
"Although many commentators have summarized chapter 38 of *Analytica Priora* I as if it was perfectly clear to them, I have not found their explanations satisfactory enough. In fact, I think Aristotle's text needs badly some sort of clarification that makes it meaningful to modern logicians. In this note I wish to propose one such reconstruction."


"Prior Analytics 1.38 is a difficult text that offers a way of handling qua propositions in formal syllogistic. By 'qua proposition' I mean a proposition that contains a qualifying term, phrase, or clause. Many such propositions have a qua connector like 'qua', 'insofar as', 'in virtue of the fact that', 'with respect to', although in some cases a construction like an accusative of respect occurs instead of an explicit connective.(1) Still, all qua propositions may be paraphrased by explicit qua connectives. So the class of qua propositions is a grammatical class of propositions of the form 'S is P qua M' The *Prior Analytics* chapter deals with a specific logical type of qua propositions, and its syllogistic properties.(2)"


"This work deals with the logical properties of the 'qua' connective, "that treacherous little word 'as'.'" This connective is represented by many expressions in ordinary language, such as 'insofar as', 'in virtue of, and 'in the sense that'. Traditionally, a use of this connective was called a reduplication. I shall trace the development of the theory of reduplication. As I shall show, this theory has its roots in various passages where Aristotle discusses 'qua' propositions. Islamic and Latin medieval philosophers then contributed to the topic. From all this there arose a theory of 'qua' propositions, or a theory of reduplication, in the high medieval period (1250-1350). Although there are of course different philosophers with different views on reduplication in that period, it will become clear that their views are extremely similar, and that it makes sense to talk of the rise of a single theory of reduplication. Indeed, the similarity of their views is due to their using Aristotle's works as a common reference point: They all heed what Aristotle says about 'qua' propositions, and attempt to offer analyses that demonstrate the truth of those 'qua' propositions that Aristotle (as well as others in the Aristotelian tradition) asserts and the validity of inferences involving 'qua' propositions that he maintains.

So I shall be dealing with propositions of form 'S is P qua M', which, dropping the italics and the single quotes, I shall henceforth call 'qua propositions'. 'Qua' will represent the type of the connective, which has different grammatical forms. When 'qua' appears in italics, it is meant to be the particular connective, 'qua'.

The program that I shall follow is this: First, I shall consider those passages in which Aristotle discusses the use of qua phrases and propositions. Next, I shall discuss Islamic philosophers, who wrote about qua propositions while commenting on those passages in Aristotle. Then I shall consider Latin medieval philosophers of the period of the old logic, when the Analytics and the *Sophistical Refutations*, which contain important passages on qua propositions, were at best not well known. Next, I shall discuss various versions of what may be loosely called the theory of reduplication. I shall consider various philosophers of the High Middle Ages on the following topics: determination, or the qualification of a sentence by a modifier; the fallacy of secundum quid es simpliciter; the exposition of reduplicative propositions; the conversion of reduplicative propositions; the reduplicative syllogistic; the supposition of terms in qua
propositions. I shall also discuss certain uses to which the theory of reduplication was put: notably, the Incarnation, the nominalist reduction of abstract terms, and supposition theory. Next, I shall discuss the post-medieval period, where the medieval theory of reduplication was codified and developed further. I shall consider the classifications and analysis of qua propositions, the formal features of the logical types distinguished, and applications, including Leibniz’s extensive use of qua propositions in his writings. I shall conclude with a survey of current work on qua propositions. Finally, I shall summarize the historical development of the theory of reduplication, offer what I consider to be the best version of that theory, and note some applications of it.” (pp. XV-XVI)

4. Barker, Evelyn M. 1984. "Unneeded Surgery on Aristotle's "Prior Analytics"." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 25:323-331. "The article takes issue with Ross's bracketing of lines 45a9-16 of Aristotle's "Prior Analytics" I 28 because they involve Aristotle in an "elementary logical error." Describing Aristotle's "method of identities" for finding syllogistic premises, I point out the lines contain an essential leg of Aristotle's argument that this method handles all cases in which the incompatibility between the attributes of a subject e and a predicate a generates a syllogistic conclusion that A does not belong to some E. Also, Aristotle's claim that incompatibility of attributes in such cases always resolves into identity of attributes is valid."


6. ———. 1999. "Grammar on Aristotle's Terms." In Rationality in Greek Thought, edited by Frede, Michael and Striker, Gisela, 175-202. Oxford: Clarendon Press. "However that may be, Aristotelian syllogistic concerned itself exclusively with monadic predicates. Hence it could not begin to investigate multiple quantification. And that is why it never got very far. None the less, the underlying grammar of Aristotle's logic did not in itself block the path to polyadicity. The later Peripatetics were conservative creatures and they lacked logical imagination. Moreover, Aristotle himself had assured them that his syllogistic was adequate for all serious scientific needs. As for Aristotle, his service to logic is nonpareil, and it would be grotesque to hide him for lack of inventiveness. It is true that, in logical grammar, he did not climb above the level which he attained in the de Interpretatione. But the Analytics does not represent a fatal, or even a new, grammatical excursion. And the story of Aristotle's fall, like the story of the fall of Adam, is a myth."


We have identified five aspects of Aristotle's syllogistic to highlight the remarkable modernity of his logical investigations: (1) Aristotle took logic to be a formal part of epistemology. A logic is an instrument for establishing knowledge of logical consequence; this is a principal concern of the science of logic. (2) Prior Analytics is a metalogical treatise on the syllogistic deduction system. Aristotle exhaustively treated all possible combinations of elemental "syllogistic" argument patterns to determine which have only valid argument instances. (3) Aristotle recognised the epistemic efficacy of certain elemental argument patterns having only valid instances, and he explicitly formulated them as rules of natural deduction in corresponding sentences. (4) Prior Analytics is a proof-theoretic treatise in which Aristotle described a natural deduction system and demonstrated certain of the logical relationships among syllogistic rules. In fact, Aristotle modelled his syllogistic in a rudimentary way for this purpose. One important metasystematic result is to have established the independence of a set of deduction rules. Finally, (5) Aristotle worked with a notion of substitution sufficient for distinguishing logical syntax and semantics. In this connection he also distinguished validity from deducibility sufficiently well to note the completeness of his
logic.
Our reading of *Prior Analytics* takes Aristotle to have treated the process of deduction much as modern mathematical logicians do and not to have been confused about some fundamental matters of logic. Least of all was he confused, as some commentators believe, about a distinction between "following necessarily" and "being necessary," both in respect of the distinction between a *syllogismos* or a deduction and a demonstration and of the distinction between assertoric logic and modal logic. Aristotle clearly distinguished between (1) a given sentence's following necessarily from other given sentences and (2) a given sentence denoting a state of affairs to be necessary (or possible). Seeing that he was concerned with the deduction process helps us to avoid such an error. In any case, Aristotle recognised that, while the conclusion of a given argument follows necessarily from its premises, this necessity might not be evident to a participant. He knew that the epistemic process of deduction produces knowledge, or makes evident, that a given sentence follows necessarily from other given sentences. He considered the product of this epistemic process to be an argumentation that includes a deductive chain of reasoning in addition to the premises and conclusion. He recognised using deduction rules in the epistemic process for establishing validity, and that this process can be applied in a purely mechanical and computational way. Furthermore, Aristotle distinguished (1) the subject matter of a given argument from (2) the use to which a given argument might be put from (3) the varying expertise of a participant. All these matters are distinct from (4) the formal matters underlying any of them. And precisely to examine these formal matters was his project in *Prior Analytics*. In this connection, then, we understand Aristotle to have distinguished two kinds of knowledge that cannot be otherwise: (1) knowledge of what is true or false, which pertains to sentences, and (2) knowledge of what valid or invalid, which pertains to arguments." pp. 110-111


"Our purpose in the present article is to present a mathematical model designed to reflect certain structural aspects of Aristotle's logic. Accompanying the presentation of the model is an interpretation of certain scattered parts of the Prior and *Posterior Analytics*. Although our interpretation does not agree in all respects with those previously put forth, the present work would have been impossible without the enormous ground work of previous scholars - especially Jenkinson, Lukasiewicz and W. D. Ross - to whom we are deeply grateful.

Our interpretation restores Aristotle's reputation as a logician of consumate imagination and skill. Several attributions of shortcomings and logical errors to Aristotle are seen to be without merit. Aristotle's logic is found to be self-sufficient in several senses. In the first place, his theory of deduction is logically sound in every detail. (His indirect deductions' have been criticized, but incorrectly on our account.) In the second place, Aristotle's logic presupposes no other logical concepts, not even those of propositional logic. In the third place, the Aristotelian system is seen to be complete in the sense that every valid argument statable in his system admits of a deduction within his deductive system, i.e. every semantically valid argument is deducible.

In the present paper we consider only Aristotle's theory of non-modal logic which has been called "the theory of the assertoric syllogism" and "Aristotle's syllogistic." Aristotle presents the theory almost completely in Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the first book of *Prior Analytics*, although it presupposes certain developments in previous works - especially the following two: first, a theory of form and meaning of propositions having an essential component in *Categories* (Ch. 5, esp. 2a 34- 2b 7); second, a doctrine of opposition (contradiction) more fully explained in *De Interpretatione* (Ch. 7, and cf. Ross, p. 3)." p. 191


"In the present article we attempt to show that Aristotle's syllogistic is an underlying logic which includes a natural deductive system and that it is not an axiomatic theory as had previously been thought. We construct a mathematical model which reflects certain structural aspects of Aristotle's logic and we examine both the mathematical properties of the model and the relation of the model to the system of logic envisaged in certain scattered parts of Prior and Posterior Analytics.

Our interpretation restores Aristotle's reputation as a logician of consummate imagination and skill. Several attributions of shortcomings and logical errors to Aristotle are shown to be without merit. Aristotle's logic is found to be self-sufficient in several senses. In the first place, his theory of deduction is logically sound in every detail. (His indirect deductions have been criticized, but incorrectly on our account.) In the second place, Aristotle's logic presupposes no other logical concepts, not even those of propositional logic. In the third place, the Aristotelian system is seen to be complete in the sense that every valid argument expressible in his system admits of a deduction within his deductive system; i.e., every semantically valid argument is deductible.

There are six sections in this article. The first section includes methodological remarks, a preliminary survey of the present interpretation and a discussion of the differences between our interpretation and that of Lukasiewicz. The next three sections develop the three parts of the mathematical model. The fifth section deals with general properties of the model and its relation to the Aristotelian system. The final section contains conclusions." p. 85

"As a kind of summary of our research we present a review of what we take to be the fundamental achievements of Aristotle's logical theory. In the first place, he clearly distinguished the role of deduction from the role of experience (or intuition) in the development of scientific theories. This is revealed by his distinction between the axioms of a science and the logical apparatus used in deducing the theorems. Today this would imply a distinction between logical and nonlogical axioms; but Aristotle had no idea of logical axioms (but cf. 77a22-25). Indeed, he gave no systematic discussion of logical truth (Axx is not even mentioned once). In the second place, Aristotle developed a natural deduction system which he exemplified and discussed at great length. Moreover, he formulated fairly intricate metamathematical results relating his central system to a simpler one. It is also important to notice that Aristotle's system is sound and strongly complete. In the third place, Aristotle was clear enough about logical consequence so that he was able to discover the method of counter instances for establishing invalidity. This method is the cornerstone of all independence (or invalidity) results, though it probably had to be rediscovered in modern times (cf. Cohen and Hersh). In the fourth place, his distinction between perfect and imperfect syllogisms suggests a clear understanding of the difference between deducibility and implication -- a distinction which modern logicians believe to be their own (cf. Church, p. 323, fn. 529). In the fifth place, Aristotle used principles concerning form repeatedly and accurately, although it is not possible to establish that he was able to state them nor is even clear that he was consciously aware of them as logical principles.

The above are all highly theoretical points -- but Aristotle did not merely theorize; he carried out his ideas and programs in amazing detail despite the handicap of inadequate notation. In the course of pursuing details Aristotle originated many important discoveries and devices. He described indirect proof. He used syntactical variables (alpha, beta, etc.) to stand for content words -- a device whose importance in modern logic has not been underestimated. He formulated several rules of inference and discussed their interrelations.

Philosophers sometimes say that Aristotle is the best introduction to philosophy. This is perhaps an exaggeration. One of the Polish logicians once said that the Analytics is the best introduction to logic. My own reaction to this remark was unambiguously negative -- the severe difficulties in reading the Analytics form one obstacle and I felt then that the meager results did not warrant so much study. After carrying out the above research I can compromise to the following extent. I now believe that Aristotle's logic is rich enough, detailed enough, and sufficiently representative of modern logics that a useful set of introductory lectures on mathematical logic could be organized around what I have called the main Aristotelian system.

From a modern point of view, there is only one mistake which can sensibly be charged to Aristotle: his theory of propositional forms is very seriously inadequate. It is remarkable that he did not come to discover this for himself, especially since he mentions specific proofs from arithmetic and geometry. If he had tried to reduce these
to his system he may have seen the problem (cf. Mueller, pp. 174-177). But, once the
tory of propositional forms is taken for granted, there are no important inadequacies
attributable to Aristotle, given the historical context. Indeed, his work is comparable in
completeness and accuracy to that of Boole and seems incomparably more
comprehensive than the Stoic or medieval efforts. It is tempting to speculate that it was
the oversimplified theory of propositional forms that made possible the otherwise
comprehensive system. A more adequate theory of propositional forms would have
required a much more complicated theory of deduction -- indeed, one which was not
developed until the present era." p. 130-131


"Conclusion.
The tendency of interpreters to find an epistemically-oriented theory in Aristotle has
been overwhelming. With the exception of James Wilkinson Miller’s 1938 book and the
writings of Jan Lukasiewicz and those directly influenced by these two, few interpreters
have found a theory of formal ontology in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. Down through the
ages, with these exceptions, interpreters have agreed that Prior Analytics is about
methods of determining validity and invalidity of arguments. People studied Prior
Analytics in order to learn more about deductive reasoning and in order to improve
their own reasoning skills.

Despite the overwhelming tendency to interpret the syllogistic epistemically it wasn’t
until the early 1970s that it occurred to anyone to wonder whether Aristotle had a
developed theory of deductive reasoning with a well worked-out system of deductions
comparable in rigor and precision with the systems then familiar from mathematical
logic. Of the logicians that studied Prior Analytics from this point of view, two of them
published articles in same twelve-month period with remarkably similar systems
affirming in clear and unequivocal terms the epistemic nature of Prior Analytics:

The simpler of the two articles holds that Aristotle’s theory of deductions recognizes
two kinds of extended deductions of conclusions from arbitrarily large premise sets:
direct deductions and indirect deductions. A direct deduction of a conclusion from
given premises begins with the premises and proceeds by chaining together simple
one-premise and two-premise inferences until the conclusion is reached. An indirect
deduction of a given conclusion from given premises is in effect a direct deduction of a
pair of contradictory opposites from the premises augmented by the contradictory
opposite of the conclusion. This view is spelled out in more detail in the introduction to
Smith’s 1989 translation of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics.

According to the ontic interpretation the syllogistic is a system of true propositions
about inclusional relations among classes. It is a system which is organized
deductively, axioms followed by deduced theorems, by employment of an underlying
logic never explicitly mentioned by Aristotle. It is a system whose place in the Organon,
in Greek philosophy, and in the history of philosophy raises many problems. When we
turn to the epistemic interpretation the changes are dramatic. From the epistemic
perspective the syllogistic is a system of deductions or chains-of-reasoning. It is
organized according to an initial-versus-derivative structure with the derivative
components as chainings of initial components. It is a system which can be seen to
explain epistemic processes of deduction presupposed by the Socratic hypothetical
method, by the so-called method of analysis, by the axiomatic method and even by
dialectic itself. According to the epistemic interpretation, the focus of the syllogistic is
on methods as opposed to results; it concerns the process of deduction rather than
conclusions per se. One might say that it concerns how to think rather than what to
think. And it is a step toward understanding the nature of proof as opposed to
persuasion and toward fulfilling the demand made by Socrates in the Phaedo for a
techné logiké. This step made by Aristotle was so firm, so detailed, and so
well-developed that it warrants the title of THE FOUNDING OF LOGIC." (pp. 19-20)


"Prior Analytics by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 - 322 BCE) and Laws of
Thought by the English mathematician George Boole (1815 - 1864) are the two most
important surviving original logical works from before the advent of modern logic. This
article has a single goal: to compare Aristotle's system with the system that Boole
constructed over twenty-two centuries later intending to extend and perfect what Aristotle had started. This comparison merits an article itself. Accordingly, this article does not discuss many other historically and philosophically important aspects of Boole's book, e.g. his confused attempt to apply differential calculus to logic, his misguided effort to make his system of 'class logic' serve as a kind of 'truth-functional logic', his now almost forgotten foray into probability theory, or his blindness to the fact that a truth-functional combination of equations that follows from a given truth-functional combination of equations need not follow truth-functionally. One of the main conclusions is that Boole's contribution widened logic and changed its nature to such an extent that he fully deserves to share with Aristotle the status of being a founding figure in logic. By setting forth in clear and systematic fashion the basic methods for establishing validity and for establishing invalidity, Aristotle became the founder of logic as formal epistemology. By making the first unmistakable steps toward opening logic to the study of 'laws of thought' -- tautologies and laws such as excluded middle and non-contradiction -- Boole became the founder of logic as formal ontology."

"Demonstrative logic, the study of demonstration as opposed to persuasion, is the subject of Aristotle's two volume Analytics. Many examples are geometrical. Demonstration produces knowledge (of the truth of propositions). Persuasion merely produces opinion. Aristotle presented a general truth-and-consequence conception of demonstration meant to apply to all demonstrations. According to him, a demonstration, which normally proves a conclusion not previously known to be true, is an extended argumentation beginning with premises known to be truths and containing a chain of reasoning showing by deductively evident steps that its conclusion is a consequence of its premises. In particular, a demonstration is a deduction whose premises are known to be true. Aristotle's general theory of demonstration required a prior general theory of deduction presented in the Prior Analytics. His general immediate-deduction chaining conception of deduction was meant to apply to all deductions. According to him, any deduction that is not immediately evident is an extended argumentation that involves a chaining of intermediate immediately evident steps that shows its final conclusion to follow logically from its premises. To illustrate his general theory of deduction, he presented an ingeniously simple and mathematically precise special case traditionally known as the categorical syllogistic."

"Aristotle's logic can accommodate non-referring terms. Genuine affirmations must contain both a referring subject and a referring predicate; sentences that contain non-referring subjects or non-referring predicates are not genuine assertions. In appendix : The translation of De interpretatione 8. 18A23."


"In the Aristotelean philosophical tradition, elenctic argumentation (Elenchos) is conceived as a form of dialectical foundation of a thesis. It takes place in the context of discussion for and against a given thesis and consists in showing that, as the denier of this thesis argues against the opponent, he is unable to maintain his position unless he presupposes the thesis itself, which thus prevails and is consequently proven. As is well known, Aristotle used this form of argumentation in many areas of his inquiry, since he regarded it as an extremely effective technique not only in the speculative sciences but in the physical and practical sciences as well.
Particularly fortunate - because of its subsequent widespread use and because of the broad reflection that it stimulated - was Aristotle's application of this form of dialectical argumentation in Book Four of the *Metaphysics* in order to justify the principle of non-contradiction. Apart from its historical influence, this application is of especial importance because it evidences Aristotle's intention to prove, not any thesis whatsoever, but a logical principle, and this expresses his claim for an epistemically absolute proof - in the form of self-proof - of the principle itself. It does not appear, however, that elenctic proof of the non-contradiction principle can be accomplished successfully. In fact, demonstration that this proof is impossible is the purpose of the present essay, in which I propose a formalization of the argument - i.e. a formal reconstruction of the argument intended to give it a sufficiently precise specification - which highlights the conceptual difficulties that lie at its root." p. 111


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"Corcoran, it seems to me, has made a very important contribution to our understanding of Aristotle’s logic, and the suggestions offered in what follows should not be construed as impugning in any substantive way the value of that contribution. Of the many points Corcoran raises, I intend to take up four: (1) whether syllogistic is a science; (2) whether the theory of propositional forms presupposed by syllogistic is adequate; (3) whether Aristotle had a doctrine of logical truth; and (4) whether Aristotle considered reasoning natural or conventional." p. 136


"Over the last few decades there have been many attempts to approach the Aristotelian syllogistic by utilizing the techniques of contemporary formal logic. The aim of this paper is to examine the most significant of these attempts and evaluate their fidelity to and consistency with Aristotle's own basic exposition of the syllogistic as expressed in the Prior Analytics (Book I, 1-2; 4-6).

Two major approaches to the formalization of the assertoric syllogistic can be distinguished in the literature. The first and older approach construes the syllogistic as an axiomatic system, while the second and more recent approach considers the syllogistic as a natural deduction system. Since many of the attempts of the first sort fail to be mentioned in current discussion, this paper will try to summarize them and only make a concluding reference to the second approach which is readily accessible in the more recent publications.

There are two main issues which must be confronted in the case of each attempt to present Aristotle's assertoric syllogistic as an axiomatic system: first, whether the method of representation, i.e., the logical alphabet and the well-formed formulas of the system, conforms to Aristotle's own approach; second, whether the specific formulas chosen as axioms and definitions, the rules of inference, and the manner of proof, etc., are faithful to or at least consistent with Aristotle's writings. Although it might appear that the first issue, a discussion of the logical symbols employed, is not of any real value, one must remember that Aristotle's logic seems tied to some basic philosophical or, better, metaphysical presuppositions. That there can be a close link between certain symbolical representations and some ontological positions is clear in the case of some other philosophers.
One instance in the twentieth century is Gustav Bergmann whose espousal of a bare particularist theory of individuation is linked to his employment of a type of Russelian formal language (Bergmann, G., *Meaning and Existence*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1960).

Attempts at presenting the syllogistic in a formal way have proceeded along four lines: first, the attempt to present the syllogistic by means of the first-order predicate calculus; second, the classic attempt of Lukasiewicz to develop the syllogistic; third, the attempt to present the syllogistic as a theory of classes; fourth, Lejewski's attempt to relate the syllogistic to Lesniewski's ontology. Each of these attempts will be treated below in light of the two issues raised above.


"Aristotle's modal propositions use modal copulae rather than modal predicates or modally qualified *dicta*; the familiar contrast between predication of *dicta* and of things is inappropriate to the Aristotelian modalities. Despite what may appear to be vacillation on Aristotle's part between *de re* and *de dicto* modality, the copulae interpretation can serve to unify the two types."


"Aristotle founds his modal syllogistic, like his plain syllogistic, on a small set of 'perfect' or obviously valid syllogisms. The rest he reduces to those, usually by means of modal conversion principles. These principles are open to more than one reading, however, and they are in fact invalid on one traditional reading (*de re*), valid on the other (*de dicto*). It is argued here that this way of framing the contrast is not Aristotelian, and that an interpretation involving modal copulae allows us to see how these principles, and the modal system as a whole, are to be understood in light of close and precise connections to Aristotle's essentialist metaphysics."


"Upon examination of all of the syllogisms in the "Prior Analytics," it is found that Aristotle has relatively strong tendencies to write the major premise before the minor premise in the first figure and in the second figure and a considerably weaker tendency to write the major premise first in the third figure. These tendencies are explained in terms of 'left-right' and 'adjacency' factors that are connected with Aristotle's treatment of the syllogism as a rectilinear array of the three terms."


62. ———. 1968. *Aristotle's Syllogistic*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas. Contents: I. Plato's dialectic and Aristotle's syllogistic 3; II. The varieties of predication 13; III: The three figures 16; IV. The non-use of rules 27; V. Validation by reduction 34; VI. INVALIDATION BY COUNTEREXAMPLE 37; VII. The syllogistic system 53; VIII. The Fourth Figure and the indirect proof 57; IX. Subalternation 80; X. Premise order 81; Appendix. I. The square of opposition 99; II. The mnemonic lines 102; III: The perfection of Aristotle' First Figure 104; IV. Theophrastus and the indirect moods 109; V. The diagrams of the three figures 133; VI. John Locke's criticisms of Aristotle and the syllogism 137; Bibliography 144; Index 147-149.

"Aristotle's work in formal logic has received a great deal of scholarly attention;
nevertheless, it remains largely misunderstood. Aristotle's logic has often been equated with traditional "Aristotelian" logic (a usage as unhistorical as "Platonic" love or "Epicurean" tastes), or, which is even worse, judged and evaluated in accordance with how closely it follows or "fails" to follow that traditional logic. Even when efforts have been made to understand Aristotle's logic in its own right, Aristotle has usually been very shabbily treated. He has commonly been accused of errors that he never made at all, such as neglecting or overlooking the fourth figure. Even his way of conceiving the syllogism as a linear array of three terms has been lost on minds handicapped by later, but not thereby better, ways of thinking.

Although I hope that this book will contribute towards a better understanding of what Aristotle did and did not accomplish in his syllogistic, I have by no means attempted to treat Aristotle's syllogistic in its entirety. (For one thing, I have confined myself to the assertoric syllogistic and not gone into the modal logic at all.) The principal task of this book has been to explore the consequences of accepting the Aristotelian syllogism as a linear array of three terms. This approach to Aristotle sheds light on many hitherto mysterious aspects of Aristotle's logic; it provides new insights into what Aristotle was doing in the Prior Analytics and enables us to correct numerous misconceptions about his logic.

My treatment of the Prior Analytics has been quite sympathetic, and my conclusions are generally favorable; indeed, one of the aims of this book is to exonerate Aristotle's work in formal deductive logic." p. V


65. Simons, Peter. 1989. "Tree Proofs for Syllogistic." Studia Logica no. 48:540-554. "This paper presents a tree method for testing the validity of inferences, including syllogisms, in a simple term logic. The method is given in the form of an algorithm and is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the obvious denotational semantics. The primitive logical constants of the system, which is indebted to the logical works of Jevons, Brentano and Lewis Carroll, are term negation, polyadic term conjunction, and functors affirming and denying existence, and use is also made of a metalinguistic concept of formal synonymy. It is indicated briefly how the method may be extended to other systems."


68. ———. 1994. "Aristotle's Completeness Proof." Ancient Philosophy no. 14:25-38. "In Prior Analytics I 23 Aristotle presents a completeness proof for syllogistic logic, or so I maintain. I reconstruct the crucial step, which I take to be his highly condensed argument that every syllogistic-style deduction with more than two premises can be reduced to a series of syllogisms proper. I detect two big holes in the argument, but show that they can be filled without recourse to anachronistically modern methods. I end with a principle about the ordering of terms, and discuss the connections between it, Platonic division and Aristotle's exclusion of the fourth figure."


70. ———. 1982. "What Is Aristotelian Ecthesis?" History and Philosophy of Logic no. 3:113-127. "I consider the proper interpretation of the process of etchesis which Aristotle uses several times in the Prior analytics for completing a syllogistic mood, i.e., showing how to produce a deduction of a conclusion of a certain form from premisses of certain forms. I consider two interpretations of the process which have been advocated by recent scholars and show that one seems better suited to most passages while the other best fits a single remaining passage. I also argue that "etchesis" for Aristotle means 'setting out' the case to be proved using letters. Aristotle's remarks about the use of letters in mathematical proofs suggest that he had some understanding of rules..."
equivalent to universal generalization and existential instantiation; the 'proofs through ecthesis' are so-called because they rest on the latter rule, with which use of letters is involved in a special way.

"I argue that Aristotle developed the syllogistic in the "Prior Analytics" in order to use it in resolving the question, presented in "Posterior Analytics" A 3, whether proof of every proposition is either necessary or possible. His method, which rests on an analysis of the possible structure of proofs derived from the study of syllogisms in the "Prior Analytics", resemble modern proof theory in both style and purpose."

"In this paper I study a formal model for Aristotelian syllogistic which includes deductive procedures designed to model the "proof by ecthesis" that Aristotle sometimes uses and in which all deductions are direct. The resulting system is shown to be contained within another formal model for the syllogistic known to be both sound and complete, and in addition the system is proved to have a certain limited form of completeness."

"I argue that Aristotle's main reason for developing the theory of deductions (syllogisms) in the "Prior Analytics" was its use as a proof-theoretic instrument to solve problems about demonstrative sciences. thus, concerning the old problem of the relation of the two "Prior" and "Posterior Analytics", I hold that the "Prior" is "propter", and therefore "post", the "Posterior". This is shown in greater detail through an analysis of the role of 'immediate' propositions in his theory."

"The three Parts of this book deal respectively with the formal analysis of Aristotle's non-modal syllogistic; with the inter-relations between various syllogistic systems, their subsystems and extensions; and with the most fundamental question about the syllogism, viz. What is it?
Part One aims to effect a synthesis of recent work (both logical and philological) on the non-modal sections of the Prior Analytics, within the framework of a new formal system which combines features of Łukasiewicz's 'axiomatic' approach with features of the 'natural deduction' approach of Corcoran and Smiley.
This system is identified, in Part Two, as one of a family which also includes the semantically complete systems of Łukasiewicz and Corcoran. Extended systems are also considered, in which rejected formulae are axiomatised, and negative or singular terms added. In particular, formal analyses are given of Aristotle's own logics of negative and singular terms, and it is shown that the whole system of categorical syllogisms can be based on a system of singular syllogisms with the Aristotelian rules of ecthesis.
The multiplicity of syllogistic systems discussed in Part Two gives rise to the search (carried out in the third Part) for properties essential to the syllogism, which would
recur in any genuinely syllogistic system. A complex syntactic property of the
categorical syllogism is first described, then a semantic one, and finally one which I will
term epistemological (without wanting to sink into psychologism). The principal
standpoint in this Part is a purely theoretical one - the semantic discussion being
within the context of the contemporary debate on entailment, and the epistemological
one belonging to the theory of fallacies. But the historical approach of the first two
Parts is not wholly abandoned, and a detailed account is given of those parts of the
Prior Analytics (not often read) which include Aristotle's own attempts at metatheory.
With some reluctance, and in the interests of brevity, I have adopted a style of
exposition which is generally dogmatic rather than dialectical, in that it seeks merely to
state the truth rather than to allow the true view to emerge in stages from partial truths
or mistaken opinions. Also, interpretations or theories which seemed to me wholly
wrong have in general not been mentioned: there are just too many of them. On the
other hand, I have tried to include reference to what seemed to me the most important
contributions of the ancient and medieval commentators.
I have proceeded (as Aristotle would have said) from what is best known in itself, to
what is best known for us, beginning with the basis of an uninterpreted formal system,
and ending with a statement of the function of the syllogism and the use of the system.
So, in a sense, the reader will not know why the beginning is as it is, until he has come
to the end. For the benefit of readers who can't stand the suspense, I have tried to make
the end independently intelligible, so that they can begin there, and then go to the
beginning, ending in the middle with a kind of syllogismus interruptus.

   "This paper examines three recent discussions of Aristotle's system of syllogisms with
   apodeictic and assertoric premisses. Though they contain no cross-references, and
   though they arrive at disparate interpretations, all three pieces share a common aid.
   That aim is to construct an intuitively graspable interpretation of Aristotle's modal
   syllogistic which is based on metaphysical considerations. I argue that none of these
   authors has succeeded in this; nevertheless, I share their broad aim, and attempt to
   show that a more satisfactory interpretation can be formulated by combining and
developing elements drawn from all three."

   34:193-208.

   68:361-376.

   Moods to the Two Universal Moods of the First Figure (Apr A7, 29b1-25)." History and
   Philosophy of Logic no. 25:73-78.

   Logica no. 48:577-585.

   Königstein: A. Hain.

   "It has been pointed out, for example by Bochenski, (1) that the principles of
   propositional logic now known as DeMorgan's Laws bear a certain resemblance to the
   laws depicted in the traditional Square of Opposition.
   The analogy, however, is not as perfect as it could be. The aim of this paper is to
   explore some of the consequences of seeking a more exact comparison between
   syllogistic and propositional logic."

86. ———. 1988. "How Many Syllogisms Are There?" History and Philosophy of Logic no.
   9:77-85.
   'The incompleteness and artificiality of the 'Traditional logic' of the textbooks is
   reflected in the way that syllogisms are commonly enumerated. The number said to be
   valid varies, but all the numbers given are of a kind that logicians should find irritating.
   Even the apparent harmony of what is almost invariably said to be the total number of
   syllogisms, 256, turns out to be illusory. In the following, it is shown that the concept of
   a "distribution-value", which is related to the traditional theory of distribution, and the
   familiar concept of "quantity" together suffice to produce a far better way of
enumerating syllogisms and a more complete understanding of the systematic features of syllogistic logic.

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