

Theory and History of Ontology (ontology.co) by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co

## The Ontology of Nicolai Hartmann: An Annotated bibliography

### Contents of this Section

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[Levels of Reality in Nicolai Hartmann's Ontology](#)

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### Main publications in German

1. Hartmann, Frida, and Heimsoeth, Renate, eds. 1978. *Nicolai Hartmann und Heinz Heimsoeth im Briefwechsel*. Bonn: Herbert Grundmann.
2. Hartmann, Nicolai. 1908. *Über das Seinsproblem in der griechischen Philosophie vor Plato*. Marburg: Alfred Töpelmann.  
Dissertationschrift.  
*Philosophische Arbeiten - Band III*. Edited by Cohen Hermann and Natorp Paul. Giessen: 1908.
3. ———. 1909. *Des Proklus Diadochus philosophische Anfangsgründe der Mathematik. Nach den ersten zwei Büchern des Euklidkommentars dargestellt*. Giessen: Topelmann.  
In *Philosophische Arbeiten - Band IV*. Edited by Cohen Hermann and Natorp Paul. Giessen: 1909.  
Reprinted Berlin, De Gruyter, 1969.
4. ———. 1909. *Platos Logik des Seins*. Giessen: Töpelmann.  
Reprinted Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1965.
5. ———. 1912. *Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
6. ———. 1921. *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*. Berlin - Leipzig: Walter De Gruyter.
7. ———. 1921. *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus. I: Fichte, Schelling und die Romantik*. Berlin - Leipzig: Walter De Gruyter.
8. ———. 1924. *Die seits von Idealismus und Realismus, ein beitrug zur Scheidung des geschichtlichen und übergeschlichen in der Kantischen philosophie*. Berlin: Heise.
9. ———. 1926. *Ethik*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.
10. ———. 1929. *Die Philosophie der deutschen Idealismus. II: Hegel*. Berlin - Leipzig: Walter De Gruyter.
11. ———. 1931. *Zum Problem der Realitätsgegebenheit*. Berlin: Pan-Verlagsgesellschaft.

- Philosophische Vorträge der Kantgesellschaft, vol. 32.
12. ———. 1933. *Das Problem des geistigen Seins. Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der Geschichtsphilosophie und der Geisteswissenschaften*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.
  13. ———. 1935. *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.
  14. ———. 1937. *Der Megarische und der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des ontologischen Modalitätsproblems*. Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften.
  15. ———. 1938. *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.
  16. ———. 1940. *Der Aufbau der realen Welt. Grundriss der allgemeinen Kategorienlehre*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.
  17. ———. 1942. *Neue Wege der Ontologie*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.  
Reprint from: *Systematische Philosophie*.
  18. ———, ed. 1942. *Systematische Philosophie*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.  
Inhalt: Arnold Gehlen: Zur systematik der Anthropologie 1-53; Erich Rothacker: Probleme der Kulturanthropologie 61-198; Nicolai Hartmann: Neue wege der Ontologie 199-311; Otto Friedrich Bollnow: Existenzphilosophie 315-430; Hermann Wein: Das Problem des Relativismus 431-559; Heinz Heimsoeth: Geschichtsphilosophie 560-646.
  19. ———. 1946. *Leibniz als Metaphysiker*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
  20. ———. 1949. *Einführung in die Philosophie*. Osnabrück.
  21. ———. 1950. *Philosophie der Natur. Abriss der speziellen Kategorienlehre*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.
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  23. ———. 1953. *Ästhetik*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.
  24. ———. 1954. *Philosophische Gespräche*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
  25. ———. 1955. *Kleinere Schriften I. Abhandlungen zur Systematischen Philosophie*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.  
1. Systematische Selbstdarstellung (1933) 1; 2. Neue Ontologie in Deutschland (1940) 51; 3. Ziele und Wege der Kategorialanalyse (1948) 89; 4. Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie (1949) 122; 5. Zeitlichkeit und Substantialität (1938) 180; 6. Naturphilosophie und Anthropologie (1944) 214; 7. Sinngebung und Sinnerfüllung (1934) 245; 8. Vom Wesen sittlicher Forderungen (1949) 279; 9. Das Ethos der Persönlichkeit (1949) 311.
  26. ———. 1957. *Kleinere Schriften II. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie-Geschichte*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.  
1. Der philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte (1936) 1; 2. Das Problem des Apriorismus in der Platonischen Philosophie (1935) 48; 3. Das Megarische und der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff (1937) 85; 4. Aristoteles und das Problem des Begriffs (1939) 100; 5. Zur Lehre vom Eidos bei Platon und Aristoteles (1941) 129; 6. Die Anfänge des Schichtungsgedankens in der alten Philosophie (1943) 164; 7. Die Wertdimension der Nikomachischen Ethik (1944) 191; 8. Aristoteles und Hegel (1923) 214; 9. Leibniz als Metaphysiker (1946) 252; 10. Die seits von Idealismus und Realismus (1924) 278; 11. Hegel und das Problem der Realdialektik (1935) 323; 12. Heinrich Maiers Beitrag zum Problem der Kategorien (1938) 346.
  27. ———. 1958. *Kleinere Schriften III. Vom Neukantismus zur Ontologie*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.  
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1. Zur Method der Philosophiegeschichte (1910) 1; 2. Systematische Methode (1912) 22; 3. Systembildung und Idealismus (1912) 60; 4. Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie (1912) 78

5. Über die Erkennbarkeit des Apriorischen (1914) 186; 6. Logische und ontologische Wirklichkeit (1914) 220; 7. Die Frage der Beweisbarkeit des Kausalgesetzes (1919) 243; 8. Wie ist kritische Ontologie überhaupt möglich? (1923) 268; Beiträge zu Kongress-Vorträgen 1926-1949; 9. Über die Stellung der ästhetischen Werte im Reich der Werte überhaupt (1926) 314; 10. Kategorien der Geschichte (1931) 321; 11. Das Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart (1936) 327; 12. Alte und neue Ontologie (1949) 333; 13. Thesen zur Logik (aus dem Philosophenlexikon) (1949) 337; Aufsätze zu Gedanktagen 1924-1931
14. Kant und die Philosophie unserer Tage (1924) 339; 15. Kants Metaphysik der Sitten und die Ethik unserer Tage (1924) 345; 16. Max Scheler (1928) 350; 17. Hegel (1931) 357; Anhang - Buchbesprechungen
18. Selbstanzeige in den Kantstudien zu: Platons Logik des Seins (1909) 363; 19. Zum Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (1913-1914) 365; 20. Zu Wilhelm Sesemann (1933) 368; 21. Zu Balduin Schwarz (1936) 374; 22. Zu Arnold Gehlen (1941) 378; 23. Zu Robert Heiss (1950) 393.
28. ———. 1977. *Der philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte. Zeitlichkeit und Substantialität. Sinnggebung und Sinnerfüllung*. Stuttgart: Reclam. Selections from the "Kleinere Schriften" published by Walter de Gruyter (1955-1958)
29. ———. 1937. "Der Megarische und der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des ontologischen Modalitätsproblems." *Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse* no. 10:1-17.
30. ———. 1939. "Aristoteles und das Problem des Begriffs." *Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse* no. 13:1-32.
31. ———. 1941. "Zur Lehre vom Eidos bei Platon und Aristoteles." *Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse* no. 8:1-38.
32. ———. 1943. "Die Anfänge des Schichtungsgedankens in der alten Philosophie." *Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse* no. 3:1-31.
33. ———. 1944. "Die Wertdimensionen der Nikomachischen Ethik." *Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse* no. 5:1-27.
34. ———. 1923. "Aristoteles und Hegel." *Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus* no. 3:1-36.
35. ———. 1934. "Sinnggebung und Sinnerfüllung." *Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie* no. 8:1-38.
36. ———. 1935. "Hegel und das Problem der Realdialektik." *Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie* no. 9:1-27.
37. ———. 1939. "Zeitlichkeit und Wirklichkeit." *Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie* no. 12:1-38.
38. ———. 1933. "Systematische Selbstdarstellung." In *Deutsche systematische Philosophie nach ihren Gestaltern*, edited by Schwarz, Hermann, 284-340. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt.
39. ———. 1931. "Systematische Philosophie in eigener Darstellung." In *Deutsche systematische Philosophie nach ihren Gestaltern - Band I*, edited by Schwarz, Hermann. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt.
40. ———. 1946. "Neue Ontologie in Deutschland." *Felsefe Arkivi*.

First published in Italian as: *Nuova ontologia in Germania* - translation by Remo Cantoni - Studi Filosofici - 1943.

The Italian translation has been reprinted in: Nicolai Hartmann, - *Introduzione all'ontologia critica* - Napoli, Guida 1972

41. ———. 1924. "Wie ist kritische Ontologie überhaupt möglich?" In *Festschrift für Paul Natorp. Zum Siebzigsten Geburtstag von Schülern und Freunden Gewidmet*, 124-177. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
42. ———. 1910. "Zur Methode der Philosophiegeschichte." *Kant-Studien* no. 15:459-485.
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44. ———. 1920. "Die Frage der Beweisbarkeit der Kausalgesetze." *Kant-Studien* no. 24:261-290.
45. ———. 1924. "Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus. Ein Beitrag zur Scheidung des Geschichtlichen und Übergeschichtlichen in der Kantischen Philosophie." *Kant-Studien* no. 29:160-206.
46. ———. 1912. "Systematische methode." *Logos* no. 3:121-163.
47. ———. 1915. "Über die Erkennbarkeit des Apriorischen." *Logos* no. 5:290-329.
48. ———. 1949. "Selbstdarstellung." In *Philosophen-Lexicon. Handwörterbuch der Philosophie nach Personen*, edited by Ziegenfuss, Werner. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.
49. ———. 1912. "Systembildung und Idealismus." *Philosophische Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*:1-23.
50. ———. 1926. "Kategoriale Gestze." *Philosophischer Anzeiger* no. 1:201-266.
51. ———. 1935. "Das Problem des Apriorismus in der Platonischen Philosophie." *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-Historische Klasse* no. 15:223-260.
52. ———. 1938. "Heinrich Maiers Beitrag zum Problem der Kategorien." *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-Historische Klasse*:38-54.
53. ———. 1948. "Ziele und Wege der Kategorialanalyse." *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* no. 2:499-536.

## Translations

### English

1. Hartmann, Nicolai. 1932. *Ethics*. London: George Allen & Unwin.  
Translated by Stanton Coit with an introduction by John Henry Muirhead.  
Reprinted with a new introduction by Andreas A.M. Kinneging, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002-2004 in three volumes: I. *Moral Phenomena* (2002); II. *Moral Values* (2004); III. *Moral Freedom* (2004).
2. ———. 1949. "German Philosophy in the Last Ten Years." *Mind* no. 58:413-433.  
Translate by John Ladd.  
This article is a survey of the philosophical work done in Germany between 1938 and 1948. The survey includes anthropology, epistemology, metaphysics, existentialist ethics, and the history of philosophy.
3. ———. 1952. *New Ways of Ontology*. Westport: Greenwood Press.  
Reprinted with a new introduction by Predrag Cicovacki, Piscataway (NJ): Transaction Publishers, 2012.

Translated by Reinhard C. Kuhn.

Table of Contents: I. The end of old ontology 3; II. The categories of Being 11; III. A new concept of reality 23; IV. The new ontology and the new anthropology 32; V. The stratified structures of the world 43; VI. Old mistakes and new critique 54; VII. Modification of the fundamentals categories 63; VIII. The strata laws of the real world 73; IX. Dependence and autonomy in the hierarchy of strata 84; X. Objections and prospects 99; XI. The stratification of the human being 114; XII. Determination and freedom 123; XIII. A new approach to the problem of knowledge 134-145.

4. ———. 2012. "How Is Critical Ontology Possible? Toward the Foundation of the General Theory of the Categories, Part One (1923)." *Axiomathes* no. 22:315-354. Translation by Keith R. Peterson.  
Abstract: "Abstract This is a translation of an early essay by the German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950). In this 1923 essay Hartmann presents many of the fundamental ideas of his new critical ontology. He summarizes some of the main points of his critique of neo-Kantian epistemology, and provides the point of departure for his new approach in an extensive criticism of the errors of the classical ontological tradition. Some of these errors concern the definition of an ontological category or principle, and others concern the relations among categories themselves. The outline for the new ontology is sketched through the correctives Hartmann appends to the treatment of each error, prefiguring his mature ontological system."
5. ———. 2013. *Possibility and Actuality*. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter.  
Translation of *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit* (1938) by Stephanie Adair and Alex Scott, with an Introduction by Roberto Poli.
6. ———. 2017. "The Megarian and the Aristotelian Concept of Possibility: A Contribution to the History of the Ontological Problem of Modality." *Axiomathes*. Translated by Frédéric Tremblay and Keith Peterson.  
Abstract: "This is a translation of Nicolai Hartmann's article "Der Megarische und der Aristotelische Möglichkeitsbegriff: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des ontologischen Modalitätsproblems," first published in 1937. In this article, Hartmann defends an interpretation of the Megarian conception of possibility, which found its clearest form in Diodorus Cronus' expression of it and according to which "only what is actual is possible" or "something is possible only if it is actual." Hartmann defends this interpretation against the then dominant Aristotelian conception of possibility, based on the opposition between *dynamis* and *energeia*, and according to which there is always an open multiplicity of simultaneous "possibilities," the outcome of which remains undetermined. Since, according to Hartmann, reality suffers no indetermination, the Megarian conception of possibility is an account of *real possibility*, whereas the Aristotelian one is merely an account of *epistemic possibility* (Frédéric Tremblay)."

### French

1. Hartmann, Nicolai. 1969. "Proclus, Principes philosophiques des mathématiques (D'après les deux premiers livres du Commentaire d'Euclide)." In *Philosophie et mathématique chez Proclus, par Stanislas Breton*, 173-243. Paris: Beauchesne. Traduction de Geneviève de Pesloüan.
2. ———. 1946. *Les principes d'une métaphysique de la connaissance*. Paris: Aubier. Traduit et avec une préface de Raymond Vancourt (deux volumes).
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Traduit par Jean-Pierre Narbonne.

### Italian



1. Hartmann, Nicolai. 1943. *Filosofia sistemática*. Milano: Bompiani. Traduzione di due saggi: *Il pensiero filosofico e la sua storia* (1936) e *Filosofia sistemática* (1933) di A. Denti e R. Cantoni; Introduzione di Remo Cantoni (nuova edizione riveduta in: *Introduzione all'ontologia critica* (1972)).
2. ———. 1963. *La fondazione dell'ontologia*. Milano: Fratelli Fabbri. Traduzione a cura di Francesco Barone.
3. ———. 1969. *L'estetica*. Padova: Liviana. Con uno studio di Dino Formaggio su "Arte e possibilità in N. Hartmann".
4. ———. 1969. *Etica*. Napoli: Guida. Traduzione di Voncezo Filippone Thaulero. Vol. 1: Fenomenologia dei costumi (1969) Vol. 2: Assiologia dei costumi (1970):Vol. 3: Metafisica dei costumi (1973).
5. ———. 1971. *Il problema dell'essere spirituale*. Firenze: La Nuova Italia. Traduzione di Alfredo Marini.
6. ———. 1972. *La filosofia dell'Idealismo tedesco*. Milano: Mursia. Traduzione di Valerio Verra.
7. ———. 1972. *Introduzione all'ontologia critica*. Napoli: Guida. Traduzione e introduzione di Remo Cantoni. Indice: Introduzione di Remo Cantoni 5; Parte prima: Il pensiero filosofico e la sua storia 31; Parte seconda: Filosofia sistemática 97; Parte terza: Ontologia nuova in Germania 171; Indice dei nomi 223-226.
8. ———. 1975. *Nuove vie dell'ontologia*. Brescia: La Scuola. Traduzione di Giancarlo Penati.
9. ———. 2003. "Ontologia vecchia e nuova." *Rivista di Estetica* no. 43:160-163. Traduzione di Tonino Griffero.
10. ———. 2009. *Ontologia e realtà*. Brescia: Morcelliana. Traduzione e introduzione di Giuseppe D'Anna.

### Spanish

1. Hartmann, Nicolai. 1957. *Rasgos fundamentales de una metafísica del conocimiento*. Buenos Aires: Losada. Traducción de J. Rovira Armengol.
2. ———. 1961. *Introducción a la filosofía*. México: Centro de Estudios Filosóficos, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Traducción de José Gaos.
3. ———. 1960. *La filosofía del idealismo alemán*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana. Translated by Hernán Zucchi. Translation of: Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus
4. ———. 2007. *El problema del ser espiritual. Investigaciones para la fundamentación de la filosofía de la historia y de las ciencias del espíritu*. Buenos Aires: Leviatán. Prólogo de Ricardo Maliandi. Traducción de Mateo Damasso y Miguel Angel Mailluquet.
5. ———. 1954. *La nueva ontología*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana. Traducción e introducción de Emilio Estiú.
6. ———. 1954. *Ontología I. Fundamentos*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Traducción de José Gaos. Reeditado en 1965 y 1986.
7. ———. 1956. *Ontología II. Posibilidad y efectividad*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

- Traducción de José Gaos. Reeditado en 1986.
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Traducción de José Gaos. Reeditado en 1986.
  9. ———. 1960. *Ontología IV. Filosofía de la naturaleza. Teoría especial de las categorías. Categorías dimensionales. Categorías cosmológicas*. México: Fundo de Cultura Econômica.  
Traducción de José Gaos. Reeditado en 1986.
  10. ———. 1964. *Ontología V. Filosofía de la naturaleza. Teoría especial de las categorías. Categorías organológicas. El pensar teleológico*. México: Fundo de Cultura Econômica.  
Traducción de José Gaos. Reeditado en 1986.  
"Nota del Traductor.  
La cuarta parte de la *Ontología* de Hartmann abarca en la edición original toda la "Filosofía de la Naturaleza" o "Teoría Especial de las Categorías" en un solo volumen de 700 páginas; y en uno solo de 136 se publicó en alemán "El Pensar Teleológico", que es en realidad una quinta y última parte de la *Ontología*, por la razón que se encontrará en el prólogo de ella, a pesar de la dada allí mismo para publicarla aparte. Para esta traducción española de la *Ontología* pareció mejor equilibrar los volúmenes, publicando como cuarto la primera mitad de la "Filosofía de la Naturaleza", a saber, "Las categorías dimensionales" y "Las categorías cosmológicas", y como quinto la segunda mitad, o sea, "Las categorías organológicas", y "El pensar teleológico", que es un desarrollo del estudio de estas últimas categorías. (...)"
  11. ———. 1964. *Autoexposición sistemática*. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma. Centro de Estudios Filosóficos,.  
Translación de Bernabé Navarro

### Studies about his work

The best introduction in English to Hartmann's thought are: W. H. Werkmeister, *Nicolai Hartmann's New Ontology* (1990) and R. Poli, C. Scognamiglio, F. Tremblay (eds.), *The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann* (2011).

1. "The Legacy of Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950)." 2001. *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12.  
Contents: Roberto Poli: Foreword 157; Predrag Cicovacki: New Ways of Ontology - The Ways of Interaction 159; Wolfgang Wildgen: Natural Ontologies and Semantic Roles in Sentences 171; Ingvar Johansson: Hartmann's Nonreductive Materialism, Superimposition, and Supervenience 195; Erwin Tegtmeier: Hartmann's General Ontology 217; Alberto Peruzzi: Hartmann's Stratified Reality 227; Roberto Poli: The Basic Problem of the Theory of Levels of Reality 261; Maria van der Schaar: Hartmann's Rejection of the Notion of Evidence 285; Liliana Albertazzi: The Roots of Ontics 299; Antonio Da Re: Objective Spirit and Personal Spirit in Hartmann's Philosophy 317; Robert Welsh Jordan: Hartmann, Schütz, and the Hermeneutics of Action 327; Gabor Csepregi: The Relevance of Nicolai Hartmann's Musical Aesthetics 339; Mark Van Atten: Gödel, Mathematics, and Possible Worlds 355; Some Bio-Bibliographical Information on Nicolai Hartmann 365.
2. Albertazzi, Liliana. 2001. "The Roots of Ontics." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:299-315.  
"According to Hartmann's analysis, the psychological level concerns the following aspects of psychic acts:

- (i) The mode of being of psychic acts.
- (ii) The nature of the correlates of these acts.
- (iii) The relationship of psychic acts with the structures of the physical and/or biological world that underlie them.
- (iv) The non-rationalizable residue which makes it a paradigm example of fundamental ontic connection.

Some of these aspects are highly problematic. As Hartmann points out, the difficulty of understanding what types of entities psychic acts are is twofold, because:

- (i) They do not appear to us objectively and they are not given to us as objects unless modified in reflection and memory once their presence is no longer actual, with all the 'objectual' modifications that the situation brings about.
- (ii) Sometimes they are states that are not experienced immediately and are unconscious.

Because of the framework in which it is inserted, Hartmann's ontology of psychic acts can be considered a further development of Brentanian descriptive psychology." p. 300-301.

3. Allen, Michael. 1981. "Nicolai Hartmann's anthropology of knowledge." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 12:41-54.  
"The article is an analysis of Hartmann's efforts to argue for the relevance of anthropological considerations in the context of epistemological realism. It concludes that Hartmann's arguments against Husserl's refusal to admit anthropological considerations into phenomenology are successful; but that realism must be redefined differently than Hartmann would define it. The article also concludes that the factor of "human interest" (Habermas) does not undermine the realist position."
4. Atten, Mark van. 2001. "Gödel, mathematics, and possible worlds." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:355-363.
5. Bar-On, Abraham Zvie. 1987. *The categories and the Principle of Coherence. Whitehead's Theory of Categories in historical perspective*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.  
Chapter IV: *The non-speculative way: Nicolai Hartmann* - pp. 121-150.
6. Barone, Francesco. 1948. *L'ontologia di N. Hartmann*. Torino: Edizioni di Filosofia.
7. ———. 1957. *Nicolai Hartmann nella filosofia del Novecento*. Torino: Edizioni di Filosofia.
8. Baumanns, Peter. 1966. "Der kritische Weg in der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmann." *Kant Studien* no. 57:296-308.
9. ———. 1968. "La méthode des apories dans la philosophie dans Nicolai Hartmann." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 73:199-204.
10. Beck, Heinrich. 1961. *Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit. Eine Entfaltung der ontologischen Modalitätenlehre im Ausgang von Nicolai Hartmann*. Pullach bei München: Verlag Berchmanskolleg.
11. Beck, Lewis White. 1942. "Nicolai Hartmann's criticism of Kant's theory of knowledge." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 2:472-500.  
"This article is a historical narrative and philosophical evaluation of Nicolai Hartmann's articles and book *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* (1925) in which he gradually distanced himself from Kant and from Marburg neo-Kantianism."  
Revised and shortened version in: Alois Joh. Buch (ed.) - *Nicolai Hartmann 1882-1982*, pp. 46-58.
12. ———. 1944. "Concerning Landmann's 'Nicolai Hartmann and phenomenology'." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 4:592-594.
13. Becker, Oskar. 1934. "Das formale System der ontologischen Modalitäten (Betrachtungen zu Hartmanns Werk *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit*)." *Blätter für*



- Deutsche Philosophie* no. 16:387-422.
14. Blystone, Jasper. 1982. "Nicolai Hartmann's Homo Ontologicus." In *Nicolai Hartmann 1882-1982*, 59-69. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.
  15. Bodeus, Richard. 1984. "The problem of freedom according to Nicolai Hartmann." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 24:55-60.
  16. Breil, Reinhold. 1996. *Kritik und System. Die Grundproblematik der Ontologie Nicolai Hartmanns in transzendentalphilosophischer Sicht*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
  17. Breton, Stanislas. 1948. "La théorie de la modalité dans l'ontologie de Nicolai Hartmann (première partie)." *Rassegna di Scienze Filosofiche* no. 2/3:20-49.
  18. ———. 1948. "La théorie de la modalité dans l'ontologie de Nicolai Hartmann (deuxième partie)." *Rassegna di Scienze Filosofiche* no. 4:30-60.
  19. ———. 1954. "Le Problème de l'être spirituel." *Giornale di Metafisica*:397-438.
  20. ———. 1962. *L'être spirituel. Recherches sur la philosophie de Nicolai Hartmann*. Lyon: Vitte.
  21. ———. 1963. "Ontology and ontologies: the contemporary situation." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 3:339-369.
  22. ———. 1969. *Philosophie et mathématique chez Proclus*. Paris: Beauchesne. Translated from German by Geneviève de Pesloüan. Suivi de 'Principes philosophiques des mathématiques' d'après le Commentaire de Proclus aux deux premiers livres des Eléments d'Euclide par Nicolai Hartmann.
  23. Buch, Alois, ed. 1982. *Nicolai Hartmann 1882-1982*. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann. Mit einer Einleitung von Josef Stallmach und einer Bibliographie der seit 1964 über Hartmann erschienenen Arbeiten.
  24. Cadwallader, Eva Huel. 1984. *Searchlight on values: Nicolai Hartmann's twentieth-century value Platonism*. Washington: University press of America. "This critique and defense of an updated value Platonism argues that Hartmann's ethics has been undeservedly neglected because of "guilt by association" with discredited positions it only superficially resembles. After examining Plato's motives for his value Platonism, and discussing G. E. Moore, the author argues that Hartmann's theory rejects both naive value Platonism and dogmatic absolutism while also avoiding vicious Skepticism. Pluralism, fallibilism, and pragmatism are invoked in defending an updated version of "revised value Platonism"."
  25. ———. 1984. "The continuing relevance of Nicolai Hartmann's theory of value." *Journal of Value Inquiry* no. 18:113-121. "This paper argues that Hartmann's much-neglected value theory has practical relevance for understanding the current American value polarization. First, ten of Hartmann's most permanent contributions to axiology are outlined. next, these are related to work by psychologists and others (Horney, Maslow, Kohlberg, Benedict, Fromm, Jung, Yankelovich). Third, the heuristic value of Hartmann's key notion of "the bi-polarity of ethics" is proposed as useful for understanding today's clash between "the moral majority" and "the new morality"."
  26. Cantoni, Remo. 1972. *Che cosa ha veramente detto Hartmann*. Roma: Ubaldini.
  27. Cicovacki, Predrag. 2001. "New Ways of Ontology - The Ways of Interaction." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:159-170. "Although Nicolai Hartmann made significant contributions to virtually all areas and disciplines of philosophy, his first and deepest love was ontology. Part of Hartmann's fascination with ontology was due to the fact that at his time the previously considered *philosophia prima* was practically non-existent. As he

remarked, ontology fell in a deep sleep after Christian Wolff. (\*) Hartmann certainly tried to awake the sleeping giant and restore its faded glory. Despite his ingenious efforts, ontology is still mostly absent from the philosophical scene. My paper will address some of the questions that this state of affairs gives rise to: Why did Hartmann's prodigious efforts to rebuild ontology not have lasting effects? Why was it that his "new ways of ontology" did not revitalize the old discipline? Could it be that Hartmann's own way of presenting what is new about his ontology made a confusing impression about the real relationship of the old and the new? Since I have the highest regard for Hartmann's work and nevertheless believe that his own presentation is - at least partially - responsible for possible misunderstandings, I will here attempt to explain his novel contribution in a way different from that employed by him. My strategy will be as follows. In section I, I will present Hartmann's criticism of the old ontology. Section II will bring a brief sketch of his main contributions to ontology. Finally, in section III, I will attempt to clarify Hartmann's "new ways of ontology" by using the model of interaction. If this conception of reality as an interactive process is indeed useful and illuminating, it will both highlight the novelty of his approach and indicate the direction in which this new ontology should be further developed."

(\*) *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1948, 4th ed.), p. XI.

28. ———. 2014. *The Analysis of Wonder. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.  
Contents: Chronological Table IX; Introduction: Does Hartmann Matter? 1; Part I: Being. I.1 Philosophical Method 9; I.2 Being as Being 17; I.3 Modifications of Being 23; I.4 Strata of Real Being 29; I.5 Categories of Real Being 35; I.6 Categories of Being and Categories of Cognition 41; I.7. Ontology of Cognition 47; I.8 Critique of Intellectualism 53; Part II: Values. II.1 Nature of Values 65; II.2 Moral Values in General 75; II.3 Four Fundamental Moral Values 83; II.4 Four Forms of Love 89; II.5 Aesthetic Object and Aesthetic Act 95; II.6 Aesthetic Values 101; II.7 Truth in Art 105; II.8 Sublime 111; II.9 Critique of Moralism 117; Part III: Personality. III.1 The Realm of Real Being and the Realm of Values 125; III.2 Personality as a Value 131; III.3 Pseudo, Spurious and Genuine Personality 137; III.4 Fulfillment of Personality 145; Conclusion: Hartmann's New Ways of Philosophy 153; Bibliography of Hartmann's Works 163; Index 165.
29. Collins, James. 1945. "The Neo-Scholastic critique of Nicolai Hartmann." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 6:109-132.  
"This is a report on the reception of Hartmann's epistemology and ontology by German and Italian Scholastics (1920-40). They appreciated his central attraction to the problem of being, his opening of human cognition to being, and his effort to transcend both idealism and naive realism. But realism can include a critical recognition of the transcendence factor in knowing and valuing, as well as a constant striving with the limits and perspectives of man's study of being. These are marks of human finitude rather than of irrationality in being."
30. Corradini, Antonella. 1985. "La struttura logica delle modalità nel pensiero di N. Hartmann." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* no. 77:118-144.
31. Csepregi, Gabor. 2001. "The relevance of Nicolai Hartmann's musical aesthetics." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:339-354.
32. D'Anna, Giuseppe. 2009. *Nicolai Hartmann. Dal conoscere all'essere*. Brescia: Morcelliana.
33. ———. 2013. *Realismi. Nicolai Hartmann «al di là» di realismo e idealismo*. Brescia: Morcelliana.
34. Da Re, Antonio. 2001. "Objective Spirit and Personal Spirit in Hartmann's philosophy." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive*

*Systems* no. 12:317-326.

"In order to discuss the theme of the relation between the personal and objective spirit in Hartmann's work appropriately, it is necessary at the outset to place his reflections within the context of the wide debate which developed within German philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century. As is well known, the Hegelian concept of the objective spirit was taken up and reformulated by historicism, in particular by Wilhelm Dilthey, apart from other writers who in various forms had drawn it towards neo-Kantianism (Georg Simmel, Ernst Cassirer). In this paper I hope to be able to highlight the characteristic traits of Hartmann's philosophy of the spirit through a critical comparison with the thoughts of Hegel and those of Dilthey. For this reason, the first part of this paper will be in the form of a brief presentation of the theory of the objective spirit, as is found in the writings of Hegel and Dilthey. In the second part I will summarise the main traits of Hartmann's theory. In the third and last part, I will highlight the critical elements proposed by Hartmann in comparison to Dilthey and above all to Hegel; in so doing Hartmann's innovative contribution to humanist and personalistic thought and philosophy will emerge. This can be summarised thus: (1) the refusal of individualism and the recognition of the existence of super-personal relations of the objective spirit and of the objectivated spirit, (2) the vindication of the autonomy and freedom of the human person."

35. Dahlberg, Wolfgang. 1983. *Sein und Zeit bei Nicolai Hartmann*. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag A.V.I.V.A.
36. Djeong-Uk, Seo. 1993. *Logik und Metaphysik der Erkenntnis: kritischer Vergleich von Hermann Cohens und Nicolai Hartmanns philosophischen Grundpositionen*. Frankfurt am Main: Haag & Herchen.
37. Dong-Huyn, Son. 1986. *Die Seinsweise des objektivierten Geistes. Eine Untersuchung im Anschluss an Nicolai Hartmanns Problematik des "geistigen Seins"*. Bern: Peter Lang.  
Inhalt: U.a. Ontologische Bestimmung des Geistes in Schichten- und Sphärenlehre N. Hartmanns; Grundformen des geistigen Seins; Ontische Struktur der Objektivation; Seinsweise des objektivierten Geistes.
38. Feucht, Roland. 1992. *Die Neoontologie Nicolai Hartmanns im Licht der evolutuonären Erkenntnistheorie*. Regensburg: S. Roderer Verlag.
39. Feyerabend, Paul K. 1963. "Professor Hartmann's philosophy of nature." *Ratio* no. 5:91-106.
40. Forsche, Joachim Bernhard. 1965. *Zur Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns. Die Problematik von kategorialer Schichtung und Realdetermination*. Meisenheim am Glan: Hain.
41. Gamba, Alessandro. 2001. "A cinquant'anni dalla 'Nuova ontologia' di Nicolai Hartman." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* no. 93:74-94.
42. ———. 2004. *In principio era il fine. Ontologia e teleologia in Nicolai Hartmann*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
43. Gamp, Rainer. 1973. *Die interkategoriale Relation und die dialektische Methode in der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns*. Bonn: Bouvier.
44. Guidetti, Luca. 1999. *La realtà e la coscienza. Studio sulla metafisica della conoscenza di Nicolai Hartmann*. Macerata: Quodlibet.
45. Harich, Wolfgang. 2000. *Nicolai Hartmann. Leben, Werk, Wirkung*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
46. ———. 2004. *Nicolai Hartmann - Grösse und Grenzen: Versuch einer marxistischen Selbstverständigung*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
47. Heimsoeth, Heinz. 1952. "Zur Geschichte der Kategorienlehre." In *Nicolai Hartmann. Der Denker und sein Werk*, edited by Heimsoeth, Heinz and Hein, Robert, 144-172. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

48. Heimsoeth, Heinz, and Hein, Robert, eds. 1952. *Nicolai Hartmann. Der Denker und sein Werk*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.  
Funfzehn Abhandlungen mit einer Bibliographie (Fifteenth essays with a Bibliography).
49. Hein, Robert. 1961. "Nicolai Hartmann: a personal sketch." *Personalist* no. 42:469-486.
50. Hülsmann, Heinz. 1959. *Die Methode in der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns*. Düsseldorf: L. Schwann.
51. Hüntelmann, Rafael. 2000. *Möglich ist nur das Wirkliche: Nicolai Hartmanns Modalontologie des realen Seins*. Dettelbach: J.H. Röll.
52. James, Helen. 1960. "Nicolai Hartmann's study of human personality." *The New Scholasticism* no. 34:204-233.
53. Johansson, Ingvar. 2001. "Hartmann's nondeductive materialism, superimposition, and supervenience." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:195-215.  
"Nicolai Hartmann's approach to philosophy was both aporetic and systematic. He stressed that philosophy contains genuine but probably insoluble problems at the same time as he was working on an ontological system. Also, he meant that philosophical-ontological systems always have to take the knowledge progress of science into account. In philosophy, this has been, and still is, an unusual combination of views. Hartmann might seem to be completely at odds with a lot of different philosophical traditions; analytic philosophy being one of them. However, today, that is not really the case. In relation to analytic metaphysics there are several overlapping problem areas. This paper is concerned with one such area, the mind-body problem. In particular, I will relate Hartmann's view that mind is *superimposed* on matter to the view of some analytic philosophers that mind is *supervenient* on matter. Both sides, and many other philosophers interested in the mind-body problem, have something to learn from such a confrontation." (p. 195)
54. Jordan, Robert Welsh. 2001. "Hartmann, Schutz, and the hermeneutics of action." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:327-338.
55. Kanthack, Katharina. 1962. *Nicolai Hartmann und das Ende der Ontologie*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
56. Kraenzel, Frederick. 1984. "Nicolai Hartmann's doctrine of ideal values: an examination." *Journal of Value Inquiry* no. 18:299-306.  
"This article evaluates Hartmann's claims that values are independent of our judgment of value, that they are independent of the real world, and that they are a multiplicity of ideal forms. By examining our moral consciousness, the article concludes that some values have ideal necessity. However, it is only a conditioned, hypothetical necessity, and the number of different ideal values is very limited."
57. Kuhn, Helmut. 1951. "Nicolai Hartmann's ontology." *Philosophical Quarterly* no. 1:289-318.
58. Landmann, Michael. 1943. "Nicolai Hartmann and phenomenology." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 3:393-423.
59. Larsen, Allan W. 1982. "The problem of freedom in the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann." In *Nicolai Hartmann 1882-1982*, 184-195. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.
60. Lörcher, Wolfgang. 1972. *Ästhetik als Ausfaltung der Ontologie*. Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain.
61. Lotz, Johannes B. 1982. "Zwei Wege der Ontologie. Nicolai Hartmann und Martin Heidegger." In *Nicolai Hartmann 1882-1982*, 208-222. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.



62. Lukács, Gyorgy. 1984. *Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins*. Darmstadt: Luchterhand.  
Vol. I, Chapter II. *Nicolai Hartmanns Vorstoss zu einer echten Ontologie* - pp. 421-467, in: *Werke* - Vol. 13, edited by Frank Bensele.  
The first edition of this volume was the Italian translation: G. Lukács - *Per l'ontologia dell'essere sociale* - Vol. I - a cura di Alberto Scarponi. Milano, Editori Riuniti, 1976 (Capitolo II. *L'impulso di N. Hartmann i direzione di una vera ontologia* - pp. 111-162).
63. Makota, Janina. 1986. "Nicolai Hartmann's and Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Man." *Reports on Philosophy* no. 10:69-79.
64. Maliandi, Ricardo-Guillermo. 1966. *Wertobjektivität und Realitätserfahrung mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns*. Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag.
65. Matteo, Armando. 2000. "Il cammino speculativo del giovane Hartmann: dalla logica dell'essere all'ontologia della logica." *Sapienza* no. 53:161-184.
66. Mayer, Emmanuel. 1952. *Die Objektivität der Werterkenntnis bei Nicolai Hartmann*. Meisenheim/Glan: Westkulturverlag A. Hain.
67. Meyer, Gerbert. 1962. *Modalanalyse und Determinationsproblem. Zur Kritik Nicolai Hartmanns an der aristotelischen Physis*. Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain.
68. Millán Puelles, Antonio. 1947. *El problema del ente ideal. Un examen a través de Husserl y Hartmann*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas.  
Segunda Parte Ontología de la idealidad: Sección segunda. La teoría de la idealidad en Hartmann. Capítulo 7 La idealidad en el ámbito matemático; Capítulo 8 El ser en sí de los objetos ideales.
69. Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1957. *Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred North Whitehead. A Study in Recent Platonism*. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers.  
Contents: Preface V; Hermann Wein: Foreword IX; Introduction XV-XL; Chapter I: Nicolai Hartmann's Philosophy of Ideal Being 1; Appendix: Nicolai Hartmann on the Ontological Status of Logic 41; Chapter II: A. N. Whitehead's Doctrine of Eternal Objects 45; Appendix I: Whitehead's Theory of Propositions 102; Appendix II: George Santayana on the Nature of 'Essences' 108; Chapter III: Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred North Whitehead: a Critical and Comparative study 112; Appendix: On the Ontological Status of Logic: The Problem 190; Chapter IV: Conclusions 194; Bibliography 211-214.  
"The present work proposes to institute a critical comparison between the philosophies of 'ideal being' of two distinguished contemporary philosophers who come from very different philosophical traditions and had, in their lifetime, little to do with each other. Owing to the fact that the philosophers are eminently interested in the nature of the real actual world, we hope that the proposed study may make a contribution towards an evaluation of the meaning, nature, and role of the so-called 'ideal being'. We may even say that it may contribute towards an understanding of the *surviving* function of the so-called Platonic Ideas today. 'Platonism' is an expression that is often used to name the most diverse currents of thought and which, therefore, has contributed towards much confusion. But, if it is not the name but the content of a philosophy that matters, we may as well name the aspect of philosophy which comes up for consideration in this work as 'Platonic'. The name need not lead to any prejudgment; but sometimes by its historical associations, it helps us to isolate an area of problem. We do not intend to insist on this name except for the sake of such convenience.  
The very fact that today such a problem is considered as living requires justification. Positivism and pragmatism, analysis and logical empiricism, philosophies of 'change' and existentialism, all these diverse currents of thought agree in having declared all sorts of Platonism dead for ever. But, is it really so? Are the problems which Plato tried to tackle solved once for ever? Or, have they been declared, once for ever, as pseudo-problems? We grant that much illusion has been removed, that



- quite a lot of problems might have been shown to be only pseudo-problems. But making allowance for such modern developments in philosophy, is it not still possible to ask: how best can we understand Plato today?  
When we find two contemporary thinkers, alive to the currents of modern thought, still, in some sense or other, recognising the importance of many of Plato's thoughts today, the presumption is that the question can be asked." (pp. XV-XVI).
70. ———. 1963. "Remarks on Nicolai Hartmann's Modal Doctrine." *Kant Studien* no. 54:181-187.  
Reprinted as Chapter XII in: J. M. Mohanty, *Phenomenology and Ontology*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, pp. 129-137.
  71. ———. 1970. *Phenomenology and ontology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.  
Chapter XI. *A recent criticism of the foundations of Nicolai Hartmann's ontology* pp. 115-128; Chapter XII. *Remarks on Nicolai Hartmann's modal doctrine* pp. 129-137.
  72. ———. 1997. "Nicolai Hartmann's phenomenological ontology." In *Phenomenology. Between essentialism and transcendental philosophy*, 25-31.  
Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
  73. Morgenstern, Martin. 1992. *Nicolai Hartmann: Grundlinien einer wissenschaftlich orientierten Philosophie*. Tübingen: Francke Verlag.
  74. ———. 1997. *Nicolai Hartmann zur Einführung*. Hamburg: Junius Verlag.
  75. Möslang, Alois. 1964. *Finalität. Ihre Problematik in der Philosophie Nicolai Hartmanns*. Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag.
  76. Münzhuber, Joseph. 1943. "Nicolai Hartmann Kategorienlehre." *Zeitschrift für Deutsche Philosophie* no. 9:187-216.
  77. Nosbüsch, Johannes. 1982. "Nicolai Hartmanns Lehre vom idealen Sein." In *Nicolai Hartmann 1882-1982*, 238-251. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.
  78. Oakeley, Hilda. 1935. "Professor Nicolai Hartmann's concept of Objective Spirit." *Mind* no. 44:39-57.
  79. Oberer, Ariolf. 1965. *Vom Problem des objektivierten Geistes. Ein Beitrag zur theorie der konkreten subjektivität im Ausgang von Nicolai Hartmann*. Köln: Kölner Universitätsverlag.
  80. Patzig, Günther, ed. 1982. *Symposium zum Gedanken an Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950)*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
  81. Peruzzi, Alberto. 2001. "Hartmann's Stratified Reality." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:227-260.  
"Which aspects of 'critical ontology' can provide effective orientation when confronted by the difficulties inherent to the opposition of logic- inspired philosophy vs phenomenology? Given the cyclical swing between the metaphysical realism of all-embracing Systems and the anti-realistic biases of relativism, does Hartmann offer a really satisfactory equilibrium-point? Is it still possible to construct a philosophical cosmology consistent with the natural sciences, while avoiding positivistic reduction of philosophy to analysis of language? How can we assign philosophy a task that goes beyond the meta-theoretical and the epistemological, while renouncing the temptation to adopt the view-from-nowhere? What about the project of a 'new' realism that refrains from positing Absolutes and yet admits the existence of perennially open problems, on which the advances of scientific knowledge seem to have little or no effect at all? How to anchor categorial analysis if not by connecting it to the advances of social, cognitive and natural sciences?"
  82. Peterson, Keith R. 2012. "An Introduction to Nicolai Hartmann's Critical Ontology." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 22:291-314.

"Nicolai Hartmann contributed significantly to the revitalization of the discipline of ontology in the early twentieth century. Developing a systematic, post-Kantian critical ontology 'this side' of idealism and realism, he subverted the widespread impression that philosophy must either exhaust itself in foundationalist epistemology or engage in system-building metaphysical excess. This essay provides an introduction to Hartmann's approach in light of the recent translation of his early essay 'How is Critical Ontology Possible?' (1923) In it Hartmann criticizes both the pretensions of epistemology as well as the principal errors of classical ontology, and he proposes a series of correctives that lead to his development of a highly original and elaborate stratified categorial ontology. This introduction explains the most important errors of the 'old' ontology, his correctives to them, and further fleshes out these correctives with reference to his mature ontological work."

83. Philipse, Herman. 2001. "What is a Natural Conception of the World?" *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* no. 9:385-399.  
"Continental philosophers such as Heidegger and Nicolai Hartmann and analytic philosophers such as Ryle, Strawson, and Jennifer Hornsby may be interpreted as using competing intellectual strategies within the framework of one and the same research programme, the programme of developing a natural conception of the world. They all argue that the Manifest Image of the world (to use Sellars's terminology) is compatible with, or even more fundamental than, the Scientific Image. A comparative examination of these strategies shows that Hartmann's strategy of stratification is superior to those of Heidegger, Ryle, and Strawson."
84. Pichler, Hans. 1952. "Die Wiedergeburt der Ontologie." In *Nicolai Hartmann. Der Denker und sein Werk*, edited by Heimsoeth, Heinz and Hein, Robert, 144-172. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
85. Poli, Roberto. 1998. "Levels." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 9:197-211.  
"It is plain that the problem of the levels or layers of a work of art is an important part of any theory of the aesthetic object. In other words, what I wish to state clearly from the outset is that of the two components that select the field of interest - that of the object, and that of its aesthetic valence - reference to the object arranges reference to its aesthetic valence. Put otherwise, the theme of the aesthetic object is a particular subdivision of ontology - a subdivision, moreover, which may prove fundamental, shedding light on several aspects of the overall framework of ontology. This was pointed by Nicolai Hartmann, when in the introduction to *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie* - one of his main ontological works - he asserted that "the problematic [of art] belongs to the area of problems in which the ontological problem is rooted." Evidently, when matters are viewed from this point of view, that part of aesthetics which addresses the problem of the aesthetic object may yield results of relevance to more general ontological reflection as well.  
Complementary to investigation by objects is investigation by acts. In this case, however, it becomes more difficult to develop the theme that I wish to discuss here, namely that of levels or layers. Hartmann again points out: "the aesthetics of today still concentrates mainly on analysis of the act, and this is why the stratification relationship, although it has often been noted, is not yet familiar to it" ([Hartmann *Das Problem des Geistigen Seins* 1933], p. 565). The perspective to which I allude was first outlined by the phenomenologist Geiger, who not coincidentally sought to develop a form of phenomenological reduction which mainly involved objects and their structures. This, as we know, was a form of reduction different from the, so to speak, more classically phenomenological ones elaborated by Husserl in order to bring out the structures and operations of consciousness. Moreover, for the purposes of this paper, the decision to give priority to the perspective of the object becomes well-nigh obligatory.  
That said, and before I develop with my theme in detail, I must present at least two presuppositions to the arguments that follow. These are two presuppositions that I

shall present from perhaps an unusual point of view, but which are of central importance nonetheless."

86. ———. 2001. "The Basic Problem of the Theory of levels of Reality." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:261-283.  
 "Two essential aspects of Hartmann's thought are its categorial perspective and the theory of the levels of reality. They are also aspects which have exerted significant influence on Hartmann's intellectual legacy, however limited that may be. Here I wish to point out their importance for Bertalanffy (see his *General Systems Theory*, 1968) and Lorenz (see his *Behind the mirror: a search for a natural history of human knowledge*, 1978). The latter notes the close similarity between his own ideas and those of Hartmann, and he recalls that for Hartmann the world possesses the unity of a system, but it is a system made up of layers. Some pages earlier he writes that he once asked Roberto Corti, who was closely acquainted with Hartmann, how he thought Hartmann would have reacted to a phylogenetic interpretation of his thought. Corti replied that Hartmann would undoubtedly have rejected such an interpretation, but then added "And yet this is the only way to do anything with it." (p. 261)
87. ———. 2015. "Nicolai Hartmann's Theory of Levels of Reality." In *Objects and Pseudo-Objects: Ontological Deserts and Jungles From Brentano to Carnap*, edited by Seron, Denis, Richard, Sebastien and Leclercq, Bruno, 223-237. Berlin: de Gruyter.
88. Poli, Roberto, Scognamiglio, Carlo, and Tremblay, Frederic, eds. 2011. *The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann*. Berlin: de Gruyter.  
 "Nicolai Hartmann was one of the most prolific and original, yet sober, clear and rigorous, 20th century German philosophers. Hartmann was brought up as a Neo-Kantian, but soon turned his back on Kantianism to become one of the most important proponents of ontological realism. He developed what he calls the "new ontology", on which relies a systematic opus dealing with all the main areas of philosophy. His work had major influences both in philosophy and in various scientific disciplines. The contributions collected in this volume from an international group of Hartmann scholars and philosophers explore subjects such as Hartmann's philosophical development from Neo-Kantianism to ontological realism, the difference between the way he and Heidegger overcame Neo-Kantianism, his Platonism concerning eternal objects and his interpretation of Plato, his Aristotelianism, his theoretical relation to Wolff's ontology and Meinong's theory of objects, his treatment and use of the aporematic method, his metaphysics, his ethics and theory of values, his philosophy of mind, his philosophy of mathematics, as well as the influence he had on 20th century philosophical anthropology and biology".
89. Ruttkowski, Wolfgang. 2007. *Essays on Aesthetics, Poetics and Terminology of Literary Studies*. München: Grin Verlag.  
 Essay I: *Stratum, Structure, and Genre* (1973) pp. 4-30.  
 "The concept of *genre* can be satisfactorily explained only in comparison with the concepts of *stratum* and *structure*. Proceeding from this conviction we shall try here to establish a demarcation of these often used terms and at the same time prove their interdependence."  
 Essay III: *The Main Differences between Roman Ingarden's and Nicolai Hartmann's Strata Systems* (1990) pp. 31-48.  
 "Although both designed strata-models for various kinds of art and especially for literature, the philosophers Nicolai Hartmann and Roman Ingarden never entered into any kind of dialogue. Also in secondary literature there is no exact comparison of their systems to be found.  
 For that reason, the two strata systems are compared here for the first time and their respective advantages and deficiencies are being pointed out.

- Amongst other things. the following topics are being discussed: 1. In what way Hartmann's "Real Foreground" ("Realer Vordergrund") is more specifically subdivided in Ingarden's system. - 2. How, on the other hand. Ingarden's "Stratum of Depicted Objects" ("Schicht der dargestellten Gegenständlichkeiten") was more thoroughly subdivided by Hartmann. 3. Why there cannot be found in Hartmann's system a corresponding stratum for Ingarden's "Stratum of Schematized Aspects" ("Schicht der schematischen Ansichten") - and 4. Why Hartmann's two strata of the Treat Background" ("Irrealer Hintergrund") are consolidated by Ingarden and expressly not seen as a stratum."
90. Sajama, Seppo. 1985. "Supererogation and high values." *Theoria* no. 51:77-88. "Nicolai Hartmann's value-theory can be used to generate a five-fold classification of actions: "duties" are actions whose omission is blameworthy and performance not praiseworthy, whereas the performance of "supererogatory" actions is praiseworthy and their omission not blameworthy. Moreover, the contrary of a duty is a "forbidden" action, that of an supererogatory action is an "excusable" action. Besides these four, there are also "indifferent" actions."
91. Samuel, Otto. 1953. *A Foundation of Ontology. A Critical Analysis of Nicolai Hartmann*. New York: Philosophical Library.  
Contents: Introduction IX-XV; 1. Why must we return to ontology? 1; 2. The incomplete approach of Hartmann 7; 3. On the Extant as Extant in general 15; 4. On the difference between Being (*Sein*) and Extant (*Seiendes*) 29; 5. The relationship of Hereness (*Dasein*) and Suchness (*Sosein*) 45; 6. Modes and modalities of Being 57; 7. The Givenness of Real Being 74; 8. The certainty of Reality 90; 9. The problem and position of Ideal Being 115; 10. The transition to meontology 128; Index 151-155.  
Note: Chapters 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 are the outilemes of the teachings of Hartmann. Chapters 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 contain the critical analysis of his views.  
"Hartmann's literary accomplishments in life consist of three parts. The first one comprises the new foundations of ontology. It is composed of three books: "*Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*" (On the Foundations of Ontology), "*Möglichkeit and Wirklichkeit*" (Possibility and Factuality), and "*Der Aufbau der realen Welt*" (The Structure of the Real World). The last of the three presents the general theory of categories (\*). The second part covers natural philosophy, an introduction to the special theory of categories, furthermore "*Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*" (Outlines of a Metaphysics of Knowledge), and "*Das Problem des geistigen Seins*" (The Problem of Spiritual Being). The third part is his "*Ethik*" (Ethics).  
The present dissertation will be limited primarily to the first of these books, "*Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie*." This book consists of a thirty-eight-page introduction (the reader will find here a condensed, five-page summary) and four individual papers - "*Das Seiende als Seiendes*" (The Extant as Extant), "*Dasein and Sosein*" (Hereness and Suchness), "*Die Realitätsgegebenheit*" (The Givenness of Reality), and "*Das ideale Sein*" (Ideal Being)." pp. X-XI.  
(\*). [The fourth and last book, "*Philosophie der Natur. Abriss der speziellen Kategorienlehre*" (Philosophy of Nature. Sketch of Special Theory of Categories) was published in 1950].
92. Schaar, Maria van der. 2001. "Hartmann's rejection of the notion of evidence." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:285-297.  
"Any one fascinated by the problem of evidence, does well to read Günther Patzig's formulation of the problem given in an article on Husserl (Patzig 'Husserl on Truth and Evidence', in J. N. Mohanty (ed.), *Readings in Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, pp. 179-196) (1). Either evidence is accessible to consciousness, in which case the evidence of our judgement can give no guarantee for (absolute) truth; or evidence is a guarantee for



(absolute) truth, but then it cannot be accessible to consciousness. Possibly Patzig's attention was drawn to the problem of evidence by his teacher at Göttingen, Nicolai Hartmann. Although Hartmann was not alone in criticizing the concept of evidence at the first half of the twentieth century, he must be credited for having given a clear formulation of the problem of evidence. This paper attempts an evaluation of Hartmann's criticism of the concept of evidence. Any epistemological theory of evidence has to answer Hartmann's criticism on the notion of evidence. Hartmann's epistemology, and his criticism of the concept of evidence, will be dealt with in the first half of the paper. An outline of an epistemology that meets Hartmann's challenge, in terms of an evidence theory of truth, is presented in the second half of the paper." (p. 285)

(1) 'Evidence not in the sense of piece of evidence *for* something, but as a characteristic of certain judgements, evidence *of*.

93. Schaper, Eva. 1956. "The aesthetics of Hartmann and Bense." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 10:289-307.
94. Schilling, Kurt. 1951. "Bemerkungen zu Nicolai Hartmanns Ontologie." *Archiv für Recht- und Sozialphilosophie* no. 39:533-555.
95. Schlittmaier, Anton. 1999. *Zur Methodik Und Systematik Von Aporien: Untersuchungen zur Aporetik bei Nicolai Hartmann und Gottfried Martin*. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann.
96. Schuetzinger, Caroline. 1966. "The gnoseological transcendence in Nicolai Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition (First part)." *The Thomist* no. 30:1-37.
97. ———. 1966. "The gnoseological transcendence in Nicolai Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition (Second part)." *The Thomist* no. 30:136-196.
98. Scognamiglio, Carlo. 2004. *La teoria ontologica di Nicolai Hartmann e la processualità del reale*. Roma: Edizioni di Filosofia.it.
99. ———. 2007. "Il problema del soggetto nell'ontologia critica di Nicolai Hartmann." In *Perspectives sur le sujet / Prospettive filosofiche sul soggetto*, edited by Trincia, Francesco and Bancalari, Stefano, 126-145. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
100. ———. 2010. *La Persona. Etica e ontologia in Nicolai Hartmann*. Lecce: Pensa Multimedia.
101. Seel, Gerhard. 1982. *Die Aristotelische Modaltheorie*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Ertse Kapitel: *N. Hartmanns generelle Modaltheorie; seine Theorie der Realmodi; seine Interpretation der Aristotelischen Modaltheorie* - pp. 1-132.
102. Siitonen, Arto. 1989. *Problems of Aporetics*. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia. Contents: Preface 9; Introduction 11; PART I: Towards a Theory of Questions and Problems. Chapter 1; The Greek Background and Its Modern Influence 15; Chapter 2: Nicolai Hartmann's Idea of Aporetics 29; Part II. Hartmann's Influence: Cohen, Nyman. Chapter 1: The Development of Hartmann's Ideas in the Works of His Followers 51; Chapter 2: Related Tendencies 77; Part III. A Critical Approach to Hartmann's Theory of Aporetics. Chapter 1: Appraisal of the Insolubility Thesis 87; Chapter 2: Unknowability Thesis and Progress of Knowledge 99; Chapter 3: Aporia and Argument 113; Chapter 4: Problem Thinking and System Thinking 125; Chapter 5: On Problem History 133; Conclusions 143; Notes 150; Literature 177; Index of Concepts 186; Index of names 190-194.  
 "The present book represents what may be called "archaeology of ideas." Its main aim is to give information on some scarcely known currents of thought and connexions between ideas in the philosophy of the present century, and to evaluate those ideas. The central concept of the book is *aporia* (impasse, perplexity, doubt), and the main figure is Nicolai Hartmann (1882—1950), a German ontologist and critical realist. Perhaps his most significant idea was that the Aristotelian method of aporetics or problem-discussion should be reactivated and given a basic role in doing philosophy. The Greek background of aporetics is first studied and its modern



- influence discussed. The dimensions of Hartmann's aporetics are then analysed in the context of his philosophy. It is examined and evaluated, how Hartmann's pupils Wein, Landmann and Hartkopf applied his ideas. Related tendencies, represented by Morris R. Cohen and Alf Nyman, are also studied. The main part of the book contains a detailed criticism of Hartmann's theory of aporetics." p. 9)
103. Sirchia, Francesco. 1969. *Nicolai Hartmann dal neokantismo all'ontologia. La filosofia degli scritti giovanili (1909-1919)*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
  104. Smith, John E. 1954. "Hartmann's New Ontology." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 7:583-601.
  105. Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1982. *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.  
Third revised edition; first edition 1960; second edition 1965.  
Chapter VI: *Phenomenology in the Critical Ontology of Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950)*, pp. 305-357.
  106. Stallmach, Josef. 1987. *Ansichsein und Seinsverstehen. Neue Wege der Ontologie bei Nicolai Hartmann und Martin Heidegger*. Bonn: Bouvier.
  107. Taubes, Jacob. 1953. "The development of the ontological question in recent German philosophy." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 6:651-664.
  108. Tegtmeier, Erwin. 2001. "Hartmann's General Ontology." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:217-225.  
"It is striking how many different word combinations containing "being" you find in Hartmann: ways of being (Seinsweisen), modes of being (Seinsmodi), elements of being (Seinsmomente), degrees of being (Seinsstufen), grades of being (Seinsgrade), factors of being (Seinsfaktoren), regions of being (Seinsregionen), spheres of being (Seinssphären), layers of being (Seinsschichten), weight of being (Seinsgewicht), presentation of being (Seinsgegebenheit). I happen to have claimed at several places' that existence does neither allow for differentiation nor for gradation. However, the Phenomenologists, Hartmann's contemporaries, like such verbal combinations, too. And there is, of course, a long tradition of this. The founder of ontology, Aristotle, founded this subject before all on the term "being" and its ambiguities. He distinguishes between the use of "to be" with a substantial and with an accidental predicate, also between its use in actuality and potentiality predication. On the face of it, Aristotle distinguishes between kinds of predicative connection. However, he does not admit genuine connections but only natured things. Thus, he can be taken to claim that substances, things with accidents, actual and potential things exist in different ways. He distinguishes in Hartmann's terms between two ways of existence (Existenzweisen), namely substantial and accidental existence, and two modes of existence (Modi der Existenz), namely actuality and potentiality. Following Plato who granted full existence only to forms and mere half-existence to perceptual things, Aristotle also assumes degrees of existence, accidents, e.g., have a lower degree of existence than substances and relational accidents a lower degree than qualitative accidents. In Aristotle categories are distinguished as different ways of being. Hartmann holds that different ways of being do not already found categories or only in a wide sense. On the whole Hartmann understands the distinction between ways of being as formal and that between categories as material (inhaltlich)." (pp. 217-218)
  109. Tertulian, Nicolas. 1984. "La rinascita dell' ontologia: Hartmann, Heidegger e Lukács." *Critica Marxista*:125-150.
  110. ———. 2003. "Nicolai Hartmann et Georg Lukács. Une alliance féconde." *Archives de Philosophie* no. 46:663-698.  
"The encounter between Lukács' philosophy and ontological thought of Nicolai Hartmann is a seldom tackled topic in philosophical historiography. The contact with Hartmann's great ontological works played a key role in the genesis of *Ontology of Social Being*, the work which has crowned the intellectual and political

course of Lukács. This paper aims to clear up the deep affinity between two historical thoughts that all seemed to separate. Hartmann cultivated a *philosophia perennis* above socio-historical contingences, while Lukács, an engaged philosopher in the battles of the century, built a work which was saturated with Marxian thought. There are nevertheless significant links between them: a critique of Husserlian phenomenology, a critique of neo-positivist currents and, above all, strong reservation with regard to Heidegger."

111. Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 1957. *Essence et existence. Étude à propos de la philosophie de Roman Ingarden et Nicolai Hartmann*. Paris: Aubier Editions Montaigne.
112. Vossenbergh, Ewald van den. 1963. *Die letzten Gründe der Innerweltlichkeit in Nicolai Hartmanns Philosophie*. Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana.
113. Wahl, Jean. 1953. *La structure du monde réel d'après N. Hartmann*. Paris: Centre de documentation universitaire. Cours de la Sorbonne (1952).
114. ———. 1954. *La théorie des catégories fondamentales dans Nicolai Hartmann*. Paris: Centre de documentation universitaire. Cours de la Sorbonne (1953).
115. ———. 1955. *Les aspects qualitatifs du réel. I. Introduction, la philosophie de l'existence; II. Début d'une étude sur Husserl; III. La philosophie de la nature de N. Hartmann*. Paris: Centre de documentation universitaire. Cours de la Sorbonne (1954).
116. Wein, Hermann. 1952. "Nicolai Hartmanns Kategorialanalyse und die Idee einer Strukturlogik." In *Nicolai Hartmann. Der Denker und sein Werk*, edited by Heimsoeth, Heinz and Hein, Robert, 173-185. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
117. ———. 1959. "Der Streit und die Ordnung und Einheit der Realwelt. Für und wider Nicolai Hartmann." *Philosophia Naturalis* no. 5:174-220.
118. Werkmeister, William Henry. 1970. *Historical Spectrum of Value Theories. I. The German-Language Group*. Lincoln: Ne-Johnsen.
119. ———. 1981. "Kant, Nicolai Hartmann, and the Great Chain of Being." In *The Great Chain of Being and Italian Phenomenology*, edited by Bello, Angela Ales, 69-97. Dordrecht: Reidel.  
 "At first glance it may seem that relating the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Nicolai Hartmann to Alexander Pope's conception of the Great Chain of Being is arbitrary to the point of absurdity. However, a closer look at the facts will soon show that it is by no means absurd or even arbitrary, for both Kant and Hartmann are concerned with an interpretation of the Great Chain of Being -- albeit from radically different points of view. This difference Nicolai Hartmann has stressed in his formidable *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*. (1) There he quotes Kant's "highest principle of all synthetic judgments": "The conditions of the possibility of experience as such are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and therefore have objective validity in a synthetic judgment *a priori*." (2)  
 Kant had argued, quite correctly, that synthetic judgments *a priori* could not validly apply to objects if the conditions of the possibility of experience were imposed upon the subject by the objects of experience. The failure of empiricism in all its forms is proof of this fact. Not one of them can justify the *a priori* employment of synthetic propositions. Kant had therefore assigned to the subject the role of imposing the conditions of possible experience upon the object. But in doing so, he had overlooked a "third possibility", namely, that the conditions of the possibility of experience are imposed neither by the subject nor by the object; that they are simply metaphysical conditions "this side of idealism and realism" which are equally binding for subject and object.

It is Hartmann's contention that this "highest principle" is obvious to all who understand it, and that it finds its validation in the actual analysis of experience. In what sense, then, does it help us to understand Hartmann's conception of the Great Chain of Being? And how does this differ from Kant's commitment to Pope's idea?" (p. 69)

(1) Second edition (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1925), p. 340

(2) A158 / B197

120. ———. 1990. *Nicolai Hartmann's New Ontology*. Tallahassee: Florida State University Press.  
Contents: Introduction XI-XVII; Chapter I: The epistemological basis of Nicolai Hartmann's New Ontology 1; Chapter II: The structure of the real world 32; Chapter III: An analysis of modalities 69; Chapter IV: Philosophy of Nature 88; Chapter V: The realm of Spiritual Being 134; Chapter VI: Ethics 192; Chapter VII: Aesthetics 223; Bibliography 241; Index 245-252.  
"This is an integrative study of "all" of Nicolai Hartmann's publications, with special attention to his epistemology, his categorial analyses of the structure of the real world, of modalities, and the realm of spiritual reality. In all of his works Hartmann begins with the phenomena, not with metaphysical speculation, and carries his analyses out in great detail. There is nothing like it in the philosophy of the early twentieth century."
121. Wildgen, Wolfgang. 2001. "Natural ontologies and semantic roles in sentences." *Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems* no. 12:171-193.  
"My central concern in the treatment of Hartmann's "New Ontology" will be the role of language and other "symbolic forms" (in the terms of Cassirer's "Philosophie der symbolischen Formen", 1923-1929)."
122. Wirth, Ingeborg. 1965. *Realismus und Apriorismus in Nicolai Hartmanns Erkenntnistheorie. Mit einer Bibliographie der seit 1952 über Hartmann erschienenen Arbeiten*. Berlin: De Gruyter & Co.
123. Wolandt, Gerd. 1963. "Hartmanns Weg zur Ontologie." *Kant Studien* no. 54:304-316.
124. ———. 1982. "Nicolai Hartmanns Systematik." In *Nicolai Hartmann 1882-1982*, 290-305. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.