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Bibliography of Intercultural and Comparative Philosophy: O-S

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Bibliography

1. Olberding, Amy. 2009. "Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies." *APA Newsletters* no. 9:3.
"In February of this year, the Committee on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies hosted a panel at the APA's Central Division meeting in Chicago. The focus of the panel concerned the intersections of Asian philosophies and feminism. While the essays and commentary delivered for the panel reflected the specific academic research foci of our participants, there are of course many ways to understand how Asian philosophies and feminism intersect, or fail to intersect. Consequently, this section of the *Newsletter* aspires to expand on

the discussions of our panel, as well as to explore additional territory. For it, some of our panel participants and several other scholars working in Asian philosophy reflect on a variety of related subjects. These include, for example, the search for affinities between feminist concerns and the concerns found in Asian materials; the state of the field of Asian philosophy as it pertains to incorporating feminist consciousness; the personal experiences of feminist scholars who seek to enliven their work with both historical sensitivity and feminist commitments; and the capacity of feminist readings of Asian philosophies to foster scholarly development and political progress. As the work presented here illustrates, there are many ways to frame and understand the import of feminism for Asian philosophies."

2. Oldmeadow, Harry. 2007. "The Comparative Study of Eastern and Western Metaphysics: A Perennialist Perspective." *Sophia* no. 46:49-64.
Abstract: "The comparative study of Eastern and Western philosophy has been hindered and/or distorted by Eurocentric assumptions about "philosophy", especially the overvaluation of rationality as an instrument of knowledge. The widespread discounting of Eastern thought derives, in large measure, from the modern Western failure to understand the nature of the traditional metaphysics of both the Occident and the East. This failure can be remedied by recourse to the work of a group of "traditionalist" or "perennialist" thinkers who expose the limitations of many approaches to the comparative study of philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular."
3. OuYang, Min. 2012. "There is No Need for *Zhongguo Zhexue* to be Philosophy." *Asian Philosophy* no. 22:199-223.
Abstract: "In this paper, I shall argue that philosophy proper is a Western cultural practice and cannot refer to traditional Chinese thinking unless in an analogical or metaphorical sense. Likewise, the Chinese idiom 'Zhongguo zhexue' has evolved its independent cultural meaning and has no need to be considered as philosophy in the Western academic sense. For the purpose of elucidating the culturally autonomous status of Zhongguo zhexue, as well as the possible counterparts of Western philosophy in other cultures, I contend that Davidsonian anomalous monism may provide a proper explanatory framework for the intercultural relationships between different 'sophias' from various traditions. As for the equivocal English term 'Chinese philosophy', I suggest replacing it with a more precise new word: 'sinosophy'."
4. Ouyang, Xiao. 2018. "Rethinking Comparative Philosophical Methodology: In Response to Weber's Criticism." *Philosophy East and West* no. 68:242-256.
"Ralph Weber's (2013, pp. 593–602) illuminating study of the recent works on "(meta-)methodology in comparative philosophy" shows that this trend has persisted well into contemporary studies and enhances its influence in the community —"all [authors] seem to rely to some degree on the presumption that comparative philosophy is best understood as 'intercultural philosophy'."(4) Weber argues, however, that this "contemporary dominance of cultures in comparative philosophy," namely the "rely[ing] on cultures as [a] philosophically relevant pre-comparative tertium," has been an "unwarranted assumption" and has caused problems concerning "reification" and "the effect of inclusionary exclusion."(5) He therefore calls for a "(self-)critical engagement with comparative philosophy" with the help of his "analytical tool" of comparison, which consists of five variables that are "distinguished in standard conceptualizations," namely "the comparer, the comparata, the pre-comparative tertium, the tertium comparationis, the result of the comparison."(6)" (p. 244)
(4) Weber's use of the term "intercultural" and Moore's preference "transcultural" are not essentially different. Both refer to interaction among multiple cultures. Another synonym is "cross-culture." Therefore, in my argument I am using the terms interchangeably.
(5) It can be understood as a kind of "two-edged sword." Weber (2013, p. 601) thinks that "the same factors that allow scholars of these cultures to claim a niche

for themselves within philosophy can be and are used by others to (dis)qualify that area of scholarship as being about something other than philosophy proper.”

(6) Weber (2014, p. 162) defines the “tertium comparationis as the respect in which determined comparata are compared” and the “‘pre-comparative’ tertium” as “which is at work in the setting up of the comparison.”

References

Weber, Ralph. 2013. “How to Compare?” — On the Methodological State of Comparative Philosophy.” *Philosophy Compass* 8, no. 7 : 593 — 603.

———. 2014. “Comparative Philosophy and the Tertium: Comparing What with What, and in What Respect?” *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* 12, no. 2 : 151–171.

5. ———. 2018. "Rejoinder to Ralph Weber." *Philosophy East and West* no. 68:261-263.

"Ralph Weber's reply to my comment, as we have come to expect from his writing, is both well articulated and instructive. His clarification has helped me to further grasp the consideration that underpins his methodological criticism. I am also encouraged to find agreement on the worth of a historical study of comparative philosophy as an established sub-discipline. In addition, Weber's attitude toward "disagreement" is thought-provoking. However, I would like to suggest that disagreement is positive and meaningful if and only if (1) it is not based on misunderstanding, and moreover if (2) disagreement itself should not be regarded as the purpose. The ideal intellectual exchange should be able to encompass both (1) the aim and endeavor to achieve a potential agreement, and (2) the possibility for an ongoing dialogue and disputation.

In this spirit, I will now respond to some points raised by Weber in his reply to my comment." (p. 261)

6. Pang-White, Ann A. 2009. "Chinese Philosophy and Woman: Is Reconciliation Possible?" *APA Newsletters* no. 9:3-4.

"The choice of transcending the facticity of masculine discourse shouldn't be limited to the Western canon but open to all, including Asian philosophy. One can dwell on the fact that most of what Confucius, Mencius, or Xunzi says has nothing to do with women's liberation, or well-being per se, or one can choose to suspend that limitation and extract the relevance of the ideas of *ren*, reciprocity, and relationality to a more wholesome vision of human society where gender oppression is a historical past, not an ongoing struggle. Much of the prejudice against the incorporation of, or just a sheer neglect of, the relevance of Asian philosophy to feminism in the West has been centered on the explicit sexist references found in the tradition. But this facticity of masculine discourse is common to all traditions, be they East, West, North, or South, so my question would be this: Why selectively exclude non-Western canons in feminist discourse?" (p. 4)

7. Panikkar, Raimundo. 1988. "What Is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?" In *Interpreting Across Boundaries. New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, edited by Larson, Gerald James and Deutsch, Eliot, 116-136. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

"Comparative studies are still fashionable today because they belong to the thrust toward universalization characteristic of western culture. The West not being able any longer to dominate other peoples politically, it tries to maintain—most of the time unconsciously—a certain control by striving toward a global picture of the world by means of comparative studies.

Yet, this very thrust toward homogenization and "global thinking" may boomerang into decentralization and pluralism once the wisdom of other cultures becomes better known.

Paradoxically enough, comparative philosophy, which has an inbuilt trend to overcome the plurality of cosmo-visions, may end by legitimizing mutually irreconcilable systems and becoming the stronghold of pluralism.

- I shall offer a definition of comparative philosophy and argue that it is different from all other comparative studies by virtue of the subject matter under comparison. And this uniqueness finds its paradoxical expression in my thesis that, strictly speaking, comparative philosophy is an impossible independent discipline, which nevertheless thrives in the very recognition of its impossibility.(1)" (p. 116)
- (1) This is the thesis of my paper "Aporias in the Comparative Philosophy of Religion," *Man and World* 3-4 (1980): 357-383.
8. Quintern, Detlev. 2017. "Beyond Cross-Cultural Philosophy: Towards a New Enlightenment." *Philosophical Investigations (University of Tabriz-Iran)* no. 11:191-204.
Abstract: "The acculturation of humanities from the late 1980ies onwards led not only to imagined different worlds (e.g. West / Islam), postmodernity overshadowed also common grounds of world's philosophies. Christianity and Islam share far more than what might separate them, and we find Islam in „the West“ as Christianity „in the East“. The Logos of Life Philosophy as developed by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (1923-2014) strives towards deciphering the deep layers of philosophy and its common grounds. Tracing back to Gnostic, Platonic (neoplatonic) and Islamic shaped philosophies - Ikhwan as-Safa will serve as an example - the Logos of Life / Aql Al-Kulli (universal reason) will be historicized in the following while introducing approaches towards a New Enlightenment (A.-T. Tymieniecka) as an alternative to the current crisis in meta-sciences."
 9. Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, and Raju, Poolla Tirupati, eds. 1960. *Concept of Man: A Study in Comparative Philosophy*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Contents: P. T. Raju: Prologue to the second edition 9; S. Radhakrishnan: Prefatory remarks 23; P. T. Raju; Introduction 29; I. John Wild: The Concept of Man in Greek Thought 56; II. A.J. Heschel: The Concept of Man in Jewish Thought 122; III. W. T. Chan: The Concept of Man in Chinese Thought 172; IV. P. T. Raju: The Concept of Man in Indian Thought 220; V. P. T. Raju: Comparisons and Reflections 320; VI. Ernst Benz: The Concept of Man in Christian Thought 394; VII. Ibrahim Madhour: The Concept of Man in Islamic Thought 452; VIII. M. B. Milin: The Concept of Man in Marxist Thought 476; IX. P. R. Raju; Epilogue 536; Index 540-546,
 10. Raju, Poolla Tirupati. 1947. "The Western and the Indian Philosophical Traditions." *Philosophical Review* no. 56:127-155.
"Without entering further into the principles of comparative philosophy, we may adopt, as a modus operandi for the comparison of the two traditions, the comparisons of their origins, of their developments, and of their endings. Their origins are of the past and can no longer change.
The endings, so far as we are concerned, are what they are in the present. In the future, the two traditions may blend ; and the future historian of philosophy may trace two origins for the philosophy of his time, just as European culture of the present traces its birth to both Greece and Rome. Or possibly the two traditions may continue without regard for each other, which is certainly not to be desired. And as the endings for us are what they are now, the modes of their respective developments are also of the past. A careful understanding of the two traditions in these three aspects should enable us to determine the individuality of each with respect to the other." (pp. 128-129)
 11. ———. 1955. "Idealisms: Eastern and Western." *Philosophy East and West* no. 5:211-234.
"Since World War II, humanity has become world-conscious. People have come to realize that every part of the world is now more closely knit with every other part than before. Events which previously would have been considered to be only of national importance are now of international importance. Even countries which are self-sufficient in every respect no longer think they can cut themselves off from the rest of the world. Great and rich nations are worried about the poverty of small nations. Economically and politically, the parts of the world have come closer and closer. But should they not also come close psychologically and reflectively? Or

should we conclude that we are coming dangerously closer? Dangerously or helpfully, we are coming closer, and we have to spread the feeling of common humanity. We want mutual understanding of cultures; but cultures attain reflectiveness in their philosophies. So mutual understanding of cultures will be mere dilettantism without mutual understanding of philosophies. And mutual understanding of philosophies is not possible unless it is accepted that, essentially and in truth, man and his reason are the same everywhere. Hence the need for comparative philosophy, which will naturally lead to philosophies with broader outlook. Our sense of what is important will become truer." (p. 212)

12. ———. 1957. "Being, Existence, Reality, and Truth." *Philosophy East and West* no. 17:291-315.
"For philosophy the concepts of Being, Existence, Reality and Truth are very important, if not central; but no other concepts are more vague than they, and no other terms are more loosely used than theirs. For a student of comparative philosophy, the difficulty becomes all the greater in understanding them, because each is used in different senses by different philosophers and sometimes by the same philosopher in different places. Again, in some languages separate words are not found to mean the different concepts. Further, as will be shown in this paper, some of these words do not naturally express the meanings they are sought to express, and our understanding becomes vague and confused. Now that English is one of the languages for the intercommunication of philosophies and cultures, it is important to find out not only the distinct meanings of these words but also how English expresses these meanings clearly and naturally. And these words and concepts are of primary importance for philosophy in general and for comparative philosophy in particular, the study of which is being taken up seriously. Much confusion will be prevented if the meanings they can naturally express are delimited." (p. 291)
13. ———. 1962. *Introduction to Comparative Philosophy*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Reprint: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1977.
Contents: Preface V; General Introduction 3; 1. Western Philosophy and the Struggle for the Liberation of the Outward 13; 2. Chinese Philosophy and Human Mindfulness 93, 3. Indian Philosophy and Explication of Inwardness 169; 4. Comparisons and Reflections 249; Appendixes 337; Chronological Table 339; Glossary of Indian and Chinese Terms 352; Index 357.
14. ———. 1963. "Comparative Philosophy and Spiritual Values: East and West." *Philosophy East and West* no. 13:211-225.
"The tendency is strong to identify spiritual values with what we call intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic values, or Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. But, when the reality of spirit is rejected, these values must be considered as relevant only to the physical body or the biological principle. It is not realized that by denying the reality of spirit we destroy the very foundation of these values. For whom are these values meant and on what are they based? Our physico-chemical and biological nature is what it is, and there is no question of its becoming something different from what it is: it does not strive for the realization of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. The originator of these values has, then, to be conceded to be spirit. But how are we to identify and locate it?" (p. 212)
15. ———. 1970. *Lectures in Comparative Philosophy*. Poona: University of Poona.
"For the meaning of " comparative philosophy " one should not go merely to its etymology and philology. Etymologically, the term may mean " any philosophical work that compares " or " any philosophy that is developed by comparing any other philosophies. " In either case, the philosophies compared may be any two philosophies of the same tradition or even of the same period of that tradition, as for instance the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. But such work is not called comparative philosophy, although it is comparison of two philosophies. Without

restricting and defining the meaning of the term, we lose its true significance and importance.

Again, comparative philosophy is not a system of philosophy, just as comparative religion is not any established religion. But comparative philosophy may and ought to lead to a more comprehensive and adequate system of philosophy, just as comparative religion may and ought to produce a religious genius who can start a new and comprehensive and adequate religious outlook that meets the needs of modern man. Comparative philosophy is a philosophical discipline and ought to be recognized as the most important philosophical activity of the present, in which the East and the West are both violently and non-violently merging with each other." (pp. 1-2)

16. Ramose, Mogobe B. 2015. "On the contested meaning of 'philosophy'." *South African Journal of Philosophy* no. 34:551-558.
Abstract: "The thesis to be defended in this essay is that the meaning, and by implication the use, of philosophy continues to be contested. I will focus primarily on philosophy in South Africa in order to elucidate this thesis. In doing so, I will argue that the future of philosophy in South Africa lies precisely in the willingness to contest its meaning and use. Such a contestation must be in the form of a dialogue predicated on the principle of the equality of all human beings and the openness to learn from one another without precluding the possibility of change in oneself and the existential conditions that prevail. My starting point is that the present is the child of the past and the present in turn is the parent of the future. I will therefore look back with the view to arriving at the present that is the field of contestation."
17. Raphals, Lisa. 1992. *Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Foreword by Gregory Nagy.
18. ———. 1994. "Skeptical Strategies in the "Zhuangzi" and "Theaetetus"." *Philosophy East and West* no. 44:501-526.
"Both the *Qi wu lun* [*] and *Theaetetus* engage in extended discussions of the nature of knowing, language, explanation, perception, and perceptual judgment. Paul Woodruff asks a question about Plato that can also be applied to *Zhuangzi*: "Which came first, the sceptic or the epistemologist?" The epistemologist asks what knowledge is and how it can be acquired; the skeptic tries to detach her from that project. Zhuangzi, like Plato, may be doing something different from either of these, though it smacks of both.⁶ The *Qi wu lun* is the major consideration of epistemology in Warring States writings; the *Theaetetus* is the only Platonic dialogue devoted to a discussion of episteme, knowing. Yet we may observe that *Zhuangzi* never offers his own theory of knowing, and Socrates never reaches a definition of *episteme*. In this essay I compare several ostensibly skeptical elements in the *Qi wu lun* chapter of the *Zhuangzi* and the *Theaetetus* of Plato. I argue that the *Zhuangzi* and the *Theaetetus* use remarkably similar skeptical methods to explore epistemological problems in ways that are unique within their respective traditions.
My purpose in making this case is twofold. One, I want to show that methods of argument in China and Greece may have more in common than we may be predisposed to suppose. Two, the comparison allows us to reexamine our own understanding of what skepticism is and does." (pp. 501-502)
[*] The second chaptet of *Zhuangzi*.
References
Burnyeat, M. F., 1990. *The Theaetetus of Plato with a Translation of Plato's Theaetetus by M. J. Levett. revised by Myles Burnyeat*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Graham, Angus C. trans. 1986. *Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981. Reprint, Unwin Paperbacks.

19. ———. 2002. "Gender and Virtue in Greece and China." *Journal of Chinese philosophy* no. 29:415-436.
 "This article concerns a particular aspect of gendered virtue, namely, the claim that women "think differently than men"—more specifically, the claim that men and women differ in intellectual and ethical capacities, including capacities for moral reasoning and political and ethical judgment. Claims of this kind are legion. They are the property of no one culture or tradition, and have been used—across cultures—to deny political and civil rights to women by the imposition of an epistemological and ethical double standard.
 (...)
 Even feminists engage in this debate: some hold that gender predisposes women toward certain virtues, and men toward certain vices; others attack that position with equal vehemence.
 After a brief consideration of metaphorical and rhetorical uses of gender, I present two sets of gendered virtue controversies. The Greek arguments begin in Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, continue in Aristotle's *Politics*, and resume in the European Enlightenment in the works of Rousseau and his critics. The Chinese arguments begin with the *Analects* of Confucius, reappear in Han dynastic histories, and continue in contemporary debates about Confucianism, feminism, and the status of women in contemporary Asian societies. These comparative controversies show that arguments about gendered virtue and debates about the relative ability of women and men to make intellectual and ethical judgments are not the property of any one "tradition," Asian or Western, ancient or modern. In the final part of the article, I use these debates to consider some contemporary ramifications of the "Asian values" debate, including claims that Confucianism is "feminist," or "more" or "differently" benign or feminist than Western philosophy." (pp. 415-416, notes omitted)
20. Raud, Rein. 2006. "Philosophies versus Philosophy: In Defense of a Flexible Definition." *Philosophy East and West* no. 56:618-625.
 "It is strange that no one has taken up Carine Defoort's clearly formulated and timely argument about the intercultural tensions in interpreting what philosophy is, although the issue deserves at least a roundtable, if not an international conference.
 (1)
 I doubt that this is because there is a general consensus that the matter is now settled, and I would therefore like to develop the argument a bit further and offer a few additional factors to consider. It is also obvious that the problem is not limited to the subject of Chinese philosophy alone: all traditions of thought from all over the world, but most notably the Indian, Islamic, and Japanese heritages, are affected by the positions we adopt. As in most debates about the commensurability of cultural traditions, we can find differences when we look for them, and similarities if these are what we would like to see, so the "conflict of sensitivities"(2) is also a matter of attitudes.
 My own position is that regardless of what we prefer to call the practice of deeper thought (and 'philosophy' is a very good name), it would be extremely useful for all of its participants, whatever their origin and upbringing, to find a common denominator for them to be able to exchange ideas and mutually enrich each other on its basis. In what follows I shall try to sketch a perspective from which this could, in my opinion, be theoretically grounded." (p. 618)
 (1) Carine Defoort, "Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate," *Philosophy East and West* 51 (3) (July 2001): 393–413.
 (2) *Ibid.*, p. 406.
21. Reding, Jean-Paul. 2004. *Comparative Essays in Early Greek and Chinese Rational Thinking*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
 "Comparing ancient Chinese to ancient Greek philosophical thinking is certainly a fascinating enterprise. But it is also a questionable one. What is the philosophical justification for such an undertaking? And why should we compare ancient Chinese to ancient Greek thought, rather than to Indian, Arabic or African ways of thinking?"

We might ask, further, if we have at our disposal a comparative method adaptable to a project of this scope.

Let me begin by trying to answer the last question first. The comparative method is firmly established in the natural sciences, where we have a number of comparative disciplines, such as comparative zoology and comparative anatomy. Historical linguistics, comparative law, religious studies and comparative mythology also deserve to be mentioned in this context. Comparative philosophy, however, is rather ill famed, and has never acquired the status of a unified and independent philosophical discipline. Even the very notion of comparative philosophy as a discipline distinct from pure philosophy is rejected sometimes.

Comparative philosophy is also seen very often as nothing more than a broader approach to the study of the history of philosophy, by including Indian, Chinese and African philosophies as appendices to standard histories of Western philosophy. The most common way of practising comparative philosophy, however, is to spot marked differences or similarities between specific doctrines or global attitudes of Western and Eastern philosophy. The goal I have set myself is to rehabilitate the comparative method as a more rigorous way of doing philosophy with a cross-cultural perspective." (Introduction, p. 1, notes omitted)

22. Rein'1, Robert L. 1953. "Comparative Philosophy and Intellectual Tolerance." *Philosophy East and West* no. 2:333-339.

"Comparative philosophy may be studied either for the purpose of determining the relations among the different systems, where the objects studied are the systems rather than the objects with which the systems profess to be concerned, or for the sake of obtaining wisdom. The second of these purposes implies the first, but only the second is philosophic inquiry in the fullest sense. In connection with the first, Mr. Kwee has indicated the necessity of approaching a philosophy through its historical and socio-cultural setting, and has suggested eight approaches to the problem of comparative philosophy in general.(1) To these an addition is suggested, not in the sense of another method, but as an attitude that is required by all these approaches. The attitude is tolerance, specifically a variety that might be called intellectual. One must be intellectually tolerant if one is to reach out beyond the boundaries of one's own culture, and even more tolerant if one is to pursue investigations of a comparative nature." (p. 333)

(19 J. Kwee Swan Liat, "Methods of Comparative Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West*, I, No. 1 (April, 1951), 10-15. The eight approaches are: the philological, the historical, the comparative, the formal-evaluative, the psychological, the phenomenological, the sociological and anthropological, and the total-integrative." (p. 333)

23. Rivera Berruz, Stephanie, and Kalmanson, Leah, eds. 2018. *Comparative Studies in Asian and Latin American Philosophies: Cross-Cultural Theories and Methodologies*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

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24. Rorty, Richard. 1991. "Philosophers, Novelists, and Intellectual Comparisons: Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens." In *Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophical Perspectives*, edited by Deutsch, Eliot, 3-20. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Also published in R. Rorty, *Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Essays on Heidegger and Others*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991, pp. 66-82.
"When tolerance and comfortable togetherness become the watchwords of a society, one should no longer hope for world-historical greatness. If such greatness — radical difference from the past, a dazzlingly unimaginable future — is what one wants, ascetic priests like Plato, Heidegger, and Suslov will fill the bill. But if it is not, novelists like Cervantes, Dickens, and Kundera may suffice. The fact that philosophy as a genre is closely associated with the quest for such greatness — with the attempt to focus all one's thoughts into a single narrow beam and send them out beyond the bounds of all that has been previously thought — may help explain why it is among the philosophers of the West that contemporary Western self-hatred is most prevalent. It must be tempting for Africans and Asians — the principal victims of Western imperialism and racism — to see this self-hatred as about what the West deserves. But I would suggest that we take this self-hatred as just one more symptom of the old familiar quest for purity which runs through the annals of the ascetic priesthood in both East and West. If we set these annals to one side, we may have a better chance of finding something distinctive in the West which the East can use, and conversely." (p. 20)
25. ———. 1996. "The Ambiguity of 'Rationality'." *Constellations* no. 3:73-83. *Symposium on Critical Theory by David Hoy and Thomas McCarthy* (Malden: Blackwell 1994).
"It is tempting to describe Critical Theory as an American version of the Habermas-vs.-Foucault debate, a debate which has agitated Europe in the ten years since the publication of Habermas's *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. It is also tempting to read it as a contribution to the debate over postmodernism which is presently agitating the American academy. But neither description is quite right." (p. 73)
(...)
"In his rejoinder to Hoy, Thomas McCarthy agrees that we need Foucauldian "critical histories of contingent regimes of rationality." But he disagrees with Hoy on the question of "whether there is anything universal at all to say about reason, truth, objectivity, and the like, or rather anything that would not be too 'thin' to be of any use" (223). McCarthy thus lays out what I take to be the central issue of the book: namely, whether these traditional topics of philosophical debate are relevant to socio-political deliberation." (p. 73)
26. Rosán, Laurence J. 1952. "A Key to Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 2:56-65.
"The present writer therefore wishes to suggest that the key to comparative philosophy is not the contrast of cultures but rather the contrast of basic philosophical *attitudes* or *types* of philosophy. There are certain philosophical attitudes that appear again and again at widely separated points in space and in widely separated periods of time, each of which is logically consistent within itself but in fundamental conflict with each of the others. Much further study would be required to determine the exact number and nature of these attitudes. But for the purposes of this article and in order to demonstrate the significance and value of this conception, let me arbitrarily speak of three such fundamental attitudes, understanding that this number represents undoubtedly a great simplification, although not, I hope, a falsification. The following paragraphs, therefore, are not

intended to convey any new factual knowledge but rather to clarify and integrate the field of comparative philosophy. The examples offered as illustrations of each particular philosophical attitude are not meant to be exhaustive but merely suggestive, so that the reader will be able to think of many others which could have been used. Perhaps in certain cases there may be some disagreement about the classification of a particular author, but this, I imagine, will not affect the general validity of my approach. Of course, many writers cannot be clearly classified inasmuch as they mingle elements of two or more attitudes within themselves; since this would imply real inconsistency, however, I believe that the greatest philosophers will be those most amenable to classification." (pp. 56-57)

27. ———. 1961. "Are Comparisons between the East and the West Fruitful for Comparative Philosophy?" *Philosophy East and West* no. 11:239-243.
 "In an earlier issue there appeared an article entitled "A Key to Comparative Philosophy," by the present writer.(2)"
 (...)
 "This article evoked a comment, printed in the same issue, entitled "Keys to Comparative Philosophy," by the editor of this Journal, Charles A. Moore.(3) Moore made good criticisms of some particular aspects of the typology that I suggested, but he did not attack the conception itself."
 (...)
 "But the purpose of the present article is not polemical, though the foregoing paragraph may seem somewhat contentiously phrased. On the contrary, I take seriously Moore's conclusion that there are probably several very different interpretations of comparative philosophy. What I would like to examine now is the question: Why are there these different "keys" to comparative philosophy? And I would like to suggest—neither facetiously nor pedantically, however the words may seem to strike the reader—that the reason there are different approaches to the problem of comparative philosophy is simply that there are different philosophies to begin with, and that each type of philosophy will, very naturally, offer a solution to this particular problem that will be consistent with the rest of its metaphysical and ethical views. In other words, whereas in my previous article I attempted a "typology of philosophies" as the key to comparative philosophy, I am here accepting the fact that there are several such "keys," but suggesting that there is a necessary reason for the variety of these "keys" themselves. In short, there is a "typology of the solutions to the problem of comparative philosophy," and this typology may be similar or even parallel to the typology of the philosophies themselves." (pp. 239-240)
 (2) *Philosophy East and West*, Ibid., II, No. 1 (April, 1952), 56-65.
 (3) Ibid., pp. 76-78.
28. Rosemont, Henry Jr. 2014. "Symposium: Does the Concept of »Truth« Have Value in the Pursuit of Cross-Cultural Philosophy?" *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies* no. 1:150-217.
 Abstract: "The symposium »Does the Concept of >Truth< Have Value in the Pursuit of Cross-Cultural Philosophy?« hones on a methodological question which has deep implications on doing philosophy cross-culturally.
 Drawing on early Confucian writers, the anchor, Henry Rosemont, Jr., attempts to explain why he is skeptical of pat, affirmative answers to this question. His co-symposiasts James Maffie, John Maraldo, and Sonam Thakchoe follow his trail in working out multi-faceted views on truth from Mexican, Japanese Confucian, and Tibetan Buddhist perspectives respectively. As these positions substantiate, the aforementioned non-Anglo-European traditions seem to draw on an integrated view of thinking, feeling, and living a human life. For their practitioners, truth is less of a correspondence with a given external reality.
 In fact, it enables human beings to strike the right path in living good, social lives."
 H. Rosemont Jr., *Introductory Statement* 151;
 Responses;

- J. Maffie: Reflections on Henry Rosemont's »Introductory Statement« 161; J. Maraldo: Truth is Truthfulness: The Japanese Concept of Makoto 168; S. Thakchoe: Tibetan Reflections on the Value of Truth in Cross-Cultural Philosophy 186; H. Rosemont, Jr.: Reply: Truth as Truthfulness 205-217.
29. Ross, Donald. 2019. *Introduction to World Philosophy*. London: Austin Macauley Publishers.
 "About the Book: What would it be like to go back in time and converse with the great sages of China, of India, of classical Greece and Rome, of the Christian and Islamic worlds, of Europeans of the Enlightenment? This book, *Introduction to World Philosophy*, aims to communicate some of the excitement and "mind-stretchingness" that such an encounter would produce. It is intended to engage interested laypersons while remaining faithful to the standards of professional scholarship. It is written in an informal style yet does not talk down to the reader. Representatives from each of the five aforementioned periods are presented in pairs—one philosopher a more "head-in-the-clouds" thinker and the other a more "feet-on-the-ground" one. Besides demonstrating how each tradition offers a range of perspectives rather than a single, dominant one, such an approach achieves an optimum balance between breadth and depth. Ideas found in these texts range from mind-bending metaphysical speculation and the theory of knowledge, to questions of ethics and politics, to points of elementary logic. The whole discussion is prefaced by an extended exploration of what philosophy is. The author feels that it is important to reach out to the general public, to feed a genuine hunger out there for an accessible guide to the subject, and also acknowledge the relevance of non-Western, as well as Western, cultures to an increasingly globalized world."
30. Scharfstein, Ben-Ami. 1998. *A Comparative History of World Philosophy. From the Upanishads to Kant*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
 Contents: Preface XI; Acknowledgments XIII; Chapter 1. The three philosophical traditions 1; Chapter 2. The beginnings of metaphysical philosophy Uddalaka, Yajnavalkya, Heraclitus, Parmenides 55; Chapter 3. The beginnings of moral philosophy Confucius/Mencius, the Buddha, Socrates 79; Chapter 4. Early logical relativism, skepticism, and absolutism Mahavira, Chuang-tzu, Protagoras, Gorgias, Plato 113; Chapter 5. Early rational Synthesis Hsün-tzu, Aristotle 145; Chapter 6. Early varieties of atomism Democritus/Epicurus/Lucretius, "Gautama" and Nameless Buddhists 171; Chapter 7. Hierarchical idealism Plotinus/Proclus, Bhartrhari 205; Chapter 8. Developed skepticism Sextus Empiricus, Nagarjuna, Jayarashi, Shriharsha 233; Chapter 9. Religio-philosophical synthesis Udayana, Chu Hsi, Avicenna, Mairnonides, Aquinas 275; Chapter 10. Logic-sensitized, methodological metaphysics Gangesha, Descartes, Leibniz 329; Chapter 11. Immanent-transcendent holism Shankara, Spinoza 367, Chapter 12. Perceptual analysis, realistic and idealistic Asanga/Vasuhandu, Locke, Berkeley, Hume 407; Chapter 13. Fideistic neo-skepticism Dignaga/Dhamakirti, Kant 467; Afterword 517; Notes 531; Bibliography 655; Note on the Author 659; Index 661.
 From the Preface: "Because I hope that newcomers to the history of philosophy will be among the readers of this hook, I have taken care to explain whatever I think they need to know. The book begins with the reasons for studying philosophy comparatively and with the difficulties raised by such study, and it ends with a view of philosophy that is personal but that rests on all of the preceding discussion The philosophers dealt with represent certain attitudes. schools. and traditions, but they are remembered most interestingly and accurately as individuals. So even though I have had to omit a great deal and make schematic summaries, I have in each instance tried to suggest the philosopher's style, density, and order of thought. In its later chapters the book tends to grow more difficult and elaborate, like the philosophies it deals with; but the early chapters prepare for the later ones. and, whatever the difficulty, I have always wittiest as simply and clearly as I can. To avoid making a long book forbiddingly longer, I have limited not only the number of philosophers dealt with but also the range of thought by which each of them is represented Plato. for example, is limited to his theory of Ideas and Kant

- (except in the later discussion) to his Critique of Pure Reason. In keeping with the needs of a particular comparison. I have sometimes drawn a broad sketch and sometimes entered into details. When it has seemed natural. I have shared my own views with the reader—there is no good reason to pretend that I am a neutral, disembodied voice. But however I judge each philosopher's thought, I have committed myself to expound it with a minimum of bias." (p. XI)
31. ———. 2001. "How important is truth to epistemology and knowledge? Some answers from comparative philosophy." *Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge* no. 15:275-283.
 "What can I say in a few pages to persuade someone with philosophical interests but without prior experience in comparative philosophy that he or she is living an unreasonably restricted intellectual life? With respect to the present subject, I'm sure that the senses, implications and varieties of such an inescapable conception as that of the usefulness of truth will be grasped in a richer, more mature way if the field of inquiry is broadened beyond contemporary Western philosophy. The so-called 'primitives' are the hardest to investigate for such a purpose because of their great variety, the uneven character of what evidence there is, and the fact that the presuppositions of their thought are of course not laid out and defended in treatises but remain for the most part implicit in their ways of life. I can do no better here than confine myself to a few hints, by way of examples that have for one reason or another interested me. I should add that I may refer to acts or attitudes in the present tense, though they may now be obsolete." (p. 276)
32. Schepen, Renate, and Graness, Anke. 2019. "Heinz Kimmerle's intercultural philosophy and the quest for epistemic justice." *The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa* no. 15:1-7.
 Abstract: "Since the 1990s epistemic (in)justice has been a central issue of post-colonial and feminist studies. But only during the last decade the term has become paradigmatic and new aspects of the issue have been addressed – particularly because of the works of De Sousa Santos (2012, 2014) and Fricker (2007). One of the pioneers of an intercultural approach to philosophy is the German philosopher Heinz Kimmerle (1930–2016), who in the 1980s began to focus his research on African philosophies. Intercultural philosophy aimed for more epistemic justice in the academy long before the term epistemic or cognitive injustice was coined and became a new paradigm in the social sciences and humanities. Kimmerle, for example, was one of the main proponents of a radical reform of the Eurocentric curricula in academic philosophy, and he called for the inclusion of philosophical traditions from various regions of the world. Similarities in the starting point of research and research questions in philosophy and post- or decolonial studies, and proposed solutions to epistemic injustice in these disciplines, give enough reason to combine the social sciences' theories of epistemic justice with the methods of intercultural philosophy for a reciprocal cultural enrichment between these disciplines. This article shows that theories of 'epistemic justice' could benefit from Heinz Kimmerle's method of dialogue and reflective listening. Similarly, insights derived from post-colonial, decolonial and feminist theory could strengthen an awareness of structural power inequalities in intercultural philosophy. Therefore, we explore how theories of epistemic justice and intercultural philosophy can complement each other."
 References
 Fricker, M., 2007, *Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
 De Sousa Santos, B., 2012, 'Public sphere and epistemologies of the south', *Africa Development* 37(1), 43–67.
 De Sousa Santos, B., 2014, *Epistemologies of the south: Justice Against Epistemicide*, Routledge, New York.
33. Schiltz, Elizabeth. 2014. "How to Teach Comparative Philosophy." *Teaching Philosophy* no. 37:215-231.

- Abstract: "This article articulates a range of possible pedagogical goals for courses in comparative philosophy, and discusses a number of methods and strategies for teaching courses intended to achieve those ends. Ultimately, it argues that the assignment to teach comparative philosophy represents an opportunity to design a course with remarkable freedom and tremendous potential. Comparative philosophy courses can engage students in unique ways that not only increase their understanding of the fundamental assumptions and beliefs of non-Western traditions, but also facilitate the development of the skills and dispositions that enable them to become better philosophers."
34. Seaford, Richard. 2020. *The Origins of Philosophy In Ancient Greece and Ancient India: A Historical Comparison* . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 "This book is devoted to a unitary argument, but over such a wide range of material that I offer the reader preliminary guidance in this chapter, beginning with an overview.
 The next chapter (concluding Part A) presents explanations of the similarity between the earliest philosophy in India and Greece.
 Part B describes the polytheist reciprocity that, among an elite, was replaced in both cultures by monism. Part C centres on the main factors behind this replacement in India: the individual *interiorisation* of what I call the cosmic rite of passage, and *monetisation* . Part D describes the similar factors behind the similar development of ideas in Greece. The conclusion (Part E) summarises and explores the variety of factors behind the new imagining of universe and inner self." (from the Summary, p. 3)
35. Selusi, Ambrogio. 2021. *Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception and the Exclusion* . New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
 "The purpose of this work is to examine the European understanding of China and India within the histories of philosophy from 1600 to 1744. The year 1600 is the publication of *Barbaricae philosophiae antiquitatum* by Otto van Heurn and 1744 the year of release of the last book of the *Historia critica* by Jakob Brucker, which was entitled 'De Philosophia Exotica'. Heurn's book is our *terminus post quem* , since in this work it was introduced for the first time in a 'history of philosophy' a chapter about modern or contemporary Indians, together with a chapter about ancient Indians.
 About Brucker, he provided a very long and detailed chapter on contemporary Asians in his widespread history of philosophy, while, after him, Asians were usually excluded from the histories of philosophy; that is the reason for choosing Brucker as our *terminus ante quem* . The two authors represent two opposite historiographical paradigms and the latter author openly rejected the method and the historical asset of the former. Therefore, we shall, on one side, investigate the description of these two Asian civilizations in a century and a half of 'histories of philosophy', on the other side, we shall try to understand the change of historiographical paradigms and appreciate the effects of these changes in the description of the two civilizations with which we are concerned" (p. 1)
36. Senghass, Dieter. 2002. *The Clash within Civilizations: Coming to terms with cultural conflicts* . New York: Routledge.
 "Intercultural philosophy must face the realities of today's world, particularly when in pursuit of politico-theoretical and socio-philosophical issues.
 This world is, however, completely different from the one that existed at the time when classical philosophy came into being. This is why all contemporary philosophies, and especially philosophies from non-European, non-Western cultures, must turn to the political, socioeconomic and cultural complexities emerging in their own environment.
 Such a confrontation will inevitably lead to differentiation processes which in the light of such historic changes it will be hard to confine to any form of cultural-essentialist straitjacket. It is this issue that creates such inner turmoil within cultures

- and their characteristic philosophical profiles; as a rule, it is hardly possible to reduce the many solutions put forward to a common denominator. Cultures, in the current, holistic sense of the word, and in the sense of civilizations, disintegrate, some earlier, some later; for some the process is slow, for others it is more accelerated; ultimately, however, this disintegration is irreversible.³⁰" (p. 23, a note omitted)
37. Shaner, David Edward, Nagatomo, Shigenori, and Yasuo, Yuasa. 1989. *Science and Comparative Philosophy: Introducing Yuasa Yasuo* . Leiden: Brill.
"This book was written with a diverse group of readers in mind. We intended to serve the interests of both philosophers and scientists by introducing a broad conceptual framework in which different research methods can be shown to be mutually beneficial. An implicit theme running through the text is our belief that even an elementary understanding of complex patterns of human cognition and behavior requires that scholars employ several research strategies. Both scientific and phenomenological methods are constrained by their use of precisely defined—and therefore restrictive—sets of models, theories, laws, and patterns of explanation. Although these models, etc., constitute the pulars upon which sound research strategies are based, their employment requires embracing a _ diversity of assumptions. While these methodological assumptions give direction to different research programs, the exclusive use of any single research strategy can systematically distort and oversimplify the complex subject matter of studies focusing upon 'human nature'." (Preface, p. XVII)
38. Shankman, Steven, and Durrant, Stephen W., eds. 2002. *Early China/Ancient Greece: Thinking through Comparisons* . Albany: State University of New York Press.
Contents: Steven Shankman and Stephen W. Durrant: Introduction 1; 1. David L. Hall: What Has Athens to Do with Alexandria? or Why Sinologists Can't Get Along with(out) Philosophers 15; 2. Haun Saussy: No Time Like the Present: The Category of Contemporaneity in Chinese Studies 35; 3. Michael Puett : Humans and Gods: The Theme of Self-Divinization in Early China and Early Greece 55; 4. Steven Shankman: "These Three Come Forth Together, But are Differently Named": Laozi, Zhuangzi, Plato 75; 5. Roger T. Ames: Thinking through Comparisons: Analytical and Narrative Methods for Cultural Understanding 93; 6. C. H. Wang: Alluding to the Text, or the Context 111; 7. David N. Keightley: Epistemology in Cultural Context: Disguise and Deception in Early China and Early Greece 119; 8. David Schaberg: The Logic of Signs in Early Chinese Rhetoric 155; 9. Andrew Plaks: Means and Means: A Comparative Reading of Aristotle's Ethics and the Zhongyong 187; 10. Lisa Raphals: Fatalism, Fate, and Stratagem in China and Greece 207; 11. Anthony C. Yu: Cratylus and Xunzi on Names 235; 12. Michael Nylan: Golden Spindles and Axes: Elite Women in the Archaemenid and Han Empires 251; 13. Stephen W. Durrant: Creating Tradition: Sima Qian Agonistes? 283; List of Contributors 299; Index 303-305.
39. Sheldon, Wilmon H. 1956. "What Can Western Philosophy Contribute to Eastern?" *Philosophy East and West* no. 5:291-304.
"Notice that we are here treating of philosophy as a distinct pursuit, not as a phase of cultural differences between East and West.
True, indeed, the culture of a region, nation, race and its philosophy are deeply interwoven. But we are asking only what the individual philosophers as independent truthseekers of the Western arena can offer to the individual truthseekers of the East, giving them, if possible, truths in addition to what they already have. And if in the following we seem to dwell overlong on the weaknesses of Western thought, remember the old counsel: Set your own house in order first, then go out to help your neighbors." (p. 291)
40. Shen, Vincent. 2003. "Some Thoughts on Intercultural Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 30:357-372.

"It is an undeniable fact that philosophy was, and still is, culturally bound. Western philosophy was very much related to the long cultural heritage from ancient Greece, through Rome, to Medieval and modern Europe. In other cultural traditions, for example, in China, we find other traditions of philosophy, such as Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. As Martin Heidegger has well pointed out, Western philosophy has developed from a decisive choice made by the Western culture in the time of Parmenides and Plato. Until now, many works in the history of Western philosophy are still unjustly entitled "The History of Philosophy," yet it is regrettable for us to say that this kind of exclusiveness and arrogance does set aside arbitrarily many other possibilities.

In this context, to study intercultural philosophy means not to enclose one's own vision of philosophy within the limit of one's tradition, especially that of Western philosophy. This is particularly necessary today when the type of rationality that has been given foundation by Western philosophy and that has been essential for the development of modern Western science and technology is now much challenged and even collapsing. Now the world is open to other types of rationality, or better say, to more comprehensive function of human reason." (p. 357)

41. ———. 2003. "Some Thoughts on Intercultural Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* no. 30:357-372.
 "But what is an intercultural philosophy? This should not be limited to only doing comparative philosophy, as is in the cases of comparative religion, comparative linguistics, etc., which are often limited to the studies of resemblance and difference between different religions or languages. Although doing comparative philosophy in this manner could lead to a kind of relativism in philosophy, it could not really help the self/mutual understanding and practice of philosophy itself. For me, the real target of doing intercultural philosophy is therefore to put into contrast between, rather than sheer comparison of, different philosophical traditions. I understand "contrast" as the rhythmic and dialectical interplay between difference and complementarity, continuity and discontinuity, which leads eventually to the real mutual enrichment of different traditions in philosophy.(3)" (p. 358)
 (3) I have worked out a philosophy of contrast in my works, especially in my *Essays in Contemporary Philosophy* , (Taipei: Li-ming Publishing Company, 1985) and *Contrast, Strangification and Dialogue* (Taipei:Wunan, 2002).
42. Shi'er, Ju. 2010. "The Cultural Relativity of Logic: From the Viewpoint of Ethnography and Historiography." *Social Sciences in China* no. 31:73-89.
 Abstract: "The concept of general argumentation has expanded the family of logic so that it incorporates the logic of other cultures besides modern culture. Based on reports of fieldwork among the Azande and the fruits of research on ancient Chinese logic and the logic of Buddhism, this paper attempts to provide a factual foundation for the proposition "the cultural relativity of logic" from a descriptive perspective. Adopting deductive argument as a meta-method, this paper argues for the existence of the cultural relativity of logic in modern culture and of the translated version of the logic of other cultures in modern culture. With the aid of ethnography and the historical research findings, we show that the logic of other cultures also has its own cultural relativity. We also seek to show through the concepts of language games and life forms that deductive argumentation as a meta-method likewise possesses cultural relativity."
43. Siderits, Mark. 2017. "Comparison or Confluence In Philosophy?" In *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy* , edited by Ganeri, Jonardon, 75-92. New York: Oxford University Press.
 "Later chapters in this volume will focus on particular figures or texts important to the history of Indian philosophy, and explore their approach to a given philosophical issue. They thus convey important information about the Indian philosophical tradition. The present essay concerns one of the uses to which that information might be put. The question to be addressed here might be put in the

following way. It is currently standard practice to include a component on the history of philosophy in the undergraduate philosophy curriculum. But what is included there is almost always exclusively Western. Suppose the history of the Indian philosophical tradition were studied at a degree of depth comparable to that given the Western tradition in the typical undergraduate curriculum. What would be the point? How might this be thought to contribute to the practice of philosophy? We think we know how to answer the comparable question when we are asked to defend the study of earlier periods of the Western tradition. The student working on the ontological status of abstract objects might, we think, benefit from knowing about the views of Plato, Aristotle, and Ockham on universals; work in meta-ethics would seem to require some knowledge of the varieties of ethical theories that have been proposed and worked out in the past; and so on. This explains why we are not shocked when Spinoza's name is casually dropped into a discussion of the grounding problem—a problem that only began to be discussed a few decades ago. When we see the practice of philosophy as chiefly concerned with trying to solve unresolved philosophical problems, we can see why it might prove useful to know the genealogy of the problem and how related issues were addressed in the past." (p. 75)

44. Silius, Vytis. 2020. "Diversifying Academic Philosophy: The Post-Comparative Turn and Transculturalism." *Asian Studies* no. 8:257-280.
Abstract: "The article asks why, in Western universities, the success of the academic field of comparative philosophy has so far failed to significantly diversify the curricula of academic philosophy. It suggests that comparative philosophy has mainly relied on the same approaches that have made academic philosophy Eurocentric, namely, on the history of philosophy as the main mode of teaching and researching philosophy. Further, post-comparative philosophy and transcultural studies are presented as providing tools to address the foundations of the institutional parochialism of academic philosophy, while preserving one of the most fundamental tenets of philosophy—the quest for universal knowledge that transcends cultural particularities."
45. Sjödin, Anna-Pya. 2011. "Conceptualizing Philosophical Tradition: A Reading of Wilhelm Halbfass, Daya Krishna, and Jitendranath Mohanty." *Philosophy East and West* no. 61:534-546.
Abstract: "This article takes as its point of departure the question of how Wilhelm Halbfass, Daya Krishna, and Jitendranath Mohanty have conceptualized tradition in relation to "Indian" philosophy. They have all reacted to, and criticized, homogeneous and static conceptions of Indian philosophies, and by articulating different ways of apprehending tradition they have tried to come to terms with such limiting images. My reading of their texts has been informed by a questioning of how they, in turn, conceptualize tradition. Most of all this is related to the tendency, on the one hand, to stress that tradition is open-ended and dynamic but at the same time to speak of tradition as one singular and universalizable phenomenon, sometimes even as a reified phenomenon ("it"). This discussion is connected to a concern of mine regarding how to conceptualize a plurality and heterogeneity while avoiding a reifying, generalizing language. Toward the end I present a reading of the *Nyayasutra* and how the concept of *siddhant* could be understood in the light of three of its commentaries. This reading is here framed as the practical and philosophical outcome of the reflections made in the analysis of Halbfass, Krishna, and Mohanty."
46. Skof, Lenart. 2008. "Thinking between Cultures. Pragmatism, Rorty and intercultural philosophy." *Ideas y Valores* no. 138:41-71.
Abstract: "The paper discusses Rorty's critique and special relation to intercultural thinking.
It looks into the history of both pragmatism and intercultural philosophy, discusses some of their possible points of convergence, and finally follows the implications of

- this encounter for our intercultural understanding of Rorty's version of pragmatism, especially in the context of a contemporary North-South intercultural dialogue."
47. Smart, Ninian. 2008. *World Philosophies*. New York: Routledge. Revised second edition edited by Oliver Leaman (First edition 1999).
48. Smid, Robert W. 2009. *Methodologies of Comparative Philosophy: the Pragmatist and Process Traditions*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
 "This text examines one small but important source of such contributions: namely, comparative philosophers. While cross-cultural influence is hardly unprecedented in the study of philosophy, twentieth-century philosophers experienced this influence on a scale far beyond that of any previous century: more cultures converged in a greater variety of venues and to a greater extent than had ever done so before. The rise of comparative philosophy in the twentieth century represents the attempt of many of these philosophers to understand these cross-cultural influences and consider their philosophical implications. Perhaps as a validation of their efforts, comparative philosophy has grown in both interest and influence and now represents a vibrant subfield in the discipline of philosophy." (p. 2)
49. ———. 2022. "On the Taming of Comparison: Methodological Myopathy, Plurality, and Creativity." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 181-202. New York: Bloomsbury.
 "My argument proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I offer a definition of comparison that underscores the role of difference in the comparative encounter and links the negotiation of that encounter with interest.
 (...)
 Yet both concepts have roots that go much deeper than that, reaching as far back as the initial encounter with difference, and the interests that inform that encounter can continue to affect the comparative process in often unacknowledged ways. In the second section, then, I identify two seams in the comparative process that provide an indication of some of these interests: namely, the question of what makes a comparison "interesting" and the close relation between philosophical commitments and comparative method.
 (...)
 In the third section, then, I offer three recommendations for becoming more critically aware of the interests driving method, each of which seeks to provide critical distance between comparativists and their methodological choices. The end result is an embrace of a provisional methodological pluralism, which represents not an underlying philosophical commitment but rather a methodological stance. Embracing methodological pluralism in this way, I argue, amounts to the reintroduction of invention at the level of methodology. In the conclusion, I offer some observations regarding the role of creativity in comparison and its relation to the methodological interests highlighted in this chapter." (pp. 183-184)
50. Smith, Huston. 1980. "Western and Comparative Perspectives on Truth." *Philosophy East and West* no. 30:425-437.
 Abstract: "My article consists of four parts. Beginning with the comparative side of our symposium theme, I divide this into a temporal, historical comparison (Part I) and a geographical, spatial comparison (Part II). In Part III, I turn expressly to our Western handling of the truth issue, reserving Part IV for pulling these various strands together."
51. Soldatenko, Gabriel. 2022. "Reflections for Comparative Method from a Latin American Philosophical Perspective." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 119-138. New York: Bloomsbury.
 "This brief introduction through Nietzsche gives us a general frame through which to take up and look more closely at the conceptual points where comparative and Latin American philosophy intersect; more specifically, through the concept of

- culture and crosscultural method; secondly, by way of the related and corollary goal of pushing back against Western philosophic universality and creating philosophy anew; and thirdly, through the metaphilosophical question of the overarching goal and purpose of philosophy. To that end, this chapter is divided into three sections: the first two offering close readings of essays that were foundational to Latin American philosophy and how they relate and contribute to thinking about comparative thought; and the third offering a brief review of useful signposts that Latin American philosophy offers for further reflection on comparative method." (p. 122)
52. Solomon, Robert C., and Higgins, Kathleen M., eds. 1995. *World Philosophy: A Text with Readings*. New York: McGraw Hill.
Contents in Brief: Timeline XV; Syllabus for a world civilization course XIX; Preface XXV; Introduction XXXI; 1. Graham Parkes: Japanese Philosophy 1; 2. Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall: Chinese Philosophy 30; 3. Steven H. Phillips: South Asian Philosophy 65; 4. Eric L. Ormsby: Arabic Philosophy 120; 5. Janet McCracken and Homayoon Sepasi-Tehrani: Persian Philosophy 145; 6. J. Baird Callicott and Thomas W. Overholt: American Indian Philosophy 188; 7. Jorge Valadez: Latin American Philosophy 219; 8. Jacqueline Trimier: African Philosophy 247; 9. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins: Western Philosophy 292; A Note on the Contributors 342; Index 344-350.
53. ———, eds. 2003. *From Africa to Zen: An Invitation to World Philosophy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Second expanded edition (First edition 1993).
Contents: Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins: Introduction; David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames: Understanding Order: The Chinese Perspective; 2 Graham Parkes: Ways of Japanese Thinking; 3 J. Baird Callicott and Thomas W. Overholt: Traditional American Indian Attitudes toward Nature; 4 Jorge Valadez: Pre-Columbian and Modern Philosophical Perspectives in Latin America; 5 Eric Ormsby: Arabic Philosophy; 6 Oliver N. Leaman: Jewish Philosophy; 7 Homayoon Sepasi and Janet McCracken: Persian Philosophy; 8 Jacqueline Trimier: The Myth of Authenticity: Personhood, Traditional Culture, and African Philosophy; 9 Stephen H. Phillips: Indian Philosophies; 10 Peter D. Hershock: Buddhist Philosophy as a Buddhist Practice; 11 Roy W Perrett: Ngā Whakaaro Māori: Māori Philosophy; 12 Robert A. McDermott: Esoteric Philosophy; About the Contributors.
54. Soni, Jayandra. 1998. "Intercultural Relevance of Some Moments in the History of Indian Philosophy." *Topoi* no. 17:49-55.
"The history of Indian philosophy since ancient times has been characterized by its dialogic attitude. Discussion and debate, whether they were in a written form or actually conducted in public, were the hallmarks of any school of thought, because other views were first taken into account before presenting its own so-called established position. The history of the emergence of each of the different schools was generally based on a fundamental work which set forth its basic categories. Most of these basic works were compiled in a very cryptic and curt style, sometime in the four hundred years just before and after our common era. Commentators elaborated the basic philosophy from within their own tradition in order to make the basic views understandable to the uninitiated, whilst at the same time defending the tradition against attacks from opponents. This paper attempts to recall certain moments in the early development of Indian philosophy which directly or indirectly reflect an attitude to philosophizing relevant in an intercultural context. Two such interrelated moments will be mentioned here: 1. the significance of debate and the emergence of rules of debate which ultimately led to a discussion of logical issues when discussing an argument; 2. the significance of epistemology for the view of the world, the objects to be known, and the subject who knows. By way of an introduction and orientation to some of the issues in Indian philosophy a few presuppositions will be considered in order to show that the differences among the

- various schools are more important than certain generalities which in some cases may be drawn." (p. 49)
55. Sprung, Mervyn, ed. 1978. *The Question of Being: East-West Perspectives*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Each chapter in this book (except the first) originated at a symposium arranged by the philosophy department of Brock University, St. Catherines, Ontario.
Contents: Mervyn Sprung: The Question of Being as comparative philosophy 1; Some Western Perspectives: Joseph Owens: Being in early Western tradition 17; Charles H. Kahn: Linguistic relativism and the Greek project of ontology 31; Hans Georg Gadamer: Plato and Heidegger 45; Zygmunt Adamczewski: Questions in Heidegger's thought about Being 55; Robert C. Schaff: Heidegger's path of thinking and the Way of Meditation in the early Upanisads 67; Some eastern perspectives: Wilhelm Halbfass: On Being and What There Is: Indian perspectives on the Question of Being 95; J. G. Arapura: Some special characteristics of *Sat* (Being) in Advaita Vedanta 111; Mervyn Sprung: Being and the Middle Way 127; Jindra Nath Mohanty: Some aspects of Indian thinking on Being 141; Index 159-161.
56. Steineck, Raji C., and Wber, Ralph, eds. 2018. *Concepts of Philosophy in Asia and the Islamic World: Vol. 1: China and Japan*. Leiden: Brill.
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 "Interculturally motivated thinking is increasingly becoming the crucial test of the general endeavours of thought and their being comprehended as categories. Amongst other aspects, this is revealed in the fact that almost all spectres of philosophy deal with the topic of interculturality."
 (...)
 "All these aspects contribute to a situation which is philosophically and politically precarious, yet also challenging and exciting.
 A possible attempt to, first of all, become conscious of this new overall situation, which I want to call “intercultural basic situation” (*interkulturelle Grundsituation*), could be to set the theme of world-concept (*Weltbegriff*) which has always appeared in philosophical tradition, but now, due to the intercultural discussion, moves towards the centre of attention in a different way. The basic concept of “world” is probably that with the largest dimension, i.e. it is able to embrace universal structures as well as regional or individual ones, even the microstructures of environmental and physiologica lorganical conditions. Of course I do not want to give a description of the history of the world-concept. Instead, the topic is to be examined in terms of its relevance for intercultural thinking. I want to present some thoughts about what is really meant by “world”, how we can meet a world, and especially how its notion is to be seen in very different ways and circumstances. It is undergoing a change and transformation so that we can not start form a world-*concept*, but rather have to talk about a “*World-lines* s” (*Welthaftigkeit*) or, even more accurate, a “*world-phenomenon*”. I want to suggest some steps, demonstrating the “structures of *world* -oriented encounter”. (pp. 37-38)
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 6. Indian tradition 107; 7. Chinese tradition 158; 8. Islamic tradition 233; Index 285; About the Author 293.
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 Abstract: "Philosophy is a radical inquiry whose task is to interrogate the fundamental assumptions of some given activity, discipline, or set of beliefs. In doing so, philosophical inquiry must attempt to delineate a problem and to develop a method for resolving that problem. However, to be true to its intention, philosophy must be able to examine not only the object of its inquiry but also its own method of interrogation. To accomplish this task, philosophical inquiry must be able to create a distance not only from the assumptions under investigation but also from its own assumptions, which is to say, that it must be able to raise questions about its own method. This self-reflexivity requires that any given philosophical investigation must be examined from an alternative vantage point.

Since the assumptions which inform the inquiry are deeply imbedded within a given culture, immanent critique is insufficient. The only way to step outside the boundaries of these cultural presuppositions is to reflect on the given problem from the vantage point of another culture's philosophical tradition. Thus, I argue that philosophical inquiry is unable to go beyond certain limits without being cross-cultural philosophy. I illustrate the way in which cross-cultural philosophy does this with respect to the problem of the self by placing the Western philosophical approach to this problem in dialogue with the Indian Hindu-Buddhist narrative."

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61. ———. 2014. "Introduction: The Project of Intercultural Philosophy." In *What is Intercultural Philosophy?*, edited by Sweet, William, 1-18. Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
 "One response to the contact of different cultures and traditions during the past century has been the proposal of a comparative or of an intercultural philosophy. Such a response is not without precedent; we see similar responses, for example, in literary, religious, and political studies. In intercultural philosophy, however, we find an attempt to have philosophers from different cultures or traditions actively engage one another – and to do so in a way that shows not only mutual respect, but also the recognition that one's own philosophical views are not complete, that there are other, legitimate philosophical views, and that one's own views may need a rearticulation or even revision." (p. 1)