Annotated Bibliography on Aristotle's *Categories*. Second Part: K - Z

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


   "The categories of Aristotle do not represent a complete logical inventory, a classification of all terms or concepts represented in language. They do attempt to classify all the terms of a basic object language, where these terms are specified by the questions that can be asked or answered concerning an individual subject. Hence the number of categories will be determined by the number of fundamentally distinct questions that can be raised concerning such a subject. As has often been pointed out, the full list of ten given in the *Categories* and in *Topics* 1.9 suggests that Aristotle must have taken a human being as his specimen subject, for only in this case would the two minor categories, Posture and Having (or Clothing) be natural topics of inquiry.

   There is, then, a factual connection between Aristotle's list of categories and the linguistic forms of question or inquiry. But what is the philosophical significance of this connection? Reflection on this matter may proceed along two quite distinct lines of thought, each of which could provide material for a study devoted to questions and categories. On the one hand, we might consider Aristotle's doctrine simply as an early example of the genre, and widen the concept of category to include modern theories of logical, conceptual, and grammatical categories. Our topic would then become: the connection between interrogative forms and categorial distinctions in general. On the other hand, we may keep our attention fixed on Aristotle's doctrine but generalize the remark about interrogative forms to include other grammatical or linguistic considerations. Our topic will then be: the significance of the connections between Aristotle's scheme of categories and certain facts of grammar, including the grammar of questions in Greek. It is this second topic that I propose to study here: I will discuss Aristotle's theory, not category theories in general." pp. 227-228 (notes omitted)


   Contents: I. The origin of logic as a science 3; II. Concepts, terms, definitions, ideas, categories 20; III. Judgments, subject and predicate 43; IV. Syllogisms 60; V. Induction; ancient and modern logic 75; Books cited 89; Index 91-95.


   Written in 1920, but first published in 1968.


   "About Aristotle's criteria for "being a substance" in the *Categories*. On the basis of close textual
analysis, it is argued that subjecthood, conceived in a certain way, is the criterion that explains why both concrete objects and substance universals must be regarded as substances. It also explains the substantial primacy of concrete objects. But subjecthood can only function as such a criterion if both the subjecthood of concrete objects and the subjecthood of substance universals can be understood as philosophically significant phenomena. By drawing on Aristotle's essentialism, it is argued that such an understanding is possible: the subjecthood of substance universals cannot simply be reduced to that of primary substances. Primary and secondary substances mutually depend on each other for exercising their capacities to function as subjects. Thus, subjecthood can be regarded as a philosophically informative criterion for substancehood in the Categories.


   Analectas Husserliana - Vol. 46


    "Critical discussion of C. Shields (1999). An examination of Aristotle's theory of homonymy shows that, on the version of homonymy presented in the Categories, the sorts of beings distinguished by the categories cannot be defined by the usual strategy of definition by genus and differentia. The more-developed theory of homonymy, and the expanded ontology, of books Z and H of the Metaphysics, however, provide the necessary solution to this problem."


"What where Aristotle's aims in the Categories? We can probably all agree that he wanted to say something about different uses of the verb 'to be' -- something relevant to ontology. The conventional interpretation goes further: it has Books Gamma and Zeta of the Metaphysics superseding theories put forward in the Categories. We should expect then that the Categories and these books of the Metaphysics try to do the same sort of thing. Most exegetes do indeed ascribe to the earlier work fairly elaborate ontologies, though they are in disagreement as to what theory Aristotle held while writing it. I shall argue in this paper that the whole enterprise of reconstructing the ontology of the Categories from its small stock of clues is misguided; that the business of the Categories is to set out data for which the Metaphysics tries to account. This view is not without consequence relevant to some widely held theses. I shall claim that the difference between the Categories and the Metaphysics cannot uncritically be used to trace the development of Aristotle's ontology, that the differences between the two doctrines has been greatly exaggerated."


"I discuss three interpretations of Aristotle's definition of 'in a subject' at Categories 1a24-5 -- one associated with Michael Frede, one with G. E. L. Owen and one with John Ackrill. I consider whether Ammonius's commentary on the Categories -- particularly his treatment of the fragrance in the apple that leaves the apple and comes to us -- should lead us to settle on one of the three interpretations. Finally, I sketch the 'metaphysics of containers' presented in the Categories and try to explain why the definitional question is important for assessing that metaphysical doctrine."


"That which is there to be spoken of and thought of, must be. Parmenides, Fragment 6 (McKirahan trans.)
The short treatise entitled Categories enjoys pride of place in Aristotle's writings. It is the very first work in the standard edition of Aristotle's texts. Each line of the thirty columns that make up this treatise has been pored over by commentators, from the first century BCE down to the present. Moreover, its gnomic sentences still retain their fascination for both philosophers and scholars, even today.

In the tradition of Aristotelian commentary, the first works of Aristotle are said to make up the Organon, which begins with the logic of terms (the Categories), then moves on to the logic of propositions (the De Interpretatione) and then to the logic of syllogistic argumentation (the Prior Analytics). But to say that the Categories presents the logic of terms may leave the misleading impression that it is about words rather than about things. That is not the case. This little treatise is certainly about words. But it is no less about things. It is about terms and the ways in which they can be combined; but this "logic" of terms is also meant to be a guide to what there is, that is, to ontology, and more generally, to metaphysics.
The Categories text was not given its title by Aristotle himself. Indeed, there has long been a controversy over whether the work was even written by Aristotle. Michael Frede's discussion of this issue in "The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories" (Frede 1987: 11-28) is as close to being definitive on this issue as is possible. Frede concludes that the Categories can only be the work of Aristotle himself or one of his students. The question of authenticity is often connected with the issue of whether the last part of the Categories,
chapters 10-15, traditionally called the "Postpraedicamenta," and the earlier chapters really belong to the same work. We shall have very little to say about the Postpraedicamenta here.


"We discuss Aristotle's Categories as an answer to Plato's one-over-many argument. For Plato, F-ness is something "over against" particular F things; to predicate "F" of these things is to assert that they all stand in a certain relation to F-ness. Aristotle answers that predication is classification; and there being a classification of a certain sort is a fact correlative with there being things classifiable in the way the classification in question would classify them."


"Aristotle's theory of relations involves serious difficulties of interpretation. By attempting to solve some of the problems posed by J. L. Ackrill in his famous commentary on the Categories (Ackrill, 1963), I hope to contribute to a better understanding of Aristotle's statements on the nature and status of relational attributes. In general, my procedure has been to analyze the criteria by which entities are supposed to fall under the category of 'the relative'. The following topics will be considered: i) Aristotle's two definitions of relatives in Categories 7, ii) the pseudo-relational character of the parts of substances, and iii) the threefold classification of relatives in Metaphysics chapter 15. A corollary of these discussions will be that relations may have played for Aristotle a far more conspicuous role in the 'definition' of substances and attributes than has been hitherto acknowledged."


"In the Topics, Categories, and De Interpretatione, Aristotle is struggling with a variety of problems that span the fields of metaphysics and philosophy of language. Both the problems and the attempted solutions have much relevance to some of the main issues in contemporary British and American philosophy. Thus it is unfortunate that though there is a large number of ancient commentaries on these texts, little has been written on these matters in modern times that is of genuine philosophical significance. Professor Ackrill's new translation and notes' make a fine contribution toward remedying this deficiency. (...) It is impossible to write a complete review of Ackrill's book, for, not being able to assume familiarity with Aristotle's theories, the reviewer would have to cover simultaneously Aristotle's views, the quality of the new translation, and the quality of Ackrill's notes. As an alternative, the reviewer hopes to introduce the reader to this volume by selecting one of the key nest of problems that Aristotle discusses in these works and discussing Aristotle's views, the translation, and Ackrill's views in this limited context. Unfortunately, even this limited task is too large for the size of a paper to be expected under these circumstances. Nevertheless, this sketchy introduction might be of some value to those interested in the problems at hand."


It is maintained that three positions must be assumed in order to interpret the first five chapters of Aristotle's *Categories*. This includes the meaning and role of "present in a subject." These positions are: 1) a rejection of univocity, 2) a dual conception of accident, 3) the principle of discrimination. There are some comments on Aristotle's attempts to work out a notion of science that would account, at the same time, for the flux of individuals and the necessity and universality proper to science. It is concluded that within the individual or the concrete, particular present, is grasped the necessity required for science. Also, from insight flows the concept or definition, which is the universalization of the insight.
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<td>47</td>
<td>Ragnisco, Pietro</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td><em>Storia Critica Delle Categorie, Dai Primordi Della Filosofia Greca Sino Ad Hegel.</em> Firenze: Cellini.</td>
<td>Two volumes</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Reale, Giovanni</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>&quot;Filo Conduttore Grammaticale E Filo Conduttore Ontologic Nella Deduzione...&quot;</td>
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"Most scholars either deny Aristotle's authorship of the first treatise of the Organon, or else consider the problem of authorship to be insoluble. I maintain, however, that such judgements are wrong and that the treatise is of genuine Aristotelian authorship, and of considerable importance for our knowledge both of Aristotle's own development, and also that of later Platonism. I shall try to show the authenticity of the treatise in the following study, and shall divide my investigation into the following main divisions:
A. The view of the ancient commentators concerning the authenticity of Categories Chs. 1-9;
B. Modern criticism of the authenticity of Categories Chs. 1-9;
C. The authenticity of Categories Chs. 10-15."
[See also the following note to Ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics (Second part) - Vivarium, November, 1978, p. 85: "Unlike some 30 years ago (see my papers published in Mnemosyne 1951), the present author has his serious doubts, now, on the authenticity of the first treatise of the Organon].


From the Introduction: "It seems to be the fatal mistake of philology that it always failed to get rid of Kantian influences as to the question of the relation of logic and ontology. Many modern mathematical logicians have shown that the logical and the ontological aspect not only are inseparable but also that in many cases it either lacks good sense or is even impossible to distinguish them. Accordingly, the distinction of logical and ontological truth (especially of propositional truth and term-truth), that of logical and ontological accident and that of logical and ontological categories, has not the same meaning for modern logic as it seems to have for 'traditional' logic (for instance the logic of most Schoolmen).

I hope to show in this study that the distinction of a logical and an ontological aspect (especially that of logical and ontological categories) can be applied to the Aristotelian doctrine only with the greatest reserve. A sharp distinction carried through rigorously turns out to be unsuitable when being applied to Aristotelian logic. For both aspects are, for Aristotle, not only mutually connected but even interwoven, and this in such a way that the ontological aspect seems to prevail, the logical being only an aspect emerging more or less in Aristotle's generally ontological way of thinking." pp. 6-7.

Contents: Bibliography I-III; Introduction 1-7; Chapter I. Aristotle's doctrine of truth 8-35; Chapter II. The distinction of essential and accidental being pp. 31-43; Chapter III. Logical and ontological accident 44-52; Chapter IV. The nature of the categories in the Metaphysics 53-66; Chapter V. The doctrine of the categories in the first treatise of the Organon 67-75; Chapter VI. The use of the categories in the work of Aristotle 76-88; Appendix. The names of the categories 89-92; Index locorum 93-96.


"3. The multiplication of being in Aristotle's Categories;

3.1. Introduction. One of the results of the preceding section may be that Lloyd (1956, p. 59) seems to be wrong in asserting that in Plato's view the rôle of the universal is played by the Idea exclusively, and that only by the time of the Middle Academy, that is, for the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., the performers of this rôle have been multiplied. As a matter of fact the distinction between Plato and his followers of the Middle Academy on this score would seem to be a different one. The ontological problems of participation were felt as early as in the Platonic dialogues (see our section 2), as well as the logical ones concerning predication (which will be discussed in a later section). Well, the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., introduced explicitly a threefold distinction of the Platonic Form or rather of its status which was (only) implied with Plato. I think, Lloyd is hardly more fortunate in ascribing (ibid.) this
introduction chiefly to the influence of Aristotelian logic on Platonic interpretation. It is true, in stating the basic distinction between en hypokeimenoi and kath' hypokeimenon Aristotle tried to face the same cluster of fundamental problems which induced later Platonists to the distinction of the Forms as taken before or after the methexis (cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Categ. 79, 12ff.). However, Plato's disciple, Aristotle (the most unfaithful one, in a sense, as must be acknowledged) was as deeply engaged on the same problems as were his condisciples and the Master himself in his most mature period. It is certainly not Aristotle who played the rôle of a catalyst and was the first to provoke the multiplication of the Platonic Form in order to solve problems which were not recognized before in the Platonic circle. On the contrary, Plato himself had saddled his pupils with a basic and most intricate problem, that of the nature of participation and logical predication. It was certainly not left quite unsolved in the later dialogues, but did still not have a perspicuous solution which could be accepted in the School as a scholastic one. So any of his serious followers, (who were teachers in the School, at the same time) was bound to contrive, at least, a scholastic device to answer the intricate question. To my view, Aristotle's solution should be discussed in this framework. For that matter, Aristotle stands wholly on ground prepared by his master to the extent that his works on physic and cosmology, too, are essentially discussions held within the Academy (Cp. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the history of his development, Oxford 1949, 308)."

The place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's philosophy, a scholastic device to answer the intricate question. To my view, Aristotle's solution should be discussed in this framework. For that matter, Aristotle stands wholly on ground prepared by his master to the extent that his works on physic and cosmology, too, are essentially discussions held within the Academy (Cp. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the history of his development, Oxford 1949, 308)."

3.2. Aristotle's classification of being as given in the Categories; 3.2.1. The common view: categories = predicates; 3.2.2. The things said 'aneu symplókês'; 3.2.3. The doctrine of substance given in the Categories; 3.2.4. The ontological character of the classification; 3.2.5. Some obscurities of the classification; 3.2.6. The different status of the 'things' meant; 3.2.6.1 The first item of the classification; 3.2.6.2. The second item of the classification; 3.2.6.3. The third item of the classification; 3.2.6.4. The ontological status of the 'things' meant in the items (2) and (3); 3.2.6.5. The fourth item of classification; 3.2.7. The relation between the different 'things'; 3.3. Categories and predicables; 3.3.1. The opposition of category and predicable; 3.3.2. The impact of the opposition; 3.3.3. The obscure position of the differentia; 3.3.4. Conclusion.


4.2. On some modern interpretations of 'kata symplókên'; 4.3. Aristotle's use of the categories; "For this section see also my Utrecht dissertation, The place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's philosophy, Assen 1952 pp. 76-88. I have to correct or to adjust my former views on several points."; 4.31. The categories as a classification of reality; 4.32. The categories as a classification of sentence predicates; 4.33. The categories as a classification of 'copulative being'; 4.4. How did Aristotle arrive at his list of categories?; 4.5. Are the categories the 'highest predicates'?; 4.6. The categories taken as names in Metaph. Z 1-6 and Anal. Post. 1 4; 4.7. An attempt at a reinterpretation of Categories, chs. 1-5; 4.8. Aristotle's view on relatives: 4.9. Conclusion.


From the Preface: "In this book I intend to show that the ascription of many shortcomings or obscurities
to Aristotle resulted from persistent misinterpretation of key notions in his work. The idea underlying this study is that commentators have wrongfully attributed anachronistic perceptions of 'predication', and statement-making in general to Aristotle. In Volume I, what I consider to be the genuine semantics underlying Aristotle's expositions of his philosophy are culled from the Organon. Determining what the basic components of Aristotle's semantics are is extremely important for our understanding of his view of the task of logic -- his strategy of argument in particular.

In chapter 1, after some preliminary considerations I argue that when analyzed at deep structure level, Aristotelian statement-making does not allow for the dyadic 'S is P' formula. An examination of the basic function of 'be' and its cognates in Aristotle's philosophical investigations shows that in his analysis statement-making is copula-less. Following traditional linguistics I take the 'existential' or hyparctic use of 'be' to be the central one in Greek (pace Kahn), on the understanding that in Aristotle hyparxis is found not only in the stronger form of 'actual occurrence' but also in a weaker form of what I term 'connotative (or intensional) be' (1.3-1.6). Since Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour', in spite of his skilful manipulation of the diverse semantic levels of expressions, is in fact not explicitly organized in a well-thought-out system of formal semantics, I have, in order to fill this void, formulated some semantic rules of thumb (1.7).

In chapter 2 I provide ample evidence for my exegesis of Aristotle's statement-making, in which the opposition between 'assertible' and 'assertion' is predominant and in which 'is' functions as an assertoric operator rather than as a copula (2.1-2.2). Next, I demonstrate that Aristotle's doctrine of the categories fits in well with his view of copula-less statement-making, arguing that the ten categories are 'appellations' ('nominations') rather than sentence predicates featuring in an 'S is P' formation (2.3-2.4). Finally, categorization is assessed in the wider context of Aristotle's general strategy of argument (2.5-2.7).

In the remaining chapters of the first volume (3-6) I present more evidence for my previous findings concerning Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour' by enquiring into the role of his semantic views as we find them in the several tracts of the Organon, in particular the Categories De interpretatione and Posterior Analytics. These tracts are dealt with in extenso, in order to avoid the temptation to quote selectively to suit my purposes.


From the Preface to the first volume: "The lion's part of volume two (chapters 7-11) is taken up by a discussion of the introductory books of the Metaphysics (A-E) and a thorough analysis of its central books (Z-H-O). I emphasize the significance of Aristotle's semantic views for his metaphysical investigations, particularly for his search for the true ousia. By focusing on Aristotle's semantic strategy I hope to offer a clearer and more coherent view of his philosophical position, in particular in those passages which are often deemed obscure or downright ambiguous.

In chapter 12 I show that a keen awareness of Aristotle's semantic modus operandi is not merely useful for the interpretation of his metaphysics, but is equally helpful in gaining a clearer insight into many other areas of the Stagirite's sublunar ontology (such as his teaching about Time and Prime matter in Physics) .

In the Epilogue (chapter 13), the balance is drawn up. The unity of Aristotelian thought is argued for and the basic semantic tools of localization and categorization are pinpointed as the backbone of Aristotle's strategy of philosophic argument.

My working method is to expound Aristotle's semantic views by presenting a running commentary on the main lines found in the Organon with the aid of quotation and paraphrase. My findings are first tested (mainly in Volume II) by looking at the way these views are applied in Aristotle's presentation of his ontology of the sublunar world as set out in the Metaphysics, particularly in the central books (ZHO). As for the remaining works, I have dealt with them in a rather selective manner, only to illustrate that they display a similar way of philosophizing and a similar strategy of argument. In the second volume, too, the exposition is in the form of quotation and paraphrase modelled of Aristotle's own comprehensive manner of treating doctrinally related subjects: he seldom discussed isolated problems in the way modern philosophers in their academic papers, like to deal with special issues tailored to their own contemporary philosophic interest."


"According to Aristotle, the relation "being said of" is transitive. Categ. VIII,11a 20-32 and Topics IV,4,124b 15-19 would be inconsistent with its transitivity if categories were summa genera, but the idea that they are is not as well supported in Aristotle's writings as the idea that "being said of" is transitive."

36:427-433.


Contents: List of tables VIII; Preface IX; List of abbreviations XIII; Part I. Categories in Aristotle. I. The history and general nature of the categories 3; II. The logical aspect of the categories in Aristotle 13; III. The metaphysical aspect of the categories in Aristotle 23; Part II. Categories in St. Thomas. IV. The history of the categories from Aristotle to St. Thomas 38; V. General nature of the categories in Thomistic philosophy 46; VI. The nature of substance 64; VII. The nature of accident 77; Summary and conclusion 96; Bibliography 98; Index 102-109.

"Knowledge to be of value must be founded on reality. Hence it follows that unless our ideas faithfully reflect reality, our judgments about it will be false. One of the most evident illustrations of this fact is found in the divergent views philosophers have taken with regard to our widest universal concepts, the categories of being. It is, therefore, an important task of metaphysics to inquire into the modes which characterize the being that these concepts represent.

Aristotle, the first philosopher known to have undertaken this task, presents a classification of our generic concepts ; metaphysical, in that it must necessarily regard and classify the objects of those concepts, that is, real beings Therefore, after considering the history and general nature of the categories in the first chapter of the Aristotelian section, we shall examine the logical and metaphysical aspect in the two chapters following. Chapter four will present the historical transition from Aristotle to St. Thomas. Since St. Thomas wrote no logical treatise on the categories, nor any commentary on Aristotle's logical treatment of them, it will be necessary for us to proceed in a somewhat different manner in the Thomistic section of our work. In keeping with the primarily metaphysical trend in St. Thomas' thought, which is particularly evident in his treatment of the categories, we propose to present in the last three chapters respectively the general character of his teaching on the categories and a consideration of the nature of substance and the nature of accidents." PP. IX-X (note omitted)

Originally published in Italian as: *Relatività aristoteliche* - Dianoia, 2, 1997 pp. 11-15 (first part) and 1998, 3, 11-23 (second part).

"This study of relativity in Aristotle and his successors, examines Aristotle's contrast in *Categories* chapter 7 between two rival criteria for relativity. It is widely held that the first is a specifically linguistic criterion, the second an ontological one. Against this the paper argues that, while the first permits the inclusion of things for which a relation to something else is no more than 'part' of what it is to be them, the latter restricts relativity to things which consist in a relation 'and nothing more'.

The second half of the study starts from the conclusion in the previous part that the second kind of relativity distinguished at the end of *Categories* chapter 7 marks off things which consist in a relation 'and nothing more'. It is argued that this notion of relativity originated in the early Academy, from which it also passed to the Stoics.

64. Segalerba, Gianluigi. 2001. *Note Su Ousia*. Pisa: Edizioni ETS.

Vol. 1 (Only published)


"A re-examination of the question why, in the revival of interest, in the first century B.C. in Aristotle's esoteric works, as opposed to his doctrines, the work *Categories* played so large a part. The answers suggested are that the work aroused interest just because it did not easily fit into the standard Hellenistic divisions of philosophy and their usual agendas, and that, more than Aristotle's other works with the possible exception of the *Metaphysics*, it revealed aspects of Aristotle's thought that had become unfamiliar during the Hellenistic period."


Studies Aristotle's two different treatments of the category of quantity: one in *Categories* 5 and one in *Metaphysics* 5, 7, with emphasis on how these conceptions represent hierarchical structures found in the physical world.


"An examination of *Categories*, *Metaphysics* 7-9, and *Physics* shows that an appreciation of the way plenitude influenced Aristotle's thought is crucial in understanding his approach to various inquiries. Although he does not explicitly state plenitude as a principle, his allegiance to it is nonetheless clear."

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<td>84.</td>
<td>Ushida, Noriko</td>
<td>&quot;Before the Topics?: Isaak Husik and Aristotle's Categories Revisited.&quot;</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Ancient Philosophy no. 23:113-134. &quot;I. Husik, in arguing for the authenticity of the Categories (in: Philosophical Review 13, 1904, pp. 514-528), substantially overstated the case for the similarity of that treatise to the Topics. The two works differ greatly in their treatment of the theory of substance ( Cat. 5, 3 B 10-21; SE 22, 178 B 38ff.).&quot;</td>
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"Aristotle is sometimes held to the thesis [T1] that singular affirmative sentences imply the existence of a bearer for the grammatical subject of the sentence. Thus the truth of 'Socrates is sick' requires that something exist which is identical with Socrates. attribution of T1 to Aristotle can be justified by appeal to *Categories* 13 b 27-33 which seems to contain a straightforward statement of the thesis. Unfortunately, T1’s status becomes problematic in light of "On interpretation" 21 a 24-28, for here Aristotle seems to deny T1 explicitly. This, at least, is the consensus among his commentators. We are thus faced with a serious inconsistency in Aristotle's account of singular sentences, an inconsistency most interpreters are content merely to mention, if they notice it at all. The first part of this paper advances some suggestions for reconciling the troublesome passages. In the second part I draw out certain related features of Aristotle's theory of singular sentences."

90. ———. 1979. "*Said of and Predicated of* in the *Categories*." *Philosophical Research Archives* no. 5:23-34.


"Wedin addresses the debate over whether nonsubstantial individuals, that inhere in a subject but are not said of a subject, i.e. accidents, such as the pallor of Socrates, are nonrecurring particulars or a kind of determinate universal. Wedin examines the secondary literature on this topic and divides it into two schools of thought, determined by the contributions of J.L. Ackrill and G.E.L. Owen. According to Ackrill, individuals in non-substance categories are particular to the substance they are in; Owen critiques Ackrill's view, and proposes that these items can recur in more than one subject and hence are a sort of universal. Wedin finds Owen's thesis unsatisfactory, even after supplementing it with an improved version due to Michael Frede; instead, Wedin argues for a revised version of Ackrill's interpretation of nonsubstantial individuals as nonrecurring particulars. According to Wedin, Aristotle is committed to individuals only -- e.g. to Socrates and to the particular bit of pallor in him: this conclusion has an important bearing on the ontological status of individuals and on the primacy of substance to nonsubstantial items."


"This provides a systematic account of the framework of Aristotle's *Categories*, showing how the early chapters (including chapter one) provide essential features of a precise and deliberately worked-out theory."


English translation of: *La place de la logique dans la pensée aristotélicienne*.


"The term *kategoria* in Aristotle's *Topics* and *Categories* denotes predicates. Hence the categories are best understood as classifying predicates and not predications. The equivocal use of the term in *Top. 1, 9* is related to its use in signifying either linguistic or non-linguistic entities, and not because it can be used to mean predication."


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