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## Bibliography of Intercultural and Comparative Philosophy: Deu-K

### Contents

This part of the section [Intercultural and Comparative Philosophy](#) includes the following pages:

[Intercultural and Comparative Philosophy: An Overview](#)

### Selected bibliography on Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy:

[A-Den](#)

[Deu-K \(Current page\)](#)

[L-N](#)

[O-S](#)

[T-Z](#)

[African Philosophy](#)

[Selected bibliography on African Philosophy](#)



[Comparative philosophy. Bibliography of the studies in English: Complete PDF Version on the website Academia.edu](#)

### Bibliography

1. Deutsch, Eliot, ed. 1991. *Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophical Perspectives*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.  
Contents: Preface XI; Acknowledgments XVII;  
The Crisis of Modernity  
Richard Rorty: Philosophers, Novelists, and Intercultural Comparisons: Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens 3; Lucius Outlaw: Lifeworlds, Modernity, and Philosophical Praxis: Race, Ethnicity, and Critical Social Theory 21; David L. Hall: Modern China and the Postmodern West 50; Svetozar Stojanovic: From Marxism to Post-Marxism 71;  
Incommensurability

Richard J. Bernstein: Incommensurability and Otherness Revisited 85; Alasdair MacIntyre: Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation Between Confucians and Aristotelians about the Virtues 104; Karl H. Potter: The Commensurability of Indian Epistemological Theories 123;

Relativism

Bilal K. Matilal: Pluralism, Relativism, and Interaction between Cultures 141; Jiang Tianji: The Problem of Relativism 161; Ferenc Feher: Between Relativism and Fundamentalism: Hermeneutics as Europe's Mainstream Political and Moral Tradition 174;

Language and Non-Western Cultural Traditions

A. C. Graham: Conceptual Schemes and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese 193; Thomas P. Kasulis: The Origins of the Question: Four Traditional Japanese Philosophies of Language 213; Roger T. Ames: Meaning as Imaging: Prolegomena to a Confucian Epistemology 227; Li Zhilin: On the Dual Nature of Traditional Chinese Thought and Its Modernization 245;

Culture and the Ethical

Karl Otto Apel: A Planetary Macroethics for Humankind: The Need, the Apparent Difficulty, and the Eventual Possibility 261; Antono S. Cua: Reasonable Challenges and Preconditions of Adjudication 279; Hilary Putnam: The French Revolution and the Holocaust: Can Ethics Be Ahistorical? 299; Joel K. Kupperman: Tradition and Moral Progress 313;

Culture and ther Aesthetic

Arthur C. Danto: The Shape of Artistic Pasts, East and West 331; Megumi Sakabe: Surrealistic Distortion of Landscape and the Reason of the Milieu 343; Richard Wollheim: Why Art Changes 354;

Culture and the Religious

Frederick J. Streng: The Transcendental in a Comparative Context 367; Margaret Chatterjee: Reflections on Religious Pluralism in the Indian Context 385; Lenn E. Goodman: Three Enduring Achievements of Islamic Philosophy 401; G. C. Pande: Two Dimensions of Religion: Reflections Based on Indian Spiritual Experience and Philosophical Traditions 430;

Culture and the Political

Graham Parkes: Between Nationalism and Nomadism: Wondering about the Languages of Philosophy 455; Aziz Al-Azmeh: The Discourse of Cultural Authenticity: Islamist Revivalism and Enlightenment Universalism 468; Kwame Gyekye: Traditional Political Values and Ideas: An Examination of Their Revelance to Developments in Contemporary African Political Order 487;

Cultural Identity

Maria L. Herrera: On the Interpretation of Traditional Cultures 505; Roop Rkha Verma: The Concept of Progress and Cultural Identity 526; Agnes Heller: Moses, Hsüan-tsang, and History 535; Daya Krishna: Secularism: Sacred and Profane 548;

Scientif Progress

Larry Laudan: Scientific Progress and Content Loss 561; Marcello Pera: A Dialectical View of Scientific Rationality and Progress 570; Ilkka Niiniluoto: Scientific Progress Reconsidered 593; Lorenz Krüger: Does Progress in Science Lead to Truth? 615;

Contributors 629; Index 637-641.

"The essays in this volume from among many of the leading thinkers from numerous countries throughout the world were first presented at the Sixth East-West Philosophers' Conference, which was held in August 1989 in Honolulu, Hawaii, and which I had the honor to direct. While never forming a melody quite as lovely as any of Mozart's, the authors did address several common problems under the general theme "Culture and Modernity: The Authority of the Past" in a spirit which sought mutual cross-cultural understanding through careful interpretation and frank critical engagement. Many voices were heard and listened to artfully. Although there is always something of a tension among philosophers engaged in comparative work between those who are disposed to look for, find, and announce similarities and those who seek, discover, and celebrate differences in modes of

- thought, styles of argumentation, basic ideas, and presuppositions among diverse cultures and different individuals within those cultures, the conference on the whole was concerned more with the plurality issuing from differences than with the singularity following from sameness—while all the time its participants being very much aware of a common human/natural/spiritual world that has emerged so suddenly in world history and whose very fate rests so largely on the success of cooperative undertakings by those who represent very different worlds within that common matrix." (Preface, pp. X-XI, a note omitted)
2. ———. 1997. *Introduction to World Philosophies*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
"This text presents a collection of readings - from classical and modern Western and Asian philosophical traditions. Explores basic problems and enduring issues in philosophical anthropology, ethics and political philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion."
  3. ———. 2002. "Comparative Philosophy as Creative Philosophy." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:23-26.  
"Comparative philosophy — or what we might today better call “cross-cultural,” “trans-cultural,” or simply “global” philosophy — has throughout its history and development exhibited a rich diversity of aims, methods and styles. Let me briefly sum-up a few of the most enduring of these and then set forth some features of what I take to be its most vital intentionality, namely to contribute to creative philosophical thinking." (p. 23)
  4. Deutsch, Eliot, and Bontekoe, Ron, eds. 1997. *A Companion to World Philosophies*. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Contents: List of Contributors IX; Preface XII; Guide to Pronunciation XV;  
Part I: Historical Background  
1 Tu Weiming: Chinese Philosophy: A Synoptic View 3; 2 J. N. Mohanty: A History of Indian Philosophy 24; 3 John Charlot: Classical Polynesian Thinking 49; 4 D. A. Masolo: African Philosophy: A Historical Overview 63; 5 Ninian Smart: A Survey of Buddhist Thought 78; 6 Tamara Albertini: Islamic Philosophy: An Overview 99;  
Part II: Philosophical Topics  
The Chinese Tradition  
7 Shun Kwong-Loi: Ideas of the Good in Chinese Philosophy 139; 8 Roger T. Ames: The Chinese Conception of Selfhood 148; 9 P. J. Ivanhoe: Human Beings and Nature in Traditional Chinese Thought 155; 10 Carine Defoort: Causation in Chinese Philosophy 165; 11 Henry Rosemont, Jr: Chinese Socio-Political Ideals 174; 12 Chung-Ying Cheng: Reality and Divinity in Chinese Philosophy 185; 13 A. S. Cua: Reason and Principle in Chinese Philosophy: An Interpretation of *Li* 201; 14 David L. Hall: The Way and the Truth 214; 15 Stephen J. Goldberg: Chinese Aesthetics 225;  
The Indian Tradition  
16 Daya Krishna: Socio-Political Thought in Classical India 237; 17 Gerald James Larson: Indian Conceptions of Reality and Divinity 248; 18 Arindam Chakrabarti: Rationality in Indian Philosophy 259; 19 John M. Koller: Humankind and Nature in Indian Philosophy 279; 20 J. N. Mohanty: The Idea of the Good in Indian Thought 290; 21 Edwin Gerow: Indian Aesthetics: A Philosophical Survey 304; 22 Stephen H. Phillips: The Self and Person in Indian Philosophy 324; 23 Amita Chatterjee: Truth in Indian Philosophy 334;  
The Buddhist Tradition  
24 P. D. Premasiri: Ideas of the Good in Buddhist Philosophy 349; 25 John Ross Carter: Reflections on Social and Political Ideals in Buddhist Philosophy 360; 26 G. C. Pande: Causality in Buddhist Philosophy 370; 27 Knut A. Jacobsen: Humankind and Nature in Buddhism 381; 28 Kenneth K. Inada: Buddhist Reality and Divinity 392; 29 Thomas P. Kasulis: The Buddhist Concept of Self 400; 30 David Bastow: Rationality in Buddhist Thought 410; 31 Matthew Kapstein: Buddhist Perspectives on Ontological Truth 420;

## The Islamic Tradition

32 Andrey Smirnov: Truth and Islamic Thought 437; 33 Seyyed Hossein Nasr: Islamic Aesthetics 448; 34 Josep Puig Montada: Reality and Divinity in Islamic Philosophy 460; 35 John Walbridge: Selfhood/Personhood in Islamic Philosophy 472; 36 Mourad Wahba: The Concept of the Good in Islamic Philosophy 484; 37 Andrey Smirnov: Causality and Islamic Thought 493; 38 Majid Fakhry: Rationality in Islamic Philosophy 504;

## Part III: The Contemporary Situation

39 Roger T. Ames: Contemporary Chinese Philosophy 517; 40 Shigenori Nagatomo: Contemporary Japanese Philosophy 523; 41 Bina Gupta: The Contemporary Indian Situation 531; 42 John Charlot: Contemporary Polynesian Thinking 542; 43 Segun Gbadegesin: Current Trends and Perspectives in African Philosophy 548; 44 Michiko Yusa: Contemporary Buddhist Philosophy 564; 45 Marietta Stepaniants: Contemporary Islamic Thought 573; Index 581-587.

"The purpose of this work is to provide a sophisticated, one-volume companion to the study of select non-Western philosophical traditions. It has become increasingly evident to many teachers and students of philosophy as well as to general readers that philosophy is not the exclusive province of the West: that indeed other traditions have a depth and range comparable to Western thought and exhibit distinctive features, the knowledge of which can enrich philosophical understanding and creativity wherever it occurs. This volume will strive at once to introduce some of the finest thinking within and about non-Western traditions to teachers, students and general readers, and to offer interpretations and insights relevant to the work of other scholars in the field." (from the Introduction, p. XII)

5. Devaraja, N. K. 1967. "Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 17:51-59.

"The philosophical temper both in the East and in the West, being rooted in human nature, is more or less the same, the differences in the lines of development followed and results obtained being due largely to historical and cultural factors. In particular, I wish emphatically to deny the distinction that, as against the rational method employed by Western philosophers, Indian thinkers are inclined to use the method of intuition. Currency to such a view was given, during the latter half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, by some spokesmen of the Indian tradition who were unaccustomed to doing philosophy in a rigorous way, and had but passing acquaintance with the golden age of logico-epistemological development in Indian thought lying between the first and the tenth centuries A.D. I am more inclined to agree with the view of Dr. P. T. Raju that the Indian philosophical tradition is naturalistic and rationalistic." (pp. 58-59)

6. Dilworth, David A. 1989. *Philosophy in World Perspective: A Comparative Hermeneutic of the Major Theories*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

"In this work I will sketch the outline of the architecture of theories, East and West, by examining the implications of a series of comparative judgments. In essence, I will show that all the major theory-formations fall under four generic types, themselves systematically related—Sophistic, Democritean, Platonic, and Aristotelian. (This nomenclature refers to and is drawn from historical paradigms, for the principles of philosophy come to light in exemplary texts and can be known in their essential variety from no other source. But I will demonstrate that, while they are associated with classical Athenian philosophers, the four pure types transcend their historical models.)

All the other possible theory-formations are contractions of these four types. In a current economic idiom, the mixed types of philosophical texts are subsidiaries. While they seem to function independently, they still presuppose and ultimately rely on their parent companies. In this sense each of the four pure modalities of theory-formation has its own synoptic character." (p. 7)

7. Dorte, Kenneth. 2018. *Can Different Cultures Think the Same Thoughts? A Comparative Study in Metaphysics and Ethics*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.  
 "The project of this book has two aims. One is to explore issues in metaphysics and ethics, including the way metaphysics can be foundational for ethics. I approach these issues through the works of major thinkers in the three main philosophical traditions—India, China, and the West— comparing philosophers from two traditions in each chapter. An advantage of this approach is that examining a subject from different directions gives us different perspectives and allows us to see limitations and assumptions that may be inconspicuous otherwise. The comparison may also provide us with a perspective that is more than the sum of its parts. Each of the chapters addresses its theme through the work of a different pair or group of philosophers, while the Conclusion compensates for this diversity of voices with an overview of the book as a whole." (Preface, p. IX)
  
8. Du Oluwagbemi, Jacob. 2010. "Intercultural Philosophy, Africa's Predicament and Globalization: Finding the Missing Link." *Annals of Humanities and Development Studies* no. 1:301-312.  
 Abstract: "That the world has become a global community is no longer an issue. What has become an issue is the paradox in the midst of this globality. This paradox manifests in the clash between cultural identity and cultural diversity. Against the backdrop of particularism, as pursued by the vanguards of interculturality, I examine the essential ingredients of intercultural philosophy with a view to showing how this approach can be used by African philosophers to address the pressing issues of contemporary Africa. The thesis of this paper is: in light of the interdependence and intensification of inter-relations within the globe, no culture, African or non African can remain shut up in its cocoon or operate as a windowless monad because the globalizing dynamics call for mutual complementarity and enrichment. Within the universalizing phenomenon of globalization, Africa can find its missing link through interculturality. This will not only enable African philosophers to reflect and interpret other cultures but also appropriate what has enabled other cultures to excel in order to transform the African condition."
  
9. Dussel, Enrique. 2009. "A New Age in the History of Philosophy: The world dialogue between philosophical traditions." *Philosophy & Social Criticism* no. 35:499-516.  
 Abstract: "his article argues the following points. (1) It is necessary to affirm that all of humanity has always sought to address certain 'core universal problems' that are present in all cultures. (2) The rational responses to these 'core problems' first acquire the shape of mythical narratives. (3) The formulation of categorical philosophical discourses is a subsequent development in human rationality, which does not, however, negate all mythical narratives. These discourses arose in all the great urban neolithic cultures (even if only in initial form). (4) Modern European philosophy confused its economic, political and cultural domination, and the resulting crises in other philosophical traditions, with a Eurocentric universality claim, which must be questioned. (5) In any case there are formal universal aspects in which all regional philosophies can coincide, and which respond to the 'core problems' at an abstract level. (6) All of this impels entry into a new age of inter-philosophical dialogue, respectful of differences and open to learning from the useful discoveries of other traditions. (7) A new philosophical project must be developed that is capable of going beyond Eurocentric philosophical modernity, by shaping a global trans-modern pluriverse, drawing upon the 'discarded' (by modernity) own resources of peripheral, subaltern, postcolonial philosophies."
  
10. Fleming, Jesse. 2003. "Comparative Philosophy: Its Aims and Methods." *Journal of Chinese philosophy* no. 30:259-270.  
 "My first answer to all such objections to the enterprise of comparative philosophy is that it is almost inevitable that we understand, or interpret, the new and

unfamiliar by comparing it with that with which we are already familiar. According to this phenomenological or hermeneutic principle, someone first encountering the *I Ching*, for example (or any other alien philosophical system), will always think about ways in which this unfamiliar philosophy is similar to the philosophical terrain that is our conceptual “home turf” so to speak. After first identifying what we take to be similarities between the two philosophical theories (or systems, concepts, or traditions), we naturally move on to identifying significant differences: similarities and differences in regard to logic and method of proof, in regard to values, assumptions, and aims. It is by identifying both similarities and differences that we can better understand the two (or more) things (here, theories) better. There is a natural, if logically and epistemologically unjustifiable, tendency to see similarity of different philosophical theories as somehow confirming each of them (insofar as they are similar), just as in science a theory or experiment gains credence if repeated elsewhere under similar but different circumstances.

At the very least, such comparisons (of say, the “Tao” with “Nature”) help shed light on how one concept or theory in comparison with others could have been proven differently from the way it was, or what its practical consequences might be, contrary to what one has usually assumed them to be. In fact, it seems obvious to me that highlighting similarities (and differences) between two philosophical theories or traditions helps us to notice assumptions we make without being aware of it—assumptions regarding how a theory can be proven to be true (or false), and what the theoretical and practical implications of a philosophical position are." (p. 2670)

11. Frazier, Jessica. 2020. "'The View from Above': A Theory of Comparative Philosophy." *Religious Studies* no. 56:32-48.  
Abstract: "What if doing philosophy across cultures is always implicitly a matter of metaphilosophy – of articulating more clearly the nature of philosophy itself? What if it forces us to ‘stand back’ hermeneutically and map out a ‘view from above’ of the underlying fabric of ideas – in their constitutive concepts, their relations to other ways of thinking, and their potential to be configured in alternative fascinating and fruitful ways?  
This article incorporates existing approaches to comparative philosophy within a single scheme of complementary philosophical activities, and a single overarching metaphilosophical project. These approaches are (1) ‘archival’ (exploring parallel but separate philosophical traditions), (2) ‘equivalentist’ (comparing traditions in terms of analogies and contrasts), and (3) ‘problem-solving’ (using multiple traditions to provide philosophical solutions). I situate these within (4) the overarching hermeneutic project of ‘mapping’ concepts and their possibilities. This entails the theory that philosophies drawing on multiple perspectives are always implicitly engaged in mapping out the underlying eidetic structure upon which philosophy does its work, and charting the conceptual possibilities surrounding any idea."
12. Freschi, Elisa. 2022. "Thinking Along with Texts from Afar: Why One Doesn't Understand Texts without Philosophical Reflection and Can't Do Philosophy without Inspiration." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 97-117. New York: Bloomsbury.  
"In this chapter, I will argue in favor of doing intercultural philosophy confronting philosophers of the past. I will start by discussing whether at all one needs to engage with other philosophers while doing philosophy and claim that comparisons are just the normal way we think, and that in this sense the real choice is not between comparing and not comparing but between comparing explicitly or implicitly, that is, between comparing while being aware of what one is doing and comparing while being unaware of the way one is accessing a new idea through the lenses of a familiar one. Next, I will argue in favor of the engagement with philosophical texts that are remote in time, space, or other circumstances, in order to challenge our ideas and seeming intuitions. I will then move on to the

constructive part of this paper, in which I will promote engaging with great thinkers of the past, since this engagement will sharpen one's understanding of them as well as one's philosophical acumen. The greatness of an author depends on what one is looking for and, for instance, an epistemologist might not recognize the greatness of Martin Buber and viceversa.

(...)

Last, I will speak in favor of the very unfashionable topic of translations as a philosophical exercise.

(...)

How do the topic of engaging with philosophers of the past and that of translations hold together? Because the latter is an indicative test of the effectiveness of the former and because both require a close engagement. In both cases, one needs to step out of one's comfort zone and move toward a confrontation with the other thinker." (pp. 97-98, notes omitted)

13. Freschi, Elisa, and Keating, Malcolm. 2017. "How Do We Gather Knowledge Through Language?" *Journal of World Philosophies* no. 2:42-46.  
The present issue of *Journal of World Philosophies* will host a series of papers discussing the phenomenon of linguistic communication<sup>2</sup> from a philosophical point of view and from a cross-cultural perspective.  
The papers' authors discussed the topic together with some other scholars in a workshop in Athens, 2015.  
(...)  
The present series of contributions will deal with these topics from different points of view, elaborating on materials from the classical Indian, ancient Greek, and medieval Arabic traditions. We hope to contribute to a debate whose foundations have been set by works such as Matilal and Chakrabarti's *Knowing from Words*, (6) which focused on the topic of testimony from the perspective of Indian Philosophy (especially Nyāya) and of analytic philosophy.  
The contributions are organized around the following four issues:  
1. What do we know?  
2. How (through which instrument of knowledge) do we know it?  
3. What is the role of language as a medium?  
4. What is the role of the social context?" (p. 42, some notes omitted)  
(6) *Knowing From Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony* ed. Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti (Dordrecht, Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1989).

14. Frisina, Warren G. 2016. "Thinking Through Hall and Ames: On the Art of Comparative Philosophy." *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* no. 15:563-574.  
Abstract: "With the publication of their first collaborative book *Thinking Through Confucius*, David Hall and Roger Ames launched a comparative philosophical project juxtaposing American pragmatism and Chinese Confucianism (Hall and Ames 1987).  
This essay focuses on the role pragmatic assumptions play in Hall's and Ames's announced goal of opening a "new route" into Chinese intellectual history. Hall and Ames aim to teach scholars whose scholarly sensibilities have been formed in the West what they must acknowledge about their own traditions before they can engage Chinese thinkers constructively. After happily acknowledging my own debt to Hall and Ames and defending as hugely helpful the broad arc of their work, this essay raises questions about the way they deploy pragmatic assumptions as tools for "removing the useless lumber" that they claim "block" Western thinkers' access to Chinese intellectual history. Specifically it argues that the "useless lumber" metaphor is misplaced."

15. Ganeri, Jonardon. 2016. "Symposium: »Is Reason a Neutral Tool in Comparative Philosophy?«." *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies* no. 4:134-142.

149Abstract: "Is Reason a Neutral Tool in Comparative Philosophy? In his answer to the symposium's question, Jonardon Ganeri develops a »Manifesto for [a] Re:emergent Philosophy.« Tracking changes in the understanding of ›comparative philosophy,‹ he sketches how today's world of academic philosophy seems to be set to enter an »age of re:emergence« in which world philosophies will (and can) be studied through modes of global participation. In their responses, the symposium's discussants tease out implications of this Manifesto for different issues: While Mustafa Abu Sway suggests that comparative philosophy be understood as an intra-philosophical dialogue, whose aim depends on its participants, Paul Boghossian questions whether there can be conflicting, yet equally valid, ways of arriving at justified beliefs about the world. For her part, Georgina Stewart draws out the similarities between Ganeri's understanding of comparative philosophy and the ethical stance involved in studying Maori science. In his Reply, Ganeri fleshes out his understanding of a pluralistic realism. Only an epistemic culture, which is open to a plurality of epistemic stances, he contends, can propel polycentric modes of knowledge production."

Contents: Jonardon Ganeri: A Manifesto for Re:emergent Philosophy, 134; Responses: Mustafa Abu Sway: On the Possibility of Rational Neutrality in Comparative Philosophy: A Response to Jonardon Ganeri 144; Paul Boghossian: Is Comparative Philosophy Based Upon a Mistake? A Reply to Ganeri's ›Re:emergent Philosophy‹ 149; Georgina Stewart: What's In a Name? In Support of *A Manifesto for Re:emergent Philosophy* 154; Reply; Jonardon Ganeri: Reflections on Re:emergent Philosophy 164; References 183-186.

16. ———. 2022. "Why Philosophy Needs Sanskrit, Now More than Ever." In *Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities*, edited by Burik, Steven, Smid, Robert W. and Weber, Ralph, 139-158. New York: Bloomsbury.
- "Let me begin by trying to identify the sources of the doctrine that European philosophical tradition, its classics and its canon, occupies a privileged position in the global intellectual history of humanity. I'll then review a different, Sanskritic, conception of classicity, and go on to describe the critique of European exceptionalism by anticolonial thinkers from the first half of the twentieth century. That part of the chapter will be diagnostic, but I also want to say something constructive, and I'll move in the final third of the chapter to sketch an alternative model for philosophical practice to that which currently prevails, one grounded in a defense of pluralism, a pluralism about ways of interrogating the single reality we share, and a model itself retrieved from Sanskrit thinkers." (p. 139)
17. Gangadean, Ashok K. 1976. "Formal Ontology and Movement between Worlds." *Philosophy East and West* no. 26:167-188.
- "In this article I shall focus on one aspect of a general problem of movement between worlds. The concept of a world is an ontological one. Different worlds involve different ontologies. A world, an ontology, is reflected in a language. Thus, from an ontological point of view, different languages are worlds apart. When I speak of different languages in this article I do not mean different in terms of linguistic criteria but different from an ontological point of view. This means that movement between worlds involves movement between different languages.(1)"
- (1) When I speak of different languages here I mean different in terms of ontological criteria.
- Thus, although English and French are from a linguistic point of view different languages, from an ontological point of view they may well be the same language. Alternatively, although English may, from a linguistic point of view, be considered one language, it is possible that from an ontological point of view it involves more than one language. Criteria determining what is to count as one language is discussed in part II.
18. ———. 1980. "Comparative Ontology: Relative and Absolute Truth." *Philosophy East and West* no. 30:465-480.



"Perhaps the most important challenge for comparative thought is whether there can be univocal truth between different worlds. For if there is not an *interworld* concept of truth, a concept of truth which is prior to and independent of any particular world, an ontologically neutral truth which is common to all possible worlds, in short, an *absolute* truth, then the possibility of rational discourse between worlds is questionable. The urgency of this concern is seen when the radical difference between worlds is appreciated. A world, in the classical ontological sense, is a particular categorial structure which materially defines what is possible and intelligible for experience and human understanding as a whole. What makes sense in one world may fail to make sense in another. What is possible in one world may not be a possibility in another. This means that worlds differ in the most radical way-propositional content and ontological possibilities being radically incommensurable between different worlds. And since meaning and truth are relative to a given particular ontology (for an ontology or worldview defines the very possibility of meaning and truth for the world in question) this seems to preclude the possibility of an absolute truth which is univocal, ontologically neutral, and common to all worlds." (p. 465. a note omitted)

19. Garfield, Jay L., and Edelglass, William, eds. 2011. *The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 Contents: Jay L. Garfield and William Edelglass: Introduction 3;  
 PART I CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, EDITED BY CHENYANG LI  
 Chenyang Li: Chinese Philosophy, 9  
 1. Chung-Ying Cheng: The Yijing: The Creative Origin of Chinese Philosophy, 13;  
 2. Peimin Ni: Classical Confucianism I: Confucius, 26; 3. Manyul Im: Classical Confucianism II: Mencius and Zunzi, 37; 4. Liu Xiaogan: Daoism: Laozi and Zhuangzi, 47; 5. Chris Fraser: Major Rival Schools: Mohism and Legalism, 58; 6. Brook Ziporyn: Chinese Buddhist Philosophy, 68; 7. John Berthrong: Neo-Confucianism, 82; 8. Shu-hsien Liu: Contemporary Confucianism, 95;  
 PART II NON-BUDDHIST INDIAN PHILOSOPHY, EDITED BY NALINI BHUSHAN  
 Nalini Bhushan: Non-Buddhist Indian Philosophy, 109;  
 9. Arnita Chatterjee: Nyaya-Vaishika Philosophy, 112; 10. T. S. Rukmani: Samkhya-Yoga, 127; 11. Dan Arnold: Mimamsa, 138; 12. John Taber: Vedanta, 147; 13. Jeffery D. Long: Jain Philosophy, 159; 14. Nalini Bhushan: Anglophone Philosophy in Colonial India, 170;  
 PART III INDO-TIBETAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY, EDITED BY WILLIAM EDELGLASS AND JAY L. GARFIELD  
 William Edelglass and Jay L. Garfield: Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy, 187  
 15. Jan Westerhoff: Abhidharma Philosophy, 193; 16. John Dunne: Madhyamaka in India and Tibet, 205; 17. John Powers: Yogacara, 222; 18. Tom J. F. Tillemans: Buddhist Epistemology (*pramāṇavāda*), 233; 19. Matthew T. Kapstein: Buddhist Thought in Tibet: An Historical Introduction, 245; 20. Anne Carolyn Klein: Dzogchen, 265; 21. Barbra R. Clayton: Buddhist Ethics, 279;  
 PART IV JAPANESE AND KOREAN PHILOSOPHY, EDITED BY KOJI TANAKA  
 Koji Tanaka: Japanese and Korean Philosophy, 297  
 22. Robert E. Carter: Japanese Ethics, 302; 23. Mara Miller: Japanese Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art, 317; 24. Bret W. Davis: Natural Freedom: Human/Nature Nondualism in Japanese Thought, 334; 25. Bret W. Davis: The Philosophy of Zen Master Dogen: Egoless Perspectivism, 348; 26. John C. Maraldo: Nishida Kitaro: Self, World, and the Nothingness Underlying Distinctions, 361; 27. Jin Y. Park: Korean Buddhist Philosophy, 373;  
 PART V ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY, EDITED BY TAMARA ALBERTINI  
 Tamara Albertini: Reintroducing Islamic Philosophy: The Persisting Problem of "Smaller Orientalisms", 389;  
 28. Andrey Smirnov: The Hellenizing Philosophers, 397; 29. Hossein Ziai: Philosophy of Illumination, 410; 30. Erik S. Ohlander: Sufism, 419; 31. Eric

- Ormsby: Islamic Theology, 432; 32. Robert Gleave: Muslim Jurisprudence, 447; PART VI PHILOSOPHY IN AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN DIASPORA, EDITED BY ALBERT MOSLEY AND STEPHEN C. FERGUSON II  
 Stephen C. Ferguson II: Philosophy in Africa and the African Diaspora, 461; 33. Tsenay Serequeberhan: Africana Philosophy: Prospects and Possibilities, 467; 34. Barry Hallen: African Philosophy, 478; 35. Clevis Headley: Afro-Caribbean Philosophy, 489; 36. John H. McClendon III and Stephen C. Ferguson II: African American Philosophy: A General Outline, 509; 37. Albert Mosley: Race in Contemporary Philosophy, 524; 38. Rodney C. Roberts: Affirmative Action, 533; PART VII RECENT TRENDS IN GLOBAL PHILOSOPHY, EDITED BY CYNTHIA TOWNLEY  
 Cynthia Townley: Recent Trends in Global Philosophy, 545  
 39. Christine M. Koggel: Global Feminism, 549; 40. Adam Arola: Native American Philosophy, 562; 41. Workineh Kelbessa: Indigenous Environmental Philosophy, 574; 42. Gillian Brock: Cosmopolitanism 582; 43. J. Angelo Corlett: Reparations, 596;  
 Index 611-633.
20. Gorong, Yang. 2008. "Being and Value: From the Perspective of Chinese-Western Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 58:267-282.  
 "When a human being begins to examine a thing, the following questions will always be asked: "What is it?" "What does it mean?" "What should it be?" The first question mainly concerns the inherent specifications or simply the features of the thing; the second, its meaning to the human being; and the third, the necessity and way of realizing such a meaning.<sup>1</sup> Both of the last two questions relate particularly to the issue of value. The inherent connection of the three questions is rooted in the close relationship between being and value and consequently the very concreteness of being." (p. 267)
21. Graham, Angus Charles. 1989. "Conceptual Schemes and Linguistic Relativism in Relation to Chinese." *Synthesis Philosophica* no. 4:713-732.  
 Reprinted in in A. C. Graham, *Unreason within Reason: Essays of the Outskirts of Rationality*, La Salle, IL: Open Court 1992, pp. 59-83 and in Bo Mou (ed.), *Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement*, Leiden: Brill 2018, pp. 247-268.  
 "Philosophers discussing conceptual schemes seem generally to treat them as assumptions in propositional form behind the thought of different cultures, cosmologies, or phases in the history of science. On the one hand, conceptual schemes appear as conflicting systems of assumed truths which are only imperfectly testable by observation, and bring us uncomfortably near to epistemological chaos; on the other, suspicion arises that the notion of a conceptual scheme may not be coherent at all: As Donald Davidson argues in his paper, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", we seem to end up with nothing definite but "the simple thought that something is an acceptable conceptual scheme or theory if it is true."<sup>(1)</sup> For inquirers into the thought and language of other cultures, the issue is inescapable. That very idea is one of their indispensable tools, to which Davidson's objections do not directly apply, since their own tendency is to think of it in terms, not of propositions,<sup>(2)</sup> but of classification by naming, and perhaps of syntactic structures. I wish to argue that examination of their usage can open up a different perspective on the philosophical problems.  
 At the roots of the systems of propositions called 'conceptual schemes' by philosophers there are patterns of naming pre-logical in the same sense as patterns of perception are pre-logical, and I shall myself use the term exclusively of these." (p. 713)  
 (1) Davidson in *Post-Analytic Philosophy*, ed. John Rajchman and Cornel West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 139.  
 (2) For practical reasons I shall speak of 'propositions' where Davidson and others say 'sentences', reserving the latter for sentences in natural languages, English,

- Chinese.
22. Hackett, Stuart Cornelius. 1979. *Oriental Philosophy: A Westerner's Guide to Eastern Thought*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.  
 "This book will attempt to explain, in language intelligible to the Western reader and with as few technical complications as possible, the main philosophical positions associated with the religious traditions of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism.  
 It is a real introduction to oriental thought directed to the level of the upperclass college student and therefore explicitly intended as a basic text for courses in this area. It is, however, not an exhaustive treatment of the subject, and its ideal function would be to provide an expository and critical framework to be supplemented both by class lectures and by supplementary readings in primary source materials, such as those listed in the bibliography.  
 As it stands, the book has numerous qualities that contribute to its usefulness: it contains not only expositions of the perspectives discussed, but also evaluative critical sections which attempt to assess these views along lines carefully explained in the introduction. A further distinctive feature is the marginal outline, which provides a basis both for understanding the text and for developing organized insight into the views discussed. There is also a glossary which briefly and clearly defines the principal special terms that are used, as well as a general bibliography which will guide the reader into accessible literature on the subject in the English language. A final unusual quality of the book is that each section ends wit" (Preface, p. VII)
23. Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1985. "India and the Comparative Method." *Philosophy East and West* no. 35:3-15.  
 Reprinted in W. Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988, pp. 419-433.  
 "The expression "comparative philosophy" itself is ambiguous. It does not make it clear whether philosophy is the subject or the object of comparing.  
 Do we philosophize while we are comparing, i.e. in and through comparison, or do we just deal with philosophy or philosophies as objects of comparative historical or anthropological research? If "comparative philosophy" is supposed to be *philosophy*, it cannot just be the comparison of *philosophies*. It cannot be the objectifying, juxtaposing, synoptic, comparative investigation of historical, anthropological or doxographic data.  
 Comparative philosophy is philosophy insofar as it aims at self-understanding. It has to be ready to bring its own standpoint, and the conditions and the horizon of comparison itself, into the process of comparison which thus assumes the reflexive, self-referring dimension which constitutes philosophy. And, of course, in applying the term and concept of philosophy cross-culturally and beyond the sphere in which it was created and originally used, we cannot be sure whether we are indeed comparing philosophies, or whether we are comparing the Western tradition of philosophy with other traditions which, in spite of all analogies, are ultimately not philosophical traditions. But this might be a deeper challenge to self-understanding than merely dealing with what is explicitly referred to as philosophy, i.e. with the history of philosophy under the secure and thoughtless guidance of the word "philosophy." (p. 433)
24. Hall, David L. 2001. "Just How Provincial *Is* Western Philosophy? 'Truth' in Comparative Context." *Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge* no. 25:285-297.  
 "I shall claim that the putative absence of speculations concerning 'truth' in the Chinese tradition is a direct consequence of quite different approaches the Chinese have taken to the three Western suppositions cited above—namely, the necessity to distinguish things as they appear from the way they really are; the belief that the cosmos or world is a one rather than a many, and the preference for substantive over processive understandings of the way of things. I would argue that these are

necessary cultural requisites for the development of truth theories as we have come to think of them in the West.

In the following section I will provide some evidence that the cultural requisites for the development of Western-style truth theories were not effective in shaping the development of classical Chinese cultural sensibilities." (p. 288)

(...)

"In the West, truth is a knowledge of what is real and what represents that reality. For the Chinese, knowledge is not abstract, but concrete and specific. Truth is not representational, but performative and participatory. It is a kind of know-how, a practical understanding of how to follow the proper path.

Truth-seekers begin with—a wide-eyed wonder at the natural world around them—and proceed to the development of theories of the way things are, and finally become well-nigh obsessed with discovering if their theories are *true*. This leads to a concern for propositional and doctrinal consensus, *orthodoxy*.

Way-seekers search out those forms of action that promote harmonious social existence. Theirs is a concern for orthopraxy. For the way-seekers, truth is a quality of persons, not of propositions. Truth as 'way' refers to the genuineness and integrity of a fully functioning person.

25. Hamminga, Bert, ed. 2005. *Knowledge Cultures: Comparative Western and African Epistemology*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.  
 Contents: Bert Hamminga: Introduction 7; Yoweri Kaguta Museveni: The Power of Knowledge 11; Kwame Anthony Appiah: African Studies and the Concept of Knowledge 23; Bert Hamminga: Epistemology from the African Point of View 57; Bert Hamminga: Language, Reality and Truth: The African Point of View 85; Leszek Nowak: On the Collective Subjects in Epistemology: The Marxist Case and a Problem for the African Viewpoint 117; Bert Hamminga: The Poznan View: How To Mean What You Say 129; Contributors 141; Index and Glossary 143-147.
26. Hengelbrock, Jürgen. 1996. "Some reflections on Aristotle's notion of time in an intercultural perspective." In *Time and Temporality in Intercultural Perspective*, edited by Tiemersma, D. and Oosterling, H.A.F., 43-52. Amsterdam: Rodopi.  
 "It may be surprising to look back at Aristotle's way of thinking from an intercultural point of view. Aristotle is reputed as the thinker of the universals suppressing the differences, as the theorist of abstraction, neglecting particularities - natural particularities as well as those which are constitutive elements of culture. Indeed Aristotelian philosophy aims at transgressing what we name cultural phenomena. It tries to constitute a universal science of being, beings and essences, valid for all people at all times.  
 On the other hand Aristotle's thought seems to have derived from the Greek language. The structure of Greek syntax: had it not been the model of his doctrine of categories? In his well-known book on the Hopi language (1956) B. J. Whorf even suggests that Aristotle was duped by his Greek mother tongue. From this point of view, the Aristotelian ontological substance is the equivalent to the subject of the Greek sentence, and the grammatical complement in the sentence is transformed into the ontological accident. Aristotle's ontology, in this context, is just the grammar of Greek language. From this point of view the Aristotelian assumption that there is a universal science appears as a grand illusion. Today someone might even consider this assumption as grand arrogance: by his pretention he imposes the Greek model of understanding on mankind as the only valid one." (p. 43)  
 References  
 Carroll John (ed.), *Language, Thought and Reality. Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*, Cambridge, MA, The M.I.T. Press 1956.
27. Hershock, Peter D., and Ames, Roger T., eds. 2019. *Philosophies of Place: An Intercultural Conversation*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press and East-West Philosophers' Conference.  
 Contents: Peter D. Hershock and Roger T. Ames: Introduction 1;  
 Part I Conversations of Place in Intercultural Philosophy

- 1 David B. Wong and Marion Hourdequin: Hiding the World in the World: A Case for Cosmopolitanism Based in the Zhuangzi 15; 2 Steven Burik: Between Local and Global: The Place of Comparative Philosophy through Heidegger and Daoism 34; 3 Britta Saal: About the Taking Place of Intercultural Philosophy as Polylogue 51; 4 John W. M. Krummel: Place and Horizon 65; 5 James Buchanan: The Proximate and the Distant: Place and Response-Ability 88;
- Part II The Critical Interplay of Place and Personal Identity
- 6 Joshua Stoll: Where Is My Mind? On the Emplacement of Self by Others 107; 7 Meera Baindur: Accommodation, Location, and Context: Conceptualization of Place in Indian Traditions of Thought 127;
- Part III Personhood and Environmental Emplacement
- 8 Michael Hemmingsen: Public Reason and Ecological Truth 147; 9 Justas Kučinskis and Naglis Kardelis: The Wisdom of Place: Lithuanian Philosophical Philology of Arvydas Šliogeris and Its Relevance to Global Environmental Challenges 159; 10 Rein Raud: Landscape as Scripture: Dōgen's Concept of Meaningful Nature 177;
- Part IV Shared Places of Politics and Religion
- 11 Albert Welter: Public Places and Privileged Spaces: Perspectives on the Public Sphere and the Sphere of Privilege in China and the West 195; 12 Takahiro Nakajima: Seeking a Place for Earthly Universality in Modern Japan: Suzuki Daisetz, Chikazumi Jōkan, and Miyazawa Kenji 216; 13 Bindu Puri: Transforming Sacred Space into Shared Place: Reinterpreting Gandhi on Temple Entry 228; 14 Michael Warren Myers: Israel and Palestine: A Two-Place, One-Space Solution 251;
- Part V The Emotionally Emplaced Body
- 15 Ilana Maymind: Exile as "Place" for Empathy 271; 16 Carl Helsing: Sprouts, Mountains, and Fields: Symbol and Sustainability in Mengzi's Moral Psychology 288; 17 Lara M. Mitia: The Place of the Body in the Phenomenology of Place: Edward Casey and Nishida Kitarō 302; 18 Kathleen Higgins: Putting the Dead in Their Place 318;
- Contributors 329; Index 339-344.
28. Hofmeyr, Murray. 2004. "The Promise and Problems of Intercultural Philosophy." *Phronimon* no. 5:51-76.  
Abstract: "In this paper I sketch the main elements of Heinz Kimmerle's conceptualisation of intercultural philosophy: a new concept of difference that makes possible a new take on "different and equal" which is the foundation for real dialogue. I interrogate the concept of culture in intercultural philosophy, and argue that for the South African context sufficient emphasis must be placed on power relations as they impact on cultures and the legacy of a history of cultural domination. I try to show that Kimmerle's notion of the equality of cultures implies that a particular context is taken seriously as a valid instance of the human condition, and in that sense it is of equal status with all other situations. All 'localities' are linked in some way or another. It thus belongs to adequately conceptualising the thoughts and feelings of a specific locality that the need for dialogue should be reflected. A philosophy that negates these shifts would be disqualified as inadequate. The fact that it seeks dialogue is indicative of the experience of an aporia.  
It is lack, incompleteness, which is universal!. I also tentatively propose "contextual philosophy" as a more appropriate name for intercultural philosophy in South Africa."
29. Hongladarom, Soraj. 2019. "How to Understand the Identity of an Object of Study in Comparative Philosophy." *Comparative Philosophy* no. 10:119-126.  
"Bo Mou has presented a list of methodological principles concerning how to maintain adequate methodological guiding principle in doing philosophy comparatively. Its main idea is that these principles should maintain rationality and objectivity of comparative philosophy. Perhaps the most important principle in his list is the first one: in Mou's words, "A methodological guiding principle is considered adequate (in this connection) if, given an object of study, it enables the

agent to recognize that there is a way that the object objectively is such that it is not the case that “anything goes,” and we can all talk about that same object even though we may say different things (concerning distinct aspects of the object) about it.” (Mou 2018,1-2 [Mou 2016, 269-70]). In other words, an adequacy condition for a fruitful undertaking of comparative philosophy is that both sides recognize that there exists at least an object in common.

(...)

In this paper I would like to take up this argument and show that in some cases comparative philosophy and constructive dialogs between different philosophical traditions could indeed take place successfully even without sharing an objective individual thing that Mou argues for. This, however, does not imply that “anything goes” because both the traditions can engage in a common enterprise even though they don’t share any individual object in common. My example will come from comparing Buddhist philosophy with Aristotle’s philosophy on individuals. The Buddhist and the Aristotelian can, as I shall argue, engage in a very constructive dialogue with each other even though they don’t share anything in common in their respective ontologies. Not sharing anything does not entail that anything goes because the Buddhist and the Aristotelian still can debate and understand each other’s point through translations of their respective vocabularies.” (pp. 119-120)

References

Mou, Bo (2018), “On Adequacy Conditions for How to Adequately Maintain Methodological Guiding Principles to Look at Distinct Approaches”, presented at the 24th World Congress of Philosophy, 15th August 2018, Beijing, China.

[Editorial note: the partial contents of this unpublished paper under the engaging discussion in this “Constructive-Engagement Dialogue” section previously appear in Bo Mou (2016), “How Constructive Engagement in Doing Philosophy Comparative is Possible”, *Synthesis Philosophica* 62.2: 265-277; the interested reader can see them in this published article.]

30. Hoogland, Jan. 1996. "The necessity of intercultural philosophy." In *Time and Temporality in Intercultural Perspective*, edited by Tiemersma, D. and Oosterling, H.A.F., 25-41. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- "In some of his writings Heinz Kimmerle states that there is a 'philosophical-historical necessity' (*philosophiegeschichtliche Notwendigkeit*) for an intercultural dialogue within philosophy (eg. Kimmerle 1994, 131f.). I think he is right. At the same time I have some critical questions about the meaning of this concept of necessity. In this essay I will make clear that a truly open dialogue between philosophers from different cultures can be hindered by a certain kind of dogmatism, which is characteristic for Western thinking. I will show this on the basis of the work of Herman Dooyeweerd. This does not mean that I will undermine the thesis that this dialogue is necessary as such. On the contrary, it is once again Dooyeweerd's philosophy which can illustrate how necessary such a dialogue is, because of the prejudices in his judgements about 'primitive' cultures. In another essay I already investigated the meaning of the concept of 'necessity' in Kimmerle's argument.(1) In this essay I will consider the subject from a different perspective. In his *Die Dimension des Interkulturellen* Kimmerle illustrates his thesis by means of the problem of time in Western thought (Kimmerle 1994). Starting from the critique of Derrida on the Western way of thinking about time, he pleads for an intercultural exchange of ideas about this subject to overcome the aporias within the Western concept of time." (p. 25)
- (1) J. Hoogland 'Die Ansprüche einer interkulturellen Philosophie' (The claims of an intercultural philosophy); not yet published. [Heinz Kimmerle (ed.), *Das Multiversum der Kulturen: Beiträge zu einer Vorlesung im Fach 'Interkulturelle Philosophie' an der Erasmus Universität Rotterdam*, Leiden: Brill 1996, pp. 57-75]
31. Izutsu, Toshihiko. 1983. *Sufism and Taoism: A Comparative Study of Key Philosophical Concepts*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Abstract: "In this deeply learned work, Toshihiko Izutsu compares the metaphysical and mystical thought-systems of Sufism and Taoism and discovers that, although

historically unrelated, the two share features and patterns which prove fruitful for a transhistorical dialogue.

His original and suggestive approach opens new doors in the study of comparative philosophy and mysticism.

Izutsu begins with Ibn 'Arabi, analyzing and isolating the major ontological concepts of this most challenging of Islamic thinkers. Then, in the second part of the book, Izutsu turns his attention to an analysis of parallel concepts of two great Taoist thinkers, Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzi. Only after laying bare the fundamental structure of each world view does Izutsu embark, in the final section of the book, upon a comparative analysis. Only thus, he argues, can he be sure to avoid easy and superficial comparisons. Izutsu maintains that both the Sufi and Taoist world views are based on two pivots—the Absolute Man and the Perfect Man—with a whole system of ontological thought being developed between these two pivots. Izutsu discusses similarities in these ontological systems and advances the hypothesis that certain patterns of mystical and metaphysical thought may be shared even by systems with no apparent historical connection."

32. Jenco, Leigh Kathryn. 2007. "'What Does Heaven Ever Say?' A Methods-centered Approach to Cross-cultural Engagement." *American Political Science Review* no. 101:741-755.

Abstracty: "How can we conduct cross-cultural inquiry without reproducing the ethnocentric categories that prompt critique in the first place? Postcolonial and comparative political theorists have called into question the "universal" applicability of Western liberal political norms, but their critiques are drawn most often from competing Western discourses (e.g., poststructuralism) rather than from the culturally diverse traditions of scholarship whose ideas they examine. In contrast, I suggest attending to these culturally situated traditions of scholarship, especially their methods of inquiry, in addition to their substantive ideas. This method-centered approach reinterprets cross-cultural engagement, not as a tool for modifying existing parochial debates on the basis of "non-Western" cases, but as an opportunity to ask new questions through alternative frames of reference. Examining the interpretive methodologies of two Chinese classicists, I show how their methods offer not only new ideas but also new methods for the practice of political and cross-cultural theory."

33. ———. 2012. "How meaning moves: Tan Sitong on borrowing across cultures." *Philosophy East and West* no. 62:92-113.

"This essay offers an attempt at a cross-cultural inquiry into cross-cultural inquiry by examining how one influential Chinese reformer, Tan Sitong (1865–1898), thought creatively about the possibilities of learning from differently situated societies." (p. 92)

(...)

"I center my discussion on a theory about the relationship between dao and qi that the radical reformer Tan Sitong formulated around 1895, in support of "total Westernization" (quanpan Xihua). Following but ultimately contesting the dominant ti/yong paradigm of the more conservative Foreign Affairs School, Tan parses the problem out in this way: how, if at all, are the particular concrete manifestations of the Western world that seem so brilliantly useful — steam engines, guns, tall buildings — related to the values or principles that Western people seem to uphold? How can they come not only to be imitated by Chinese but also to have meaning for them? Tan recognized that these meanings were related but irreducible to the ideas individuals held separately in their minds, or the values enforced by state institutions. In response, he produces an original and unusually metaphysical account of how values and meaning are produced and consumed across society, as well as how they work to support more observable external phenomena such as parliamentary government, technological development, and social practices of equality." (p.93)

34. Jiménez Estrada, Vivian M. 2005. "The Tree of Life as a Research Methodology." *Australian Journal of Indigenous Education* no. 34:44-52.  
Abstract: "This paper is grounded on the premise that research, as a colonising practice, needs constant reconceptualisation and rethinking. I propose a methodology based on some of the values, visions and stories from my own Maya Indigenous culture and knowledge in addition to other Indigenous cultures across the world. I argue that researchers need to constantly acknowledge and change the negative impacts of ignoring multiple ways of knowing by engaging in respectful methods of knowledge collection and production. This paper contributes to the work Indigenous scholars have done in the area of research methodologies and knowledge production. First, a general overview of the values and concepts embedded in the Ceiba or the "Tree of Life" is presented; then, a discussion of what respectful research practices entail follows; finally, it concludes with a reflection on how the Ceiba is a small example of how researchers can adapt their research methodology to the local context."
35. Jung, Hwa Yol. 2011. *Transversal Rationality and Intercultural Texts: Essays in Phenomenology and Comparative Philosophy*. Athens: Ohio University Press.  
"This book of thirteen selected essays spans almost half a century from 1965 (chapter 3) to 2009 (chapters 9 and 13). Many, if not all, of them are experimental and exploratory in nature." (Introduction, p. X)  
(...)  
"Chapter 2 advances the concept of transversality, which is central to the main themes of this book. It begins with a critique of the notion of universality in modern Western philosophy. It targets Hegel—the modernist incarnate—in particular, who had a dark view of the non-Western world, particularly China and India. His overarching Eurocentric universality is founded on the fallacious assumption that what is particular in the West is made universalized whereas what is particular in the non-West remains particular forever." (p. XII)  
(...)  
"Transversality means to overcome and go beyond ("trans") the clash of ethnocentrism both "Orientalist" and "Occidental" as a result of "essentializing" (to use Edward W. Said's phrase) the Orient or the Occident. We are warned not to take it simply as a middle point between bipolar opposites. Rather, it breaks through bipolarity itself (theory and practice, philosophy and nonphilosophy, mind and body, femininity and masculinity, humanity and nature, Europe and non-Europe, etc.). What must be recognized as important is the fact that transversality is the paradigmatic way of overcoming all polarizing dichotomies and ready for the conceptualization of "world philosophy." The end product of transversality in the fusion of cultural (and disciplinary) horizons is hybridity or creolization. Viewed in this way, what is traditionally called "comparative philosophy" is not just a neglected and underdeveloped branch of philosophy, but *it is poised to transform radically the very conception of philosophy itself.*" (pp. XII-XIII)
36. Kaipayil, Joseph. 1995. *The Epistemology of Comparative Philosophy: A Critique with Reference to P. T. Raju's Views*. Rome: Centre for Indian and Inter-Religious Studies.  
"Comparative philosophy has been in existence as an organized discipline with plausible aims and methods of its own for over the past fifty years. Its potential was well exploited to facilitate East-West understanding, exchange, and cooperation in philosophy. For all this, the debate about the philosophical rationale of comparative philosophy, i.e. its place and function in the wider context of philosophical enterprise, is far from over. Now it is time for us to do a "stocktaking" or a state of the art assessment of the subject, and this is what we intend to do by analysing P. T. Raju's views on comparative philosophy. Raju is used as a case study because he, of all writers on/in comparative philosophy to date, is of singular importance and special consideration for both the theoretical contribution to the subject and the amount of literature produced in the field."



As for the format of our study, the work consists of a general introduction and four chapters. The first three expository chapters present Raju's views on comparative philosophy and his philosophical synthesis. As a rule these chapters contain Raju's views only, excepting those comments and observations we make in the footnotes. The fourth chapter offers critiques of Raju's comparative philosophy and calls for a paradigm shift in East-West studies in philosophy. While we question the justification for pursuing comparative philosophy as an independent discipline, we maintain the need and relevance of cross-cultural and comparative studies in philosophy and argue for a fresh perspective of philosophical studies and a new syllabus for history of philosophy." (From the Preface)

37. Kakol, Peter. 2002. "A General Theory of Worldviews Based on Madhyamika and Process Philosophies." *Philosophy East and West* no. 52:207-223.  
Abstract: "The aim of this essay is to make a contribution to the emerging field of "cross-cultural analysis of worldviews" by showing how the basic insights of process philosophy and Madhyamika Buddhism can be combined into a comprehensive theory of worldviews that is both developmental and typological (or diachronic and synchronic). It is hoped that this theory of worldviews will enable cross-cultural analyses of worldviews to go beyond mere comparison of similarities and differences between worldviews by showing how worldviews can mutually transform one another through dialogue. I will begin by outlining the basic ideas of both process thought and Madhyamika Buddhism, their respective theories of worldviews, and how these relate to contemporary thought. I will then argue that these two theories are compatible with one another and that their combination can contribute to the development of a general theory of worldviews. Finally, I will show how such a general theory of worldviews- which is also necessarily a general theory of values-can be used in the evaluative analysis of worldviews.
38. Kalmanson, Leah. 2015. "Have We Got a Method for You! Recent Developments in Comparative and Cross-Cultural Methodologies." *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies* no. 3:205-214.  
Abstract: "Recent developments in comparative and cross-cultural philosophy converge on the question of philosophical methods. Three new books address this question from different perspectives, including feminist comparative philosophy, Afrocentricity, and metaphilosophy. Taken together, these books help us to imagine interventions in the methodologies dominant in Western academic philosophy through a fundamental reevaluation of how we think, reason, and argue. Such reevaluation underscores the problems that Eurocentrism poses for feminist discourse and the resources that comparative philosophy offers for addressing these problems."  
References  
J. McWeeny, and A. Butnor (eds.), *Asian and Feminist Philosophies in Dialogue: Liberating Traditions*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014;  
A. Monteiro-Ferreira, *The Demise of the Inhuman: Afrocentricity, Modernism, and Postmodernism*, Albany: SUNY Press, 2014;  
S. Mattice, *Metaphor and Metaphilosophy: Philosophy as Combat, Play, and Aesthetic Experience*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014.
39. ———. 2017. "The Ritual Methods of Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 67:399-418.  
"In several recent articles, Leigh Kathryn Jenco questions the use of Eurocentric methodologies in conducting cross-cultural research within and about Chinese traditions.(3)" (p. 399)  
(...)  
"In what follows, I begin with Jenco's claim that we might look to several scholars of the Ming and Qing dynasties for examples of research practices that could be adopted widely today. These include meditation routines meant to prepare the mind for scholarly research, and memorization techniques aimed at internalizing texts to catalyze philosophical insight and, ultimately, self-transformation. As I show, these

methods are part of a general “ritual methodology” evident across all the sanjiao 三教(8) traditions (i.e., the “three teachings” of Ruism,(9) Daoism, and Buddhism) and informed by a certain conception of the mirror-like functioning of the mind. From within this context, I consider both the viability and desirability of such a ritualized approach to scholarship for contemporary professional philosophers.” (p. 400)

#### References

- (3) In particular, see Jenco, “How Meaning Moves: Tan Sitong on Borrowing across Cultures,” [Philosophy East and West 62, no. 1] pp. 92–113, and “‘What Does Heaven Ever Say?’ A Methods-centered Approach to Cross-cultural Engagement,” [American Political Science Review 101, no. 4] pp. 741–755.
- (8) Sanjiao or the “three teachings” is a term that goes back to at least the Sui dynasty; I use it here to emphasize certain methodological similarities that underlie these various East Asian traditions.
- (9) Following Robert Eno in *The Confucian Creation of Heaven*, I use “Ruism” in place of “Confucianism” to better approximate the Chinese term rujia 儒家 or “scholarly lineage.”
40. Kasulis, Thomas P. 2002. *Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.  
The 1998 Gilbert Ryle Lectures.  
"This book is not a study of any particular culture, although I cannot deny I have often had specific cultures or subcultures in mind as I developed the theory. As the next chapter will explain, for example, I doubt that I would have developed the reiterative patterns in this way if it had not been for my exposure to Japanese culture. Yet the book is not intended to be an analysis of any single culture, even Japanese culture. It is more like a thought experiment that raises fundamental issues about the nature of culture itself, especially the relation between culture and thought. One aim of this book is to present the case for understanding at least some cultural phenomena in terms of the reiterative or recursive analysis. The role of the philosopher is not just to analyze but also to give us better tools for analysis. My readers are therefore invited, indeed encouraged, to use the tools in relation to whatever cultures or subcultures they wish. It is unlikely that any culture is ever a perfect example of either an intimacy-dominant or integrity-dominant culture (generalities always have qualifications or exceptions), but the hope is that the analysis and critical tools presented here may help us see connections and differences we might have otherwise missed. If this hope is realized, communication and understanding across cultures will be assisted and the book will have served its ultimate purpose." (p. 11)
41. Kessler, Gary E. 2015. *Voices of Wisdom: A Multicultural Philosophy Reader*. Andover (Hamshire): Cengage Learning.  
Ninth edition.  
"Since the publication of the first edition of *Voices of Wisdom*, I am gratified to note that more introductory textbooks now incorporate a multicultural perspective, a perspective that was unique to this introductory reader when it was first published in 1992.  
At that time the introductory readers that were available treated philosophy as if it were entirely an Anglo-European male phenomenon. Little or no attention was given to Hindu, Buddhist, Chinese, African, Native American, Latin American, and feminist philosophy. *Voices of Wisdom* helped to change that situation, offering to those who wished it the possibility of assigning significant readings that represent the global nature of philosophizing." (preface, p. XI)
42. Kimmerle, Heinz. 1996. "How can time become time (again)? How to repeat what never has been?" In *Time and Temporality in Intercultural Perspective*, edited by Tiemersma, D. and Oosterling, H.A.F., 11-23. Amsterdam: Rodopi.  
"Time can never become what it essentially is: the pure openness of being and of becoming. But we can work on a way of understanding it, which is more open, less

- fixed into the opposition of time or no time, of being or not being. We can do this if we opt for a pluriformity of time or Being as being experienced in different ways. I do not mean this in a highly speculative sense, rather in a more practical sense. How can we think and act in ways which are more adequate to the being of time? On the one hand we can follow the thinking of Heidegger, Derrida and Lyotard who deal with this difficult question. On the other hand we can find the pluriformity of being and of time directly and concretely in the pluriformity of cultures. And it is a very practical exercise to work on the maintenance of this pluriformity. Therefore, with regard to our present issue, we will first ask how time is thought of by Lyotard and also by Heidegger and Derrida and secondly how time is experienced in other cultures and how this experience is conceptualized. As an example I have chosen the concept of time in African thought. Thus a highly speculative and a more practical approach come together, for thinking is also a way of living and as philosophers we have to learn how we can to live by working out how we must think. This 'must', of course, is not a purely logical imperative; nor is it orientated to a certain direction: east or west, south or north, but to the openness of Being as happening to be." (p. 12)
43. ———. 2007. "Transdisciplinary research in the cooperation between intercultural philosophy and empirical sciences." *TD: The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa* no. 3:95-103.  
Abstract: "This article will examine how philosophy and empirical sciences can cooperate in research. It is presupposed that in philosophy and in the empirical sciences different types of discourses are used. This difference causes a large gap between them, which has to be bridged. Intercultural philosophy is understood as a specific approach to philosophy as a whole. It is necessary to make philosophy fit into a world in which exchanges are happening on a global level in many fields. In the dialogues between the philosophies of different cultures, support is needed from certain empirical sciences for the understanding of the philosophy, which is based on the the participation of philosophers in everyday life and everyday language. Therefore, in addition to the the support by empirical sciences, living in a foreign culture, participating in its life, is necessary for intercultural philosophers."
44. ———. 2010. "My Way to Intercultural Philosophy." *Recerca. Revista de Pensament i Anàlisi* no. 10:35-44.  
Abstract: "My way of philosophical thought led me from hermeneutics, via dialectics and philosophies of difference to intercultural philosophy with special attention for African philosophy. I studied hermeneutics with the theologians Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs at Tübingen, Philipp Vielhauer at Bonn and the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer at Heidelberg in the 1950ies. Reading Hegel and Marx I came to accept the position of materialist dialectics. My favorite author was Ernst Bloch who combines his position of materialist dialectics with a critical interpretation of religion, especially Jewish-Christian religion. Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of Hegelian dialectics brought me to the philosophies of difference. The concept of the Other in these philosophies formed the entrance to contribute to the foundation and the development of intercultural philosophy."
45. ———. 2011. "Respect for the Other and the Refounding of Society: Practical Aspects of Intercultural Philosophy." In *Intermedialities: Philosophy, Arts, Politics*, edited by Oosterling, Henk and Plonowska Ziarek, Ewa, 137-152. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.  
"The aim of "Intercultural" philosophy is to add a new dimension to Western philosophical traditions. From a Western point of view, this type of philosophizing is carried out by leading dialogues between Western and non-Western traditions of thought. The position that every culture has its own specific way or style of thought and of philosophy is taken as an important starting point. Or, to formulate it in a negative manner, Western philosophy is not chosen as the criterion for judging where philosophy can or cannot be found. If philosophy occurs in traditional African ways of thought, which is generally acknowledged since African

philosophy is a regular section at the World Congresses of Philosophy, this means that philosophy can be found also in cultures that do not practice primarily written forms of communication and tradition. From here the step can be taken to ascribe philosophy to all cultures. The reflection of a culture on the right of its existence and its specific way of life among other cultures and in the middle of nature brings about philosophy in that particular culture. The dialogues between the philosophies of different cultures are treating topics, which are of common interest for them and/or of an importance that exceeds the problems of one of the cultures in question. Intercultural philosophical dialogues presuppose that the philosophies of all cultures are equivalent in rank and different in style as well as in contents." (p. 137)

46. King, R. A. H., ed. 2015. *The Good Life and Conceptions of Life in Early China and Græco-Roman Antiquity*. Berlin: De Gruyter.  
 Contents: I Methods  
 R.A.H. King: Introduction 3; G.E.R. Lloyd: Models for living in ancient Greece and China. A supplementary note on methodology and aims 21; Ralph Weber: On Comparing Ancient Chinese and Greek Ethics: The tertium comparationis as Tool of Analysis and Evaluation 29;  
 II China  
 Paul R. Goldin: The Consciousness of the Dead as a Philosophical Problem in Ancient China 59; Guo Yi: The Ideas of Human Nature in Early China 93; Dennis Schilling: Cosmic Life and Human Life in the "Book of Changes" 117; Christoph Harbsmeier: Good Fortune and Bliss in Early China 145; Elisabeth Hsu: Bing-distress in the Zuo zhuan: the not-so-good-life, the social self and moral sentiment among persons of rank in Warring States China 157; Michael Nylan: Pleasures and Delights, Sustaining and Consuming 181;  
 III Greece and Rome  
 William Charlton: Is the Concept of the Mind Parochial? 213; Jörg Hardy: Taking Thoughts about Life seriously. The existential dimension of Socratic Inquiry in Plato's *Apology* 227; Richard Stalley: Filial Piety in Plato 247; Hua-kuei Ho: The Good Life for Plato's Tripartite Soul 265; Thomas Buchheim: Good counsel and the role of logos for human excellence. On the rhetorical anthropology of "the measure of all things" 281; Michael Erler: Hedonê in the Poets and Epicurus 303;  
 IV Comparisons  
 Lisa Raphals: Autonomy, Fate, Divination and the Good Life 321; R.A.H. King: Mencius and the Stoics – *tui* and *oikeiôsis* 341; Lee H. Yearley: The Role and Pursuit of the Virtue of Equanimity in Ancient China and Greece 363;  
 Index locorum 387; General index of subjects 395-402.
47. Kirloskar-Steinbach, Monika, and Kalmanson, Leah. 2021. *A Practical Guide to World Philosophies: Selves, Worlds, and Ways of Knowing*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.  
 "As our subtitle indicates, this introduction to "world philosophies" is also a book about selves, worlds, and ways of knowing. As such, it accomplishes two interrelated tasks: (1) it not only brings a world philosophical approach to bear on these fundamental issues; but (2) it also shows how our very understanding of the meaning of the terms "selves," "worlds," and "knowing" is transformed in the process.  
 Although we intend for this volume to stand on its own as an exercise in world-philosophical practice, we have also designed it to serve as a guidebook to the Bloomsbury series *Introductions to World Philosophies*. The series is an educational resource that provides in-depth introductory texts in world-philosophical traditions appropriate for classroom use as well as accessible to a general audience. Each volume in the series responds to the thematic framework indicated in our subtitle, such that together the contributions provide a diverse array of philosophical perspectives on fundamental questions related to selves, world, and ways of knowing." (p. 1)

48. Kirloskar-Steinbach, Monika, Ramana, Geeta, and Maffie, James. 2014. "Introducing Confluence: A Thematic Essay." *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies* no. 1:7-63.  
Abstract: "In the following thematic introduction, we seek to situate *Confluence* within the field of comparative philosophy and substantiate why we deem a new publication necessary. For this purpose, we reconstruct the salient stages in the development of comparative philosophy in Section I, and then proceed to expound the rationale underlying *Confluence* in Section II. Our reconstruction of these stages pursues an exploratory rather than a documentary approach."
49. Koller, John M. 2018. *Asian Philosophies*. New York: Routledge.  
Seventh edition (First edition 1970).  
"By studying the great philosophical traditions of Asia, it is possible for us to understand these traditions' carefully considered answers to these questions, answers that are supported by profound insights and good reasons. Because these answers have guided the thought and action of the peoples of Asia over the centuries, they provide the basic clues to the guiding ideas and values of Asian societies today. And in today's world, where the very future of humankind depends upon understanding and cooperation among people with diverse values and ideas, it is imperative that these values and ideas be understood.  
As each of us tries to creatively develop our own personal philosophy, we can benefit enormously from an understanding of the different ways that the basic questions of life have been answered by the great thinkers in the Asian traditions."  
(from the Preface)
50. Kramer, Eli. 2021. *Intercultural Modes of Philosophy, Volume One: Principles to Guide Philosophical Community*. Leiden: Brill.  
"This work is part of a larger project, a three-volume series entitled "Intercultural Modes of Philosophy". Each volume engages the reader in a different philodynamic image of a mode of the philosophical life. My method in this project is what I call radically empirical philosophy of culture, which transitions Cassirerian cultural phenomenology out of critical idealism and into a Jamesian and Whiteheadian inquiry into the higher thresholds of experience (human culture). In this first volume, I explore the neglected communal mode of philosophy (philosophical community) through meta-ethical principles that articulate what makes it robust, successful, and valuable. In the second volume, I will trace the enactments of philosophical wanderers. These philosophical wanderers enact reflective life as the force that, as an exercise in being obnoxious, awakens culture out of its settled dogmatism and onto new and more ethically rich routes in the wider world. The third volume will meditate on and with philosophical speculators, as those who create and maintain philodynamic cosmic images for reconstructive contemplation. In other words, it will explore the structure of systematic philosophical inquiry both for creator and audience. Together, these three modes of philosophy can be thought of as the "three tripod legs" that support (ground) robust philosophical life within, and effective for, a culture." (Preface)
51. Krishna, Daya. 1988. "Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be." In *Interpreting Across Boundaries. New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, edited by Larson, Gerald James and Deutsch, Eliot, 71-83. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Reprinted in N. Bhushan, J. L. Garfield, D. Raveh (eds.), *Contrary Thinking. Selected essays of Daya Krishna*, New York: Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 59-67.  
"To search for the distinctive philosophical problems seen as problems or for distinctiveness in the solutions offered to similar problems is not only to see the alien tradition in a new way but to enrich oneself with the awareness of an alternative possibility in thought, a possibility that has already been actualized. The awareness of this alternative actualized possibility may, one hopes, free one's conceptual imagination from the unconscious constraints of one's own conceptual

tradition.

Thus comparative philosophy has the chance to function as a mutual liberator of each philosophical tradition from the limitations imposed upon it by its own past, instead of being what it is at present, the imposition of the standards of one dominant culture upon all the others and the evaluation of their philosophical achievements in terms of those alien standards." (p. 83)

52. Kupperman, Joel J. 2001. *Classic Asian Philosophy: A Guide to the Essential Texts*. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 "I came therefore to view this book, which is a generalist rather than a specialist project, as an extension of teaching. The organizing principle is simple. Each of the eight chapters focuses on one classic Asian text (or, in one case, cluster of texts), which is widely available in paperback, frequently in more than one translation. Each of these eight books, incidentally, is one that at some time or other I have used as one of the assigned books in an undergraduate course. The goal of each chapter is not only to explicate the text (or texts) but also to make it come alive. That is, we should be able to see Asian philosophers as struggling with important questions, ones that could matter to us too, and as offering answers that (even were we to find in the end that we cannot entirely accept them) would be plausible—in relation to those questions—to an intelligent person." (Preface, VI)
53. ———. 2002. "The Purposes and Functions of Comparative Philosophy." *APA Newsletters* no. 2:26-29.  
 "There are many reasons for comparative study of philosophies that represent different traditions and possibly originate in different cultures. The two that stand out are (1) appreciation, including deeper understanding of philosophical texts, and (2) the suggestiveness of philosophy in an unfamiliar tradition, providing new prompts for philosophical investigation. The first can grow out of fascination with great philosophy of a variety of kinds. The second can emerge in a working life, part of which is designed to create new philosophy." (p. 26)
54. Kwee, Swan Liat. 1951. "Methods of Comparative Philosophy." *Philosophy East and West* no. 1:10-15.  
 "Methodical evaluation goes farther than the formal preparatory stages of translation and collation. Comparative philosophy is a multiple and integral approach to the common issues of philosophy. In its historical development, from about the middle of the last century to the present, we see many phases." (p. 12)  
 (...)  
 "The comparative approach. This involves, as a next step, the schematic analysis of the total subject matter of philosophy, and may center about problems ( comparative metaphysics, comparative logic, comparative ethics, etc.) or about pervasive attitudes ( realism, idealism; monism, dualism, pluralism, etc.). This method of schematic comparison is the first stage in evaluation. Comparison involves the finding of analogies and, as a result, of specific differences. This process deepens our insight into the structural correlations in philosophy. Comparison may be considered as the most fundamental element in evaluation. The danger in attempts at comparison is that the starting point, the viewpoint of comparison, may be biased. Many Western scholars try to evaluate Eastern systems of thought by comparing them from a Christian standpoint, which tacitly is assumed as the only correct one. Comparison must do justice to every item compared both by stating the common analogical pattern and by relevating important specific differences. Both methods deserve equal attention. Comparison tends to overstress the analogy and to neglect the essential differences, often resulting in a false conviction that all philosophy or religion is essentially the same." (p. 13, notes omitted)
55. ———. 1953. *Methods of Comparative Philosophy*. Scheveningen - Leiden: Offsetdrkkerij Dorsman.  
 Contents: Preface V-IX; Part One: The Meaning of Comparative Philosophy. 1: Introduction 3; 2. Analysis of the phenomenon 18; 3. A historical perspective 30; Part Two: The Meaning of Philosophy. 4. Phenomenology of philosophy 61; 5. The

function of philosophy 68; 6. The contents of philosophy 84; 7. The systematics of philosophy 92; Part Three: The Methods of Comparative Philosophy. 8. A triangulation of methods 111; 9. The historical and sociological approach 120; 10. The anthropological and psychological approach 139; 11. The linguistic and logical approach 154; 12. The transcendental re-evaluative approach 171; Bibliography 187; Index 207-217.

"The analysis of methods of comparative philosophy, originally intended to serve as a base for the design of a new program of applied philosophical studies in Indonesia, is presented here as a general survey of the phenomenon of comparative philosophy as such, without references to Indonesian thought. As a survey it strives after comprehensiveness rather than completeness. No such survey has been attempted yet. Those who are engaged in the study of comparative philosophy may have some knowledge of some of the other projects with analogous purposes, but a comprehensive and systematic treatment of comparative philosophy, covering the whole field of studies, is still lacking. The present study by no means pretends to fill up this gap completely. It does not attempt to give a detailed and accurate picture of the scene, but rather to indicate the main horizons. As in a usual triangulation some points of reference are marked off with some emphasis while inter mediate areas are left out of consideration. The only possible merit of such an undertaking lies in what has-not-yet-been-said rather than in what is actually propounded, It serves to stimulate to further, more systematic and more integral researches rather than to registrate objectively what has been achieved at the moment. It serves to link apparently disconnected projects and themes, and so to open unexpected vistas and to readjust and enlarge existent perspectives, When it succeeds to evoke some fertile criticism, to bring about more-effective co-ordination in the many contemporary projects of comparative philosophy, and to contribute to the growth of practical transcultural understanding, the author's main intentions have been amply rewarded.

Because this work is itself a survey it is impracticable to add a summary to it. The three parts of which it is composed, respectively dealing with a systematic analysis of the phenomenon of comparative philosophy, asystematic analysis of the phenomenon of philosophy itself, and the current methods of comparative philosophy, constitute a systematic whole." (pp. VI-VIII)

"This study is composed of three parts.

The first part will be an analysis of *the meaning of comparative philosophy*. A first mapping of the phenomenon is carried out in three sections. Some of the most significant recent studies are mentioned in this chapter. A second chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the main problems. Then, the phenomenon is viewed in a historical perspective.

The second part will contain an analysis of *the meaning of philosophy* itself. The phenomenon of philosophy being the formal object of study in comparative philosophy, a mapping of this phenomenon itself is indispensable for an adequate integration of the various fragmentary endeavours in comparative philosophy. On the base of a comprehensive phenomenology of philosophy the systematic study of comparative philosophy will be facilitated. The third and last part is a comprehensive survey of current *methods of comparative philosophy*. A triangulation of methods is an efficient means to reveal the actual character of comparative philosophy as a consistent discipline." (pp. 4-5)