Fine, Kit. 1970. "Propositional Quantifiers in Modal Logic." Theoria no. 36:336-346.
"In this paper Ï shall present some of the results I have obtained on modal theories which contain quantifiers for propositions. The paper is in two parts: in the first part I
consider theories whose non-quantificational part is S5; in the second part I consider theories whose non-quantificational part is weaker than or not contained in S5. Unless otherwise stated, each
theory has the same language L. This consists of a countable set V of propositional variables p1, p2,, the operators v (or), ~ (not) and □ (necessarily), the universal quantifier (p), p a
propositional variable, and brackets ( and ), The formulas of L are then defined in the usual way." (p. 336)
———. 1971. "The Logics Containing S4.3." Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik no. 17:371-376.
"In this paper I prove some general results on logics containing S 4.3. In section 2 I prove that they all have the finite model property. Bull  has already proved thia result;
but his proof is algebraic, whereas mine is semantic. In sections 3 and 4, I prove that they are all finitely axiomatizable. It follows from these results that they are all decidable. Finally, in
section 5, I show that the lattice of S 4.3 logics is isomorphic to one on finite set of finite sequences of natural numbers. Needless to say, these results carry over to the extensions of the
intermediate logic LC.
In a paper on logics containing K4, I shall present another semantic proof that S4.3 logics have the finite model property and thereby also establish some results on compactness."
(1) R. A. Bull, "That All Normal Extensions of S4.3 Have the Finite Model Property", Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, 12, 1966, pp.
———. 1971. "Counting, Choice and Undecidability." Manifold no. 11:17-22.
Abbreviations: Continuum Hypothesis = CH; Axiom of Choice = AC.
"In 1900 Hilbert stated 23 problems which he considered to be of crucial iaportance. The first of these was ’prove Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis'. Gödel (1939) and Cohen (1963) have
shown that the hypothesis can neither be proved nor disproved. Their proofs are expounded in:
P. J. Cohen, Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis, Benjamin 1966.
P. J. Cohen, "Independence results in set theory", in Studies ln Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, North-Holland 1965, pp. 39-54.
K. Gödel, "The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis with the axiom of set theory", 1939, 4th printing, Princeton 1966·" (p. 71)
"The question now remains: what attitude should the working mathematician take towards CH? It is important to leave AC on one side at this point because it possesses a degree of
self-evidence that CH certainly lacks.
There are, I think, two main attitudes. On the one hand, one could say there is no sense in which CH is true or false and give up looking for ways of settling the question. Instead,
one would develop different set theories, with or without CH, somewhat in analogy to the alternative geometries of the 19th century. On the other hand, one could say that CH Is either true or false
and look for new ways of determining which.
Two main ways suggest themselves. The first is to dispense with proof and to accept that hypothesis concerning transfinite cardinals which is most fruitful in consequences. The
second is to search for new self-evident axioms that might settle CH.
These new axioms might be formulated in terms of set-theoretic notions or in terms of a new notion or new notions altogether.
The adoption of non-deductive procedures or the discovery of non-set-theoretic notions would conflict with two common views about mathematics, viz. that all mathematical knowledge
is based upon proof and that all mathematical notions can be given a set-theoretic definition. Although it is too early to talk of feasibility, it is worth noting that these common views are based
upon an analysis of extant mathematics. There seems to be no reason, in principle, why they should be true." (p. 82)
———. 1972. "In So Many Possible Worlds." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 13:516-520.
"Ordinary modal logic deals with the notion of a proposition being true at least one possible world. This makes it natural to consider the notion of a proposition being true in
k possible worlds for any non-negative integer k. Such a notion would stand to Tarski's numerical quantifiers as ordinary possibility stands to the existential quantifier.
In this paper (1) I present several logics for numerical possibility. First I give the syntax and semantics for a minimal such logic (sections 1 and 2); then I prove its
completeness (sections 3 and 4); and finally I show how to extend this result to other logics (section 5)." (p. 516)
(1) The results of this paper are contained in my doctorate thesis, submitted to the University of Warwick in 1969. I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, the late Arthur Prior.
Without his help and encouragement this paper would never have been written.
———. 1972. "For So Many Individuals." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 13:569-572.
"In , Tarski introduces the numerical quantifiers.
Because of their definability, the numerical quantifiers have rarely been considered on their own account. However, in this paper I consider a predicate logic without identity which
is enriched with numerical quantifiers as primitive. In section 1, I present the syntax and semantics for this logic; and in sections 2 and 3, I establish its completeness." (p. 569)
 Tarski, A., Introduction to Logic, Oxford University Press (1946).
———. 1972. "Logics Containing S4 Without the Finite Model Property." In Conference in Mathematical Logic, London '70, edited by Hodges, Wifrid, 98-102. Berlin: Springer
"In , Harrop asked whether there were logics containing the intuitionistic logic IL which lack the finite model property [=fmp]. Jankov gave examples of such logics, but they
were not finitely axiomatizable. By the Tarski-McKlnsey translation, Harrop's problem relates to the question of whether there exist extensions of the modal logic S4 without fmp. Makinson  showed
that there are extensions of the modal logic M without fmp, but he could not extend his results to S4. In this paper, I shall exhibit logics containing both IL and S4 which lack fmp, but are finitely
axiomatized and decidable." (p. 98)
"Finally, it should be noted that we can add axioms to the logics described above so as to obtain logics which are decidable, finitely axiomatized, complete for their intended
interpretation, and yet without fmp." (p. 101)
 Harrop, R., On the existence of finite models and decision procedures, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, vol. 54 (1958), 1-16.
 Makinson, D., A Normal Modal Calculus Between T and S4 Without the Finite Model Property, Journal of Symbolic Logic, voi. 34, Number 1 (1969), 35-38.
———. 1972. "Some Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Representative Decision on Two Alternatives." Econometrica no. 40:1083-1090.
"A social decision rule is one that produces a social decision for each configuration of individuals' decisions. Such a rule is representative if it produces a social decision that
is the result of repeatedly applying the rule of simple majority decision to decisions obtained
by that rule. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a social decision rule for two alternatives to be representative." (p. 1083)
"The central problem of this paper is to find an alternative characterization of the representative functions. May in  gave an alternative characterization of the simple majority
decision functions, and Murakami in [2 and 3] established that monotonicity and self-duality are necessary conditions for being a representative or indirect majority decision function. (In fact,
Murakami deals with what he calls democratic functions, i.e., representative functions which are non-dictatorial; but this latter condition may be added or left out at will.) However, he was not able
to establish any sufficient conditions. In this paper, I establish his conjecture that strong monotonicity with self-duality is a sufficient condition.
I use this result and a new property of not being "zigzag" to prove that monotonicity, self-duality, and not being zigzag are necessary and sufficient conditions. (2)
Finally, I show that the monotonic, self-dual, and positive functions are exactly those definable in terms of the voting and jury operators." (p. 1084)
(2) P. C. Fishburn independently solved this problem in his paper "The Theory of Representative Majority Decision," Econometrica, 39 (1971), pp. 273-284. However, he uses a
completely different method of proof and a slightly different condition in place of "not zigzag".
 MAY, K. O.: "A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision," Econometrica, 20 (1952), 680-684.
 MURAKAMI, Y.: "Formal Structure of Majority Decisions," Econometrica, 34 (1966), 709-718.
 MURAKAMI, Y.: Logic and Social Choice. London: Macmillan, and New York: Dover, 1968.
———. 1973. "Conditions for the Existence of Cycles under Majority and Non-Minority Rules." Econometrica no. 41:889-899.
"This paper provides type I necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity under simple majority rule. (2) For type II conditions, a master list of
orderings is acceptable if the social rule generates a "rational" (e.g., transitive) social ordering whenever the individuals select their preference orderings from the list. A list ordering may be
selected any number of times, and, in particular, it may not be selected at all. For type I conditions, on the other hand, each list ordering must be selected at least once, so that the list and the
configuration of individual orderings must exactly match in the kind of orderings they contain. Thus for type II conditions it is the absence of certain kinds of orderings that blocks irrational
social choice, whereas for type I conditions the presence of certain kinds of orderings may also contribute toward blockage.
Type II conditions have been determined for a wide variety of rules and under several definitions of rationality. Our main interest in this paper is in type I conditions for simple
majority rule with rationality defined in terms of transitivity or quasi-transitivity. However, our method of argument will yield simple alternative proofs of some standard results on type I
conditions and it will also yield the type I and type II conditions for transitivity under non-minority rule.
Section 1 lays down some relevant definitions. Section 2 proves the "min-midmax" theorem, which is the basis for all that follows. Sections 3 and 4, respectively, establish the
conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity under majority rule.
Finally, Section 5 proves the min-mid-max theorem for the non-minority rule and establishes the condition for transitivity under that rule." (p. 889)
(2) The terminology of type I and II conditions is Pattanaik's . Type II conditions were first proposed by Inada  and type I conditions by Pattanaik .
 INADA, K.: "On the Simple Majority Decision Rule," Econometrica, 36 (1969), 490-506.
 PATTANAIK, P. K.: "SufficientConditions for the Existence of a Choice Set under Majority Voting," Econometrica, 38 (1970), 165-170.
 PATTANAIK, P. K.: Voting and Collective Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
———. 1973. "Surveys on Deontic Logic, Mathematical Logic and the Philosophy of Mathematics." In UNESCO Survey of the Social Sciences.
———. 1974. "An Ascending Chain of S4 Logics." Theoria no. 40:110-116.
"This paper shows that there exists a continuum of logics containing the modal logic S4. (1) §1 contains preliminary definitions and results; §2 introduces the key notion of a frame
formula; §3 establishes the main result and some consequences; and §4 establishes some further results." (p. 110)
(1) Jankov  has independently, and previously, proved the analogous result for intuitionistic sentential logic. His method of proof is algebraic, whereas mine is semantic.
 V. A. Jankov, On the Extension of the Intuitionist Propositional Calculus to the Classical Calculus, and the Minimal Calculus to the Intuitionist Calculus, Journal of
Symbolic Logic 38, 1973, pp. 331-332.
———. 1974. "Models for Entailment." Journal of Philosophical Logic no. 3:347-372.
Reprinted in: Alan Ross Anderson, Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., with contributions by J. Michael Dunn ... [et al.], Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992 vol. II, pp. 208-231.
"This paper gives a modelling for Ackermann’s systems Π' and Π", Anderson’s and Belnap’s system E and R, and several of their subsystems. The
distinctive feature of this modelling is a point-shift in the evaluation of negation and entailment: the negation of a formula holds at a point if the formula itself fails to hold at a complementary
point; and an entailment holds at a point if whenever its antecedent holds at a point its consequent holds at an appropriately associated point. These rules enable negations of valid formulas to hold
at a point and valid formulas themselves to fail to hold at a point. They also provide a grip on certain axioms involving negation or nested entailment." (p. 347, notes omitted)
The first two sections present the deductive-semantic framework; §51.1 specifies the models, and §51.2 the logics. The following two sections establish completeness; §51.3 for a
minimal logic B, and §51.4 for Π', Π", E and the several subsystems. §51.5 outlines various alternative versions of the modeling. The last two sections contain applications of the modeling:
§51.6 to the admissibility of modus ponens; and §51.7 to the finite model property and decidability. Many of the systems considered are shown to have these properties; see §63 for a further survey on
decidability, and §65 for fundamental undecidabilily results." (pp. 208-209 of the revised reprint)
———. 1974. "An Incomplete Logic Containing S4." Theoria no. 40:23-29.
"This paper uses the standard terminology of modal logic. It should suffice to say that: all logics contain the minimal logic K and are closed under necessitation,
substitution and modus ponens; frames consist of a relation defined on a non-empty set of points; models consist of a frame with a valuation; and truth-at-a-point is defined and notated in an obvious
way; with the formula □A true at a point iff A is true at all accessible points. The formula A is true in (satisfied by) a model if it is true in all (some) points of the
model; A is strongly verified in a model if all substitution-instances of A are true in the model; and A is valid in a frame if A is true in all models based upon
the frame, A set of formulas is true, strongly verified, or valid if all of its members are. Unless otherwise stated, all logics contain S4 and all models and frames possess reflexive and
A logic is complete if any formula valid in all frames that validate the logic is in the logic. This paper exhibits a logic L containing S4 that is not complete." (p. 23)
———. 1974. "Logics Containing K4. Part I." Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 39:31-42.
"There are two main lacunae in recent work on modal logic: a lack of general results and a lack of negative results. This or that logic is shown to have such and such a desirable
property, but very little is known about the scope or bounds of the property. Thus there are numerous particular results on completeness, decidability, finite model property, compactness, etc., but
very few general or negative results.
In these papers I hope to help fill these lacunae. This first part contains a very general completeness result. Let In be the axiom that says there are at most
n incomparable points related to a given point. Then the result is that any logic containing K4 and In is complete.
The first three sections provide background material for the rest of the papers. The fourth section shows that certain models contain no infinite ascending chains, and the fifth
section shows how certain elements can be dropped from the canonical model. The sixth section brings the previous results together to establish completeness, and the seventh and last section
establishes compactness, though of a weak kind. All of the results apply to the corresponding intermediate logics." (p. 31)
Fine, Kit, and Fine, Ben J. 1974a. "Social Choice and Individual Ranking I." Review of Economic Studies no. 41:303-322.
"This paper investigates social positional rules. The rules are social in that they produce a social output for any configuration of individual preference orderings. They are
positional in that the output produced depends only upon the positions occupied by each alternative in the individual preference orderings. (3)
Social rules may be distinguished by the form of their output, be it a quasi-ordering, choice structure or complete ordering. For each form of output, we shall determine the class
of social rules that satisfy certain desirable conditions. Part one deals with quasi ordering rules; part two will deal with the other types of rules.
Indeed, this part shows that certain desirable conditions are uniquely satisfied by the so-called positional rule. One alternative is as good as another by this rule if any
individual's ranking of these cond alternative can be matched by as high a ranking of the first alternative by some possibly different individual. The individuals'rankings should be as good for the
one alternative as for the other." (p. 303)
(*) Some of the results of this paper are contained in B. Fine's B.Phil. thesis, Oxford1971. We should like to thank the editor and a referee for many helpful suggestions.
(3) There have been several recent papers on positional rules. See , ,  and . However, most of the results of these papers overlap with the material of Part II (which is
forthcoming in this journal) rather than Part I. Further details will be given there, but let us note that Smith  also has a variable number of individuals and a composition condition (his
 Arrow, K. J. Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: Wiley, 1951; 2nd ed. 1963).
 Fisburn, P. C. "A Comparative Analysis of Group Decision Methods", Behavioural Science, 16 (1971).
 Fishburn, P. C. The Theory of Social Choice (Princeton UniversityPress, 1973).
 Gale, D. The Theory of Linear Economic Models (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).
 Gardenfors, P. "Positionalist Voting Functions", forthcoming in Theory and Decision. [September 1973, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp 1-24]
 Hansson, B. "On Group Preferences", Econometrica, 37 (1969).
 Sen, A. K. Collective Choice and Social Welfare (Holden-Day, 1970).
 Smith, J. H. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate", forthcoming in Econometrica. [Vol. 41, No. 6 (Nov., 1973), pp. 1027-1041 ]
Fine, Kit. 1974b. "Social Choice and Individual Ranking II." Review of Economic Studies no. 41:459-475.
"In Part I of this paper it was shown that certain appealing conditions forced any social quasi-ordering rule to include the positional rule, which is itself the intersection of all
finite ranking (f.r.) rules. These conditions are slightly strengthened in the first three sections of this part, but this allows us to characterize in Section 3 the rules that also satisfy the
additional properties as the intersection of some set of f.r. rules. In case a continuity property, which can be interpreted as a non-veto condition applied to groups, does not hold, the set of f.r.
rules must be extended to include transfinite weightings. Section 1 finds sufficient conditions for a quasi-ordering rule to be positional. This is used in Section 2 to prove the results contained in
Section 3 for the special case of a social ordering rule, when a single f.r. rule emerges. This special case is then generalized in Section 3.
In Section 4, for the first time in the paper, we analyse conditions that recognize social decision depending upon the number of alternatives. Previously, only the number of
individuals has been effectively allowed to vary. Again, simple and natural properties have powerful consequences, and it is thereby shown that the Borda rule is a compelling choice for making social
decision, given a veil of ignorance, that is no knowledge of the special features of the individuals and alternatives concerned. In case only a quasi-ordering rule is required, social decision is
based on the intersection of a set of f.r. rules symmetrical about the Borda rule.
In Section 5 we turn to choice structureules. First a positional choice structure is defined. It is the strongest such rule containing all the f.r. rules, since an alternative in a
set belongs to the choice from that set iff for some f.r. it is best in the set. This last condition is shown to be equivalent to demanding that the HC of that element does not belong
to the convex hull of the HC of the other alternatives in the set. Then an outline is made for a conditions analysis of the rule: it is found to be the weakest rule satisfying certain
conditions, in the sense that any other rule satisfying those conditions must be more decisive. In this, the method, results and analysis correspond to Part I's consideration of the positional
Section 6 is devoted to an examination of some questions concerned with the independence of conditions and Section 7 contains concluding remarks. The above only sketches the major
results of thispaper. In addition,the analysis of normal social quasi ordering rules in Section 2 and Section 3 has obvious relevanceto the theory of production and utility under risk in the presence
Finally, it should be noted that throughou this part, individual preferences are assumed to be antisymmetrical.Whilst the complications posed by individual indifference were
overcome in Part I (Section6), a more general analysis becomes analytically cumbersome and presents more problems here. Nevertheless many of the results, especially analysis by conditions, do apply
more generally, though possibly ith slight modifications." (pp. 459-460)
(*) The first part of the paper [1974a] was written up by K. Fine and the second by B. Fine. Both authors have contributed to all sections of the paper, though the first has
contributed more to the material on the positional rule and the second to the material on normal social rules. Some of the resultsfor ordering rules in this paper have been independently established
by Smith [Smith, J. H. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate", Econometrica. Vol. 41, No. 6 (Nov., 1973), pp. 1027-1041].
———. 1975. "Vagueness, Truth and Logic." Synthese no. 30:265-300.
Reprinted in: Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith, Vagueness: A Reader, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996, pp. 119-150.
"My investigation of this topic began with the question "What is the correct logic of vagueness?" This led to the further question "What are the correct truth-conditions for a vague
language?" And this led, in its turn, to a more general consideration of meaning and existence.
The contents of the paper are as follows. The first half contains the basic material. Section 1 expounds and criticizes one approach to the problem of specifying truth-conditions
for a vague language. The approach is based upon an extension of the standard truth-tables and falls foul of something I call penumbral connection. Section 2 introduces an alternative framework,
within which penumbral connection can be accommodated. The key idea is to consider not only the truth-values that sentences actually receive but also the truth-values that they might receive under
different ways of making them more precise. Section 3 describes and defends the favoured account within this framework.
According to this account, as roughly stated, a vague sentence is true if and only if it is true for all ways of making it completely precise. The second half of the paper then
deals with consequences, complications and comparisons of the preceding half. Section 4 considers the consequences that the rival approaches have for logic. The favoured account leads to a classical
logic for vague sentences; and objections to this unpopular position are met. Section 5 studies the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness: first, in its bearing upon the truth-conditions for a
language that contains a definitely-operator or a hierarchy of truth-predicates; and second, in its relation to some puzzles concerning priority and eliminability.
Some of the topics tie in with technical material. I have tried to keep this at a minimum.
But the reader must excuse me if the technical undercurrent produces an occasional unintelligible ripple upon the surface. Many of the more technical passages can be omitted without
serious loss in continuity." (p. 265)
———. 1975. "Normal Forms in Modal Logic." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 16:229-237.
"There are two main methods of completeness proof in modal logic.
One may use maximally consistent theories or their algebraic counterparts, on the one hand, or semantic tableaux and their variants, on the other hand. The former method is elegant
but not constructive, the latter method is constructive but not elegant.
Normal forms have been comparatively neglected in the study of modal sentential logic. Their champions include Carnap , von Wright , Anderson [l] and Cresswell . However,
normal forms can provide elegant and constructive proofs of many standard results. They can also provide proofs of results that are not readily proved by standard means.
Section 1 presents preliminaries. Sections 2 and 3 establish a reduction to normal form and a consequent construction of models. Section 4 contains a general completeness result.
Finally, section 5 provides normal formings for the logics T and K4." (p. 229)
 Anderson, A. R., "Improved decision procedures for Lewis's calculus S4 and Van Wright's calculus M," The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 34 (1969), pp. 253-255.
 Bull, R. A., "On the extension of S4 with CLMpMLp," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. VIII (1967), pp. 325-329.
 Carnap, R., "Modalities and quantification," The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 11 (1946), pp. 33-64.
 Cresswell, M. J., "A conjunctive normal form for S3.5," The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 34 (1969), pp. 253-255.
 Wright, G. H. von, An Essay in Modal Logic, Amsterdam (1951).
———. 1975. "Review of David Lewis 'Counterfactuals'." Mind no. 84:451-458.
Reprinted in: Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers, as chapter 10, pp. 357-365.
"This is an excellent book. It combines shrewd philosophical sense with fine technical expertise; the statement of views is concise and forthright; and the level of argument is
high." (p. 451)
"Lewis suggests that merely possible worlds are like the actual world, ‘differing not in kind but only in what goes on at them’. Indeed, for him there is no absolute difference
between the actual world and the others: the difference is relative to a particular possible world as point of reference. A similar view has been held about the present time, but it is hard to accept
for possible worlds. On the logical construction view, the actual world is distinguished by the property that all of its propositions are true. Here ‘true’ is an absolute term. It is not defined as
truth in the actual world but, on the contrary, truth-in-a-world is defined as set-theoretic membership." (p. 455).
———. 1975. "Some Connections between Elementary and Modal Logic." In Proceedings of the Third Scandinavian Logic Symposium, edited by Kanger, Stig, 15-31. Amsterdam:
"A common way of proving completeness in modal logic is to look at the canonical frame. This paper shows that the method is applicable to any complete logic whose axioms express a
XA-elementary condition or to any logic complete for a A-elementary class of frames. We also prove two mild converses to this result. (1) The first is that any finitely axiomatized logic has axioms
expressing an elementary condition if it is complete for a certain class of natural subframes of the canonical frame. The second result is obtained from the first by dropping ‘finitely axiomatized’,
and weakening ‘elementary’ to ‘A-elementary’.
Classical logic is used in the formulation and proof of these results.
The proofs are not hard, but they do show that there may be a fruitful and non-superficial contact between modal and elementary logic. Hopefully, more work along these lines can be
§ 1 outlines some basic notions and results of modal logic. For simplicity, this is taken to be mono-modal. However, the results can be readily extended to multi-modal logics and,
in particular, to tense logic.
§ 2 proves the first of the above results and a related result as well; § 3 proves the second of the above results; and finally, § 4 constructs counterexamples to some plausible
looking converse results." (pp. 15-16)
(1) After writing this paper, I discovered that A.H. Lachlan had already proved the first of these ‘mild converses’ in . His proof uses Craig’s interpolation theorem, whereas
mine uses the algebraic characterization of elementary classes. R.I. Goldblatt  independently hit upon this latter proof at about the same time as I did.
He also has a counter-example to the converse of this result. It is similar to the one in § 4.
I should like to thank Steve Thomason for the references above and for some helpful comments on the paper.
 R.I. Goldblatt, First-order definability in modal logic, [The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Mar. 1975), pp. 35-40]
 A.H. Lachlan, A note on Thomason’s refined structures for tense logic, Theoria, [Vol. 40, No. 2 (Aug. 1974), pp. 117–120]
———. 1976. "Review of The Nature of Necessity' (A. Plantinga)." The Philosophical Review no. 86:562-566.
Reprinted in: Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers, as chapter 11, pp. 366-370.
"This book discusses several topics in the theory of modality: the de re/de dicto distinction, possible worlds, essences, names, possible objects, and existence. In the
final two chapters, the preceding material is applied to the problem of evil and the ontological argument. In its philosophical (though not theological) parts, the book is close to Kripke’s
Naming and Necessity.
There are similar accounts of the a priori/necessary distinction, proper names, transworld identity, and the identity theory." (p. 562)
———. 1976. "Completeness for the Semi-Lattice Semantics. Abstract." Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 41:560.
———. 1976. "Completeness for the S5 analogue of Ei. Abstract." Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 41:559-560.
———. 1977. "Properties, Propositions and Sets." Journal of Philosophical Logic no. 6:135-191.
"This paper presents a theory of cxtensional and intensional entities. The entities in question belong to a hierarchy that begins with individuals, sets, properties and
propositions. The hierarchy extends to higher orders, both extensional and intensional. Thus it contains sets of propositions, properties of sets, properties of such properties, and, in general, it
contains relations-in-intension and relations-in-extension over types of entities already in the hierarchy.
The theory does not say what a proposition or property is. Rather, a possible worlds account of these entities is taken for granted. Thus a proposition is regarded as a set of
possible worlds, a property as a set of world-individual pairs, and similarly for the other intensional entities.
What the theory does is to characterize and investigate various properties of the entities in terms of possible worlds. These properties include existence, being purely general or
qualitative, being logical, having an individual constituent, and being essentially modal. Thus the theory is ontological rather than linguistic. Its main concern is with the ontological status of
the various entities and not with their relation to language." (p. 135)
———. 1977. "Postscript to 'Worlds, Times and Selves', by Arthur Norman Prior." In Worlds, Times and Selves, 116-168. London: Duckworth.
Reprinted in: Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers, as chapter 4.
"Fundamental to Prior’s conception of modality were two theses:
The ordinary modal idioms (necessarily, possibly) are primitive (1)
Only actual objects exist (2)
The first thesis might be called Modalism or Priority, in view of its nature and founder. The second thesis is sometimes called Actualism, and the two theses together I call Modal
Actualism." (p. 116)
"My aim in this chapter is to carry out this programme of reconstruction, at least in outline. I have often followed the lead of Prior, much of whose later work (3) arose from this
programme. However, I cannot be sure that he would have approved of all of the steps I take." (p. 118)
(1) Many references might be given. See e.g. ‘Modal Logic and the Logic of Applicability’ Theoria, 34 (1968), reprinted as Chapter 6 above.
(2) See Papers on Time and Tense, p. 143
(3) See the chapter of this book, Ch. XI of Papers on Time and Tense, and V of Past, Present and Future.
———. 1978. "Model Theory for Modal Logic Part I: The 'de re / de dicto' Distinction." Journal of Philosophical Logic no. 7:125-156.
"It is an oddity of recent work on modality that the philosopher's main concern has been with quantificational logic whereas the logician's has been with sentential logic. There
have, perhaps, been several reasons for this divergence of interest. One is that the area of sentential modal logic is already rich in logical problems; and another is that the semantics for
quantified modal logic has been in an unsettled state. But whatever the reasons have been in the past, the time would now seem ripe for a more fruitful interaction between these two approaches to the
study of modality.
My aim in these papers has been to bring the methods of model theory closer to certain common philosophical concerns in modal logic. Indeed, most of the results answer questions
that arise from some definite philosophical position. In this respect, my approach differs from that of Bowen  and others, who attempt to extend the results of classical model theory to modal
logic. Although this approach has its attractions, it also suffers from two drawbacks. The first is that most of its results are devoid of philosophical interest; and the second is that many standard
results of classical model theory, such as the Interpolation Lemma, do not apply to some standard modal logics, such as quantified S5 (see my paper ).
The philosophical position that underlies the results of the first two parts of this paper may be called de re scepticism. It is the doctrine that quantification into modal
contexts does not, as it stands, make sense. Call a sentence de dicto if, in it, the necessity operator never governs a formula that contains a free variable. Then for the de re
sceptic, only de dicto sentences, or their equivalents, are legitimate." (p. 125)
 Bowen, K. A., 1975, ‘Normal Modal Model Theory’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 4, 2, 97–131.
 Fine, K., ‘Failures of the Interpolation Lemma in Modal Logic’, Journal of Symbolic Logic, (44), 1979, pp. 201-206.
———. 1978. "Model Theory for Modal Logic Part II: The Elimination of 'de re' Modality." Journal of Philosophical Logic no. 7:277-306.
"In the first part of this paper, two philosophical positions were introduced: de re scepticism; and anti-Haecceitism. According to the first, quantification into modal
contexts does not, as it stands, make sense; and according to the second, the identity or non-identity of individuals in distinct possible worlds is a matter of convention. It was shown that the two
positions are equivalent in the sense that whatever first-order modal sentence is legitimate for the one is also legitimate for the other.
A soft and hard version of each of these positions may be distinguished. According to the soft de re sceptic, it is possible to make sense of de re modal
discourse; and according to the soft anti-Haecceitist, it is possible to define coherent identity conditions for individuals across possible worlds. Both of the soft positions, then, are compromising
ones in that they allow that ordinary modal discourse may be reconstructed. The hard versions of the positions, on the other hand, deny that any such reconstruction is possible.
The soft de re sceptic may reconstruct ordinary modal discourse in various ways. One way is to reinterpret either quantification or modality (or both) so that each de
re sentence is equivalent to one that is de dicto. Although this method has been prominent in the literature, I shall deal with it only incidentally here. I hope to deal with it more
fully elsewhere. Another way is to add axioms to the standard modal logic so that two conditions are satisfied. The first (eliminability) is that every de re sentence should have a de
dicto equivalent relative to the resulting system. The second (conservativeness) is that no dicto sentence should be provable in the resulting system that is not already a theorem of
standard modal logic." (p. 277)
———. 1979. "Failures of the Interpolation Lemma in Quantified Modal Logic." Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 44:201-206.
"Beth’s Definability Theorem, and consequently the Interpolation Lemma, fail for the version of quantified S5 that is presented in Kripke’s . These failures persist when the
constant domain axiom-scheme ∀x □ φ ≡□ ∀x φ is added to S5 or, indeed, to any weaker extension of quantificational K.
§1 reviews some standard material on quantificational modal logic. This is in contrast to quantified intermediate logics for, as Gabbay  has shown, the Interpolation Lemma holds
for the logic CD with constant domains and for several of its extensions. §§2—4 establish the negative results for the systems based upon S5. §5 establishes a more general negative result and,
finally, §6 considers some positive results and open problems. A basic knowledge of classical and modal quantificational logic is presupposed." (p. 201)
 D. Gabbay, Craig's interpolation lemma for modal logics, Conference in Mathematical Logic, London, 1970, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, no. 255,
Springer-Verlag, Berlin and New York, 1972, pp. 111-127.
 S. Kripke, Semantical considerations on modal logic, Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 16 (1963), pp. 83-94.
———. 1979. "Analytic Implication." In Papers on Language and Logic, edited by Dancy, Jonathan, 64-70. Keele: Keele University Library.
Reprinted in: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 27, 1986, pp. 169-179.
"Parry presented a system of analytic implication in  and , Dunn  gave an algebraic completeness proof for an extension of this system and Urquhart  later gave a
semantic completeness proof for Dunn's system with necessity. This paper establishes completeness for Parry's original system, (*) thereby answering a question of Gödel , and then, on the basis of
the completeness result, derives decidability; it also deals with quantificational versions and other modifications of his system.
Section 1 contains some informal remarks on the notion of analytic implication.
They are not strictly relevant to the later analysis, although they may help to place it in perspective. Section 2 presents the semantics and Section 3 exhibits a system of analytic
implication. Section 4 helps to demonstrate that the system is equivalent to Parry's, and Section 5 establishes completeness. Finally, Section 6 outlines the theory for some related systems." (p.
(*) I mean the full system of  with adjunction, A14 and A15.
 Anderson A. R. and N. D. Belnap, Jr., "A simple treatment of truth-functions," The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 25 (1959), pp. 301-302.
 Dunn, J. M., "A modification of Parry's analytic implication," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 13, no. 2 (1972), pp. 195-205.
 Epstein, D., "The semantic foundations of logic," to appear.
 Hughs, G. E. and M. J. Cresswell, An Introduction to Modal Logic, Methuen, London, 1968.
 Kielkopf, C. F., Formal Sentential Entailment, University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1977.
 Parry, W. T., "Ein Axiomsystem fur eine neue Art von Implication (analytische Implication)," Ergebrisse eines Mathematischen Colloquiums, vol. 4 (1933), pp. 5-6.
 Parry, W. T., "The logic of C. I. Lewis," pp. 115-154 in The Philosophy of C. I. Lewis, ed., P. A. Schilpp, Cambridge University Press, 1968.
 Parry, W. T., "Comparison of entailment theories," The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 37 (1972), pp. 441 f.
 Post, E. L., The Two-Valued Iterative Systems of Mathematical Logic, Princeton, University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1941.
 Urquhart, A., "A semantical theory of analytical implication," Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 2 (1973), pp. 212-219.
———. 1980. "First-Order Modal Theories. [II. Propositions]." Studia Logica no. 39:159-202.
Abstract. "This paper is part of a general programme of developing and investigating particular first-order modal theories. In the paper, a modal theory of propositions is
constructed under the assumption that there are genuinely singular propositions, ie. ones that contain individuals as constituents. Various results on decidability, axiomatizability and definability
"In some recent work (, , , ), I have attempted to carry out a dual programme of developing a general model-theoretic account of first-order modal theories, on the one
hand, and of studying particular theories of this sort, on the other. The two parts of the programme are meant to interact, with the second providing both motivation and application for the first.
The present paper belongs to the second part of the programme and deals with the question of giving a correct essentialist account of propositions.
My approach is distinctive in two main ways, one linguistic and the other metaphysical. On the linguistic side, I have let the variables for propositions be both nominal and
objectual. That is to say, the variables occupy the same position as names and are interpreted in terms of a range of objects, which, in the present case, turn out to be propositions. This approach
stands in contrast to the earlier work of Prior , Bull , Fine , Kaplan  and Gabbay , , in which the variables are sentential (they occupy the same position as sentences) and are
interpreted either substitutionally or in terms of a range of intensional values." (p. 159)
 R. A. Bull, On modal logic with propositional quantifiers, Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (1969), pp. 257–263.
 K. Fine, Propositional quantifiers in modal logic, Theoria 36 (1970), pp. 336–346.
 —, Model theory for modal logic, part I, Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1978), pp. 125–156.
 —, Model theory for modal logic, part II — The elimination of de re modality, Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1978), pp. 277–306.
 —, First-order modal theories, part I — Modal set theory, to appear in Nôus. 
 —, Model theory for modal logic, part III — Existence and predication, to appear in Journal of Philosophical Logic. 
 D. M. Gabbay, Modal logic with propositional quantifiers, Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logic und Grundlagen der Mathematik 18 (1972), pp. 245–249
 —, Investigations in Modal and Tense Logics, D. Reidel, Holland, 1976.
 D. Kaplan, S5 with quantifiable propositional variables, Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1970), pp. 355.
 A.N. Prior, Egocentric logic, Nôus, vol. II, no. 3 (1968), pp. 191–207.
———. 1981. "First-Order Modal Theories. I: Sets." Noûs no. 15:177-205.
"The aim of this paper is to formalize various metaphysical theories within a first-order modal language. The first part deals with modal set theory. The later parts will deal with
propositions, possible worlds, and facts.
Such an undertaking is relevant both to logic and to metaphysics.
Its relevance to logic lies mainly in its bearing on the model theory for first-order modal languages. I have begun to develop such a theory in . The consideration of particular
theories can then provide both an application of and motivation for general results in this field. There is already a fruitful interaction between the proof of general results and the consideration
of particular first-order theories within classical model theory; and the hope is that there should be as beneficial an interaction within modal logic.
The relevance of the undertaking to metaphysics consists mainly in the general advantages that accrue from formalizing an intuitive theory. First of all, one thereby obtains a
clearer view of its primitive notions and truths. This is no small thing in a subject, such as metaphysics, that is so conspicuously lacking in proper foundations.
But once a formalization is given, one can establish results about the theory as a whole and thereby obtain that overall view of a subject that philosophers often strive for but
rarely obtain." (p. 177)
"The plan of this part of the paper is as follows. §1 contains an informal discussion and justification of our axioms for modal set theory. §2 then presents the formal theories. §3
develops a proof- and a model-theory for class abstracts in modal set theory and establishes a useful result on transferring abstracts from classical set theory into a modal context. In §4, it is
shown that the formal theories are equivalent in that any two of them share the same theorems in their common language. The proof of equivalence contains general result on when the possible worlds
semantics for a given modal theory can be represented within that theory itself. The next section discusses the adequacy of our formalizations and shows that, in a certain sense, they capture all of
the essential truths about sets as such. The last section is concerned with the identity of sets and places the problem within a general account of the identity of objects." (p. 178)
 Fine, K., 'Model Theory for Modal Logic I, II, III', The Journal of Philosophical Logic, (1978) 125-56, (1978) 277-306, and to appear. [1981, 293-307]
———. 1981. "Model Theory for Modal Logic. Part III: Existence and Predication." Journal of Philosophical Logic no. 10:293-307.
"This paper is concerned with the technical implications of a certain view connecting existence to predication. This is the view that in no possible world is there a genuine
relation among the nonexistents of that world or between the nonexistents and the existents. (1) The meaning of the term ‘genuine’ here may be variously explained. On an extreme interpretation, all
relations are ‘genuine’, so that none of them are to relate non-existents.
On a milder interpretation, the genuine relations are those that are simple or primitive in some absolute sense. But even without appeal to an absolute concept of simplicity, we can
require that all relations should be analyzable in terms of some suitable set of relations, relating only existents to existents.
In order to make our results applicable to the thesis, we shall suppose that the primitive non-logical predicates of our language correspond to the genuine relations, whatever they
might be taken to be. Thus, the linguistic formulation of the thesis becomes that the primitive predicates of the language should only be true, in each world, of the existents of that world.
Of course, the thesis might have been given a linguistic formulation, without any reference to relations, in the first place.
The thesis is an instance of what has been called Actualism. This is the ontological doctrine that ascribes a special status to actual or existent objects. Another form of the
doctrine, so-called World Actualism, says that the behaviour of nonexistents is supervenient upon the behaviour of the existents, that two possible worlds which agree in the latter respect cannot
differ in the former respect. The present thesis, by contrast, might be called Predicate Actualism. It should be clear that Predicate Actualism implies World Actualism, at least if the
predicates used to describe the world are to express ‘genuine’ relations; for then there are no relationships involving nonexistents by which two worlds might be distinguished. On the other hand,
World Actualism does not, as it stands, imply Predicate Actualism." (p. 293)
(*) This paper is the third and final part of a series (see the references below). It was completed and submitted to the Journal of Philosophical Logic in 1977, at about
the same time as the other parts. But because of some mishap in the mail, its publication was delayed. The present part is independent from the other parts in its results, but draws upon the
terminology of Section 2 of Part I.
I should like to thank the editor, R. Thomason, for many valuable remarks on the earlier version of the paper.
(1) I have briefly discussed this thesis elsewhere. The reader may like to consult Section 7 of [ 11], pp. 151 and 156-160 of , p. 564 of , and Section 8 of [7b].
There has been a fair amount of recent literature on the topic. I cannot give a complete survey, but the reader may like to consult Chapters IV-V of , p. 86 of , Chapters
VII-VIII of , and pp. 333-336 of [ 11].
[l] Fine, K., Postscript to Worlds, Times and Selves (with A. N. Prior), Duckworth, England (1977).
 Fine, K., ‘Propositions, Sets and Properties’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1977), 135-191.
 Fine, K., ‘Review of ‘, Philosophical Review 86 (1977), 562-66.
 Fine, K., ‘Model Theory for Modal Logic - Part I’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1978), 125-156.
[S] Fine, K., ‘Model Theory for Modal Logic - Part II’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1978), 277-306.
 Fine, K., The Interpolation Lemma Fails for Quantified S5’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (1979), 201-206.
[7a, b, c] Fine, K., ‘FirstaIder Modal Theories - I Sets, II Propositions, III Facts’, in Nous (1981), Studia Logica XXXIX, 2/3 (1980) 159-202, and
Synthese (1981), respectively.
 Kripke, S., Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’, Acta Philosophica Fennica 16,83-94. Reprinted in L. Linsky (ed.), Reference and Modality, Oxford
University Press (1971).
 Plantinga, A., The Nature of Necessity, Clarendon Press,Oxford (1974).
 Prior, A. N., Time and Modality, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1957).
 Stalnaker, R., ‘Complex Predicates’, Monist 60 (1977), 327-339.
———. 1982. "The Problem of Non-Existents. I: Internalism." Topoi no. 1:97-140.
Contents: A. Iintroduction. 1. Outline 97; 2. Methodology 99; B. Preliminaries, 1. Contexts and Objects 101; 2. Identity and Being 102; 3. The Identity of Non-existents 104; c. An
Internalist Theory. 1. The Rudiments 106; 2. The Extended Theory 108; D. Refinements. 1. Implicit /Explicit Copula 110; 2. Diagonal Difficulties 115; 3. Dual Diagonal Difficulties 120; 4. Correlates
123; 5. Modal Matters 129; E. Criticisms. 1. Against Platonism 130; 2. Against Internalism 132; 3. Other Theories 136; Notes 137; References 139.
"The main philosophical question about non-existents is whether there really are any. My own view is that there are none. But even if this is granted, we may still ask what they are
like, just as the materialist may consider the nature of sensations or the nominalist the nature of numbers.
On this further topic, there seem to be three main divisions of thought, which may be respectively labelled as:
(i ) platonism /empiricism;
(ii) literalism /contextualism;
(iii ) internalism / externalism.
Let me attempt a rough characterization of these divisions. More refined formulations will come later. On a platonic conception, the non-existent objects of fiction, perception,
belief and the like do not depend for their being upon human activity or upon any empirical conditions at all; they exist, or have being, necessarily.
Under an empirical conception, on the other hand, these objects are firmly rooted in empirical reality; they exist, or have being, contingently. On an extreme conception of this
sort, these objects are literally created and are brought into being by the appropriate activity either of or within the agent.
All in all, the three divisions provide for 8 ( = 23) combinations of positions. Each, I think, is coherent, but some are more natural than others. For example it is
natural, though not necessary, for the ‘platonist’ to accept internalism and for the ‘empiricist’ to accept externalism; for the means by which the objects are individuated will naturally be taken to
provide conditions for their existence or being.
My own view on these questions is given by empiricism, contextualism and extemalism, not that this is a common combination in the literature. This view will be defended in the
second part of this paper. In the present part, I am concerned to discuss a view that combines internalism with contextualism and platonism; and in the third part, I shall discuss the literalist
position, mainly in association with platonism and internalism. I have not attempted systematically to consider all of the possible combinations of position. I have only looked at the more prominent
or plausible of the views, though what I say on them should throw light on what is to be said of the others.
The plan of the present part is as follows. In section A2, I discuss general methodological issues facing any philosophical study of nonexistents and, in particular, defend the
claim that one can say what they are like without presupposing that there really are any. In section B, I try first to delineate more precisely the subjectmatter of our theories and then to describe
the problems of providing identity and existence conditions with which any such theory should deal. In section C, I give an initial formulation of an internalist theory, which is successively refined
in section D. Finally, in section E, I give two major criticisms of the theory as thus developed. A more detailed account of each section is given in the list of contents.
It is of the greatest importance to note that the present part does not contain my own views on the subject. It is only in the last section of this part that the internalist
position is criticized, and it is only in the second part of this paper that my own, more positive, views are developed." (pp. 97-99)
———. 1982. "First-Order Modal Theories. III: Facts." Synthese no. 53:43-122.
"This paper forms the third part of a series on the development and study of first-order modal theories. It was not originally intended for this issue, but is relevant to Prior's
work in two main ways. First, it does not treat modal logic as a mere technical exercise, but attempts to relate it to common philosophical concerns. This was an approach that Prior himself adopted
and perhaps did more than anyone else to foster. Secondly, the paper deals with the more specific topic of facts.
This was a matter upon which Prior had definite views and upon which he had written extensively - in relation to the definition of necessity (), the semantics for the modal
system Q (), and the correspondence theory of truth ( and ). I have found all of these writings useful and, although I have disagreed with him on several points, the influence of
his views on my own should be evident.
It is therefore with respect and affection that I dedicate this paper to his memory.
The paper falls into two main parts, one philosophical and the other technical. Either may be read independently of the other, but both are required for an all-round view. The first
part is in two sections. One attempts to show that a modal first-order theory of facts is viable, and the other discusses its principles and their bearing on various philosophical issues. The second
part is in six sections, which fall into three groups. Those of the first group (§§3--4) deal with the modal theory of possible worlds, both in itself and in its application to other subject-matter.
Since I regard worlds as very big facts, it is only natural that they should be considered in this paper. The next section (§5) deals with the theory of facts under the anti-objectualist assumption
that they contain no individual constituents. The sections of the last group (§§6-8) deal with facts under objectualist assumptions and include a statement of the appropriate objectualist conditions,
a proof of their equivalence to the corresponding conditions for propositions, and an account of the resulting theories. It will be helpful, and sometimes essential, to have the earlier parts of the
series ( and ) at hand.
In the technical part of this paper, I have concentrated on the question of finding a correct essentialist theory of facts. As far as I know, very little work has been done in this
direction, although there is a start in . On the other hand, there is now a fair amount of material on facts as a subject, not of object-theory, but of semantical metatheory (see ,  and
, for example). I do not wish to dispute the interest of this material, either for logic or the philosophy of language; but it will not fall within the purview of the paper." (pp. 43-44)
 Fine, K. (1979): 'First-Order Modal Theories II - Propositions', Studia Logica 39, 159-202.
 Fine, K. (1981): 'First-Order Modal Theories I - Sets', Nous 15, 117-206.
 Martin J. (1975): 'Facts and the Semantics of Gerunds', Journal of Philosophical Logic 4, 439-454.
 Prior, A. N. (1948): 'Facts, Propositions and Entailment', Mind 57, 62-68.
 Prior, A. N. (1957): Time and Modality, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 Prior, A. N. (1967): 'Correspondence Theory of Truth', in Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. P. Edwards), New York: Macmillan.
 Prior, A. N. (1971): Objects of Thought, England: Oxford University Press.
 Taylor, B. (1976): 'States of Affairs' in Truth and Meaning (ed. G. Evans and J. McDowell), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 van Fraassen, B. C. (1969): 'Facts and Tautological Entailments', The Journal of Philosophy 66, 477-487.
 Wells, R. S. (1949): 'The Existence of Facts', Review of Metaphysics 3, 1-20.
———. 1982. "Act, Events and Things." In Sprache und Ontologie. Akten des sechsten Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 23. bis 30. August 1981, Kirchberg am Wechsel
(Osterreich), edited by Leinfellner, Werner, Kraemer, Eric and Schank, Jeffrey, 97-105. Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
"The purpose of my theory is not to provide a reference for ordinary uses of a qua-phrase but to account for the identity of certain olher objects — chairs, tables and the
like— to which we clearly do refer.
Qua objects are governed by certain principles; and it is in terms of them that they are best understood.
Existence. The qua object X qua φ exists at a given time (world-time) if and only if x exists and has φ at the given time (world-time);
Identity. (i) Two qua objects are the same only if their bases and glosses are the same, (ii) A qua object is distinct from its basis (or from the basis of its basis,
should that be a qua object, and so on).
Inheritance. At any time (world-time) at which a qua object exists, it has those normal properties possessed by its basis." (p. 100)
"The theory of qua- objects has some other applications worth mentioning. First, the qua objects are very like Aristotle's compounds of matter and form, with the matter
corresponding to the basis and the form to the gloss. Aristotle's views, it seems to me, have not been taken seriously enough; many of his more distinctive doctrines have either been forgotten or
fallen into disrepute. A modern version of the Aristotelian theory should give us the courage to embrace some of those doctrines and the means to articulate them more clearly.
Secondly, the theory of qua objects is able to throw light on the question of the ground ' for necessary truths." (p. 104)
———. 1983. "The Permutation Principle in Quantificational Logic." Journal of Philosophical Logic no. 12:33-37.
"The story goes back to 1940, with the publication of Quine’s Mathematical Logic . He there presents a system of quantificational logic in which only sentences or closed
formulas are theorems."
"The story now goes to 1963, with the publication of papers by Kripke  and Lambert . Kripke was concerned to block the derivation of the Barcan formula or its converse within
a quantified version of the modal logic S5. He was able to do this by requiring, as in Quine , that only closed formulas be theorems. However, because he wished to dispense with the rule of
necessitation and because he also wished to allow for the empty domain, he did not quite take Quine’s revised system as the quantificational basis for his modal logic."
Quite independently, Lambert developed a similar system. Like Kripke, he was concerned to allow for the empty domain; but he also wished to allow for theorems with free
"As later became clear, Lambert’s full system (with identity) is complete for its intended interpretation. But it was then generally assumed that this system without its identity
axioms and the corresponding quantificational part of Kripke’s system (which had not been formulated with identity in the first place) were also complete. Indeed, in their paper  of 1970, Leblanc
and Meyer gave a metalogical investigation of the Lambert fragment in which it was presupposed that Permutation and related principles were derivable; and, in , Kripke claimed completeness for his
full modal system, which would have entailed completeness for its quantificational fragment. But then, Lambert pointed out, in a letter to Meyer of around 1968-9, the difficulty of deriving
Permutation within the identity-free part of his system; and independently, in his paper of 1970 (, p. 286, fn. 6), Trew pointed to the related difficulty of deriving Permutation within Kripke’s
system. The problem of deriving the principle became open and, at least within the world of free logicians, achieved some notoriety.
It now appears that Permutation is not derivable within these systems." (pp. 33-35)
 Berry, G. D. W., ‘On Quine’s axioms of quantification’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 6 (1941), 23-27.
 Kripke, S., ‘Semantical considerations on modal logic’, Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963), 83-94.
 Lambert, K,, ‘Existential import revisited, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 4 (1963), 288-292.
 Leblanc, H. and Meyer, R. K., ‘On prefacing (∀X ) A ⊃X AY/X with (∀Y) - A free quantification theory without identity’, Zeitschrift fur Matkematische Logik und Grundlagen
der Mathematik 16 (1970), 447-462.
 Quine, W. V., Mathematical Logic (1st edn.), Harvard University Press, Boston, 1940.
 Quine, W. V., 2nd edn. of above (1951).
 Trew, A., ‘Nonstandard theories of quantification and identity’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1970), 267-294
———. 1983. "A Defence of Arbitrary Objects." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no. Supplementary volume 57:55-77.
Reprinted in: Fred Landman, Frank Veltman (eds.), Varieties of Formal Semantics. Proceedings of the Fourth Amsterdam Colloquium, September 1982, Dordrecht: Foris
Publications, 1984, pp. 123-142.
"There is the following view. In addition to individual objects, there are arbitrary objects: in addition to individual numbers, arbitrary numbers; in addition to individual men,
arbitrary men. With each arbitrary object is associated an appropriate range of individual objects, its values: with each arbitrary number, the range of individual numbers; with each arbitrary man,
the range of individual men. An arbitrary object has those properties common to the individual objects in its range. So an arbitrary number is odd or even, an arbitrary man is mortal, since each
individual number is odd or even, each individual man is mortal. On the other hand, an arbitrary number fails to be prime, an arbitrary man fails to be a philosopher, since some individual number is
not prime, some individual man is not a philosopher.
Such a view used to be quite common, but has now fallen into complete disrepute. As with so many things, Frege led the way." (p. 55)
"In the face of such united opposition, it might appear rash to defend any form of the theory of arbitrary objects. But that is precisely what I intend to do. Indeed, I would want
to claim, not only that a form of the theory is defensible, but also that it is extremely valuable. In application to a wide variety of topics— the logic of generality, the use of variables in
mathematics, the role of pronouns in natural language— the theory provides explanations that are as good as those of standard quantification theory, and sometimes better.
Rather than present the finished theory at the outset, we may see it as the outgrowth of the criticisms that have been directed against its cruder formulations. Each criticism, if
not deflected, will lead to an appropriate change of formulation. The finished form of the theory will then emerge as the cumulative result of these various criticisms; it will be, if you like, the
prize that the proponent of the naive view can carry off with him in the contest with his critics. This is not how I myself came to the theory; but it is perhaps the most congenial approach for those
who are already sceptical. (pp. 55-56)
———. 1984. "Critical Review of Parsons' 'Nonexistent Objects'." Philosophical Studies no. 45:95-142.
Review of: Terence Parsons, Nonexistent Objects, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.
"There has recently been a rebellion within the ranks of analytic philosophy. It has come to be appreciated that, in the debate between Russell and Meinong, Russell was perhaps
mistaken in his criticisms and Meinong was perhaps correct in his views. As a consequence, an attempt was made to rehabilitate the Meinongian position, to defend it against the most obvious attacks
and to develop it in the most plausible ways. T. Parsons was among the first of the contemporary philosophers to make this attempt, (1) and so it is especially appropriate that his views should now
be set out in a book.
I should say, at the outset, that I thoroughly approve of the Meinongian project. As Parsons makes clear (pp. 32— 38), we refer to non-existents in much the same way as we refer to
other objects. It is therefore incumbent upon the philosopher to work out the principles by which our discourse concerning such objects is governed. Not that this is necessarily to endorse a realist
position towards the objects of the resulting theory. Nominalists and Platonists alike may attempt to set out the principles that govern arithmetical discourse; and it is in the same spirit that the
realist or anti-realist may attempt to set out the principles of our fictional discourse.
Despite my approval of the project, I must admit to some misgivings as to how Parsons has carried it out. These misgivings are of two kinds. There are first some internal
criticisms, requiring only change within Parsons’ basic approach. There are then some external criticisms, requiring change to the basic approach.
These criticisms, though, should not be thought to detract from the merits of Parsons’ book. It is, in many ways, an admirable contribution to the field.
It gives weight both to the interest and the legitimacy of the Meinongian enterprise; it pinpoints the difficulties which any satisfactory theory must deal with; and in its solution
to those difficulties, it sets up a theory with a degree of rigour and systematicity that should serve as a model for years to come. As a well worked-out and accessible contribution to object theory,
there is no better book." (pp. 95-96)
(1) Others include Castafieda , Rapaport , Routley  and Zalta .
 Castaneda, H. N.: 1974, Thinking and the structure of the world’, Philosophia 4, pp. 3-40.
 Rapaport, W.: 1978, ‘Meinongian theories and a Russellian paradox’, Nous 12, pp. 153-180.
 Routley, R.: 1980, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond (Australian National University, Canberra).
 Zalta, E. N.: 1980, ‘An introduction to a theory of abstract objects’, Ph.D. Thesis (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
Fine, Kit, and Mc Carthy, Timothy. 1984. "Truth without Satisfaction." Journal of Philosophical Logic no. 13:397-421.
"In his famous paper , Tarski gave a definition of truth for a formalized language. Unable to perform a direct recursion on the concept itself, he gave a definition in terms of
satisfaction. This makes it natural to ask if such an indirect procedure is necessary or whether a definition of truth can be given without using or somehow invoking the concept of satisfaction.
The question, as it stands, is vague; and later we shall be concerned to make it more precise. But even as it stands, it has an obvious technical interest. The situation that Tarski
found himself in is common in mathematics. We wish to define a certain concept, but unable to perform a direct recursion on the concept itself we perform a recursion on a related concept of which the
given concept is a special case. It would therefore be desirable to know when the related concept is necessary, both in the case of truth and in general.
The question may also have some philosophical interest. There is a fundamental difference between the concepts of truth and of satisfaction. The former merely applies to certain
linguistic units; the latter connects language to an ontology of objects, typically extra-linguistic. A negative result on defining truth without satisfaction may perhaps constrain formal attempts to
implement non-referential conceptions of truth. In the present paper, however, we will not be concerned in detail with the philosophical aspects of our question, although we will from time to time
mention some points of contact between our discussion and the philosophical literature.
Interest in our question dates back to Wallace ; and the topic was subsequently taken up by Tharp  and Kripke  (especially Section 10).
We have made our presentation self-contained, though the reader may consult the earlier work for general background and for elucidation of particular points.
The plan of our paper is as follows. Section 1 sets out the general framework in which our question and its cognates are posed. Section 2 solves the questions in case the
meta-theory is not required to be finitely axiomatized; and Section 3 gives partial solutions in case finite axiomatizability is required, thereby answering a question of Kripke’s  and of Tharp’s
Finally, Section 4 considers the question under other provisos on the metatheory." (pp. 397-398)
 Kripke, Saul, ‘Is there a problem about substitutional quantification?’ in G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics (Oxford, 1976),
 Tarski, A., ‘ The concept of truth in formalized languages’, in A. Tarski, Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics (Oxford, 1956), 152-278.
 Tharp, Leslie H., Truth, quantification, and abstract objects’, Nous V (1971), 363-372.
 Wallace, J., ‘On the frame of reference’, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, D. Reidel, 1972, pp. 219-252.
Fine, Kit. 1985. "Natural Deduction and Arbitrary Objects." Journal of Philosophical Logic no. 14:57-107.
Reprinted in Philosopher's Annual, vol. 8, 1985.
"This paper is an abridged and simplified version of my monograph Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects . It may be read by the diligent as a preparation for the longer work
or by the indolent as a substitute for it. But the reader, in either case, may find it helpful to consult the paper, A Defence of Arbitrary Objects , for general philosophical
This paper deals with certain problems in understanding natural deduction and ordinary reasoning. As is well known, there exist in ordinary reasoning certain procedures for arguing
to a universal conclusion and from an existential premiss.We may establish that all objects have a given property by showing that an arbitrary object has the property; and having shown that there
exists an object with a given property, we feel entitled to give it a name and infer that it has the property." (p. 57).
 Fine, K., ‘A defence of arbitrary objects’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. LVII, 55-77 (1983); also to appear in Varieties of Formal Semantics
(eds. F. Landman and F. Veltman), GRASS III, Fovis Publications, Dordrecht Cinnaminson (1984).
 Fine, K., Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects, to appear in the Aristotelian Society Monograph Series (1984).
———. 1985. "Logics Containing K4. Part II." Journal of Symbolic Logic no. 50:619-651.
"The plan of this part is as follows. §1 presents some elementary results on pmorphisms. §2 introduces the logics to be proved complete and §3 the conditions for which they are
complete. §4 contains the completeness proof. In §5 we show that there are a continuum of subframe logics, while in §6 we give various alternative characterizations of the subframe logics and extend
our results on the finite model property from logics to theories. The final section, §7, gives a general characterization of those of the subframe logics that are compact and gives reasonably
practicable methods for determining when a logic is compact and what condition its axioms express.
I make free use of the material in the first five sections of Part I, and the reader is advised to have that part at hand." (p. 620)
———. 1985. "Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist Discourse." In Alvin Plantinga, edited by Tomberlin, James and Inwagen, Peter van, 145-186. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Reprinted in: Modality and Tense. Philosophical Papers, as chapter 5, pp. 176-213.
"Plantinga is what I call a modal actualist. He believes that the idioms of necessity and possibility are to be taken as primitive in preference to talk of possible worlds and that
only actuals, as opposed to possibles, are to be granted ontological status. On these two issues, he and I agree.
The modal actualist faces a challenge. Talk of possible worlds and of possible individuals appears to make perfectly good sense. There seems to be a clear meaning, for example, in
the claim that some possible object does not exist. So the modal actualist, once he grants that possibilist discourse makes sense, must somehow give it sense. It is on this question of how such a
challenge is to be met that Plantinga and I disagree.
He favours a reduction of possibilist discourse in which possible worlds and possible individuals give way to propositions and properties, respectively; I favour a reduction in
which reference to possibles becomes a modal manner of reference to actuals. In this paper, I shall attempt to adjudicate between these rival positions.
In the first section, I shall set out the problem of reduction and Plantinga's favoured solution. In the second, I shall present my central criticism of the reduction, viz. that it
is question-begging. In the next three sections, I shall consider the related question of whether properties and propositions exist necessarily, first presenting an argument against and then
disposing of an argument for their necessary existence. In the final section, I shall present my own reduction and the reasons for preferring it to Plantinga's.
The central theme of this paper is the question of reduction; but it should have a broader significance than such a theme might suggest. Partly this is because other issues, of
independent interest, are raised: the connection between existence and predication; the necessary existence of propositions; the Priorian stand on modality. But perhaps more important than this
question of particular issues is the question of how the issues are to be approached, of what is to count as a plausible consideration one way or another. Even when I have found myself in agreement
with Plantinga on a certain view, I have often also found myself unhappy with the reasons he adduces in its favour. It is in this difference of approach, then, that the paper may also have a broader
significance." (pp. 145-146)
———. 1988. "Semantics for Quantified Relevance Logic." Journal of Philosophical Logic no. 17:27-59.
Reprinted in: Alan Ross Anderson, Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., with contributions by J. Michael Dunn ... [et al.], Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992 vol. II, pp. 235-262.
"This paper is a companion piece to my Incompleteness for Quantified Relevance Logics. In that earlier paper, I showed that RQ and other systems of quantified relevance
logic were not complete for the standard semantics. In the present paper, I provide a semantics with respect to which they are complete." (p. 27)
"This section is divided into five subsections. The first two lay out the semantics, the third presents the logics, and the last two establish soundness and completeness. A basic
knowledge of the semantics for propositional relevance logic is presupposed (see §51). It is conceivable that the methods of the present section might be used to simplify the proofs of incompleteness
for the standard semantics; but this is not here investigated." (p. 239 of the reprint)