other hand, concerning the whole-part aspect of *logoi*, the dreamed theory and the *Sophist* are closer. According to the dreamed theory, by means of a statement we can express our knowledge of complexes, but what we can only name, elements, we can neither know nor state. According to the *Sophist*, we can name beings by means of a name or a verb, but in doing so we do not state anything of anything.

The *Sophist*'s view of both statement and syllable seems to be that they are wholes that come to be when their parts are put together and that the wholes have a character that their parts do not have. This suggests that syllables and statements are open to whatever force there is in the second horn of the dilemma brought against the dreamed theory." (p. 270)

143. Ge, Tianqin. 2022. "Is dynamis a definition or a criterion of being in Plato's *Sophist*? Reinterpreting *Sophist* 247d-e in light of the Hippocratic method in the *Phaedrus*." *Convivium* no. 35:5–24.

Abstract: "This paper discusses the issue of whether the power (dynamis) is a criterion of being, or a definition of being at Plato's *Sophist* 247d8-e4. I propose a new solution to this problem in light of the Hippocratic Method Passage at Plato's *Phaedrus* 270d, arguing that, when one takes this parallel passage into account seriously, the dynamis proposal at *Sophist* 247d8-e4 only provides a criterion of being. This paper first gives some preliminary remarks on Plato's discussion of the notions of 'definition' and of 'criterion'.

Then I argue that the *Phaedrus* passage is a proper parallel passage of the *dynamis* proposal passage. After establishing the understanding of *physis* as essence in both the Hippocratic Corpus and Plato's dialogues, this paper provides a detailed textual analysis between the Hippocratic Method Passage and the *dynamis* proposal passage. I demonstrate that the *dynamis* proposal at most provides a necessary condition of being, which falls short of being a proper definition of being. Therefore, the *dynamis* proposal only points to a criterion of being."

144. Gerson, Lloyd P. 1986. "A Distinction in Plato's *Sophist*." *The Modern Schoolman* no. 63:251–266.

Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.), *Plato: Critical Assessments Vol. IV: Plato's Later Works*, London: Routledge 1998, pp. 125-141.

145. ———. 2006. "The 'Holy Solemnity' of Forms and the Platonic Interpretation of *Sophist*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:291–304.

"There is a famous passage in Plato's *Sophist* which serves-as well as any, I believe-to indicate perhaps one of the most fundamental divides among Plato scholars. The division is between those who do and those who do not take seriously the ancient Platonic tradition's interpretations of Plato. The passage is the Eleatic Stranger's response to the claim of the 'Friends of the Forms' that 'real being' (τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, 248a11) is immovable."

(...)

"The argument leading up to this rhetorical question is this: if knowing is a case of 'acting' (ποιεῖν) on something, then being known is a case of 'being acted upon' (παρχεῖν). Since the Friends of the Forms agree that real being is known, they would seem to be forced to admit that the Forms, insofar as they are known, are acted upon. But that which is acted upon is 'in motion' (κινεῖσθαι). So, the Forms would seem to be in motion insofar as they are acted upon. But the Friends have maintained that Forms are not in motion; on the contrary, they are completely immovable. So, the Friends are faced with an apparent dilemma: either Forms are not known or else their claim that real being is immovable must be abandoned." (p. 291)

(...)

"In sum, the Platonic interpretation of *Sophist* maintains that the Friends of the Forms - both ancient and modern - do not grasp full-blown Platonism. Perhaps Plato himself at one time in his career did not grasp its nature either. Platonism is, among other things, the view that οὐσία must never be supposed to have its own separate reality. It is always and necessarily understood as embedded in the matrix Demiurge-οὐσία-Idea of the Good. From the Platonists' perspective, Aristotle wrongly collapsed or telescoped this matrix into the Prime Unmoved Mover, thereby making it unsuitable to be the absolutely simple first principle of all. The inseparability of ontologically primary thinking and being is a doctrine shared by Plato and Aristotle." (p. 302)

146. ———. 2024. "Being and Power in Plato's *Sophist*." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 265–272.

Abstract: "At *Sophist* 247D8-E4, the Eleatic Stranger offers as a "defining characteristic" (ὄρος) of what is "really being" (ὄντως εἶναι) "power" (δύναμις), that is, the ability to affect or be affected by anything in any way, to any degree, and at any time, even once. This defining characteristic is later applied to the argument between the materialists and the idealists, but it is not subjected to further analysis. This definition takes on particular significance in the light of *Republic* VI 509B8-9, for there the Idea of the Good is "beyond ousia," surpassing it both "in seniority" (πρεσβεία) and "in power" (δυνάμει). In this paper, I explore some of the connections between the two passages."

147. Gevorkian, Arasi T. 1987. "Idealism in Plato's *Sophist*." *Russian Studies in Philosophy* no. 26:43–63.

Abstract. "Marxist studies in the history of philosophy are based on the assumption that all philosophical schools and currents fall into two main traditions, materialism and idealism, and that the whole of the history of philosophy can be described as an opposition between the two. Lenin observed that this distinction goes back to antiquity, and that even then the "tendencies" of Democritus and Plato were already in evidence."

148. Giannopoulou, Zina. 2001. "'The Sophistry of Noble Lineage' Revisited: Plato's *Sophist* 226 b1 - 231 b8." *Illinois Classical Studies* no. 26:101–124.

"This paper deals exclusively with the sixth logos of sophistry, which depicts the sophistic art as "noble" and its practitioner, the sophist, as a teacher with apparently similar educational characteristics as those possessed by Socrates, the greatest enemy of sophistic practices. My aim is to shed some new light on the identity of the "sophist of noble lineage." Some of the methodological questions which will shape my argumentation are the following: is "noble sophistry" a suitable characterization of Socrates' elenctic method? If the answer to this question is positive, then how can one explain the fact that the Socratic method seems to be reflected in otherwise straightforward definitions of the sophists which condemn and repudiate their practices? If, on the other hand, the sixth definition does not intend to present Socrates as a "noble sophist" but simply reveals a more positive aspect of the σοφιστική τέχνη which *could* be seen as Socratic, what are the distinctive boundaries that clearly separate the *elenchos* from even the noblest eristic? In order to conduct my examination, I have divided this paper into three parts. In Part I, I attempt a close reading of the method used by the Eleatic Stranger and demonstrate its limitations; it is, I suggest, the nature of these limitations which contributes significantly to the ambiguity of the *logos* provided in the sixth definition. In Part II, I explore the main methodological tool of the definition, namely the "body and soul" analogy, and assess its impact on the quality of the logos provided. Finally, in Part III, I offer my own interpretation; its novelty lies in the fact that it contextualizes this part of the *Sophist* in the broader frame of the dialectical quest conducted by the Stranger and attempts to account for its intentional definitional ambiguity." (pp. 101-102)

149. Gibson, Twyla. 2009. "The Code of Ethics in Medicine: Intertextuality and Meaning in Plato's *Sophist* and Hippocrates' *Oath*." In *Critical Interventions in the Ethics of Healthcare: Challenging the Principle of Autonomy in Bioethics*, edited by Holmes, David and Murray, Stuart J., 183–198. London: Routledge.

"I develop a set of criteria for identifying connections between Hippocrates and Plato by drawing upon media and information theory to adapt the principles devised by researchers working on intertextuality in other ancient Greek collections. Next, I turn to Plato's *Sophist*,

a dialogue that explains the procedure for distinguishing multiple sequences of classifications that make up the different branches of the definition of art or technique (*techne*). I delineate the topics in the definition of the Merchant of Learning, and then use this Platonic sequence as a template for comparing the organization of topics and ideas in the *Oath*. I show that the sequential order of topics in the *Oath* corresponds point by point to the serial order of the topics in the various classifications of the definition explained in Plato's *Sophist*. The presence in the *Oath* of the same sequence described in Plato makes it possible to line up the classifications in the two works and to cross-reference and compare information in corresponding categories. Cross-referencing of topics and ideas allows us to bring information presented in Plato to bear on the interpretation of the *Oath*. This new information provides the resources for dealing with issues of interpretation that have gone unresolved due to lack of evidence concerning the meaning and context of words and ideas. The discovery of connections between Plato and Hippocrates adds to our understanding of the meanings communicated in the *Oath* by linking the Greek medical tradition to the wider context of ancient thought and expression.

This broadened context sheds new light on the foundations of Western medical ethics and provides the evidence and insights needed to reconstruct and reassess the history of our ethical tradition. It is my argument that the expanded horizons of meaning gained through the study of intertextual connections among Hippocratic and Platonic texts and traditions provides a rich resource for reevaluating the history of Western medical ethics, and for defending and critiquing the possibilities entailed by biomedical technologies today." (p. 184)

150. ————. 2010. "The Fisher: Repetition and Sequence in Plato's *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Ion*." *The McNeese Review* no. 48:84–112.

"In this study, I address the question of a coherent philosophical system in Plato's collected dialogues as well as the problem concerning the meaning and function of Plato's method. Is there evidence of a consistent set of principles in Plato's dialogues that pertain to all the disparate discourses in the collection?

What is the purpose of the method of division and of the sequences of topics and ideas that make up the classifications spelled out by the characters in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*? This study proposes new answers to these questions." (pp. 86-87)

(...)

"Comparing passages from several important dialogues in light of one definition suggests that the *Sophist* does offer a technical explanation and demonstration of Plato's method. Tracing the definition of the fisher across three books highlights a number of consistencies that point to the presence of a system, and shows how repetition and sequencing are principles that may be applied to different texts in the collection. Moreover, finding the definition in four works makes it possible to transfer findings from the case studies to Plato's dialogues more generally. Generalizing from the examples to the dialogues as a whole suggests that the "Forms" are the system of rules and conventions that govern the order, shape, and organization of all of Plato's dialogues." (pp. 108-109)

151. ————. 2011. "The Philosopher's Art: Ring Composition and Classification in Plato's *Sophist* and *Hipparchus*." In *Orality and Literacy: Reflections across Disciplines*,

edited by Carlson, Keith Thor, Fagan, Kristina and Khanenko-Friesen, Natalia, 73–109. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

"With Plato, argued media theorist Marshall McLuhan, the Greeks 'flipped out of the old Homeric world of the bards into this new, rational ... civilized world.'(1) McLuhan and other scholars associated with the foundations of media studies cite Plato's writings as evidence for dating the shift from primary orality to literacy in ancient Greek culture.

Further research has demonstrated that the 'great divide' of orality versus literacy is untenable; traditional oral modes of communication persist alongside and into written texts.

This study re-examines Plato's dialogues in light of recent research concerning ring composition, an oral formulaic technique found in Homer. Comparative analysis of two exemplary dialogues - Plato's *Sophist* and *Hipparchus* - shows that these works manifest the ring pattern associated with oral traditional modes of communication. This comparative evidence suggests that the dialogues are transitional compositions, and that Plato's writings represented not a break with the oral tradition but rather its transposition to written texts. I explain the implications of these findings for the interpretation of the history and philosophy communicated in Plato's dialogues, in other ancient oral derived works, and for the study of oral histories and traditions today." (p. 73)

(1) Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Me: Lectures and Interviews*, ed. Stephanie McLuhan and David Staines (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2003), 227.

152. Gili, Luca. 2017. "Plato, Soph. 216 a3–4." *Méthexis* no. 29:171–173.

"N.-L. Cordero has persuasively argued that there is no reason to delete ἐταίρων (l. 4) if one were to choose the reading ἕτερον (l. 3), that all manuscripts preserve, instead of ἐταῖρον.(2)" (p. 171)

(...)

"My reading turns the reference to the followers of the Eleatics as a piece of Platonic irony – they are philosophers, but definitely not as good as the stranger – Plato's alter ego? – nor, we can suppose, as their masters Parmenides and Zeno." (p. 173)

(2) Cf. N.-L. Cordero, *El Extranjero de Elea, 'compañero' de los Parmenídeos...desde 1561*, *Méthexis* xxiii (2013), 51–58. Cordero, however, seems to be unaware of the fact that Y, the earliest source for ἕτερον, does not have a primary status. On this issue see A. D'Acunto, "Su un'edizione platonica di Niceforo Moscopulo e Massimo Planude: il Vindobonensis Phil. Gr. 21 (Y)," *Studi classici e orientali* 45 (1996), 261–279. Accordingly, Cordero's intervention, whose rationale I fully endorsed, should not be understood as an emendation *ope codicum*, but rather as an emendation *ope ingenii* that at least one Byzantine reader already suggested. The text that Cordero and I defend is not an ancient variant.

153. Gill, Mary Louise. 2006. "Models in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*." *Journal of the International Plato Society* no. 6:1–9.

"Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman* use a notion of a model (*paradeigma*) quite different from the one with which we are familiar from dialogues like the *Phaedo*, *Parmenides*, and *Timaeus*. In those dialogues a *paradeigma* is a separate Form, an abstract perfect particular,

whose nature is exhausted by its own character. Its participants are conceived as likenesses or images of it: they share with the Form the same character, but they also fall short of it because they exemplify not only that character but also its opposite. Mundane beautiful objects are plagued by various sorts of relativity—Helen is beautiful compared to other women, but not beautiful compared to a goddess; she is beautiful in her physical appearance, but not in her soul or her actions; she is beautiful in your eyes, but not in mine, and so on. The Form of the Beautiful, which is supposed to explain her beauty, is simply and unqualifiedly beautiful (*Symp.* 210e5-211d1).

In the *Sophist* and *Statesman* a model involves a mundane example whose definition is relevant to the definition of some more difficult concept under investigation, the target. The steps taken to define the example also reveal a useful procedure to be transferred to the more difficult case. This much should be fairly uncontroversial. In my view it is important to recognize that a *paradeigma* is not merely an example (or paradigmatic example) of some general concept." (p. 1)

154. ———. 2010. "Division and Definition in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*." In *Definition in Greek Philosophy*, edited by Charles, David, 172–199. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In this paper I will argue that dichotomous division yields a good definition of a target kind only in the simplest and most uncontroversial cases. Plato also uses division in defining more complex kinds, but then it serves as a preliminary strategy, which undertakes to expose some puzzle about the kind under investigation, which the enquirers must resolve in some other way, or at least in conjunction with some other method.

We have trouble catching the sophist, because we find him, not at the end of a single branch, but at many different termini, allowing multiple definitions. We find the statesman at a single terminus, but he has many rivals there, who claim to share his expertise; the definition of the statesman reached by dichotomous division, though very detailed, turns out to be much too general. These disappointing results serve a purpose. Plato wants us to see that something about the sophist explains why he turns up all over the map, and that something about the statesman explains why he has company at the terminus. In each dialogue, reflection on the peculiar outcome of division enables the enquirers to recognize something about the kind in question which helps to explain the peculiarity. The enquirers aim to discover a real definition that applies to all and only instances that fall under a kind, and which specifies its essence -- the feature or complex of features that explains why in the case of the sophist he turns up in too many places, and why in the case of the statesman he is not alone at the terminus." (p. 173)

155. ———. 2012. *Philosophos: Plato's Missing Dialogue*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: Introduction 1; 1. Forms in Question 18; 2. A Philosophical Exercise 45; 3. The Contest between Heraclitus and Parmenides 76; 4. Knowledge as Expertise 101; 5. Appearances of the Sophist 138; 6. Refining the Statesman 177; 7. The Philosopher's Object 202; Works Cited 245; Index Locorum 263; Index of Names 274; General Index 278-290.

"The only thing that does not exist is something indescribable, something with no features at all: nothing—or to use Owen's colorful phrase, "a subject with all the being knocked out of it and so unidentifiable."(12) I take it that not-being, so understood, is the focus of the first

three puzzles about not-being in the *Sophist* and of the sixth deduction in the Parmenides, so it could be that Plato restricts non-existence to an unidentifiable non-thing: Plato's notion of existence need not correspond to our own. Even so, he talks about fictional entities in several dialogues (centaurs and other mythical creatures), and the *Sophist* itself begins and ends with a discussion of production, defined by the Stranger as bringing into being something that previously was not (219b4–6, 265b8–10).⁽¹³⁾ Furthermore, the Battle of the Gods and Giants at the center of the dialogue treats two distinct views about what is real (tangible things or immaterial forms), a dispute that surely concerns actual being or existence (a monadic property), what things have it and what things do not. The items rejected on each side are describable, even as the opponents on the other side (Gods or Giants) deny their being. The Stranger tries to settle the feud with his definition of being as *dunamis* (the capacity to act on or to be affected by something else). Moreover, this same monadic being—the nature of being (250c6–7)—is the property that becomes mysterious in the Aporia about Being (249d9–250d4) directly following the Battle of the Gods and Giants.¹⁴ Plato is clearly interested in monadic being in the *Sophist* — what things have this feature, and what things, though describable, do not. In Chapter 5 I take the first steps toward an alternative interpretation of being, one indebted to Lesley Brown and Michael Frede, which aims to preserve the virtues of their different proposals without the shortcomings." (p. 176)

(12) Owen (1971: 247).

(13) Cf. E. N. Lee (1972: 300) and Heinaman (1983: 12).

¹⁴ Discussed below in Chapter 7 secs. 7.2 and 7.6.

References

Heinaman, R. 1983. "Being in the Sophist." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 65: 1–17.

Lee, E. N. 1972. "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist." *Philosophical Review* 81: 267–304.

Owen, G. E. L. 1971. "Plato on Not-Being." In G. Vlastos (ed.), *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology*. Garden City: Doubleday. 223–67. Repr. in G. E. L. Owen, 1986. 104–137.

Owen, G. E. L. 1986. *Logic, Science and Dialectic*. M. C. Nussbaum (ed.). London: Duckworth/Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

156. ———. 2021. "Images of Wisdom in the Prologue of Plato's *Sophist*." *The Journal of Greco-Roman Studies* no. 60:137–152.

Abstract: "This paper examines the prologue of Plato's *Sophist* in light of interpretive claims by Proclus, and revived by Myles Burnyeat,* that Plato imaged in the opening scene of his dialogues the main philosophical themes of the work.

This paper applies that insight to the prologue of the *Sophist* and argues that Proclus is right but that the work in which this prologue is embedded is much larger than the dialogue it introduces. A close reading of the *Sophist's* prologue reveals it to image, in a literary way, the whole series of dialogues—*Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and missing *Philosopher*—

of which the *Sophist* is a member. At the end of the *Sophist*, the sophist is identified as imitator of the wise man. The paper explores the sophist in relation to the kinds it imitates, including two sorts of wise men, the philosopher and the statesman, and asks whether there is a wide kind covering all of them, both genuine experts and their benign and dangerous imitators. If there is such a kind, what is its status as a kind? The paper considers a genealogical family, descended from a common ancestor (intelligence or cleverness) with derivative kinds differentiated from one another by their object and their aims, either beneficial or harmful."

[*] Burnyeat, M. F., 1997, "First Words," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 43, 1-20. (reprinted as Chapter 16 in F. M. Burnyeat, *Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, p. 305-326.

157. ————. 2024. "Knowledge and Forms in Plato's *Parmenides* and *Sophist*." In *Platonism: Proceedings of the 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium*, edited by Hrachovec, Herbert and Mácha, Jakub, 9–30. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Abstract: "Platonic forms explain certain features of perceptible things and equip us to know them. This paper examines three passages: the Greatest Difficulty in the *Parmenides* shows that Socrates' failure to explain participation, the relation between sensible things and forms, renders forms unknowable to us. The Battle of Gods and Giants in the *Sophist* treats forms as immutable, but their immutability apparently rules out their intelligibility. The Stranger offers a path forward by defining being as power, a solution then undermined in the Aporia about Being, which reveals that the form of being is neither immutable nor intelligible. This paper shows where the Aporia goes wrong and opens a way back to the constructive proposal in the Battle of Gods and Giants. The paper finally considers how forms are affected in being known and gestures toward Plato's solution to the problem of participation."

158. Giovannetti, Lorenzo. 2021. "Between Truth and Meaning. A Novel Interpretation of the *Symploke* in Plato's *Sophist*." *Elenchos. Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 42:261–290.

Abstract: "In this paper, I provide an interpretation of the *symploke ton eidon* at *Soph.* 259e. My goal is to show that the specific metaphysical view expressed by the interweaving of forms best accounts for Plato's explanation of truth and falsehood.

In the first section, I introduce the fundamentals of the interpretation of the greatest kinds and their functions. After that, I propose an interpretation of the assertion at 259e, the upshot of which is that the interweaving of forms only deals with extra-linguistic items, that it is related to both truth and meaning of linguistic items, in a very complex way which I aim to explain throughout the paper, and that it never involves sensible particulars. In the second section, I put forward my reading of the Stranger's description of how *logoi* are structured and how they work. I pay particular attention to the view that words reveal being when they intertwine to form a statement. In the third section, I interpret the statements concerning Theaetetus. My goal is to advance a new reading of the specific role that kinds and their interweaving play with regard to the truth and falsehood of the statements concerning Theaetetus. The result is the very specific view that the kinds, which are the separated ontological cause of what happens in space and time, are the grounds of both the truth and the meaning of statements."

159. Gómez-Lobo, Alfonso. 1977. "Plato's Description of Dialectic in the *Sophist* 253d1-e2." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 22:29–47.

"In the *Sophist* there is an obscure and much disputed passage (253 d 1-e 2) which professes to say something about what is proper to the science of Dialectic (... μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι ; 253 d 2-3). The *communis opinio* is that we are offered there a description of the Method of Division. The facts that the passage is introduced by the expression τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι, that it appears in a late dialogue and moreover in a dialogue where that method is explicitly practiced (218 b 5-236 c 8 and 264 b 9-268 d 5) seem to be very strong reasons for suspecting that here Plato must have in mind the Diaeretic Method. This conviction seems to be almost unavoidable when one takes the lines as an "*ausführliche Definition des Dialektikers*" (Stenzel). (2) If it is such an exhaustive definition, how could Division be missing from it? I would like to challenge the generally accepted view and show that another quite different interpretation gives a better sense to the text and solves some problems which otherwise must remain puzzling. Since nearly all recent interpretations depend on Stenzel's, I shall discuss it first (I). Then (II) I shall put forward the main theses of my interpretation and lastly (III) I shall paraphrase the whole text." (p. 29)

(...)

"Summary: *Soph.* 253 d 1-e 2 does not describe Division, it anticipates the comparison Being and Not-Being with other Forms which will ultimately provide Plato's answer to the dilemma of Parmenides." (p. 47)

(2) Julius Stenzel, *Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles*, 2. Auf., Leipzig, 1931 (reprint Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1961), English translation by D. J. Allan, *Plato's Method of Dialectic*, Oxford, 1940. Quotations or my own translations from the German original will be identified by 'orig.' Quotations from Allan's translation are identified by 'trans.' Occasionally Allan's version is inaccurate; in such cases I have referred to the original German text.

160. ————. 1981. "Dialectic in the *Sophist*: a reply to Waletzki." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:80–83.

Reply to Waletzki (1979).

"In "Platons Ideenlehre und Dialektik im *Sophistes* 253d" (*Phronesis* 24 (1979) 241-252) Wolfgang Waletzki has criticized an earlier article of mine on that passage (*Phronesis* 22 (1977) 29-47). Although I have benefitted from a number of his observations, I am not in a position to accept his interpretation as a whole. Instead of arguing piecemeal against each of his claims, I would here like to embark first on a task which I believe to be more rewarding: the working out of criteria which would have to be satisfied by a correct interpretation of the disputed passage. In the light of these criteria I hope to show that Waletzki's approach is unsatisfactory, thus vitiating his specific claims." (p. 80)

161. Gonzalez, Francisco J. 1997. "On the Way to Sophia: Heidegger on Plato's Dialectic, Ethics, and *Sophist*." *Research in Phenomenology* no. 27:16–60.

"The great lacuna in the Heideggerian *Gesamtausgabe* has been a detailed interpretation of an entire Platonic dialogue. This situation has changed with the publication of the lecture

course on Plato's *Sophist* (1924/25). (1) This text does not disappoint for lack of thoroughness or scope: Heidegger takes the task of interpreting this major Platonic dialogue so seriously that he devotes over two hundred pages to preparing his interpretation and almost four hundred pages to detailed, almost line by line exegesis of the text, from the dramatic prologue to the explanation of the possibility of falsehood. With this course, therefore, we are finally in a position to assess the extent to which Heidegger succeeded in coming to terms with Plato's thought.

In this paper I argue that, despite some important insights, this attempted "philosophical appropriation of Plato" (2) fails. I also suggest that this failure exposes certain limitations of Heidegger's thought, specifically with regard to the relation between ethics and ontology." (p. 16)

(1) *Platon: Sophistes*, vol. 19 of *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Ingeborg Schussler am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, hereafter GA 19.

(2) To use Heidegger's own characterization of what Friedrich Schleiermacher failed to achieve: "*die philosophische Aneignung Plato*" (GA 19: 313). All translations of Heidegger and Plato in this paper are my own.

162. ————. 2000. "The Eleatic Stranger: His Master's Voice? ." In *Who Speaks for Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity*, edited by Press, Gerald A., 161–181. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

"Interpreters of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* almost universally assume that the Eleatic Stranger speaks for Plato. This is surprising, given how little speaks in favor of this assumption and even how intuitively implausible it is." (p. 161)

(...)

"Yet, interpreters are apparently willing to live with some implausibility here because they consider it even more implausible that the Stranger should not speak for Plato. Their argument, insofar as it can be reconstructed, assumes that the only positive assertions made in the two dialogues are the Strangers and that therefore one could, without losing anything essential, eliminate the dialogue form by putting what the Stranger says into the form of a treatise authored by Plato. The aim of the present chapter is to refute this specific assumption and therefore the interpretation that depends on it. Socrates *does* speak in both dialogues, and what he says is of extraordinary importance; furthermore, a major, perhaps the major event of Socrates' life, namely, his trial, forms the dramatic context. These words and deeds of Socrates are not peripheral curiosities added to relieve the tedium of an otherwise highly abstract discussion. Instead, as I will show, what Socrates says and who he is, even his silence in the dialogue, expose serious problems in what the Stranger says. If Plato in this way uses Socrates against the Stranger, the assumption that the Stranger speaks for Plato, already implausible on the surface, is rendered untenable. On the other hand, we are not thereby required to conclude that Plato rejects everything the Stranger says and chooses Socrates instead as his mouthpiece. What we have here, as elsewhere, is not a disguised author expounding doctrines in a disguised treatise, but rather a drama in which two opposed and limited perspectives confront each other and in that confrontation leave us with a *problem*." (pp. 161-162, notes omitted)

163. ———. 2003. "Confronting Heidegger on Logos and Being in Plato's *Sophist*." In *Platon und Aristoteles - sub ratione veritatis. Festschrift für Wolfgang Wieland zum 70. Geburtstag*, edited by Damschen, Gregor, Enskat, Rainer and Vigo, Alejandro G., 102–133. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

"In his WS 1924-25 lecture course on Plato's *Sophist*, Heidegger charges that, because in this dialogue the method of separation and division is applied not only to objects in the world, such as the angler, but also to Being itself and its structures, Plato recognized no distinction between the way of dealing with beings (*Behandlungsart des Seienden*) and the way of dealing with Being (*Behandlungsart des Seins*). What underlies this charge is Heidegger's conviction, which he seeks to support in the present course, that to address Being by way of λόγος and its structure, which is what the method of διαίρεσις does, is inevitably to collapse the distinction between Being and beings. Heidegger further suggests that Plato's Ideas or Forms are a product of this approach to Being and the confusion it produces (287). The goal of this paper is to defend Plato against this charge by arguing the following: 1) Plato fully recognizes both the ontological difference itself and the inability of λόγος, and any λόγος-centered approach, to preserve and do justice to this difference; 2) Plato's response to this "weakness" of λόγος is, in the *Sophist*, to distance himself from the λόγος of Being (and non-being) presented there by means of various strategies, most generally the dialogue

form itself; 3) though the εἶδη are unavoidably objectified in discourse, Plato did not understand the εἶδη as objectively present things: indeed, it was precisely in order to avoid objectifying the εἶδη that Plato refrained from offering a "theory of Forms"; 4) Heidegger's attempt to reduce the dialogue's characterization of Being as δύναμις to a characterization of Being as *presence* is unacceptable; 5) despite Heidegger's insistence to the contrary, even the account of Being as δύναμις is presented in the dialogue not as final, but as aporetic and necessarily so. In pursuing this goal it is neither my intention nor even possible in the present context to give a detailed, step-by-step exposition of Heidegger's course, much less of the *Sophist* itself. Instead, I will assume some acquaintance with both in focusing on only those moments where Heidegger explicitly sets himself apart from Plato, with the aim of encouraging us to set ourselves apart from Heidegger's reading of Plato." (pp. 102-103, notes omitted)

164. ———. 2011. "Being as Power in Plato's *Sophist* and Beyond." In *Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 63–95. Praha: Oikoymenh.

"In the literature on Plato's metaphysics one finds much discussion of what kinds of beings exist for Plato, what makes one class of beings 'more real' than another, what relation exists between these different levels of beings, and what ultimate principles or causes can be invoked to explain the nature of these beings. What is much harder to find is reflection on what this word 'being' actually means for Plato. If both sensible objects and the Forms can be said to be, if the latter must nevertheless be said to be more truly, or 'more beingly', than the former, then what exactly is meant by this word 'be'? If this fundamental question has been neglected in the literature, the reason is not that Plato fails to address it. In the *Sophist* this question is not only addressed, but given an answer. Since the passage in question (247d8-e4) is the only place in the Platonic corpus where this question is directly raised and answered - and this in a context that stresses the great importance and indispensability of the question - one would expect it to be the subject of a voluminous literature. Strangely, the exact opposite is the case. Not only the literature on Plato's ontology, but even the literature

devoted specifically to the *Sophist*, displays little interest in the definition of being this dialogue offers. Those scholars who have discussed the definition at all have tended to dismiss it as purely provisional, ad hominem, and in the end unPlatonic. Other scholars, particularly in more recent works on the *Sophist*, quickly pass over the definition with little or no comment.' What explains this neglect? The first set of scholars presumably have interpretative grounds for denying that the definition is Plato's, but many devote little effort to making this case and all fail to suggest what might be a better definition in Plato's eyes.

The second set of scholars, in simply passing over the definition with no comment, perhaps have deeper philosophical reasons for just not being interested in the question, though these reasons are left unarticulated.

Ironically, many scholars writing on the *Sophist* today are in this way like those tellers of *muthoi* or those figures of *muthos* (the Giants and Gods) which the Eleatic Visitor criticizes for only talking about the number and kinds of beings without addressing the more fundamental question of what it means for any of these things to be.

My object in the present paper is to go against this trend by showing that the definition of being, far from being merely provisional and negligible, is absolutely indispensable not only to the argument of the *Sophist*, but to a proper understanding of Plato's metaphysics in both this and other dialogues. Specifically I wish to show that the characterization of being as "nothing other than *dunamis*" is incompatible with attributing to Plato a conception of the "really real" as static and immutable." (pp. 63-65, notes omitted)

165. ————. 2024. "The Kinêsis of Being in Plato's *Sophist* and the Motivation for Aristotle's Notion of *Energeia*." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 249–256.

Abstract: "Many scholars have proven as resistant as the 'Friends of the Forms' to the Visitor's protest in the *Sophist* that life and intelligence should not be excluded from what most fully or completely is. The reason is the assumption that life and intelligence are motions and that motion is incompatible with something being complete and therefore unchanging. Yet Plato's characterization of the soul as a 'self-moving motion' would suggest a different conception of motion while, on the other hand, his explicit analysis of motion restricts it to being either 'alteration' or movement from place to place. This problem of how to understand a motion that both defines life and can be attributed to what completely is, a problem seemingly left unsolved by Plato, is arguably the motivation for Aristotle's distinction between motion, as by definition incomplete, and 'activity' (*energeia*) as by definition 'complete' in possessing its own end. Attributing 'life' interpreted as 'activity' rather than motion to what 'completely is' avoids the difficulties raised by the *Sophist*, as is evident in Aristotle's account of the active but unmoved mover. motion, life, activity,"

166. Gooch, Paul W. 1971. "'Vice is ignorance': The interpretation of *Sophist* 226a-231b." *Phoenix* no. 25:124–133.

"It is often held by Plato's commentators that the famous Socratic paradox "Virtue is Knowledge" has as its complement the doctrine that vice is ignorance. While Plato's readers never find such an aphorism as "Vice is Ignorance" stated categorically in the texts, it is interpreted to mean that in Plato's view moral evil is the result of ignorance. And from this it

is an easy step to the "intellectualist" Plato, who thought that knowledge of the right thing to do was a sufficient condition of virtue." (p. 124, notes omitted)

(...)

"My own reading of this section [*Sophist* 226a-231b] is that Plato, not popular opinion, is responsible for the division of evils into two branches, and that the division therefore cannot be considered unimportant for his ethics. Yet I cannot feel as sure as Dodds that the classification places ignorance and vice into two watertight compartments; there are indications that at least one kind of ignorance is a vice, and that its treatment cannot leave the irrational parts of the soul untouched. This in turn means that while Hackforth is probably right to say that Plato's real belief was that wrongdoing always involves ignorance, I hope to provide some evidence that this belief is not as obscured by the *Sophist* passage as Hackforth seems to think. With these claims in mind we may now turn to an analysis of the passage. After purification has been introduced as a negative art whose function is to throw out the evil and undesirable, the discussion develops various divisions within the art until the following schema becomes evident." (p. 126)

References

E. R. Dodds says that Plato "no longer makes ignorance the sole cause of wrongdoing, or increased knowledge its sole cure" ("Plato and the Irrational," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 65 [1945] 18).

R. Hackforth claims that for Plato all moral evil involves ignorance ("Moral Evil and Ignorance in Plato's Ethics," *Classical Quarterly* 40 [1946] 118).

167. Grams, Laura W. 2012. "The Eleatic Visitor's Method of Division." *Apeiron* no. 45:130–156.

"The method of division (*diairesis*) employed by the Visitor from Elea in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman* is often interpreted as a hierarchical classification, in which each cut divides a kind (*genos*) into smaller parts that are fully contained within it and each subsequent kind entails all of the previous kinds in the sequence. On this view, division begins with one large class and continues separating it into successively smaller portions, until no further cuts can be made and an infima species is reached. I argue that a strictly hierarchical interpretation of *diairesis* cannot adequately explain the Visitor's method for several reasons. First, division often produces kinds that are neither determined by nor fully contained within the intension or extension of the previous kinds, and division occasionally separates pairs of kinds that overlap in scope. In addition, division does not always move from general to more particular kinds, so the order in which a series of divisions is made often has no effect on the outcome. The same kinds may be divided in different ways in different contexts, which means that multiple paths may lead from a given starting point to the destination." (p. 130, note omitted)

168. Granieri, Roberto. 2019. "Xenocrates and the Two-Category Scheme." *Apeiron*:1–25.

Abstract: "Simplicius reports that Xenocrates and Andronicus reproached Aristotle for positing an excessive number of categories, which can conveniently be reduced to two: τὰ καθ' αὐτά and τὰ πρὸς τι. Simplicius, followed by several modern commentators, interprets

this move as being equivalent to a division into substance and accidents. I aim to show that, as far as Xenocrates is concerned, this interpretation is untenable and that the substance-accidents contrast cannot be equivalent to Xenocrates' per se-relative one. Rather, Xenocrates aimed to stress the primacy of Plato's binary distinction of beings, as presented at *Sophist* 255c13–4, over Aristotle's list of the categories."

169. ————. 2023. "Being and the Philosopher's Object in Plato's *Sophist*." *Apeiron* no. 56:723–737.

Abstract: "In the *Sophist*, Plato claims that the philosopher is always engaged through reasonings with the idea *tou ontos* (254a4–b1). I argue that, contrary to appearances and to what various commentators believe, this phrase does not refer to the Kind Being singled out in the *Sophist* as one of the so-called 'greatest' or 'most important' Kinds, but to the whole intelligible realm. The proposed reading better accounts for Plato's exact wording at *Sophist* 254a4–b1 and preserves the consistency of Plato's view on the object of philosophical knowledge. I conclude with some broader considerations on the relationship between this passage, Platonic dialectic and Aristotle's conception of a science of being qua being."

170. ————. 2023. "Not-Being, Contradiction and Difference. Simplicius vs. Alexander of Aphrodisias on Plato's Conception of Not-Being." *Méthexis* no. 35:185–200.

Abstract: "In explicating a passage from *Physics* A 3, Simplicius reports a criticism by Alexander of Aphrodisias against Plato's conception of not-being in the *Sophist*. Alexander deems this conception contradictory, because it posits that unqualified not-being is. Simplicius defends Plato and gives a diagnosis of what he regards as Alexander's interpretative mistake in raising his objection. I unpack this debate and bring out ways in which it sheds light on important aspects of Plato's project in the *Sophist* and of Simplicius' own philosophical background, notably in Damascius' *De principiis*."

171. ————. 2024. "Monism and Difference: Syrianus, Aristotle, and the *Sophist*." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 42:313–349.

Abstract: "In *Metaphysics* N 2, Aristotle criticizes Plato and the Academics for setting up the problem of principles "in an obsolete way". For they thought all things would be one (viz. Being itself) if they did not demonstrate, against Parmenides, that not-being is. And this assumption, for Aristotle, betrays a more fundamental and questionable Eleatic debt in their ontology, namely their commitment to the obsolete view that being, taken in its own right, is one. By contrast, Aristotle believes being is originally multiple and said in many ways, so there is no need to demonstrate that not-being is, to justify as much. In his commentary on Book N, Syrianus replies to Aristotle and argues, among other things, both that his criticisms are flawed and that his own ontology can only stand if the Platonist account of multiplicity, difference and not-being is also endorsed. I scrutinize these counterobjections and argue that this debate reflects two essentially different ways of explaining fundamental facts in the structure of reality."

172. ————. 2024. "The Referents of 'Being' in Plato's *Sophist*." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 349–356.

Abstract: "I argue that part of Plato's strategy to neutralize the paradox of falsehood is to pin down various referents of the name 'being', τὸ ὄν. I focus on four and track their role in the

dialogue's argument. They are: (1) any primary being; (2) the Kind Being; (3) any participant in the Kind Being; (4) a set of participants in the Kind Being."

173. ———. 2025. "Plato's Isolation of a Kind Being or Why in the *Sophist* to Be Is Not to Be Something." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 64:1–52.

Abstract: "In the *Sophist* Plato singles out Being (*on, ousia*) as just one among the Kinds or Forms. This paper argues that the exploration of one main implication of Plato's isolation of a Kind Being enables us to question aspects of an entrenched scholarly consensus about Plato's conception of being, namely that for Plato 'to be is always to be something'. By scrutinizing various passages from the second half of the *Sophist*, starting from 250 a 8–d 3, it defends the view that when Plato metaphysically analyses 'X is' in terms of X's participation in or combination with the Kind or Form of Being, he does not mean that X is something, or is itself, or is variously characterized (or similar), but that it exists."

174. Greenstine, Abraham Jacob. 2019. "Accounting for Images in the *Sophist*." In *Plato and the Moving Image*, edited by Biderman, Shai and Weinman, Michael, 19–36. Leiden - Boston: Brill Rodopi.

Abstract: "Plato's *Sophist* is a critical dialogue for the question of images, for here the interlocutors divide images into two kinds – likenesses and apparitions – in their hunt for an account of sophistry. Yet much of the recent scholarship on the *Sophist* does not make much of this division. This chapter defends the continuing significance of the distinction between likeness and apparition. It argues for its importance in Plato's analysis of images, in his theory of accounts, and in his endeavor to differentiate philosophy from sophistry. It further contends that one can only distinguish likenesses from apparitions by establishing a correct perspective on both the image and the original. Thus, the *Sophist* exhorts us differentiate likenesses from apparitions, even as we struggle to consistently find the right perspective for this task. Living in the cinematic age only intensifies the need to distinguish likeness from apparition. Over the course of this chapter, we consider two films that advance our questions about perspectives, images, and falsity: Carol Reed's *The Third Man* (1949) and Orson Welles' *F for Fake* (1974). Like the *Sophist*, both films reveal a world of apparitions, where names are confused, lies are constant, and the truth is elusive."

175. Griswold, Charles. 1977. "Logic and Metaphysics in Plato's *Sophist*." *Giornale di Metafisica* no. 6:555–570.

Abstract: "In part one of this essay I defend the thesis that the "greatest genera" of the "Sophist" are not the metaphysical ideas of the earlier dialogues, and that the "participation" of these genera in each other is to be understood from a linguistic or logical, rather than metaphysical, perspective. The genera are like concepts, not essences. In part two I argue that the Stranger's doctrine of the genera means that they cannot be unified, self-predicative, separable, and stable; the doctrine deteriorates for reasons internal to itself. I suggest throughout that the Stranger's philosophical orientation is more "subjectivistic" than that of (Plato's) Socrates; unlike the ideas, the genera are subject to the soul's intellectual motion and productive capacity. finally, I suggest that there is no convincing reason for holding that the Stranger's views are superior to those of Socrates."

176. Grönroos, Gösta. 2013. "Two Kinds of Belief in Plato." *Journal of The History of Philosophy* no. 51:1–19.

"In the *Sophist* (263e10–264b4), Plato distinguishes between two kinds of belief.

On the one hand, there is a kind of belief that occurs "according to thinking" (κατὰ διάνοιαν), being "the completion of thinking" (διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις). This kind is called 'doxa.' On the other hand, there is another kind of belief that occurs "through sense perception" (δι' αἰσθήσεως). This kind is called 'phantasia,' perhaps best rendered as "appearing." The purpose of this paper is to uncover the distinction between these two different kinds of belief." (p. 1)

(...)

"The failure to recognize this distinction between two kinds of belief in Plato, despite the enormous scholarly effort devoted to the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*, is probably due to the fact that we do not operate with such a distinction any longer.

We may admit that beliefs are more or less justified, but this observation suggests that beliefs differ in degree (of justification), rather than in kind. Moreover, if we embrace the view that the formation of any belief requires the possession of concepts and the capacity for propositional thought, and that these capacities are the hallmarks of thinking and rationality at large, then it is difficult to escape the conclusion that even a *phantasia* is formed through thinking, and that it is a disposition of reason in precisely that sense. But attributing such an anachronistic starting point to Plato overshadows a more specific notion of thinking, and a different way of accounting for the role of thinking in belief formation. As Plato's unfolding of the disguise of the sophist shows, this kind of thinking, giving rise to a qualified kind of belief, may well be worth serious consideration." (p. 18)

177. Gulley, Norman. 1962. *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*. London: Methuen & Co.

Chapter III: Knowledge and Belief; § 4: The *Sophist's* Account of Statement and Belief, pp. 148-168.

178. Guthrie, William Keith Chambers. 1978. *A History of Greek Philosophy V: The later Plato and the Academy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

On the *Sophist*: Chapter II, 3, pp. 122-163.

179. Hackforth, Reginald. 1945. "False Statement in Plato's *Sophist*." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 39:56–58.

"Plato's examination of False Statement (*Sophist* 259 D-263 D) is, like many of his discussions in the later dialogues, a mixture of complete lucidity with extreme obscurity. Any English student who seeks to understand it will of course turn first to Professor Cornford's translation and commentary(1); and if he next reads what M. Diès has to say in the Introduction to his Budé edition of the *Sophist* he will, I think, have sufficient acquaintance with the views of modern Platonic scholars on the subject. For myself, at least, I have not gained any further understanding from other writers than these two." (p. 56)

(...)

(1) *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 298-317.

180. Hamlyn, David W. 1955. "The Communion of Forms and the Development of Plato's Logic." *The Philosophical Quarterly* no. 5:289–302.

"The impression given by many accounts of Plato's philosophy is that the doctrine of the communion of forms (or kinds) which is introduced in the *Sophist* is new and revolutionary. It may well be true that the use to which Plato puts this doctrine is revolutionary, but there are unmistakable hints of it much earlier. In the *Republic* 476a we are told of the communion of forms with actions, bodies, and one another, and, as Ross points out,(1) the doctrine is implicit in the account of the theory of forms given in the *Phaedo* 102b ff., in the sense that we are told that certain forms exclude each other." (p. 289)

(...)

"The doctrine of the communion of forms is an attempt to do two things at once - to characterise predicates as names referring to a kind of particular, and also to relate such names to those occurring as the subjects of assertions by means other than that of identity and difference. Consequently the assertion that Plato looked on proper names as disguised descriptions should be qualified by saying that for him descriptions were only another kind of name-names of forms rather than names of sensible particulars. Hence the doctrine of ' communion ' is still vitiated by the fault from which Plato was trying to free himself. That it was an important advance nevertheless is clear." (p. 302)

181. Harte, Verity. 2002. *Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Contents: 1. The Problem of Composition 1; 2. Composition as Identity in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* 48; 3. A New Model of Composition 117; 4. Composition and Structure 158; 5. Plato's Metaphysics of Structure 267; References 293; General Index 300; Index of Names 300; Index Locorum 304-311.

"In my view—a view for which the book as a whole constitutes a defence—Plato's discussions of part and whole in the works I shall consider may be divided into two distinct groups: those in which Plato explores a model of composition which he does not endorse; and those which work towards building an alternative to the rejected model. This book is organized around discussion of these two groups. §1.6 to Chapter 2 examine the discussions of the first group, Chapters 3 and 4 those of the second.

The division between these two groups does not coincide with the division between different works. To the first group—those which focus on the model which Plato does not endorse—belong passages of the *Parmenides*, the *Theaetetus*, and a passage of the *Sophist*. To the second group—those which develop an alternative to the rejected model—belong other passages of the *Parmenides* and of the *Sophist*, and passages of the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. The *Parmenides* as a whole enacts the contrast between the two groups and provides an illustration of the framework I propose for understanding their relation. Over the course of the *Parmenides* arguments involving the rejected model of composition are used to expose the problems that arise from its adoption; problems to which the alternative model of composition is framed as a solution." (pp. 2-3)

182. ————. 2024. "Dialectical Know-How: A Deflationary Approach to *Sophist* 253b-254a." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 107–124.

Abstract: "The paper offers a deflationary approach to the description of dialectical knowledge at *Sophist* 253b-254a, arguing that its focus is dialectical knowing, the condition of a dialectical knower, and that this condition is best understood as a form of know-how, constituted by the ability to individuate kinds and a grasp of the permissible ways kinds combine, the permissible relations between them. It is a mistake to expect to be able to identify specific kinds as referents for designations such as "a single character". Instead, what we find here are placeholders for any kind standing in the relevant relation. The paper concludes with a speculative suggestion that in two of the four distinguished relations we find two different part-whole relations."

183. Havlíček, Aleš, and Karfík, Filip, eds. 2011. *Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense*. Praha: Oikoymenh.

Contents: Preface 7; Thomas Alexander Szlezák: Die Aufgabe des Gastes aus Elea Zur Bedeutung der Eingangsszene des *Sophistes* (216a–218a) 11; Francesco Fronterotta: Some Remarks on the Senses of Being in the *Sophist* 35; Francisco J. Gonzalez: Being as Power in Plato's *Sophist* and Beyond 63; Walter Mesch, Die Bewegung des Seienden in Platons *Sophistes* 96; Filip Karfík: *Pantelôs on* and *megista genê* (Plato, *Soph.* 242C–259b) 120; Noburo Notomi: Dialectic as *Ars Combinatoria*: Plato's Notion of Philosophy in the *Sophist* 146; Luc Brisson: Does Dialectic always Deal with the Intelligible? A Reading of the *Sophist* (253d5–e1) 156; Aleš Havlíček: Die Aufgabe der Dialektik für die Auslegung des Seins des Nichtseienden 173; Nestor-Luis Cordero: Une conséquence inattendue de l'assimilation du non-être à « l'Autre » dans le *Sophiste* 188; Denis O'Brien, The Stranger's "Farewell" (258e6–259a1) 199; Štěpán Špinka: Das Sein des Nicht-Seins. Einige Thesen zur strukturellen Ontologie im Dialog *Sophistes* 221; Christoph Ziermann: La négativité de l'être chez Platon 240; David Ambuel: The Coy Eristic: Defining the Image that Defines the Sophist 278; Francisco Lisi: Ποιητικὴ τέχνη in Platons *Sophistes* 311; Jakub Jinek: Die Verschiedenheit der Menschentypen in Platons *Sophistes* 328; T. D. J. Chappell: Making Sense of the *Sophist*: Ten Answers to Ten Questions 344; Index locorum 377.

184. Heidegger, Martin. 1997. *Plato's Sophist*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Heidegger's lecture course at the University of Marburg in the Winter Semester of 1924-25.

Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer.

Original German edition: *Platon, Sophistes*, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1992, edited by Ingeborg Schüssler (*Gesamtausgabe*, II, 19).

185. Heinaman, Robert E. 1981. "Being in the *Sophist*." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 65:1–17.

"There is an influential view, developed during the last fifteen years, concerning the relationship between the concept of existence and the notion of Being in Plato's *Sophist*. (a)

Three distinguishable claims are involved in this account:

(1) Plato does not wish to isolate the existential use of 'to be' from its other uses.

(2) Plato's discussion of being concerns syntactically incomplete uses of 'to be,' not syntactically complete uses of the verb. (b)

(3) The concept of existence plays no role in the philosophical problems discussed or their solutions. Plato operates with a "scheme of concepts which lacks or ignores an expression for 'exist.' (c)

I have no quarrel with (1). But (1) must be clearly distinguished from (3) since Plato may have failed to mark out the existential use of 'to be' while nevertheless using the word to mean *existence* with this latter concept playing an important role in the argument. In this paper I will try to show that there are no good reasons to accept (2) or (3). Although I shall deal with points raised by John Malcolm and Michael Frede, the focus will be on Professor Owen's paper. The first section will argue that Owen's interpretation of the *Sophist* is untenable and the second section will show that his arguments for (2) and (3) are unsuccessful. Finally, the third section explains how the position I defend is compatible with Plato's employment of negative existentials.

The position I defend is that the concept of existence does not monopolize but is part of the notion of Being in the *Sophist*." (pp. 1-2)

(a) G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in G. Vlastos (ed.) *Plato I* (New York, 1971), pp. 223-67; Michael Frede, *Prädikation und Existenzaussage* (Göttingen, 1967); J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of *tò ón* and *tò me ón* in the *Sophist*," *Phronesis* (1967), pp. 130-46. Also cf. W. Bondeson, "Some Problems about Being and Predication in the *Sophist*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* (1976), p.7, n. 15; A. P. D. Mourelatos, "'Nothing' as 'Not-Being'," in G. Bowersock, W. Burkert, M. Putnam (eds.) *Arktouros* (New York, 1979), pp. 319-29.

(b) Owen, pp. 225, 236, 240-41. Frede makes the still stronger claim that *every* use of 'to be' in the *Sophist* is incomplete (Frede, pp. 37, 40, 51). I discuss Frede's interpretation in an appendix.

(c) Owen, p. 263.

186. ————. 1981. "Self-Predication in the *Sophist*." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:55–66.

"A major problem in the interpretation of Plato's metaphysics is the question of whether he abandoned self-predication as a result of the Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides*. In this paper I will argue that the answer to this question must be 'no' because the self-predication assumption is still present in the *Sophist*.(1)" (p. 55)

(...)

"It has often been said that 250c confuses identity and predication. But since 255 establishes Plato's commitment to self-predication, it is preferable to see the mistake as occurring a few lines later (250c 12-d3) where the Stranger concludes that, since Being does not rest or move according to its own nature, it does not rest or move at all (cf. *Parm.* 139c6-d1). It is plausible to suppose that Plato believes that this error is corrected by the doctrine of the communion of Forms (cf. 252b8-10, 255e4-6, 258b9-c3)." (p. 63)

(1) The claim that the *Sophist* is committed to self-predication has been made before. W. F. Hicken, "Knowledge and Forms in Plato's 'Theaetetus'," in R. E. Allen (ed.) *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics* (London, 1965), p. 192; R. S. Bluck, "False Statement in the *Sophist*,"

Journal of Hellenic Studies (1957), p. 186, n. 2; G. Striker, *Peras und Apeiron* (Gottingen, 1970), p. 37; W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy V* (Cambridge, 1978), p. 43, n. 1. Cf. W. G. Runciman, *Plato's Later Epistemology* (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 80, 95, 102; R. Marten, *Der Logos der Dialektik* (Berlin, 1965), p. 214, n. 134.

187. ———. 1983. "Communion of Forms." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 83:175–190.

"At *Sophist* 259e5-6 Plato says: 'Logos exists for us on account of the interweaving of Forms'. It appears to be an important claim, and various suggestions have been made as to why Plato believed logos depends on the communion of Forms. It has often been thought that the communion of Forms referred to in 259e5-6 lays down conditions for meaning, not truth. Thus, in a well known paper Professor Ackrill has suggested that the communion of Forms covers relations of compatibility, incompatibility, and presumably other relations which determine the meaning of words. (1) I believe that such an interpretation is too optimistic and that Plato's view is less sophisticated than scholars would like to admit. I will argue that the communion of Forms does not provide an explanation of meaning but of an entity's being characterized by a property. It is simply the relation of participation which in earlier dialogues related individuals to Forms. (But I make no claims about resemblance.)

259e5-6 occurs in a context (259d9-260a3) where the Eleatic Stranger refers back to an earlier argument for the conclusion that some Forms combine and some do not (251d5-252e8). And that earlier passage had been followed by a discussion where five 'Great Kinds' had been distinguished (254d4-255e1) and some relations of communion had been pointed out (255e8-257a12; cf. 254c4-5). If we want to determine what Plato means by 'communion of Forms' we must examine 251d-252e where Plato presents his arguments in support of the claim that some Forms combine and some do not.

One preliminary problem is the question of how to translate 'logos' in the statement that logos has come to be on account of the communion of Forms. The answer is provided by the context. 'Logos' also occurs in 260a5 and 260a7 where it possesses the same sense as 'logos' in 259e6. 260a7 says that we must determine what logos is, and when the explanation of logos is finally given (261d-262e) an explanation of statements is provided. So 259e5-6 is saying that statements exist because of the communion of Forms." (pp. 175-176)

(1) J. L. Ackrill, 'XYMJI-AOKHE IAQN', in G. Viastos (ed.) *Plato I* (New York, 1971), pp. 201-9. Also cf. his 'In Defense of Platonic Division', in O. Wood and G. Pitcher (eds.) *Ryle* (London, 1971), pp. 376, 391-92.

188. ———. 1986. "Once More: Being in the *Sophist*." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 68:121–125.

"According to what I will call the 'new' interpretation, the meaning of 'being' which plays an important role in the philosophical argument of the *Sophist* is not 'existence' but 'being such and such,' what is expressed by syntactically incomplete uses of 'to be.' (a) In an earlier paper I claimed, to the contrary, that 'being' is used to mean existence in the *Sophist*'s argument, although its meaning corresponds to the other uses of the verb as well. (b) Against the new interpretation I argued as follows:

- (1) The *aporiai* of 237-41 are solved in 251-59 by rejecting 237-41's assumption that 'not-being' means 'contrary to being' and claiming that 'not-being' instead means 'different from being.'
- (2) On the new interpretation, 'the contrary of being' means 'what is (predicatively) nothing.'
- (3) The *aporia* of 240c-241b cannot be given a coherent interpretation if 'not-being', as there used, is understood to mean 'what is (predicatively) nothing.'
- (4) Hence the meaning of 'not-being' required by the new interpretation is unacceptable, and the new interpretation should be rejected.

In a recent note John Malcolm has replied to this argument and raised some other objections to my paper. (c) Here, I will limit myself to explaining why Malcolm's objections have no force, and why his reply to my argument. simply exchanges one absurdity for others." (p. 121)

(a) Its main proponents are G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in G. Vlastos (ed.) *Plato I* (New York, 1971), pp. 223-67); Michael Frede, *Prädikation und Existenzaussage* (Göttingen, 1967); J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of *tò on* and *tò mé on* in the *Sophist*," *Phronesis* (1967), pp. 130-46.

(b) "Being in the *Sophist*," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* (1983), pp. 1-17.

(c) "Remarks on an Incomplete Rendering of Being in the *Sophist*," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* (1985), pp. 162-65. Ensuing references to Malcolm will be to this paper.

189. Hermann, Arnold. 2011. "Parricide or Heir? Plato's Uncertain Relationship to Parmenides." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 147–165. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

Summary: "Most scholars view Plato's critique of Parmenides in the *Sophist*, particularly the observations surrounding the "parricide" remark, as quite apt and justified. The theory is that Parmenides deserves to be rebuked for failing to recognize that "What Is Not" can be understood in more ways than one, namely, not only in an existential sense, but also predicatively or, in the language of the *Sophist*, as indicating "difference." I aim to show, nevertheless, that Plato's indictment of Parmenides misses the mark in significant ways, allowing Parmenides to escape the so-called threat of parricide not once but twice.

For example, Parmenides' abundant use of alpha-privatives (e.g., ἀγένητον)—as well as the negative οὐ (or οὐκ) when there is no a-privative form available—indicates that he was well aware of the difference between indicating "is not" predicatively versus existentially. Moreover, the Poem nowhere suggests that his strictures regarding the use of What Is Not are to be taken in the broadest possible sense, disallowing, in effect, the discrimination between the existential and the predicative case. Only when sought after as a "way of inquiry" does What Is Not—in contrast to the Way of What Is—fail to provide us with a graspable, expressible object. After all, the "Way of What Is Not," lacks any sort of *sēmata*, or signs, that can be used to navigate it. As a "way of inquiry for thinking" (B2), it leads nowhere, lacking any sort of expressible or knowable object or goal. The complete absence of an object or result, however, does not hinder us from making statements to this effect, nor from uttering the words "What Is Not" or "Not Being." Yet this fine distinction is lost to

many who have criticized Parmenides for being inconsistent, careless, or simply ignorant. The move from the intellectual unavailability of an object that marks a defunct way of inquiry, to the claim that to even speak of such a “way” is both illegitimate and impossible—all the while insisting that Parmenides himself is to be blamed for such a monstrous fallacy—seems an egregious gloss-over, even if the perpetrator is someone of Plato’s stature. If my arguments prove sound, then Parmenides should be absolved of the charges leveled against him.”

190. Hermann, Fritz Gregor. 1998. "On Plato's 'Sophist' 226b-231b " *Hermes* no. 126:109–117.

"The sixth attempt to show what it is to be a sophist (226 b-231 b) marks a fresh starting point in the discussion by Theodorus' guest-friend from Elea and Theodorus' young pupil Theaetetus. The first five attempts were closely modelled on the exemplary search for the angler (218 e-221 c), and started from the division, διαίρεσις, of all the arts and crafts into acquisitive, κτητική, and productive, ποιητική. Unlike the previous sections whose divisions were arrived at by abstract consideration, the passage commencing at 226 b starts with the enumeration of concrete examples of household activities. Adduced by the Elean, they serve as illustrations of the art of separation, διακριτική (1)." (p. 109)

(1) Cf. e.g. F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, London 1935, p. 177f

191. Hestir, Blake E. 2003. "A "Conception" of Truth in Plato's *Sophist*." *Journal of The History of Philosophy* no. 41:1–24.

" Plato's solution to the problem of falsehood carries a notorious reputation which sometimes overshadows a variety of interesting developments in Plato's philosophy. One of the less-noted developments in the *Sophist* is a nascent conception of truth which casts truth as a particular relation between language and the world. Cornford and others take Plato's account of truth to involve something like correspondence; some find the origin of Aristotle's "correspondence" account of truth in Plato's *Sophist*. But all this assumes a lot about Plato, much less Aristotle. For one, it assumes that to claim that the statement 'Theaetetus is sitting' is true is to claim that it is true because it corresponds with the fact that Theaetetus is sitting. Other scholars have been reluctant to accept Cornford's view, but few offer any explanation of what sort of account of truth we might ascribe to Plato by the end of the *Sophist*. Tarski has argued that truth is a simpler notion than that of correspondence. In fact, he claims his own "conception" of truth is similar to the classical conception we find in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* -- a conception of truth formulated in Greek in much the same way Plato formulates it in the *Sophist*. Unfortunately, Tarski never sufficiently explains what it is about the classical conception that makes it closer to his own. I argue that Tarski is generally right about the ancient conception of truth, but this is not to claim that Tarski's own conception is in Plato. By interpreting Plato's solution to the paradox of not-being and his solution to the problem of falsehood, I argue that Plato's account of truth implies a simpler notion of truth than correspondence. I outline various types of correspondence theory and show that none of these fits what Plato says about truth, syntax, and meaning in the *Sophist*." (pp. 1-2)

192. ————. 2016. *Plato on the Metaphysical Foundation of Meaning and Truth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments page IX; Note on the text XII; List of abbreviations XIII; 1 Introduction 1; Part I Stability 17; 2 Strong Platonism, restricted Platonism, and stability 19; 3 Concerns about stability in the *Cratylus* 39; 4 Flux and language in the *Theaetetus* 57; 5 The foundation exposed: *Parmenides* 135bc 84; Part II Combination 105; 6 Being as capacity and combination: a challenge for the Friends of the Forms 107; 7 The problem of predication: the challenge of the Late-Learners 144; Part III Truth 181; 8 Predication, meaning, and truth in the *Sophist* 183; 9 Plato's conception of truth 209; 10 Truth as being and a substantive property 234; Bibliography 243; Index locorum 259; General index 265.

"My project is motivated by my interest in understanding the following two passages from Plato's *Sophist*. In the first passage, the so-called Stranger from Elea presents Theaetetus with an account of true and false statement.

In the second, he relates that account to thought and judgment, although my project concerns only that aspect of it that is an extension of the first.⁽²⁾ He describes thought as "discourse without voice" (*dialogos aneu phônês*) and judgment as the end result of thought. Statement and judgment involve doing something with words and thoughts, respectively, namely asserting or denying, and assertions and denials are either true or false:

I [*Sophist* (263b4–12)]

II [*Sophist* (263e3–264b4)]

"Together these passages stand as what I consider to be the quintessential expression of Plato's account of truth and falsehood, yet they do not by themselves constitute a complete account of his conception of truth. I am interested in that conception and its relation to Plato's semantics and metaphysics.

This project aims to fill several gaps in the current scholarship on ancient Greek conceptions of truth, meaning, and language. What is missing is a detailed investigation into how the development of Plato's understanding of the metaphysical foundation of meaning plays an integral role in his conception of truth in the *Sophist*. The two aforementioned passages follow on the heels of a discussion of language and signification that emerges, I argue, from a systematic approach to semantics that Plato commences in the *Cratylus* and continues through the *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*, each of which is commonly taken to precede the *Sophist*. The *Sophist* supplies something of an explanation of how being grounds meaning and truth. However, more needs to be said about the mechanism of being, its relation to meaning and truth, the relation between the latter two, and what sort of conception of truth emerges from all this. It is also the case that more could be said about how this conception of truth complements the account of truth as being in "middle-period" dialogues such as the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. Moreover, there has not been a detailed treatment of the striking parallels between Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of meaning and truth. This book contributes to the developing scholarship in these areas. (pp. 2-3)

(2) So, for example, I will not be discussing Plato's account of concept acquisition and cognition.

193. Hopkins, Burt C. 2013. "The *Génos* of *Lógos* and the Investigation of the Greatest *Genê* in Plato's *Sophist*." *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* no. 13:353–362.

Abstract: "It is argued that once the negative criterion for distinguishing *eikones* from *phantasmata* in *lógos* about the originals in the intelligible realm appears in the *Sophist*, the Stranger's claim in the final divisions that "we now indisputably count off the kind of image-making as two" (266e), i.e., likeness making and semblance making, becomes problematical.

Specifically, what becomes a problem is whether the distinction in question is a *mathesis* (learning matter) and therefore something capable of becoming *epistême*. Consequent this, it is also argued that the eidetic-*arithmoí* that appear in the dialectical investigation of the greatest kinds rule out precisely the power of *lógos* to make the kind of clean cut the Stranger proposes regarding the sophist and philosopher belonging to different gene, given the incomparable nature of the *gené* and *eidê* being divided."

194. Horan, David. 2019. "Plato's Parmenides in Plato's Sophist." *Etudes platoniciennes* no. 15:1–23.

Abstract: "I wish to argue in this article that Plato, in considering the position of the monists in the *Sophist*, relies heavily upon arguments carried forward from the *Parmenides*. Accordingly, I argue, he invokes, in turn, three understandings of what one means, imported from the *Parmenides*, and finds that all of them fall short, and generate *aporiai*, when they are used in the *Sophist* as the basis for an account, not of the one, as in the *Parmenides*, but of being, or "what is". In fact I shall argue in this paper that an entirely coherent reading of the overall challenge to the monists in the *Sophist*, beginning with the naming argument, or names' argument, through to the argument about the whole, only emerges if we take account of the arguments of the *Parmenides*, and three conceptions of what "one" is, taken from that dialogue."

195. Hoseup, Rhee. 2021. "The Division of Images and the Deception of the *Sophist*." *The Journal of Greco-Roman Studies* no. 60:153–167.

Abstract: "This article discusses the division of images (*eidōla*) presented in *Sophist*, and explores how the sophist's verbal deception is made based on this division. In *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger distinguishes between two types of images: likenesses (*eikones*) and apparitions (*phantasmata*). If the likeness is an image that actually resembles the original, the apparition is an image that does not actually resemble the original but appears to resemble it. How exactly should this distinction be understood? Cornford's argument that the distinction between likenesses and apparitions is made according to the 'degree of reality' leads to the conclusion that Plato uses the concept of 'image' inconsistently. Bluck criticizes Cornford on the grounds that likenesses and apparitions are both related to falsehood as branches of images.

This criticism is reasonable but does not help us to understand the distinction.

According to Notomi, given the metaphysical distinction between reality and appearance, if the likeness is a correct image that truly resembles the original and represents its appearance, then the apparition is an incorrect image that only appears to resemble it by points of view. I basically agree with Notomi's view, but his interpretation does not accurately reveal the falsehood particular to the apparition, nor does it accurately account for the deception of sophists, other than painters. It is because, according to Notomi's interpretation, apparitions will appear as likenesses, i.e., they will represent the same appearance as likenesses even in the 'unbeautiful point of view.' This, contrary to Notomi's

assertion that the apparition is an incorrect image, seems to allow for the possibility that it can represent 'true appearances.'

Moreover, unlike painters, the deception of sophists occurs when the original is not well known, and therefore it is difficult for the observer to determine which is a likeness, that is, when he does not know which image represents true appearances. For this reason, I argue that the falsehood particular to the apparition arises on the one hand by accidental resemblance irrelevant of the essence of the original and, on the other hand, by aesthetic and emotional effect. Thus, the sophist's verbal deception can be achieved by stimulating the emotions of the audience with flashy rhetoric unrelated to the truth, and by imitating the appearance of a wise person in terms of performing discourses. Furthermore, the deception of the sophist can be discriminated into two types, according to the view on the relation between language and Forms."

References

Cornford, F. M., 1935, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, London: Routledge and K. Paul.

Notomi, N., 1999, *The Unity of Plato's Sophist: Between the Sophist and the Philosopher*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

196. Hull, Andrew. 2022. "The Modal Definition of Being in Plato's Sophist." *Melita Classica. Journal of the Malta Classics Association* no. 8:26–50.

"One of the more understudied elements of the *Sophist* lies in the nature of the definition offered to the Giants and rejected by the Gods at 247d8-e5:

Stranger: I say, then, that a thing genuinely is if it has some capacity, of whatever sort, either to act on another thing, of whatever nature, or to be acted on, even to the slightest degree and by the most trivial of things, and even if it is just the once. That is, what marks off the things that are as being, I propose, is nothing other than capacity.

The common view is that, whatever the exact nature of the definition (from now on called the 'modal definition of being' after Crivelli),(4) it disappears from the dialogue entirely after the Friends reject it. Against this, I will argue that the modal definition is still present in the dialogue because it is necessary for both communion between the Forms and knowledge of the Forms. Following Crivelli, I will argue that the modal definition of being means that any being possesses the power to affect something or to be affected by something. If the modal definition is indeed tacitly affirmed by Plato in the *Sophist*, then we have a unified definition for being that describes both Forms and the soul, finally answering the question of what unites these seemingly disparate types of entities.

Achieving this level of unity in Plato's ontology introduces a new way to consider Platonic psychology that fully recognizes the soul's (and human life as a whole) place in between being and becoming." (pp. 26-27, some notes omitted)

(4) Crivelli (2011) *Plato's Account of Falsehood: A Study of the Sophist*. (Cambridge University Press) 87.

197. Hülsz, Enrique. 2013. "Plato's Ionian Muses: *Sophist* 242d-e." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 103–115. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"The focus of this short paper will be a couple of very famous lines at *Sophist* 242d–e, which constitute one of the precious few certain references to Heraclitus within the Platonic corpus. It will be well to recall from the outset that there are virtually no full quotations of Heraclitus in Plato's works, with the possible exception of two consecutive passages in *Hippias Maior* (289a – b) usually counted as sources for Heraclitus fragments (DK22) B82 and (DK22) B83, which do not qualify as *verbatim* quotations but are at best mere paraphrases. What looks like the dominant trend in current scholarship concerning Plato's views on Heraclitus is largely based on the *Cratylus* and the *Theaetetus*, which seem to provide a basic sketch for the official image of the Ephesian as the main representative of the Universal flux theory (the famous but apocryphal dictum, πάντα ῥεῖ). In spite of the popularity of this view, surely also based on Aristotle's authority, if Universal flux is what allegedly defines Heracliteanism, Heraclitus was no Heraclitean." (p. 103, notes omitted)

198. Ionescu, Cristina. 2013. "Dialectic in Plato's *Sophist*: Division and the Communion of Kinds " *Arethusa* no. 46:41–64.

Abstract: "This paper explores the Eleatic Stranger's use of the method of division in the *Sophist* and attempts to reveal it to be a dialectical method of discovery, not of demonstration, that proceeds tentatively while it ultimately aims to ground its discoveries in the communion of the very great kinds. To illuminate this view, I argue for three main theses: first, that the method of division is a method of discovery, not of demonstration; secondly, that the much discussed passage at *Sophist* 253d-e is about both the method of division and the communion of kinds; and thirdly, that the method cannot succeed to discover natural articulations of reality as long as it ignores considerations of value."

199. ———. 2020. "Images and Paradigms in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 40:1–22.

"At the heart of two Platonic dialogues, one of which is the sequel of the other, the Eleatic Stranger draws two distinctions: one between two types of images (εἰδῶλα): εἰκασία (likenesses) and φαντάσματα (appearances), *Sophist* 234a-236d, and the other between two kinds of paradigms (παραδείγματα): perceptible and verbal paradigms, *Statesman* 277a-c, 285d-286b. My present aim is to examine the relevance of each of these distinctions in its respective context, and to suggest a way to understand the relation between them." (p. 1)

200. Irani, Tushar. 2022. "Perfect Change in Plato's 'Sophist'." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 60:45–93.

Abstract: "This paper examines how Plato's rejection of the friends of the forms at 248 A–249 B in the *Sophist* is continuous with the arguments that he develops shortly after this part of the dialogue for the interrelatedness of the forms. I claim that the interrelatedness of the forms implies that they are changed, and that this explains Plato's rejection of the friends of the forms. Much here turns on the kind of change that Plato wants to attribute to the forms. I distinguish my view of the sort of change that the forms experience from other kinds of change—such as 'Cambridge change'—that scholars have believed Plato has in mind in rejecting the friends of the forms. On the view that I advance, a form experiences a change

(which I call 'perfect change') in its association with another form that distinguishes it as the distinctive being that it is—that is, through its possession of its distinctive properties."

201. Isenberg, Meyer W. 1951. "Plato's *Sophist* and the Five Stages of Knowing." *Classical Philology* no. 46:201–211.

"in a well known passage in the *Seventh Epistle* (342 A ff.) Plato describes the five stages (1) which one traverses on the road to the knowledge of what is real. If this epistle was written about 353 B.C., its explanation of Plato's method, whether it is primarily directed to the beginner or the advanced student, (2) should have an intimate connection with the method pursued not only in the early and middle dialogues, but especially in the works of Plato's old age. Since the *Sophist* is one of the latest dialogues and has been generally considered one of the most difficult it may not be too far from the mark to inquire whether a right understanding of Plato's five stages of knowing in the *Seventh Epistle* may not be of use in the interpretation of that dialogue. In this way, perhaps, some difficulties which that work has raised may be solved and a more intimate acquaintance made with Plato's dialectical method.

It is, then, the purpose of the present paper to show that the movement of thought in the *Sophist* follows closely the description of method in the passage of the Seventh Epistle referred to above. All descriptions of method, however, tend to be more simple and more rigid than the actual application of the method itself." (p. 201)

(1) Plato does not use the word "stages." $\delta\iota' \delta\upsilon\nu$ (342 A 7) should be translated "instruments." But only "name," "discourse," and "image" are instruments.

The term "stages" in the present paper is used in a loose sense to indicate the unfolding of the dialectic.

It has no ontological significance. Various "stages" can only become definite in the context of the *Sophist* and its interpretation. It is important to note, then, that the various stages listed in this passage do not have even the apparent fixity of the levels of the divided line in the *Republic*, but are rather extremely fluid terms which flow into one another as the dialectic twists and turns. Note the term $\delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\nu\eta$ (343 E 1).

(2) Harward in his excellent edition of the *Epistles* states that Plato is "quoting material from some discourse addressed to a single learner, apparently a beginner in philosophy, who has already had a grounding in mathematics" (*The Platonic Epistles* [Cambridge, 1932], p. 213, n. 95). This may well be the case, but many an advanced student may be benefited by an elementary exposition. The importance of the passage on either count is not diminished.

202. Jeng, I-Kai. 2017. "Plato's *Sophist* on the Goodness of Truth." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 21:335–349.

Abstract: " 'Late' Platonic dialogues are usually characterized as proposing a 'scientific' understanding of philosophy, where 'neutrality' is seen favorably, and being concerned with the honor of things and/or their utility for humans is considered an attitude that should be overcome through dialectical training. One dialogue that speaks strongly in favor of this reading is the *Sophist*, in which the stance of neutrality is explicitly endorsed in 227b-c. This paper will propose a reading of the *Sophist* showing that this common view of late Plato is misleading. It will argue for three things. First, 227b-c, when contextually understood,

actually shows the limitation of being neutral. Second, that limitation compels the interlocutors in the rest of the conversation to pursue a non-neutral way of philosophizing about the sophist, contrary to the advice put forward in 227b-c. Finally, the non-neutral definition of the sophist that concludes the dialogue does not signal Plato's preference for a non-neutral conception of philosophical knowledge either. A careful consideration of the dramatic ending suggests that he has reservations about it no less than he does about a neutral conception. The fact that both these conceptions had limitations perhaps explains why Plato, even in his late years, did not turn to the treatise format but remained within the dialogue: only in this form is it possible to retain both in philosophical logos."

203. ———. 2019. "On the Final Definition of the *Sophist*: *Sophist* 265A10–268D5." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 72:661–684.

Abstract: "This paper defends the closing definition of the sophist in Plato's *Sophist* as a modest success. It first argues that it consistently articulates the sophist's class structure as someone who resembles someone wise without being in the same class as that being. Then it explains why this structuring principle satisfies the demands of a successful definition as stated in the *Sophist* 232a1-6, and how the earlier definitions, despite being informative, nevertheless are failures. Since a number of scholars consider the final definition to fail no less than the earlier ones, the paper then turns to address four common objections in the literature. The conclusion briefly discusses how this reading affects our understanding of the method of division (*diaeresis*) in Plato."

204. ———. 2023. "Elenchos in Plato's *Sophist*." *History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis* no. 26:1–27.

Abstract: "This paper examines the terms 'elenchos' and 'elenchō' as they occur in the *Sophist* in order to reveal a refined view of *elenchos* as a philosophical method. The explicit discussion of *elenchos* as a method in 226a6–231b8 must be read together with other passages described by these terms. Once this is done, it shall be seen that there are two types of elenchus employed in several ways. The first type, which I identify with the familiar Socratic elenchus, is used to purge false opinions or to arrive at plausible answers to philosophical difficulties. The second type, which appears to be the Stranger's own method, is used to positively disclose relations between Forms. On this reading, *elenchos* is not merely destructive or preparatory for dialectic; it also forms a part of it."

205. Johnson, Patricia Ann. 1978. "Keyt on ἔτερον in the *Sophist*." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 23:151–157.

"In his article, "Plato on Falsity: *Sophist* 263B," David Keyt introduces a crucial question for understanding the definition of false statement given by Plato in the *Sophist*: What is the relation of flying to Theaetetus (or, to the attributes which belong to Theaetetus)? The response given to this question will amount to an interpretation of the key line, 263B11-13. Keyt mentions five interpretations and argues briefly against each, but the major argument of his paper is devoted to showing that the definition of falsity is vague and therefore defies specific translation. I shall not discuss all of these possible interpretations because my concern here is in defending what Keyt calls the Oxford interpretation. He argues directly against this view as raising serious epistemological problems, but he also challenges it as an interpretation by presenting counter arguments to the two most persuasive reasons for choosing this interpretation over the others. I shall try to respond to the more significant of these challenges." (p. 151)

206. Jordan, Robert William. 1984. "Plato's Task in the *Sophist*." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 34:113–129.

"I shall argue that it is clear that Plato would himself characterize his task in the *Sophist* as showing τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν (258d 5) - that what is notbeing is being.(3)

Problems arise only in the interpretation of Plato's task. We must be guided in our interpretation by the solution Plato offers to his problems. This solution turns firstly on his demonstration of Communion of Kinds, and secondly on his distinction between otherness and opposition. The conclusion Plato draws from his discussion of Communion of Kinds has sometimes been thought to lend support to the view that Plato's task here is that of distinguishing different senses of *einai*. I shall argue that this view of the passage presents serious problems for the commentator. And this view of Plato's task in the *Sophist* receives no support at all from Plato's contrast between otherness and opposition. That contrast, however, equally fails to support the other commonly held view of the problems Plato is facing in the *Sophist*, that Plato is keen to distinguish between the *medamos on* and the *me on*. In particular, the analogy Plato draws between 'being' and 'big' presents a major difficulty for this view.

Finally, I shall introduce a new interpretation of Plato's task, via a consideration of his stated intention to commit patricide and refute Parmenides' criticism of the road of enquiry followed by mortals. Once we have seen that Plato promises to refute Parmenides, but does not accomplish this task by distinguishing between different senses or uses of *einai*, nor yet by a distinction between being in no way and simply not being, only one possibility remains: Plato thinks the refutation of Parmenides achieved if he can show that being (F) is not opposed to notbeing (G). This interpretation of Plato's task is then shown to fit well, both with the puzzles that introduce the central section of the *Sophist*, and with Plato's resolution of those puzzles by way of his demonstration of Communion of Kinds, and his distinction between otherness and opposition. It is compatible with what Plato says and does in *Sophist* 241-56; and it accounts well for the nature of Plato's discussion of negation and falsity in the dialogue. (pp. 113-114)

(3) We normally translate *to mega* as 'what is big'. I consequently translate *to on* as 'what is being' and *to me on* as 'what is notbeing', to preserve the parallel in the Greek.

207. Kahn, Charles H. 1988. "Being in Parmenides and Plato." *La Parola del Passato* no. 43:237–261.

Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, *Essays on Being*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 167-191.

"Despite the silence of Aristotle, there can be little doubt of the importance of Parmenides as an influence on Plato's thought. If it was the encounter with Socrates that made Plato a philosopher, it was the poem of Parmenides that made him a metaphysician. In the first place it was Parmenides' distinction between Being and Becoming that provided Plato with the ontological basis for his theory of Forms.

When he decided to submit this theory to searching criticism, he chose as critic no other than Parmenides himself. And when the time came for Socrates to be replaced as principal speaker in the dialogues, Plato introduced as his new spokesman a visitor from Elea. Even in the *Timaeus*, where the chief speaker is neither Socrates nor the Eleatic Stranger, the

exposition takes as its starting point the Parmenidean dichotomy.(1) From the *Symposium* and *Phaedo* to the *Sophist* and *Timaeus*, the language of Platonic metaphysics is largely the language of Parmenides." (p. 237)

(...)

"My aim here has not been to analyze Plato's use of to be in the formulation of his own ontology, but only to demonstrate how faithfully Parmenidean he is in his progression from an initial, quasi idiomatic use of εἶναι for truth and reality to more philosophically loaded, 'ontological' uses of the verb in which existential and predicative functions are combined with connotations of truth, stability, and permanence." (p. 257)

(...)

"In the *Sophist* veridical being is carefully analyzed as 'saying of what is *that it is* concerning a subject' (236b), whereas the problematic concept of not-being is dissolved into distinct negations for falsehood, identity, and predication. A long and laborious effort of analysis was required to bring to light the confusions hidden in Parmenides' argument. But these confusions infect only the negative concept of what is not. The positive conception of Being emerges unscathed, to dominate the metaphysical tradition of the West for many centuries to come." (p. 258)

(1) *Timaeus* 27d5: 'The first distinction to be made is this: what is the Being that is forever and has no becoming, and what is that which is always becoming but never being?'

208. ————. 2007. "Why is the *Sophist* a sequel to the *Theaetetus*?" *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 52:33–57.

Abstract: The *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* both stand in the shadow of the *Parmenides*, to which they refer. I propose to interpret these two dialogues as Plato's first move in the project of reshaping his metaphysics with the double aim of avoiding problems raised in the *Parmenides* and applying his general theory to the philosophy of nature. The classical doctrine of Forms is subject to revision, but Plato's fundamental metaphysics is preserved in the *Philebus* as well as in the *Timaeus*. The most important change is the explicit enlargement of the notion of Being to include the nature of things that change.

This reshaping of the metaphysics is prepared in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* by an analysis of sensory phenomena in the former and, in the latter, a new account of Forms as a network of mutual connections and exclusions. The division of labor between the two dialogues is symbolized by the role of Heraclitus in the former and that of Parmenides in the latter. *Theaetetus* asks for a discussion of Parmenides as well, but Socrates will not undertake it. For that we need the visitor from Elea. Hence the *Theaetetus* deals with becoming and flux but not with being; that topic is reserved for Eleatic treatment in the *Sophist*. But the problems of falsity and Not-Being, formulated in the first dialogue, cannot be resolved without the considerations of truth and Being, reserved for the later dialogue. That is why there must be a sequel to the *Theaetetus*."

209. ————. 2013. *Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue: The Return to the Philosophy of Nature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 3. Being and Not-Being in the *Sophist*, pp. 94-130.

"In the *Theaetetus* Socrates insisted on avoiding the discussion (which *Theaetetus* had requested) of Parmenides' doctrine of Being. As the promised sequel to the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist* is designed to fill that gap. A significant change in style suggests that a considerable lapse of time may have occurred between the composition of these two dialogues.

Nevertheless, the reappearance of *Theaetetus* as interlocutor in the *Sophist* is a clear reminder of continuity in this project.

It was presumably with these Parmenidean issues in view that Plato chose to replace Socrates as chief speaker with a visitor from Elea. One of Plato's principal tasks in this dialogue will be to correct Parmenides' account of Not-Being. The choice of a spokesman from Parmenides' own school will serve to guarantee an atmosphere of intellectual sympathy for the doctrine to be criticized." (p. 94)

210. Kalligas, Paul. 2012. "From Being an Image to Being What-Is-Not." In *Presocratics and Plato: Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn*, edited by Patterson, Richard, Karasmanis, Vassilis and Hermann, Arnold, 391–409. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

"As Cornford has formulated it,(5) "the class of 'images' (εἰδῶλα) we are concerned with—semblances—imply two relations between image and original.

The image is more or less like the original, though not wholly like it, not a reproduction. But it is also conceived as possessing in some sense a *lower grade of reality*, as illusory, phantom-like" (author's emphasis). Thus it is not unusual to find Plato being accused of abandoning the world of concrete sensible reality in favor of a nebulous region of intangible presumed "prototypes" of the items encountered by our everyday experience, of assuming as properly real what—to every sober minded naturalist—seem to be no more than abstractions from things or features existing in the world of our common, and commonly shared, experience.

In what follows, I wish to challenge certain aspects of this interpretation of the analogy of the image and to suggest that Plato did not intend to question the reality of sensible existence, but only to deny that we can be confident about the truth of any statements we make in reference to it. In my view, in interpreting the image analogy we have to take seriously into account the extended analysis Plato offers with respect to the various kinds of imaging in the *Sophist*, where a great amount of energy is given to an *ex professo* examination of this, at first glance, rather inconsequential or, at best, marginal topic." (pp. 392-393)

(5) See F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1935), 199.

211. Kapantaīs, Doukas. 2023. "Complete versus Incomplete εἶναι in the *Sophist*: An unhelpful dilemma " *Rhizomata* no. 11:250–274.

Abstract: "Since the publication of *The verb "be" in Ancient Greek* by Charles Kahn, people have put a lot of emphasis and invested too much labor in all kinds of historico-philological analyses in order to resolve philosophical questions regarding the concept of existence in Greek thought. Useful as these analyses might be, they cannot provide us with conclusive answers to the specific philosophical questions under scrutiny, and, perhaps, it is time for us to abandon the overwhelming optimism motivating the pioneers behind these attempts. I use

the *Sophist* as a case study. I conclude that whether the Form of Being represents existence or predication cannot be settled on speculation regarding the syntax of the verb εἶναι; absolute εἶναι need not be existential in meaning, and complemented εἶναι may be existential in meaning."

212. Karagöz, Taha. 2023. "Three Aspects of the Linguistic Communion (*Koinōnia*) in Plato's *Sophist*: Articulation of Letters, Predication of Names and Accord (*Homologia*) of *Logoi*." *Areté. Revista de Filosofía* no. 34:215–234.

Abstract: "In the *Sophist*, Plato presents the possibility of the separation of things in relation to each other based on the communion (*koinōnia*) of *logos*. In this study, I discuss the linguistic communion revealed in the dialogue by illuminating its three fundamental aspects: (1) Articulation of letters in names as communion on the syntactic level, (2) Predication of names in *logoi* as communion on the semantic level, (3) *Homologoi* of *logoi* as the ultimate communion of language. I thus conclude that these three linguistic aspects are interdependent."

213. Karanasiou, Argyri G. 2016. "The Term *symplokē* in *Symposium* 202b1 and in *Sophist* 240c1ff, 259d-261c: Heidegger's Interpretation of the Concept of "Interconnection" in Platonic Thought " In *Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25)*, edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 113–130. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

"The pivotal question raised in this study is, whether Socrates's presentation of Eros in the *Symposium* could serve as an allegory of the concept of *symploke*(2) of Forms anticipating the exclusive and exhaustive distinction of a thing, its polar contrary, and its different (the *tertium quid* or third alternative) as presented in the relevant discussion of the *Sophist* (240c1; 259e5f; 260a1-6; d5).(3) Heidegger (GA 19, 572) argues that although Plato has seen the *heteron* early (in the *Symposium*), he only conceived the difference between *heteron* and *enantiosis* (mere negation) later referring to *symploke* as a logical possibility of something 'being' and 'not-being' at the same time; existing, even if it is other than itself (GA 19, 431-32; 569-75; 580). Relating to this topic in his Lectures on the *Sophist* Heidegger refers to a passage (*Smp.* 202b1) where the idea of otherness (*heteron*) is probably defined as signifying not necessarily opposition (*enantion*, GA 19, 572).⁴ Both the discovery of the *heteron* as a category in the *Symposium* and the resolution of the problem of negation through the notion of interconnection (*symploke*) in the *Sophist* laid the foundation of dialectical logic (cf. *Sph.* 253d; 259c4ff)." (pp. 113-114)

(2) The term is rendered either as 'combination', 'dependency' or 'interrelation'. The verb *symploke* means in general 'plait together' and it is usually used with the verb *syndeo* which at *Rsp.* 309b means 'bind together' or 'unite'. Both verbs occur at *Sph.* 268c5-6 when a reverse recapitulation of the definition (*toúnoma*) of the sophist is concisely mentioned (beginning at the end and closing at the opening of the dialogue).

(3) Cf. Seligman (1974), 18-9.

(4) Patt (1997), 23 7.

References

GA = Heidegger Gesamtausgabe

Patt, Walter. *Formen des Anti-Platonismus bei Kant, Nietzsche und Heidegger*. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1997.

Seligman, Paul. *Being and Not-Being: An Introduction to Plato's Sophist*. Dordrecht: Springer, 1974.

214. Karfik, Filip. 2011. "Pantelôs on and megista genê (Plato, *Soph.* 242C–259b) " In *Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfik, Filip, 120–145. Praha: Oikoymenh.

"About the middle of Plato's *Sophist* a perplexity (ἀπορία) emerges out of a lengthy discussion as to how to catch the "tribe" of sophists with a definition. It turns out that to define a sophist as somebody who has to do with falsehood implies the existence of not-being.(1)

Such a hypothesis clearly infringes the ban placed on not-being by Parmenides in his celebrated poem.(2)"

(...)

"The inquiry into this question, which eventually leads to a solution of the question about not-being, fills out the rest of the central part of the dialogue.⁷ Both these questions having been solved, the interlocutors take up the interrupted job of defining the sophist and bring it to a successful conclusion. The *Sophist*, unlike the *Theaetetus*, thus ends up with a positive answer to the question it has initially raised, namely: "What is a Sophist?"⁸ But the way to get there is anything but straightforward and raises more questions than it solves. Formally, both subordinated questions, about not-being and about being, receive due answers, the first one via the second one.

But especially the answer to the question "What does it mean 'to be'" is itself far from being clear. Modern interpreters do not agree about its general meaning and there are several more particular points in Plato's presentation which are in dispute. In this paper I would like to enquire once again into these vexed issues in order to get clearer about the general meaning of Plato's answer to the question: "What is being?" (pp. 120-121)

(1) Cf. Plato, *Soph.* 236d8–237a4.

(2) Cf. *ibid.*, 237a4–b1, line a8–9 = Parmenides, fr. 7 Diels – Kranz

215. Keane, Niall. 2010. "Interpreting Plato Phenomenologically: Relationality and Being in Heidegger's *Sophist*." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 41:170–192.

"... this paper sets out to examine the phenomenological import of Heidegger's subsequent interpretation and appropriation of relationality (*pros ti*) and *logos* in his analyses of the *megista gene* in the *Sophist*. This paper addresses some of the more philosophically salient points of Heidegger's 'phenomenological interpretation' and addresses what were, according to him, both the philosophical merits and limitations of Plato's 'late ontology'. To this end, I will attempt to explicate the phenomenological issues that inevitably remained unthematized in Plato's *Sophist*. In this respect, I shall largely focus on Heidegger's early interpretation of Plato's analysis of 'movedness' (*kinesis*), 'otherness' (*heterotes*) and

'relationality' (*pros ti*); each of which will then be considered with respect to the role of the *logos*.

The ancillary aim of this article will be to disentangle these specific issues from the perspective of the limits and ground of the *pros ti* and it will subsequently examine how Heidegger's early reading of 'relational movedness' in the *Sophist* inspired his later *Being and Time* analysis of the disclosive negativity of Dasein's "Being-in-the-world" (*In-der-Welt-sein*). By way of conclusion, I argue, against what I consider to be a renewed case of 'Platonic apologetics', that Heidegger's reading of Plato is best understood when approached from a purely 'phenomenological perspective'. I contend that it is only by approaching Heidegger's 'deconstructive' interpretation of Plato's highest kinds from the standpoint of his nascent existential-ontology of Dasein, that one can both meaningfully defend and contextualise his interpretation of the *Sophist* against the above reproach. In contrast to what I have called a 'Platonic apologetics', I would like to argue that Heidegger's compelling interpretation of the *Sophist* offers us an unconventional (yet nonetheless valid) way of responding to Plato's thought, a response which is thoroughly evinced in the 1924/25 interpretation which I shall now pursue." (p. 170)

216. Kerferd, George B. 1954. "Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry (*Sophist* 226a-231b)." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 4:84–90.

"Plato's *Sophist* begins with an attempt to arrive by division at a definition of a Sophist. In the course of the attempt six different descriptions are discussed and the results summarized at 231 c-e. A seventh and final account may be said to occupy the whole of the rest of the dialogue, including the long digression on negative statements. The first five divisions characterize with a considerable amount of satire different types of sophist, (1) or more probably different aspects of the sophistic art.(2) The sixth division (226 a-231 b) is very different. To quote Cornford's words, 'satire is dropped. The tone is serious and sympathetic, towards the close it becomes eloquent.' (3)

(...)

"It is the purpose of this paper to argue that the natural meaning of the passage is the right one the persons referred to are sophists and Plato was aware that one aspect of their activities was not only extremely valuable but was a necessary preliminary to his own philosophy." (p. 84)

(...)

"There is thus ample evidence of the practice by sophists of a method which could be described in the terms which Plato uses in the Sixth Definition, a method which if used in the right way could prepare the ground for a true understanding of reality based on the Forms. It is in this sense that Plato could speak of 'the art of sophistry which is of noble lineage'." (p. 90)

(1) Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, 173.

(2) Taylor, *Plato, the Man and His Work*, 379. There is nothing to support Jackson's view (*Journal of Philosophy*, XIV (1885), 176-82) that Plato is describing successive stages in the history of the sophistic movement. *Soph.* 232 a shows that Plato held there was a single common element underlying the name 'sophist' and it is for this that he is searching.

(3) *Op. cit.* 177.

217. Ketchum, Richard J. 1978. "Participation and Predication in the *Sophist* 251-260." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 23:42–62.

"While a great deal of progress has been made in recent years in bringing to light the philosophical sense of the *Sophist* one problem, or cluster of problems, has resisted analysis. (1) The problem is that Plato seems to use a particular form of sentence ambiguously; the fact that he does so seems to reveal a fundamental confusion on Plato's part."

(...)

"Now it is argued that Plato uses sentences of the form "the F (is) ... sometimes to express a Form-predication and sometimes to say something about the nature of the F or perhaps about the nature of particular F 's. The fact Plato vacillates between these two types of predication not only obscures whatever philosophical point he may be making but also shows that Plato was confused about the nature of Forms.

I think, however, that there is a plausible reading of the *Sophist* which shows Plato to be in no way confused as to the meaning of such sentences.

None of the first-order sentences of the *Sophist*, I will argue, are Form predications.

After arguing that the text forces this conclusion on us (Part I), I will try to make the conclusion plausible (Part II) by describing a type of predication, different from Form-predication, in terms of which all of the first-order sentences of the *Sophist* can be consistently understood. A consequence of my interpretation is the rather surprising thesis that nowhere in the *Sophist* with the exception of those passages in which the friends of the Forms are discussed, does Plato mention the Forms of the middle dialogues. I will conclude (Part III) by explaining how I think those passages which seem to mention Forms are to be understood." (p. 42-43)

(1) The problem has been discussed by R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, 2nd Edition (Oxford, 1953), 250-264; I. M. Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrine: II, Plato on Knowledge and Reality* (London, 1963), 401-410; M. Frede, "Prädikation und Existenzaussage," *Hypomnemata*, Heft 18, (1967) 9-99; and G. Vlastos, "On Ambiguity in the *Sophist*" in *Platonic Studies*, (Princeton, 1973), 270-322, among others, while it is alluded to by G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being" in *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology*, G. Vlastos, ed., (Garden City, 1971), 233, note 20.

218. Keyt, David. 1969. "Plato's Paradox that the Immutable is Unknowable." *The Philosophical Quarterly* no. 19:1–14.

"One of the great questions that Plato considers in the *Sophist* is that of the number and nature of real things (242C5-6). The protagonist of the dialogue, an Eleatic stranger, raises problems for both the pluralist (243D6-244B5) and the monist (244B6-246E5) without resolving them and then turns to the battle of gods and giants, the battle between those who hold that "body and being are the same" (246B1) and those who hold that "true being is certain intelligible and bodiless Forms" (246B7-8). What the one holds is the logical contrary, not the contradictory, of what the other holds; so it is possible that they are both

wrong. This seems in fact to be the Eleatic's conclusion (249C10-D4), although by the time he gets to the friends of the Forms the property under examination has shifted from corporeality to mutability. The Eleatic stranger presents the friends of the Forms with an interesting paradox (248D1-E5). This is my subject. The friends of the Forms hold that real being " is always invariable and constant " (248A11-12). But being is known (248D2). And on the hypothesis that to know is to act on something, that which is known is acted upon (248D10-E1). Further, to be acted upon is to be changed (248E3-4). Therefore, since being is known, it is changed (248E3-4). But this conclusion contradicts their original contention." (p. 1)

(...)

"My conclusions are that he is not deeply committed to the proposition that Forms undergo change, but that he ought to be, and that he is deeply committed to the proposition that Forms are completely changeless, but for insufficient reasons. A Platonist really ought to hold that Forms are changeless in some respects but not in others. In what respects? This is my third question. Aristotle, in commenting on Plato's theory of Forms, provides a basis for answering it." (p. 2)

219. ————. 1973. "Plato on Falsity: *Sophist* 263b." In *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos*, edited by Lee, Edward N., Mourelatos, Alexander and Rorty, Richard, 285–305. Assen: Van Gorcum.

220. Klein, Jacon. 1977. *Plato's Trilogy: Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

"There can be no doubt that the Platonic dialogues entitled *Theaetetus*, *The Sophist*, and *The Statesman* belong together --- in that order and are meant to be a "trilogy," regardless of when they were written. It is important to note that these three conversations are supposed to take place not during three days but *two*, shortly before the trial and the conviction of Socrates. (3) The conversation in the *Theaetetus* is followed on the next day by two conversations, by that in the *Sophist* and that in the *Statesman*. There is almost certainly no pause between the latter two. (4)" (p. 3)

(...)

"Independently of the time sequence within the dialogues, something is dealt with in the *Sophist* which happens to be the fundamental premise in the *Theaetetus*, namely, that the roots, the ultimate sources of everything, the "ruling beginnings" (the *αρχαί*), are these two: the 'Same' and the 'Other'. We shall, therefore, begin with the *Sophist*, continue with the *Theaetetus*, and end with the *Statesman*.

How shall we convey what is either said or not said explicitly but only implied in the dialogues? We shall watch the text carefully, always remaining aware of the playfulness --- the sister of seriousness which persists in the dialogues and determines the way they proceed. We shall watch how the spoken words produce the dramatic content presented to us. We shall participate in the discussions: the paraphrase of the text of the dialogues will be interwoven with what occurs in us as listeners." (p. 5)

(3) *Theaet.* 210d 1-3.

(4) Cf. Diès, *Platon: Oeuvres complètes*, Vol. 8, pt. 3, *Le Sophiste*. Paris, 1963.

221. Kohnke, Friedrich Wilhelm. 1957. "Plato's Conception of τὸ οὐκ ὄντως οὐκ ὄν." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 2:32-40.

"In the neo-Platonic philosophy of the fifth century A.D. the hypostases of being are found in connection with a four-level scale of being and non-being." (p. 32)

(...)

"Plato seems to have formulated the concept of οὐκ ὄντως οὐκ ὄν for the first time in the *Sophistes*." (p. 38)

(...)

"We are now in a position to recognise its roots: The neo-Platonists derived a terminology for their fourfold system of being from Plato's *Parmenides*, the dialogue which they honoured as the revelation of metaphysical truth, and combined this with their system of hypostases of the cosmos." (p. 40)

222. Kostman, James. 1973. "False Logos and Not-Being in Plato's *Sophist*." In *Patterns in Plato's Thought. Papers Arising Out of the 1971 West Coast Greek Philosophy Conference*, edited by Moravcsik, Julius, 192–212. Dordrecht: Reidel.

"In the *Sophist*, Plato argues that false statements are possible, defending this common-sense view against the claims of a notorious sophistic puzzle: if there are false λόγοι, according to the puzzle, then not-Being is (237a3-4); but, as Parmenides had testified, what is-not cannot be (237a4-b2).

After introducing this puzzle, Plato goes on to magnify the difficulties it raises (237b7-239c3), and he asserts that, in order to refute Parmenides, we must show both that what is-not is and that what is is-not (239c4-242b5). Plato then takes up several traditional theories about Being (242b6-251a4), and finds that this subject too is full of perplexity. So he attempts to resolve the whole cluster of problems he has raised, starting with the question of how one and the same thing can be called by many names (251a5-c7). This leads to the topic of the communion of Kinds (251c7-257a12). But, as we shall see, it is only at 257b1 that Plato begins

his direct reply to the original sophistic puzzle." (p. 192)

223. ————. 1989. "The Ambiguity of 'Partaking' in Plato's *Sophist*." *Journal of The History of Philosophy* no. 27:343–363.

"In the central section of the *Sophist* (250-259), as Gregory Vlastos has shown,(1) statements about Forms or Kinds are subject to a certain structural ambiguity: 'The F is G' may be either an 'ordinary' or a 'Pauline' predication, in Vlastos' terminology; that is, it may either attribute being G to the F itself or assert that necessarily whatever is F is G. For example, 'Being is at rest' may assert either that the Form Being itself is at rest, in which case it is an ordinary predication, or that necessarily whatever is is at rest, in which case it is a Pauline predication." A few scholars have quibbled with Vlastos' interpretations of some of the passages on which he bases the claim that the ambiguity exists, but I find it surprising that, in the decade and a half since its publication, Vlastos' central thesis---that Plato was "utterly unaware" of the ambiguity--has never been directly challenged. After summarizing

the evidence for the existence of the ambiguity in section 1 of this paper, I shall show in section 2 that the argument by which Vlastos concludes that there is "positive evidence" for his thesis is fundamentally incoherent.

In the rest of this paper, I offer an argument, based on my analysis of two important passages (255c-e and 250a-e) and the relationship between them, that there is additional circumstantial evidence that Plato was not only aware of the ambiguity but allowed it to play a significant, though indirect, role in the overall argument of *Soph.* 250-259." (p. 343)

(1) Gregory Vlastos, "An Ambiguity in the Sophist," in his *Platonic Studies*, 270-322. This article will be referred to as 'AS'; all references to it and other papers in *Platonic Studies* are to the first edition.

224. Kraus, Manfred. 2024. "Ἀληθῆς δόξα in the Sophist between Theaetetus and Seventh Letter." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 461–468.

Abstract: "The problem of defining and distinguishing true and false speech is a central concern of the *Sophist*. But the problem of discerning true and false opinion (δόξα) is closely related. In this respect, the *Sophist* takes up issues raised in the *Theaetetus*, where ἀληθῆς δόξα plays a central role in the search for a definition of knowledge. The *Sophist* sets out to resolve problems left open in the *Theaetetus* by providing a more advanced concept of λόγος as a combination of nouns and verbs, and by developing criteria for truth and falsity by the establishment of the five "most important classes" and the inclusion therein of Otherness (τὸ ἕτερον). In both dialogues, λόγος and δόξα are closely linked by way of thought (διάνοια) as the mediating element, so that the criteria for truth and falsity of λόγοι are applicable also to truth and falsity of opinions. In the *Seventh Letter*, in the hierarchical pyramid of the means for acquisition of knowledge, true opinion rises to even higher epistemological dignity, since it is paralleled with intelligence (νοῦς) and knowledge and thus placed above name, λόγος and image and closest to the supreme fifth element (the εἶδος). This role of ἀληθῆς δόξα in *Theaetetus*, *Sophist* and *Seventh Letter* also fits in with the general role of ἀληθῆς δόξα in Platonic epistemology in the early and middle dialogues. Thus, ἀληθῆς δόξα needs to be taken seriously as an essential element in Plato's epistemological thinking, and the *Sophist* occupies a central position in this context."

225. Kurihara, Yuji. 2024. "Two Ontological Functions of the Nature of Difference in Plato's *Sophist*." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 389–397.

Abstract: "To characterize the sophist as a maker of what is not, one must know what Not-Being is. *Sophist* 257c–258e elucidates Not-Being in terms of Difference. Although Not-Being was traditionally identified with Difference itself (Cherniss and Ross), most scholars today consider it part of Difference (Lee, Brown, Kahn, etc.). This paper advocates the traditional view by clarifying two ontological functions of Difference: ἀφορίζειν (marking off) and ἀντιτιθέναι (setting against). Section 1 analyzes the analogy of Difference and knowledge in 257c–d, showing that the nature of Difference functions as marking off a still indefinite Kind (being) from Being itself and other parts of Being—the "generic" function—and then specifying the content of the Kind at issue by setting it against a particular Kind—the "specific" function. Section 2 discusses the Not-Beautiful in 257d–e to explain how these two functions work. By the specific function of Difference, we learn what the Beautiful is, identifying paradigmatic exemplars of the Not-Beautiful in daily life. Section 3

interprets 258a–b as generalizing this account, concluding that the antithesis between a part of the nature of Difference and a part of the nature of Being is nothing but Not-Being. Thus, the context indicates that Not-Being is identical to Difference itself, which performs this antithesis as its function. Although the widespread view uses “τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὄν ἕκαστον μῶριον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον” (258e2) as strong evidence, this participial phrase stands for the function of the nature of Difference, as ἀντιτιθέμενον is a dominant participle, thereby meaning “the part of it [the nature of Difference] being set against each being” as an example of the *ab urbe condita* construction.”

226. Lacey, Alan Robert. 1959. "Plato's *Sophist* and the Forms." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 9:43–52.

"The *Sophist* is on the face of it concerned to charge the sophist with being a mere maker of images, and to defend this charge by showing that images, though they 'are not' what they are images of, yet in some sense 'are'. This leads to the analysis of Not-being as being other than, but Plato makes it quite clear that the general problem concerns Being as much as Not-being (250 e); the difficulty is that Being is neither Rest nor Motion, and so can neither rest nor move of its own nature, but surely it must do one of these (250 c, d). In other words Being is in danger of not being able to have attributes except by being identical with them. The ensuing discussion seems to point out that this is not so, and that Forms, like other things, do have some attributes and not others, without being identical with them.

But such an interpretation will only hold if the *Megista Gene* are in fact all Forms. This is denied by Dr. A. L. Peck, who argues (*Classical Quarterly*. 1952; cf. 1953, 1954) (2) that the whole point of the discussion is to show that Being, Not-being, Same, and Other are not Forms, but merely empty names, and so φάντασματα rather than the εἰκόνας which are the names of real things; the sophist raises paradoxes by relying on linguistic habits (Dr. Peck (S p. 52) points to the frequency of verbs of saying in the *Sophist*) to pervert the theory of Forms into positing absurd Forms." (p. 43)

227. Lanigan, Richard L. 1982. "Semiotic Phenomenology in Plato's *Sophist*." *Semiotica* no. 41:221–246.

Reprinted in: John Deely (ed.), *Frontiers in Semiotics*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1986, pp. 199-216.

"My essay attempts to explicate the main features of the Platonic argument in order to establish that the model of discourse analysis is semiotic in nature and phenomenological in function. I am using the term model in its technical theory construction sense as an 'exemplar' (combined 'paradigm' and 'prototype') in a theory."

(...)

"My essay does not represent an effort to claim that Plato is either a semiologist or a phenomenologist. Rather, I argue that the dialogue *Sophist* offers a long neglected textual model of binary analogue thinking that is foundational to many of the issues current in the study of the philosophy of communication where semiology and phenomenology intersect in the problematic of analysis. Indeed, many of the basic elements in the Platonic investigation are being unnecessarily reinvented by contemporary theorists. By addressing the fundamental problem of the Being of Not-Being, Plato provides a semiotic phenomenology of discourse in which he demonstrates the acceptability of analytic proofs as the concrete

analysis of empirical communication acts. Thus, the dialogue *Sophist* represents a critical, but often ignored, theoretical foundation for an empirical examination of the sign relationship between the ontology of the speaking subject and the epistemology of the discourse system." (pp. 221-222, note omitted)

228. Larsen, Jens Kristian. 2007. "The Soul of Sophistry: Plato's "Sophist" 226a9–231b9 revisited." *Filosofiske Studier* no. 102:1–14.

"It is a widespread opinion that the first part of the *Sophist* (216a – 237b) is primarily concerned with the problem of finding an adequate definition of the sophist. Within this passage six different definitions

are given, each unsatisfactory, until a seventh description leads to the main problems of the dialogue, namely the questions concerning non-being, being, the intertwining of forms and the problem concerning false statements. Whereas the first five definitions are relatively unproblematic, the sixth is known to be troublesome – it has a peculiar resemblance to the Socrates-figure of the elenctic dialogues.

In the following I shall argue that the so-called sixth definition is not a definition of the sophist at all, but a methodological reflection which plays a central role in the overall composition of the dialogue. I shall further argue that this methodological reflection shows that Plato did not change his basic notion of philosophy in the late dialogues towards a more 'technical' concept, as is often maintained, but in a fundamental way stayed true to the Socratic, 'existential' impulse." (p. 1)

229. ————. 2013. "The Virtue of Power." *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* no. 13:306–317.

Abstract: "The "battle" between corporealists and idealists described in Plato's *Sophist* 245e6–249d5 is of significance for understanding the philosophical function of the dramatic exchange between the Eleatic guest and Theaetetus, the dialogue's main interlocutors.

Various features of this exchange indicate that the Eleatic guest introduces and discusses the dispute between corporealists and idealists in order to educate Theaetetus in ontological matters. By reading the discussion between Theaetetus and the Eleatic guest in the light of these features, one comes to see that the primary audience for the proposal advanced by the Eleatic guest in this passage, namely that being is power, is not any of the participants in the "battle," as has been commonly assumed, but Theaetetus himself—a fact to bear in mind in any viable interpretation of the passage."

230. ————. 2016. "Plato and Heidegger on Sophistry and Philosophy." In *Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25)*, edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 27–60. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

"The present chapter investigates Heidegger's early understanding of Platonic dialectic in its contrast to sophistry as this comes to expression in his Lectures on Plato's *Sophist*." (p. 27)

(...)

"To investigate Heidegger's early understanding of sophistry is thus a challenging task, since this understanding cannot be isolated from his broader interpretation of Plato's understanding of philosophy or from his own understanding of philosophy, developed in discussion with the philosophical tradition. Moreover, as Heidegger's interpretation of Plato is primarily based on a reading of the *Sophist*, a text that may not be typical of Plato, we need to look at the *Sophist* itself if we wish to evaluate Heidegger's engagement with Plato. Accordingly, the chapter will have two main parts. The first part will focus on Plato's *Sophist*, in particular on the connection between *arete*, virtue, and the inquiry into sophistry in the dialogue. Here a now common reading of the *Sophist* will be examined critically. The second part will focus on Heidegger's interpretation of philosophy and sophistry in the light of the *Sophist* and will ask what role, if any, *arete* plays in this interpretation." (pp. 28-29)

231. ————. 2019. "Eleaticism and Socratic Dialectic: On Ontology, Philosophical Inquiry, and Estimations of Worth in Plato's *Parmenides*, *Sophist* and *Statesman*." *Etudes platoniciennes* no. 15:1–17.

Abstract: "The *Parmenides* poses the question for what entities there are Forms, and the criticism of Forms it contains is commonly supposed to document an ontological reorientation in Plato. According to this reading, Forms no longer express the excellence of a given entity and a Socratic, ethical perspective on life, but come to resemble concepts, or what concepts designate, and are meant to explain nature as a whole. Plato's conception of dialectic, it is further suggested, consequently changes into a value-neutral method directed at tracing the interrelation of such Forms, an outlook supposedly documented in certain passages on method from the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* as well.

The article urges that this reading is untenable. For in the *Parmenides* the question for what entities one should posit Forms is left open, and the passages on method from the *Sophist* and *Statesman* neither encourage a non-normative ontology nor a value-neutral method of inquiry. What the three dialogues encourage us to do is rather to set common opinions about the relative worth and value of things aside when conducting ontological inquiries; and this attitude, the article concludes, demonstrates a close kinship, rather than a significant difference, between Plato's Socrates and his Eleatic philosophers."

232. ————. 2020. "Differentiating Philosopher from Statesman according to Work and Worth." *Polis. The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought* no. 37:550–566.

Abstract: "Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman* stand out from many other Platonic dialogues by at least two features. First, they do not raise a *ti esti* question about a single virtue or feature of something, but raise the questions what sophist, statesman, and philosopher are, how they differ from each other, and what worth each should be accorded. Second, a visitor from Elea, rather than Socrates, seeks to address these questions and does so by employing what is commonly referred to as the method of collection and division. Some scholars have argued that this so-called method is value neutral and therefore unable to address the question how philosophy differs from sophistry and statesmanship according to worth. This article contends that the procedures of collection and division does not preclude the visitor from taking considerations of worth into account, but rather helps establish an objective basis for settling the main questions of the dialogue."

233. Lee, Edward N. 1966. "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the *Sophist*." *The Philosophical Review* no. 81:267–304.

"On pages 257c-258c of the *Sophist*, Plato introduces a notion which he calls the "Parts of the nature of Otherness." He then writes explicitly - in fact, he writes it twice - that that Part of Otherness, and not merely Otherness by itself, defines the genuine non-Being that is needed to conclude his inquiry and to trap the Sophist.(2) But why does he say so? Just what difference is there between the not-Being explicated by means of the Parts of Otherness and the not-Being explicated through Otherness by itself? I am convinced that none of the existing interpretations of the Parts doctrine adequately answer that question or accurately analyze Plato's own meaning. My aim will be to do both. To begin (I), we will work through the details of the difficult passage in which Plato spells out his doctrine of the Parts of Otherness; then we shall try to clarify the philosophical role that the doctrine plays-first (II) in Plato's analysis of negation (particularly his account of the sense of negative predication statements), and then (III), though more briefly, in connection with one of the wider metaphysical issues raised in the *Sophist*." (p. 267)

(...)

"If the account in Sections I and II above is sound, then the logical force of Plato's theories in the *Sophist* proves to be much greater than the commentators have appreciated. Not only can he analyze the sense of negative identity statements, but he can analyze the sense of negative predication statements as well. To an extent much greater than had earlier been recognized, he did succeed in dealing with the problem of negation. Yet we have noted that his aims in the *Sophist* were not narrowly logical or "analytical" in nature, and we need also to ask what other substantive issues he may have hoped to illuminate by means of these analytic achievements." (p. 299)

234. Lee, SangWon. 2016. "The Dynamic Association of Being and Non-Being: Heidegger's Thoughts on Plato's *Sophist* Beyond Platonism." *Human Studies* no. 39:385–403.

Abstract: "This article examines Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's *Sophist*, focusing on his attempts to grasp Plato's original thinking of being and non-being. Some contemporary thinkers and commentators argue that Heidegger's view of Plato is simply based on his criticism against the traditional metaphysics of Platonism and its language. But a close reading of his lecture on the *Sophist* reveals that his view of Plato is grounded in Plato's questioning struggle with the ambiguous nature of human speech or language (*logos*). For Heidegger, Plato's way of philosophizing is deeper than the metaphysical understanding of Platonism which sees only fixed ideas of being. In the *Sophist*, dialectical thinking of Plato constantly confronts the questionable force of the *logos* which betrays the natural possibility of non-being based on the tension between movement and rest. Thus, from Plato's original insight Heidegger uncovers the dynamic association (*koinōnia*) of being and non-being as a natural ground of everyday living with others. However, although Heidegger's understanding of the *Sophist* powerfully demonstrates the lively possibility (*dunamis*) of being beyond the customary perspective of Platonic metaphysics, his interpretation fails to further disclose Plato's political question of being emerging in the *Sophist*, which seeks the true associative ground of human beings."

235. Leigh, Fiona. 2008. "The Copula and Semantic Continuity in Plato's *Sophist*." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 34:105–121.

"Lesley Brown first made a radical claim about uses of the Greek verb 'to be' (*einai*) in Plato's *Sophist* some twenty years ago (1986).(1)

(...)

"In brief, Brown's innovation is as follows: The verb 'to be' in Greek, unlike its counterpart in modern English, permits a complete and an incomplete use. Sometimes it does not take a complement, though it could, and at other times context demands a complement (whether elided or not). In the former case, the verb exhibits what Brown calls a 'C2' complete use, and in the second, an incomplete use. Brown's view is that the verb is not being used merely homonymously in these cases, but, like 'to teach' in English, exhibits a certain continuity of meaning across uses. The mistake has been to take complete uses of *estin* as C1 complete uses, i.e. as uses that will not bear further completion.

The first critical discussion (to my knowledge) of Brown's reading has recently appeared in print.⁽⁶⁾ In it John Malcolm advances several arguments against Brown's reading. I shall argue, however, that Malcolm's textual considerations are less than decisive. More significantly, I shall suggest that his conceptual arguments miss their mark in two ways: one objection relies on a less than charitable reading of Brown, while another involves the questionable attribution of an assumption to the author of the *Sophist*. But despite my defence of Brown's view, I do not endorse it. On the contrary, I hope to show that Brown's central thesis—that there is a semantic continuity between complete and incomplete uses of *einai*—lacks the textual support it requires from the *Sophist*. Moreover, a central argument of that dialogue tells against it. (pp. 105-106)

(...)

"I have argued that Malcolm's arguments against Brown's reading of *einai* in the *Sophist* are ultimately unconvincing. None the less, I hope to have shown that Brown's reading receives insufficient support from the relevant passages, and is even rendered doubtful by a central argument of that work. If this is right, the contention that *einai* has a C2 complete use in the *Sophist*—a use referred to in the *kath' hauta/pros alla* distinction at 255 c 14—will turn out to be at best improbable, and at worst defeated." (p. 120)

(1) L. Brown, 'Being in the Sophist: A Syntactical Enquiry' ['Being'], *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 4 (1986), 49–70; repr. with revisions in G. Fine (ed.), *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Oxford, 1999), 455–78 (all references are to the later publication).

(6) J. Malcolm, 'Some Cautionary Remarks on the "is"/"teaches" Analogy' ['Remarks'], *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 31 (2006), 281–96.

236. ———. 2009. "Plato on Art, Perspective, and Beauty in the *Sophist*." *Literature & Aesthetics* no. 19:183–214.

"With only a few exceptions, readers of Plato's later dialogue, the *Sophist*, have not usually associated it with Platonic aesthetics. But this is to overlook two important features of the dialogue. First, the unfavourable contrast, built up throughout the dialogue, between the practice of sophistry – likened to the practice of the mimetic arts (235c-236e)—and the practice of philosophy. Only the latter, the Stranger implies, affords the possibility of what we might call an aesthetic experience, i. e., the experience of beauty in the soul, while the former results in ugliness (230d-e). Second, it overlooks the argument at 235d-236c, offered by the main speaker in the dialogue, the Eleatic Stranger, for the claim that certain artworks, such as monuments and large paintings, are necessarily illusory."

(...)

"I mentioned above that the conception of a beautiful soul figures in the Stranger's remarks on the benefits of knowledge, as contrasted with the deleterious effects of submitting oneself to the teaching of sophists.

However, the conception of beauty at work here, and its relation to truth and knowledge, is not argued for or defended in our dialogue, but instead appears to be presupposed: there is nothing in the *Sophist* that counts as an advance in Plato's thought on the conception of beauty. Nonetheless, as a preliminary, I want first to review this conception in the corpus, and its connection to truth, knowledge, and virtue, in order to provide a broader context within which to situate the importance accorded to a beautiful soul in the *Sophist*. We will see that the experience of beauty generally, and coming to have a beautiful soul in particular, is desirable because it has moral value. We will also see, however, that aesthetic value is not thereby reduced to moral value, since it will emerge that the soul's beauty is for Plato a constituent of the good life, of eudaimonia, and not simply a means towards that end." (pp. 183-184, notes omitted)

237. ———. 2010. "Being and Power in Plato's *Sophist*." *Apeiron* no. 43:63–85.

"What should we make of the passage in the *Sophist* at 247d-e, in which the Eleatic Stranger declares that being is whatever has the power (*dunamis*) to act or be affected, even if only once, in the smallest way? Does this proposal about being — the '*dunamis* proposal' (2) — express the view of the Stranger's interlocutors, the giants, or is the Stranger speaking in his own voice and so representing Plato's view? (3) If the latter, how could the proposal be seen to survive the encounter with the 'friends of the Forms', and be applicable to immutable Forms? Is the employment of '*horos*' and '*horizein*' at 247e3 meant to indicate that a mere mark of being is offered in the proposal, or the very definition of being? How these questions are answered determines what role, if any, one takes the *dunamis* proposal about being to play in the later constructive part of the dialogue, in which the Form, Being, takes centre stage."

(...)

"I shall argue that in the *Sophist* Plato has the Stranger forge the definition — that whatever has the power to act or be affected is a being — by distinguishing relations of causation (or *poiesis*) from relations of change." (p. 63-64)

(2) L. Brown, 'Innovation and Continuity: The Battle of Gods and Giants', In J. Gentzler, ed., *Method in Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon 1998), 181-207, at 184ff.

(3) Although it has been recently challenged, the orthodox position, that provided one proceeds with care one can read off Plato's position — however partial and provisional — from the views expressed by the main character of a dialogue, remains, and I shall assume it here. (For the case *pro*, see D. Sedley, *Plato's Cratylus*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), 1-2; M. Frede, 'The Literary Form of the *Sophist*', In M. L. Gill and M. M. McCabe, eds., *Form and Argument in Late Plato* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), 135-151. 142,150-1. For the case *contra*, see e.g., R. Blondell, *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), 18-21.)

238. ———. 2012. "Modes of Being at *Sophist* 255c-e." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 57:1–28.

Abstract: "I argue for a new interpretation of the argument for the non-identity of Being and Difference at *Sophist* 255c-e, which turns on a distinction between modes of being a property. Though indebted to Frede [*Prädikation und Existenzaussage*] (1967), the distinction differs from his in an important respect: What distinguishes the modes is not the subject's relation to itself or to something numerically distinct, but whether it constitutes or conforms to the specification of some property. Thus my view, but not his, allows self-participation for Forms. Against Frede and the more traditional interpretation, I maintain that the distinction is not introduced by way of the pros *alla/kath' hauta* distinction, or by way of uses or senses of the verb 'to be', but is established prior to the argument and is deployed in its frame. Moreover, since I read the argument's scope as restricted to properties in what I shall call the attribute mode, my interpretation can explain, as its rivals cannot, why the criterion of difference at 255d6-7 does not apply to the Form, Difference, itself."

239. ———. 2012. "Restless Forms and Changeless Causes." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* no. 112.

Abstract: "It is widely held that in Plato's *Sophist*, Forms rest or change or both. The received opinion is, however, false—or so I will argue. There is no direct support for it in the text and several passages tell against it. I will further argue that, contrary to the view of some scholars, Plato did not in this dialogue advocate a kind of change recognizable as 'Cambridge change', as applicable to his Forms. The reason that Forms neither change nor rest is that they are purely intelligible entities, not susceptible to changing or being at rest. Since Plato continues in the *Sophist* to treat Forms as causes, it follows that Forms are changeless causes. I ask what conception of cause might allow for this view, and reject the suggestion that Plato was some kind of proto-dispositionalist about causation. Instead I suggest that he understood causation to incorporate a notion of structuring, such that Forms can be seen to structure their participants and so cause them to possess the attributes they possess."

240. ———. 2024. "The Theory of Being and the Argument for Forms in Plato's *Sophist*." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 69:402–438.

Abstract: "This paper argues for two claims. First, that in the *Sophist* a metaphysical theory of being is constructed from the ground up, largely on the basis of a claim treated as an axiomatic principle, the 'dunamis proposal' (247d–e), which, I will argue, ought to be understood as Plato's own definition of being. Second, once its core is in place, the theory is put to use to provide dialectical arguments against proponents of alternative metaphysical theories for the existence of various entities in the ontology. These include—notably—an argument for the existence of Forms."

241. Lentz, William. 1997. "The Problem of Motion in the *Sophist*." *Apeiron* no. 30:89–108.

"In the *Sophist*, Plato seems to introduce κίνησις, motion or change, into the unchanging and eternal realm of being. On the face of it, this looks like an outright contradiction; i.e., motion or change is introduced into a realm of unchanging and perfect actualities. The introduction of motion occurs in two ways: Plato suggests that when the soul knows its object it affects

that object (248e2-4), and he claims that motion and rest define reality (249d3-4). Neither of these claims is very clear; both require some interpretative work.

After a brief examination of previous attempts to explain Plato's introduction of motion into being, I suggest that a solution to these problems begins with Plato's claim that being is defined by power. The concept of power is then filled out by reference to the genera of motion, rest, sameness, and difference. I oppose the tendency in the literature to reject motion and rest as essential genera. Instead I argue that these two genera are required in order for there to be relations in being — relations that are manifest between forms but do not affect the nature of the forms themselves. I also reject the tendency to explain the interweaving of forms as a function of discourse. Instead I argue that the interweaving of forms is referred to a metaphysical state that in turn makes knowledge and discourse possible." (p. 89)

242. Lewis, Frank A. 1976. "Did Plato Discover the "*Estin*" of Identity?" *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* no. 8:113–143.

Summary: "(I) The notion of an *is* of identity in English. Some passages from Plato suggesting the existence of the comparable notion of a special *estin* of identity in Greek. (II) What in particular would lead Plato to recognize such a special sense of *estin*? Forms, participation, and predication. In the account of ordinary singular predications, a predicate 'Y' is true of a subject *X* just in case *X* participates in the form the Y associated with. (III) Self-participation. If nothing can participate in itself, then for any forms *X* and Y, *X* participates in Y and so is Y only if *X* is not Y. Even if self-participation is allowed, still in the majority of cases a subject is not what it participates in. The difficulty for all theories of predication which wish to explain how a thing can *be* something which it also *is not*. (IV) The *is* of identity re-examined. Some fallacies which might support the notion, and some arguments against it. (V) *Sophist* 255e11-256d10. Plato does not explicitly recognize an *estin* of identity. Four competing, "equally best" accounts of the grammatical theory he may implicitly be invoking: (i) the *estin* of identity; (ii) relational terms; (iii) the definite article; (iv) the *not* of nonidentity. (VI) Conclusion. The notion of a special *estin* of identity has little basis in Plato's text."

243. ———. 1976. "Plato on "Not"." *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* no. 9:89–115.

"Plato's account of not being can be seen as a treatment of issues connected with the analysis of negation. It is generally agreed that his account covers at least one set of negative assertions. We are explicitly told how to analyze such sentences as "Motion is not rest," "Motion is not the same," which the context shows are intended to assert the nonidentity of motion and assorted other forms. For Plato, such assertions form a special class of sentences, which he analyzes by reference to the form "otherness." What is less clear is whether Plato successfully distinguishes negative sentences of this sort from negative sentences for which, on his terms, a different pattern of analysis is appropriate: "Socrates is not beautiful," "Helen is not wise." I shall call these sentences of negative predication proper ("NP" hereafter).(1) I argue that Plato does recognize this second sort of sentence, and that he does in the *Sophist* offer a theory to say how such sentences get their meaning. At the same time, his theory is in many respects unlike the kind of theory we should demand for the task at hand. These differences may help explain why the details of his account have so often seemed so elusive.

I offer first (I) a general account of the context within which Plato's treatment of negation takes place. I then turn (II) to a detailed examination of the passage at 25 7b3-c3, where I shall argue that we find our best evidence for what Plato regards as the chief desiderata in an account of NP. I end (III) with some brief comments on the aims and limits of Plato's inquiry." (pp. 89-90)

(1) By "NP," accordingly, I mean to confine my attention to simple, singular, negative sentences other than sentences that are denials of identity. I follow Plato in ignoring the use of negation in combination with general sentences.

244. Lisi, Francesco Leonardo, Migliori, Maurizio, and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, eds. 2011. *Formal Structures in Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The three dialogues, which are the object of the collected papers included in this volume, are a unicum in the Platonic corpus. No other existing trilogy is connected dramatically so clearly as they are.

From the formal point of view, in these texts Plato shows his brilliant literary ability in all its facets in order to deploy all the grades of the philosophical inquiry, always related to education: *maieutikos elenchus*, dialectical *dihairesis* and everything entangled with allegory and myth. In the first dialogue of the trilogy Socrates searches in Theaetetus' soul for the definition of *episteme*, not knowledge in general, but the specific wisdom proper of the true philosophers. In the following *Sophist* and *Statesman*, on the other hand, a new character, the guest from Elea, offers the science they had looked for as a gift, the *diáiresis*. The exercises in it serve also for distinguishing the true philosopher-statesman from his fake: the sophist and all the historical politicians acting in the scene. Actually these dialogues develop the subject of the excursus, which stands at the centre of the *Theaetetus* (172c3-177c5): the opposition between true and false philosopher."

Essays on the *Sophist*:

Milena Bontempi: *Opinione e legge: l'anima e la città nella trilogia, Teeteto, Sofista, Politico*, pp. 47-58; Elisabetta Cattanei: *Arithmos nel Teeteto, nel Sofista et nel Politico di Platone*, pp. 59-71; Francesco Fronterotta: *Dialettica et diáiresis nel Sofista platonico*, pp.151-167; Beatriz Bossi: *¿Por qué Platón no refuta Parménides en el Sofista?*, pp. 180-192; Noburu Notomi: *Where is the Philosopher? A single project of the Sophist and the Statesman*, pp. 216-236.

245. Livov, Gabriel. 2011. "The Father and the Sophist: Platonic Parricide in the *Statesman*." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 331–343. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

Summary: "Through a certain approach to Plato's philosophical parricide, I try to prove the strong political significance of the *Statesman* as a metaphorical and theoretical space of criticism of the Parmenidean principles of the *Republic*.

I intend to shed light on a well-known metaphor that Plato uses to illustrate the controversy he engages in against Parmenides, his Philosophical Father. The motif of Father Parmenides' crime appears as a superb key to the interpretation of the reformulation process Plato undertakes in his late dialogues, clearly in the *Sophist*, but also in the *Statesman*. I take

both dialogues as a methodological, conceptual and dramatic unity, and my general argumentative operation implies projecting the refined logics and ontology of the *Sophist* onto its practical counterpart, a revised version of the standard Platonic politics of the *Republic* that

is exposed in the *Statesman*. I will explore some political analogies and concepts closely related to the metaphoric system of parricide, which will work as a vehicle to understand the Platonic criticism of Parmenidean metaphysico-political unity and, at the same time, as significant evidence of the self-criticism of the *Republic*'s Parmenidean homogeneity."

246. Lloyd, A. C. 1953. "Falsehood and Significance According to Plato." In *Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy. Vol. 12*, 68–70. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
247. Losev, Alexandre. 2020. "Plato's Quincunxes." *Philosophia: E-Journal for Philosophy and Culture* no. 26:200–209.

Abstract. The Five Greatest Kinds discussed in Plato's *Sophist* are taken to be just one instance of a fivefold structure found in various related texts. Contemporary linguistic theories are a source for ideas about its functioning."

248. Lott, Micah. 2012. "Ignorance, Shame and Love of Truth: Diagnosing the Sophist's Error in Plato's *Sophist*." *Phoenix* no. 66:36–56.

"In the past several decades, philosophers have shown substantial interest in Plato's dialogue the *Sophist*. Much of this interest has focused on the sections of the dialogue which provide an account of being and not-being, and of true and false speech. The sixth definition of the sophist, however, which is developed at 226b–231e, has received less attention." (p. 36, note omitted)

(...)

"I begin with a brief overview of the dialogue and a summary of the argument leading to the sixth definition. I then address some of the ambiguities in that argument and spell out some of the argument's implications, paying particular attention to the notions of ignorance and shame. I then show how ideas from the sixth definition illuminate the final definition of the sophist. Although my focus in this paper is the *Sophist*, in my discussion of the sophist's condition I also touch on some relevant cases of learning and shame from other Platonic dialogues, including the *Apology*, *Charmides*, and the *Republic*. Two key assumptions that affect my interpretation but which remain mostly unargued for are: 1) that the sixth definition describes some kind of expertise, even if it does not accurately describe the sophist, and 2) that the final definition of the sophist is, at least within the context of the dialogue, an adequate definition of the sophist." (p. 37)

249. Lu, Yan. 2024. "Modes of Power and Different Beings in *Sophist* 246a-249d." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 273–281.

Abstract: "This paper re-examines Plato's dynamis proposal in *Sophist* 246a-249d and argues that power is an intrinsic relational property with distinct modes for bodies, forms, and souls—namely, interactional, constitutional, and directional powers. This conclusion challenges the restriction of power to specific beings and shows the need to differentiate

between power bearers. The interpretation rejects the notion of power as a definition or type of being, proposing instead that it serves as a criterion for comparing different beings. Plato's exploration of power does not establish a 'power ontology' but facilitates 'ontological comparison' by highlighting interrelationships among beings with varying modes of power."

250. Luce, J. V. 1969. "Plato on Truth and Falsity in Names." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 19:222–232.

"Further discussion of the logical points at issue between Lorenz-Mittelstrass [*] and Robinson [**] would involve a critique of the modern reference-theory of names. I propose to confine myself to Platonic exegesis, and to ask which of their theories better fits the facts of Plato's thought about names, not only as it appears in the *Cratylus*, but as stated or implied in other dialogues. My general conclusion will be that Plato in practice regards names as functioning in the sort of way required by the Lorenz-Mittelstrass theory, though I would not be prepared to ascribe to Plato a theory of the proposition as sophisticated as that implied in their symbolism (p. 6). In section II of the paper I aim at showing in detail that the concept of 'stating a name', i.e. applying a name as a predicate to its nominate, is fully accepted and used by Plato throughout the *Cratylus*, that this implies that names may be vehicles of truth or falsity, and that there is no reason to suppose that Plato was unhappy or suspicious about the logical validity of the concept of truth/falsity in names. In section III I shall argue that Plato treated names as descriptive predicates in earlier dialogues, and continued to do so in late dialogues, notably in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, and that this is not incompatible with the fact that a doctrine of propositional truth is developed in one section of the *Sophist* (261 d-263 d). In section IV I shall consider briefly how a doctrine of truth-names and lie-names fits into Plato's general conception of the relations between language, truth, and reality." (p. 223)

References

[*] KUno Lorenz, Jürgen Mittelstrass, "On Rational Philosophy of Language: the Programme in Plato's *Cratylus* Reconsidered", *Mind* LXXVI (1967), 6.

[**] Richard Robinson, "The Theory of Names in Plato's *Cratylus*", *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, XXXII, 1955, 1-16.

251. MacIsaac, Gregory. 2024. "The False Appearance of the Sophist Himself in the First Six Definitions of Plato's *Sophist*." *Plato Journal* no. 25:95–117.

Abstract: "The key to how the definitions in *Sophist* fit together is the seventh definition, the maker of false appearances. The first six definitions are a false appearance of the sophist himself, as a businessman who sells an art of disputation to rich young men. Because this is a deception, to unmask him we need to supplement the brief descriptions in *Sophist* from Plato's portraits of sophists in other dialogues. This lets us see his true nature, a predatory hunter for students' money, whose promise of political success

is bait, but whose practice enslaves one to the ignorance and vice of the people."

252. Mahoney, Timothy A. 2015. "Commentary on Planinc." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 31:218–225.

Commentary on Z. Planinc, *Socrates and the Cyclops: Plato's Critique of 'Platonism' in the Sophist and Statesman*.

Abstract: "Zdravko Planinc's Odyssean reading of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* presents a radical critique of claims that these dialogues present developments of Plato's thought. His claim that Plato intends us to see the Stranger as no more than an outrageous sophist, however, is undermined by the quality of at least some of Stranger's arguments and insights."

253. Malabed, Rizalino Noble. 2016. "The Sophist of Many Faces: Difference (and Identity) in *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*." *Φιλοσοφία: International Journal of Philosophy* no. 17:141–154.

Abstract: "One can argue that the problem posed by difference/identity in contemporary philosophy has its roots in the persistent epistemological imperative to be certain about what we know. We find this demand in Plato's *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. But beyond this demand, there is a sense in the earlier dialogue that difference is not a passive feature waiting to be identified. "Difference" points towards an active differentiating. In the *Sophist*, difference appears in the method of dividing and gathering deployed to hunt for the elusive "sophist." Difference is also one of the great kinds that weaves together other kinds. Practically, difference enables the sophist's expertise of appearance-making as he knowingly confuses things with words. This paper then quizzes the concept of difference in all these guises in the two dialogues."

254. Malcolm, John. 1967. "Plato's Analysis of τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν in the *Sophist*." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 12:130–146.

"The main thesis I shall present is that in the *Sophist* Plato does not distinguish the existential sense of εἶναι from the predicative and identifying senses. It is regarded as a commonplace that he did so, (1) but I shall try to show that it is advisable to translate τὸ ὄν and εἶναι in a more general way, as "being" and "to be" respectively. This is sufficient not only to bring out the force of the paradoxes in 236e-250e, but also to explain Plato's use of the expression μέτερον τοῦ ὄντος in 251 a-259 e and his account of τὸ ὄν as a vowel form in the same section." (p. 130)

(...)

"In short, I am suggesting that neither in *Sophist* 251-259 nor in 236e-250e do we need to take τὸ ὄν to be existential. Insofar as it need not be so taken, and in certain places it must not be so taken, it ought to be translated as 'being' rather than as 'existence'." (p. 131)

(...)

"Although I have denied that Plato distinguishes an existential sense of εἶναι, I would agree that he does distinguish positive predication from positive identity. He makes the latter a sub-division of the former.

To say "XpY" is to predicate Y of X. 'X is identical with Y' is written 'XpSrY.' To identify is to predicate sameness.

Plato, however, does not distinguish negative predication from negative identity. At 256e τὸ μὴ ὄν is limited to non-identity (as opposed to predication which is here τὸ ὄν), but at 263b, a parallel phrasing, τὸ μὴ ὄν must include predication (e.g. the flying of Theaetetus).

Plato's account of negation holds only for negative identity. He gives no account of negative predication as such.(30) (p. 145)

(1) Pro Taylor pp. 60, 81; Cornford p. 296; Ackrill p. 1; Moravcsik pp. 42, 51.

Crombie, though he has reservations as to the success of Plato's undertaking, maintains (p. 502) that it was a prime purpose of his to distinguish the existential sense of εἶναι in the *Sophist*. Contra Runciman p. 84.

(30) See Taylor pp. 64-65, also Runciman pp. 98, 101, Crombie p. 500, n. 1. For a dissenting opinion, see Moravcsik pp. 68-75.

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Runciman, W. G., *Plato's Later Epistemology* (Cambridge, 1962).

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Addendum

I note with some satisfaction that my major thesis is consistent with the results attained by Michael Frede in his thorough study *Prädikation und Existenzaussage*. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen, 1967.

255. ———. 1983. "Does Plato Revise his Ontology in *Sophist* 246c-249d?" *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 65:115–127.

"At *Sophist* 248 e—249 a, while examining the doctrine of the Friends of the Forms to the effect that real being or true reality (ἡ ὄντως οὐσία) is always unchanging and is attained by thought alone (248 a), the Eleatic Stranger forcefully poses the rhetorical question whether we can easily be convinced that change, life, soul and intellect are not present to true reality: is that which completely is (το παντελώς ὄν), devoid of mind and changeless? Theaetetus readily agrees that we cannot exclude mind and change from the real. The Stranger

concludes (249 b) that both change and that which is changed qualify as "beings" (οντά), and later (at 249d), that being (reality) is both the unchanging and the changed." (p. 115)

(...)

"Although I am persuaded that the Friends of the Forms include Plato himself, I shall not try to establish this or, indeed, to say definitively how the supposed emendation might apply in detail to Forms, souls and sense-objects. I shall suggest, rather, that the best way to read the passage in question is not to assume that Plato is here categorically affirming metaphysical truths which he endorses, be they at the expense of his earlier views or otherwise. On the contrary, given that we have here a part of a section which aims at showing confusion in the use of the term "being," we cannot plausibly regard it as a source of any new commitments on his part as to the nature of the real." (p. 116)

256. ———. 1985. "Remarks on an Incomplete Rendering of Being in the *Sophist*." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 67:162–165.

"In this journal, Band 65, Heft 1, pp. 1-17, Robert Heinaman has launched an attack on those (1) who have claimed that Plato's solution to the alleged paradox of false statement (*Sophist* 236-264) restricts itself to an incomplete use of "being" (identity and predication) and is not concerned with questions of existence. It is my contention that Heinaman's assault miscarries in that he has totally misjudged the position he purports to oppose."

(1) I consider pages 1-13 of Heinaman's "Being in the *Sophist*". These are directed at G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being, in: G. Vlastos (ed.), *Plato I*, New York 1971, pp. 223-267 and J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν in the *Sophist*", *Phronesis* (1967), pp. 130-46. An appendix, pp. 13-17, treats of M. Frede's *Prädikation und Existenzaussage*, Göttingen 1967 and is beyond the scope of this paper.

257. ———. 1985. "On 'What is Not in any Way' in the *Sophist*." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 35:520–523.

"To ensnare the sophist of the *Sophist* in a definition disclosing him as a purveyor of images and falsehoods Plato must block the sophistical defence that image and falsehood are self-contradictory in concept, for they both embody the proposition proscribed by Parmenides - 'What is not, is'. It has been assumed that Plato regards this defence as depending on a reading of 'what is not' (*to me on*) in its very strongest sense, where it is equivalent to 'what is not in any way' (*to medamos on*) or 'nothing'.

Likewise, the initial paradoxes of not-being (237b-239c) are seen as requiring that *to me on* be understood in this way, that later designated by Plato (257b, 258e-259a) as the opposite of *to on* or 'being'. On this interpretation, Plato's counter-strategy is to recognise a use of *to me on* which is not opposed in this strict sense to being, but is indeed a part of it and is 'being other than'.

In a stimulating article,(1) R. W. Jordan challenges this account.(2) I shall briefly attempt to show that his objections are not decisive and that his own interpretation is open to question." (p. 520)

- (1) R. W. Jordan, 'Plato's Task in the *Sophist*', *Classical Quarterly* 34 (1984), 113-29.

(2) Referred to by Jordan as 'Malcolm's view'. Though flattered by the appellation, I can claim to be but an adherent and not the initiator (see Jordan, p. 120, notes 14 and 15.

258. ————. 2006. "A Way Back for *Sophist* 255c12-13." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 26:275–289.

"At *Sophist* 255c8 the Eleatic Stranger asks whether Difference is to be distinguished from Being. As evidence that these are two distinct items he introduces at c12-13 two ways in which beings can be: (1) in themselves or *αυτά καθ' αυτά* (hereafter, KH) and (2) with reference to others or *προς άλλα* (hereafter, PA).(1)

At 255d1-7 it is then shown that Difference, unlike Being, only shares in the second way of being, since what is different is always different in relation to something else. Now this may be read in a straightforward and unproblematic manner since there are many ways in which something can be said to be without this something being said, in the surface grammar, to be in relation to something else.

Compare, for example, 'Socrates exists' or 'Socrates is a man' with 'Socrates is wiser than Miletus'.

Yet some of the most distinguished and deservedly influential commentators differ radically from such a 'naïve' reading and see the KH/PA contrast here as germane to such issues as replying to the late-learners, dealing with self-predication, contrasting statements of identity with those of predication, involving different uses of 'is', and discussing the so-called 'two-level' paradoxes.(2) There is no doubt that these approaches have been philosophically most instructive and inspiring, but, I shall maintain, they should not intrude into the exegesis of this particular passage. The naïve reading is to be preferred."

(1) Line references to Plato are from Burnet 1900. The title's passage is at lines 13-14 (mislabeled 15!) in Duke et al. 1995. The Budé edition, Diès 1925, agrees with Burnet.

(2) For this last item see Vlastos 1973, 323ff. The most discussed example is that where Motion, *qua* its nature as motion, moves, but, *qua* Form is at rest.

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Vlastos, Gregory. 1973. *Platonic Studies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

259. ————. 2006. "Some Cautionary Remarks on the 'Is' / 'Teaches' Analogy." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 31:281–296.

"Ancient Greek thinkers, notably Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle, are regarded by some as having been led into error through a failure to recognize the difference between two uses of

(their equivalent of) the verb 'to be': the incomplete or copula, and the complete or existential.(1) They allegedly acted as if 'X is F' entailed 'X is', i.e. 'exists'.

Not everyone is convinced by this. I shall consider two responses.

The one I favour is to grant that a rigid existence/copula distinction is a legitimate tool for the interpretation of these philosophers.

Furthermore, I suggest that their reasoning may be understood in a way that does not leave them as vulnerable to the charge of this confusion as is sometimes supposed. The other reaction takes a more subtle approach. It maintains that, with respect to 'being', the complete/incomplete distinction is a modern contrivance,(2) hence it is anachronistic to employ it in addressing the ancients. In the use of the Greek equivalent of 'to be' the copula had some 'built-in' existential import. Since writers in that language did not have two completely different uses to confuse, it is unfair to look at them from this perspective.

Two leading proponents of this latter doctrine are Charles Kahn and Lesley Brown. Although it was introduced some time ago, this view continues to enjoy current endorsement(3) and I believe it is not inappropriate to examine the reasoning offered in its support in the work of Brown, especially that of 1994.(4)" (pp. 281-282, note 1 abbreviated)

(1) The charge is found in J. S. Mill, *A System of Logic* (London, 1843), 1. iv. i, who mentions Plato and Aristotle and implies that they were open to this error. He refers us to the *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, 2 vols. (1829; new edn. London, 1869), by his father James Mill.

(2) See e.g. C. Kahn, 'A Return to the Theory of the Verb be and the Concept of Being' ['Return'], *Ancient Philosophy*, 24 (2004), 381–405 at 385, who allows that we should use 'such modern distinctions' in our 'hermeneutical metalanguage', but that are (i.e. exist).' My aim will be to help him avoid this precarious position as far as is possible.

(3) Let me give two items from 2003: B. Hestir, 'A "Conception" of Truth in Plato's Sophist', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 41 (2003), 1–24 at 6 n. 16 ; J. Szaif, *Der Sinn von 'sein'* (Freiburg and Munich, 2003), 19 n. 13. To these may be added two from 2002: J. van Eck, 'Not-Being and Difference: On Plato's Sophist 256 d 5–258 e 3', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 23 (2002), 63–84 at 70–1; A. Silverman, *The Dialectic of Essence* (Princeton, 2002), 145 n. 17, 150 n. 21.

(4) The article in question is L. Brown, 'The Verb "to be" in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks' ['Verb'], in S. Everson (ed.), *Language* (Companions to Ancient Thought, 3; Cambridge, 1994), 212–36. (Any 'bare' page references in my article will be to this item.) Kahn, 'Return', 383, accepts Brown's contribution unreservedly. He writes, 'She *shows* [emphasis added] that the relation between the verb *einai* in sentences of the form X is and X is Y is like that between the verb teaches in Jane teaches and Jane teaches French'. See also his 385.

260. Marback, Richard C. 1994. "Rethinking Plato's Legacy: Neoplatonic Readings of Plato's *Sophist*." *Rhetoric Review* no. 13:30–49.

"In what follows I will historicize the reception of the terms Platonist and sophist by briefly exploring neo-Platonic discussions of sophistry and sophistic. As late Roman and early

Christian exegetes of the Platonic texts, the neo-Platonists might at first seem unflinching adversaries of sophistry. While it might be unrealistic for us to expect any sympathetic treatment of Gorgias from scholars so invested in the authority of classical authors like Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, we should not be surprised to find these same scholars promoting sophistry-the contingency of meaning in the context of expression -- in the name of Plato." (p. 31)

(...)

"To recognize that Plotinus and Proclus and Augustine discerned and grappled with issues of sophistry raised by Plato in the *Sophist* is, I think, to recognize their creative influence over the subsequent reception and impact of classical rhetoric.

(...)

Along these lines I have attempted to show how the *Sophist*, as one instance, was used and can be used to fashion sophistic or antisophistic perspectives, how readings of it by rhetoricians, logicians, and ethicists, or by Augustine, Plotinus, and Proclus, reiterate or reject an antagonism to sophistry. Reading Plato in this way, I think we benefit from finding that along with the sophist whose language skills eluded easy capture in the Stranger's philosophical net, the neo-Platonist similarly eludes well-defined historical categories. Adding the *Sophist* to our Plato makes more elusive, more sophisticated, the contingent and contextual elements by which we fashion our rhetorical terms as historical, genealogical categories. This approach also raises questions about the kinds of textual strategies that led to the dialogue's exclusion from Plato's rhetorical canon. Discussions of why the primary rhetoric texts in the Platonic corpus have come to be the *Phaedrus* and *Gorgias* can and should inform discussions of what sophistry has meant throughout the years people have been forming this canon. Such selectivity presupposes reading and writing and talking about the dialogues in particular ways, employing strategies and making choices influenced by an inheritance of possible issues and conflicts as well as settled ways of reading and representing that reading that may or may not be identified as "sophistic." Attention to the neo-Platonists and their readings of Plato's *Sophist* thus points not only, as Quandahl says, to the rhetorical elements of Plato (347), such attention points as well to the contextual and contingent rhetorical strategies constantly at work in the shaping of philosophy's, rhetoric's, and sophistry's intertwined histories." (p. 47)

References

Quandahl, Ellen. "What is Plato? Inference and Allusion in Plato's *Sophist*", *Rhetoric Review* 7 (1989): 338-51.

261. Marcos de Pinotti, Graciela Elena. 2016. "Plato's Argumentative Strategies in *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*." In *Plato's Styles and Characters. Between Literature and Philosophy*, edited by Cornelli, Gabriele, 77-87. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"In *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, Plato accomplishes a construction operation of his adversaries which leads him to associate doctrines regularly attributed to Heracliteans or Eleatic thinkers with different sophistic positions. However, his primary purpose is not to refute historical positions, but to assert fundamental theses and principles of his own philosophy. So I am not interested here in evaluating the legitimacy of such associations, or "dialectical combinations", as Cornford (1935, p. 36) calls them. I will focus instead on the peculiar

kind of argument he employs for the refutation of both kinds of opponents. This is a sort of peculiar argumentation, as I will try to show, which does not appeal to the existence of the Forms but to the conditions of the possibility of language." (p. 77)

(...)

"To conclude, I would like to emphasize once more that the resource to the conditions of possibility of language rather than to the thesis of the existence of the Forms is not a defect of the argumentative strategy displayed in the passages of *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* analyzed here. On the contrary, such resource gives rise to a special type of argument that tries to persuade every language user and not only those who defend the Forms. Despite this, Plato's reader will inevitably find veiled references to these realities in almost all of them." (p. 86)

262. Marion, Florian. 2024. "The Late-Learners of the School of Names: *Sph.* 251a8-c6: ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος (the good man) and 白馬 (white horse)." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 227–236.

Abstract: "The focus of this contribution is on the 'late-learners' digression. In *Sph.* 251a8-c6, the Eleatic Stranger briefly discusses the view of some 'young and old late-learners' who hold that, from a logico-metaphysical point of view, unlike 'a man is a man' or 'a good is good', the statement 'a man is good' is neither a well-formed nor a grammatical sentence. Usually, modern commentators devote little energy to interpreting this passage since they are content to note that it suffices to discriminate identity and predication to avoid the sophism. The aim of this paper is to show that the position of the 'late-learners' is in fact more subtle than it seems, since it is widely open to many readings, and that the chosen reading of the digression has a direct impact on the general interpretation of the rest of the dialogue (communication of kinds, semantic distinction between names and verbs, etc.). To this end, the view of the 'late-learners' will be compared with a similar position discussed in a quite different philosophical ecosystem: the White-Horse Paradox forged by Gōngsūn Lóng, a dialectician of the 'School of Names'. This paradox states that the sentence 'a white horse is not a horse' is true. Many readings of the White-Horse Paradox have been offered: some of these readings are the same as those suggested for the 'late-learners' view, but others are absent from the scholarly literature, although they provide interesting insights into the interpretation of *Sph.* 251a8-c6. "

263. Marongiu, Laura. 2024. "The Quadratic Division in Plato's *Sophist* 265e-266d." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica*:591–603.

Abstract: "In Plato's *Sophist*, the Stranger proposes a division *more geometrico* by cutting the productive art widthwise and lengthwise (265e8-266d7). In this paper, I shall reconstruct the often-neglected mathematical background of this complex διαίρεσις. By laying emphasis on its two-dimensional, quadratic structure, I shall argue that this division is not – strictly speaking – dichotomous but represents some sort of deviation from the bifurcation pattern widely employed elsewhere. Besides exploring the advantages of choosing an alternative pattern of division from a methodological point of view, I shall assess the role of the quadratic division within the broader context of the final division and definition of the sophist."

264. Matthen, Mohan. 1983. "Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 28:113–135.

Abstract: "This is an essay about the ontological presuppositions of a certain use of 'is' in Greek philosophy - I shall describe it in the first part and present a hypothesis about its semantics in the second.

I believe that my study has more than esoteric interest. First, it provides an alternative semantic account of what Charles Kahn has called the 'is' of truth, thereby shedding light on a number of issues in Greek ontology, including an Eleatic paradox of change and Aristotle's response to it.

Second, it finds in the semantics of Greek a basis for admitting what have been called 'non-substantial individuals' or 'immanent characters' into accounts of Greek ontology. Third, it yields an interpretation of Aristotle's talk of 'unities' which is crucial to his treatment of substance in the central books of the *Metaphysics*."

(...)

"I have argued in this essay for the recognition of a sort of entity that is not familiar in modern ontologies. I have argued on the basis of a syntactic and semantic analysis of certain uses of 'is', and found textual support for the analysis in certain texts of Aristotle. In addition, the recognition of predicative complexes enables us to give a unified treatment of a number of puzzling features of Greek ontology.

It is possible that the Greeks may have regarded predicative complexes not in the way I have presented them, namely as constructed entities derivative from more basic types, but as the entities given in perception, and so epistemically and even ontologically prior. If so, we may find that in positing the Forms, Plato was making a break with an ontology of predicative complexes, not, as is usually thought, with an ontology of individual substances. Similarly, it is possible that Aristotle posited individual substances against the background of an ontology composed of predicative complexes and Platonic Forms. These possibilities offer the prospect of a richer appreciation of the development of Greek ontology than is now customary." (pp. 130-131)

265. Matthews, Gareth B. 2023. *Why Plato Lost Interest in the Socratic Method*. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan.

Edited by S. Marc Cohen.

Chapter 10: *Philosophy Professionalized*: Sophist, 101-114.

Abstract: "Plato still believes that the elenchus is valuable as a method for cleansing one's mind of the belief that one knows things one does not know. But there are both internal and external limitations in what the elenchus can be reasonably expected to accomplish. And Plato also thought that philosophy can do more to get beyond those limitations. Only by going beyond the elenctic method will we be able to adequately address the foundational questions of philosophy."

266. Mazur, Zeke. 2013. "The Platonizing Sethian Gnostic Interpretation of Plato's *Sophist*." In *Practicing Gnosis: Ritual, Magic, Theurgy and Liturgy in Nag Hammadi, Manichaean and Other Ancient Literature. Essays in Honor of Birger A. Pearson*, edited by DeConick, April D. , Shaw, Gregory and Turner, John D. , 469–493. Leiden: Brill.

"This essay constitutes the second part of a larger investigation into the evidence of a tacit debate between Plotinus and the Gnostics over the interpretation of Plato. In a previous part of this study, I made the case that Zostrianos drew on a number of specific passages describing the cyclical reincarnation of souls especially in the *Phaedrus*, but also in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, and that Plotinus and Porphyry had tacitly responded in several locations throughout their writings.(4) Here I would like to present a similar case for the Gnostic use of the *Sophist*. The specific thesis of this essay is that the Platonizing Sethians drew at least in part upon the text of Plato's *Sophist* for central aspects of their metaphysics, and—in relation to the topic of the present volume—they even went so far as to reconceptualize the dialectical methods described in the *Sophist* in terms of their praxis of visionary ascent." (pp. 469-470)

(4) Mazur, Zeke. 2016. Traces of the Competition Between the Platonizing Sethian Gnostics and Plotinus' Circle: the Case of Zostrianos 44–46. In *Estratégias anti-gnósticas nos escritos de Plotino. Actas do colóquio internacional realizado em São Paulo em 18–19 de março 2012*, M.P. Marsola and L. Ferroni, eds. São Paulo: Rosari et Paulus, pp. 125-211.

267. McCoy, Marina. 2008. *Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments VII; 1 Introduction 1; 02 Elements of Gorgianic Rhetoric and the Forensic Genre in Plato's *Apology* 23; 3 The Rhetoric of Socratic Questioning in the *Protagoras* 56; 4 The Competition between Philosophy and Rhetoric in the *Gorgias* 85; 5 The Dialectical Development of the Philosopher and Sophist in the *Republic* 111; 6 Philosophers, Sophists, and Strangers in the *Sophist* 138; 7 Love and Rhetoric in Plato's *Phaedrus* 167; Bibliography 197; Index 209-212.

"In this chapter, I argue that part of Plato's purpose in the *Sophist* and *Theaetetus* is to offer two different accounts of the nature of philosophy.

Plato engages his audience in a reflection upon the nature of philosophy through the contrast between Socrates' and the Stranger's ways of speaking. I focus on two main questions about the *Sophist*. First, how is the Stranger's character and way of speaking distinct from Socrates' character and speech in the *Theaetetus*? Second, how do the divisions and collections of the *Sophist* illuminate some of the differences between Socrates and the Stranger? I argue that the Eleatic Stranger is deliberately presented as an enigmatic figure who may alternately be identified as either a sophist or a philosopher. While the Stranger defines sophistry in such a way that he would separate his own activity from that of the sophists, the drama of the dialogue suggests that Socrates would not consider the Stranger to be a philosopher. That is, the dialogues function to draw us into the philosophical question of what philosophy is. The *Sophist* and *Theaetetus* as a pair demonstrate that the philosopher–sophist contrast is relative to the way in which one constructs a positive understanding of philosophy.

I argue that the Stranger's understanding of himself as a philosopher is inadequate from Socrates' standpoint, although the Stranger seems to identify himself as a philosopher. While the Stranger identifies philosophy with a method of division and collection, and especially with applying that method to metaphysical questions, Socrates emphasizes self-knowledge and knowledge of the human soul and its moral good as central to philosophical practice.⁴ Both Socrates and the Stranger are interested in persuasion, but Socrates' rhetoric is to be found in the role of a midwife who is helping others to give birth to ideas and to

grow in self-knowledge, while the Stranger's rhetoric is oriented toward making his interlocutor more compliant and dispassionate." (pp. 139-140, notes omitted)

268. McDowell, John. 1982. "Falsehood and Not-Being in Plato's *Sophist*." In *Language and Logos. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen*, edited by Schofield, Malcolm and Nussbaum, Martha, 115–134. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"For me, G. E. L. Owen's 'Plato on Not-Being' (1971) radically improved the prospects for a confident overall view of its topic. Hitherto, passage after passage had generated reasonable disagreement over Plato's intentions, and the disputes were not subject to control by a satisfying picture of his large-scale strategy; so that the general impression, as one read the *Sophist*, was one of diffuseness and unclarity of purpose. By focusing discussion on the distinction between otherness and contrariety (257B1-C4), Owen showed how, at a stroke, a mass of confusing exegetical alternatives could be swept away, and the dialogue's treatment of not-being revealed as a sustained and tightly organised assault on a single error. In what follows, I take Owen's focusing of the issue for granted, and I accept many of his detailed conclusions. Where I diverge from Owen - in particular over the nature of the difficulty about falsehood that Plato tackles in the *Sophist* (§§5 and 6 below) - it is mainly to press further in the direction he indicated, in the interest of a conviction that the focus can and should be made even sharper." (p. 115)

269. McPherran, Mark L. 1986. "Plato's Reply to the 'Worst Difficulty' Argument of the *Parmenides*: *Sophist* 248a- 249d." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 68:233–252.

"In a previous paper I have argued that the theory of relations Hector-Neri Castañeda has discovered in the *Phaedo* is clarified and extended in the *Parmenides*. In particular, the paper contains an Interpretation of the 'worst difficulty' argument (*Parm.* 133a —135a), an argument purporting to establish that human knowledge of the Forms is impossible. My Interpretation showed the argument to utilize the extended theory of relations in its premises. I also showed, contrary to previous interpretations, how Plato's argument was logically valid.

One consideration in favor of the Interpretation I offered is that it allows the argument at last to live up to its description as the most formidable challenge to the early theory of Forms (in a long *series* of tough arguments), requiring a "long and remote train of argument" by "a man of wide experience and natural ability" for its unsoundness to be exposed (*Parm.* 133b4 —c1).

Unfortunately, the *Parmenides* does not contain such a reply, even though the text at 133b seems to hint that Plato had already formulated one. Did he ever entertain and record a reply, and if so, could that reply rescue some version of the theory of Forms from the devastating consequences of the 'worst difficulty'? In the following, I present my previous reconstruction of that argument and the most plausible lines of response open to a defender of a theory of Forms. In the second section I argue that Plato gives clear recognition to one of those replies in the *Sophist*, and I show how that reply would save the theory of Forms. Finally, I will contend that this reply is Plato's best line of response, and I will discuss the problem of actually attributing the adoption of this solution to him." (pp. 233-234, some notes omitted)

(1) Mark McPherran, "Plato's Parmenides Theory of Relations," in F. J. Pelletier and J. King-Farlow (eds.), *New Essays on Plato, Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplementary Volume IX (1983): 149 — 164 (hereafter, "Plato's Parmenides Theory").

(2) My Interpretation dealt explicitly only with the first half of the argument (133a11 — 134c3). The second half (134c4—135a3) attempts to establish that just as men cannot know Forms, so the gods cannot be knowers of particulars (e. g., men), but only Forms.

References to Hector-Neri Castañeda:

"Plato's Phaedo Theory of Relations," *Journal of Philosophical Logic* I (1972): 467—480.

"Plato's Relations, Not Essences or Accidents, at Phaedo 102b — d2," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 1 (1978): 39 — 53.

"Leibniz and Plato's Phaedo Theory of Relations and Predication," M. Hooker (ed.). *Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays* (Minneapolis, 1982): 124—159.

270. Mesquita, Antonio Pedro. 2013. "Plato's Eleaticism in the *Sophist*. The Doctrine of Non-Being." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 175–186. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"The aporia experienced by the interlocutors in the *Sophist* on the notion of non-being is, essentially, the following:

1. That which absolutely is not cannot be thought of or spoken of (238c).
2. However, every assertion concerning that which is not, even if negative in content, requires the mediation of an "is" in order to be expressed.
3. In effect, when we say that non-being is not thinkable or utterable, we are, in actual fact, uttering it and, necessarily, uttering it as being, namely, as being unutterable (239a).
4. Therefore, due not to linguistic ambiguity but to ontological requirement, to say that non-being is not utterable is the same as asserting that it is unutterable and, in general, to say that non-being is not is to say that non-being is non-being, which certainly collides with what those assertions were intended to demonstrate in the first place, that is, the absolute unutterability and the absolute non-being of non-being.
5. In fact, each of those assertions tacitly affirms the opposite of what it declares, namely, that non-being is utterable (precisely as being unutterable) and, therefore, that non-being is (precisely as being nonbeing).

The most immediate interpretation of this section would be as follows: the Eleatic notion of non-being, here patently challenged, must be superseded; and the Platonic notion of "other" (ἑτέρων), introduced through the novel doctrine of the κοινωσίᾳ τῶν εἰδῶν, is exactly what supersedes it.

Such an interpretation has, however, the disadvantage of being external to the argument, replacing analysis of its internal progress with the abstract assumption of the two extreme moments that structure it, namely, the two different notions of non-being. As an act of

supersession, it excludes the Eleatic notion of non-being to the benefit of the Platonic one, without realizing that every act of supersession is never simply one of negation, but also one of incorporation.

Now, this is precisely what happens with the question of non-being in the *Sophist*.

The Eleatic notion is not dissolved; it is, rather, interpreted in the light of another conception of non-being which, in absorbing it, refashions it into a different shape.

The peremptory interdiction of Parmenides, according to which non-being is not,⁽¹⁾ is never actually refuted: it is taken as possessing its own truth, although such truth is understood as limited, and confined within new boundaries." (pp. 175-176)

(1) In summary form, for the exact statement never appears as such. See DK B 2.5 – 8, B 6. 2, B 7. 1, etc.

271. Michaelides, C. P. 1975. "The concept of not-being in Plato." *Diotima. Review of Philosophical Research* no. 3:19–26.

272. Mié, Fabian. 2011. "Plato's *Sophist* on Negation and Not-Being." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 363–372. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

Summary: "This brief paper develops an interpretation of Plato's theory of negation understood as an answer to Parmenides' paradoxes concerning not-being. First, I consider some aspects that result from an analysis of *Sophist* 257b–259d, formulating some general theses which I then go on to unfold in more detail in the following section. Finally, I show what exactly Plato's so-called overcoming of the Eleatic problem related to negation and falsehood is; and I outline some of the main semantic and metaphysical consequences that are entailed by this overcoming."

273. Migliori, Maurizio. 2007. *Plato's Sophist: Value and Limitation on Ontology*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

Five lessons followed by a discussion with Bruno Centrone, Arianna Fermani, Lucia Palpacelli, Diana Quarantotto.

Original Italian edition: *Il Sofista di Platone. Valore e limiti dell'ontologia*, Brescia: Morcelliana 2006.

Contents: Preface p. 9; First Lecture – Plato's Writings and Dialectical Dialogues p. 11; Contents: Preface p. 9; First Lecture – Plato's Writings and Dialectical Dialogues p. 11; Second Lecture – The Sophist's Manifold Nature p. 29; Third Lecture – The driving force of Plato's Philosophy p. 51; Fourth Lecture – Ontology and Meta-ideas p. 69; Fifth Lecture – The relative importance of the *Sophist* p. 93; Appendix I – The Whole-Part relation in the *Parmenides* and the *Theaetetus* p. 103; Appendix II – The Doing-Suffering Pair p. 121; Appendix III – The Dialectics of Being in the *Parmenides* (161 E - 162 B) p. 125; Exchanges with the Author 127-206.

"The Philosophical Contents of the Sophist.

First of all, one should establish as closely as possible the meaning of the dialogue in its Author's mind. With Plato this task is far from easy, for it is one of the issues that arouses the liveliest debate among critics. As elsewhere, I suggest following the classification put forward by Szlezák (1) in an attempt to single out three elements in the dialogue:

- a) The overriding issue, the aggregating force that breathes life into the text and which Plato never lets his readers forget about;
- b) The thematic hub of the writing, the philosophically crucial question which assesses the worth of the overriding issue and/or confers it legitimate meaning;
- c) The foremost problem which the argumentative development must grapple with.

This model has always appeared to me as capable of yielding some kind of clarifying effect. It is especially helpful in showing how the various facets of the discourse are not set alongside one another but necessarily recall each other. The aim is to identify three elements, strongly-linked yet not mutually coinciding, among the wealth of opinions in Plato's text. Weaving them into one another will provide us with the thread that can guide us through the dialogue." (pp. 93-94)

(1) T. A. Szlezák, *Come leggere Platone*, Rusconi, Milano 1991, pp. 126-127. [in English: Thomas A. Szlezák, *Reading Plato*, Translated by Graham Zanker, New York: Routledge 2003].

274. ————. 2021. "The Use and Meaning of the Past in Plato." *Plato Journal* no. 21:43–58.

Abstract: "This essay is based on two premises. The first concerns the vision of writing proposed by Plato in *Phaedrus* and especially the conception of philosophical writing as a maieutic game.

The structurally polyvalent way in which Plato approaches philosophical issues also emerges in the dialogues. The second concerns the birth and the development of historical analysis in parallel with the birth of philosophy.

On this basis the text investigates a series of data about the relationship between Plato and "the facts".

- 1) If we compare the *Apology of Socrates* with other sources, we discover a series of important "games" that Plato performs to achieve the results he proposes.
- 2) The famous passage of *Phd.* 96A-102A, which concludes with the Ideas and with a reference to the Principles, expresses definite judgments on the Presocratics.
- 3) In his works Plato attributes to the sophists some merits, even if the outcome of their contribution is overall negative.
- 4) However, in the fourth complicated diairesis of the *Sophist*, there is a "sophist of noble stock", an educator who can only be Socrates.

5) Plato in the *Sophist* shows the weakness of the Gigantomachy, and proposes an adequate definition of the beings: the power of undergoing or acting. This reveals, before the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus*, the dynamic and dialectical nature of his philosophy

In summary, a multifocal vision emerges, adapted to an intrinsically complex reality."

275. Miller, Dana. 2004. "Fast and Loose about Being: Criticism of Competing Ontologies in Plato's *Sophist*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 24:339–363.

"In the *Sophist*, in the context of an argument designed to demonstrate that being (τὸ ὄν) is as puzzling as non-being, the Eleatic Visitor embarks on a discussion of competing views about being. It is generally thought that this discussion (242b6-250e4) establishes a number of significant claims that are made in the course of the Visitor's argument. The argument proceeds on two levels: (i) a general argument that focuses on what the Visitor regards to be a muddle about being and the consequences of this muddle, and (ii) specific arguments against specific views, where these arguments seek both (a) to refute these views and (b) to shed light on the muddle and consequences that are the concern of (i). Scholarship has been largely concerned with the claims made under (iia), as for example, the claim made in the argument against the Friends of the Forms that the objects of knowledge are somehow moved or changed by their being known. My intent, however, is chiefly to set out (i), the general argument, and then to examine the particular arguments from the perspective of (iib), that is, how these arguments relate to the general argument. Yet to get at (iib), it is necessary to examine the Visitor's arguments in some detail and this requires approaching them from the perspective of (iia). Because the claims made in the discussion should be understood with reference to their context, I begin by situating the general argument within the larger argument of the *Sophist* and explain the dialectical purpose that the discussion is meant to serve. Then, in brief, I argue that the puzzle about being derives from muddled thinking about the notion of being and that this muddled thinking lies at the base of the various earlier views about being that the Visitor undertakes to refute. To show how this is the case, I examine the argument against these views." (p. 339)

276. Miller, Mitchell. 2016. "What the Dialectician Discerns: a new reading of *Sophist* 253d-e." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 36:321–352.

"At *Sophist* 253d-e the Eleatic Visitor offers a notoriously obscure schematic description of the kinds of eidetic field that the philosopher practicing dialectic 'adequately discerns' (ικανῶς διαισθάνεται, 253d7). My aim is to propose a fresh reading of that obscure passage. For all of their impressive thoughtfulness and ingenuity, the major lines of interpretation pursued so far have missed, I will argue, the full context of the passage. As a consequence, the proponents of these lines *Statesman* of interpretation have failed to avail themselves of resources that would have freed them from otherwise unavoidable moments of force or neglect in their readings. The key is to recognize the place of the *Sophist* within the trilogy of the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and, accordingly, to expand the context of *Sophist* 253d-e to include the *Theaetetus* and the *Statesman*. In his schematic description at *Sophist* 253d-e, the Visitor refers to the eidetic fields traced by two distinct modes of logos. At the end of the *Theaetetus*, Socrates offers anticipatory sketches of each of these modes; but in the body of the *Sophist* the Visitor restricts his practice of dialectic to just one of the two—only in the second half of the *Statesman* does he take up the other mode. As a consequence, only a reader who is oriented by the close of the *Theaetetus* and who lets this orientation guide her in a reading of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* together is well positioned to recognize the referents of the Visitor's remarks at *Sophist* 253d-e." (p. 321)

277. Mohr, Richard D. 1982. "The Relation of Reason to Soul in the Platonic Cosmology: "Sophist" 248e-249c." *Apeiron* no. 16:21–26.

Reprinted as Chapter X in R. D. Mohr, *The Platonic Cosmology*, Leiden: Brill, 1985, pp. 178-183.

"Since Cherniss' *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy I*, there has been nearly universal agreement among critics that Plato's God or divine Demiurge is a soul.(1) Yet the *prima facie* evidence is that the Demiurge is not. In all three of Plato's major cosmological works the *Timaeus*, the *Statesman* myth, and the *Philebus* (28c-30e), the Demiurge is fairly extensively described and yet not once is he described as a soul. Rather souls, and especially the World-Soul, and what rationality souls have are viewed as products of the Demiurge (*Timaeus* 35a, 36d-e, *Philebus* 30c-d, *Statesman* 269c-d). Nonetheless, the overwhelming critical opinion is that since the demiurgic God of these works is described as rational, this entails that God is a soul. Three texts are adduced to prove this, *Timaeus* 30b3, *Philebus* 30c9-10, and *Sophist* 249a. These texts are taken as claiming A) that if a thing is rational, then it is a soul. Proclus saw that at least the *Timaeus* passage can mean only B) that when reason is in something else, what it is in must be an ensouled thing. The rhetoric of the *Timaeus* sentence strongly suggests that reading B is correct and the argumentative context of the *Philebus* sentence (properly understood) requires sense B. This leaves (as Cherniss is willing to admit, *ACPA*, p. 606) the *Sophist* passage alone as bearing the whole weight of Plato's alleged commitment to the view A) that everything that is rational is a soul. I wish to give a new, tentative interpretation to this passage which shows that it is, like the *Timaeus* and *Philebus*, committed only to the weaker claim B) that when reason is in something, it is so along with soul. This leaves the Demiurge who is not in anything free to be rational without being a soul and to serve rather as a maker of souls." (p. 21, notes omitted)

(1) H.F. Cherniss, *ACPA* I (Baltimore, 1944), appendix XI, which is in part an attack on Hackforth's "Plato's Theism" (1936) rpt. in R.E. Allen (ed.), *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics* (London, 1965), pp. 439-447.

278. Mojsisch, Burkhard. 1998. "Logos and Episteme. The Constitutive Role of Language in Plato's Theory of Knowledge." *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* no. 3:19–28.

Abstract: "This essay first differentiates the various meanings of the term *logos* as it appears in Plato's dialogues *Theaetetus* and *The Sophist*. These are: the colloque of the soul with itself, a single sentence, a proposing aloud, the enumeration of the constitutive elements of a whole and the giving of a specific difference; further, opinion and imagination. These meanings are then related to Plato's determination of knowledge (*episteme*) and therewith truth and falsity. One can be said to possess knowledge only when the universal contents of thought -- dialogical thought -- are set in relation to the perceivable, imagination or opinion. Reflections on the principle significance of possibility as such -- a thematic not addressed by Plato -- conclude the essay."

279. Monserrat Molas, Josep, and Sandoval Villarroel, Pablo. 2013. "Plato's Enquiry Concerning the Sophist as a Way Towards "Defining" Philosophy." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 29–39. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"The *Sophist* discloses the urgency of the question concerning being, and it is only in *pondering this question that the essence of philosophising comes to light and is realised*. In other words, the dialogue does not deal with the question of being simply because the problem of the sophist requires that it do so, but rather it deals and has to deal with the question concerning being in that its fundamental concern, its σκοπός, which consists in moving towards the essence of philosophy, not by way of a formal, abstract "definition", but rather through the consummation of philosophising.

For this reason the Stranger of Elea later on poses the question: καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνηυρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον [253c8 – 9], "and have we unwittingly found the philosopher while we were looking for the sophist?". Who, then, is the philosopher?

He is that human being who has devoted himself fully, through thinking, to enquiring again and again into the essence of being: ὁ δὲ γε φιλόσοφος, τῆ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ιδέα [254a8 – 9]." (pp. 38-39, note omitted)

280. Moravcsik, Julius M. E. 1958. "Mr. Xenakis on Truth and Meaning." *Mind* no. 67:533–537.

"In a somewhat breathless article Mr. J. Xenakis has presented us with a new interpretation of Plato's theory of truth and meaning in *Sophist*, pp. 260-263.(1) In this brief note I shall show that the theory which Xenakis champions is objectionable, and toward the end I shall suggest that Plato need not be burdened with it. Xenakis claims that all statements must satisfy four rules. According to the third of these, all statements - if they are to be statements - must be about something.(2) Little can be found in the article that pertains to the status of the four rules. We are told, however, that two of them are formation rules, and two are truth-conditions. Since Xenakis insists that all statements must satisfy the truth-conditions, one can assume that he excludes the possibility of there being statements which are neither true nor false. I am not sure whether he would go on to say that any utterance which does not satisfy one of the truth-conditions is meaningless. It may be that he would restrict himself to maintaining that if any utterance does not meet one of the truth-conditions, then meaningful as it may be, it cannot be true or false - and hence it cannot be a statement. In order to be on the safe side, I shall examine rule [3] first as a criterion of meaningfulness, and then as a mere truth-condition." (p. 533)

(1) *Mind* (April 1957), pp. 165-172.

(2) *Ibid.* pp. 168-169.

281. ———. 1960. "ΣΥΜΠΛΟΚΗ ΕΙΔΩΝ and the Genesis of ΛΟΓΟΣ." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 42:117–129.

"Διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν [For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another. (Translation added)] (*Sophist* 259e5—6)*. In these lines Plato states that rational discourse is made possible by the interwovenness of the Forms. The task of the Interpreter is to discover what the nature of this interwovenness is, and to ascertain the exact nature of the relationship between the interwovenness of the Forms and the structure of rational discourse. At present there is considerable disagreement concerning these issues. In this paper the main difficulties of 259e5—6 will be outlined, and some recent attempts to

overcome these difficulties will be surveyed. It will be indicated where and why I dissent from the positions taken by several contemporary authors, and a new Interpretation will be presented which attempts to show that a plurality of Forms, woven into a pattern, underlies each meaningful sentence, and that the interwovenness can be explained by reference to formal concepts. The importance which — in my opinion — Plato attaches to formal concepts in the *Sophist* has implications for the Interpretation of the theory of Forms as found in the later dialogues." (p. 117)

(...)

"In conclusion let me sum up the most important implications of what Plato says in 259e5—6. Plato believes that the changing dynamic combination of words, yielding meaningful discourse, is based on the static interwovenness of the Forms. For discourse is changing, man-made; and the language of 262d2—6 shows that Plato regards it s such. But he also believes that one of the essential tasks of meaningful discourse is to convey Information. Fundamental to the conveying of Information is the ability to order the elements of reality according to concepts (23). What makes this ordering possible, according to Plato, is the general fact that the elements of reality are identifiable and describable." (p. 129)

(*) Burnet's numbering of lines is followed throughout the paper.

282. ————. 1962. "Being and Meaning in the *Sophist*." *Acta Philosophica Fennica* no. 14:23–78.

From the Conclusion: "Communion and interweaving are the key concepts of the *Sophist*. They are used on two levels; the ontological and the semantic. The two are not sharply separated, and each helps to explain the other. The Communion of the Forms parallels the interwovenness of words, and thus 253-256 parallels 260-262. A similar parallel and relations of dependence are presented between the discussions of Not-being and falsehood. Thus 257-258 and 263 go together. This interrelatedness not only brings out the nature of Plato's philosophizing in this period, but it also presents the interpreter with the task of working out the whole passage as a unit, for the interpretations of the parts are interdependent. This justifies and necessitates my lengthy analysis.

Plato's arguments show that truth and falsehood are not matters of mental sight or blindness. Thus one should not conceive of the objects of knowledge as self-sufficient atomic units. Philosophical atomism is denied on all levels. The paradigm-case of how *not to* read Plato therefore is: "each element in the statement has now a meaning; and so the statement as a whole has meaning". (1) The notion of Communion and the analogy with vowels lead to the conception of the Forms as functions, as something incomplete, something which need arguments in order really to express something. At least some of the Forms are shown to be like functions in this dialogue. If we are willing to pursue Plato's line of thought beyond the point to which it is carried in the dialogue, we see that what Plato says leads to construing all Forms as functions. For what we know are truths and falsehoods, and these are complexes which contain Forms. The constituents of these complexes are not 'simples', or metaphysical atoms of some sort. In order to understand them we have to know into what complexes they fit. We do not grasp them prior to all completions.

It is small wonder that modern commentators of this dialogue have not made much progress with it. They approach it with the 'part-sum, division-collection, genus-species' distinctions in mind. Merely because one aspect of dialectic is said to be the method of division they

identify all of Plato's methodology with this notion, and seek to explain the middle part of the *Sophist* within this framework. But these are the wrong tools and the wrong questions. When seen in proper light, the suggestions of the *Sophist* present themselves as topics the further exploration of which is one of the more important philosophical tasks today." (p. 77-78)

(1) F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato translated with a running commentary*, p. 315.

283. Morgan, Michael L. 1993. "'Philosophy' in Plato's *Sophist*." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 9:83–111.

"In this paper I want to use a different approach to understand Plato's primary task in the *Sophist*. I want to ask a rather large set of questions about the dialogue. These questions arise out of the dialogue when it is viewed in terms of its relation to the *Theaetetus* and *Politicus*, to issues Plato discusses in the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Phaedrus*, and to a consideration of Plato's place in fourth century Athenian culture. Once I have stated these questions and clarified them, I shall consider how the *Sophist* might be taken to answer them. All of this will be somewhat programmatic and provisional. The *Sophist* is a puzzling, demanding, complex text, and to make my case regarding the issues I have in mind would require much more evidence, interpretation, and argument than I can provide here. This is a beginning, with a promissory note for future development.

The questions that I want to ask about the *Sophist* are these: where, in the dialogue, do we find what Plato would think of as philosophy? Where - if anywhere - does he engage in it? Where does he refer to it or describe it, either directly or indirectly?

Who is a philosopher in the *Sophist*-Socrates, the visitor from Elea, Plato, all or none of these? And why does Plato here seek to articulate what sophistry is and how it differs from philosophy?" (p. 84)

(...)

"Philosophy, then, differs from sophistry in purpose—as well as in method and object, for philosophy is essential to the best human life. It is a form of intellectual and religious transcendence that is divine because its objects are divine and hence because its cognitive goal is pure, permanent, and comprehensive.

As the philosopher's understanding of the map of the world of Forms increases, so does the clarity, purity, and stability of the soul.

To Isocrates Parmenides is a sophist; to Plato he is a philosopher and divine, epithets that transfer to his followers, one a visitor to Athens, another Plato himself. Eleatic in spirit, the visitor advocates views that are Platonic in letter, for Plato is himself an Athenian with Eleatic convictions, and like the visitor a parricide and disciple all at once." (p. 110)

284. Morgenstern, Amy S. 2001. "Leaving the Verb 'To Be' Behind: An Alternative Reading of Plato's *Sophist*." *Dionysius* no. 19:27–50.

"Equating the terms *esti*, *to on*, and *ta onta* with the verb "to be", understood existentially, predicatively, or as an identity sign, cannot serve as a basis of an illuminating approach to

the Eleatic Stranger's investigation in Plato's *Sophist*. An alternative reading of *esti* at 256 A 1, *Esti de ghe dia to methexein tou ontos*, allows a more comprehensive analysis of the limitations and accomplishments of this investigation. Here *esti* should be interpreted as *rhema*, i.e. a name that, in this instance, says something about *kinesis*, the implied subject."

285. Mourelatos, Alexander. 1979. "'Nothing' as 'Not-Being': Some Literary Contexts that Bear on Plato." In *Arktouros. Hellenic studies presented to Bernard M. W. Knox on the occasion of his 65th birthday*, edited by Bowersock, Glen, Burkert, Walter and Putnam, Michael, 319–329. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Reprinted in: J. P. Anton, A. Preus (eds.), *Essays in Ancient Greek philosophy*, Volume Two, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983, pp. 59-69.

"It has often been noticed that Plato, and before him Parmenides, assimilates "what is not" (*to me ón*) to "nothing" (*medén* or *oudén*).¹ Given that the central use of "nothing" has important ties with the existential quantifier ("Nothing is here" ---- "It is not the case that there is anything here"), it has widely been assumed that contexts that document this assimilation also count as evidence that both within them and in cognate ontological contexts the relevant sense of "being" or "to be" is that of existence. That this assumption is not to be granted easily, has been compellingly argued by G. E. L. Owen [*Plato on Not-being*, 1971]. His main concern was to show that the assumption is particularly mischievous in the interpretation of the *Sophist*, where he found it totally unwarranted. My own concern is to attack the assumption on a broader plane. "Nothing" in English has uses that do not depend on a tie with the existential quantifier. So too in Greek: *medén* or *oudén* can be glossed as "what does not exist," but it can also be glossed as "not a something," or in Owen's formulation, "what is not anything, what not-in-any-way is': a subject with all the being knocked out of it and so unidentifiable, no subject." In effect, the assimilation of "what is not" to "nothing" may-in certain contexts-work in the opposite direction: not from "nothing" to "non-being" in the sense of non-existence; rather from "non-being" as negative specification or negative determination to "nothing" as the extreme of negativity or indeterminacy. To convey the sense involved in this reverse assimilation I borrow Owen's suggestive translation "not-being" for *me on*, a rendering which makes use of an incomplete participle, rather than the complete gerund, of the verb "to be"." (p. 59 of the reprint)

(...)

"Observations made in this paper can be read as providing support, in yet a different way, for a thesis advanced by Charles H. Kahn (22) and others. In a formulation I prefer, the thesis is that the dialectic of Being in classical Greek speculation focuses not on "What there is" but on "What it is" or "How it is"; not on existence but on *physis*, constitution, or form. (23)" (p. 67 of the reprint)

(22) See "Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy," *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos.* 58 (1976): 323-34; cf. Kahn, *The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek*, *Foundations of Language*, suppl. ser., 16 (Dordrecht and Boston, 1973): 394-419.

286. Mouzala, Melina. 2019. "Logos as "weaving together or communion of indications about ousia" in Plato's *Sophist*." *Platonic Investigations* no. 10:35–75.

Abstract: "In this paper, we set out to show that in the *Sophist* the interweaving of Forms (*sumplokē tōn eidōn*) is the substantial presupposition of the existence of logos, because

what we do when we think and produce vocal speech is understanding by our *dianoia* the way in which the Forms are interwoven, and what we weave together in our speech are indications about ousia (*peri tēn ousian delōmata*). *Dianoia* conceives of the relations between the Forms, and these relations are reflected in our thought and its natural image, vocal speech. We support the idea that we cannot interpret the Platonic conception of the relationship between language and reality through the Aristotelian semiotic triangle, because according to it the relation between *pragmata* or *onta* and *logos* becomes real through the medium of thought (*noēmata*). On the contrary, *logos* in Plato has an unmediated relation with reality and is itself reckoned among beings.

In parallel, we set out to show the difference between the Platonic conception of *logos* and the Gorgianic approach to it, as well as the approaches of other Sophists and Antisthenes.

Logos itself in Plato is a weaving which reflects the interweaving of Forms, while vocal speech is a natural image of thought. *Logos* in its dual meaning, *dianoia* and vocal speech, is illustrated in Dialectic, because as vocal speech is a mirror to *dianoia*, so Dialectic is a means which clearly reflects the thinking procedures of *dianoia*."

287. Mouzala, Melina G. 2023. "Pursuing Self-Knowledge in Plato's *Sophist*. The Communion of the Sophistic and Socratic Dialectic in the Sixth Definition of the *Sophist*: A Reading Based on Proclus' Interpretation of Dialectic in the *Sophist*." In *Ancient Greek Dialectic and Its Reception* edited by Mouzala, Melina G., 157–188. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"The aim of this paper is to draw a line of interpretation that claims that when the fifth definition places the emphasis on *logos* (λόγος), it paves the way to the sixth; *logos* is a human characteristic which brings to the fore and realizes the manifestation of all thinking and specifically of controversies and disputations in which our thought is involved and expressed. The same subject is reserved and developed in the sixth definition. Moreover, my aim is to show that the sixth definition, apart from the explicit discussion of purification or cathartic dialectic, actually thematizes division itself. Based on Proclus' interpretation of

eristic in the *Sophist*, I will show that the notion of communion (κοινωνία) is implicitly examined for the first time in the dialogue within the sixth definition of the sophist, where the Sophistic and the Socratic dialectic are commingled. Finally, I maintain that from the analysis of the crucial passage 230 b–d, we can infer that the basic characteristic of Socrates' cathartic method is a specific emotional attitude of the person who is subjected to elenchus, which due to its reflexive and self-referent character, leads to self-knowledge. This kind of self-knowledge is a way of self-recovery or self-recollection that also proves to have a collective or non-individual character, since the same emotional attitude, in cooperation with the cohesive and therapeutic intervention of the unificatory *logos*, binds again the person who is subjected to elenchus with the latent commonality of an intersubjective wisdom that has been forgotten." (pp. 157-158)

288. Moya, Keylor Murillo. 2022. "A footnote on Alain Badiou's critique of Plato's *Sophist*." *Síntesis. Revista de Filosofía* no. 5:98–115.

Abstract: "In his second book on being and event, *Logics of Worlds*, Alain Badiou describes Plato's late dialogue, *The Sophist* as "one of the first transcendental inquiries in the history of thought". In this dialogue, Plato introduces what he calls the Idea of the Other, the possibility of a being of nonbeing, an inevitable break with the Parmenidean tradition. However, according to Badiou, Plato fails to provide an example of how this Idea of the

Other can manifest itself or be effective in a world, or in other words, appear. This paper argues that not only there is such an example in Plato's *Sophist*, namely, the *phantasma*, but also that it can be strongly related to Badiou's philosophical system."

289. Muckelbauer, John. 2001. "Sophistic Travel: Inheriting the Simulacrum through Plato's *The Sophist*." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* no. 34:225–244.

"A single question marks our departure, a question that, while apparently straightforward, has assumed so many shapes and disguises that it would not be unjust to claim it has infected all of Western history. In its current manifestation, however, we will take our cue from Plato in phrasing it thus: What is a Sophist? When Plato first formulated the question in these terms, he well understood that its self-evident simplicity could be deceptive and that its effects might proliferate uncontrollably. As Jacques Derrida comments, "The question of what the Sophists really were is an enormous question" (Olson 17). In Plato's case, attempting to "hunt down" the Sophist led from a disturbing journey through the world of images to an unsettling encounter with the existence of nonbeing." (p. 225)

References

Olson, Gary. 1990. "Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition: A Conversation," *Journal of Advanced Composition*, 10.1: 1–21.

290. Muniz, Fernando, and Rudebusch, George. 2018. "Dividing Plato's Kinds." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 63:392–407.

Abstract: "A dilemma has stymied interpretations of the Stranger's method of dividing kinds into subkinds in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*. The dilemma assumes that the kinds are either extensions (like sets) or intensions (like Platonic Forms). Now kinds divide like extensions, not intensions. But extensions cannot explain the distinct identities of kinds that possess the very same members. We propose understanding a kind as like an animal body—the Stranger's simile for division—possessing both an extension (in its members) and an intension (in its form). We find textual support in the Stranger's paradigmatic four steps for collecting a subkind."

291. Murphy, David J. 2023. "The sophist's puzzling *epistēmē* in the *Sophist*." *Classical Quarterly* no. 73:53–65.

Abstract: "Against prevailing interpretations, this article contends that Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman* accord the sophist a kind of 'knowing-how' (*epistēmē*). In *Soph.* 233c10–d2, the Visitor and Theaetetus agree that the sophist has not truth but a *δοξαστική ἐπιστήμη*. This phrase cannot mean 'a seeming knowledge', for *-ικός* adjectives formed from verbs express the ability to perform the action denoted by the verb—here, *δοξάζω*.

Although not a first-order, subject-area knowledge, sophistry is a second-order knowledge of how to form and use judgements (*doxai*). Other acknowledgements of the sophist's *epistēmē* and the ascription to him of *τέχνη*, 'craft/expertise', confirm that the Visitor's conclusion is not to be dismissed as irony. To critics who argue from the *Gorgias* and from other works that Plato must consider the Visitor's conclusion an error, the author replies: 1) other dialogues do not control the Visitor dialogues; 2) the Visitor does not validly demonstrate that the sophist lacks all knowledge; 3) by admitting sensibles into Being, the Visitor and Theaetetus allow the objects of *epistēmē* to include things in the embodied

world, even likenesses. Non-philosophers' *epistêmê* in the Visitor dialogues is not implicated in the difficulties that critics have raised about epistemology in the so-called Two Worlds dialogues. On this new ontology, even the sophist, if guided by philosophical rulers, can benefit citizens by employing his elenctic expertise as Socrates did, aiding their growth toward virtue."

292. ————. 2024. "Σκοπός and the Unity of the *Sophist*." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 365–371.

Abstract: "Although like Noburu Notomi I defend the thematic unity of the *Sophist*, I locate the unifying subject or "target," *skopos*, not in "the sophist" but in "Being and Not-Being on every level." Against Notomi's case that the *skopos* is the sophist: most of the dialogue concerns questions about Being; to define an unknown via bifurcation is a flawed method; the final definition does not fit known sophists; schools were Plato's rivals by the time of writing. My proposed unifying target comes close to Marsilio Ficino's "Being and Not-Being." Although Being is not discussed in every part of the dialogue, sections can have subsidiary *skopoi*, which all serve the whole. My interpretation helps illuminate connections between the search for the sophist in the "frame" part of the dialogue and discussions about Being in the dialogue's core."

293. Murr, Dimitri El. 2006. "Paradigm and diairesis: a response to M. L. Gill's 'Models in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*'." *Plato Journal* no. 6:1–9.

"In her interesting and stimulating paper, Mary-Louise Gill addresses one of the central issues in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*: what is a model (*paradeigma*) and how does one become useful in a dialectical inquiry? Gill's main thesis is clear: a *paradeigma* becomes truly useful when not only the sameness between the example and the target but also their difference are recognized ("the inquirers need to recognize, not only the feature that is the same in the example and the target, but also the difference between the two embodiments and the procedural difference those different embodiments entail.")

(...)

"At the start, I have to say I am sympathetic with most of the conclusions Gill has drawn from the important issues she tackles in this paper. So it will come as no surprise that my response to her will consist of a series of reflections on certain points she has singled out rather than a proper response built on an alternative interpretation.

I choose to focus on three distinct points, all of which I take to be crucial to Gill's argument as well as to our understanding of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* in general." (p. 1)

294. Myers, Bess H. R. 2021. "Platonic Synergy: A Circular Reading of the *Sophist* and *Timaeus*." *Journal for the History of Rhetoric* no. 24:251–273.

Abstract: "The *Sophist*, with its ostensible goal of locating and defining the sophist, is among the Platonic dialogues often read by rhetoricians. Plato's *Timaeus*, less so. This has been an oversight because the *Timaeus* provides a metaphysical explanation for Plato's anxieties about sophistry and rhetoric. When read together, the *Sophist* and *Timaeus* warn of the dangers of sophistry, though they do so in contrasting ways. The *Sophist* directs us to the external world while the *Timaeus* directs us inward toward an eternal, unchanging reality.

We learn from the *Timaeus* that sophistry causes both corporeal and metaphysical wandering, a type of motion which runs counter to that of the natural order of the universe and which Plato associates with opportunism and instability. He contrasts wandering with the circular motion associated with philosophical steadfastness. Reading these dialogues in tandem reveals a set of overlapping dichotomies which connect the *Timaeus* to other dialogues in which Plato addresses sophistry and rhetoric."

295. Naas, Michael. 2003. "For the Name's Sake." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 7:199–221.

Abstract: "In Plato's later dialogues, and particularly in the *Sophist*, there is a general reinterpretation and rehabilitation of the name (*onoma*) in philosophy. No longer understood rather vaguely as one of potentially dangerous and deceptive elements of everyday language or of poetic language, the word *onoma* is recast in the *Sophist* and related dialogues into one of the essential elements of a philosophical language that aims to make claims or propositions about the way things are. *Onoma*, now understood as name, is thus coupled with *rhema*, or verb, to form the two essential elements of any *logos*, that is, any claim, statements, or proposition.

This paper follows Plato's gradual rehabilitation and reinscription of the name from early dialogues through late ones in order to demonstrate the new role Plato fashions for language in these later works."

296. Nancy, Michel. 2013. "Remarks on the First Five Definitions of the *Sophist* (*Soph.* 221c-235a)." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 57–70. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"The *Sophist* is explicitly dedicated to the question of getting to know what constitutes a sophist. It is, however, far from being the only dialogue where one finds a definition of one. This is natural enough, given that, from the *Apology* to the *Theaetetus*, a good part of Plato's work is devoted to pointing out the difference between Socrates and the sophists who were his contemporaries, considered less for who they were as individuals or for the particular positions they adopted than as representatives of a manner of thinking which Plato himself calls 'sophistry'.(2) So it is normal that, as part of the enterprise, Plato would have been led to clarify just what the manner of thinking is which he condemns through the character Socrates. The question one ought rather to answer, however, is: Why, after so many repeated condemnations of sophistry, does Plato feel the need to devote a dialogue to it? After the *Theaetetus*, and the antithesis there – which takes up the central part of the dialogue – between the frequenter of the law courts and the philosopher,(3) is it still necessary to ask the question whether the sophist and the philosopher are or are not the same thing?" (p. 57)

(2) Cf. *Gorg.* 463b6, 465c2, 520b2; the *Protagoras* (316d3 – 4) talks of the σοφιστική τέχνη. (I naturally leave aside from the calculation the occurrences of the word in the *Sophist*).

(3) *Theaetet.* 172c3 – 177b7.

297. Nehamas, Alexander. 1982. "Participation and Predication in Plato's Later Thought." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 36:343–374.

Reprinted in: A. Nehamas, *Virtues of Authenticity. Essays on Plato and Socrates*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999, pp. 196-223.

"One of the central characteristics of Plato's later metaphysics is his view that Forms can participate in other Forms. At least part of what the *Sophist* demonstrates is that though not every Form participates in every other (252d2-11), every Form participates in some Forms (252d12-253a2), and that there are some Forms in which all Forms participate (253cl-2, 256a7-8). This paper considers some of the reasons for this development, and some of the issues raised by it." (p. 343)

(...)

"Having many properties is not being many subjects. Beauty is many things in virtue of participating in them, in virtue of bearing to them that relation which Plato had earlier introduced in order to account for the claim of some things which are not beautiful to be called "beautiful" nonetheless. But Plato came to see that the phrase "are not" is illegitimate in this context.

(...)

In arriving at this realization and in extending the ability to have many names, that is, to bear predicates, to Forms as well as to their participants, Plato finally left behind the tradition from which he had emerged. This tradition, he realized, was common to thinkers ranging from the sophists to the sage he most venerated and who was, astonishingly, discovered in the many-headed sophist's hiding place—a place which, even more astonishingly, he had himself supplied. In the *Sophist* Plato liberated himself from that tradition and showed that to have a characteristic is not an imperfect way of being that characteristic. In this, I think, he offered us the first solid understanding of the metaphysics of predication in western philosophy." (p. 374)

298. Nikulin, Dmitri. 2025. *Non-Being in Ancient Thought*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: Preface VII; Acknowledgments XV; Permissions XVII; 1. Parmenides: Being and Nothing 1; 2. Democritus: Non-Being as the Void 42; 3. Plato: Non-Being as the Other of Being 73; 4. Diogenes [the Cynic]: Non-Being as Convention 116; 5. Aristotle: Non-Being as Thought in Many Ways 148; 6. Plotinus: Non-Being as the One 187; 7. Simplicius: Non-Being Voided 231; Conclusion 257; Bibliography 259; Index 269-286.

"Plato. Plato's *Sophist* is central to his dialogical and dialectical reasoning about being and non-being. Here, the interlocutors discuss and attempt to refute Parmenides' claim that non-being is not.

In order to do so, Plato makes the Stranger from Elea establish an account of being that would then justify and corroborate an account of non-being. Plato accepts Parmenides' insight that being is thinkable and is thought. Thinking-being is the reason-*nous*, which differs from the dialectical, discursive *logos* that unfolds itself throughout the dialogue, making turns and twists of the pros and contras through the dialogue's speakers. The *nous* thinks itself as and in many different forms or ideas, each of which is and is being as being thought. Yet, since all forms are being and are thinkable and thought, they are not mutually isolated but instead comprise an entire intelligible, beautiful cosmos of beings where they

always actually, and not potentially, communicate and reflect each other and thus connect into a system of forms." (Preface, pp. XVI-XVII)

299. Noriega-Olmos, Simon. 2012. "Plato's *Sophist* 259E4-6." *Journal of Ancient Philosophy* no. 6.

Abstract: "There are at least seven different well-known interpretations of *Sophist* 259E4-6. In this paper I show them to be either misleading, in conflict with the context, or at odds with Plato's project in the dialogue. I argue that 259E4-6 tells us that in view of the fact that statements consist in the weaving of different linguistic terms that stand for different extra-linguistic items, if there is to be statements, then reality must consist in a plurality of items some of which mix with some and some of which do not mix with some according to certain ontological rules. My argument for this construal of *Sophist* 259E4-6 involves an analysis of the passage as well as an assessment of how that text fits into its context."

300. ———. 2018–2019. "'Not-Being', 'Nothing', and Contradiction in Plato's 'Sophist' 236D–239C." *Archiv für Begriffgeschichte* no. 60-61:7–46.

Abstract: "At 236D-239C, *Sophist* presents three arguments to the conclusions, that the expression 'not-being' does not say or express anything, that we cannot even conceive of the alleged entity of not-being and that we contradict ourselves when claiming that not-being is not and that the expression 'not-being' does not express anything at all. I intend to answer five questions concerning these arguments: (Question 1) What does Plato mean when he says that the expression 'not-being' does not say anything at all? (Q2) What sort of semantic relation does he think the expression 'not-being' involves? (Q3) How could he possibly explain that 'not-being' is, after all, an expression? (Q4) What does he think we are to learn about the contradictions ensued by our talk of not-being? (Q5) And what does he think is the ontological status of not-being? My motivation for considering these questions is that the arguments against not-being in *Sophist* 236D-239C have not been charitably discussed and therefore have not been fully explored."

301. ———. 2024. "The Enigmatic Locus *Desperatus* at *Sophist* 244d11–12." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 237–246.

Abstract: "*Sph.* 244d11–12 is a *locus desperatus*. Editors have suspected these lines to be corrupted. Accordingly, they have proposed multiple emendations. In my view, however, the passage does not need emendation but only interpretation and Schleiermacher's construal. I argue that *Sph.* 244d11–12 shows that the one is not identical to a name. It shows this by analyzing what a name is and proving that the terms 'name' and 'one' are not intersubstitutable *salva veritate*."

302. Notomi, Noburu. 1999. *The Unity of Plato's Sophist: Between the Sophist and the Philosopher*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The aim of this work is to clarify the topic with which the *Sophist* is mainly concerned, and I do not discuss other hotly debated topics, such as the senses of the verb 'to be', and the dialogue's relation to the theory of Forms." (p. XIV)

"About the philosopher only a few passing reflections are offered in the Middle Part, as we saw in Chapter 7. It is a philosopher's attitude to value intelligence, wisdom, and knowledge

(249cro-d5), and it was also philosophical to admit the proper combination of kinds, since it saved discourse, and therefore philosophy (260ar-7). The more important passage is in the midst of the Middle Part (253c6-254b6), where knowledge of dialectic is said to be rightly ascribed to the philosopher. In that digression, the Eleatic visitor wonders whether the inquirers, in searching for the sophist, may by chance have stumbled on the philosopher (Passage 38: 253c6-9; cf. e4-6). Yet clearly the description of dialectic in that digression (Passage 39) is not decisive, but rather, proleptic, and the mention of the philosopher is just an anticipation which needs further investigation. In this way, the question of what the philosopher is is not explicitly discussed in the *Sophist*. However, this does not imply that Plato intended another dialogue, the *Philosopher*, to give a fuller account and definition of the philosopher. On the contrary, the whole project of the *Sophist* has already shown the philosopher in three ways." (p. 297)

"The *Sophist* says little about the philosopher, but the dialogue as a whole shows something of what the philosopher really is. The inquirers try to be philosophers in defining the sophist, by performing dialectic. Apart from this way, there does not seem to be any other proper way of revealing the essence of the philosopher; for it is by our confronting the sophist within ourselves that philosophy can be secured and established." (p. 299)

303. ————. 2007. "Plato on *What Is Not*." In *Maieusis. Essays on Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat*, edited by Scott, Dominic, 254–275. New York: Oxford University Press.

"What is not (τὸ μὴ ὄν) was scarcely discussed in ancient philosophy before Plato.

Although this phrase, or concept, made occasional appearances in philosophical arguments, it did not figure as their primary subject." (p. 254)

(...)

"Modern philosophers often assume that Plato treats *what is not* merely as the privation of being and that he dismisses the idea of absolute nothingness from the inquiry altogether, although the latter always remains a real philosophical problem. Pointing to the way in which Plato in the *Sophist* describes *what is not* as 'different from *what is*', these philosophers fault him for reducing the problem of absolute nothingness to that of something lacking particular properties. Against this interpretation, which at first sight seems to give an adequate account of the argument of the dialogue, I suggest that Plato tackles a more profound problem.

What is not is no more trivial or easy to deal with than its counterpart, *what is*. It is perhaps a more perplexing concept, since it seems to prevent any discussion (λόγος). This feature takes us to the heart of the problem that Plato faces in the *Sophist*. There he works out a new strategy to overcome the difficulty: *what is not* can only be clarified together with *what is*. The purpose of my paper is to clarify the implication of this strategy." (pp. 255-256)

304. ————. 2008. "Plato Against Parmenides: *Sophist* 236d-242b." In *Reading Ancient Texts: Vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien*, edited by Stern-Gillet, Suzanne and Corrigan, Kevin, 167–187. Leiden: Brill.

"Parmenides, one of the greatest and most influential Greek thinkers, is not mentioned in Plato's earlier dialogues. His name appears only in four dialogues: *Symposium*, *Parmenides*,

Theaetetus, and *Sophist*. This peculiar fact by no means implies that Parmenides had little influence on Plato's earlier thinking. On the contrary, it is generally agreed that *Republic V* bases the theory of forms on the Parmenidean scheme of what is and what is not. Nevertheless, that passage contains no reference to its source. (p. 167)

(...)

"It is noteworthy that Parmenides is never mentioned again after the *Sophist*." (p. 168)

(...)

"In presenting his own view, O'Brien criticises my reading of the *Sophist* on philological and philosophical grounds.(8)" (p. 169)

(...)

"Our disagreement concerns how we view Plato's attitude toward Parmenides.

O'Brien suggests that Plato introduces a new distinction between two 'kinds' of *what is not*, which is unknown to Parmenides. Consequently, according to him, Plato's response is oblique. From one point of view, Plato can agree with Parmenides, while from another he is in disagreement; but from the standpoint of Parmenides himself, Plato's criticism is irrelevant or unanswerable. By contrast, my reading is straightforward: Plato tackles the same philosophical difficulty that Parmenides faces, and criticises him so forcefully in order to secure the possibility of logos and philosophy.

In this paper, I present my arguments against O'Brien's criticisms, first by focusing on the key text, secondly by reconsidering Plato's strategy, and finally in respect of philosophical interpretation.(9)" (p. 170)

(8) O'Brien (2000), 56, 68–75, 79, 84, 93–94, 96, takes up and criticises my 1999 (esp. pp. 173–179).

(9) I have also discussed Plato's argument on *what is not*, in Notomi (forthcoming).

References

Notomi, N. (1999), *The Unity of Plato's Sophist: between the sophist and the philosopher*, Cambridge.

Notomi, N. (forthcoming), 'Plato on what is not', D. Scott ed., *Maieusis: Festschrift for Myles Burnyeat*, Oxford. [2007]

O'Brien D. (2000), 'Parmenides and Plato on what is not', M. Kardaun and J. Spruyt eds., *The Winged Chariot, Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk*, Leiden: 19–104.

305. ———. 2011. "Where is the Philosopher? A single project of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*." In *Formal Structures in Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman*, edited by Lisi, Francesco Leonardo, Migliori, Maurizio and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, 216–236. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

306. ———. 2011. "Dialectic as *Ars combinatoria*: Plato's Notion of Philosophy in the *Sophist*." In *Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 146–195. Praha: Oikoymenh.
307. ———. 2011. "Image-Making in *Republic X* and the *Sophist*. Plato's Criticism of the Poet and the Sophist." In *Plato and the Poets*, edited by Destrée, Pierre and Herrmann, Fritz-Gregor, 299–326. Leiden: Brill.

"The famous phrase, 'the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry' (*Rep. X*, 607b), represents Plato's critical attitude towards poetry. However, this phrase might mislead us, the modern readers, in multiple ways.

I believe it as yet a matter in need of clarification what the real target of Plato's criticism is and how he deals with it. To re-examine his treatment of poetry reveals how Plato conceptualizes his own pursuit, namely philosophy, in contrast to its rivals." (p. 299)

(...)

"The *Sophist* is the later dialogue which finally defines the sophist as 'the imitator (*mimêtês*) of the wise' (*Soph.* 268c). While this dialogue does not deal with a poet or poetry in a direct way, it nevertheless examines the foundation of Plato's earlier criticism of poetry in *Republic X*: namely the ontological basis of the art of image-making. Plato's implicit intention can be seen in remarkable correspondences between the two dialogues."

(...)

"*Republic X* presents the ontological argument to criticise the poet; poetry is treated as a special kind of making, i.e. image-making or imitation.

In a parallel way, the *Sophist* defines the sophist as a specific kind of making, i.e. image-making and apparition-making in particular. Finally we should consider some differences between the two treatments of image-making.

First of all, while, as we saw in the previous section, the *Sophist* confronts the difficult challenge concerning the problematic notions of 'image' and 'making', the *Republic* does not seem to worry about such a metaphysical danger. Whereas the *Sophist* clarifies the concept of image in the course of defining the sophist, the *Republic* simply uses it." (p. 324, notes omitted)

308. ———. 2017. "Reconsidering the Relations between the Statesman, the Philosopher, and the Sophist." In *Plato's Statesman: Dialectic, Myth, and Politics*, edited by Sallis, John, 183–195. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"In the opening conversation of the *Sophist*, Socrates (just before the trial in 399 BC) raises a crucial problem about the philosopher: how to distinguish between three kinds of people, a philosopher, a sophist, and a statesman." (p. 184)

(...)

"From this initial problem, the *Sophist* first engages in definition of the sophist and finally clarifies what the sophist is. The *Statesman* next discusses and defines the statesman." (p. 184)

(...)

"In the *Sophist*, the philosopher surprisingly appears in the middle of the inquiry. When the art of discerning combinations and separations of kinds is discussed, the Eleatic Visitor abruptly suggests that they may have come across the philosopher before finding the sophist (253c), and he gives a description of the art of dialectic, which belongs to philosophy. However, when he says that they will see the philosopher more clearly if they wish (254b), this is far from clear indication of a plan for another dialogue.

Rather, it is more important that the inquirers may have encountered the philosopher already in search for the sophist; for they are like two sides of one coin, or, more precisely, the original and its image." (p. 185)

The *Sophist* does not present the definition of the philosopher, but it finally shows the philosopher through definition of the sophist in three ways (11):

(1) First, since each feature of the sophist illuminates its opposite characteristic, the definitions of the sophist show what the philosopher should be. In addition to the contrast between apparition making (φανταστική) and likeness making (εικαστική), which we shall see, the sophist is characterized as "ironical" in consciously concealing his ignorance (267e–268a), while the philosopher sincerely admits it.

(2) Second, the inquiry into the sophist discusses dialectic (διαλεκτική), the art of the philosopher, in the middle part of the dialogue. The inquirers actually practice and demonstrate dialectical arguments, and thereby show what philosophers should do.

(3) Third, the project of the whole dialogue, namely, to define the sophist and thereby to show the philosopher, is itself a pre-eminent task of the philosopher. In this way, the *Sophist* represents the philosopher in stark contrast to the sophist. As for the problematic sixth definition, the "sophist of noble lineage" eventually turns out to represent more Socrates than the sophist." (pp. 185, 186 a note omitted)

(11) Cf. Notomi, *The Unity of Plato's Sophist*, 296–301.

309. ————. 2021. "Images and Imagination in Plato's *Republic* and *Sophist*." *The Journal of Greco-Roman Studies* no. 60:12–31.

Abstract: "Images are familiar to us, but if asked what they are, philosophical difficulties emerge. This paper examines how Plato dealt with the difficulties concerning images.

Plato faced the basic question about the image because the Sophist insists that images do not exist, based on the Parmenidean prohibition of combination between *what is* and *what is not*, in the *Sophist*. This treatment of images should be considered along with the *Republic* because the Sophistic counterattack in the *Sophist* is closely related to the critical treatment of images in the *Republic*, and we can detect the Parmenidean backgrounds in these two dialogues.

In these dialogues, Plato treated the notion of the image in two ways. First, the image is not simply an inferior entity but a transforming factor. Images guide philosophical inquiry by visualising the target of discussion. Second, by distinguishing between true and false images, we can investigate the truth by means of the former. To consider the role that

images play in philosophical inquiry, this paper discusses three examples: two are from the *Republic* and one is from the *Sophist*. Firstly, two opposite figures, one of the most just and the other of the most unjust, are presented by Glaucon in *Republic* II. They serve as a model of opposite personality for considering what justice and injustice are. Secondly, the Ideal City is depicted in words, in *Republic* V, as a model of the Form of justice. Thirdly, the Sophist of Noble Lineage, in the *Sophist*, shows that the same image appears differently to different observers. From an improper point of view, this person looked like a sophist at first, but at the final examination, it turned out to be a philosopher.

Thus, this paper shows the correct philosophical attitude towards images.

If the Sophist rejects the existence of images and attempt to undo the distinctions between the original and the image and between true and false images, philosophical inquirers should prove the existence of images and try to distinguish between true and false images to contemplate the original, that is, reality. Thus, the correct use of images will make us philosophers."

310. ———. 2024. "Similarities between the Sophist and the Philosopher." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 39–54.

Abstract: "Plato's *Sophist* primarily addresses the most important question, 'What is a sophist?' The difference between a sophist and a philosopher is hardly obvious, and in this dialogue, Plato attempts to resolve the problem of how to dissociate the sophist from the philosopher by raising a fundamental question about the similarity between the two. This paper revisits this problematized notion of similarity and proposes a further reflection on this issue. First, I carefully examine the initial exchange between Theodorus and Socrates, which focuses on the various images of philosopher, especially in relation to the *Phaedrus*. The allusions to the *Phaedrus* point to the real issue of the confusion of philosopher and god. Next, in the first outer part of the dialogue, when six definitions are completed, the Eleatic visitor points out the slippery nature of the concept of similarity. This theme is related to the rhetoric of the sophist, discussed in the *Phaedrus*. I suggest that the problem of similarity has already been examined in the *Parmenides*, which offers important suggestions on how to understand 'similar' as affection that participates in 'the same'. In the *Sophist*, this consideration suggests that the art of dialectic, by dealing with sameness and difference, can distinguish between similarity and dissimilarity. It is on this basis that the sophist and the philosopher are ultimately distinguished in relation to god in the second outer part. Finally, I suggest that the sophist and the philosopher are distinguished at three levels: theoretical, performative, and philosophical. The dialogue *Sophist* aims to make us, the readers of the dialogue, true philosophers, by confronting the 'sophist within us'."

311. O'Brien, Denis. 1993. "Non-Being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus: a Prospectus for the Study of Ancient Greek Philosophy." In *Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers*, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 1–26. London: University College London Press.

English version of "Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon, Plotin", in Pierre Aubenque (ed.), *Études sur le Sophiste de Platon*, Napoli: Bibliopolis 1991, pp. 317-364.

"Negation and contrariety. In the *Sophist*, a Stranger from Elea sets out to refute Parmenides. Or so at least he does in most modern studies of that deceptively simple

dialogue. But because Parmenides has been misunderstood, so too, inevitably, has been the Eleatic Stranger's criticism of Parmenides. For although the Eleatic Stranger does warn of the dangers of parricide (he may have to murder Parmenides, the father of Greek philosophy), in fact he starts off by agreeing with Parmenides, and that agreement, contrary to what most modern scholars will tell you, is never withdrawn or cancelled in the course of the argument.

Let me explain. The Eleatic Stranger distinguishes between two uses of the negation in the expression to me on, "what is not".

The negation may be used to mean "what is not in any way at all" (*to medamos on*, 237b7-8). "What is not in any way at all" is what would be, impossibly, the contrary of being (d. 258e6-7).

Impossibly: for there is no contrary of being, since there is nothing entirely without participation in being. What is entirely without participation in being is what you might expect it to be - just plain nothing. There isn't any." (p. 5)

312. ————. 2000. "Parmenides and Plato on What is Not." In *The Winged Chariot: Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk*, edited by Kardaun, Maria and Spruyt, Joke, 19–104. Leiden: Brill.

"Understanding of Plato's *Sophist* cannot therefore be dissociated from our understanding of the poem of Parmenides, and vice versa.

To understand the poem of Parmenides we need to appreciate that the goddess is working with a single conception of non-being, an appreciation which we can best arrive at by seizing the distinction between the two uses of non-being that are established in Plato's *Sophist* and yet, at the same time, refusing to read back that distinction into the poem of Parmenides.

Understanding the *Sophist* requires us, on the contrary, to appreciate that the Stranger arrives at his new definition of 'what is not' by consciously distancing himself from the way in which Parmenides had thought of nonbeing, nearly one hundred years before.

The distinction between the two 'kinds' of non-being is, in both cases, the same. But where the Stranger consciously and deliberately marshals his arguments in the light of that distinction, Parmenides, on the contrary, produces the arguments he does because the Stranger's distinction forms no part of his conscious self. (298)" (p. 90)

(298) Some of the implications of this style of conclusion for how I understand the history of philosophy are spelt out in O'Brien (1993).

References

O'Brien, D. (1993) 'Non-being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus: A Prospectus for the Study of Ancient Greek Philosophy', in *Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers*, The Stanley Victor Keeling Memorial Lectures at University College London, 1981-1991, ed. R. W. Sharples (London) 1-26.

313. ———. 2011. "The Stranger's "Farewell" (*Sophist* 258e6-259a1)." In *Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 199–220. Praha: Oikoymenh.

"Don't let anyone try and tell us that we dare say of the contrary of being that it is. We have long ago said farewell to any contrary of being, to the question of whether it is or of whether it isn't...' Those are the first words spoken by the Stranger after Theaetetus' enthusiastic reaction (258 E 4-5: 'absolutely so', 'most true') to the Stranger's declaration (258 D 5-E 3) that he and Theaetetus have 'dared' speak of 'the form that there turns out to be, of what is not'.

A 'contrary of being'. A 'form that there turns out to be, of what is not'. The meaning of those two expressions, together with their difference of meaning, lies at the very heart of Plato's dialogue, of what the *Sophist* is all about. If the meaning, with the difference in meaning, of those two expressions has not been understood, then the dialogue itself has not been understood." (p. 199)

314. ———. 2013. "A Form that 'Is' of What 'Is Not' . Existential *Einai* in Plato's *Sophist* " In *The Platonic Art of Philosophy*, edited by Boys-Stones, George, El Murr, Dimitri and Gill, Christopher, 221–248. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Motivated by an otherwise very understandable desire to study ancient philosophical texts philosophically, recent commentators have taken to weeding out from Plato's dialogues any existential use of the verb *einai*, seemingly in deference to the supposedly philosophical principle that existence cannot be a predicate. The result is disastrous. This is not only because Plato very clearly does use the verb as a predicate complete in itself, with a meaning that can properly be described as 'existential', notably in his account of being and non-being in the *Sophist*, but also because the principle itself is not what it is all too often thought to be." (p. 221)

(...)

"Veer to one side or another of that narrow line and you end up in one or other of the errors portrayed in the concluding pages of this essay. Identify the form of non-being with a straightforward negation of the existential meaning of the verb, and the Stranger will end up asserting, of 'what is not in any way at all', that it 'is' (Notomi's error). Identify the form of non-being with a negation of the copulative use of the verb joined to any and every complement, so that 'non-being' is so because it is 'other than' and therefore 'is not' any one of all the vast variety of different forms that participate in being, and you will end up asserting, of 'being itself', that it is 'non-being' (Owen's error). Start from Plato's own assumption that an existential use of *einai* has to be subjected to the same analysis as 'is the same' or 'is beautiful', with one specific part of otherness, and only one, opposed to 'being', whether to the form or to the instantiation of the form, while at the same time taking into account the different extension of forms that are, and forms that are not, participated universally, and you will, if you pay close attention to both syntax and argument, avoid both errors. You may even come within shouting distance of the essentials of Plato's reply to Parmenides." (p. 248)

315. ———. 2013. "Does Plato refute Parmenides?" In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 117–155. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"I have a couple of times ventured to suggest that in the *Sophist* Plato does not refute Parmenides.(2) The reaction has been, to say the least, hostile.(3) Hostile, with more than a touch of disapproval. You might have thought I had suggested that the Queen of England was a man. The suggestion was not only false, but foolish. A mere eye-catcher. Absurd, and unseemly." (p. 117)

(...)

"Not only is it obvious why Plato should want to refute Parmenides; it also seems clear enough, to many readers of Plato's *Sophist*, that he no less obviously claims to do so. When the Stranger of Plato's dialogue introduces Parmenides (237a3 – b3), he quotes a pair of verses giving voice to what are called elsewhere in the poem the 'opinions of mortals' (fr. 1.30 and 8.51 –52), summarised in the pithy sentence 'things that are not, are' (237a8 = fr. 7.1: εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα)." (p. 119)

(...)

"Pinned down to their context, the places where the Stranger supposedly speaks of successfully 'refuting' Parmenides vanish like the morning dew on a summer's day. But if the Stranger doesn't claim to have 'refuted' Parmenides, does he then leave it to be understood that he therefore agrees with him?

Not at all. But at the crucial moment when he prepares to trumpet his discovery of 'the form that there turns out to be, of what is not', the language he uses is not the language of 'refutation'.

The Stranger: 'So do you think we've been unfaithful to Parmenides, in taking up a position too far removed from his prohibition?' (258c6 – 7: οἷσθ' οὖν ὅτι Παρμενίδη μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ἠπιστήκαμεν) Theaetetus: 'What do you mean?' (258c8: τί δή;)

The Stranger: 'By pushing on ahead with the search, what we've shown him goes beyond the point where he told us to stop looking' (cf. 258c9 –10: πλεῖον ἢ κείνος ἀπεῖπε σκοπεῖν, ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ζητήσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν αὐτῷ.).

Just so. The metaphor of distance, of uncharted and forbidden territories, hits off the situation very neatly. The Stranger and Theaetetus have entered a new world, far removed from the world of Parmenides, and have survived to tell the tale. But that does not mean that they claim to have 'refuted' him in any simple sense. How could they have done?

Refutation implies contradiction. No-one in his right mind would think to contradict Parmenides' denial that 'things that are not, are', in so far as those words are taken as meaning, or even as implying, that 'things that do not exist, do exist'." (pp. 151-152, note omitted)

(2) O'Brien (1995) 87 – 88, (2000) 94 –98.

(3) Dixsaut (2000) 269 n. 2. Notomi (2007) 167 – 187.

References

Dixsaut, M., *Platon et la question de la pensée*, Paris 2000 = Dixsaut (2000).

Notomi, N., 'Plato against Parmenides: *Sophist* 236D-242B', in S. Stern-Gillet and K. Corrigan (eds.), *Reading Ancient Texts, vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien*, Leiden-Boston 2007, 167 – 187 = Notomi (2007).

O'Brien, D., *Le Non-être. Deux études sur le 'Sophiste' de Platon*, Sankt Augustin 1995 = O'Brien (1995).

O'Brien, D., 'Parmenides and Plato on What is Not', in M. Kardaun and J. Spruyt (eds.), *The Winged Chariot. Collected essays on Plato and Platonism in honour of L. M. de Rijk*, Leiden, Boston, Köln 2000, 19 – 104 = O'Brien (2000).

316. ———. 2019. "To Be and Not To Be in Plato's *Sophist*." In *Passionate Mind: Essays in Honor of John M. Rist*, edited by David, Barry, 93–136. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

"Surely you can no more say of something that it both is and is not (as do Parmenides' mortals) than you can say of it that, at one and the same time, it is non-being and being (as does the Stranger of Plato's *Sophist*)?"

3. Words and their meaning

The solution to the puzzle, if there is one, will have to depend on the precise meaning of the words in Greek. Dictionaries and grammars will take you only so far. The ultimate test has to be Plato's use of the common idiom of his time, modified, when necessary, by the context—by the meaning, however idiosyncratic, that he has given his words in the course of an argument.

Those are the two criteria adopted in the course of this article. To steer your way through the Greek text of the *Sophist*, you will need to recognise a distinction that Plato has taken over from the common parlance of the day, while at the same time adapting it to his own purposes.

The distinction lies between two uses of *einai*, its common-or-garden use as a copula, joining a subject to an attribute, the verb and its attribute making up the predicate (x 'is so-and-so'), and a less common, but still well authenticated, use as a predicate complete in itself (x 'is'), traditionally called, for convenience, an 'existential' use of the verb, simply because such a use may easily lend itself, in modern English, to translation by 'exist'." (p. 95 a note omitted)

317. O'Leary-Hawthorne, Diane. 1996. "Not-Being and Linguistic Deception." *Apeiron* no. 29:165–198.

"Though it is certainly clear that Plato spends a great deal of time in this dialogue [the *Sophist*] grappling with problems that we now place squarely in the domain of philosophy of language, we should think carefully about the context of these pursuits. As Owen, Wiggins, Pelletier and countless others would have it, Plato is concerned with the nature of language, with the structure of sentences, with negation, with truth and with falsity simply because these problems are important and Plato was aware of their importance. Reluctant as I am to place any obstacles in the way of Plato's unstable popularity, I submit that we must think again about the relevance that these problems had for Plato." (p. 167)

(...)

"At the very least, even if we are skeptical about attributing a mistrust of language to Plato, there are certainly grounds here for caution. If indeed Plato has devoted himself in the *Sophist* to repairing 'the naive semantics of natural language' or some similar project, it is unlikely that he will have done so without some hint as to how these issues might fit into his broad scheme of philosophical knowledge. At best Plato is concerned with linguistic matters in the *Sophist* precisely because he wants to examine and explain what underlies the linguistic skepticism that runs through the dialogues. In what follows I shall argue that beneath the glistening surface of debate about reference and truth in the *Sophist* there does lie a beautifully simple, though highly rigorous, account of the disparity between language and the world it purports to represent. Embedded within the Stranger's most technical linguistic pursuits is something we should have been missing in the Platonic corpus, that is, an explanation of Plato's persistent suggestion that language is not a good place to turn for philosophical insight." (p. 168)

318. O'Rourke, Fran. 2003. "Plato's Approach to Being in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, and Heidegger's Attribution of Aristotelian Influence." *Diotima.Revue de recherche philosophique* no. 31:47–58.

"Olympiodorus reports the last dream of Plato: «Shortly before he died, Plato dreamt that he had become a swan which flew from tree to tree, thereby causing the utmost trouble to the archers who wanted to shoot him down.

Simmius the Socratic interpreted the dream as meaning that Plato would elude all the pains of his interpreters. For to archers may be likened those interpreters who try to hunt out the hidden meanings of the ancients, but Plato is elusive because his writings, like those of Homer, must be understood in many senses, both physically, and ethically, and theologically, and literally»(1)" (p. 47)

"It is significant to note that in the three dialogues we have examined, the *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, Plato brings the reciprocal, dynamic, distinction and relation «to act and act upon» to bear in his reflections, respectively, on φύσις, κίνησις, and εἶναι: these themes are inseparable; they refer to the intrinsic principles of every reality in its constitution, operation and foundation. The distinction and relation are clearly for Plato of central and lasting importance. In further support of Plato's own discovery of δύναμις it is worth noting that for Plato in the *Republic*, the Good which is the principle of all things, the source of their Being and intelligibility, is not itself Being, but «lies beyond Being, surpassing it in dignity and power» (509 b: ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.). This is to place power at the heart of being, suggesting that for Plato the dignity or value of being is its power to act or be acted upon! Επέκεινα is indeed an unresolved dilemma.

Despite the criticisms offered earlier, we must conclude that Plato contributed immeasurably to the early development of the philosophy of being. His self-reproach, that the discussion in the *Sophist* concerning nonbeing was lengthy and irrelevant, is not only harsh but untrue. To quote Solon, as he does himself: *χ.χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ* [beautiful/goods things are difficult]. The *Sophist* is a worthy contribution to this most difficult and rewarding of questions. It offers rich insights and distinctive signposts on a path of far reaching discovery. To refer again to Olympiodorus (32): whereas Aristotle wrote that all men seek wisdom, he suggests that all philosophers seek Plato as a source which overflows with wisdom and inspiration. Plato deserves our praise and, in words which he placed in the mouth of Socrates, in Athens it is easy to praise an Athenian." (pp. 57-58)

(1) Olympiodorus, *Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato*, ed. L. G. Westerink, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1956, p. 6.

(32) *Loc. cit.*, cf. supra and n. 1.

319. Oberhammer, Arnold. 2021. "Dialectic in Plato's Sophist and Derrida's 'Law of the Supplement of Copula' " In *Platonism: Ficino to Foucault*, edited by Rees, Valery, Corrias, Anna, Crasta, Francesca M., Follesa, Laura and Giglioni, Guido, 314–324. Leiden: Brill.

"Derrida [*] refers to *Sophist* 253d, where the Eleatic Stranger determines being to be the ability (δύναμις) to connect. He sees being (ὄν), in addition to motion and rest, as the third 'in the soul' (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ).(12) The progress of the Eleatic Stranger, as opposed to the older aporetic ontologies where either motion or rest were considered to be, is based on the concept of 'otherness', ἕτερον. Being is different (ἕτερον) to motion and rest with the result that, 'according to its own nature' (κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν), it is neither one nor the other.(13) Plato's definition of being as disposition (δύναμις) or commonality (κοινωνία) takes place with reference to 'the most general classes' (μεγίστα γένη), which are connected because they are different to each other. In line with the critique of some 'old men who came by learning late in life,' it is impossible for one to be many.

Here the relationship between λόγος and ὄν takes centre stage.(14)" (pp. 316-317)

(12) Plato, *Sophist*, 250b7–10: ' τρίτον ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὄν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθείς, ὡς ὑπ' ἐκείνου τὴν τε στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν περιεχομένην, συλλαβῶν καὶ ἀπιδῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, οὕτως εἶναι προσεῖπας ἀμφοτέρα.'

(13) 13 Ibid., c3–7: ' οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ συναμφοτέρον τὸ ὄν ἀλλ' ἕτερον δὴ τι τούτων. [...] κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἄρα τὸ ὄν οὔτε ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.'

(14) Ibid., 251b6: ' τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι.'

[*] Derrida, Jacques. 'Le supplément de copule: La philosophie devant la linguistique,' in

J. Derrida, *Marges de la philosophie*. Paris: Les Éditiones de Minuit, 1972, 209–46.

320. Oscanyan, Frederick S. 1973. "On Six definitions of the Sophist: *Sophist* 221c-231e." *Philosophical Forum* no. 4:241–259.

Abstract: "The paper shows that the definitions of the *Sophist* on 221c-231e refer to specific contemporaries of Socrates: Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Euthydemus and Thrasymachus. Produced by the method of divisions, each definition consists of a nesting class of attributes. An examination of the Platonic corpus reveals that these same characteristics are used to satirically describe the sophists listed above. As the final definition equally describes Thrasymachus and Socrates, it is shown why Plato viewed the method of divisions as inadequate for obtaining the proper definition of sophistry: a good Platonic definition must have ostensive truth as well as essential validity."

321. Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane. 1966. "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present." *Monist*:317–340.

Reprinted in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.), *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays*, Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974 and in: G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science, and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986 pp. 27-44.

"In sum, it is part of the originality of Plato to have grasped, or half-grasped, an important fact about certain kinds of statement, namely that they are tenseless whereas others are tensed. But he tries to bring this contrast under his familiar distinction between the changeless and the changing. So he saddles the familiar distinction with a piece of conceptual apparatus taken from Parmenides, a tense-form which retains enough of a present sense to be coupled with expressions for permanence and stability, yet which has severed its links with the future and the past. Armed with this device Plato is able to turn the distinction between tensed and tenseless statements into a more congenial distinction between timebound and timeless, changing and immutable, objects.

But at a price. The concept of stability has been stretched so that stability is no longer a function of time. And the interesting propositions, so far from staying tenseless, are restated in an artificial and degenerate tense-form. The theory for which we are asked to tolerate these anomalies will need to hold firm against scrutiny. But on scrutiny there seems to be something wrong at its roots.

What is wrong, I think, can be put very shortly. It is that to be tensed or tenseless is a property of statements and not of things, and that paradoxes come from confusing this distinction; just as they come from trying to manufacture necessary beings out of the logical necessity that attaches to certain statements. But how is the distinction to be recognized? One way, a good way, is to notice that tenseless statements are not proprietary to one sort of subject and tensed statements to another. And there seems to be evidence in another work of Plato that he did notice this, and brought the point home by a valid argument.

I want to end by discussing that evidence. It occurs in the *Sophist*, in the criticism that the chief speaker brings against the so-called "friends of the Forms.(15)" (pp. 335-336)

(15) My account of this argument lies close to that given by J. M. E. Moravcsik [Being and Meaning in the *Sophist*] in *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, 14 (1962), 35-40, which should be consulted for its criticism of alternative views.

322. ———. 1971. "Plato on Not-Being." In *Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology*, edited by Vlastos, Gregory, 104–137. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.

Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 104-137 and in: Gail Fine (ed.), *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 416-454.

"Platonists who doubt that they are Spectators of Being must settle for the knowledge that they are investigators of the verb 'to be'. Their investigations make them familiar with certain commonplaces of the subject for which, among Plato's dialogues, the *Sophist* is held to contain the chief evidence. But the evidence is not there, and the attempt to find it has obstructed the interpretation of that hard and powerful dialogue. The commonplaces that I mean are these: In Greek, but only vestigially in English, the verb 'to be' has two

syntactically distinct uses, a complete or substantive use in which it determines a one-place predicate ('X is', 'X is not Y') and an incomplete use in which it determines a two-place predicate ('X is Y', 'X is not Y'). To this difference there answers a semantic distinction. The verb in its first use signifies 'to exist' (for which Greek in Plato's day had no separate word) or else, in Greek but only in translators' English, 'to be real' or 'to be the case' or 'to be true', these senses being all reducible to the notion of the existence of some object or state of affairs; while in its second use it is demoted to a subject-predicate copula (under which we can here include the verbal auxiliary) or to an identity sign. Plato's major explorations of being and not-being are exercises in the complete or 'existential' use of the verb. And, lest his arguments should seem liable to confusion by this versatile word, in the *Sophist* he marks off the first use from the verb's other use or uses and draws a corresponding distinction within the negative constructions represented by *to me on*, 'not-being' or 'what is not'. For the problems which dominate the central argument of the *Sophist* are existence problems, so disentangling the different functions of the verb 'to be' is a proper step to identifying and resolving them." (pp. 104-105, notes omitted)

323. ———. 1973. "Plato on the Undepictable." In *Exegesis and Argument. Studies in Greek philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos*, edited by Lee, Edward N., Mourelatos, Alexander and Rorty, Richard, 349–361. Assen: Van Gorcum.

Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, *Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 138-147.

324. Pacitti, Domenico. 1991. *The Nature of the Negative. Towards an Understanding of Negation and Negativity*. Pisa: Giardini editori.

Contents: Preface IX-X; On the nature of the Negative 1; Epilogue 77; Notes 79; Bibliographical references 103; Index nominum 115-118.

On Plato's *Sophist* see in particular pp. 63-75.

"The immensity of the 'tours de force' necessary in the *Parmenides* and *Sophist* for the admission of nonbeing on a par with being reflects the enormous hold that Parmenides must have exerted over the Greeks. His writing in verse, like the monotheist Xenophanes, reflects divine inspiration and the transcendent powers of thought. Thus it is not he but the goddess who speaks throughout.

The style of Parmenides fr. B8, 12-21 is strikingly reminiscent of the Vedic hymn and may easily be read as a solution to the anonymous poet's riddle. But his answer that there is only 'is' and no 'is not' cannot, I think, be understood as meaning that Parmenides wished to reject negative predication out, as Anscombe (*Parmenides, Mystery and Contradiction*, 1969) would have in the first place, Parmenides himself consistently uses negatives, which would be highly implausible if that was what he wished to outlaw, and secondly, his position on the illusory nature of 'opinion' and the nonexistence of what is not is quite compatible with the use of the negative.

For in Parmenides (fr. B2, B6, 1-2, & B8 34-36) thought and reality are probably even more closely bound together than in Plato, in that reality - or at least true reality - can be thought, and if 'opinion' is part of what is not, then the result of thinking *that* is what he calls a non-thought, which must be taken to mean something that is not a true or authentic thought. We

find Aristotle (*Posterior Analytics* 89a) still pondering over this problem of how true knowledge and mere opinion could have the same object of reference.

Similarly, Parmenides' convincing rebuttal (fr. 3) of what is having been produced out of what is not, which would then mean what is being in some sense what is not, led Aristotle (*De Anima* 417a and *Metaphysics* 1051b) to his theory of potentiality in order to bridge the gap somehow between nonbeing and being.

And this is a radical challenge to the common concept of time: the unreality of past and future which are illusory, the present which is all there is, timeless and eternal.

For Parmenides, then, reason, namely the correct use of thought in contact with reality - not the world of appearance but the real world - will alone lead to truth." (pp. 73-74)

325. Painter, Corinne. 2005. "In Defense of Socrates." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 9:317–333.

bstract "In this essay I argue that the Stranger's interest in keeping the philosopher and the sophist distinct is connected, primarily, to his assessment of the charges of sophistry advanced against Socrates, which compels him to defend Socrates from these unduly advanced accusations. On this basis, I establish that the Stranger's task in the *Sophist*, namely to keep philosophy distinct from sophistry, is intimately tied to the project of securing justice and is therefore not merely of theoretical importance but is also—and essentially—of political and ethical significance."

326. ————. 2014. "The Stranger as a Socratic Philosopher: The Socratic Nature of the Stranger's Investigation of the *Sophist*." *The St. John's Review* no. 56:65–73.

"Much of the secondary literature on Plato's *Sophist* considers the Stranger to be a non-Socratic philosopher, and regards his appearance in the dialogues as a sign that Plato had moved on from his fascination with Socrates to develop a more "mature" way of philosophizing.(2) This essay will argue, on the contrary, that the investigation led by the Stranger in the *Sophist* demonstrates an essentially Socratic philosophical stance. In order to do this, I will consider carefully some dramatic evidence in the *Sophist* that allows us to notice a philosophical "transformation" in the Stranger.

My consideration focuses upon the Stranger's rejection of the Parmenidean way of philosophizing followed by his acceptance of the Socratic way of practicing philosophy. This is revealed most decisively by the Stranger's willingness to pursue truth and justice at the expense of overturning the practices of his philosophical training, and, secondarily, by his genuine concern with showing that Socrates is not guilty of sophistry."

(2) There are far too many accounts to list here; but see, for example, Stanley Rosen, *Plato's Sophist: The Drama of the Original and Image* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 1999). Just as Rosen argues in his text, most of the accounts in the literature that treat this issue view the Stranger as non-Socratic and advance the position that he represents at least a change, or perhaps even a progression, in Plato's thinking away from, for instance, emphasis on the Socratic elenchus, to a more developed, mature philosophical practice that emphasizes dialectic."

327. Painter, Corinne Michelle. 2005. "In Defense of Socrates: The Stranger's Role in Plato's *Sophist*." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 9:317–333.

Abstract: "In this essay I argue that the Stranger's interest in keeping the Philosopher and the Sophist distinct is connected, primarily, to his assessment of the charges of Sophistry advanced against Socrates, which compels him to *defend* Socrates from these unduly advanced accusations. On this basis, I establish that the Stranger's task in the *Sophist*, namely to keep philosophy distinct from sophistry, is intimately tied to the project of securing justice and is therefore not merely of theoretical importance but is also -- and essentially - of political and ethical significance."

328. Palmer, John. 1999. *Plato's Reception of Parmenides*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"The Gorgianic perspective on Parmenides' philosophy also figures crucially in the First Deduction of the subsequent exercise in which Parmenides undertakes an examination of his own theory. Plato has Parmenides reject this reductive perspective, thereby providing us with a crucially important instance of how Plato is concerned with combating certain sophistic appropriations of Parmenides so as to recover him for the uses he himself wants to make. This dynamic of reappropriation becomes increasingly important as we continue to examine Plato's later period reception.

This theme in fact guides my discussion of the complex representation of Parmenides in the *Sophist*, where I argue that Plato's efforts to define the Sophist so as to discriminate between this figure and the Philosopher are accompanied by an attempt to recover Parmenides from sophistic appropriations that challenge certain of the key distinctions of Plato's middle period metaphysics. I therefore take issue with the common view that Plato in the *Sophist* is determined to 'refute' Parmenides. The *Sophist's* denial of the viability of the distinctions between truth and falsehood and between reality and appearance employ the logic of Parmenides in ways Plato himself finds unacceptable. Plato's own view of Parmenides in this dialogue emerges in the ontological doxography in which Parmenides is significantly associated with Xenophanes and in the subsequent interrogation of this doxography's first two groups. The interrogation of the Eleatics in particular has important connections with various deductions in the *Parmenides's* dialectical exercise. These connections make it possible to see where in each dialogue Plato is concerned with sophistic appropriations of Parmenides and where he is engaging with him in ways that reflect his own understanding. This understanding is reflected to some extent in portions of the *Timaeus* but most directly and importantly in the *Parmenides's* Second Deduction. I therefore conclude this study by describing how Plato will have understood Parmenides' account of the attributes of Being in B8 and the relation of this account to the cosmology he presented alongside it, and I explain how this understanding is reflected in the Second Deduction." (p. 16)

329. ———. 2024. "What completely is, what in no way is, and what is and is not in Plato's *Sophist* and *Republic*." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 325–331.

Abstract: "Plato's treatment of what in no way is at *Sophist* 236d-239c has important connections with the arguments directed toward the lovers of sights and sounds in *Republic* V. Understanding these connections is crucial to understanding the *Sophist's* articulation of the agenda for its main discussion that follows at 239c-242c, where Plato effectively indicates the need to reconsider the Parmenidean legacy of those arguments."

330. Palumbo, Lidia. 2013. "Mimesis in the *Sophist*." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 269–278. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"Mimesis is the production of images (*Soph.* 265b1 – 3). These cover a very wide semantic field, including the meanings of "opinion" and "viewpoint". A false image is a wrong opinion that says the things that are not: in believing, we imagine; in thinking, we represent what we think. The false belief is therefore a mental scene, an image that possesses neither a corresponding reality nor a model, although it is perceived as a real scene. The virtue of an image (the *arete eikonos*) lies in its being similar to what is true, whereas the similarity between false and true can produce a deception similar to that caused by a dream or by poetry.

The aim of this paper is to show that in the *Sophist* falsity is closely linked to *mimesis*. This is not because every *mimesis* is false, but because all falsity is mimetic. That not every *mimesis* is false is shown at 235c – 236c. The crucial distinction between *eikastike* and *phantastike* must be understood as the distinction between true and false *mimesis*. That every falsity is mimetic is a far more complex issue, which I shall be discussing in this paper. I shall claim that falsity does not consist in confusing something for something else, but, more specifically, in confusing an image for its model." (p. 269)

331. Panagiotou, Spiro. 1981. "The 'Parmenides' and the 'Communion of Kinds' in the 'Sophist'." *Hermes* no. 109:167–171.

"The section on the Communion of Kinds in the *Sophist* is prefaced with an outline of the view that in calling the same thing by many names we make it 'many', and are thus guilty of contradiction: we make what is 'one' to be 'many' and vice versa (251 A - C). The language here leaves no doubt that this aspect of the 'one and many' problem ought to be regarded as specious (cf. 251 B 5 - 6; C 4), although the Stranger does not explain why it should be so regarded. After making some derogatory remarks on those who are impressed by this aspect of the problem, the Stranger abruptly turns to the section on the Communion of Kinds. Though we are not told so, we may be certain that the two sections are related and that the Communion of Kinds has something to do with problems of the 'one and many' variety. We may, furthermore, fill in some of the missing details by considering what Plato has to say on the same topic in the *Philebus*." (p. 168)

332. Pappas, Nickolas. 2013. "Introduction." *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*:277–282.

Abstract: "Plato's *Sophist* is part of the most striking change that occurs within the chronology of his dialogues. Their dramatic presentation changes, the main speaker Socrates replaced by the Eleatic stranger. The dialogues still seek to define terms, but now use the method of division and collection and succeed where earlier attempts used to fail. They transform Platonic metaphysics to include the great kind *heteron* "other," which points the way to a new enterprise of understanding the reality of appearance rather than opposing appearance to reality. The seven papers collected in this part explore metaphysical, methodological, and pedagogical topics explored in or arising from the *Sophist*. Their subjects include the other, number (*arithmos*), power (*dunamis*), mixture, appearance, and myth."

333. ———. 2013. "The Story that Philosophers Will Be Telling of the Sophist." *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* no. 13:338–352.

Abstract: "Plato's stranger exemplifies the impulse to move beyond myth into logos, anticipating the later author Palaephatus. The stranger wishes earlier philosophers had not mythologized being to their students; he works to define the sophist so as to escape myths about that figure. Yet reading the *Sophist* alongside Palaephatus illuminates how far myth continues to permeate this work. The sophist's moneymaking is mythologized into his wildness. The stranger's closing words about announcing the meaning of the sophist hark back to a dense mythic passage from the *Iliad*. If philosophy begins by bidding good-bye to myth, it has not left home yet."

334. Partenie, Catalin. 2004. "Imprint: Heidegger Interpretation of Platonic Dialectic in the *Sophist* lectures (1924-25)." In *Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue*, edited by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 42–71. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

"My essay will follow one episode of this Platonic-Heideggerian interplay. The episode has at its core four theses centered upon the Platonic dialectic that Heidegger advances in his lectures on Plato's *Sophist*. I shall argue that these theses, although they reveal a biased reading of Plato, manage to draw our attention to a genuine and important Platonic distinction, usually overlooked, between authentic and inauthentic human existence, and that this distinction also lies at the core of the fundamental ontology expounded in *Being and Time*. At the close of the essay I shall address, but only in a preliminary way, the question of why Heidegger did not acknowledge this Platonic imprint on his *Being and Time*.

The lectures on Plato's *Sophist* were delivered at the University of Marburg during the winter semester 1924–25. They contain a running commentary of the *Sophist* completed by extensive analyses of book Z of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, book A (chapters 1 and 2) of the *Metaphysics*, and the *Phaedrus*.

Of the many theses Heidegger advances in these lectures (whose published text counts 653 pages), I shall focus here on four, centered upon the Platonic dialectic." (pp. 42-43)

335. ———. 2016. "Heidegger: Sophist and Philosopher." In *Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25)*, edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 61–74. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

"Heidegger's Lectures on Plato's *Sophist* are a long and complex affair. In their opening section, entitled "Preliminary Considerations", Heidegger claims that a double preparation is required for an interpretation of Plato's late dialogues: one philosophical-phenomenological, the other historiographical-hermeneutical." (p. 61)

(...)

"Usually, scholars go "from Socrates and the Presocratics to Plato"; Heidegger, however, will go from "Aristotle back to Plato" (11). Why? Because "what Aristotle said is what Plato placed at his disposal, only it is said more radically and developed more scientifically" (11-12)." (p. 62)

(...)

"So, we know how to grasp in the right way the past we encounter in Plato: through Aristotle. But how are we to grasp in the right way the past we encounter in Aristotle? In other words, if Aristotle is going to be the guiding line for our interpretation of Plato, what

will be our guiding line for the interpretation of Aristotle? Who said more radically, and developed more scientifically, what Aristotle placed at our disposal? Nobody, Heidegger claims. Aristotle "was not followed by anyone greater", so "we are forced to leap into his own philosophical work in order to gain an orientation" (12), or guiding line. In what follows I shall argue that Heidegger's actual guiding line throughout the lectures was not Aristotle, but his own thinking at the time, which he brought to its fullest development in the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time*." (p. 62)

336. Pasqualoni, Anthony. 2023. "Thought, Memory, and Being in Plato's *Sophist*." *Archai. The Origins of Western Thought* no. 33:1–26.

Abstract: "Thinking as described in Plato's *Sophist* undergoes two basic changes: it progresses by shifting from one to many and it regresses by shifting from many to one. The change from one to many is generative; the change from many to one is reductive. These opposing changes provide a tension for thinking, and like Heraclitus' bow string, this tension gives thinking its efficacy. Thinking would wander and accumulate endlessly unless it regresses from many to one. Yet, thinking would stagnate if it could not progress from one to many. Both changes are essential characteristics of thinking, and both rest on memory. Memory constitutes the foundation of thought."

337. Pavani, Anna. 2025. "The Dialectical Function of Names in the 'Sophist'." *Apeiron* no. 58 (2):165–180.

Abstract: "Language plays a pivotal role in Plato's *Sophist*. Scholarly attention has focused primarily on verbs, especially the verb "to be," and on statements. In this paper, I take a step back and focus on names (*onomata*) to argue that the very act of attributing a name (*onomazein*) plays a crucial role in the dialectical enterprise.

Specifically, I argue that in the so-called Outer Part of the *Sophist*, names (*onomata*) contribute (i) to determining the project of the *Sophist*, (ii) to understanding how the interlocutors aim to track down the sophist, and (iii) to making sense of the whole development of the search for the sophist. (i) I shall defend the claim that the *Sophist* and *Statesman* are to be understood as one answer to Socrates' opening question as to whether each of the three terms "sophist," "statesman," and "philosopher" picks out a distinct *genos* (217a7–9). (ii) In order to distinguish each of the three terms from the others, the interlocutors employ the Method of Collection and Division, which has been variously interpreted in the secondary literature. By means of a close reading of a largely overlooked passage (i.e., *Sph.* 227a7–c6), I shall show that the act of naming has a unifying function and that Collection and Division aim to apprehend what is akin and what is not by considering all possible objects under scrutiny as equally worthy of investigation. I shall further show that we can rightly speak of Division and Collection, since there is Collection in the Outer Part of the *Sophist*. (iii) Finally, I shall show that the pattern that develops through the sequence of the Divisions moves backwards, making us go back to what has been said to be the only common ground of the joint inquiry, namely the name "sophist," and to the very first assumption this name reveals, namely that the sophist must possess a *technê* because of his name."

338. Peck, Arthur Leslie. 1952. "Plato and the ΜΕΓΙΣΤΑ ΓΕΝΗ of the *Sophist*. A Reinterpretation." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 2:32–56.

"It is important to recognize that the problem dealt with by Plato in the central part of the *Sophist* (232 b-264 d) is one which arises from the use of certain Greek phrases, and has no necessary or direct connexion with metaphysics (although the solution of it which Plato offers has an important bearing on the defence of his own metaphysical theory against one particular kind of attack).

We tend to obscure this fact if we use English terms such as 'Being', 'Reality', 'Existence', etc., in discussing the dialogue, and indeed make it almost impossible to understand what Plato is trying to do. It is the way in which the Greek terms ὄν and μή ὄν and other such terms are used by the 'sophists' which gives rise to the problem." (32)

(...)

"It is not easy to suppose that Plato thought the business of the true philosopher, as described at *Sophist* 253 d-e, consisted in spending his time on such verbal futilities as saying that Rest is not Motion, Motion is the same as itself, Motion is other than Being, etc. (Indeed, even in the discussion in the *Sophist*, the Eleatic Visitor and Theaetetus require no 'high art' to see that Rest and Motion cannot 'mix'.) The difficulties caused by sophistic verbal conjuring must, of course, be overcome by the philosopher; but once they are overcome, the philosopher can go forward with his own proper work. It is indeed surprising that the view has ever been entertained that the business of the true philosopher, as described in *Sophist* 253 d-e, is illustrated by the argument about the μέγιστα γένη. The philosopher's work, as epitomized in the phrases κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι (253 d) and διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι (253 e), is surely much more closely represented by the making of 'Divisions', of which semi-serious examples are given in the earlier part of the dialogue, than by the discussion about the μέγιστα γένη. It is, of course, true that any such work of Division would be blocked at the outset so long as the τό μη ὄν ουκ ἔστιν objection held the field; but once that objection is cleared away the course is open for the true dialectical philosopher to proceed with his work." (p. 56)

339. ———. 1962. "Plato's "Sophist": The συμπλοκή τῶν εἰδῶν." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 7:46–66.

In Plato's *Sophist*, at 259 E 4 ff., we read the following sentence:

τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων: διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν [The complete separation of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse. For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another (*translation added*)].

A few pages later, at 263 A2 and 8, we find these examples of λόγος:

‘Θεαίτητος κάθηται, [Theaetetus sits] Θεαίτητος πέτεται [Theaetetus flies].

The difficulty which seems to present itself is that these examples of λόγος do not illustrate what is said in the second part of the sentence quoted." (p. 46)

(...)

"The amount of effort expended by Plato in combating the activities of 'sophists' and ἀντιλογικοὶ is itself an indication of the prevalence and (as he felt it) the danger to

philosophy of the kind of talk which was in vogue. The danger of this attitude, as Plato saw it, was its superficiality, its undue preoccupation with words instead of realities."

(...)

"Plato's attack, then, is against those who confine their attention to terminology, who fail to consider whether their terminology is a correct representation of the facts, or who believe it is a reliable index to truth and reality - or think they can floor Plato by specious verbal manipulations.

It will, I believe, be found that μετέχειν and all the various verbs and nouns used to denote 'combining' and 'mixing' in the *Sophist* imply no more than that two terms can be used together in the same sentence without self-contradiction." (p. 66)

340. Pelletier, Francis Jeffry. 1975. "'Incompatibility' in Plato's *Sophist*." *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 14:143–146.

"I want to consider a much-disputed reading of a certain critical area of Plato's *Sophist*. It is widely agreed by most commentators that in this text, between 255E and 259E there occurs a refutation of Parmenides' dictum that "one cannot say that which is not", and that this is followed by an application of the foregoing discussion to the problems of sentential falsity. (For a partial list of commentators, see bibliography.) It is also generally agreed that Plato uses the Form, The Different, for this purpose. What is not generally agreed upon is how Plato uses The Different." (p. 143)

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341. ———. 1983. "Plato on Not-Being: Some Interpretations of the συμπλοκή εἶδον (259e) and Their Relation to Parmenides Problem." In *Midwest Studies in Philosophy VIII*, edited by French, Peter A., Uehling Jr., Theodore E. and Wettstein, Howard K., 35–65.

"We have witnessed," says Mourelatos (1979: p. 3), "in the 'sixties and 'seventies, in English language scholarship, that rarest of phenomena in the study of ancient philosophy, the emergence of a consensus." This interpretation is so agreed upon that "one may even speak of a standard Anglo-American interpretation of Parmenides." One of the presentations counted by Mourelatos as standard, indeed one of the paradigms, is that of Furth (1968). According to this interpretation, Parmenides' infamous ontological views follow as corollaries from his implicit views about language and meaning. I will briefly present this Parmenidean view about language, but I will not here try to justify the attribution (for these sorts of arguments see Furth, 1968; Mourelatos, 1979; and Pelletier, *forthcoming* [1990]).

In this paper, I am interested in the Platonic response to Parmenides, especially the response that occurs in the middle portion of the *Sophist* (249-265). Since I am going to evaluate this as a response to the "standard interpretation" of Parmenides, it is clear that I owe a justification for my belief that Plato understood his opponent to be our "standard Parmenides." This issue, too, I will avoid here (further discussion can be found in Pelletier [1990], which discusses the "Parmenidean" arguments of *Sophist* 237-241, *Theaetetus*, 188-189, and *Cratylus* 429-430, with an eye toward showing that Plato was aware of these types of argument.)" (p. 35)

"It seems that one way to clarify the details of the interpretation of Parmenides is to investigate the *symplokê eidôn* of the *Sophist*. Unfortunately, Plato's position is also open to a variety of interpretations and cannot be convincingly elucidated in the absence of a precise account of what Parmenides' argument was. One, therefore, wishes to set up all the possible interpretations of Parmenides and all the interpretations of the *symplokê eidôn* and then to inspect these lists to discover which pairs of Parmenidean/Platonic interpretations mesh the best. This, it seems to me, would provide the best evidence possible that one had finally gotten both Plato and Parmenides right. I will not attempt that Herculean task. Rather, I will state one interpretation of Parmenides, Furth's, and ask which of the many ways to understand Plato's position best accords with that interpretation of Parmenides. (p. 36)

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342. ———. 1990. *Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction XI-XXI; 1. Methodological preliminaries 1; 2. Parmenides' problem 8; 3. Plato's problems 22; 4. Some interpretations of the *symploke*

eidon 45; 5. The Philosopher's language 94, Works cited 149; Index locorum 155; Name Index 159; Subject index 163-166.

343. Peramatzis, Michail. 2020. "Conceptions of Truth in Plato's *Sophist*." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 102:333–378.

Abstract: "The paper seeks to specify how, according to Plato's *Sophist*, true statements achieve their being about objects and their saying that 'what is about such objects is'. Drawing on the 6th definition of the sophist, I argue for a normative-teleological conception of truth in which the best condition of our soul—in its making statements or having mental states—consists in its seeking to attain the *telos* of truth. Further, on the basis of Plato's discussion of original and image, his distinction between correct and incorrect image, and the 7th definition, I argue that achieving the *telos* of truth involves preserving the original's proportions and appropriate features. The view that Plato's conception of truth takes statements or mental states to be certain types of image is not ground-breaking. The important contribution of my argument is that it offers a plausible way to understand two recalcitrant claims made by Plato: first, that falsity obtains not only in the region of incorrect images (appearances) but also within correct images (likenesses); second, that some incorrect images are based on knowledge and so could be true."

344. Perl, Eric D. 2014. "The Motion of Intellect On the Neoplatonic Reading of *Sophist* 248e-249d." *The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* no. 8:138–160.

Abstract: "This paper defends Plotinus' reading of *Sophist* 248e-249d as an expression of the togetherness or unity-in-duality of intellect and intelligible being. Throughout the dialogues Plato consistently presents knowledge as a togetherness of knower and known, expressing this through the myth of recollection and through metaphors of grasping, eating, and sexual union. He indicates that an intelligible paradigm is in the thought that apprehends it, and regularly regards the forms not as extrinsic "objects" but as the contents of living intelligence. A meticulous reading of *Sophist* 248e-249d shows that the "motion" attributed to intelligible being is not temporal change but the activity of intellectual apprehension. Aristotle's doctrines of knowledge as identity of intellect and the intelligible, and of divine intellect as thinking itself, are therefore in continuity with Plato, and Plotinus' doctrine of intellect and being is continuous with both Plato and Aristotle."

345. Petterson, Olof. 2018. "The Science of Philosophy: Discourse and Deception in Plato's *Sophist*." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 22:221–237.

Abstract: "At 252e1 to 253c9 in Plato's *Sophist*, the Eleatic Visitor explains why philosophy is a science. Like the art of grammar, philosophical knowledge corresponds to a generic structure of discrete kinds and is acquired by systematic analysis of how these kinds intermingle. In the literature, the Visitor's science is either understood as an expression of a mature and authentic platonic metaphysics, or as a sophisticated illusion staged to illustrate the seductive lure of sophistic deception. By showing how the Visitor's account of the science of philosophy is just as comprehensive, phantasmatic and self-concealing as the art of sophistry identified at the dialogue's outset, this paper argues in favor of the latter view. "

346. Pfefferkorn, Julia, and Spinelli, Antonino, eds. 2021. *Platonic Mimesis Revisited*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

Contents: Julia Pfefferkorn, Antonino Spinelli: Revisiting Mimesis in Plato: An Introduction 7; Stephen Halliwell: The Shifting Problems of Mimesis in Plato 27; Michael Erler: Performanz und Analyse. Mimesis als Nachmachen – ein Element traditioneller Paideia in Platons früheren Dialogen und seine Analyse in den *Nomoi* 47; Andrea Capra: Imitatio Socratis from the Theatre of Dionysus to Plato's Academy 63; Anna Pavani: The Essential Imitation of Names: On Cratylean Mimesis 81; Laura Candioto: Mimesis and Recollection 103; Elenio Cicchini: Der mimische Charakter. Mimos und Mimesis in der Philosophie Platons 123; Justin Vlasits: Plato on Poetic and Musical Representation 147; Irmgard Männlein-Robert: Mit Blick auf das Göttliche oder Mimesis für Philosophen in *Politeia* und *Nomoi* 167; Lidia Palumbo: Mimêsis teorizzata e mimêsis realizzata nel *Sofista* platonico 193; Michele Abbate: Der Sophist als mimêtês tôn ontôn (*Sph.* 235a1 f.). Ontologische Implikationen 211; Alexandra V. Alván León: Wolf im Hundepelz: Mimesis als Täuschung in der Kunst des *Sophisten* 225; Benedikt Strobel: Bild und falsche Meinung in Platons *Sophistes* 249; Francesco Fronterotta: Generation as μίμησις and κόσμος as μίμημα: Cosmological Model, Productive Function and the Arrangement of the χώρα in Plato's *Timaeus* 275; Antonino Spinelli: Mimoumenoi tas tou theou periphoras. Die Mimesis des Kosmos als menschliche Aufgabe im *Timaios* 291; José Antonio Giménez: Gesetz und Mimesis im *Politikos* 313; Julia Pfefferkorn: Plato's Dancing City: Why is Mimetic Choral Dance so Prominent in the *Laws*? 335; Index Locorum 359–376.

347. Philip, James Allenby. 1961. "Mimesis in the *Sophistes* of Plato." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* no. 92:453–468.

"If a generalized use of mimesis was current in Plato's time, it was current as an extension of a more specific use. We shall find in Plato instances of both the specific and the generalized use and instances in which, because Plato allowed them to co-exist, the meaning and connotations of the one overlap those of the other, and ambiguities arise. Already in the *Republic* these two senses of mimesis, the specific or dramatic sense and the generalized or metaphysical sense, are both present. They are exhibited again in the final division of the *Sophistes* as two classes related to one another as genus to species. When we have delimited the two senses in the *Republic* we will consider their relation in the *Sophistes* and its implications." (pp. 453-454)

(...)

"We must then ask ourselves: What enables us to know? and by what process of knowing do we make ourselves like the object of our knowledge?"

(...)

So we affirm that in the wide spectrum of meaning given to mimesis in the Platonic dialogues we can distinguish two principal senses: a restricted or dramatic sense of making oneself like another, and a wider sense describing the creative processes in all the productive crafts; and further that in the final division of the *Sophistes* we find the latter related to the former as genus to species." (p. 468)

348. ———. 1968. "False Statement in the *Sophistes*." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* no. 99:315–327.

"I shall limit myself to showing what are the moves he makes, and how he reaches the conclusion he does reach.

The question whether Plato's doctrine is tenable, in whole or in part, in terms of modern logic is beyond the scope of this study.

The discussion of false statement falls into five parts, each part corresponding to a move in the development of the thesis. It will be convenient to conduct our discussion conforming to these divisions:

1. 256D11-258C7: Not-being and its two kinds.
2. 258C7-260A1: Summing up against Parmenides.
3. 260A1-261C6: The problem of statement (*logos*).
4. 261C7-263A1: Basic doctrine of meaning and statement.
5. 263A1-263D5 : Test case : "Theaetetus flies" etc.

It must be remembered throughout that Plato is single-mindedly pursuing his purpose, which is to show that false statement as τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγειν is possible; and further that this phrase means: (a) in the Parmenidean sense, (if anything) nothing relevant to our inquiry, (b) in a modified sense, to say what is not as what is other than (or different from) X, and (c) to make a false statement. This last sense is for Plato's purpose the important one. He will use it to differentiate between the activities of the sophist and the philosopher, and to justify his relegating the sophist to the class of purveyors of false statement.

It must also be remembered that, here as elsewhere, Plato for all his frequent prolixity excludes from his argument what he does not consider essential to it. In the present instance he attempts no general logical doctrine." (pp. 315-316)

349. ———. 1968. "The apographa of Plato's *Sophistes*." *Phoenix* no. 22:289–298.

Since Burnet's edition of Plato it has been recognized that B, T, and W are primary sources for the first half of the Platonic corpus, and for most of those dialogues, including the *Sophistes*, the only primary sources. (In the Budé *Sophistes*, edited by Diès, Y is cited in the apparatus as a primary source; though this has been shown to be the case for other parts of Y it is not the case for the *Sophistes*, as will appear below.) All other manuscripts are conceded to be apographa of these, and their mutual relations have been in part explored. They have not been examined systematically, on the basis of collations, to discover precisely how they depend on one another and whether any of the manuscripts other than the principal three can be primary sources for our tradition in whole or in part." (p. 289)

Codices referred to by sigla are as follows: B = Clarkianus 39 of the Bodleian Library, Oxford; T = Ven.app.cl. 4.1 (542 in the new numbering of Mioni's catalogue) of the Marciana Library, Venice; W = Vind.suppl.phil.gr.7, Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna; Y = Vind.phil.gr.21, Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna. All other codices are referred to by the abbreviation of their library designations; a list is given in Post [L. A. Post, *The Vatican Plato and its Relations* (Middletown 1934)]; I shall discuss the primary source manuscripts, B, T, and W, in a separate study.

350. ———. 1969. "The *Megista Gene* of the *Sophistes*." *Phoenix* no. 23:89–103.

"Five common concepts or *megista gene* -- being, identity, difference, motion and rest-play a key role in the *Sophistes*. (1) They are not an innovation. Allusion is made to them, and to similar concepts, in earlier dialogues. Already in the *Phaedo* (103E-105C) certain ideas having a mathematical character-equality, oddness, evenness-are recognized not as a special category but as functioning in special ways and having peculiar problems. It is in the *Parmenides* that we first encounter them as a grouping. (2) There *Parmenides* introduces them as similar ideas specially suited to the training of neophytes in dialectic. The ideas mentioned are (136A-B): unity/plurality, similarity/dissimilarity, motion/rest, being/non-being, coming-to-be/passing away. To these are later added identity/difference (139B) and equality/inequality (140B)." (pp. 89-90, note 1 partly omitted)

(...)

"Let us now turn to the *Sophistes*. If we are to understand the role of the *megista gene* we must observe how and in what context they are introduced. The critical issue of the whole dialogue is approached by an episode to which Plato has given the name *Gigantomachia*, or Battle of the Giants. In this episode idealists and empiricists are pitted against one another in bitter conflict. Their ideological quarrel is about οὐσία.

The giants maintain that only what has physical body and is perceptible to touch or contact may be said to be real, or to exist. The idealists maintain that the only genuine reality/substance is to be found in incorporeal, intelligible kinds or ideas, physical body being merely genesis or change and process.

In the thesis of the idealists we have in its most uncompromising form Plato's *chorismos* of intelligibles and sensibles. But we find Plato not, as we might expect, championing the cause of the Friends of the Ideas, as he calls his idealists. Instead he attempts to mediate. Let us observe how he does so, remembering always that he develops only such aspects of his metaphysical assumptions as seems to him necessary for the theme he is treating." (p. 92)

(1) I use for *megista gene* "common concepts." That equivalent is suggested by *Tht.* 185c 4, and Ryle has pointed out in *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics*, ed. R. E. Allen (London 1965) 146 that it is used also by Aristotle. So it may have had some currency in the Academy. To translate by "greatest," "highest," "very important," is to suggest that they occupy a place in some hierarchy of concepts or ideas, whereas their importance derives from the fact that they are topic-neutral and of almost universal application. Their logical importance has been pointed out by Ryle, *loc. cit.*, and in *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, ed. R. Bambrough (London 1965) 64-65. My debt to those discussions will be obvious.

(2) By "first" I mean first in the order Plato assigned to the dialogues -- *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophistes*, *Politicus*. I shall treat the *Timaeus* as subsequent to these. I shall not attempt to discuss again the actual date of writing of any dialogue or part of a dialogue. Relative dating does not affect my thesis here. It ceases to be of major importance if we accept even in part the Krämer/Gaiser theory of *agrapha dogmata*.

351. Pippin, Robert B. 1979. "Negation and Not-Being in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and Plato's *Sophist*." *Kant Studien* no. 70:179–196.

"The origins of our contemporary fascination with language are, of course, quite complex and go to the very heart of that persistent twentieth-century attempt to see philosophy as a "critique of language". But, in investigating those origins, it does no one an injustice to insist

upon the importance of Ludwig Wittgenstein and especially his little book, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, in bringing the issue to the prominence it enjoys today."

(...)

"In fact, [Wittgenstein] seems to return quite explicitly to Plato's account of language as an *eidolon* in a dialogue like the *Sophist*. In a certain sense, one could claim that the central problem of dialogues like the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* was Wittgenstein's major concern in his early work."

(...)

"Further, in the opinion of some commentators, the Eleatic Stranger and Wittgenstein not only begin with very similar problems, they seem to arrive at very similar solutions.

The picture theory's representational model of language's relation to the world, the ontology taken by some to be supported by the picture theory (Wittgenstein's infamous "simples"), the doctrines of logical space and the "form" of objects, and perhaps more than any other issue, Wittgenstein's "derivative" explanation of negation (the claim that any not-X depends on X for its intension and the claim that it has no negative extension, that there are no negative facts), all count as evidence for Platonic shadows stretching across the *Tractatus*. This seems especially true when we consider that Wittgenstein regarded as a major consequence of the picture theory its ability to account for meaningful, false propositions, that it could explain how "Thought can be of what is not the case".

Plato's discussion of images is clearly and directly concerned with much the same problem in "capturing" the elusive sophist.

In the following, I will consider two such comparable issues- the general theory of language involved in both accounts, and their specific solution to the problem of negation and false propositions. What I hope to accomplish by this contrast is to illuminate two very different kinds of analyses appropriate to the topic of "not-being", differences one could roughly characterize as "semantic" versus "ontological". Further, this difference in orientation and in emphasis will involve differences within each mode; specifically it will involve a "picture" versus an "image" theory of language, and atomistic versus nonatomistic ontologies." (pp. 179-180, notes omitted)

352. Pirocacos, Elly. 1998. *False Belief and the Meno Paradox*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Abstract: "The *Sophist* is a dialogue that may be addressed as a sequel to the *Theaetetus*. It also finds Socrates suspended of his capacity as director of inquiry, and replaced by an Eleatic Stranger. The difficulty of the task is located in the form of refutative argumentation adopted by each, and therefore involves the evaluation of the justifying epistemological systems supporting each. The stage setting of the *Sophist* is even more involved than the three phased report of the dialogue in the *Theaetetus*. The philosophical persuasion of the Stranger deserves special attention, especially given that he has been assigned the role to designate the criteria of philosophical inquiry by way of establishing the true relations between the tripartite subjects of inquiry. Both *Theaetetus* and the Eleatic Stranger are agreed that being and not-being are equally puzzling terms; but *Theaetetus* seems to have understood the objective of the present dialogue in a slightly different way."

353. Pitteloud, Luca. 2014. "Is the Sensible an Illusion? The Revisited Ontology of the *Sophist*." *Aufklärung* no. 1:33–57.

"I want to argue in this paper that, in the *Sophist*, behind the discussion about the nature of non-being, Plato provides the reader some elements about a revision of his ontology. First, the analysis of the notion of image gives some indications concerning the nature of the sensible, which is usually described as an image of the intelligible (*Republic* 509a9 and 509e1-2, *Timaeus* 52c).

Second, since the dialogue seems to assume that not only Forms are part of the realm of being, but what is in motion too, it will appear that sensible objects must somehow belong to being. The focus of this paper is the revision of the nature of the sensible." (p. 33)

(...)

"Conclusion: A new realm of being

The Friends of the Forms have to admit that Forms are acted upon but not that they change. In this way, they could easily defend the idea that for a Form, to be known, does not imply any alteration or change. *Nevertheless*, they seem to accept another different thesis, namely that some objects that are in motion belong to the realm of being. The Eleatic Stranger asks the question of the *pantelôs on* (248e7): this does not refer to what is really being (*ontôs on*), but to the total family of being. To this realm of being belong motion (κίνησις), life (ψυχήν) and intelligence (φρόνησιν). In this way, the *Sophist* does not only assert that an image cannot be reduced to non-being, but also that what is in motion is part of the realm of being. Those two elements seem to plead for a revaluation of the nature of the sensible, which has to be part of the set of being. We face an ontology with two degrees of being: the intelligible and its image, namely the sensible. The sensible is not reducible to an illusion or to falsehood (and nothingness), but is somehow a being. As the *Timaeus* will explain it, it is the image of the intelligible appearing into a milieu (the Receptacle), which guaranties to it some degree of existence (*Timaeus*, 52b3-d1)." (pp. 52-53)

354. Planinc, Zdravko. 2015. "Socrates and the Cyclops: Plato's Critique of 'Platonism' in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 31:159–217.

Abstract: "The Eleatic Stranger plays a central role in all reconstructions of Plato's "Platonism."

This paper is a study of the literary form of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* and its significance for interpreting the Eleatic's account of the nature of philosophy. I argue that the Eleatic dialogues are best understood through a comparison with the source-texts in the *Odyssey* that Plato used in their composition. I show that the literary form of the *Sophist* is a straightforward reworking of the encounter of Odysseus and his crewmen with Polyphemus the Cyclops; and that the form of the *Statesman* is a somewhat more complex reworking of the narrative in which Odysseus and those loyal to him oppose Antinoös, leader of the Ithacan suitors. The comparison reveals that the Eleatic Stranger is no way Plato's spokesman. On the contrary: by casting the Stranger in the role of Polyphemus and the Cyclopean Antinoös, Plato intends the *Sophist* and *Statesman* to be read as an explicit critique of the metaphysical and political doctrines that have since come to be identified as Platonism. In Plato's characterization, the Eleatic Stranger is neither a philosopher nor a

sophist. He is an intellectual—the sort of person who professes to be a philosopher and is often mistaken for one."

355. Politis, Vasilis. 2006. "The Argument for the Reality of Change and Changelessness in Plato's *Sophist* (248e7-249d5)." In *New Essays on Plato: Language and Thought in Fourth-Century Greek Philosophy*, edited by Herrmann, Fritz-Gregor, 149–175. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales.

"Plato's metaphysics, from beginning to end, is tiered rather than tier-less.(1) This is because Plato's general account of reality is characterized by a fundamental distinction between certain things, especially the changeless forms, which he argues are perfect beings,(2) and certain other things, the changing objects of sense-perception, which he argues are something, as opposed to being nothing at all, only in virtue of being appropriately related to and dependent on those perfect beings.(3) However, in a dialogue addressed to the very question, 'What is there?' – and to the related question, 'What is being?' – he defends an answer which, so it appears, makes no reference to two tiers of reality and indicates rather a tier-insensitive ontology. This is the argument in the *Sophist* (248e7–249d5) which, together with the arguments that precede it in the dialogue, is summed up in the conclusion that any changing thing (κινούμενον), and likewise any changeless thing (ἀκίνητον, στάσιμον), is something that is.(4) There can be no doubt that this conclusion is about any changing thing and any changeless thing, and there is no suggestion, moreover, that the things referred to must occupy one or the other of two tiers of reality.

Following Julius Moravcsik and Gwil Owen, Lesley Brown has recently defended a tier-insensitive interpretation of this argument, such that the 'upshot is an all-inclusive ontology'.(5) On the other hand, a number of critics, including David Ross, Harold Cherniss, and Michael Frede, have defended a tiered interpretation.(6) It seems to me, however, that the choice between these two interpretations – which evidently is of central importance for the understanding of Plato – has not been properly characterized, much less settled. My aim in this paper is to show, first, that the choice between these two fundamentally different and opposed interpretations of this argument, the tier-insensitive and the tiered interpretation, depends on how we read the single phrase, τὸ παντελῶς ὄν, at 248e8–249a1; and second, that the correct reading of this phrase commits us to a tiered interpretation beyond reasonable doubt, and that Plato's formulation of the conclusion (249c10–d4), which sums up both this and the previous arguments in the dialogue, does not state a commitment to a tier-insensitive ontology." (pp. 149-150)

(1) See for example *Phaedo* 74 (esp. 74d5–8), 78–9 (esp. 79a6–7), 100b1–e7; *Republic* 475e9 ff.; *Symposium* 210e6–211b5; *Timaeus* 27d6–28a4, 51d3–52a7 (I am assuming that the *Timaeus* is a late dialogue); *Philebus* 58e4–59a9, 61d10–e3.

(2) παντελῶς ὄντα (*Republic* 477a3 and *Sophist* 248e8–249a1; see below). Also εἰλικρινῶς ὄντα (e.g. *Republic* 477a7, 478d6), ἀληθινὴ οὐσία (e.g. *Sophist* 246b8), ὄντως ὄν / οὐσία (e.g. *Timaeus* 28a3–4, 52c5 and *Sophist* 248a11), and sometimes simply οὐσία (e.g. *Phaedo* 78d1 and *Sophist* 246c2). Plato's terminology is not fixed, indeed reconciling, or otherwise, his terms is an inquiry of long standing.

(3) i.e. the relation of one-way dependence which Plato sometimes refers to as 'participation' and 'communion' (μέθεξις, κοινωνία).

(4) The conclusion is stated at 249c10–d4. It is important to observe (as we will see in section 6) that this conclusion sums up not only the immediately preceding argument (248e7–249c9), i.e. the argument against the friends of the forms (which is our present concern), but also the earlier argument against the materialists (246e5–247c8, which is not our main concern at present).

(5) Brown 1998, 204. Moravcsik (1962, 31 and 35–41) argues that Plato defends an ‘all-inclusive’ and ‘tier-insensitive’ answer to the question ‘What exists?’ So too Owen 1986b [originally 1966], 41–4 [336–40]. A tier-insensitive interpretation is also defended by Teloh 1981, 194–5 and Bordt 1991, 514, 520, 528.

(6) see Ross 1951, 110–11; Cherniss 1965, 352; Frank 1986; Frede, 1996, 196; and Silverman 2002.

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356. Priest, Graham. 2014. *One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Part II. Chapter 9: *In Search of Falsity*, 140–153.

357. Prior, William J. 1980. "Plato's Analysis of Being and Not-Being in the *Sophist*." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 18:199–211.

"In this paper I offer an account of Plato's analysis of Being and Not-Being in the *Sophist*. This account differs from those current in several important respects. First, although I take it that Plato distinguishes in the *Sophist* among existential statements, statements that are predicative in grammatical structure, and statements of identity, I do not believe that he distinguishes corresponding senses or uses of the verb "to be." Second, I do not take Plato's analysis to be linguistic or logical in nature, but rather metaphysical or ontological. In my view, the Greek verb "*esti*" is analyzed in terms of a metaphysical theory, the Theory of Forms, and specifically in terms of the metaphysical concept of participation. This indicates a third difference between my view and that of commentators who believe that Plato's late dialogues show a trend away from transcendent metaphysics and toward a more neutral sort of conceptual analysis. As I shall hold that the genuine conceptual breakthrough of the *Sophist* is made with metaphysical apparatus not much changed from the *Phaedo*, I deny that this passage, at least, can be taken as evidence for such a trend.

The passage in which Plato makes his analysis is *Soph.* 251a-257c. I shall examine briefly the entire passage, but concentrate on 255e-256e, from which I draw the bulk of the material for my account." (p. 199)

358. ———. 1985. *Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics*. London: Croom Helm.

Contents: Acknowledgments; Introduction: The problem of Plato's development 1; The metaphysics of the early and middle Platonic dialogues 9; 2. The challenge of the *Parmenides* 51; 3. The response of the *Timaeus* 87; 4. The *Sophist* 127; Appendix: The doctrinal maturity and chronological position of the *Timaeus* 168; Bibliography 194; Index 199-201.

359. Priou, Alex. 2013. "The Philosopher in Plato's *Sophist*." *Hermathena* no. 195:5–29.

"The above observations suggest that only by situating the arc of the *Sophist* between the *Theaetetus* and *Statesman* does the larger significance of its issues emerge. Obvious though this may sound, scholars who treat the *Sophist*'s place in the trilogy as a whole don't approach it from the perspective of Socrates' failure to define false opinion in the *Theaetetus*. As we have seen, Plato presents the Stranger's inquiry into being and non-being as a response to Socrates' shortcomings in the *Theaetetus*; and, as I hope to show, his response anticipates the specific inquiry taken up in the *Statesman*. Toward this end, I will walk the arc of the *Sophist*'s argument from the *Theaetetus* to the *Statesman* as follows. First, I will consider how the initial definitions of the sophist frame the dialogue's famous digression on images, being, and non-being (Section II). I will then consider how this frame necessitates the distinction of 'spoken images' (εἰδῶλα λεγόμενα) into φαντάσματα and εἰκόνες, i.e. those that respectively distort and preserve the proportions of the beings, the very distinction that eventually allows the Stranger to distinguish between true and false opinions (Section III).

Thereafter, I will discuss how this distinction in spoken images necessitates the acquisition of a 'dialectical science' (διαλεκτική ἐπιστήμη), which very acquisition appears intractably problematic (Section IV). I will then conclude with some general reflections on the stance of the dialogue as a whole, the possibility of defining false opinion, and how the interpretation

advanced informs the search for the statesman in the *Statesman* (Section V). My basic aim throughout will be to show that, in so situating the *Sophist* between its prequel *Theaetetus* and sequel *Statesman*, we come to see the place of the philosopher in Plato's *Sophist*." (pp. 7-8, noted omitted)

360. Proios, John D. 2023. "Plato, *Sophist* 259 c7–d7: contrary predication and genuine refutation." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 73:66–77.

Abstract: "This paper defends an interpretation of Plato, *Soph.* 259c7–d7, which describes a distinction between genuine and pretender forms of 'examination' or 'refutation' (ἔλεγχος). The passage speaks to a need, throughout the dialogue, to differentiate the truly philosophical method from the merely eristic method. But its contribution has been obscured by the appearance of a textual problem at 259c7–8. As a result, scholars have largely not recognized that the Eleatic Stranger recommends accepting contrary predication as a condition of genuine refutation. After reviewing various proposals to change the text, the paper defends this reading. Finally, the paper turns to the methodological significance of accepting contrary predication. The dialogue depicts contrary predication as an instance of a class of statements that compel the soul's disbelief. *Soph.* 259c7–d7 suggests that these kinds of statements are a crossroad: one can either reject them and turn to eristic discourse or accept them and practise genuine refutation. The paper reflects on what this indicates about Plato's meditations on contradiction and philosophy."

361. Przelecki, Marian. 1981. "On What there Is Not." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 8:123–129.

"It is my contention (which I shall try to defend in what follows) that the text of the dialogue contains thoughts and ideas that closely correspond to those characteristic of modern logical semantics. The difficulties which Plato is coping with and the solutions proposed by him find their explicit counterparts in the discussions of contemporary logicians and semanticists.

This statement, however, needs some qualification. The text of the dialogue is comprehensive and indefinite enough to allow for different readings and interpretations. It is only some interpretation of some of its fragments that may be said to yield that version of its problems which is suggested below. I would, however, contend that the interpretation advanced is a warranted one and the fragments so interpreted essential for the author's standpoint. One more point should be explicitly stated beforehand. Referring to what I call modern logical semantics, I mean by this a definite semantic theory: model theoretic semantics in its standard version, which might be regarded as a "classical" form of contemporary logical semantics. Some deviations from this use will be indicated in what follows.

The most important philosophical content of the dialogue is contained in its second part (esp. in the paragraphs 237-264). The main problem concerns the semantic characteristic of falsehood and, involved in it, notion of not-being." (p. 123)

362. Quandahl, Ellen. 1989. "What is Plato? Inference and Allusion in Plato's *Sophist*." *Rhetoric Review* no. 7:338–348.

"In this essay I will suggest that when rhetoricians consider the *Sophist*, they will find the opposition of Plato to Sophists disturbed. My argument is not particularly new; for several

decades scholars like E. A. Havelock, Mario Untersteiner, and G. B. Kerferd have been reevaluating, and indeed revaluating, Sophistic thought, and noticing similarities, rather than contradictions, between the Sophists and Plato's Socrates. And yet I think that for many rhetoricians "Plato" means *Phaedrus*, *Gorgias* and perhaps portions of the *Republic* and *Symposium*, dialogues that are all striking in their "literary" qualities and in their discussion of the "Forms," Plato's version of the "foundations" around which the recurrent foundational/antifoundational debate centers. But the *Sophist*, rather than disproving sophistic relativism, provides philosophical underpinnings for the view that meaning is contextual and not absolute. At the level of inference—and the *Sophist* has often been seen as prototypically "logical"—we see in this dialogue how logical categories are in fact metaphorical. And if we read it with "literary" or "rhetorical" eyes, although it lacks the "poetic" quality of other dialogues, we find an extended illustration of ways in which words are allusive, replete with covert histories which, fully as much as "logical" inference, contribute to conclusions." (pp. 338-339)

(...)

"Whether Plato abandoned the theory of Forms or loyalty to his character Socrates in the late dialogues is not, at last, my concern. Rather, I want to question ways in which Plato has been appropriated and summarized, and the tradition in which the Plato of rhetoricians did not write the same texts as did the Plato of, say, logicians or ethicists. When rhetoricians add the *Sophist* to their Plato, Plato is no longer "Platonic," but a writer whose text acknowledges, both theoretically and by example, the power of contextual and contingent elements in rhetoric." (p. 347)

363. Ray, A. Chadwick. 1984. *For Images. An Interpretation of Plato's Sophist*. Lanham: University Press of America.

"Our dialogue is apparently an inquiry into the nature of the sophist. Theaetetus and Theodorus have kept their appointment with Socrates from the day before, when the Theaetetus is supposed to have transpired, (1) and after which Socrates was to go to the portico of the King Archon to meet the indictment of Meletus against him. (*Theaet.* 210d) Socrates, the lover of wisdom, has been indicted by Meletus on charges of "criminal meddling," inquiring into natural phenomena, making the weaker argument defeat the stronger, (*Apol.* 19b-c) and embracing atheism (*Apol.* 26c). The philosopher seems to have been mistaken in the popular mind for a sophist. His defense, the *Apology*, may be read largely as an attempt, adumbrated from the first sentence, to distinguish between appearance and reality; Socrates is not what his accusers make him appear to be. After Socrates has met the King Archon, it should not be surprising in the dramatic context if he shows a keen interest in the difference between the Philosopher and the Sophist. Thus the nature of the Sophist is to be today's topic.

A further reason for Socrates to bring the discussion to the nature of the Sophist is that Theodorus and Theaetetus have brought with them a guest from Elea, a student of the school of Parmenides and Zeno. Briefly, the "Eleatic School", as will become clearer, affirms the reality of being and denies the reality of any non-being, the upshot being (so the Stranger will suggest) that there could be no such thing as mere appearance or any falsehood, such as might seem to be real without being so. If the *Apology* presents a personal defense against false images propagated about Socrates, the *Sophist* can be seen in large part as a philosophical defense of the logical possibility of images at all. In fact, this will be the perspective of the present interpretation. As Socrates at the end of his life must give an

account of himself to answer his critics, so perhaps must Plato toward the end of his career answer some of his most astute critics.

The concept of an image is central to Plato's metaphysics because he explains how many things may be called by one name by appeal to that concept. Where a number of individuals are all called F, this is possible because of F-ness itself, a Form which is different from the individuals but of which these are called images. The Form is said to make the many things F (*Phaedo* 100d) as these come to mirror that Form, to resemble it to one degree or another. The relationship of "the many" to the Form, which accounts for their somehow having its character, is called participation or sharing, but the nature of this relationship is somewhat problematic. Plato's diffidence on the subject is evident in the middle dialogues both in his refusal to let any explanatory terms harden into technical vocabulary and from his own explicit tentativeness, as Socrates expresses it at *Phaedo* 100d. That the uncertainty remains in Plato's later thought, including the *Sophist*, will be evident in the present discussion. But the reality of images cannot be open to question.

Now Plato in the *Sophist* will identify certain Eleatically inspired challenges to his theory of participation and images, challenges which he will be able to answer in part from the resources of his own "classical theory" as developed in middle dialogues like the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. To the extent that those resources are sufficient, the *Sophist* is essentially a "conservative" dialogue upholding the adequacy of the classical theory to handle particular objections. On the other hand, new developments in Plato's thought are apparent in the dialogue, (the upgraded status of sensible objects, for instance), developments for which Plato probably would have found no need had he not taken seriously the problems of deceptive appearance and falsehood." (pp. 1-2)

(1) Clearly Plato is using these details as a literary device. The historical Socrates never addressed the issues treated here.

364. Reagan, James T. 1965. "Being and nonbeing in Plato's *Sophist*." *The Modern Schoolman* no. 42:305–314.

"I take it that the principal problem of the dialogue concerns the ontological status of the Forms, or true being: to discern a real differentiated plurality in being which will at once ground a true dialectic or science and repudiate the false dialectic of the *Sophist*. Plato is wholly lacking in any conception of what will later be called metaphysical analogy, which might permit an essentially differentiated plurality of being. The famous Hypotheses of the latter part of the *Parmenides* have established the controlling limits within which Plato must solve the problem of the metaphysical status of the Forms. In fact, he concludes to a plurality which is differentiated not in terms of essence but in terms of relations which remain outside the essence of the Forms. This in turn will require that he posit a new metaphysical factor, relative nonbeing. Finally, he will accept as the epitome of science or true knowledge the true but nonessential dialectic which this view of being will support." (p. 305)

365. Reeve, C. D. C. . 1985. "Motion, Rest, and Dialectic in the *Sophist*." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 67:47–64.

"If discourse is to be possible at all, some Kinds (γενε) (1) must blend (μετέχειν) with one another (251d5ff.).(2) To follow the 'late learners' (251b5-6) in refusing to allow one thing to share in another is 'to make short work of all theories' (252a5-6). But nor can it be that all

Kinds blend (252d2ff.), otherwise Motion itself would rest, and Rest itself would move, and both are impossible (252d6-11).⁽³⁾ We need some science then 'to be our guide on the voyage of discourse' (253d10) and to tell us 'which Kinds are consonant, which incompatible' (253b10-c1). The science in question is dialectic (253d1-3).

My present topic is one rather stormy section of that voyage, namely the Eleatic Stranger's dialectical remarks about Rest and Motion and their proper interpretation. However what I have to say bears directly on the larger issues of Dialectic and the Theory of Forms." (p. 47)

(...)

Conclusion

If the foregoing discussion is cogent, the Sophist contains a cleverly constructed trap, and many of the Eleatic Stranger's remarks about Rest and Motion cozen us into it. If we take his bait, and fail to learn the lessons he teaches us in his discussion of Not-being, the *Sophist* presents us with paradoxes and contradictions of the sort I have been addressing. These lead us to believe that Plato was himself confused and urge us to import solutions from elsewhere. (49) If, on the other hand, we detect the trap, and learn the lesson the Stranger has to teach, we solve his puzzles about Being and being known, and the paradoxes and contradictions disappear.

Of course no analytic philosopher would play tricks of this sort - we like our philosophy transparent not tricky. Thus we tend to mistrust, often rightly, readings of the great philosophers which exhibit them as other than plain. We all know, of course, that Plato was a great literary artist and a great teacher as well as a great thinker. And we know that art is artful and that teachers often leave dangling puzzles to test their pupils' acumen. But we often read Plato as if his art and pedagogical purposes were extraneous to his thought. The result is that we often get the thought wrong." (p. 62)

(1) 1 The Eleatic Stranger calls the five *μεγιστα γενε*, Being, Rest, Motion, Identity, and Difference, both *γενε* (254d4) and *ειδε* (255c5). He applies both appellations to *λογος* and *δοξα* (260a5, 260d7-8). At 255c12-d7 *τὸ καθ' αὐτό ἀνδ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο ἀρε ψαλλεδ εἶδε*. 'The question is thus unavoidably raised, Are all of these to be reckoned as Platonic Forms?', Peck (1962: 62). To postpone it for treatment on another occasion I adopt the following convention: I call all the items referred to either as *γενε* or as *ειδε* 'Kinds', and I leave open the question of whether or not Kinds are Forms.

(2) 2 Line references are to Burnet (1900). References are fully explained in the Bibliography.

(3) I have followed Vlastos (1970: 272n5) in using 'Motion' and 'Rest' as dummies for the Greek words *κινεσις* and *στασις* (and their cognates). I remind you that *κινεσις* covers all kinds of variation and that *στασις* stands for invariance in its most general sense.

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366. Rickless, Samuel C. 2010. "Plato's Definition(s) of Sophistry." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 30:289–298.

Abstract: "Plato's *Sophist* is puzzling inasmuch as it presents us with seven completely different definitions of sophistry. Though not all seven definitions could be accurate, Plato never explicitly indicates which of the definitions is mistaken. Recently, Kenneth Sayre and Mary Louise Gill have proposed a clever solution to this puzzle. In this paper I explain why the Sayre-Gill solution is mistaken, and suggest a better solution."

"There is something about the Sophist that has always bothered me. Why are there so many definitions of sophistry in the dialogue? Here is the problem: either all the definitions are right, or all of them are wrong, or some of them are right and some of them are wrong. But it can't be that all the definitions are right, because, after all, they are all different.

(...)

In this paper, I want to consider one influential answer to what we might call "the puzzle of the many definitions", criticize it, and then provide an answer of my own. The answer I am going to criticize appears most clearly in the work of Kenneth Sayre, and also perhaps in the work of Mary Louise Gill. It is, I think, a very clever and compelling answer, but, as I will argue, it is mistaken." (p. 289)

References

Gill, Mary Louise. 2006. "Models in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*." *Journal of the International Plato Society* 6.

Sayre, Kenneth M. 2007. *Method and Metaphysics in Plato's Statesman*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

367. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1981. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part V. Plato's Semantics in His Critical Period (Second part)." *Vivarium* no. 19:81–125.

"In concluding the previous section I argued (1980: nr. 4.9, p. 62) that Aristotle's *Categories* may be viewed as dealing with the several ways in which an individual man can be named without destroying his concrete unity. A well-known passage of Plato's *Sophist* (251 A 8ff.) was referred to in which Plato deals with the puzzle of one man with many names. It is true, Plato labels the puzzle as just 'a magnificent entertainment for the young and the late-learners' (251 B), and is more interested in the related question of how 'things' like Rest and Change (presently called Kinds) can also have several attributes (attributive names) and the general problem of attribution as implying the 'Communion' of Kinds. But it is obvious at the same time that in this shape too the puzzle is mainly concerned with the notions of naming, asserting and predication. So Plato's *Sophist* unavoidably has to be part of our discussion. A further argument for taking the *Sophist* into consideration may be found in

Ammonios' commentary to Aristotle's *De interpretatione*. He remarks {ad 17 a 26ff. : *Comm. in Aristot. graeca* IV 5, p. 83, 8-13, ed. Busse) that the analysis of the *apophantikos logos* as given by Aristotle is to be found scattered all over Plato's *Sophist* (261 Cff.) right after that master's excellent expositions about Non-being mixed with Being (*peri tou synkekramenou toi onti mê ontos*). For that matter, on more than one item of Aristotle's *Categories* and *De interpretatione* the Ancient commentators refer to related questions and discussions in Plato's later dialogues, especially the *Sophist*. I hope to show in sections (5) and (6) that the views found in the *Categories* and *De interpretatione* are most profitably compared with what Plato argues in the related discussions of the *Sophist*." (p. 81)

[* Parts (1), (2), (3) and (4) are found in this Journal 15 (1977), 81-110; 16 (1978), 81-107, 18 (1980), 1-62; 19 (1981), 1-46.]

368. ———. 1982. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part VI. Plato's Semantics in His Critical Period (Third part)." *Vivarium* no. 20:97–127.

"5. 8 Conclusion. From our analysis of *Soph.*, 216 A-259 D it may be concluded that Plato did certainly not abandon his theory of Forms. We may try to answer, now, the main questions scholarship is so sharply divided about (see Guthrie [*A History of Greek Philosophy*] V, 143ff.). They are, in Guthrie's formulation: (1) does Plato mean to attribute Change to the Forms themselves, or simply to enlarge the realm of Being to include life and intelligence which are not Forms?, and (2) is he going even further in dissent from the friends of Forms and admitting what they called Becoming --changing and perishable objects of the physical world -- as part of the realm of True Being?

The first question should be answered in the negative. Indeed, Plato is defending a certain Communion of Forms, but this regards their *immanent* status and, accordingly, the physical world primarily, rather than the 'Forms themselves' (or: 'in their exalted status' as Guthrie has it, p. 159). As to the second question, to Guthrie's mind Plato's language makes it almost if not quite insoluble. I think that if one pays Plato's expositions the patient attention he asks for 'at 259 C-D and follows his analysis stage by stage, the exact sense and the precise respect in which he makes his statements (cf. 259 D 1-2: *ekeinêi kai kat' ekeino ho physi*) about Being and Not-being, Sameness and Otherness, and so on will appear. It will be easily seen, then, that there is no recantation at all in Plato's development. He still maintains, as he will maintain in his later works (e.g. *Philebus*, 14 D ff.) the Transcendent Forms as what in the last analysis are the only True Being. But Plato succeeds in giving a fuller sense to the old notions of 'sharing' and 'presence in' without detracting the 'paradigm' function of the Forms in any respect. Matter, Change and Becoming is given a better position in the Theory of Forms in that their immanent status has been brought into the focus of Plato's interest. From his *Parmenides* onwards Plato has been searching for the solution of his metaphysical problems and has actually found it in the *Sophist* in a new view of participation. Forms in their exalted status are just a too eminent cause for the existence of the world of Becoming. But their being *shared in*, i.e. their immanent status, make them so to speak 'operable' and yet preserve their dignity of being paradigmatic standards. What makes something to be a horse is, no doubt, the Transcendent Form, HORSENESS, but it only can *partake of* that Form and possess it as an immanent form. So the Highness of the Form and the unworthy matter can come together as matter 'informed', that is, affected by an immanent form.

Plato never was unfaithful to his original view about Forms as the only True Being. In our dialogue, too, he brings the eminence of True Being (taken, of course, as a Transcendent Form) into relief by saying (254 A) that the true philosopher, through his devotion to the

Form, 'What is' ('Being'), dwells in the brightness of the divine, and the task of Dialectic, accordingly, is described from that very perspective (see Part (5), 96ff.). Focussing on the immanence of the Forms does not detract anything from their 'exalted status', since immanent forms are nothing else but the Transcendent Forms as partaken of by particulars.

(...)

In his critical period Plato never ceased to believe in the Transcendent World. The important development occurring there consists in his taking more seriously than before their presence *in* matter and their activities as *immanent* forms. In the *Sophist* he uses all his ingenuity to show that a correct understanding of the Forms may safeguard us from all extremist views on being and not-being and zealous exaggerations of the Friends of Forms as well." (pp. 125-127)

369. ————. 1986. *Plato's Sophist. A Philosophical Commentary*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Contents. Preface 9; Preliminary: Plato's *Sophist* to be reconsidered? 11; Introduction 13; Chapter 1. The dispute about interpreting Plato 22; Chapter 2. The evolution of the doctrine of *Eidos* 30; Reconsidering Plato's *Sophist* 69; Chapter 3. The dialogue's main theme and procedure 71; Chapter 4. On current views about 'what is not' 82; Chapter 5. On current views about 'what is' 93; Chapter 6. Plato's novel metaphysical position 103; Chapter 7. The variety of names and the communion of kinds 110; Chapter 8. An important digression on dialectic 126; Chapter 9. The communion of kinds; Chapter 10. How the five kinds combine 159; Chapter 11. The reinstatement of 'what is not' (256d-259d) 164; Chapter 12. On philosophic and sophistic discourse 186; The framework: semantics and philosophy in Plato; Chapter 13. Plato's semantics in the *Cratylus* 217; Chapter 14. Naming and representing 254; Chapter 15. Language and knowing 277; Chapter 16. Semantics and metaphysics 327; Bibliography 355; Index of passages quoted or referred to 365; Index of proper names 377; Index of terms and topics 383-394.

"The way in which Plato announces (*Sophist*, 249C-D) his novel metaphysics has been puzzling modern scholars for a long time: 'What is and the All consist of what is changeless *and* what is in change, both together'. Did Plato really introduce Change into the Transcendent World and thus abandon his theory of Unchangeable Forms?

Many of Plato's commentators have claimed that the use of modern techniques of logico-semantic analysis can be a valuable aid in unraveling this problem and other difficulties Plato raised and attempted to solve. However, not all modern distinctions and tools can be applied without reservation; for many of these are entirely alien to Plato's thought. Interpreters of Plato must also resist the temptation of applying methods as disjointing the dialogue and selecting specific passages only, in their eagerness to prove that Plato was explicitly interested in (their own favourite) problems of 'identity and predication' (not to mention such oddities as the 'self-predication of Forms'), or the distinctions between different senses (or applications) of 'is'.

The present author has tried to understand Plato by a close reading of the complete dialogue and to relate the doctrinal outcome of the *Sophist* to Plato's general development. Close reading Plato involves following him in his own logico-semantic approach to the metaphysical problems, an approach which shows his deep interest in the manifold ways to 'name' (or to 'introduce into the universe of discourse') 'what is' (or the 'things there are').

The reader may be sure that my indebtedness to other authors on this subject is far greater than it may appear from my text. Also many of those who have gone in quite different directions than mine have been of great importance to me in sharpening my own views and formulations. Two authors should be mentioned *nominatim*: Gerold Prauss and the late Richard Bluck; two scholars, whose invaluable works deserve far more attention than they have received so far.

I owe my translations of the Greek to predecessors. Where I have not followed them, my rendering is no doubt often painfully (and perhaps barbariously) literal: I do not wish to incur the suspicion of trying to improve Plato by modernising him." (from the Preface)

370. Ringbom, Sixten. 1965. "Plato on Images." *Theoria* no. 31:86–109.

The purpose of the present paper is to discuss Plato's use of the concept of picture in three different contexts. First, his use of the picture as a metaphysical model; secondly, the picture-object relation as a semantic explanation; and, thirdly this same relation as an argument of value.

(...)

In his metaphysical model Plato regards the objects of our experience as pictures of the Ideas (1). But he also discusses the relationship between the visible things and the pictures of these things—for instance, the relation between a bed and a painting of a bed, or the name "bed".

(...)

The obvious procedure in approaching Plato's theory of pictures is to discuss each aspect in turn. But this must not mean that we isolate the three functions from each other; the purpose of the following discussion is, on the contrary, to show that Plato's line of thought in all three cases adheres to the same pattern, and that it is actually based on an analogy between the three aspects." (pp. 86-87)

(1) D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, Oxford 1953, p. 12 f.

371. Roberts, Jean. 1986. "The Problem about Being in the *Sophist*." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 3:229–243.

Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.), *Plato. Critical Assessments, Vol. IV: Plato's Later Works*, London: Routledge 1998, pp. 142-157.

"It is by now a matter of firmly entrenched orthodoxy that Plato's discussion of being in the *Sophist* serves to distinguish different meanings or uses of "esti." This claim has taken different forms in different hands.

Nevertheless, almost everyone seems agreed that a large part of what Plato needs (and gets) in order to rescue negation and falsity from sophistic attacks is either a distinction between the existential "is" and one or more incomplete uses of "is," a distinction between the so-called "is" of identity and the copula, or some more subtle distinction between incomplete uses of the word which amounts to a distinction in kinds of predication.

I shall argue that what Plato says about being in the *Sophist* is in no useful way described as a distinguishing of different senses or uses of the word "is." (1) The Eleatic puzzles Plato is out to solve here are solved, in large part, by demonstrating that being is something distinct from any or all of the things that might normally be described as being." (p. 229)

(...)

"There is, moreover, reason for suspicion of any interpretation which reduces the discussions of being and not-being to discussions of positive and negative statement in general. The commentators have failed to notice how careful Plato is to separate questions about the nature of being and not-being and the bearing of alternative answers on the status of negative and false statement. When he first sets out the problem he begins by describing the Eleatic position on not-being (237b10-239a12) and then showing, in a separate argument (240c7-241b3), that this makes false statement and negative statement impossible. The pattern is repeated later. After he has shown that not-being is he goes on (260a5-264b8) to explain how statements in general are put together and how false statement is to be explicated. That the blending of not-being and logos is still taken as, at least in principle, an open question after the discussion of not-being is completed suggests that that discussion could not have been intended as an account of negative statement. Nor is there any reason to take the previous account of being as an account of positive statement. They are, just what they claim to be, and all that they need to be, purely metaphysical accounts of being and not-being." (p. 239)

(1) I do not mean to deny that there is something to be learned from looking at Plato's use of *esti*, only that this is not his own object in the *Sophist*. For the record, I think that there is a complete use of "is" to be found in the *Sophist* for reasons I will not go into here. Much of what I would say in defense of this has been said by Robert Heinaman in "Being in the Sophist," *Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. 65 (1983), pp. 1-17.

372. Robinson, David B. 1999. "Textual notes on Plato's « Sophist »." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 49:139–160.

"In editing Plato's *Sophist* for the new OCT [Oxford Classical Texts] vol. I, ed. E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan (Oxford, 1995), there was less chance of giving novel information about W = Vind. Supp. Gr. 7 for this dialogue than for others in the volume, since Apelt's edition of 1897 was used by Burnet in 1900 and was based on Apelt's own collation of W."

(...)

"A reviewer counts 66 changes in our text of the *Sophist*, which may perhaps be a slight over-estimate. Classification of changes as substantive or as falling into different groups is sometimes difficult, but I think plausible figures are as follows. We (myself aided in the earlier sections by Nicoll) have in 25 places made a different choice of readings from the primary mss. and testimonia. We have printed conjectures where Burnet kept a ms. reading in 17 places, but conversely we have reverted to a ms. reading where Burnet had a conjecture in 8 places. We have printed alternative conjectures to conjectures adopted by Burnet in 6 places. So we have actually departed from the primary sources on at most 9 more occasions overall than Burnet. What must be noted is that Burnet had already printed conjectures (including readings from secondary mss.) on something like 87 occasions (12 from secondary mss., 75 from modern conjectures from Stephanus onwards), so our

percentage addition to Burnet's departures from the primary sources is modest. Moreover Burnet printed about 25 readings from testimonia; we have followed him in 20 or so of these cases, and this in turn implies that the primary mss. are in error at these further 20 places." (p. 139)

373. ————. 2001. "The Phantom of the *Sophist*: το ουκ οντως ουκ ον (240a–c)." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 51:435–457.

"A spurious phantom, Platonistic but non-Platonic, a non-entity by the name of ουκ οντως ουκ ον, made spectral appearances in manuscripts and printed texts of Plato's *Sophist* over a long period. It perhaps first manifested itself a little earlier than Proclus and Damascius; but there seems to be no evidence of its appearing to Plotinus. It was rather strongly present in the primary MSS (give or take a little blurring). It still appeared in the Teubner edition by Hermann in 1852. But it was attacked by Bonitz in 1864, and on most views was successfully exorcized when Badham's conjecture of 1865 was added to an earlier conjecture of Baiter's, each removing an unwanted ουκ. Campbell's edition of 1867 shows no awareness of Badham's conjecture, but on an overall view, since then it might seem that the phantom had been left for dead by most interpreters. Apelt in 1897 said '*locus . . . sanitati suae est redditus*'. Burnet, as we have seen, banished the phantom from his 1900–5 OCT." (p. 436)

(...)

"The cruel deception practised by both phantoms turns upon readers making the erroneous assumption that we have exposition of doctrine in this passage, where in fact we have what is at least primarily intended as a *reductio ad absurdum*. This is not a situation where the Visitor is stating a Platonic view of ειδωλα; what is happening is that the supposed Sophist attempts to reduce the concept of ειδωλον to absurdity.

The passage does not set out to show that Plato or his Visitor, or even his Sophist, thought that ειδωλα have some degree of phantom being, but that an enterprising Sophist could argue that they have no being at all. Plato will later refute his own imaginary Sophist (not by introducing intermediates); but here the Sophist must be allowed to make his challenging manoeuvre." (p. 437)

374. Robinson, Jim. 1993. "A Change in Plato's Conception of the Good." *Journal of Philosophical Research* no. 18:231–241.

Abstract: "One of the most interesting passages in the *Republic* is the comparison of the Form of the Good with the Sun. Although this depiction of the Good was never repeated, many hold that the Good retained its privileged place in Plato's metaphysics. I shall argue that there are good reasons for thinking that Plato, when writing the *Sophist*, no longer held his earlier view of the Good. Specifically, I shall contend that he ceased to believe that as the Sun makes its objects visible, so the Good makes the Forms knowable. This being the case, it cannot also be said to illuminate either the Forms or the order they exhibit. My procedure will be first to consider briefly how, in the *Republic*, the Good can be said to illuminate the Forms. I shall then determine the extent to which, in the *Sophist*, this function can still be credited to the Good. "

375. Robinson, Thomas M. 2013. "Protagoras and the Definition of 'Sophist' in the *Sophist*." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 3–13. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"I should like to begin by setting out as clearly as I can what seem to be the main things that can be said about Protagoras, and offer an evaluation of them. This will be in large part without reference to the final definition of 'sophist' in the *Sophist*. I shall then turn to the definition, and see where if anywhere it appears to fit into the picture, and what can be said about the definition as a definition." (p. 3)

(...)

"As the dialogue draws to a close an intense, and uncompromisingly negative definition of the sophist is finally offered, and this one undoubtedly excludes what had earlier been called the sophist of noble lineage.

The sophist (268c) is now described as a *mimetes* who operates on the basis of belief not knowledge, by contrast with *mimetai* who operate on the basis of knowledge not belief. More precisely the mimesis characterizing a sophist is said to be a) mimesis of that which is 'insincere', of that which is productive of 'contradictions', and of that which is non-knowing; b) mimesis of that specific form of copy-making that constitutes appearance-making; and c) mimesis of that species of production which is marked off as human not divine." (pp. 10-11)

376. Rodriguez, Evan. 2020. "'Pushing Through' in Plato's *Sophist*: A New Reading of the Parity Assumption." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 102:159–188.

Abstract: "At a crucial juncture in Plato's *Sophist*, when the interlocutors have reached their deepest confusion about being and not-being, the Eleatic Visitor proclaims that there is yet hope. Insofar as they clarify one, he maintains, they will equally clarify the other. But what justifies the Visitor's seemingly oracular prediction? A new interpretation explains how the Visitor's hope is in fact warranted by the peculiar aporia they find themselves in. The passage describes a broader pattern of 'exploring both sides' that lends insight into Plato'saporetic method."

377. ———. 2023. "A Homeric lesson in Plato's « Sophist »." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 73:593–601.

Abstract: "Plato's closing reference to the *Iliad* in the *Sophist* has been largely overlooked in contemporary scholarship. The reference, a quotation from the confrontation between Glaucus and Diomedes in Book 6, forms part of a broader frame to the dialogue. The frame, with its recurring themes of identification and misidentification, helps us make better sense of the dialogue's final description of the sophist and its central concerns about the relationship between philosophy and sophistry. It also provides a revealing case study of Plato's use of Homer as part of a broader strategy for undermining simple appeals to authority."

378. Rosen, Stanley. 1983. *Plato's Sophist: The Drama of the Original and Image*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

"I said previously that I prefer the dramatic to the ontological approach to the *Sophist*. It should now be clear that this does not require a suppression of the narrowly technical themes in the dialogue.

On the contrary, it requires their meticulous analysis, both in themselves and as elements in a comprehensive dramatic structure.

In this section, I should like to clarify this view from a somewhat different angle and to introduce a term to describe my reading of the *Sophist*. The term in question is dramatic phenomenology.

Whereas a dialogue is not a "drama" in the sense of a poetic play written to be performed in the theater, it has a manifestly dramatic form. A dialogue is a poetic production in which mortals speak neither to gods nor to heroes, but to each other. At the same time, there is a hierarchy of mortals within a Platonic dialogue that is rooted, not in the contingencies of birth but in the natures of diverse human souls. Similarly, a dialogue is not a phenomenological description, but an interpretation of human life. As a poetic production, it so orders its scenes of human life as to provide an indirect commentary on the significance of the speeches delivered within those scenes.

Adapting a distinction of the Stranger's to our own purposes, we may say that a dialogue is centrally concerned with the better and the worse, the noble and the base." (p. 12)

379. Roupa, Vichy. 2020. *Articulations of Nature and Politics in Plato and Hegel*. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan.

Chapter 3: Producing the Categories of Being: The *Sophist*

"The *Cratylus*'s aporetic ending inevitably raises the question whether this is Plato's last word on names or whether the issue is explored further in another dialogue where a more positive outcome is reached. The aim of this chapter is to show that the dialogue where Plato carries forward the programme of the *Cratylus* is the *Sophist*.(1) Although it is sometimes argued that the *Sophist* breaks new ground completely unanticipated in the *Cratylus*, there is an area of shared concern between the two dialogues that warrants, I believe, reading the *Sophist* as a development of the *Cratylus*.(2) This area is marked, in the first instance, by the methodological approach adopted; the two interlocutors—it is set down early on in the dialogue—will strive to reach agreement not only as regards the name but, first and foremost, as regards the thing itself. Thus, the Eleatic Visitor, who leads the discussion in the *Sophist*, claims in 218c to have only the name ('sophist') in common with his discussant Theaetetus at this stage, but this is not enough because 'in every case' they 'always' need to be in agreement 'about the thing itself [*pragma auto*] by means of verbal explanation [*dialogon*], rather than doing without any such explanation [*choris logou*] and merely agreeing about the name [*tonoma*}'. So, the aim of the dialogue is to achieve an understanding of the sophist that goes beyond the un-stated assumptions that each of the discussants has about the sophist. (p. 43)

(1) I thus follow the interpretative approach of Fine and Barney both of whom reject a sharp distinction between the analysis of the *Cratylus* (which is aimed at the level of the name) and that of the *Sophist* (which is aimed at the level of the statement or sentence). See Gail Fine, 'Plato on Naming', *The Philosophical Quarterly* 27, no. 109 (1977): 289–294; Rachel Barney, *Names and Nature in Plato's Cratylus* (London: Routledge, 2001), 170–172. This

view is reinforced by Kahn: 'The contents of the *Cratylus* on the theory of naming, the problems of flux, Protagorean relativism and the paradox of false statement, all point ahead to discussion of these topics in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*'. Charles Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 364. See also R.M. van den Berg, *Proclus' Commentary on the Cratylus in Context: Ancient Theories of Language and Naming* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 8–13.

(2) The proponents of this view see in the *Sophist* a radical break in Plato's thinking because in it Plato offers an account of language at the level of the sentence or statement rather than that of the name. The distinction between name and statement is not made in the *Cratylus*, nor is there any recognition in the earlier dialogue of the importance of syntax for the truth value of a proposition. See Barney's summary of this view (which she calls the 'syntactical reading of the *Sophist*') in Barney, *Names and Nature in Plato's Cratylus*, 170.

380. Rowe, Christopher J. 1983. "Plato on the sophists as teachers of virtue." *History of Political Thought* no. 4:409–427.

Abstract: "When he came to try to find a formal definition of the sophist, Plato found him an elusive creature; and with good reason. But there are two features which regularly recur in his references to them: the sophist is a professional teacher, and what he professes to teach is ἀρετή. Sophists are people who claim παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;(1) they set themselves up as παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον (2) The only apparent exception is Gorgias, who though classified as a sophist in other dialogues, is represented in the *Meno* as laughing at other sophists for claiming to teach ἀρετή;(3) and it may well be that Plato regarded this disclaimer as disingenuous. (4) But there is a difficulty here, in that on the face of it different sophists claimed to teach different things under the title of ἀρετή. Hippias, for example, is portrayed in the *Hippias Major* as professing to encourage a 'devotion to honourable and beautiful practices', (5) whereas in the *Euthydemus* the ἀρετή which the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus claim to impart is apparently coextensive with skill in eristic debate.(6) In that case, 'teacher of ἀρετή appears to be a highly ambiguous description, and therefore incapable of serving, even informally, to define the class. In general, historians of philosophy tend to suggest that behind the apparent differences between individual sophists in this respect lies a single shared purpose: the teaching of 'the art of success'."

(1) *Gorgias*, 519e7.

(2) *Protagoras*, 349a2. Cf. also *Meno*, 95b; *Apology*, 20b; *Euthydemus*, 273d; *Hippias Major*,

283c ff.

(3) *Meno*, 95c.

(4) cf. E.L. Harrison, 'Was Gorgias a Sophist?', *Phoenix*, 18 (1964) (hereafter Harrison), pp. 183-92.

5) *Hippias Major*, 286a f.

(6) See below, pp. 423-6; and Harrison, p. 189, note 34.

381. ———. 2015. "Plato, Socrates, and the *genei gennaia sophistike* of *Sophist* 231b." In *Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato*, edited by Nails, Debra and Tarrant, Harold, 149–167. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.
382. ———. 2015. "Plato versus Protagoras: The *Statesman*, the *Theaetetus*, and the *Sophist*." *Diálogos* no. 98:143–165.

Abstract: "The *Statesman* is nowadays generally read either on its own, or with *Republic* and *Laws*. But more attention needs to be given to the fact that it is designed as part of a trilogy, alongside *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. Reinstating the dialogue in this context gives a fuller perspective on its purposes. The *Statesman* (1) identifies existing so-called «statesmen», for whom the Protagoras of *Theaetetus* is chief apologist, as the greatest exemplars of sophistry as defined in *Sophist*: mere «imitators» and dealers in falsehood; (2) offers the Platonic alternative to the Protagorean vision of human life and organization sketched in the first part of *Theaetetus*; and (3), in common with *Sophist*, illustrates –after the apparent failures of *Theaetetus*– both what knowledge is and how it can be acquired. Finally, and controversially, the *Statesman* emerges, along with *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, as part of one and the same project as the *Republic*."

383. Rowett, Catherine. 2024. "'It Seems to Me That Our Soul Is a Bit Like a Book': Inner Language and Erroneous Thoughts in Plato's *Philebus*, *Sophist*, and *Theaetetus*." In *Platonism: Proceedings of the 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium*, edited by Hrachovec, Herbert and Mácha, Jakub, 31–50. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Abstract: "In Plato's *Philebus*, Socrates proposes that one makes a silent utterance when deciding what something is. The utterance is inscribed in the soul as if written and can be accompanied by an illustration. This illustrated book can contain falsehoods and truths, which explains how one's doxa can be true or false. Either the words or the pictures may be false. I compare that passage with similar ideas in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. I argue that in the *Theaetetus*, Plato devises a deliberately unworkable attempt at explaining the same phenomenon that is clearly and successfully explained in the *Philebus* but that the judgement under discussion in the *Sophist* is of a different kind, since it involves not one but two terms (a label plus a predicate). In these cases, falsity in judgement may arise due to just one of the two items being false."

384. Rudebusch, George. 1990. "Does Plato Think False Speech is Speech?" *Noûs* no. 24:599–609.

"Before Plato came along, there was no satisfactory account of the nature of false speech. This is not to say that no one had yet figured out how to tell a lie; the Greeks were notorious, even in their own literature, as skillful liars. What I mean is that there was a pair of puzzles floating around unanswered. These puzzles were expressed as arguments that false speech was impossible. One puzzle went like this: to say what is false is to say what does not exist, but to say what does not exist is to say nothing at all, and to say nothing at all is not to speak. Thus there can be no such thing as false speech. The other puzzle went like this: to say what is false is to say what is other than the things that are. Nonetheless (in view of the first puzzle), to say what is other is to say something that is. But to say what is is to speak the truth. Thus there can be no such thing as false speech.(1)" (p. 599)

(...)

"In what follows, I shall look at (I) the problem of false speech which Plato faces, (II) the solution he gives in the *Sophist*, and (III) how that very solution is undermined by the argument of the *Theaetetus*. It will then be clear (IV) what sort of reconciliation is ruled out and what sort remains to be investigated, if we are to avoid paradox." (p. 600)

(1) The distinction between these two puzzles is not always recognized. But the puzzles are two, and Plato presents them as a pair: *Eud.* 283e7-284a8 and 284b1-b7; *Crat.* 429d4-6 and 429e3-9; and *Tht.* 167a7-8 and 167a8-b1.

385. ———. 1991. "Sophist 237-239." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 29:521–531.

"The text of the *Sophist* at 237-239 is aporetic: it leads any talk of non-being into perplexity. This passage shares with many other of Plato's dialogues the following structure. A question is asked and an answer, given in a single sentence, is reached and accepted by the interlocutor. Then the interlocutor is examined further, his assent to that answer is undermined, and the interchange ends. After giving the details of this passage (in section I), I shall argue (section 11) that the Stranger does not share *Theaetetus*'s perplexity and continues to hold the rejected answer. Such an interpretation needs an explanation: why should the Stranger behave this way? Sufficient reasons can be found in the Stranger's pedagogy. What those pedagogical reasons are, and how good they are, I consider in section 111." (p. 521)

386. Runciman, Walter. 1962. *Plato's Later Epistemology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Preface VII-VIII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. The 'Theaetetus': logic and knowledge 6; 3. The 'Sophist': ontology and logic 59; 4. Conclusion 127; Selected bibliography 134; Index 137.

387. Ryle, Gilbert. 1939. "Plato's *Parmenides*." *Mind* no. 48:129–151.

Second part: *Mind*, 48, pp. 302-325.

Reprinted in: R. E. Allen, *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965 pp. 97-147; G. Ryle, *Collected Papers. Volume I. Critical Essays*, London: Hutchinson 1971 (reprint: New York, Routledge, 2009), *Essay I* pp. 1-44.

On *The Sophist* see in particular pp. 42-46.

"However, there is a pair of concepts which are forced upon our notice in the course of the operations which turn out to require a very different sort of elucidation, namely those of non-existence and existence. For a Sophist is a pretender who either thinks or says that what is not so is so.

The puzzle which arose in the *Theaetetus* arises again here. How can what does not exist be named, described or thought of? And if it cannot, how can we or Sophists talk or think of it, falsely, as existing? So the question is squarely put: What does it mean to assert or deny existence of something?

(...)

"Now the interesting thing is that it is true that existence and nonexistence are what we should call 'formal concepts', and further that if modern logicians were asked to describe the way in which formal concepts differ from proper or material or content-concepts, their method of exhibiting the role of formal concepts would be similar to that adopted here by Plato. But we need not go further than to say that Plato was becoming aware of some important differences of type between concepts.

There is no evidence of his anticipating Aristotle's enquiry into the principles of inference, which enquiry it is which first renders the antithesis of formal and other concepts the dominant consideration.

There is, consequently, in Plato, no essay at abstracting the formal from the contentual features of propositions, and so no code-symbolisation for the formal in abstraction from the material features of propositions." (pp. 44-46 of the reprint)

388. ————. 1960. "Letters and Syllables in Plato." *The Philosophical Review* no. 69:431–451.

Reprinted in G. Ryle, *Collected Papers. Volume I. Critical Essays*, London: Hutchinson 1971 (reprint: New York, Routledge, 2009), *Essay III* pp. 57-75.

"In his later dialogues Plato makes a lot of use of the notions of letters of the alphabet and the spelling of syllables out of these letters. He frequently uses these notions for the sake of analogies which help him to expound some more abstract matters.

There is one of his uses of the letter-syllable model which is not of special interest to me, namely, for the exposition of some merely chemical theories about the combinations of a few material elements into multifarious compounds.

Plato employs this model in this way in the *Timaeus* (48B–C), though he says that the analogy is not a good one. Here he is stating what is essentially an Empedoclean theory. Sextus Empiricus says that *stoicheion*, used thus to denote an ultimate material element, was a Pythagorean term.

My interest is in Plato's use of the alphabet model in expounding his logical or semantic views, namely his views about the composition of the thoughts, that is, the truths and falsehoods that we express or can express in sentences (*logoi*)." (p. 57 of the reprint)

(...)

"Conclusion. Plato in his late dialogues was concerned with some of the same cardinal problems as those which exercised Frege and the young Russell, problems, namely, about the relations between naming and saying; between the meanings of words and the sense of sentences; about the composition of truths and falsehoods; about the role of 'not'; about the difference between contradictories and opposites; and in the end, I think, about what is expressed by 'if' and 'therefore'. His admirable model, which Frege lacked, of the phonetic elements in syllables enabled Plato to explain more lucidly than Frege the notion of the independent-variability-without separability of the meanings of the parts of sentences. On the other hand, lacking the apparatus of algebra, he was nowhere near abreast of Frege's and Russell's symbolisation of substitution-places. Plato could not extract implications from

their particular contexts or therefore codify implication patterns. A blackboard would have been of no use to him.

Plato says nothing about the bearings of the alphabet model on the Theory of Forms, or of the Theory of Forms on the alphabet model. So I shall not say much. If the Theory of Forms had maintained or entailed that Forms are just subject-terms of a superior sort, that is, just eminent namables, then this theory could contribute nothing to Plato's new question, What does a sentence convey besides what its subject name mentions?

But if the theory of Forms had been meant or half-meant to explain the contributions of live predicates, including tensed verbs, to truths and falsehoods about mentioned subjects, then in his operations with the model of letters and syllables, Plato has raised to maturity things which, in his Theory of Forms, had been only embryonic. To his terminal questions about the composition of *logoi* and, therewith, about the roles of live, tensed verbs, the Theory of Forms was either quite irrelevant or else quite inadequate." (pp. 74-75 of the reprint)

389. Saati, Alireza. 2015. "Plato's Theory of the Intercommunion of Forms (Συμπλοκή Ειδῶν): the Sophist 259, e4-6." *Philosophy Study* no. 5:35–43.

"Plato's lifelong confrontation with Parmenides and his metaphysical mire of believing that nothing (το μὴ ὄν) does not actually exist, gradually in the Sophist comes into finish, insofar as the philosopher after facing the foe and having the last laugh simmers down. In this paper after giving an interpretation of what Parmenides says, I shall present an analysis of Plato's drastic answer to him (*Sophist*, 259 e4-6) to see how Plato opens the impasse way created by the Eleatic philosopher. Here the intercommunion of Forms is regarded as the final answer by which Plato devastates Parmenides infamous thesis. Since hitherto no in-depth analysis is given by the scholars who are puzzled with the subject, I have tried to analyze the intercommunion of Forms philosophically. Plato's Eleatic challenge has always been crucial in Plato himself and philosophical development after him. As while as Parmenides thesis (*Sph.*, 238 a8-9) provides the sophists opportunity to reject the falsehood, Plato's theory of Forms in contrast in order to cross off the extremely sly sophists tries to make Parmenides come down. In my opinion, the intercommunion of Forms, as the last step of the theory of Forms, basically determines Plato's late ontology tightly knitted with logic. Vindicating this proposal depends on true understanding of the intercommunion of Forms. Since Plato's late ontology, in my opinion, is closed to Frege's ontology and discussion of language, we are armed to interpret the intercommunion of Forms with recent recent logico-philosophic achievements, I think.

In this respect, this is what I have done in my paper: analyzing sentence from Plato's logico-metaphysical point of view. Ultimately, I have tried to show how the aim of the intercommunion of Forms, which Plato himself states, is demonstrating the possibility of dialogue and discourse. This statement explicitly sets forward that the discussion is bound up with several logical approaches, according to which finally full bright light is shed on different implications of the subject such as universals." (p. 35)

390. Sabrier, Pauline. 2019. "Parts, Forms, and Participation in the Parmenides and Sophist: A Comparison." *Etudes platoniciennes* no. 15:1–9.

Abstract: "This paper addresses the vexed question of the outcome of the second horn of the dilemma of participation in Plato's *Parmenides* bringing in *Sophist* 257c7-d5 where the Eleatic Stranger accepts what he seems to reject in the *Parmenides*, namely that a Form can

have parts and nevertheless remain one. Comparing Plato's treatment of parts of Forms in both passages, and in particular the relation among Being, Change and Rest at *Sophist* 250a8-c8, I argue that unlike in the *Parmenides*, in the *Sophist*, parts and wholes are seen as offering a structure that can explain how things that may, at first, appear unrelated nevertheless belong together."

391. ————. 2020. "Plato's Master Argument for a Two-Kind Ontology in the *Sophist*: A New Reading of the Final Argument of the Gigantomachia Passage (249b5–249c9)." *Apeiron*:1–20.

Abstract: "In this paper I defend a new reading of the final argument of the Gigantomachia passage of Plato's *Sophist* (249b5–249c9), according to which it is an argument for a two-kind ontology, based on the distinction between the changing beings and the unchanging beings. This argument, I urge, is addressed not only to Platonists but to all philosophers – with one exception. My reading is based on the claim that this argument does not rely on the view that nous requires unchangeable objects – what I call the traditional reading – but on the view that nous itself is unchanging. The difference between the traditional reading and my reading is that on the former, Plato's argument relies on a distinctive epistemological assumption, whereas on the latter, Plato's argument is free from any such commitments. If the argument of this paper is along the right lines, then this implies that this argument has a much more far-reaching scope than critics have usually assumed. It also invites us to reconsider Plato's

approach to the question of being in the *Sophist*."

392. Sallis, John. 1975. *Being and Logos. The Way of Platonic Dialogue*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International.

Second edition with a new preface 1986; Third edition titled: *Being and Logos. Reading the Platonic dialogues*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.

Chapter VI. *The Way of Logos: Sophist*, pp. 456-532.

393. ————. 2013. "Plato's *Sophist*: A Different Look." *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* no. 13:283–291.

Reprinted in: Hallvard Fossheim, Vigdis Songe-Møller, Knut Ågotnes, Knut (eds.), *Philosophy as Drama: Plato's Thinking through Dialogue*, New York: Bloomsbury Academic 2019, pp. 231-240.

Abstract: "This paper deals with the question of difference in the *Sophist*. It begins with the difference that sets this dialogue apart from its dramatic predecessor, the *Theaetetus*, and with the task posed at the outset of determining the difference between the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher. An account is then given of the critical engagements through which the question of being and of its intertwining with nonbeing is taken up. Outlining the discussion of the five kinds, it concludes with a close examination of the *genos* difference as "chopped into bits" and hence as a different "look"."

394. Sampson, Kristin. 2013. "A Third Possibility: Mixture and Musicality." *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* no. 13:328–338.

Abstract: "This paper considers two small textual places within Plato's *Sophist*, namely 252d–253c and 259d–260b. First it turns to what is called a third possibility and looks at how this is described by examples related to the letters of the alphabet and the notes of music. Three words that are used to describe the mixing that these two examples display are συμμίγνυμι, κοινωνία, and μίξις. What is common for these three words is that they are shrouded in a similar kind of ambiguity of meaning, related to sexuality.

This paper argues the relevance of taking this ambiguity seriously, something which has not, to my knowledge, previously been done. Next it considers how the exposition of this third possibility results in the emergence of the philosopher. At this point also a view of language and thinking (*logos*) related to the philosopher is developed, and used in order to distinguish between the philosopher and the sophist. At the end of the paper, in the last textual fragment mentioned (259d–260b), it is indicated how this is a place where an echo of the musical and the philosophical resound, where these two elements are linked to each other, to *logos*, and to the necessity of mixture."

395. Sayre, Kenneth M. 1970. "Falsehood, Forms and Participation in the *Sophist*." *Noûs* no. 4:81–91.

"The *Sophist* is one of Plato's most constructive dialogues, and one of the most cleverly constructed. Feigning pursuit of the essential sophist, Plato analyzes in turn (a) δύναμις as the mark of what is, (b) collection and division as the source of "the free man's knowledge," (c) the modes of combination among the forms, (d) Difference as the nature of "that which is not" and, in culmination, (e) the distinction between false and true judgment which separates the sophist from the philosopher. These results surpass in their solidity any positive contribution of the *Phaedo* or the *Republic*.

Yet they are achieved with a more austere conception of the forms than any found in these earlier dialogues. The structure of this more mature conception, I believe, is best illustrated in Plato's analysis of true and false discourse. My purpose in this paper is (1) to recapitulate what I take to be Plato's analysis of truth and falsehood in the *Sophist*, (2) to contrast the theory of forms presupposed by this analysis with the theory of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, and (3) to sketch against this background the theory of participation which seems to be implicit in the *Sophist* and other late dialogues. My contention, in preview, is that a form in this later context is a kind definable in terms of criteria for membership, and that participation is the relationship by which individuals qualify for membership in a kind." (pp. 81-82)

396. ———. 1976. "*Sophist* 263b Revisited." *Mind* no. 85:581–586.

"This passage [*Sophist* 263b: 'Theaetetus sits' and 'Theaetetus flies'] has posed problems for sympathetic commentators. One is the problem of mere intelligibility. (1) A more basic problem has been that of reconstructing from the passage a credible account of true and false judgment. In *Plato's Analytic Method* (Chicago, 1969) I offered an interpretation which, although I believe accurately directed, is potentially flawed in an important respect. (2) The difficulty with this interpretation stems from a mistaken assumption, which most commentators share, about the nature of not-Being in the *Sophist* account. Correcting this mistake yields an interpretation which is more fully Platonic both in content and elegance, and which is considerably more faithful to the text of the dialogue."

(1) A sensitive discussion of syntactical ambiguities in these sentences may be found in David Keyt's 'Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263B,' in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty (eds.), *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos* (Humanities Press, New York: 1973), to which I am indebted in the translation above.

Robert Vacca also is to be thanked for advice on Plato's use of ὄν ἔστιν .

(2) I say 'potentially flawed' because, although the interpretation in the book is literally compatible with what I now believe to be the correct account, its further elucidation in my 'Falsehood, Forms and Participation in the Sophist,' *Noûs*, iv (1970), 81-91, brought the flaw to the surface. I am indebted to Alvin Plantinga for drawing the problem to my attention.

This interpretation was developed originally in response to difficulties with other accounts of false judgment in the *Sophist*, which need not be reviewed for present purposes.

397. ———. 1983. *Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Second edition: Parmenides Publishing, 2005 with a new introduction and the essay "*Excess and Deficiency at Statesman 283C-285C*".

398. ———. 1992. "A maieutic view of five late dialogues." In *Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues*, edited by Klagge, James C. and Smith, Nicholas D., 221–243. New York: Oxford University Press.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Supplementary volume.

"There are five dialogues of Plato's late period, each consisting of a conversation with a master philosopher, in which the conversation is organized by methodological principles explicitly proposed by the philosopher himself. In the case of the *Theaetetus*, the method was stated by Socrates in earlier dialogues, notably the *Phaedo* and book 6 of the *Republic*. In each of the remaining four, however, the method is expounded and applied within the same conversation-by the Stranger from Elea in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, by Parmenides himself in his namesake dialogue, and by a renovated Socrates in the late *Philebus*. I shall refer to these five as the methodological dialogues." (p. 221)

(...)

"I have made two claims concerning the methodological dialogues.

The first is that the conversational format of these dialogues is intended to serve the maieutic function described by Socrates in the *Theaetetus*, and characterized in the *Seventh Letter* as the only path to the flame-like revelation of philosophic knowledge. The second is that the respective methods of these conversations provide the structure by which they are enabled to lead the reader to that state of fulfilment.

The first claim is supported by the texts involved, the second by the experience of the attentive reader. Neither claim by itself, perhaps, is particularly adventuresome. I have suggested further, however, that together these claims answer the question posed at the beginning of this discussion: namely, how the conversational format of these five late

dialogues relates to the methods they severally illustrate. The answer, in summary, is that the method in each case provides the discipline by which the reader is enabled to follow the path of the conversation, to the state of wisdom that can be found at its end." (p. 243)

399. ————. 2006. *Metaphysics and Method in Plato's Statesman*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 2. Collection in the *Phaedrus* and the *Sophist* 36; Chapter 3. Division in the *Phaedrus* and the *Sophist* 52-72.

"The Statesman is third in a sequence of dialogues employing the method of dialectical division. In both the *Phaedrus* and the *Sophist*, division is paired with a companion procedure of collection. To evaluate the absence of collection in the *Statesman*, it is helpful to look carefully at how it functions in these two previous dialogues. This is the purpose of Chapter 2. Also discussed in this chapter is the language of collection that appears in the *Philebus*, despite the absence of the corresponding methodological procedure.

In similar fashion, Chapter 3 addresses the use of division in those two earlier dialogues. A notable feature of division in the *Phaedrus* is its use of nondichotomous distinctions, a feature which is absent in the *Sophist* but reappears in the *Statesman*. The *Sophist* contains eight fully developed lines of division in all, each of which is examined in the course of this chapter." (p. 5)

400. ————. 2008. "Dialectic by Negation in Three Late Dialogues." In *Reading Ancient Texts: Vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien*, edited by Suzanne, Stern-Gillet and Corrigan, Kevin, 189–212. Leiden: Brill.

"While little is beyond dispute in Platonic commentary, it seems clear that there are three distinct methods of dialectical inquiry to be found in the middle and late dialogues. One is the method of hypothesis featured in the final arguments of the *Phaedo* and implicated in the Divided Line of the *Republic*. Another is the method of collection and division, introduced in the *Phaedrus* and employed extensively in the *Sophist* before collection is phased out in the course of the *Statesman*. And third is the method introduced by Parmenides in his namesake dialogue and meticulously illustrated in the ensuing arguments on Unity.(1) I shall refer to this latter as "Parmenides' method." (p. 189)

(...)

But what are we to say in this regard about Parmenides' method?

Unlike the other two, the dialectical procedure employed by Parmenides is confined to a single dialogue. On initial consideration, at least, it appears that we lack evidence for earlier versions in Plato's thought.(4)

While the dialectical approach in question is said (at *Parmenides* 135D) to be essential for achieving the truth, and while it produces some of the most substantial results in the entire Platonic corpus, (5) we encounter it here in full-blown form with no indication of prior development. Or so at least it appears.

The purpose of the present paper is to dispel this appearance. Parmenides' method is distinguished from the other two primarily by its use of negative hypotheses. As we shall

see, there are sections of both the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* where negation figures in the explication of important topics. While these passages are familiar in their own right, I am not aware of any previous attempt to connect them with the distinctive method of the *Parmenides*. If the attempt of the present paper is successful, we will have reason to believe that Parmenides' method was anticipated in dialectical manoeuvres employed (appropriately enough) by the Eleatic Stranger." (p. 190)

(1) While any of these three methods might be accompanied by *elenchus* in a particular rhetorical setting, it should be noted that Socratic refutation by itself is not a dialectical method.

(4) Although one part of the procedure is said at 135D8 to trace back to Zeno, there is no reason to think that the method overall is not due to Plato himself.

(5) This claim is supported in K. Sayre, *Parmenides' Lesson: Translation and Explication of Plato's Parmenides* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).

401. Schipper, Edith Watson. 1964. "The Meaning of Existence in Plato's *Sophist*." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 9:38–44.

"In this paper, I should like to give arguments for the following points: (1) that, for the later Plato, what exists must be defined by forms interrelated in logos; (2) that the particular things of experience exist, and also are defined by the interrelated forms. Their existence is not that of substantial subjects beyond their predicative forms, but is comprised by the forms, which formulate them and bring them out of the matrix of experience. Thus, Plato is sketching a profoundly original approach to the perennial problems of philosophy." (p. 38)

402. ————. 1965. "Souls, Forms, and False Statements in the *Sophist*." *The Philosophical Quarterly* no. 15:240–242.

"In a provocative and ingeniously worked out article, Robert Turnbull has presented his view of the *Sophist's* account of false statements. (1) I should like to bring out some passages which raise questions about his position, and briefly suggest an alternative view to which I think they point.

The argument, as I understand it, rests upon Mr. Turnbull's interpretation of the Platonic ontology as consisting of " forms, souls, and immanent characters " (2) Immanent characters or actions, " the stuff of Becoming ", exist in the souls, and participate in the forms for which the souls strive.

A false statement about a soul ascribes to it a possible action participating in a form which is not (is different from or contrary to) the form for which the soul strives. For " the contrariety of forms is reflected in references to actions " (3) Thus, a false statement rests on the difference of some forms from others, though it is about the possible actions which illustrate the contrary forms and are somehow in the souls." (p. 240)

(1) "The Argument of the *Sophist*", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 14, Jan. 1964, pp. 23–34.

(2) *op. cit.*, p. 24.

(3) *op. cit.*, p. 34.

403. ————. 1965. *Forms in Plato's Later Dialogues*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Chapter IV: Forms in the *Sophist*, pp. 31-42.

"This little book is concerned with one problem, that of whether and in what respects Plato continued to hold his earlier theory of forms of the *Phaedo* and *Republic* in his later dialogues. The earlier theory is first considered; since those who deny that Plato continued to hold his theory base their contention on an interpretation of it which is inadequate to explain even the arguments of the earlier dialogues. The later dialogues are then examined, in an attempt to show that the earlier theory is continually assumed, in all its essentials; although it is developed and modified to make it more consistent and adequate to experience.

Special attention is given to Plato's treatment of the problem of the relation of the forms to the perceived things, left unexplained in the earlier dialogues, but clearly recognized and wrestled with in the later ones. This problem is the perennial one of how the objects of intellectual argument and explanation are related to the things of experience. A solution to that problem is brought out in Plato's reconsideration of his theory of forms." (*Preface*, P. VII)

"The *Sophist* by common consensus, is placed sometime after the *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*, and before the *Politicus*. Its place in the dialogues is thought to follow their literary order; and it starts with an appointment made at the end of the *Theaetetus*, while the *Politicus* refers to the immediately preceding discussion of the *Sophist*.

The *Sophist* could be subtitled: *On Being and Not Being*.

Ostensibly, it is a laboriously worked out definition of the sophist by means of diaeresis, carried on by the Eleatic Stranger. Again, Theaetetus responds. Yet the defining of the sophist seems to serve primarily as a means of introducing discussions of the nature of existence and as an illustration of the interconnecting of the forms, the *συμπλοκη ειδων*, the central conception of the dialogue and the most important addition to Plato's later metaphysics." (p. 31)

404. Schoener, Abraham. 2000. "Not the Sophist." In *Retracing the Platonic Text*, edited by Russon, John Edward and Sallis, John, 41–54. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

"We must pause for a moment to recall just what Penelope is weaving. It is a burial shroud for Laertes, the father of Odysseus—the father of the image of the philosopher—who is not yet dead. This is a sign that, for Plato, the writing of the dialogues is not a supplement or marker for the dead, defunct philosopher, but that the writing precedes and even announces his death. Plato's Socratic dialogues are Socrates' Penelopean burial shroud, tolling the death of conversational, "living," philosophy.

This brings us to our last question. This is a very vexed one and seems to be addressed with the greatest seriousness in all of the literature on the *Sophist*. The question is: Who is the (real) philosopher?

Our answer must now be "Nobody in particular." Stop worrying about the question. It is a question left over from the pretextual era of philosophy. Once philosophy becomes and recognizes itself to be textual, the question for now and all time is: What is being? This displacement is the deepest form of the patricide of Socrates by Plato." (p. 53)

405. Sedley, David. 2019. "Etymology in Plato's *Sophist*." *Hyperboreus. Studia Classica* no. 25:290–301.

Abstract: "The etymological method displayed at considerable length in the *Cratylus* is widely assumed to be intended by Plato as an object of ridicule. In my 2003 monograph *Plato's Cratylus* I resisted this assumption. In the present paper I seek to strengthen my case by arguing that in Plato's major work on philosophical logic, the *Sophist*, the same method is re-employed twice, at 221 a–c and 228 b–e, for entirely serious purposes."

406. Seligman, Paul. 1974. *Being and Not-Being. An Introduction to Plato's Sophist*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

"The present study has been undertaken with the ontological perspective in mind. In addition the historical roots of Plato's thinking will be emphasized. His struggle with the Eleatic legacy permeates this dialogue in a deeper sense and to a greater degree than has generally been admitted. On the other hand, the value of logically and linguistically oriented exegeses of the *Sophist*, such as have appeared during the last thirty years, is readily acknowledged. Still, they have not given us the whole story; they have neglected a significant dimension of Plato's thinking, and therefore need supplementing, and it only speaks for the richness of his work that it can be approached in more than one way.

My discussion will concentrate on the middle sections of the dialogue and follow the order of its argument, which develops organically and with greater cohesion than its dramatic form and artistic presentation might suggest. There can be no doubt about the seriousness of Plato's concern (*contra* Peck, 1952, cp. Runciman, 1962, p. 59), but there is also present a tinge of poetic playfulness which can have a baffling effect on readers seeking straightforward, unequivocal answers. At times it looks as though Plato lived up to the Heraclitean word that nature likes to conceal itself. It seems though that on some issues raised in the *Sophist* Plato himself was wavering, that there are others on which he had not made up his mind. In any case, he was never prone to produce a closed and final system, and each dialogue right to the end of his life meant a fresh start. But certain positions he never surrendered, and some of these permeate the *Sophist* as well. One of them is his belief in a rational and intrinsically knowable order of reality. That order is apprehended by the intuitive intellect and capable of being set out, indeed needing to be set out, in reasoned discourse; i.e., it is apprehended by *noesis*, accompanied by *logoi*. As Plato matured, the emphasis shifted from the former to the latter mode. And while the latter takes the stage in the *Sophist*, there is no evidence that the former was abandoned by him even then." (pp. 2-3)

References

- Peck, A. L. (1962). "Plato's *Sophist*: The Symplōke ton Eidōn," *Phronesis*, VII, I.
- Runciman, W. G. (1962). *Plato's Later Epistemology*. Cambridge, U.P.
407. Sellars, John. 2010. "Stoic Ontology and Plato's *Sophist*." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*:185–203.

"It has been suggested that Stoic ontology should be conceived as a reaction against Platonism thus understood. It has also been suggested that Stoic ontology be conceived as a 'reversal' of Platonism,(4) inverting the order of priority between bodies and incorporeals, or particulars and universals, depending how one views it. The most significant attempt to analyse the relationship between Stoic ontology and the work of Plato, however, must be Jacques Brunschwig's article 'The Stoic theory of the supreme genus and Platonic ontology'" in which he argues that Stoic ontology was in effect a philosophical response to material the early Stoics found in Plato's *Sophist*.(5) It was through reading Plato, Brunschwig claims, that the early Stoics developed their own distinctive position.

The aim of what follows is to assess this claim and to ask whether Stoic ontology can be read as the product of a critical engagement with Plato's *Sophist*. I shall begin in the first section with a brief overview of Stoic ontology along with a closer look at some of the differences between the principal recent interpretations. I shall focus my attention not only on Brunschwig's account of Stoic ontology but also those of David Sedley (which came before) and Victor Caston (which came after).(6) In the second section I shall move on to consider the *Sophist*, giving a brief overview of those sections of the dialogue that Brunschwig claims already contain the central features of Stoic ontology. In the third and final section I shall consider to what extent, if any, Stoic ontology can be said to be the product of a critical reading of the *Sophist*." (pp. 183-184)

(4) This is a claim made by G. Deleuze, *Logique du sens* (Paris 1969), where he says that the Stoics were the first to reverse Platonism. However he doesn't specify how he thinks they achieved this and his account of Stoic ontology is eccentric to say the least (on which see J. Sellars, 'Aion and Chronos: Deleuze and the Stoic theory of time', *Collapse* 3 (2007) 177-205 (178 n. 4)). Elsewhere, in *Différence et répétition* (Paris 1968), he claims that Plato himself was the first to reverse Platonism.

(5) First published as J. Brunschwig, 'La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et l'ontologie platonicienne', in *Matter and metaphysics*, ed. J. Barnes and M. Mignucci (Naples 1988) 19-127 and translated in Brunschwig's *Papers in Hellenistic philosophy* (Cambridge 1994) 92-157. All subsequent references are to the English version.

(6) It goes without saying that I have learned an enormous amount from the work of each of these authors and what I offer here is merely by way of a footnote to their contributions to our understanding of Stoic ontology. I shall not discuss directly earlier accounts of Stoic ontology as they are dealt with and taken into consideration in the works I shall consider, but I note the earlier discussion in J. M. Rist, *Stoic philosophy* (Cambridge 1969) 152-72.

408. Shorey, Paul. 1930. "Plato *Sophist* 255c and το δισσόν." *Classical Philology* no. 88:80.

409. ———. 1931. "Plato *Sophist* 236 C and *Laws* 668 A ff." *Classical Philology* no. 81:323–324.

"To sum up the common sense of the matter, in the *Sophist* and in order to disparage the sophist, Plato says that we may distinguish two kinds of imitation in all the mimetic arts, that which produces a likeness and that which produces an illusion. He employs a similar if not precisely identical distinction in *Republic* 380 D for another purpose. Elsewhere, when he has no such purpose in mind and is merely speaking of the general theory of art, he amplifies "imitation" by the addition of the virtual synonym "representation," and says art is imitation and representation. This, as the passage of Aristotle quoted shows [*], is a

perfectly natural mode of expression, and it is the height of hypercriticism to read into it a contradiction or withdrawal of the special point that there are tricky arts for which illusion is a better name than representation or the production of an objective likeness." (p. 324)

[*] Aristotle, *Poetics*, 11447 a 19: πολλὰ μιμοῦνταιί τινες ἀπεικάζοντες.

410. Shukhoshvili, Maia. 2009. "Terms of Ontological Structure, 'Image-Making Art' and Human Activities in Platos's *Sophist*." *Phasis* no. 12:262–267.

"Our goal is to do some kind of analyses of several terms of Plato's *Sophist*, their ancient Greek meaning and their equivalents in Georgian.

The subject of our interest is analyses of the terms which we can divide in three groups according to their semantics. These groups are: 1. terms related to the ontological structure of the dialogue *Sophist*; 2. terms related to the 'image-making art' of Plato's *Sophist*; 3. terms designated various human activities. The analyses of these terms will demonstrate how innovative Plato is in derivation of words and in use of these words." (p. 262)

411. ———. 2016. "*Tékhnē* in Plato's *Sophist* (Discussing Heidegger's Opinion)." In *Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25)*, edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 131–142. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

"The aim of this chapter is a discussion of the concept of *tékhnē* in Plato's *Sophist*, since this dialogue distinguishes and defines many different *tékhnai*. But what is *tékhnē* for Plato? Very often *tékhnē* is translated by 'art', but this is not the case for Plato and especially not in the *Sophist*.

The chapter is divided into four main parts. First of all I would like to propose Heidegger's definition and interpretation of *tékhnē*. Then I will examine the etymology and precise meaning of *tékhnē* in Ancient Greek.

The third part is concerned with the meaning and use of *tékhnē* in Plato's dialogues, and finally, in the last part of the chapter I will try to reach the meaning of *tékhnē* in Plato's *Sophist*." (p. 131)

412. Silverman, Allan. 2002. *The Dialectic of Essence. A Study of Plato's Metaphysics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

See in particular Chapter Five: *Forms and Language*, pp. 137-181 and Chapter Six: *Not-Beings*, pp. 182-217.

413. Smith, Colin C. 2019. "Dialectical Methods and the *Stoicheia* Paradigm in Plato's Trilogy and *Philebus*." *Plato Journal* no. 19:7–23.

Abstract. "Plato's *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman* exhibit several related dialectical methods relevant to Platonic education: maieutic in *Theaetetus*, bifurcatory division in *Sophist* and *Statesman*, and non-bifurcatory division in *Statesman*, related to the 'god-given' method in *Philebus*. I consider the nature of each method through the letter or element (στοιχεῖον) paradigm, used to reflect on each method. At issue are the element's appearances in given contexts, its fitness for communing with other elements like it in kind,

and its own nature defined through its relations to others. These represent stages of inquiry for the Platonic student inquiring into the sources of knowledge."

414. ———. 2020. "Diairesis and Koinonia in *Sophist* 253d1-e3." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 378:1–20.

Abstract: "Here I interpret a central passage in Plato's *Sophist* by focusing on understudied elements that provide insight into the fit of the dialogue's parts and of the *Sophist–Statesman* diptych as a whole. I argue that the Eleatic Stranger's account of what the dialectician "adequately views" at *Sophist* 253d1–e3 involves both division and the communion of ontological kinds—not just one or the other as has usually been argued. I also consider other key passages and the turn throughout the dialogue from imagistic opining toward noetic understanding."

415. ———. 2021. "The Method of Bifurcatory Division in Plato's *Sophist*." *Elenchos. Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico* no. 42:229–260.

Abstract: "The strange and challenging stretch of dialectic with which Plato's *Sophist* begins and ends has confused and frustrated readers for generations, and despite receiving a fair amount of attention, there is no consensus regarding even basic issues concerning this method. Here I offer a new account of bifurcatory division as neither joke nor naïve method, but instead a valuable, propaedeutic method that Plato offers to us readers as a means of embarking upon the kind of mental gymnastics that will stretch us properly in preparation for further, more challenging dialectical work. Considering several interpretive issues, I argue that bifurcatory division is a process of collective inquiry into the common through which an account, both definitional and taxonomical, is discovered. Depending on the level of understanding exhibited by the inquirers, this account may or may not allow for noetic understanding of the object in the deepest sense."

416. ———. 2022. "Against the Existential Reading of *Euthydemus* 283e-284c, with Help from the *Sophist*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 42:67–81.

Abstract: "I argue that the fallacy concerning false speech (283e-284c) in Plato's *Euthydemus* does not entail conflation of the alleged existential and veridical senses of 'einai' ('to be'), but instead confusion regarding predicative statements. I consider this passage by advancing interpretations of nonbeing and the structure of true and false speech in the *Sophist*. I aim to refute those who hold that this passage demands an 'existential' sense of 'einai' by offering a more Platonic interpretation."

417. ———. 2023. "Being as Communion: *Sophist* 247D–248B." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 76:395–423.

Abstract: "The author considers the Eleatic Stranger's account of being as communing (κοινωνεῖν), an under-recognized aspect of the well-known "dunamis proposal" and Plato's unfolding of the notion of being in the *Sophist*. The Stranger calls being "the power to act upon or be affected" (247d7-e3), and shortly thereafter describes "being affected or acting upon from a certain power" (248b6) as "communing" (248b2). This marks a shift away from understanding being as capacity toward understanding it as activity. The author identifies two functions of the "being-as-communion" account: (1) a critical response to the previous competing quantitative and qualitative ontologies, and (2) a new ontological notion that plays a key role in the great kinds discussion and what follows, capturing the sense in which

to be is to engage actively in relations with structuring, causal kinds. He conclude by speaking to the account's valuable insight into the meaning of being as being-with and being-through."

418. Solana, José. 2013. "Socrates and «Noble» Sophistry (*Sophist* 226b-231c)." In *Plato's Sophist Revisited*, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 71–85. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"The sixth division of the *Sophist* has caused and continues to cause notable perplexity for several reasons.

1. It is introduced into the dialogue in an anomalous way. The Stranger speaks about two kinds of art: acquisitive (κτητική) and productive (ποιητική). However, later on he introduces a third kind: separative (διακριτική) art, whose relationship with the earlier types remains unexplained.

2. The role of this new art in relation to the overall objective of the dialogue, which is to reach a strict definition of the nature of the sophist, is also not explained.

3. Apart from not contributing to the main objective, it creates great difficulties, since, on the one hand, the Stranger speaks of a "noble Sophistry" and, on the other hand, the sophist is defined as a negative figure: one who is in possession of a knowledge which is merely apparent (233c10). Thus the paradox occurs that noble Sophistry is entrusted with the task of destroying the apparent knowledge (231b5) produced by Sophistry.

In view of these difficulties, it is relevant to question, with Cornford ([1935]) 182), why in that case this division stands here." (pp. 71-72, notes omitted)

(...)

"So Plato would have faced two options: either to discard the αντιλογική τεκνηέ which would have seriously affected the έλεγχος, or to preserve it in the form of γενναία σοφιστική. This second option, chosen by Plato in the *Sophist*, is proof that Plato's position against the sophists has to do with axiological and normative postulates rather than with theoretical questions and arguments." (p. 85)

419. Speliotis, Evantha. 2013. "Sophist and Philosopher in Plato's *Sophist*." In *Socratic Philosophy and Its Others*, edited by Dustin, Christopher and Schaeffer, Denise, 197–215. Lanham: Lexington Books.

"Having completed the search for the sophist and having identified the nature of his activity (see 218b-c), we may now reflect back and "calculate before ourselves" (*dialogisometha*, 231d) how he has appeared and what we have learned. From the beginning, the sophist has been particularly associated with appearances, and he may be said to dwell in, even to be a master of, appearances.

(...)

And yet the philosopher, too, appears. Just as the sophist faces a threat because of his overweening attention to the appearances and, the Stranger has argued, insufficient attention to knowledge, being, and truth; the philosopher also faces a challenge and a threat if, in his

devotion to and pursuit of knowledge and truth, he does not care sufficiently for the appearances.

(...)

The Stranger, therefore, concludes the *Sophist* with both an affirmation and a criticism of Socrates. Socrates is in his being, his intention, and his activity a philosopher. But Socrates is also, in a sense "poor in speeches" (*phaulos en logois*). As masterful as he is at phantastic imitation, he is not masterful enough. For all his knowledge and his skill, his devotion to truth and being to the exclusion of appearance is a weakness, not a strength. The philosopher need not be a victim of others' opinions. Being masterful as he is at *phantastike*, he should also give some care and attention not only to what he does, but how he appears to others when he does it. As Plato seems to suggest also in the *Phaedrus*, the philosopher must embrace, not eschew, the true art of rhetoric, the art of making both true and beautiful speeches (see *Phaedrus* 277b-d)." (pp. 212-213)

420. Starr, David E. 1974. "The Sixth Sophist: Comments on Frederick S. Oscanyan's "On Six Definitions of the Sophist: *Sophist* 221e-231e"." *Philosophical Forum* no. 5:486–492.
421. Stenzel, Julius. 1940. *Plato's Method of Dialectic*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Translated and edited by D. J. Allan.

422. Stough, Charlotte. 1990. "Two Kinds of Naming in the *Sophist*." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 20:355–381.

"Those who hold the view that Plato is committed to self-predication by his theory of Forms are forced to consider whether he ever came to terms with the problem and, if he did not, why he did not, in view of the apparently damaging effects of the Third Man Argument. Their opponents in the tradition, on the other hand, insist that Plato would not have agreed that a Form can be predicated of itself and that his theory does not imply it. But they in turn have been hard put to explain the import of the Third Man Argument, which appears to trade so heavily on that assumption, as well as the unmistakably self-predicative language of the dialogues.

I believe that this line of thinking focuses too narrowly on what we have come to understand as the 'problem of self-predication'. To begin with, no winner in the debate is anywhere in view. Plato's language, overtly self-predicative though it is, gives no purchase to either party in the dispute, and the textual evidence on both sides is notoriously inconclusive. Much of the debate has centered on several controversial passages in the *Sophist*. In this paper I shall argue that the *Sophist* offers no unambiguous interpretation of grammatically self-predicative statements because it does not, either by design or in effect, distinguish between predication and identity. Instead of attacking certain troublesome puzzles connected with Being by directly analyzing that concept (*esti*), Plato offers a solution to those problems by distinguishing between two kinds of names." (pp. 355-356)

423. Stradberg, Jenny K. 2024. "Finding Certainty in the Being of Non-Being: A Final Rejoinder to Protagoras." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 357–363.

Abstract: "In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates demonstrates the existence of false judgments in a dilemma that leads up to the (in)famous peritrope argument (cf. *Tht.* 170c). Put simply, the

dilemma is based on the proposition 'there are false judgments.' If judged true, then false judgments exist; if judged false, then false judgments still exist since the proposition itself is deemed false. This paper aims to show in two parts that the same logic is used to demonstrate the Being of Non-Being in the *Sophist*. In this dialogue, the visitor confronts the sophist's claim that "that which is not never in any way has a share in being." (*Sph.* 260d). By construing Non-Being in accordance with Parmenides' illegitimate concept of Nothingness, as contrary to what is, the sophist argues that any association in thought or speech with Non-Being is impossible and, by extension, that false judgements cannot exist. Should the visitor and Theaetetus prove unable to challenge this claim, the sophist will have escaped into the dark region of deceit and illusion. Although they do fail to refute unintelligible Nothingness, I argue that their failure is in fact progress, as it prepares the ground for a different account of Non-Being. I will show that the transition from a failed elenchus to the victorious assertion that Non-Being has a share in Being is facilitated by the logic used against Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*."

424. Strawser, Bradley Jay. 2012. "Those Frightening Men: A New Interpretation of Plato's Battle of Gods and Giants." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 16:217–232.

Abstract: "In Plato's *Sophist* (245e–247e) an argument against metaphysical materialism in the "battle of gods and giants" is presented which is oft the cause of consternation, primarily because it appears the characters are unfair to the materialist position. Attempts to explain it usually resort to restructuring the argument while others rearrange the *Sophist* entirely to rebuild the argument in a more satisfying form. I propose a different account of the argument that does not rely on a disservice to the materialist nor restructuring Plato's argument. I contend, instead, that the argument is enthymematic in nature, allowing the definitions employed to flow out of the reasoning as originally presented. Moreover, it suggests that Plato's idealism was so deeply ingrained that modern defenses of materialism were not even live options."

425. Sweeney, Leo. 1988. "Participation in Plato's dialogues: *Phaedo*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Timaeus*." *The New Scholasticism* no. 62:125–149.

"Having witnessed Plato's upgrading intelligence (and thereupon the efficient causality it exercises) and his disclosing the efficient causality it exercises) and his disclosing the extent and nature of divine artistry, let us now, before moving to the *Timaeus*. bring the *Sophist* into focus with the *Phaedo* and *Parmenides*." (p. 125)

(...)

"In order to succeed, the three-factor theory of the *Phaedo* (the Form itself, the participated perfections, participants) needed further causes to explain how the participated perfections themselves were produced in the participants without the Form itself being changed, multiplied, divided. His answer can be found in the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*, where he joined participation explicitly with exemplarity and efficiency. More adequately, then, participation consists in things being made-as-images of the Forms (*Parm.* 132D3-4), which thereby are present in their participants through the participated perfections they cause by paradigmatically directing the artistic activity of cognitive agents (*Sophist.* 248E sgg. and 264 sgg.).

The advantages of this more adequate conception are obvious. By their activity agents are genuine causes that sensible existents are what they are. By their indirect presence through participated perfections the Forms are genuine causes of what things are. Yet they are not divided or multiplied or changed or lessened by their causality. Simply by being what it is, a Form can constantly direct as model whatever artistic activity the cognitive agent wishes to engage in. Sensible existents themselves are actually produced and yet they remain imperfect: they are only images of the Forms, upon which they depend constantly for being what they are.

Plato's procedure in formulating his philosophy was, then, to start with participation and end with efficient and exemplary causalities. But these latter do not replace the former: they complement and enrich it. A thing's participation in Forms results from the divine agent producing it while acting under their paradigmatic guidance." (p. 134)

426. Swindler, James Kenneth. 1980. "Parmenides' Paradox: Negative Reference and Negative Existentials." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 33:727–744.

"In this section I hope to show that Plato offers in the *Sophist* an alternative conception of being and irreferential language which avoids commitment to forms without instances.

Although I believe the *Sophist* contains a general semantics of reference, including the germ of a solution to the paradoxes of intensionality, I will confine myself here to Plato's solution of Parmenides' Paradox. Whereas the modern accounts I have been discussing begin with language and take some settled ontology for granted, Plato insists that a real solution requires a reconsideration of being itself. Only when we understand the nature of being can we begin to fathom reference to nonbeings.

There are at least three statements by the Eleatic Stranger defining being. At 238a he says, "To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is. . . . But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?" (24) An object exists if and only if it is possible for it to possess some real property besides existence. This principle is said to be violated in all attempts to refer to or describe what does not exist. At 247a, in refutation of materialists, the Stranger, alluding to virtues and vices, says, "But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists." If it is possible for anything to possess or not to possess some property, then that property exists. These two principles give us existential conditions for objects and properties.

(...)

"Being" means "possible relatedness"; being is exactly identical to possibility (*dunamis*); being is the possible possession of properties. At Plato's hands Parmenides' ontology falls prey to his own logic. They agree that nonbeings can have no properties, but Plato adds that beings must have properties besides their being. There can be no simple, either Parmenidean or Russellian." (p. 738)

(24) All passages from the *Sophist* are in H. N. Fowler's translation, *Theaetetus and Sophist* (New York: Loeb, 1921)

427. Szaif, Jan. 2024. "Philosophical *paideia* in Plato's *Sophist*." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 153–162.

Abstract: "The sixth division in Plato's *Sophist* (226a-231b) describes a type of apparent sophistry that practices refutation (elenchus) in a manner superficially resembling sophistic disputation, yet in pursuit of the therapeutic goal of dispelling the interlocutor's illusion of knowledge that stands in the way of achieving true excellence through genuine philosophizing. It equates this "noble" kind of sophistry with paideia (roughly, personality-forming education and culture), in opposition to instruction in specialized skills. So far, little attention has been given to this text as a source for Plato's views on paideia. This essay analyzes the conception of paideia in the sixth division and shows why it is not easy to reconcile with Plato's views on philosophical education in other dialogues or with the Visitor's own practice in the *Sophist*. To provide a basis for a correct assessment of the pedagogical function of "noble sophistry", the second part of this essay comments on what distinguishes personal, ignorance-revealing elenctic, serving as protreptic, from proposal-testing elenctic employed by the progressing philosopher. Philosophical paideia starts with the protreptic use of elenctic techniques, but then repurposes these techniques as an indispensable tool of constructive philosophical research."

428. Tabak, Mehmet. 2015. *Plato's Parmenides Reconsidered*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chapter 4: Parmenides in *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*: Introduction 127; Plato's Critique of Protagoras in *Theaetetus* 128; *Parmenides* and Parmenides in *Sophist* 141; Conclusion 163-165.

"The eight arguments of the *Parmenides* are governed by eight hypotheses, or "suppositions" (henceforth, H1, H2, H3, etc.)." (p. 59)

(...)

"There is a noteworthy suggestion in *Sophist* to the effect that Parmenides's principle is self-contradictory. On the one hand, (1) Parmenides claims that only the *one is* (as in H1) or that it is not many in any way. On the other hand, (2) his description of the *one* suggests that it *has being* and thus is a whole with parts (as in H2). What we have here is akin to setting argument 2 against argument 1. Relatedly, *Sophist* does not take up (1) directly as an object of refutation except when the Stranger mentions briefly, but critically, that Parmenides denies any combination and any conception of the real as a plurality.

However, the Stranger's refutation of (2) makes it rather evident that H2 is attributable to the historical Parmenides and that Plato thinks it creates a "measureless perplexity" for Parmenides's doctrine.

Sophist also briefly, but strongly, suggests that Plato supports H3.

This is implied in the Stranger's definition of Unity itself." (p. 163)

429. Tegos, Michalis. 2019. "How does the Sophist reply to the Parmenides? Or, Why the One is not among the *Megista Gene*." *Platonic Investigations* no. 10:42–73.

Abstract: "This paper explores the relation of the *Sophist* to the *Parmenides*: in what ways the *Sophist* responds to the questions, aporias and demands raised in the *Parmenides*.

It aims to show how the problems encountered in the first part and the categories used in the second part of the *Parmenides*, relate to the solutions proposed in the *Sophist*. The *Parmenides* has been interpreted in various ways: as a logical exercise and as a theory about gods, even as an example of perfect symmetry in impossibility.

It has been acclaimed as the best collection of antinomies ever produced, but also, as an impossible map sketching how the theory of forms should not be thought. Its purpose, a parody, or training, a pedagogic exercise necessary for the proper way to truth.

Not, however, in order to discard forms, but, on the contrary, to affirm their necessity and to refine them, lest we end up abandoning forms and, with them, the possibility of dialectic and Philosophy. Throughout the *Parmenides*, the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*, we are led through a complex argumentative and dramatic strategy to the refutation of the Eleatic doctrine and the mature ontology of the *Timaeus*. We shall seek to show that the sections on *dunamis*, the *megista gene* and the community of forms that follow the *Gigantomachia* episode about *ousia* in the *Sophist*, propose a way out of the aporias of participation and the 'greatest difficulty' of the *Parmenides*, a way to salvage the theory of forms, and, with them, the possibility of knowledge, *logos* and Philosophy altogether."

430. Thomas, Christine Jan. 2008. "Speaking of Something: Plato's *Sophist* and Plato's Beard." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 38:631–668.

"After close examination of the Eleatic Visitor's arguments, I shall defend the view that Plato intends the something requirement articulated in the *Sophist* to be a metaphysical condition on significant discourse and contentful thought. For Plato, whatever is something is some one thing that is. In other words, whatever is something exists as a well-individuated, countable entity. Being and number 'belong to' whatever is something. Moreover, whatever is something is self-identical (by sharing in sameness) and different from everything else (by sharing in difference).

One of the central aims of the *Sophist* is to articulate and to develop Plato's metaphysics of somethings. We learn in the dialogue that, strictly speaking, speech and thought must be of existing, countable beings that are self-identical and different from everything else.

Some qualifications are, of course, in order. There is reason to believe that not simply any apparently contentful piece of speech commits Plato to the somethinghood and existence of the purported subject. For example, the apparent meaningfulness of the sentences 'Pegasus does not exist' and 'Pegasus is winged' does not commit Plato to the somethinghood or existence or being of Pegasus. Or so I argue. (pp. 632-633 a note omitted)

431. Thorp, John. 1984. "Forms, Concepts and *TO MH ON*." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 2:77–92.

Note 1: "This paper is a reply to Y. Lafrance "Sur une lecture analytique du *Sophiste* 237 b 10 - 239 a 12" [*Revue de Philosophie Ancienne*, 2, 1984, pp. 41-76]. His paper and my reply continue a discussion which began when we gave a seminar together in 1982 - 83 at the University of Ottawa on 'The analytic and continental traditions in the exegesis of Plato's *Sophist*'. I wish to thank him both for his vigorous curiosity and also his friendly tolerance throughout the seminar and since." (p. 77)

(...)

"Conclusion

In conclusion let me simply restate the principal thesis which I have argued. Plato's Forms and analysts' concepts are fundamentally the same things. Once we see this a good deal of Plato's philosophical work becomes remarkably alive.

And given that Plato is thus sufficiently on our wavelength that we can take him out of the museum and treat him seriously as a philosopher, why should we not do so? I am sure it is what he would have wanted." (p. 92)

432. Tilgham, B. R. 1969. "Parmenides, Plato and logical atomism." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 7:151–160.

"In the *Sophist* Plato does not give us a theory of proper names although there is no reason to suppose he is not committed to thinking of names as meaning their bearers and likely enough he thinks of the names of the forms as logically proper names. Whether he would consider the name of a sensible object, e.g., "Theaetetus," as a logically proper name, there is no evidence to suggest. At any rate, it doesn't make any difference. Whatever he takes to be logically proper names, it would, I think, be easy enough to impose the theory of descriptions upon him to take care of the other words that we use to refer and, besides, what is important and original is not a theory of names, but a theory of sentence meaning." (p. 157)

433. Trevaskis, J.R. 1955. "The Sophistry of Noble Lineage (Plato, *Sophistes* 230a5-232b9)." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 2:36–49.

"This passage has recently been examined by Mr G. B. Kerferd in the *Classical Quarterly*.(1) He reaches interesting and novel conclusions.

The following article questions the results of his investigations and attempts to support the usual view of the passage.

It may be best to begin with a recapitulation of the dialogue up to 231 e6. An Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus attempt to define the sophist.

Five divisions are pursued under the generic starting-point κτητική. The sixth is preceded by a Collection which yields the term διαλεκτική. The τέχνη διαλεκτική is successively divided until a cathartic method of education is isolated. The question is then raised whether its practitioners are sophists. The Eleatic is doubtful about this, but is prepared to accept the qualified title." (p. 36)

(...)

"The reason for the sixth division appearing where it does in the *Sophist* must surely be that the method of Socrates portrayed in it was often confused with sophistry. After five divisions which characterize sophistry as Plato saw it and are plainly hostile, the sixth is "serious and sympathetic; towards the close it becomes eloquent.(2)" (p. 48)

(1) N.S. IV I, 2 (Jan.-Apr. 1954) pp. 84-90.

(2) i.e. Plato to his reader: "Continue to call it sophistry, if you insist; but if you do you are talking of a 'sophistry' of a very different order."

434. ———. 1966. "The μέγιστα γένη and the Vowel Analogy of Plato, *Sophist* 253." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 11:99–116.

"I wish to discuss the μέγιστα γένη section of the *Sophist* (251a5-259d8) and in particular some difficulties in the passage 253a1-c3.

Let us begin by considering a couple of general points about the *Sophist*: 1. What is the *Sophist* about? Answers commonly given are that it is concerned with the relations of Ideas to one another, or with the elucidation of significant negative and of false statement, or with a development in Plato's ontology, or with the practical illustration of the method of Collection and Division, or with a number of these topics.

Even on the assumption (which I do not share) that all these topics are to be found treated in the dialogue, it does not seem to me that their treatment is other than incidental to a more fundamental theme: philosophy. The dialogue is an exercise in doing philosophy, which is distinct from its counterfeit, sophistry or casuistry. Of course all the dialogues are in a sense exercises in doing philosophy: the reader's mind is exercised by them in philosophical questions. But the *Sophist* is a dialogue which is itself pre-eminently a demonstration of philosophy in action. The passages concerned with significant negative and with false statement, for instance, are practical examples of casuistical positions refuted. No-one strongly interested in philosophy is likely to find the dialogue dry or technical. These adjectives may be applied to it by those more interested in literature than philosophy.

2. The discussion is led by a visitor from Elea' who, it is emphasized at the beginning of the dialogue and elsewhere, is a philosopher and no mere logic-chopper. He is, in fact, indistinguishable from Plato's Socrates in some traits: for example, his use of the aporetic method, and his penchant for the method of diaeresis.

The dialogue, then, shows us philosophy in action, and is conducted by a serious philosopher." (p. 99)

(1) I call him an 'Eleian' rather than an 'Eleatic' since, although he is described at the opening of the dialogue as ἐταῖρον... τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα, it becomes clear in the course of the dialogue that he does not adopt the Eleatic position.

435. ———. 1967. "Division and its Relation to Dialectic and Ontology in Plato." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 12:118–129.

"The formal divisional exercises which we meet above all in the *Sophist* may strike the reader as tedious. Yet it is usually said that Plato lays great store by Division as a method of philosophy, one, moreover, to which he gives the title of 'dialectic' and which reveals the real structure of Ideas.

I wish to discuss how far the method is to be identified with dialectic, what relation, if any, it bears to Plato's ontology, and what Plato hopes for from it. I shall be mainly concerned with *Phaedrus*, *Sophist* and *Statesman*, having discussed the *Philebus* on a previous occasion (*Phronesis* 5,1 [1960], 39-44)." (p. 118)

436. Trindade Santos, José. 2013. "For a Non-Predicative Reading of *esti* in Parmenides, the Sophists and Plato." *Méthexis* no. 26:39–50.

Abstract: "The absence of grammatical subject and object in Parmenides' 'it is/it is not' allows the reading of the verbal forms not as copulas but as names, with no implicit subject nor elided predicate. Once there are two only alternatives, contrary and excluding each other, sustaining that a 'no-name' does not grant knowledge implies identifying its opposite – 'it is' – as the only name conducive to knowledge in itself, denouncing the 'inconceivability of a knowledge that does not know. If 'it is' is the only [name] "which can be thought/known", and "what is" is the way in which 'thought/knowledge' can be accomplished, there is no need to postulate the existence of 'anything' that is, nor of anything that can be said of "what is". Being the only name which "can be thought of/known", the unifying synthesis of "knowledge, knowing and known" in one infallible cognitive state, it is unthinkable that "what is" does not exist."

437. ———. 2016. "Reading Plato's *Sophist*." In *Plato's Styles and Characters. Between Literature and Philosophy*, edited by Cornelli, Gabriele, 89–99. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"Plato's *Sophist* explores a cluster of philosophical interconnected problems, namely those of truth/falsity and being/not-being. Highlighting some key passages in Plato's dialogues in which these problems are approached I come to the *Sophist* where they are brought together and solved." (p. 89)

(...)

"The greatest innovation contained in this conception of dialectics consists in the previous separation and subsequent combination of the ontological and epistemological perspectives on reality(14). While the three first Greatest Kinds – Being, Movement and Rest – refer to what exists, the Same and the Other provide the dialectician with the ability to relate them using different kinds of statements: existential, identitative and predicative ones (this last one exploring the participation of Forms in one another: 255a–b, 256a).

Plato's theory of Being shows how this kind includes all the others granting them 'existence' (Being is everything that is, seen in itself). In his conception of Not-Being he starts by making manifest the function played by the Other as 'difference' (Not-Being is Being seen from the perspective of any other kind: 255d, 256d–e). He then proceeds to condense in the idea of 'contraposition' (257d–258c) the role played by Not-Being in the generation of ontological hierarchies.

In these each grade is what it is, in contraposition to all the others it is not, but in relation to which it is and is said by discourse (258d–259b)." (p. 97)

(14) In the *Phaedo* or the *Republic* Epistemology and Ontology are tied together, for each one of the two cognitive competences "is related to" its own content – "being" or "opinion" – and "effects" its product: "knowledge" or "belief" (R. [Republic] V 477d ff.).

438. Tuozzo, Thomas. 2024. "The Eidos of Non-existence in Plato's *Sophist*: 257a11-b4." In *Plato's Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 381–387.

Abstract: "Some contemporary scholars (rightly) accept Ackrill's claim that in the *Sophist* the Eleatic Visitor recognizes three ways in which being can be predicated of a thing: it can be said to be identical to something, or to have some property, or to exist. But scholars generally maintain that the Visitor only recognizes two corresponding ways of predicating not-being: we can say that something is not identical to something, or that it does not have some property, but we cannot intelligibly say that it does not exist. I argue that at 257a11-b4 the Visitor does recognize this third way of predicating not-being, construing it as a special case of negative property predication. To predicate not-being of something is to say that it shares in the Form of Non-existence, viz. that part of Otherness that is set opposite the Form of Being (Existence). The scholarly resistance to this view is largely based not on the text of 257a11-b4, but rather on the *aporiai* raised for the intelligibility of the expression τὸ μὴ ὄν at 237b7-238c3. I argue that those *aporiai* are not meant to be decisive, and, in particular, that a claim that figures in the first, that the term "something" can only be intelligibly applied to something that exists, should not be thought to be endorsed as obviously true by Plato. In support I adduce *Parmenides* 160e, where the denial of that claim is persuasively argued for."

439. Turnbull, Robert G. 1964. "The Argument of the *Sophist*." *Philosophical Quarterly* no. 14:23–34.

"The aim of this paper is to present and defend an explanation of the connections between the most noteworthy parts of *Sophist*. That explanation ties together the battle of gods and giants, the section on non-being and the section on speaking and thinking falsely. As always in Platonic interpretation, however, my explanation accords with a more comprehensive interpretation of Platonic ontology and has ramifications for the explanation of other dialogues.

Baldly stated, my claim is as follows. In the battle of gods and giants section the Stranger insists that both forms and souls are, both being *dynameis* (powers). In the section on non-being a distinction is drawn between forms which, as it were, run through all the other forms as principles of their division and contrariety and forms which might be called "illustrable" forms (cf. the "illustrability" of mathematical forms in *Republic* in that the mathematician may draw diagrams). The former are Being, Same, and Different, the latter, Motion and Rest. Motion and Rest are among the "most important", for every other illustrable form may be regarded as a kind (or sub-kind) of one of them. They are, moreover, contraries, that is, they mingle with Different with respect to each other. The section on speaking and thinking falsely requires that souls are, for "names" refer always to souls. It also requires contrariety, for "verbs" refer to immanent characters (i.e., to what, strictly, participate in forms) or, better, to "possible" immanent characters. And immanent characters, sharing contrariety with the forms in which they participate, provide the possibility of speaking or thinking what is not. To speak or think what is not (i.e., to make a false "statement") is to refer to a soul and a "possible" immanent character, the "possibility" of which is assured by the diversity and contrariety of "illustrable" forms. The "discourse" principle which parallels the contrariety principle among the forms is: No soul may have in it at the same time (and in the same respect) contrary immanent characters.

And discourse here, of course, consists of juxtaposition of "names" and "verbs".

In what follows, Part I will develop the intellectual considerations upon which my interpretation rests, providing a more general framework for it.

Part II will deal directly and briefly with the text of *Sophist*." (p. 23)

440. Turner, E. G. 1955. "A Ptolemaic scrap of Plato, *Sophistes*." *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* no. 98:97–98.

"Shortly before the publication in May 1955 of *The Hibeh Papyri* Part II, I identified the contents of two small scraps printed therein as No. 228 as from Plato, *Sophistes*. I had time to insert a slip stating the identification, but not to revise or assess the value of the text, and I attempt that revision and evaluation here." (p. 97)

441. Van Eck, Job. 1995. "Falsity without Negative Predication: On *Sophistes* 255e-263d." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 40:20–47.

"The dramatic aim of the *Sophistes* is to characterise the sophist and capture him in a definition. He is to be described as an illusionist who creates false beliefs. Therefore, an analysis of falsity is needed, which is provided in 263.

Now, three of the main problems the *Sophistes* has raised among interpreters are: 'What is the preparation Plato made before he could arrive at his analysis of falsehood?', 'What is the nature of the problem about falsity Plato gets to grips with?' and 'What account of negative predication, if any, can we derive from the dialogue?' In the following I want to deal with these questions." (p. 20)

(...)

"To conclude: there is no treatment of what we usually call negative predication (that is, nonpredication) in 255e-258e, nor any reference to it, nor any use made of it in 258e-263d; further, the analysis of a sentence of the type 'x is not F' we can derive from 240e-241a and 263b-d, shows that it does not imply negative predication in the strict meaning of the phrase, viz. that a negative predicate is attributed to x. Thus, in a double sense we can say that there is no negative predication in the *Sophistes*. What we do find is falsity without negative predication. In consequence, it is wrong to speak of the 'crucial inadequacy of [the] *Sophist* account of negation to sustain Plato's theory of false judgement (50); the Platonic account of negation we can derive from the *Sophist* is an immediate result of the theory of false judgement we find there, and an adequate one indeed." (p. 40)

(50) Wiggins (1971), 268.

References

G. Vlastos ed. 1971. *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology*. New York.

Wiggins, D. 1971. 'Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of Non-Being'. 268-303 in G. Vlastos ed. 1971.

442. ———. 1997. "A Note on *Sophist* 257b9-c3." *Mnemosyne* no. 50:75–77.

"In the literature we find two kinds of translations of *Sophist* 25 7b9-c3, but, strange enough, no discussion among the commentators of the point of difference at issue. In my opinion, both versions are unsatisfactory. I will try to prove this claim and offer an alternative. The question behind the difference between the translations is: on what part of

the sentence do the genitives τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων (c1-2) and τῶν πραγμάτων (c2) depend?" (p. 75)

443. ———. 1999. "Plato's Analysis of Falsity. A Landmark in the History of Logical Analysis." In *JFAK — Essays Dedicated to Johan van Benthem on the Occasion of his 50th Birthday*, edited by Gerbrandy, Jelle, Maarten, Marx., de Rijk, Maarten and Venema, Yde. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Abstract: "Plato's theory of falsity and its preliminaries, as presented in *Sophistes* 254d-263d, has evoked many grave criticisms: it is said to be fundamentally flawed in several respects. Yet it appears that the main origin of this view is an incorrect reading of the section on negation, which precedes the analysis of falsity. This section is interpreted as treating negative predication; in fact it treats higher order (non-)identity propositions (F is [not] G). And it is on the basis of these (non)identity propositions that the falsity of atomic first order sentences is explained. The resulting analysis turns out to be impeccable and fully adequate to the problems at issue."

444. ———. 2000. "Plato's logical insights: On *Sophist* 254d-257a." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 20:53–79.

"Plato has often been censured for a serious lack of important logical insights.

Especially his theory of not being and falsity and its preliminaries, as presented in the middle part of the *Sophist*, particularly 254d-263d, has evoked many grave criticisms." (p. 53)

(...)

"I shall discuss those parts of the text that have given rise to these criticisms, which I show to be all mistaken: Plato is not guilty of any of the fallacies or failures mentioned. On all points at issue here Plato's logical insights are perfectly sound." (p. 54)

(...)

"On the basis of the criticisms dealt with above, the section 254d-263d of the *Sophist*, containing Plato's theory of not-being and falsity, has been called 'one great logical mistake' (Bostock 1984, 90). Now that we have seen all these criticisms are false, how should we evaluate the theory? We found that it is not faultless either, as it contains the idea that (a) rest does not participate of movement and movement not of rest, because (b) this would turn their-opposite-natures into each other. Actually, only the first part of (a) is true and the reason given for it is not sound. In fact, this makes the system inconsistent: it follows from the text

that every form is at rest (contra a), and also that resting is not part of the *physis* of any form (except for rest, of course), and so will not interfere with the form of movement either (contra b). How serious is this and what is the position of the inconsistency within the theory as a whole?" (p. 77)

(...)

"Thus, within the theory as a whole the idea that movement would not partake of rest and vice versa because this would turn their natures into each other, is merely a marginal slip. In fact it is the only fault in an otherwise impeccable series of arguments, leading, as our outline in the introduction can only adumbrate, to a highly adequate analysis of not being and falsity. Far from being the logical mess the criticisms would make us believe it is, the theory of falsity and negation we find in the *Sophist* is a masterpiece of logical analysis, to be reckoned among the great achievements in the history of the discipline." (p.78)

References

Bostock, D. 1984. 'Plato on "Is not' " *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2: 89-119.

445. ————. 2002. "Non-Being and Difference: on Plato's *Sophist* 256d5-258e3." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 23:63–84.

"Plato's analysis of falsity at *Sophist* 263 is given in terms of notbeing and difference. 'Theaetetus flies' is false because what is different is stated as the same, and what is not as what is, θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, (263 D 1-2), things that are different from what is the case concerning him (viz. flying) are described as the same (as what is the case about him). That there are indeed many μὴ ὄντα, 'not-beings' in the sense of things different from the things that are, the Eleatic Stranger (ES) and Theaetetus remarked some lines above, 'for we said there are many things that are with regard to each thing and many things that are not' (263 B 11-12), referring to 256 E 6-7, 'so, with regard to each of the forms, being is many and not-being is indefinite in quantity'. In this way they had been disobedient to Parmenides, who had stated, 'Never shall it force itself on us that things that are-not are [εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα].' But they had gone even further in their disobedience: 'but we have not merely shown that the things that are-not are, but also brought to light the form not-being happens to have' (258 ο 5-7).

The context of both points has caused commentators a lot of problems. The main question is, how is it that something (i.e. a form) is called an οὐκ ὄν in 256 ο 8-257 A 6? Is it because it is different from the form of being; or is it because it is different from any thing (i.e. any form) it is not identical with? And on which of the two lines is the form of not-being defined as it is introduced in the section that follows, in 258 A 11-B 8 and 258 D 7-E 3? Only a few commentators have tackled the problems systematically, and as far as I know no interpretation has been reached that is both coherent and sound. Nevertheless, such an interpretation is possible, as I shall argue in the following. I shall discuss the passages at issue, criticize commentaries that have been given, and present the interpretation intended." (pp. 63-64)

446. ————. 2008. "Self-predication and Being the Aitia of Things." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 28:105–124.

"In recent times sentences of self-predication in Plato, that is, sentences in which it is said that a certain form F-ness, is itself F. have been explained by referring to the causal role of forms. The form F-ness is F because it is the *aitia* of any particular x being F. This is taken in different senses. Some commentators are of the opinion that to say that F-ness, also called 'the F'. is itself F is to say that it is the ultimate source (explanation) of why anything is F (Fine 1992, 26 and 2003, 36, 314-315). For others, sometimes the form of F is itself F because as a cause of other things' being F, it must itself have the quality F (Malcolm 1991, 154-158 and Devereux 2003, 79).

I examine the evidence put forward for these interpretations and look at some passages pertinent to the issue of self-predication from the *Phaedo* and the *Sophist*. The *Sophist* features a context in which there is no question of the role of forms as *aitiai*; the *Phaedo* passage is explicitly about the causal role of the forms concerned. From both dialogues we can learn why a form F-ness cannot be not F, and what it means that it is F, without referring to the F as the *aitia* of F-things being F. Yet there is a very interesting connection between the causal role of the forms and a certain type of self-predication. Surprisingly, however, it is not self-predication of *forms* that is at issue, but self-predication with relation to the F-ness 'in us'." (p. 105)

References

Devereux, D. 2003. 'Plato: Metaphysics' 75-99 in C. Shields ed. *The Blackwell Guide to Ancient Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Fine, G. 1992. 'Aristotle's Criticisms of Plato' 13-41 in J. Klagge and N. Smith edd. *Methods of Interpreting Plato and his Dialogues*. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, supplementary volume.

Fine, G. 2003. *Plato on Knowledge and Forms, Selected Essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Malcolm, J. 1991. *Plato on the Self-Predication of Forms. Early and Middle Dialogues*. Oxford: Oxford University.

447. ————. 2014. "Plato's Theory of Negation and Falsity in *Sophist* 257 and 263: A New Defense of the Oxford Interpretation." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 34:275–288.

"There are two main rival interpretations of the text, the so-called Oxford interpretation and the incompatibility range interpretation.(1) On the Oxford interpretation, the sentence 'Theaetetus flies' is false, because flying is different from everything that applies to Theaetetus. So it reads a universal quantifier implied in the text: 'other things than all the things that are'. The incompatibility range interpretation, however, says that 'Theaetetus flies' is false, because flying is different from something taken from the range of attributes incompatible with flying (viz., sitting) that applies to Theaetetus. Thus it reads an existential quantifier in the text: 'other things than some things that are'. This reading finds its inspiration in an earlier passage, 257b1-c3, on negative expressions, where the idea of a range of incompatible attributes is introduced indeed, and where it is said that 'the prefixed "not" indicates some of the other things than... the things the words uttered after the negative stand for'. On this interpretation 'not big', for instance, would signify middle-sized, or small, because it means 'something other than big'.

What is at issue here, namely, to which interpretation we should subscribe, concerns an important point: whether the *Sophist* offers an adequate theory of falsity or not. On the Oxford interpretation it does, on the incompatibility range interpretation it does not.

Now, the incompatibility range interpretation is winning more and more support.² Brown 2008, 453-458 argues against the Oxford interpretation. As her criticisms are incisive and forceful indeed, adherers to this interpretation cannot ignore them. In the following, I will oppose the incompatibility range interpretation and point out that it involves a remarkable

inconsistency in the treatment of negative terms in 256-257. Then I will show that a natural reading of 263 justifies the Oxford interpretation." (pp. 275-276)

(1) The name 'Oxford interpretation' was introduced by Keyt 1973.

(2) Szaif 2004; Brown 2008; Gill 2009. Crivelli 2012 adheres to the Oxford interpretation.

References

Brown, L. 2008. 'The *Sophist* on Statements, Predication, and Falsehood' 437-462 in G. Fine ed. 2008. *The Oxford Handbook of Plato*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crivelli, P. 2012. *Plato's Account of Falsehood. A Study of the Sophist*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gill, M.L. 2009. 'Method and Metaphysics in Plato's *Sophist* and *Statesman*' 1-34 in E.N. Zalta ed. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Keyt, D. 1973. 'Plato on Falsity: *Sophist* 263B'. 285-305 in E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos, R. Rorty edd. *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos*. Assen: Van Gorcum.

Szaif, J. 2004. *Platons Begriff der Wahrheit*. Munich: Alber.

448. van Fraassen, Bas C. 1969. "Logical Structure in Plato's *Sophist*." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 22:482–498.

"In view of much recent discussion of the passage in the *Sophist* in which Plato discusses the relations among the forms, (*) it may not be inappropriate to examine this passage from the point of view of modern logical theory. There is indeed already one such study by Karl Dürr, (**) who attempts to represent the relations among the forms within the framework of classes in *Principia Mathematica*. Since we consider some of these relations to be modal in character, we cannot accept the adequacy of this framework for this purpose.

In what follows we shall examine the connection between relations among the forms and the relation of participation between forms and individuals (section 2), the peculiar character of forms corresponding to relative terms (section 3), and finally the formal representation of the described logical structures (section 4). The main point which emerges is that the problems discussed by Plato are closely related to difficult problems in current logical theory." (p. 482)

(*) 251A-259D. See for example J. B. Trevaskis, "The *megista genê* and the vowel analogy of Plato, *Sophist* 253," *Phronesis* 11 (1966), pp. 99-116, and the references therein.

(**) "Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik. Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung des Dialoges *Sophistes*," *Museum Helveticum* 2 (1945), pp. 166-194.

449. Vázquez, Daniel. 2018. "Argumentation and Reflection in Plato's *Gigantomachia* (*Sophist* 245e6–249d5)." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 100:241–285.

Abstract: "This paper argues that Plato's *gigantomachia* is simultaneously concerned with first-order arguments about metaphysics and epistemology and with second-order arguments that reflect on the impact of ethical components, argumentative strategies and theoretical assumptions in the conversation. This complex argumentative structure reveals, I suggest, an organic and systematic conception of philosophy where all the elements are interdependent. This interpretation has four consequences, two at the second-order level, and two concerning the first-order arguments. First, it shows that there are methodological and ethical requirements without which philosophy is impossible. Second, it shows that the text does not refute materialism but tries to reflect the necessary conditions

to consider possible the existence of incorporeal beings. Third, it argues that the text assumes a conception of knowledge where knowing something is a complex activity composed of two causal relations. Finally, it offers a new interpretation of the overall conclusion of the passage."

450. Vigdis, Songe-Møller. 2013. "Socrates, the Stranger, and Parmenides in Plato's *Sophist*: Two Troubled Relationships." *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* no. 13:292–305.

Abstract: "Who is the *xenos*, the Eleatic stranger, in the *Sophist*? Or rather: who is he not? In this paper, I try to shed light on this (latter) question by discussing Socrates' relationship toward the stranger as well as the stranger's relationship toward Parmenides. I argue that in the opening of the dialogue, Socrates creates an aura of disinterest, distance, and alienation toward the visitor and thus indicates that the stranger is a philosopher of another kind than himself. Through an analysis of the stranger's treatment of Parmenides' notions of non-being and being I come to the conclusion that the stranger also diverges from his spiritual father Parmenides: while both Socrates and Parmenides never lose the divine ideal out of sight, the stranger confines himself to a purely human perspective, in total isolation from the divine ideal."

451. Vlasits, Justin. 2023. "The Puzzle of the Sophist." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 105:359–387.

Abstract: "The many definitions of sophistry at the beginning of Plato's *Sophist* have puzzled scholars just as much as they puzzled the dialogue's main speakers: the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus. The aim of this paper is to give an account of that puzzlement. This puzzlement, it is argued, stems not from a logical or epistemological problem, but from the metaphysical problem that, given the multiplicity of accounts, the interlocutors do not know what the sophist essentially is.

It transpires that, in order to properly account for this puzzle, one must jettison the traditional view of Plato's method of division, on which divisions must be exclusive and mark out relations of essential predication. It is then shown on independent grounds that, although Platonic division in the *Sophist* must express predication relations and be transitive, it need not be dichotomous, exclusive, or express relations of essential predication. Once the requirements of exclusivity and essential predication are dropped, it is possible to make sense of the reasons that the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus are puzzled. Moreover, with this in hand, it is possible to see Plato making an important methodological point in the dialogue: division on its own without any norms does not necessarily lead to the discovery of essences."

452. Vlastos, Gregory. 1969. "Self-predication and self-participation in Plato's later period." *The Philosophical Review* no. 78:74–78.

Reprinted in G. Vlastos, *Platonic Studies*, Princeton. Princeton University Press 1973, pp. 335-341.

453. ———. 1973. "An Ambiguity in the *Sophist*." In *Platonic Studies*, 270–322. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Appendix I: On the interpretation of *Sph.* 248D4E4 pp. 309-317; Appendix II: More on Pauline predication in Plato pp. 318-322

454. Webb, David. 2000. "Continuity and Difference in Heidegger's *Sophist*." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 38:145–169.

"My argument in this paper comprises four claims. First, Heidegger's interpretation of *nous* and *logos* can only be fully understood in conjunction with his reading of *phronesis* and *sophia*. Second, the way in which the two pairs of terms bear upon each other turns at a series of levels on the question of relation. Third, for Heidegger the question of relation is articulated in terms of movement, and moreover Heidegger wishes movement, and thereby relation, to show itself as itself without being reduced either to a thing or to a subsequent relation between preexisting things. Fourth, while Heidegger's reception of the Aristotelian conception of movement as "continuous" (*squelches*) assists in holding open the possibility of a more fundamentally ontological discourse than is possible within the dialectical form of inquiry as presented in Plato's *Sophist*, it is paradoxically Heidegger's deployment of continuity that leads to the movement by which philosophy relates to truth being revealed as aporetic and even discontinuous. As a result, we shall see that Heidegger's attempt to secure a more "fundamental" philosophical relation to truth in fact draws philosophy back into the concreteness of human existence." (p. 146)

455. Wedin, Michael V. 1981. "Plato on What "Being" is Not." *Philosophia* no. 10-11:265–295.

"Three puzzles are raised at "Sophist" 243b-245e concerning theories that make claims about the number of things that are. I argue that they are preliminary to and reflect Plato's positive theory of being, in particular they indicate that it is a mistake to regard being as a standard first-order predicate and so support the thesis that for Plato being is a second-order or formal concept."

456. Wiggins, David. 1971. "Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of Non-Being." In *Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology*, edited by Vlastos, Gregory, 268–303. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press.

Synopsis: "I. An analysis of *Sophist* 236E ff. The sentential variant of the problem of non-being in dialogues earlier than *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. II. The display theory of sentence meaning as an escape from Plato's problem of false judgement. The theory's inability to accommodate negation. III. Plato's analytical approach to the problem of sentence-sense in *Sophist*, and anticipations of this in *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus*. IV. Relevant points from the discussion of Being in *Sophist*. V. The *Sophist* explanation of negation. Preliminary criticism and a suggested amendment of the explanation. VI. The analysis of true and false judgement at *Sophist* 263B4 ff. and Plato's return from negation to falsity. VII. Crucial

inadequacy of *Sophist* account of negation to sustain Plato's theory of false judgement. VIII. Positive achievements of the analysis."

"For these reasons I do not myself believe that Plato came near to solving the problem of negation, or that he reached any satisfactory understanding of what problem this problem really is. The little clarity we now have about the nature of the problem of negation does not lead me to think that Plato's notion of the notion of *Other* is of fundamental importance in solving it. A theory of speech acts is a more likely focus for a satisfying answer. On the other hand we are not in a position to condescend to him on the subject. As J. L. Austin complained, we ourselves are all too apt to define negation in terms of falsehood and falsehood in terms of negation, and to fend off the charge of circularity by keeping the occasions of such interdefinition apart (rather than by getting really clear about what exactly is to be expected from an analysis of negation).

As for falsity, Plato's objective was as much to *find room* for falsity as to define it by means of his account of negation; and in the former project I believe he has more success. Admittedly he mistakes the gravity of some of the obstacles which he thinks he sees in the way of admitting the existence of falsity, and he does not always take the best or the shortest way round them. As a result his eventual theory is a more primitive theory than it otherwise might have been. But in the course of it he puts logic and philosophy onto the subject of parts of speech and the asymmetrical roles of names and other parts in the completed sentence." (p. 302)

457. Wiitala, Michael. 2015. "Non-Being and the Structure of Privative Forms in Plato's *Sophist*." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 19:277–286.

Abstract: "In Plato's *Statesman*, the Eleatic Stranger explains that the division of all human beings into Greek and barbarian is mistaken in that it fails to divide reality into genuine classes or forms (*eide*). The division fails because "barbarian" names a privative form, that is, a form properly indicated via negation: non-Greek. This paper examines how the Stranger characterizes privative forms in the *Sophist*. I argue that although the Stranger is careful to define privative forms as fully determinate, he nevertheless characterizes them as having a structure unlike that of their non-privative counterparts. A privative form, in contrast to a non-privative form, is indifferent to the specificity of its members."

458. ————. 2018. "The Argument against the Friends of the Forms Revisited: *Sophist* 248a4-249d5." *Apeiron* no. 51:171–200.

Abstract: "There are only two places in which Plato explicitly offers a critique of the sort of theory of forms presented in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*: at the beginning of the *Parmenides* and in the argument against the Friends of the Forms in the *Sophist*. An accurate account of the argument against the Friends, therefore, is crucial to a proper understanding of Plato's metaphysics. How the argument against the Friends ought to be construed and what it aims to accomplish, however, are matters of considerable controversy. My aim in this article is twofold. First, I show that the two readings of the argument against the Friends that dominate the contemporary literature – the "Cambridge Change" reading and the "Becoming-is-Being" reading – lack sufficient textual support.

Second, I offer an alternative reading of the argument against the Friends that better explains both the text of 248a4-249d5 and the role the argument plays within the Stranger's wider project of demonstrating that non-being is. My thesis is that the Stranger's argument against

the Friends seeks to demonstrate that the forms must be both at rest and moved, where “moved” (*kineisthai*) has the sense of “affected.” To participate in a form is to be affected by that form. I argue that since, according to the Stranger, every form participates in some other forms (see 251d5-253a2), every form is “moved” in the sense that it is affected by the forms in which it participates. Likewise, I argue that every form is at rest in the sense that its unique nature remains unaffected by the other forms in which it participates.”

459. ————. 2022. "The Koinōnia of Non-Being and Logos in the *Sophist* Account of Falsehood." *Areté. Revista de Filosofía* no. 34:235–249.

Abstract: "At *Sophist* 260e3-261a2, the Eleatic Stranger claims that in order to demonstrate that falsehood is, he and Theaetetus must first track down what speech (*logos*), opinion (*doxa*), and appearance (*phantasia*) are, and then observe the communion (*koinōnia*) that speech, opinion, and appearance have with non-being. The Stranger, however, never explicitly discusses the communion of speech, opinion, and appearance with non-being. Yet presumably their communion is implicit in his account of falsehood, given his claim that observing that communion is needed in order to demonstrate that falsehood is (260e5-a2).

This essay seeks to make the communion that speech has with non-being explicit.

I argue that speech has communion with non-being in that the things and actions speech combines together by means of nouns and verbs need not be combined in a way that reveals (*δηλοῖ*) how the being a given speech is about combines ontologically with other beings."

460. ————. 2023. "That Difference is Different from Being. *Sophist* 255 c 9-e 2." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 62:85–104.

Abstract: "The argument by which the Eleatic Stranger differentiates the kinds being and different (255 c 9–e 2) is one of the most controversial in Plato’s *Sophist*. In it the Stranger introduces the vexed distinction between beings that are *auta kath’ hauta*, ‘themselves according to themselves’, and those that are *pros alla*, ‘relative to others’ (255 c 13–14). Although commentators have developed many interpretations of the argument, there is a key, yet hitherto unrecognized ambiguity in the syntax of the counterfactual conditional at 255 d 4–6 concerning whether the adjunct comparative clause, *hōsper to on*, should be adjoined to the protasis or apodosis. Editors from Heindorf to Robinson adjoin *hōsper to on* to the protasis. This paper argues that this construal is mistaken. Adjoining *hōsper to on* to the apodosis instead allows for a more straightforward interpretation of the argument and offers a resolution to the controversies over the ‘according to themselves’/‘relative to others’ distinction."

461. ————. 2024. "Parts of Difference in Plato’s *Sophist*, with Help from *Republic* V." In *Plato’s Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 425–431.

Abstract: "In the *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger develops an account of non-being according to which it is understood as a part of Different. Yet the precise language he uses to characterize the form Non-Being and other negative forms has two variations. In the first, a negative form is characterized as a part of the nature of Different contraposed to the nature of the form negated. Thus, Non-Beautiful is described as ‘something different among beings that is marked-off from some one kind and in turn contraposed with something among beings’ (257e2-4), and Non-Being is identified as ‘the part of the nature of Different

contraposed with the being of each thing' (258e2). In the second variation, however, a negative form is characterized as the contraposing (antithesis) of the nature of a part of Different relative to the nature of the form negated. Hence, Non-Beautiful 'turns out to be a contraposing of being in relation to being' (257e6-7) and Non-Being is 'the contraposing of the nature of a part of Different and of the nature of Being'

(258a11-b1). In this essay, I develop an account of the parts of Different that explain the two variants in the Stranger's characterization of negative forms, focusing on the Stranger's description of the Non-Beautiful as a part of Different. Since the Stranger's account of the parts of Different is based on an analogy with parts of knowledge, I begin by examining what it means to be a part of knowledge, drawing on Socrates' account of knowledge in *Republic V*."

462. Wiles, Anne M. 1999. "Forms and Predication in the Later Dialogues." In *Plato and Platonism*, edited by van Ophuijsen, Johannes M., 179–197. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
463. Wills, Garry. 1959. "'Being" in *The Sophist*." *The Modern Schoolman* no. 36:197–205.
464. Wolfe, C. J. 2012. "Plato's and Aristotle's Answers to the Parmenides Problem." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 65:747–764.

"The question raised by the great pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides were perhaps *the* main challenge for Plato and Aristotle, two of the greatest post-Socratic philosophers. To summarize the challenge briefly: Parmenides denied that there was any change in the world.

(...)

If Parmenides' argument seems tricky, it ought to. It has seemed tricky to all thinkers who have followed Parmenides. There were even a few unscrupulous thinkers who took advantage of this trickiness and used it as a justification for moral relativism. These thinkers were the sophists, and the most brilliant of them was Protagoras.

Protagoras claimed that each individual man was "the measure of all things," so the same thing that was good for one man might not be good for another based on perspective.⁽¹⁾ Ultimately, Protagoras claimed there was no measure of goodness based on human nature because human nature as a separate individual form did not exist. Only being exists, as Parmenides argued; Protagoras said the rest of what we take to be reality is an illusion and subjective. Protagoras' argument is a stronger version of the sophist arguments about convention and nature (*nomos* and *phusis*). As Plato and Aristotle both recognized, the Parmenides problem had implications for politics as well as for philosophy.

No philosopher was able to accurately interpret and refute the Parmenides problem until Plato and Aristotle. Plato answered it in an important way in his dialogue the *Sophist*, and Aristotle followed this up with the complete answer in *Physics* book 1, chapter 8. My thesis is that Plato's answer would have been good enough to defeat Protagoras in extended argument, thereby remedying the political aspects of the Parmenides problem. However, Aristotle's answer is required to answer some additional philosophical and scientific aspects.

The first section of this paper will summarize the history of presocratic philosophy and explain why Parmenides was a turning-point.

The second section will explain the sophist Protagoras' relation to the Parmenides problem. The third part will present Aristotle's complete answer to the Parmenides problem, and in the fourth part I will compare that approach with Plato's solution in the *Sophist*. Lastly, I will sum up by characterizing how I think Plato and Aristotle would have responded to Protagoras' Parmenidean sophistry in political life." (pp. 747-748)

(1) See Joe Sachs' footnote 10 on page 214 in his translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Santa Fe, NM: Green Lion Press, 2002).

465. Wood, James L. 2009. "Is There an "Archê Kakou" in Plato?" *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 63:349–384.

"Does Plato admit an *archê kakou*, a source or principle of evil? One or more than one? If he does, is the principle of evil matter, soul, a god or gods, some combination of these, or something else entirely? Or, is evil merely a human phenomenon? Just what does Plato understand by evil anyway? These questions have been repeatedly addressed by Plato's commentators, but by no means has a consensus been reached on any of them. (p. 349)

(...)

"In what follows I intend to defend this stance by an analysis of key metaphysical passages in several Platonic dialogues, and in the process I will address the central disputes in the scholarship on the present topic. I begin with the idea of the good in the *Republic* in order to elicit, by contrast, the concept of an *arche kakou*, and the negativity of this notion will be developed through the discussion of *me on* (nonbeing) and *thateron* (difference) in the *Sophist*. I turn then to the *Philebus*, where negativity is conceived as the unlimited or indeterminate (*apeiron*), and evil is realized in the embrace of the unlimited in hedonism, the pursuit of pleasure, and particularly the pleasure of the body. In the next section I show with reference to key passages in the *Statesman* and *Timaeus* that what seems to be a competing principle of evil, the bodily element (*to somatoides*), in fact is a metaphysically derivative notion referring back to the generative cosmic order and specifically to the relative negativity, *thateron*, that makes genesis possible. Finally, I consider the possibility of psychic evil on the cosmic level in the discussion of an evil cosmic soul in the *Laws*. Throughout I will show that positive evil lies only in the defection of the intellect from its responsibility to generate our being as good." (p. 350)

466. Xenakis, Jason. 1957. "Plato on Statement and Truth-Value." *Mind* no. 66:165–172.

"Plato discusses the notions of false, true and statement in a number of places, but *Sophist* 261e-3b stands out. I propose to analyse, and not merely to reproduce in other words, this passage because I expect to make it evident that it has been unduly if not regretfully neglected by those who concern themselves with such matters. I am almost tempted to retrodict, for example, that the Theory of Descriptions would not have been born had this passage been paid the attention it deserves. In any case, 'the present King of France is bald' would not have perplexed anybody because it would not have been even seriously considered, let alone chosen as a legitimate specimen of a false statement, or indeed of a statement." (p. 165)

(...)

"That Plato's analysis applies to 'there is '-statements of the form 'there is (isn't) a mouse in here 'is evident from what has already transpired before the preceding paragraph; the subject (in the by now familiar sense of 'subject') of this statement is not of course 'a mouse'—a substance expression—but 'in here', a place expression. Relational statements too can be accommodated in Plato's analysis, only that the elucidation of the truth-value of these is, perhaps, more complicated.

I am not necessarily maintaining, with Russell and others, that the higher-order use or elucidation of 'to exist' is the only one; nor that Plato did successfully cope with existential, as against attributive, statements, but rather that his present analysis can accommodate the former without postulating a Meinongian Realm of Being. If so, Quine's 'Plato's beard' need not be Plato's." (p. 172)

467. ———. 1959. "Plato's *Sophist*: A Defense of Negative Expressions and a Doctrine of Sense and of Truth." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 4:29–43.

"The *Sophist* anyhow may be said to surmount the difficulty about knowledge and *logos* appearing toward the end of the *Theaetetus*: *logos*, not being a name, can after all enter into the definition of knowledge; and it can do so, of course, as true not as false *logos*. You have knowledge not because you are "apprehending" an object if an ethereal one - for apprehension according to the *Sophist* is not thought and hence knowledge - but because you have a true *logos*.

This does not conflict with the *Theaetetus* thesis that perception is not knowledge; on the contrary it agrees with it, since perception is a form of apprehension - I should say the only form, but let that be as it may.

Nor would it conflict with that dialogue had Plato maintained in it, as perhaps he at bottom does, that knowledge is not of particulars but of principles; for principles demand *logoi*.(1) However, the *Theaetetus* is not my present concern. In fact, I am rather uneasy over the way certain concepts are managed in the "commons" passage (185a ff.), some of which might correspond to some of the "highest concepts" of the *Sophist*: they seem to be treated as though they were first-order or attributive concepts, like "red" and "sound," only not perceptual.

Perhaps this is a slip. Anyhow Plato's stand against perceptionism does not require anything of the kind. Indeed, that passage could be said to amount to the following valid argument: Knowledge entails reality or truth (right: "illusory or false knowledge" is a contradiction in terms); neither truth nor reality is a perceptual concept (right; cf. "'existence' is not a predicate"); therefore knowledge cannot be identical with perception." (pp. 42-43)

(1) It is worth adding that the Wax Tablet metaphor in the *Theaetetus* goes against 'innate ideas' of course, but also against the "Theory of Recollection" and, to that extent, against Formism.

468. Zaks, Nicolas. 2016. "Is the 'In-Itself' Relational? Heidegger and Contemporary Scholarship on Plato's *Sophist* 255c–e." In *Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25)*, edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 95–112. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

"For some scholars, the proof offered by the Eleatic Stranger in Plato's *Sophist* 255c9-e2 of the fact that otherness and being are not two names for one kind is "probably the most crucial text in the dialogue", since "it contains two lines (255c13-14) that seem to speak directly about being and how the form being is spoken of." (p 95, a note omitted)

(...)

"I will proceed as follows. After presenting the difficult text, accompanied by preliminary remarks making explicit how Heidegger's interpretation both aligns with and yet remains very different from contemporary scholarship, I start with two versions of what one might call the 'standard reading' of the proof. I claim that Heidegger would have endorsed this standard reading. But Heidegger goes further by adding a sharp remark concerning the relational character of the 'in-itself. To clarify his argument, I dig into the conception of 'understanding' and temporality developed in *Being and Time*. Then, I argue that Heidegger's remark concerning the relational character of the 'in-itself in some sense foresees Michael Frede's objection to the standard reading.(3) Finally, I present and discuss two different kinds of reactions to this objection. The first kind is a defence of the standard reading; the second regards the 'in-itself as relative. In my conclusion, I argue that even if the standard reading is right concerning the proof of 255c9-e2, the fact remains that Plato, at strategic points of the *Sophist*, speaks of forms relatively to themselves." (p. 96)

(3) Frede (1967), 17; 19, and 22. Cited and described by Heinaman (1983), 14-15.

References

Frede, Michael. *Prädikation und Existenzaussage. Platons Gebrauch von '...ist' und '...ist nicht...'* in *Sophistes*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967.

Heinaman, Robert. "Being in the Sophist." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 65, no. 1 (1983): 1-17.

469. ———. 2018. "Socratic *Elenchus* in the *Sophist*." *Apeiron* no. 51:371–390.

Abstract: "This paper demonstrates the central role of the Socratic *elenchus* in the *Sophist*. In the first part, I defend the position that the Stranger describes the Socratic *elenchus* in the sixth division of the *Sophist*. In the second part, I show that the Socratic *elenchus* is actually used when the Stranger scrutinizes the accounts of being put forward by his predecessors. In the final part, I explain the function of the Socratic *elenchus* in the argument of the dialogue. By contrast with standard scholarly interpretations, this way of reading the text provides all the puzzles about being (241c4-251a4) with a definite function in the dialogue. It also reveals that Plato's methodology includes a plurality of method and is more continuous than what is often believed."

470. ———. 2020. " Διακριτική as a ποιητική τέχνη in the *Sophist*." *The Classical Quarterly*:1–3.

Abstract: "The διακριτική τέχνη (the art of separating or discriminating), from which the sixth definition of the Sophist starts (226b1–231b9), is puzzling. *Prima facie* the art of separating does not fit the initial division of art between ποιητική τέχνη (production) and κτητική τέχνη (acquisition) at 219a8–c9. Therefore, scholars generally agree that, although mutually exclusive, ποιητική and κτητική are not exhaustive and leave room for a third

species of art, διακριτικὴ τέχνη, on a par with ποιητικὴ and κτητικὴ. However, I argue that textual evidence suggests otherwise."

471. Zistakis, Alexandar H. 2006. "Difference, συμπλοκή and the hierarchy of ideas in Plato's *Sophist*." *Phronimon* no. 7:29–45.

Abstract: "Starting from the dialectic of intertwinement, the weaving together (συμπλοκή) of ideas in the *Sophist*, this paper tries to determine the place, function and significance of Difference and Hierarchy among platonic ideas. To that effect, it is first established that and how the notion of difference becomes the fundamental and even substantial structural principle of the dialectic of being and non-being, motion and rest, and finally of the notions of unity and identity themselves. In the second instance, the question of the hierarchy among ideas is interpreted and understood as the question of liberty. Namely, that very hierarchy is understood as an intrinsic and an innate one, i.e. as the set of dialectical relationships between ideas that follow from their own essence and being, which therefore is not nor cannot be externally imposed or forced upon them. Such a character of hierarchy is, then, recognized and exemplified in the case of the individual and the collective, where it turns out not only that there exists a clear idea of individuality in Plato, but also that every individual necessarily belongs to some collective and indeed seeks to unite with the collective in the same way and for the same reasons everything or idea tends towards its form, or its own proper good."

472. Zucchetti, Nicholas. 2020. "An unexplained overlap between *Sophist* 232b1–236d4 and *Republic* X. The case of the sophist as a painter." *Archai. The Origins of Western Thought* no. 30:1–27.

Abstract: "Although most scholars agree that the lexicon of *Sophist* 232b1–236d4 is similar to that of *Republic* X, they leave undetermined whether they are theoretically compatible. Notably, both dialogues elucidate the art of imitation through the metaphor of the painter who deceives his pupils through φαντάσματα. I argue that Plato's conception of imitation of the *Republic* is not only consistent with that presented in the *Sophist*, but also importantly integrates it."

473. Zuckert, Catherine H. 2000. "Who's a Philosopher? Who's a Sophist? The Stranger v. Socrates." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 54:65–97.

"Many readers have taken the Eleatic Stranger to represent a later stage of Plato's philosophical development because the arguments or doctrines the Stranger presents in the *Sophist* appear to be better than those Socrates articulates in earlier dialogues. (1) In particular, in the *Sophist* Plato shows the Stranger answering two questions Socrates proved unable to resolve in two of his conversations the day before. In the *Theaetetus* Socrates admitted that he had long been perplexed by the fact of false opinion; he was not able to explain how it was possible. Likewise, in the *Cratylus* Socrates and his interlocutors were not able to determine satisfactorily the relation between names and the things to which they refer. Through his teaching about the idea of the other, the Stranger shows not only how false opinion is possible but also why names do not always correspond to the kinds or ideas of things. More generally, in the course of his account of previous thought the Stranger presents a fundamental critique of the teaching of "friends of the forms" like Socrates. When we examine the definition of the sophist to which the Stranger comes at the end of the dialogue, however, we find reasons to question the adequacy of his teaching and, consequently, his superiority to Socrates.

If philosophy consists in knowledge - of the whole or merely of self - we are forced to conclude, neither the Stranger nor Socrates is a philosopher.

Each or even both might appear, therefore, to be a pretender - or sophist. If, on the other hand, philosophy consists in the search for knowledge by means of a dialectical sorting of things according to kinds, Socrates and the Stranger represent two different, although related types." (pp. 65-66, a note omitted)

(1) For example, Paul Friedlaender, *Plato*, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958-69); Kenneth M. Sayre, *Plato's Late Ontology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); *Statesman*, trans. Joseph Bright Skemp (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), 96 n. 48.