

Theory and History of Ontology ([www.ontology.co](http://www.ontology.co)) by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: [rc@ontology.co](mailto:rc@ontology.co)

## An Annotated bibliography of recent studies in English on the philosophy of Descartes

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2. Aczel, Amir D. 2005. *Descartes' Secret Notebook*. New York: Broadway Books.
3. Alanen, Lilli; Knuuttila, Simo. 1988. "The Foundations of Modality and Conceivability in Descartes and his Predecessors." In *Modern Modalities. Studies of the History of Modal Theories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism*, edited by Knuuttila, Simo, 1-69. Dordrecht: Reidel.  
 "Descartes's view of modality is analyzed by contrast to two earlier models: the ancient realist one, defended by Boethius, where possibility and necessity are connected to natural potency, and the modern intensionalist one, which dissociates

- necessary and possible truths from any ontological foundation, treating them as conceptual, a priori given preconditions for any intellect. The emergence of this view is traced from Gilbert of Poitiers to Duns Scotus, Ockham and Suarez. The Cartesian theory of the creation of eternal truths, it is argued, involves a rejection of this idea of absolute conceivability and can be seen as a constructivist view of intelligibility and rationality."
4. Ariew, Roger. 1992. "Descartes and Scholasticism: The Intellectual Background to Descartes' Thought." In *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, edited by Cottingham, John, 58-90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Revised version in: R. Ariew, *Descartes and the Last Scholastics*, pp. 7-35.
  5. ———. 1992. "Descartes and the Tree of Knowledge." *Synthese* no. 92:101-116. "Descartes' image of the tree of knowledge from the preface to the French edition of the *Principles of Philosophy* is usually taken to represent Descartes' break with the past and with the fragmentation of knowledge of the schools. But if Descartes' tree of knowledge is analyzed in its proper context, another interpretation emerges. A series of contrasts with other classifications of knowledge from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries raises some puzzles: claims of originality and radical break from the past do not seem warranted. Further contrasts with Descartes' unpublished writings and with school doctrines lead to the ironic conclusion that, in the famous passage, Descartes is attempting to appeal to conventional wisdom and trying to avoid sounding novel."
  6. ———. 1999. *Descartes and the Last Scholastics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. "Parts of chapter 1 were published as "Descartes and Scholasticism: the Intellectual Background to Descartes' Thought," in *Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), pp. 58-90. Much of chapter 3 was published as "Ideas, in and before Descartes," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 56 (1995): 87-106, and some of chapter 4 as "The Cartesian Destiny of Form and Matter," *Early Science and Medicine* 3 (1997): 300-325, both co-authored with Marjorie Grene. Portions of chapter 6 appeared as "Theory of Comets at Paris during the Seventeenth Century," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 53 (1992): 355-372. An earlier version of chapter 9 was issued as "Damned if you do: Cartesians and Censorship, 1663-1706," *Perspectives on Science* (1994): 255-274. Portions of chapters 5, 7, 8, and 10 were initially published in French -- chapter 5 as "Descartes, Basson et la scolastique rénaissante," in *Descartes et la Renaissance*, ed. Emmanuel Faye and chapter 7 as "Les premières tentatives vers une scolastique cartésienne: la *Correspondance* de Descartes et les Jésuites de La Flèche sur l'Eucharistie," in *Momenti della biografia intellettuale di Descartes nella Correspondance*, ed. Jean-Robert Armogathe and Giulia Belgioioso. A portion of chapter 8 was published as "Les *Principia* en France et les condamnations du cartésianisme," in *Descartes: Principia Philosophiae (1644-1994)*, ed. Jean-Robert Armogathe and Giulia Belgioioso (Naples: Vivarium, 1996), pp. 525-640, and of chapter 10 was issued as "Critiques scolastiques de Descartes: le *cogito*," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 53, no. 3 (1997): 587-604." (pp. IX-X).
  7. ———. 1999. "The First Attempts at a Cartesian Scholasticism: Descartes' correspondence with the Jesuits of La Flèche." In *La biografia intellettuale di René Descartes attraverso la Correspondance*, edited by Armogathe, Jean-Robert; Belgioioso, Giulia; Vinti, Carlo, 263-286. Napoli: Vivarium.
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Revised English translation of: "Descartes, les premiers cartésiens et la logique", *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1, 2006, p. 55-71.
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Abstract: "I discuss the various principles of individuation promulgated by G. W. Leibniz, in his 1663 bachelor's thesis at Leipzig, *Disputatio Metaphysica de Principio Individui*, in his early treatise on transubstantiation, and in his mature work (*Nouveaux Essais*, etc.). I compare these treatments with René Descartes' principle of individuation for ensouled creatures, from the *Letters to Mesland* on transubstantiation, and with the theses of various late scholastics (those of Scipion Dupleix, Antoine Goudin, René de Ceriziers, and Théophraste Bouju, among others). I conclude that whatever might have appeared novel in the proposals of Descartes and Leibniz for the principle of individuation were also traditional options; in this respect, the difference between early modern and medieval philosophy does not seem to have been philosophical at bottom."
12. ———. 2010. "Descartes and Humanism: Historical Method, Anti-Syllogism, and (Neo) Stoic Ethics in the *Discourse On Method*." *Revue Roumaine de Philosophie* no. 54:163-174.  
"I discuss René Descartes' relation to some key characteristics of Renaissance Humanism, from the espousal of an historical method to the rejection of scholastic or Aristotelian logic, to the revival of Stoic ethics. Basically, this discussion corresponds with topics treated by Descartes in the first half (or first three parts) of his *Discourse on Method*. I conclude that, in all three cases, Descartes' adoption of Humanistic method is only partial. He flirts with humanistic views in his battles against scholasticism, but does not adopt them fully. "
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Second, revised and expanded edition of *Descartes and the Last Scholastics*.
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Contents: Preface IX; Abbreviations XI; John Cottingham: General Introduction XIII-XVIII; 1. Petrus Ramus: Dialectic 1; 2. Francisco Sanches: That Nothing is Known 8; 3. Christopher Clavius: The promotion of mathematics 24; 4. Francisco Suárez: Metaphysical Disputations 29; 5. Pierre Charron: Wisdom 51; 6. Eustachius a Sancto Paulo: A Compendium of Philosophy in Four Parts 68; 7. Scipion Dupleix: Corpus of Philosophy 97; 8. Marin Mersenne: The Use of Reason, The Impiety of the Deists, and The Truth of the Sciences 136; 9. Pierre Gassendi: Unorthodox Essays against the Aristotelians 166; 10. Jean de Silhon: The Two Truths, and The Immortality of the Soul 176; 11. François de La Mothe le Vayer: Dialogue on the Diversity of Religions, and Little Skeptical Treatise 201; 12. Charles Sorel: Universal Science 219; 13. Jean-Baptiste Morin: That God Exists 230; Appendix: Condemnations of Cartesianism 252; Bibliography 261; Index 265-269.
16. Ariew, Roger; Grene, Marjorie, ed. 1995. *Descartes and His Contemporaries. Meditations, Objections and Replies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Contents: List of Abbreviations VII; Marjorie Grene and Roger Ariew: Prologue 1; Jean-Luc Marion: The Place of the *Objections* in the Development of Cartesian Metaphysics 7; Theo Verbeek: The *First Objections* 21; Jean-Robert Armogathe: Caterus' Objections to God 34; Peter dear: Mersenne's Suggestion: Cartesian Meditation and the Mathematical Model of Knowledge in the Seventeenth Century 44; Daniel Garber: J.-B. Morin and the *Second Objections* 63; Tom Sorell:

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"It is widely agreed that Descartes took ideas to be the objects of knowledge and that his theory of clear and distinct ideas arose from his attempt to find a way of picking out those ideas whose truth was so certain and self-evident that the thinker could be said to know them with certainty. To say of an idea that it is clear and distinct was, he believed, to say of it both that it was certainly true and that any claim to know it was justified. No other criterion need be appealed to. It is at this point, however, that most of those who set out to expound Descartes' theory of knowledge are brought to a standstill. The part played by clear ideas is obvious enough, but what did Descartes mean by 'clear and distinct'? This paper is an attempt, not to make an original contribution to the study of Descartes, but to elucidate his terms and evaluate his criterion in the light of what both he and others have written." (p. 89)

(...)

"The fact that Descartes adopted the word 'idea' is itself significant. When scholastic philosophers discussed human cognition, they spoke of the mind as containing concepts (*species, intentiones*). They claimed that these concepts originated through our sense perceptions, and hence that they stood in some relation to external objects. The term 'concept' was contrasted with the term 'idea'. Ideas were the eternal essences or archetypes contemplated by God, and the question of their external reference did not arise. They were an integral part of God's mind. God could create instances of one of his ideas, but his idea was in no way dependent upon the existence of such instances. Descartes took the word 'idea' and applied it to the contents of the human mind because he wanted to escape the suggestion that these contents must be in some sense dependent on the external world as a causal agent. (9) He wished to establish the logical possibility that a mind and the ideas contained within it are unrelated to other existents, and can be discussed in isolation from them.

Descartes saw the term 'idea' as having a very wide extension.

He said "... I take the term idea to stand for whatever the mind directly perceives,"(10) where the verb 'perceive' refers to any possible cognitive activity, including sensing, imagining and conceiving.(11) Thus a sense datum, a memory, an image, and a concept can all be called ideas. This, of course, leads to the blurring of distinctions. For Descartes, "I have an idea of red" may mean that I am now sensing something red, or that I have a concept of the colour red, even if I am not now picking out an instance of that concept. Moreover, when Descartes speaks of an idea, he may be taking it as representative of some object or quality in the physical world, as when he says "I have an idea of the sky and stars," or he may be

referring to the meaning he assigns to a word, as when he says "I have an idea of substance." Nor does he make any distinction between "having an idea" and "entertaining a proposition." Such statements as "Nothing comes from nothing" and "The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles" are categorized as 'common notions', (12) and are included among the contents of the mind. Descartes does remark that in some cases an idea may be expressed by a name, in other cases by a proposition, (13) but he does not bother to pursue this line of inquiry.

One of the characteristics of an idea is 'objective reality', a scholastic phrase which Descartes adopted, but used in a new way. In scholastic writings the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' have meanings which are the reverse of the modern meanings. An object like a table exists subjectively or as a subject if it has spatio-temporal existence, if it is real or actual. In contrast, the concept of a table can be looked at as having two kinds of existence. The concept *qua* concept has formal existence, but the concept as having some specifiable content is said to have objective existence, or existence as an object of thought. The concepts of a table and of a chair are formally similar but objectively different. So far as subjective realities were concerned, the scholastics assigned them different grades of reality according to their perfection and causal power. For instance, a substance is more perfect and causally more efficacious than an accident, hence a man has a higher grade of reality than the colour red.

It was also held that every effect had a cause with either an equal or a higher grade of reality. These doctrines were not seen as having any relevance to concepts. As formally existent, a concept has of course to have some cause, but the content of the concept was not seen as having any independent reality. Descartes, however, felt that the objective reality could be considered independently of its formal reality, and that it must be graded just as subjective reality was graded. The idea of a man, he felt, has more objective reality than the idea of a colour. Moreover, the cause of the idea containing a certain degree of objective reality must have an equal or greater degree of subjective reality. For instance, the idea of God has so high a degree of objective reality that only God himself is perfect enough to be the cause of such an idea. (14)" (pp. 91-93)

(...)

"Although Descartes struggled to defend his criterion, his struggles ended in an impasse. He had made the mistake of trying to prove too much. He had wanted to develop an introspective technique by which he could be sure of recognizing those ideas which were objects of certain knowledge; but such an enterprise was doomed from the start. He could only escape from the objection that nothing about an idea can justify us in making judgment about its external reference by entering into an uneasy and unjustifiable alliance with God; and by such an alliance he negated his claim that a single criterion for true and knowable ideas could be found." (p. 105)

(9) E. S. Haldane, G. R. T. Ross (eds.) , *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, (Cambridge, 1911) [cited as 'HR'] vol. II, 68.

(10) HR II, 67-8.

(11) HR I, 232.

(12) HR I, 239.

(13) C. Adam P. Tannery, *Oeuvres de Descartes* (Paris 1897-1913) [cited as 'AT'] AT III, 395.

(14) HR I, 161-170.

21. ———. 1975. "Descartes' Theory of Objective Reality." *New Scholasticism* no. 49:331-340.

"In the *Third Meditation* Descartes, who is at the beginning sure only of his own existence, presents a complex proof for the existence of God which is based on the fact that he finds within himself an idea of God. I intend to ignore the supplementary proof which deals with the conservation of his existence, and to focus on his discussion of the properties of ideas, for it is here that Descartes is most difficult to comprehend yet most vulnerable to criticism. With the exception of Gassendi's remarks in the *fifth objection*, I shall concentrate upon what Descartes

himself had to say, for a thorough survey of all the secondary sources often serves only to obscure the main issue." (p. 331)

(...)

"Descartes reinforced his arguments with various claims about the nature of predicates and the way in which we come to understand them. He thought, mistakenly, that one could not only distinguish between negative and positive predicates, but that one could demonstrate the logical priority of such positive predicates as 'infinite' or 'perfect' by showing that one can only understand the finite or imperfect in the light of a prior acquaintance with the infinite or perfect. (29) However, although he seems now to be talking about epistemology rather than ontology, it turns out that his claims rest upon the same assumptions about the content and causation of ideas as are involved in the main proof, so they do not need to be discussed further.

However liberal one is in granting Descartes his desired premises, I think it is fair to conclude that his arguments do not prove what they purport to prove. This seems to be a strong indication that one will lose nothing by being illiberal from the very beginning." (p. 340)

(29) E. Haldane and G. Ross, *The Philosophical Works Of Descartes* (Cambridge, 1968), I, 166.

22. ———. 1998. "Antonius Rubius on Objective Being and Analogy: One of the Routes from Early Fourteenth-Century Discussions to Descartes's *Third Meditation*." In *Meetings of the Minds. The Relation between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy*, edited by Brown, Stephen F., 43-62. Turnhout: Brepols.
- "In this paper I shall use Rubius's tract on analogy to show how a rich medieval tradition survived into the seventeenth century and to shed some light on the problem of Descartes's sources for the notion of an idea's objective reality. I shall proceed as follows. First, I shall state the problem as it has been set out in recent secondary literature. Second, I shall trace the distinction between formal and objective concepts from the early fourteenth century to the early seventeenth century in the context of the discussion of analogical terms. Third, I shall examine the analogical use of terms as it was presented by Rubius. Fourth, I shall explain why a theory of language use and a theory of concepts came to be linked together. Finally, I shall discuss what Rubius had to say about formal and objective concepts, and I shall suggest a relationship between this account and Descartes's own attitude towards mental contents and simple natures."
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- "The Latin word "hyperbole" comes from the Greek verb υπερβάλλω, a composite form of hypér (behind) and bállein (throw, throw further, behind and therefore to go further).
- The goal of the essay is to clarify the use and the meaning of this concept in the XVIIth century especially considering the figures of René Descartes (1596-1650) and one of his most famous correspondents, the French writer Louis Guez de Balzac (1597-1654). The essay is divided into four parties. In the first one, it focuses on the relationships between Descartes and Balzac and their intellectual formation. In the second part, some relevant examples of definitions given in the XVIIth century of geometrical and rhetorical hyperboles are proposed. The third part of the essay is devoted to the transformation of the figure of the hyperboles achieved by Guez de Balzac. In the fourth part of the essay is analysed the uses of

- the hyperboles in Descartes; a particular attention is here devoted to the texts of the Third and Fourth Replies to Hobbes and Arnauld, in connection to the final part of the Sixth Meditation."
- French version with the title: «*Toute hyperbole tend à nous amener à la vérité par l'excès de la vérité, c'est-à-dire par le mensonge*»: *les parcours hyperboliques qui amènent à la vérité de Balzac à Descartes*, in: Vlad Alexandrescu (ed.), *Branching Off. The Early Moderns in Quest for the Unity of Knowledge*, Bucarest: Zeta Books, 2009, pp. 256-288.
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 "The article discusses the decline of Aristotelian physics at the University of Paris in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. A course of physics remained essentially Aristotelian until the final decade of the seventeenth century, when it came under the influence of Descartes. But the history of physics teaching over this period cannot be properly appreciated if it is simply seen in terms of the replacement of one physical philosophy by another. Long before the 1690s, the traditional Aristotelianism of the Schools had been forced to come to terms with the New Science to some degree, while the Cartesianism of the early eighteenth century was always alive to the challenges to Descartes's particular physical theories. Except in the early seventeenth century the physics course at Paris was always in a state of change. The replacement of Aristotelian by Cartesian physics too involved the development of a novel epistemology. Although both Aristotelian and Cartesian professors believed that natural philosophy was a science of causes based upon a priori principles, the latter had a far more probabilist conception of physics."
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"Something very important happened in our knowledge of the physical world in the seventeenth century. A number of very smart people made discoveries about the natural world that fundamentally changed our way of looking at things. But as important as the individual accomplishments of individual seventeenth-century scientists were, an important part of the story lies in the disciplinary and institutional history of that important century. What was new and important was not only Copernicus and Kepler, Descartes and Galileo, Leibniz and Newton, but the changes that happened in the larger framework in which they work. In particular, I think that there was a major change in what might be called the disciplinary geography, the way in which the disciplines that deal with our knowledge of the natural world changed in their relations with respect to one another. This involves not only intellectual changes, but, perhaps as importantly, changes in the institutions that involve the investigation of nature and the dissemination of new knowledge and points of view.  
The story is very big and very complex, and I cannot hope to tell it all in a single article. But in this short essay I would like to give a bare outline of what the whole story might look like. I will begin with an overview the state of the disciplines that are concerned with the natural world ca. 1600. I will then trace through the way in which the disciplinary geography changes over the course of the century."
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"The part of this lecture that deals with substantial forms was given in a somewhat different form, and different language, as a lecture at the University of Bern and published in *Dialectica* [1986, 40, pp. 309-322], under the title *Die Einheit des Menschen: Descartes unter den Scholastikern*." p. VII.
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"Contemporary discussions on the literary format of Descartes's Meditations typically focus on two issues. The first is whether Descartes's text resembles and is possibly influenced by the genre of religious devotional exercises, and the second is whether the stylistic devices employed by Descartes are philosophically significant. Building upon the efforts of Gary Hatfield, Bradley Rubidge, and Martial Gueroult, I argue that Descartes is influenced by an Augustinian tradition of spiritual exercise and that this influence is philosophically important for how we understand the cogito. I examine, in particular, the relevance of Marin Mersenne's recently rediscovered treatise *L'usage de la raison* (1623). This work exhibits features of an Augustinian style of religious meditation, and it is a text that can be easily connected to Descartes."
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"The author proposes that the anonymous letter dated May 19, 1641, which Mersenne delivered to Descartes, should be attributed to Thomas Hobbes. Although the text is known, it is usually considered not so much in itself as for Descartes's two replies, which contain important clarifications on the proof of God's existence. Hobbes' hand is revealed by various thematic, conceptual, and lexical analogies and, above all, by the presence of two doctrines characteristic of his thought: 1) the denial of the existence of intellectual ideas; 2) the assertion that the nature of God can only be described by the proposition "God exists". Attribution to Hobbes of the May 19th 1641 letter throws new light on the debate that followed Descartes's Meditations as well as on Mersenne's role."
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"Although we now dismiss Kant's suggestion that logic was already essentially a completed science, we ourselves embrace its ghost, the idea that the conception of logical inference with which we are most familiar is just the common conception of our illustrious philosophical ancestors. This ghost works mischief. It causes us to think whiggishly of the history of logic and so lends respectability to the thought that only since 1879 has there been great logic. More concretely, I shall argue here, the idea that were is and always has been a single dominant conception of valid inference (ours) blinds us to part of Descartes's project. By setting that project against its medieval background I hope to revive our sense of both its strangeness and its possibilities."
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Abstract. "Like every original and fruitful research programme, that of Richard Popkin has inspired other interpretations that ended up by appearing as rivals to the History of Skepticism. It is certainly not by chance that only after Popkin had rediscovered the importance played by the rebirth of skepticism, an intense debate rose about the differences, the values and the possible superiority of the moderns over the ancients concerning the extent of doubt: a kind of a *querelle des anciens et des modernes* in order to establish whether and how the former or the latter outdid each other in coherence and radicality. One could object that this dispute has already been articulated in our modern philosophical archetypes, going back at least to Hegel and his critic Kierkegaard: the first, as is well known, supported the ancients, claiming in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy that Greek skepticism had been much deeper and all-encompassing than Cartesian doubt, whereas the second, starting with Johannes Climacus's pseudoepigraphic work, backed up the moderns, stressing the break between the era of modern and the astonishment or immediacy typical of the Greeks. *De omnibus dubitandum est*: by this Cartesian quote Kierkegaard characterized the modern age whose novelty could be summarized for him in three sentences: "1) Philosophy starts in doubt; 2) Doubt is required in order to practice philosophy; 3) Modern philosophy begins in doubt"."

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 "Descartes famously claimed that a human soul is a single substance without any parts. But he also affirmed that the soul has two faculties, namely intellect and will, which act as 'two concurrent causes'. This looks quite puzzling. How can there be two causes in a single and indivisible substance? What is their ontological status? And how do they act? This chapter discusses these questions, paying particular attention to Descartes' scholastic background. It argues that there was no unified scholastic doctrine. Descartes rejected Suárez's theory, which took faculties to be really distinct parts and inner agents of the soul, while defending Ockham's theory, which considered them to be mere ways of acting of a single soul. The two explanatory models gave rise to different accounts of the unity of the soul."
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 "Descartes famously claimed that a human soul is a single substance without any parts. But he also affirmed that the soul has two faculties, namely intellect and will, which act as 'two concurrent causes'. This looks quite puzzling. How can there be two causes in a single and indivisible substance? What is their ontological status? And how do they act? This chapter discusses these questions, paying particular attention to Descartes' scholastic background. It argues that there was no unified scholastic doctrine. Descartes rejected Suárez's theory, which took faculties to be really distinct parts and inner agents of the soul, while defending Ockham's theory,

- which considered them to be mere ways of acting of a single soul. The two explanatory models gave rise to different accounts of the unity of the soul."
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"One of the chief concerns of the young Descartes was with what he, and others, termed "physico-mathematics". This signalled a questioning of the Scholastic Aristotelian view of the mixed mathematical sciences as subordinate to natural philosophy, non explanatory, and merely instrumental. Somehow, the mixed mathematical disciplines were now to become intimately related to natural philosophical issues of matter and cause. That is, they were to become more 'physicalised', more closely intertwined with natural philosophising, regardless of which species of natural philosophy one advocated. A curious, short-lived yet portentous epistemological conceit lay at the core of Descartes' physico-mathematics—the belief that solid geometrical results in the mixed mathematical sciences literally offered windows into the realm of natural philosophical causation—that in such cases one could literally "see the causes". Optics took pride of place within Descartes' physico-mathematics project, because he believed it offered unique possibilities for the successful vision of causes. This paper traces Descartes' early physico-mathematical program in optics, its origins, pitfalls and its successes, which were crucial in providing Descartes resources for his later work in systematic natural philosophy. It explores how Descartes exploited his discovery of the law of refraction of light—an achievement well within the bounds of traditional mixed mathematical optics—in order to derive—in the manner of physico-mathematics—

- causal knowledge about light, and indeed insight about the principles of a “dynamics” that would provide the laws of corpuscular motion and tendency to motion in his natural philosophical system."
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141. ———. 1965. "Descartes and the Modal Distinction." *Modern Schoolman* no. 43:1-22.
142. ———. 1966. "Descartes on Distinction." In *The Quest for the Absolute*, edited by Adelman, Frederick J., 104-134. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.  
"In view of some recent research, (1) the stage would seem to be set to make a beginning with a long-standing suggestion of Professor Gilson to compare Descartes' doctrine on distinctions with that of Francis Suarez. (2) Accordingly, one would expect that the immediate point of departure for such a comparison would be their respective interpretations of the formal distinction of Duns Scotus. This would then introduce the more formal discussion of distinctions in each man. A closing consideration should then be devoted to the doctrine of each on essence and existence since this is the context in which Descartes frames a very important statement of his position on distinctions. In short, then, one should confront Descartes on Scotus, then on distinctions and finally on essence and existence. The same confrontation should then be made with Suarez." (p. 104)  
(...)  
"In regard to Descartes, the primary focus will be first on his reply to the objections of Caterus to his *Meditations*; (4) then on his *Principles* (5) and finally on one of Descartes' letters. (6)" (p. 105)  
(1) T. J. Cronin, S.J., "Eternal Truths in the Thought of Suarez and of Descartes," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXVIII (1961), 269-288; XXXIX (1961), 23-38. See also his briefer statement "Eternal Truths in the Thought of Descartes and of His Adversary," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXI (1960), 553-559. My own article, "Descartes and the Scholastics Briefly Revisited," *The New Scholasticism*, XXXV (1961), 172-190 goes behind Suarez to the Thomistae. Leonhard Gillen, S.J., "Über die Beziehungen Descartes' zur zeitgenössischen Scholastik," *Scholastik*, XXXII (1957), 41-66. These articles concern Descartes' knowledge of Suarez and Scholasticism. Another article of mine "Suarez, Historian and Critic of the Modal Distinction Between Essential Being and Existential Being," *The New Scholasticism*, XXXVI (1962), 419-444, contains information on Suarez' ambiguous position in regard to Scotus' formal-modal distinction. This is important for any ultimate comparison with Descartes' attitude on the same question and for his doctrine on distinction in general.  
(2) *Index scolastico-cartésien*, (Paris: Alcan, 1913), p. 87, where, in the context of the term, *Distinction*, wherein Descartes has insisted that the formal distinction of Scotus "non differre a modali" and following a text of Suarez on this point in Scotus, Professor Gilson notes: "C'est sans aucun doute à cette interprétation de la distinction formelle de Duns Scot qu'il faut rapporter le texte [AT] IV, 350, 13-16, où Descartes pose trois distinctions: 'Realem, Modalem et Formalem, sive rationis ratiocinatae,' Si l'on remarque en outre qu'au texte [AT] VII, 120, 15 et 24-25, Descartes réduit comme Suarez cette même distinction formelle à la distinction modale; si l'on remarque enfin que, parmi toutes les classifications possibles des distinctions. Descartes choisit précisément celle de Suarez, on sera conduit à penser que Suarez peut être considéré comme la source probable de Descartes en ce qui concerne la doctrine des distinctions...".  
(4) *Resp. Iae*; VII. 120.15 - 121.14. All references to works of Descartes are to the Adam-Tannery edition. So the above reference indicates Descartes' reply to the first objections to his *Meditations*, ed. Adam-Tannery, vol. VII, page 120, line 15 to page 121, line 14.



- (5) *Prin. Phil.*, I, 60-62; VIII. 28.18-30.25.  
 (6) To X; IV. 348.7 - 350.29. [Lettre à Mesland [?] , Egmond 154 ou 1646, O VIII, 1, pp. 634-635; B 536.]
143. ———. 1967. "Objective Being: Descartes and His Sources." *Modern Schoolman* no. 45:49-61.
144. ———. 1977. "Suárez, Descartes, and the Objective Reality of Ideas." *New Scholasticism* no. 51.
145. ———. 1979. "Old Bottles and New Wine: A Rejoinder to J. C. Doig." *New Scholasticism* no. 53:515-523.  
 "This paper is a criticism of an article in the same journal by J. C. Doig, *Suárez, Descartes and the objective reality of ideas*. On the basis of primary and secondary source materials, it is made clear that Doig's exclusively extramental interpretation of Suárez's objective concept is insensitive to the obvious intramental dimensions of that teaching. Thus Doig's claim of a doctrinal discontinuity between Suárez and Descartes is found wanting due to a failure to consider Suárez's position on the realism of the possibles, their role in scientific knowledge in general, and the part they play in metaphysics."
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