

Theory and History of Ontology ([www.ontology.co](http://www.ontology.co)) by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: [rc@ontology.co](mailto:rc@ontology.co)

## Selected bibliography on Heidegger's Interpretation of *Aletheia* as Unconcealment

### Contents of this Section

#### History of Truth in Western Philosophy

This part of the section [History of Truth in Western Philosophy](#) includes the following pages:

#### History of Truth from Descartes to Heidegger

Descartes's Definition of Truth (under construction)

Leibniz's Definition of Truth (under construction)

#### Martin Heidegger on *Aletheia* (Truth) as Unconcealment

Selected bibliography on Heidegger's Interpretation of *Aletheia* as Unconcealment  
(Current page)

#### Heidegger's main texts on *Alétheia* and *Veritas*

Abbreviations: GA = Gesamtausgabe (Collected works); SS = Summer semester (from May to July); WS = Winter semester (from November to February)

In his work *Besinnung* (GA 67 p. 107), Heidegger give a list of nine texts where he examines the question of truth (I cite from the English translation, *Mindfulness*, translated by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary, New York, Continuum, 2006, pp. 89-90:

"Question of Truth: A directive.

1. *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (lecture of 1930) (1); in addition, interpretation of the simile of the cave in the lecture-course of 1931/32 (2)
2. *Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks* (Freiburg lecture of 1935) (3)
3. *Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerks* (Frankfurt lectures of 1936) (4)
4. *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (lecture of 1937/38) (5)
5. *Die Grundlegung des neuzeitlichen Weltbildes durch die Metaphysik* (lecture of 1938) (6)
6. *Anmerkungen zu Nietzsches II. Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung, Abschnitt VI Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit*, lecture-seminar of 1938/39 (7)
7. Lecture course of summer semester of 1939 (Nietzsche, *Wille zur Macht*, III. Buch, Der Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis) (8)
8. *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, 1936, section: *Gründung* (9)
9. *Zu Aristoteles, Physik B 1 (physis)*, third term of 1940, pp. 22 ff. (10)"

Notes:

- (1) To appear in *Vorträge*, GA 80.
- (2) See *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Hölengleichnis und Theätet*, lecture in the summer semester of 1931/32, GA 34, ed. Hermann Mörchel (Frankfurt am Main: 1988).
- (3) To appear in *Vorträge*, GA 80.
- (4) See *Holzwege*, GA 5, pp. 1-74.
- (5) See *Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik"*, lecture in the winter semester of 1937/38, GA 45 ed. F.-W. v. Hermann (Frankfurt am Main: 1984).
- (6) Published under the title "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", in *Holzwege*, GA 5, pp. 75-113.
- (7) See *Zu Auslegung von Nietzsches II: Unzeitgemasse Betrachtung*, lecture-seminar in Freiburg in the winter semester 1938/39, GA 46, ed. Hans-Joachim Friedrich (Frankfurt am Main: 2003).
- (8) See *Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis*, lecture of the summer semester of 1939, GA 47 ed. Eberhard Hanser (Frankfurt am Main: 1989).
- (9) See *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, GA 65, ed. F.-W. v. Hermann (Frankfurt am Main: 1989) pp. 293-392.
- (10) On the 'fore-concept' of 'metaphysics', elucidated out of Aristotle's concept of *physis* see *Metaphysik und Wissenschaft*, to appear in GA 76.

The following is a more complete list in chronological order; references are to the German edition of the complete works by Martin Heidegger.

The first date is that of the Gesamtausgabe volume, English translation are cited when available.

1. Heidegger, Martin. 1989. *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Ausarbeitung für die Marburger und die Göttinger Fakultät (1922)*  
First German edition 1989; new edition Stuttgart, Reclam, 2003.  
*Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle. An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation*, in: Martin Heidegger, *Supplements. From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, edited by John van Buren, New York: State University of New York Press, 2002, pp. 111-145.  
On *Aletheia* see: *Eth. Nic. VI*, pp. 129-145.
2. ———. 1994. *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*  
Lecture course at the University of Marburg, WS 1923-1924.  
GA 17, 1994.  
*Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, Bloomington: translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Indiana University Press, 2005.  
See Chapter Four: *Going Back to Scholastic Ontology: the VerumEsse in Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 120-147.
3. ———. 1992. *Platon, Sophistes*  
Lecture course at the University of Marburg, WS 1924-1925.  
GA 19, 1992.  
*Plato's Sophist*, translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.  
See in particular:  
Preliminary Considerations § 3. First Characteristic of *alétheia* pp. 10-13.  
Introductory Part: The Securing of *alétheia* as the Ground of Plato's Research into Being. Interpretation of Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* Book VI and Book X, Chapters 6-8; *Metaphysics* Book I, Chapters 1-2, pp. 15-155.
4. ———. 1976. *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*  
Lecture course at the University of Marburg, WS 1925-1926.  
GA 21, 1976.  
*Logic. The Question of Truth*, translated by Thomas Sheehan, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2010.  
Translated in Italian as: *Logica. Il problema della verità* by Ugo Maria Ugazio - Milano, Mursia, 1986.
5. ———. 1977. *Sein und Zeit*  
First edition 1927. GA 2, 1977.  
*Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (1962); reprinted Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.

Also translated by Joan Stambaugh, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996.

See § 44: *Dasein, Disclosedness, and Truth*

- a) The traditional conception of truth, and its ontological foundations;
- b) The primordial phenomenon of truth and the derivative character of the traditional conception of truth;
- c) The kind of being which truth possesses, and the presupposition of truth.

6. ———. 1996. *Einleitung in die Philosophie*  
Lecture courses at the University of Freiburg, WS 1928-1929.  
GA 27, 1996.  
Not translated in English.  
Italian translation: *Avviamento alla filosofia*, edited by Maurizio Borghi with the collaboration of I. De Gennaro and G. Zaccaria, Milano: Christian Marinotti Edizioni, 2007.  
See Chapter 3: *Wahrheit und Sein. Vom ursprünglichen Wesen der Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit* pp. 68-124.
7. ———. 1967. *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*  
Lecture given in 1930, first edition 1943.  
Reprinted in: *Wegmarken (Essays 1919-1961)*, 1967 pp. 177-202.  
GA 9, 1976. Revised and expanded 1978.  
*On the Essence of Truth*, in: Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, edited by William McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 136-154.
8. ———. 1982. *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie*  
Lecture course at the University of Freiburg, SS 1930.  
Ga 31, 1982.  
*The Essence of Human Freedom. An Introduction to Philosophy*, translated by Ted Sadler, New York: Continuum 2002.  
See: Chapter Two, § 9, d, *The Greek Understanding of Truth (alétheia) as Deconcealment. The Being which is True (aléthes on) as the Most Proper Being. The Most Proper Being as the Simple and Constantly Present*. pp. 65-74.
9. ———. 1988. *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*  
Lecture course at the University of Marburg, WS 1931-1932.  
GA 34. 1988.  
*The Essence of Truth. On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*, translated by Ted Sadler, London, New York: Athlone Press, 2002.
10. ———. 1967. *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*  
Lecture of 1931/32 revised 1940; first edition 1942, then in 1947 with the *Brief über den Humanismus*.  
Reprinted in: *Wegmarken (Essays 1919-1961)*, 1967 pp. 203-238 (second edition 1978 pp. 421-438).  
GA 9, 1976. Revised and expanded 1978.  
*Plato's Doctrine of Truth*, in: Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, edited by William McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 155-182.
11. ———. 2001. *Sein und Wahrheit. 1. Die Grundfrage der Philosophie. 2. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.*  
*Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*. Lecture course at the University of Freiburg, WS 1933-1934.  
GA 36/37 2001.  
*On the Essence of Truth*, in: *Being and Truth*, translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
12. ———. 1953. *Einführung in die Metaphysik*  
Lecture course at the University of Freiburg, Summer Semester 1935.  
GA 40, 1983 (First edition 1953).  
*Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.  
See Chapter Four: *The restriction of Being*, in particular pp. 107-122 and 201-210.

13. ———. 1977. *Der Ursprung der Kunstwerkes*  
 Written in 1935-36, first edition in: *Holzwege* pp. 1-72, 1950. GA 5. 1977.  
*The Origin of the Work of Art*, in: *Off the Beaten Track*, translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, pp. 1-56.  
 Index: a) The thing and the work; b) The work and truth; c) Truth and art; d) Afterword; e) Appendix.  
 This essay is also translated in *Basic Writings*, edited by David F. Krell, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, (second expanded edition 1993, pp. 139-212) and in: *Poetry, Language, Thought*, translated by Albert Hofstadter, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, pp. 15-86.
14. ———. 1984. *Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik"*  
 Lecture course at the University of Freiburg, WS 1937-38.  
 GA 45, 1984.  
*Basic Questions of Philosophy. Selected "Problems" of "Logic"*, translated by by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.  
 See: Chapter 3. *The Laying of the Ground as the Foundation for Grasping an Essence*, pp. 69-94; Chapter 4. *The Necessity of the Question of the Essence of Truth, on the Basis of the Beginning of the History of Truth*, pp. 95-134.
15. ———. 1989. *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*  
 Written 1936-1938.  
 GA 65, 1989.  
*Contributions to Philosophy: from Enowning*, translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.  
 See: Section V. *Grounding*, c) *The Essential Sway of Truth*, §§ 204-237.
16. ———. 1997. *Besinnung*  
 Written 1938-1939.  
 GA 66. 1997.  
*Mindfulness*, translated by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary, New York: Continuum, 2006.  
 See Section V. *Truth and Knowing-Awareness*, §§ 35-47.
17. ———. 1982. *Parmenides*  
 Lecture course in the University of Freiburg, WS 1942-1943.  
 GA 54 1982.  
*Parmenides*, translated by Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
18. ———. 1979. *Heraklit. 1. Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens (Heraklit) 2. Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos*  
 Lecture courses at the University of Freiburg, SS 1943 and SS 1944.  
 GA 55 1979.  
*Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking. Logic. Heraclitus' Teaching of the Logos*, translted by Marnie Hanlon, New York: Continuum, 2013.  
 Translated in Italian by Ugo Franco Camera: *Eraclito. L'inizio del pensiero occidentale. Logica. La dottrina eraclitea del Logos*, Milano: Mursia, 1993.
19. ———. 2000. *Alétheia (Heraklit, Fragment 16)*  
 Written in 1951, first edition in: *Vortrage und Aufsätze* 1954 (Essays 1936-1953).  
 GA 7, 2000. pp. 249-274.  
*Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16)*, in: *Early Greek Thinking*, translated by David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1975, pp. 102-123.
20. ———. 1967. *Hegel und die Griechen*  
 Written in 1958.  
 First edition in: *Wegmarken* (Essays 1919-1961), 1967 pp. 255-272 (second edition 1978 pp. 421-438).  
 GA 9, 1976. Revised and expanded 1978.

- Hegel and the Greeks*, in: *Pathmarks*, edited by William McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 323-336.
21. ———. 2007. *Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens*  
Written in 1964, originally published in French as: *La fin de la philosophie et la tâche de la pensée* in: Jean Beaufret et François Fédier, (eds.), *Kierkegaard vivant*, Paris: Gallimard, 1966, p.167-204.  
First German edition in: *Zur Sache des Denkens*, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1969, pp. 61-80.  
GA 14, 2007.  
*The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*, in: *On Time and Being*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, New York: Harper & Row, 1972, pp. 55-73; reprinted Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
22. ———. 1986. *Vier Seminare. Seminar in Le Thor 1966, 1968, 1969, Seminar in Zähringen 1973*  
First edition in: *Seminare (1951-1973)*, 1977.  
GA 15, 1986.  
*Four Seminars: Le Thor 1966, 1968, 1969, Zähringen 1973*, translated by Andrew Mitchell and François Raffoul, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.  
See: *Parmenides: The Well-rounded, Unshaking Heart of Truth*, pp. 94-97.

### Selected bibliography on *Alétheia* in Heidegger's works

1. Adkins, Arthur W.H. 1962. "Heidegger and Language." *Philosophy* no. 37:229-237.
2. Agnello, Chiara. 2006. *Heidegger e Aristotele: verità e linguaggio*. Genova: Il Melangolo.
3. Bambach, Charles. 2003. *Heidegger's Root. Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

See in particular Chapter 1.IV "*On the Essence of Truth*" and the subterranean philosophy pp. 38-45 and Chapter 4.Ii. *Heidegger's Elegy of Aletheia and the Greek beginning* pp. 189-195.

4. Bassler, O.Braldey. 2001. "The birthplace of thinking: Heidegger's late thoughts on tautology." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 17:117-133.
5. Beaufret, Jean. 2002. "Le sens de la philosophie grecque." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 18:23-43.
6. Berti, Enrico. 1990. "Heidegger e il concetto aristotelico di verità." In *Herméneutique et ontologie. Mélanges en hommage à Pierre Aubenque*, edited by Brague, Rémi and Courtine, Jean-François, 97-120. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

"Heidegger seeks to show the purely revelatory nature of the concept of truth when applied to the intellection of essences which, in 0 10. A. distinguishes this from the truth of judgements. In his 1925-6 course on logic (*Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*) Heidegger follows Bonitz in adding a negation (*ouk*) at 1051 b 32-3 and thus reading the passage as saying, 'with respect to these things, we search for what a thing always is and not whether it has this nature or not'. This negation is not to be found in any manuscript and may derive from a comment by pseudo-Alexander, who wanted to see in this passage an allusion to the vision of God. But, for Aristotle the intellection of essences too is infallible in the sense that the only alternative is ignorance. It is expressed in a definition and so does require that we enquire into whether it has this nature or not."



7. ———. 1997. "Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit dem platonisch-aristotelischen Wahrheitsverständnis." In *Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, edited by Richter, Ewald, 89-106. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
8. ———. 2000. "I luoghi della verità secondo Aristotele: un confronto con Heidegger." In *I luoghi del comprendere*, edited by Melchiorre, Virgilio, 3-27. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
9. ———. 2005. "Heidegger and the Platonic concept of truth." In *Heidegger and Plato: toward dialogue*, edited by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 96-107. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
10. Bertuzzi, Giovanni. 1991. *La verità in Martin Heidegger. Dagli scritti giovanili a Essere e tempo*. Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano.
11. Biemel, Walter. 1952. "Heideggers Schrift *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*." *Symposion. Jahrbuch für Philosophie* no. 3:473-508.
12. ———. 1994. "Marginal notes on Sallis's peculiar interpretation of Heidegger's *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*." In *The path of Archaic Thinking: Unfolding the Work of John Sallis*, edited by Maly, Kenneth. Alabany: State University of New York Press.
13. Boeder, Heribert. 1997. "Heideggers Vermächtnis zur Unterscheidung der *Alétheia*." In *Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, edited by Richter, Ewald, 107-123. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
14. ———. 1998. "Heidegger's legacy: on the distinction of '*Alétheia*'." *Research in Phenomenology* no. 28:195-210.
15. ———. 2003. "Das Wahrheits-Thema in der Ersten Epoche der Philosophie." *Sapientia* no. 58:5-22.

"The purpose of the article is a reassessment of Heidegger's central and dominating assertion on the role of *aletheia* in the origin of Occidental thought. It demands an epoché that allows for transcending resolutely his stance in the horizon of modernity -- as achieved by the distinction of the tasks of "reason" realized in its either "natural" or "mundane" or "conceptual" determination (cfr. H. Boeder, "Seditions", State University of New York Press 1997, ed. by Marcus Brainard). Only the latter has introduced the topic of *aletheia* into philosophy; contrary to Heidegger's assumption of an original concealment of *physis*. Not this, but the thematization of a primary *logos* and its divine revelation motivated the Parmenidean discussion of truth as distinct from human opinion. How then does Heidegger approach the truth in the first epoch of philosophy? Only seemingly. In truth -- *quod erat demonstrandum* -- he deviates in each case and obliterates its motive thoroughly. He fulfills the modern destiny of thought not to recognise the achievement in conceptual thinking. His is an apocalyptic destiny, that he shares with Marx and Nietzsche -- not approaching to any fulfillment, but exhaustion. In this he is of admirable consequence: that of the "evil eye" (Nietzsche). It dooms necessarily, what was formerly regarded as "metaphysics". What enables to dismiss this assessment properly? In one word: the epoché due to "logo-tectonics".

16. Boutot, Alain. 1987. *Heidegger et Platon. Le problème du nihilisme*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Chapitre III a): *La mutation dans l'essence de la vérité* pp. 184-216.

17. Brancacci, Aldo. 1990. "Le vrai et le droit: la notion d'*orthon* chez Mélissos." In *La naissance de la raison en Grèce. Actes du Congrès de Nice, mai 1987*, edited by Mattéi, Jean-François, 197-206. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

"Dans sa *Platons Lehre* Heidegger a consacré des pages fort intéressantes à la mise en évidence du concept d'*orthotés*, dont le philosophe allemand retrouve, à tort, la première formulation chez Platon. Il est bien connu que, pour Heidegger, l'instauration de la notion

de *Richtigkeit* marquerait l'avènement d'une primauté de l'*idea* sur l'*aletheia*: donc la constitution d'un concept de "cohérence" qui se substituerait à la notion de vérité comme dévoilement (*Unverborgenheit*). Dans cette perspective, l'*orthotés* en viendrait à exprimer l'adéquation entre le percevoir et l'énoncer, le se diriger (*Sichrichten*) qui se conforme (*gleicht an*) à ce qui doit être vu (*was gesichtet sein soll*), condition préalable d'une conception de la vérité comme *adaequatio* (19). Les textes de Mélissos que j'ai examinés montrent combien cette interprétation -- qu'Heidegger lui-même a rétractée dans un écrit de 1964, sans pourtant mettre en question la compréhension du concept d'*orthotés* qu'elle suppose (20) -- doit être revue et repensée. En effet, si l'on peut admettre que la constitution de la notion d'*ôrthón* est liée à l'instauration d'une conception du vrai qui pose le Sujet par rapport à l'Objet, il n'en reste pas moins que cette notion apparaît comme la conséquence de la thèse ontologique elle-même, qui l'engendre nécessairement et dont elle continue de dépendre. En d'autres termes, c'est à partir des thèses éléatico-mélissiennes qui posent l'être que s'élabore un concept d'*orthon* envisagé comme le critère qui rend possible la connaissance, ou qui la rendrait possible au cas où le *ghinoskein* aurait comme objet la réalité: *ta onta*. Dans les deux cas, la notion de relation est une notion centrale et désigne tantôt un lien positif, constitutif, entre le principe de la réalité et l'articulation de l'être en concepts, tantôt l'échec de la relation qui s'instaure, au sein d'un monde dépourvu de fondement ontologique, entre les facultés de la connaissance et leur objet, entre la réalité, toujours présupposée, et son apparaître. Dès lors, je crois être en mesure de conclure que le concept mélissien de rectitude exprime une notion éminemment catégoriale: *orthon*, entendu donc en tant qu' "orthogonalité", où Sujet et Objet sont à la fois unis et distincts." pp. 205-206

19. Cf. M. Heidegger, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*, Bern, 1954, p. 42.

20. Cf. M. Heidegger, *La fin de la philosophie et la tâche de la pensée*, in *Questions IV*, tr. fr. J. Beaufret et F. Fédier, Paris, 1976, p. 111-139.

18. Brasser, Martin. 1997. *Wahrheit und Verborgenheit. Interpretation zu Heideggers Wahrheitstänndnis von "Sein und Zeit" bis "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit"*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
19. Brogan, Walter A. 2005. *Heidegger and Aristotle. The Twofoldness of Being*. Albany: State University Of New York Press.

See *The Sophist Course: Aristotle's Recovery of Truth After Plato*, pp. 169-178 and *The 1925-1926 Logik Course: Aristotle's Twofold Sense of Truth* pp. 178-187.

20. Campbell, Richard. 1984. "Heidegger: truth as *Alétheia*." *Dialectic* no. 23:1-13.

Reprinted in: Robin Small (ed.) - *A hundred years of phenomenology: perspectives on a philosophical tradition* - Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001 pp. 73-88

21. Caputo, John. 1988. "Demythologizing Heidegger: *alétheia* and the history of Being." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 41:519-546.

Reprinted in: John D. Caputo - *Demythologizing Heidegger* - Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 9-38.

22. Chiereghin, Franco. 1984. "Essere e Verità. Note a *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* di Martin Heidegger." In. Trento: Verifiche.
23. Courtine, Jean-François. 1990. "Le platonisme de Heidegger." In *Heidegger et la phénoménologie*, 129-158. Paris: Vrin.

"Conférence prononcée à Rome (Institut Goethe 1988)"; pp. 151-158.

24. ———. 1992. "Une difficile transaction: Heidegger, entre Aristote et Luther." In *Nos Grecs et leurs modernes*, edited by Cassin, Barbara, 337-362. Paris: Seuil.

25. ———. 1992. "The preliminary conception of phenomenology and of the problematic of truth in *Being and Time*." In *Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments. Vol I. Philosophy*, edited by Macann, Christopher, 68-93. New York: Routledge.
26. ———. 1996. "Les "Recherches logiques" de Martin Heidegger: De la théorie du jugement à la vérité de l'être." In *Heidegger 1919-1929. De l'herméneutique de la facticité à la métaphysique du Dasein*, edited by Courtine, Jean-François, 7-31. Paris: Vrin.

Actes du colloque organisé par Jean-François Marquet (Université de Paris-Sorbonne, novembre 1994)

27. Dahlstrom, Daniel. 2001. *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
28. ———. 2003. "The Clearing and its Truth: reflections on Tugendhat's criticisms and Heidegger's concessions." *Études Phénoménologiques* no. 37-38:3-25.
29. Dostal, Robert J. 1985. "Beyond Being: Heidegger's Plato." *Journal of The History of Philosophy* no. 23:71-98.

Reprinted in: Christopher E. Macann (ed.) - *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments* - Vol. II. *History of philosophy* - New York, Routledge, 1992 pp. 61-89.

"Heidegger's attack on metaphysics is equivalently an attack on Platonism. Brief comments about Plato are not uncommon in Heidegger's published works, but there is only one published essay devoted exclusively to a text of Plato: *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*.

This essay's principal thesis is that Plato transformed the notion of truth from unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*) to correctness. Though this was written at a time (1930/31) when Heidegger's thought was making the famed and controverted turn (*Kehre*), the critique of Plato remains essentially the same throughout Heidegger's work. There is, of course, the late concession in *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking* that "the assertion about the essential transformation of truth [in Plato] ... from unconcealment to correctness is... untenable." But, as we will see below, this does not alter Heidegger's unrelenting critique of Plato. Unlike other aspects of Heidegger's work, his Plato critique has not elicited widespread discussion, presumably because he himself wrote so little on Plato. The best responses to Heidegger's essay on Plato have come from those close to and sympathetic with Heidegger's work yet unsympathetic with his Plato interpretation."

30. Doz, André. 1990. "Heidegger, Aristote et le thème de la vérité." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 1:75-96.
31. Escoubas, Éliane. 1988. "Heidegger, la question romaine, la question impériale: autour du 'Tournant'." In *Heidegger: Question ouvertes*, edited by Escoubas, Éliane, 173-188. Paris: Éditions Osiris.
32. ———. 1992. "Heidegger and the Imperial question." In *Martin Heidegger. Critical assessments - Vol. IV*, edited by Macann, Christopher, 145-158. New York: Routledge.
33. Fóti, Véronique M. 1992. "Aletheia and oblivion's field: on Heidegger's *Parmenides* Lectures." In *Ethics and Danger. Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought*, edited by Scott, Charles E., Dallery, Arleen B. and Holley, Roberts P., 71-82. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"Martin Heidegger insists, in his 1941-42 lecture course on Friedrich Hölderlin's "Andenken," that it is the poet who institutes (*stiftet*) history, whereas the thinker establishes its foundation (*grundet*). In his *Parmenides* lectures of the following year, Heidegger interlinks this poetico-philosophical understanding of historical origination



with the problematic of *aletheia* which, by his own account, had preoccupied him intensely since the early 1930s, and which he then still understood in the sense of truth, rather than in the later sense of the pure opening (*Lichtung*). Although, as Jürgen Habermas points out, Heidegger "rigidly maintained the abstraction of historicity (as the condition of historical existence itself) from actual historical processes," his effort to think historicity as rooted in the aletheic "power to bring to word," which he pits against "a crude biological interpretation of history" (PL 83), carries historicopolitical import. This import and concern are not explicitly thematized; but they account for the fact that, as Manfred Frings notes, "long stretches of the lecture hardly deal with Parmenides himself" but seem to ramble over a bewildering plethora of topics. Frings advocates conjoining the text with Heidegger's 1943-44 lectures on Heraclitus which continue to develop a similar problematic. The present essay, however, will focus strictly on the Parmenides lectures. It will seek to show not only that this text is meaningfully organized and internally coherent, but also that it reveals certain important aspects of the historicopolitical dimension of Heidegger's thought." pp. 71-72 (notes omitted).

34. Franck, Didier. 2004. "De l'*aletheia* à l'*Ereignis*." In *Heidegger l'énigme de l'être*, edited by Mattéi, Jean-François, 105-130. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
35. Friedlander, Paul. 1969. *Plato. An Introduction*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Second edition, with revisions (First edition 1958).

Translated from the German *Platon: Seinswaheheit und Lebenswirklichkeit*, 3 vols. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1954 by Hans Meyerhoff: I. An introduction [2d edition with revisions]; II. The Dialogues, First Period; III. The Dialogues, Second and Third periods.

First German edition 1928: Platon. I. Eidos, Paideia, Dialogos; II. Die platonischen schriften; second revised edition 1954; third revised edition Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 1964: I. Seinswahrheit und Lebenswirklichkeit; II. Die platonischen Schriften, erste Periode; III. Die platonischen Schriften zweite und dritte Periode.

See in the First volume the Chapter XI: *Alétheia*. A discussion with Martin Heidegger, pp. 221-229.

36. Frings, Manfred, ed. 1968. *Heidegger and the Quest for Truth*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
37. ———. 1974. "Protagoras Re-discovered: Heidegger's Explication of Protagoras' Fragment." *Journal of Value Inquiry* no. 8:112-123.

"This paper is written against the background of Heidegger's grasp of the destruction of metaphysics and its end in Nietzsche's concept of world, history and values through absolute subjectivity (over-man). It traces pre-socratic thought in light of the absence of subjectivism in Protagoras by showing how his fragment deals with being and nothingness, not with subjective relativism (sophism). Heidegger's identification of 'aletheia' and 'chaos' (Hesiod) is complemented by a novel look at the origin of language and myth."

38. ———. 1988. "Parmenides: Heidegger's 1942-1943 Lecture Held at Freiburg University." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 19:15-33.

"In what follows, I wish to present a number of essentials of Heidegger's lecture, originally entitled, "Heraclitus and Parmenides," which he delivered at Freiburg University in the Winter Semester of 1942/1943. This was at a time when the odds of World War II had turned sharply against the Nazi regime in Germany. Stalingrad held out and the Germans failed to cross the Volga that winter. Talk of an impending "invasion" kept people in suspense. Cities were open to rapidly increasing and intensifying air raids. There wasn't much food left.

It is amazing that any thinker could have been able to concentrate on pre-Socratic thought at that time. In the lecture, there are no remarks made against the allies; nor are there any to be found that would even remotely support the then German cause. But Communism is hit hard once by Heidegger, who says that it represents an awesome organization-mind in our time.

There are two factors that somewhat impeded my endeavor of presenting the contents of this lecture:

1. Heidegger had originally entitled the lecture "Heraclitus and Parmenides." The 1942/43 lecture was followed in 1943 and 1944 by two more lectures on Heraclitus. When I read the manuscripts of the 1942/43 lecture for the first time, I was stunned that Heraclitus was mentioned just five times, and, even then, in more or less loose contexts. I decided that the title of the lecture should be reduced to just "Parmenides" in order to accommodate the initial expectations of the reader and his own thought pursuant to having read and studied it.

2. While reading the lecture-manuscripts for the first time, another troubling technicality came to my attention: long stretches of the lecture hardly even deal with Parmenides himself, and Heidegger seems to get lost in a number of areas that do, *prima facie*, appear to be irrelevant to Parmenides. And Heidegger was rather strongly criticized for this in the prestigious literary section of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* to the effect that it was suggested that I could have done even better had I given the lecture an altogether different title and omitted the name Parmenides."

(Notes omitted).

39. ———. 1990. "Heraclitus: Heidegger's 1943 Lecture Held at Freiburg University." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 21:250-264.

"In what follows I wish to present the pivots of thought of the second of three lectures on Pre-Socratic thought Heidegger held during the period of 1942-1944. The content of the first, *Parmenides*, was covered in this Journal's Vol. 19, No. 1 (January 1988). When Heidegger delivered the second lecture that we are about to familiarize ourselves with, he was fifty-five years of age, and yet to live another thirty-three. During this remaining time of his life he gained global attention, albeit not always acceptance of his thought.

The summer of 1943 during which the second Pre-Socratic lecture was delivered, entitled: *Heraclitus. The Inception of Occidental Thought*, was marked by the end of the African and Sicilian campaigns of World War II, the breakdown of the German-Italian axis, and Mussolini's downfall. As was the case with the 1942/43 *Parmenides* lecture, Heidegger appears to have secluded himself from the turmoil of the War. His thought appears to dwell near the Inception of Western thought, out of which his own time, too, must have grown.

As I indicated at the beginning of the transferring into English of the pivotal points of the *Parmenides* lecture, the three lectures - as can clearly be seen from what follows - must be studied, and comprehended, in conjunction with one another in order to fully comprehend his doubtless novel contribution to the study of the Pre-Socratics.

On Heidegger's own invitation in 1976, I edited this second, and the third (1944) Heraclitus lectures for Vol. 55 of the German *Gesamtausgabe* (Collected Edition). Concerning the general state of the manuscript involved, I wish to refer the reader to my technical remarks to the coverage of the *Parmenides* lecture.

The last of the three Pre-Socratic lectures by Heidegger, entitled: *Logic. Heraclitus' Doctrine of Logos* (1944), will also appear in this Journal."

40. ———. 1991. "Heraclitus: Heidegger's 1944 Lecture Held at Freiburg University." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 22:64-82.

"There are two crucial points to be made concerning our third pre-Socratic lecture:

(1) The main goal of the 1943 Heraclitus lecture had been to establish an arrangement of ten Heraclitian fragments in terms of "thinking proper" (*eigentliches Denken*). Heidegger thought through ten fragments of which the second through the tenth were "falling into", as I then put it, the first, namely, Diels fragment 16. This "first" fragment we showed to be not "first" in terms of a sequence; rather, it showed itself as both center for, and surrounding the other eight. Further, it was shown that Heidegger's first fragment (16) does not "contain" the rest, but that it is "nearest" the "inception" itself of thinking-proper. Thus, the arrangement of the nine fragments falling into the scope of 16 ensued from thinking-proper, and neither from logical nor speculative argument.

(2) By contrast, the present 1944 Heraclitus lecture does not continue on from what had in 1943 been achieved. Heidegger does not investigate further fragments in the light of the exceptional, and inceptual, significance of fragment 16. Surprisingly enough, in 1944 fragment 16 is mentioned only three times (320, 350, 391). Instead, he now tells us that he will check into fragments "chosen" because of their containing the word "logos". This very different, now objective procedure brings with it that the 1944 lecture is only loosely tethered to the preceding two lectures which, we saw, are much intertwined. One such loose tether was already hinted at in the coverage of the 1943 lecture when we stated: "Logic, too, cannot match thinking proper. It cannot reach into the inception from which its own territory arises. The next 1944 Heraclitus lecture will have to say a lot more on this point." Some of the other links to the previous lectures will be shown in what follows.

The first 1943 Heraclitus lecture I divided into two parts in its German edition in Volume 55 of the Collected Works (Gesamtausgabe). I, on the other hand, divided the manuscripts of the 1944 lecture into three parts. Heidegger left it to the judgment of the editors that such divisions and other minor emendations be made to secure the maximum of clarity. My threefold division of the manuscripts will guide us in the following coverage of the lecture:

1. Logic: Its Name and Subject-Matter.
2. The Staying-Away of Original Logos and the Paths of its Access.
3. Regress into the Original Region of Logic."

41. ———. 1991. "Heidegger's Lectures on Parmenides and Heraclitus (1942-1944)." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 22:197-199.

"This is a discussion of the coverage of three Lectures Heidegger held on Parmenides and Heraclitus from 1942 to 1944. It is designed on the background of his personal experience during the trip he made to Greece in 1962 as recorded in his diary. The question is raised whether his 1943 arrangement of 10 Heraclitus fragments could be extended by "refitting transformations" of other fragments. The three Lectures are seen as tethered to Heidegger's 1966/67 Heraclitus Seminar. Central to his trip was the island of Delos where he seemingly experienced the free region of Aletheia. A "fragment" in his diary is suggested as a motto for all three Lectures."

42. Fritsche, Johannes. 2005. "With Plato into the *Kairos* before the *Kehre*: on Heidegger's different interpretatons of Plato." In *Heidegger and Plato: toward dialogue*, edited by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 140-177. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

43. Galston, William. 1982. "Heidegger's Plato: a critique of Plato's doctrine of truth." *Philosophical Forum* no. 13:371-384.
44. Gattinara, Giulio. 1995. "Heidegger interprete di Platone ovvero la traduzione errante." *Aufidus* no. 9:71-97.
45. Gethmann, Carl Friedrich. 1989. "Heideggers Wahrheitskonzeption in seinen Marburger Vorlesungen. Zur Vorgeschichte von *Sein und Zeit* (§ 44)." In *Martin Heidegger: Innen- und Assenansichten*, 101-150. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Reprinted in: Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Wrathall (eds.) - *Truth, realism and the history of Being* - Heidegger reexamined - vol. II - New York, Routledge, 2002, pp. 21-52.

Translated in Italian as: *La concezione della verità nello Heidegger di Marburgo* - in: Stefano Poggi, Paolo Tomasello (eds.) - *Martin Heidegger. Ontologia, fenomenologia, verità* - Milano, LED, 1995, pp. 329-355.

46. Giordani, Alessandro. 2001. *Il problema della verità. Heidegger vs Aristotele*. Milano: Vita e Pensiero.
47. Gonzalez Escudero, Santiago. 1983. "Una precision sobre el *es* en Parmenides." *El Basilisco* no. 15:62-70.
48. Gordon, Haym, and Gordon, Rivca. 2006. *Heidegger on Truth and Myth: A Rejection of Postmodernism*. New York: Peter Lang.
49. Greisch, Jean. 1983. "La déesse vérité. Histoire du plus long oubli." In *La Vérité*, edited by Greisch, Jean, 43-60. Paris: Beauchesne.
50. Greve, Jens. 2000. "Heideggers Wahrheitskonzeption in 'Sein und Zeit': Die Interpretationen von Ernst Tugendhat und Carl Friedrich Gethmann." *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* no. 54:256-273.

"First, it is shown that Gethmann has raised a convincing objection to Tugendhat's interpretation, according to which, Heidegger's definition of truth goes beyond that given by Husserl. Contrary to Tugendhat's view, Gethmann argues that Heidegger has not moved away from Husserl's definition of truth. Gethmann claims that Heidegger rather uses "truth" with two different meanings, one referring to the truth of assertions, whereas the second ("truth in a more primordial sense") describes the preconditions for the first. Secondly, with regard to this relationship, it is argued that Heidegger and Gethmann cannot provide an adequate analysis, primarily because truth in the primordial sense does not account for the difference between being true or false."

51. Grieder, Alfons. 1988. "What Did Heidegger Mean by 'Essence'?" *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 19:64-89.

"The word 'Wesen' ('Essence') frequently occurs in Heidegger's writings. It is indeed one of his key-words. Unless we understand what he means by it we are unlikely to understand his philosophy. After all, philosophy was for him essential thinking (*wesentliches Denken*). Yet 'Wesen' is also one of his most enigmatic terms and greatly in need of elucidation, despite the fact that he commented on its meaning in many places, scattered throughout his writings, from the thirties right through to the seventies. It is not only tedious to collect these comments but, as we shall soon see, difficult to understand and adequately interpret them.

In the following I shall focus on the three periods 1925-30, 1934-38, and 1949-57. In all three periods Heidegger's meaning of 'Wesen' is inseparable from that of 'Sein' ('Being') and 'Wahrheit' ('Truth'), and by the fifties its connection with 'Language', 'World' and 'Thing' assumes a new significance. From the mid-thirties he uses the word in an increasingly unfamiliar and puzzling manner. Its change of meaning is closely associated with the famous 'turn' ('Kehre'). One has to come to grips with this metamorphosis,

otherwise what the later Heidegger has to say, for instance on art and technology, will hardly be intelligible.

Unfortunately, few commentators have bothered to analyse this term 'Wesen', and to my knowledge none has done so in sufficient detail and in a way which makes sense to the uninitiated too. Obviously, little is achieved by simply repeating Heideggerian phrases and assertions as if they were crystal-clear. (As a rule they are not at all.) I am aware, of course, that the following remarks and analyses are still in some sense provisional and cannot fill this important gap in the Heidegger literature: they will almost certainly have to be complemented and revised in the light of the many still outstanding volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe*."

52. Grondin, Jean. 1982. "L' *alétheia* entre Platon et Heidegger." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 87:551-556.
53. Gurtler, Gary M. 2007. "Commentary on Gonzalez." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 23:112-117.
54. Hahn, Robert. 1979. "Truth (*alétheia*) in the context of Heidegger's critique of Plato and the Tradition." *Southwest Philosophical Studies* no. 4:51-57.

"According to Heidegger, the Pre-Socratic experience of "truth" as "unconcealment" is transformed by Plato so that "truth" becomes "correctness of perception" -- this marks both the origin of the "western tradition" and its decline. The paper examines Heidegger's "fourfold", a twentieth century expression of truth as "unconcealment", as a constructive response to the shortcomings of the "Tradition". Finally it is suggested that one way of reading what I call the "fourfold" in Plato's "Philebus" and "Timaeus" is to see Plato's project as the very one which Heidegger sets out to accomplish and which he denies to Plato."

55. Harrison, Bernard. 1991. "Heidegger and the Analytic Tradition on Truth." *Topoi* no. 10:121-136.
56. Hatab, Lawrence. 1990. "Rejoining *Alétheia* and Truth: or Truth is a Five-Letter Word." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 30:431-447.
57. Heitsch, Ernst. 1970. "Platon und das Problem der Wahrheit." In *Durchblicke. Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag*, edited by Klostermann, Vittorio, 207-234. Frankfurt: Klostermann.
58. Helting, Holger. 1997. "*A-létheia* Etymologien vor Heidegger im Vergleich mit einigen Phasen der *a-létheia* Auslegung bei Heidegger." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien*:93-107.
59. ———. 2006. "*Alétheia*." In *Heidegger und die Antike*, edited by Günther, Hans-Christian and Rengakos, Antonios, 47-70. München: Beck.
60. Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von. 2002. *Wahrheit, Freiheit, Geschichte. Eine systematische Untersuchung zu Heideggers Schrift 'Vom Wesen der Wahrheit'*. Frankfurt: Klostermann.
61. Hestir, Blake E. 2003. "A "conception" of truth in Plato's *Sophist*." *Journal of The History of Philosophy* no. 41:1-24.
62. Hyland, Drew. 1995. *Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic Dialogues*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

See Chapter 6: *Truth and Finitude: On Heidegger's reading of Plato* pp. 139-163.

63. ———. 2004. *Questioning Platonism. Continental interpretations of Plato*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

See Chapter One: *Heidegger's Plato* pp. 17-122.



"I shall begin with Heidegger's early (winter semester, 1924-25) lecture course on Plato's *Sophist*, where Heidegger, still very strongly under the influence of Husserlian phenomenology, interprets Plato (and Aristotle) largely from the standpoint of the existent to which they prepare the way for something like philosophy as scientific research in the phenomenological mode. From this vantage point, as we shall see in detail, Plato is to be criticized as falling far short of Aristotle. Since this is the only work of Heidegger's that engages in a thorough interpretation of an entire Platonic dialogue, I shall examine it in the greatest detail. The second text to be considered will be, significantly, Heidegger's only formally published work on Plato, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," from 1931 to 1932 (although I shall also consider briefly several lecture courses from the same time period). There, Plato will again be criticized, but this time more as the thinker who begins the fateful transformation of *aletheia*, truth as "unhiddenness," into truth as "correctness," and so the beginning of the "forgetting of Being" that becomes the Western metaphysical tradition. As such, Plato's thinking is, so far as possible, to be got beyond, if not indeed overcome. Later, as Heidegger becomes more oriented toward the poetical and even mythic, both in his writing style and the matters he addresses, he becomes somewhat more sympathetic to Plato and to the dialogue form, while remaining in the end still profoundly suspicious of Plato's thought. I shall consider third, then, an example from this later, more poetic period in Heidegger's thinking, his 1943-44 lecture course on *Parmenides*. I shall there suggest that Heidegger's own movement away from philosophy as science and toward a more poetic way of thinking ought to make him much, much more sympathetic to Plato than he in fact becomes. Finally, I shall consider two works of Heidegger's in which Plato is never mentioned, but in which it might be argued that the influence of Plato is -- or ought to be -- most apparent: Heidegger's two later attempts at writing dialogues, the "Dialogue with a Japanese," and "Conversation on a Country Path." There, we shall evaluate Heidegger's engagement not so much with his assessment of Plato's so-called doctrines, but with the Greek's choice of writing format." pp. 17-18

64. Inwood, Michael. 2005. "Truth and untruth in Plato and Heidegger." In *Heidegger and Plato: toward dialogue*, edited by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 72-95. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
65. Izquierdo Labeaga, José Antonio. 1993. "Nove definizioni di verità. L' "alétheia" nel confronto tra Heidegger e Tommaso." *Il Cannocchiale* no. 3:3-52.
66. Jeanmart, Gaele. 1998. "Le concept de vérité dans les interprétations hégélienne et heideggérienne et l'allégorie de la caverne." *De Philosophia* no. 14:19-38.

"This paper is devoted to the methodological concept of truth and that the discrepancy between Heidegger's *alétheia* and Hegel's absolute *Wahrheit* will induce opposite interpretations of a major philosophical text."

67. ———. 1999. "*Episteme* et *amathia*: le tournant dans la conception platonicienne du langage: lecture heideggérienne du *Cratyle*." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 17:109-133.
68. Kisiel, Theodore. 1993. *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

See in particular: Part II. *Confronting the ontological tradition*. Chapter 6. *Aristotle again: from Unconcealment to Presence* (1923-24) pp. 276-308.

69. Kisiel, Theodore, and Sheehan, Thomas, eds. 2007. *Becoming Heidegger. On the trail of his early occasional writings, 1910-1927*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
70. Kockelmans, Joseph, ed. 1972. *On Heidegger and Language*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
71. Krell, David Farrell. 1975. "On the Manifold Meaning of *Alétheia*: Brentano, Aristotle, Heidegger." *Research in Phenomenology* no. 5:77-94.

Reprinted in D. F. Krell, *Intimations of Mortality. Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being*, University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 1986, pp. 67-79 with the title: The Manifold Meaning of *Alétheia*.

"Do the intimations of mortality in Heidegger's thought evanesce once he has abandoned the project of fundamental ontology? Or does the object of his fundamental ontology — finite existence as the site of all understanding of Being endure even after the meta ontological and frontal ontological turns? Does not the site of such understanding of Being, broaching as it does the questions of the *truth* and the *clearing* of Being, persist in bearing traces of finitude? That truth is always accompanied by untruth, and clearing by concealing and withdrawal — are these not also intimations of mortality in Heidegger's work?

The following three chapters will try to trace these intimations in Heidegger's interpretation of truth as *alétheia* and of the clearing of Being as revealing concealing. They will do so by focusing on three quite specific themes: first, Heidegger's early "discovery" of the question of "truth" and "being" in Brentano's Aristotle: second, the burgeoning notion of "the clearing" in *Being and Time* and in the later work; and third, the question of the imputed "turning" from Man to Being in Heidegger's career of thought.

Let me now address the first of these themes. One of the four senses attributed to "being" in Franz Brentano's dissertation on Aristotle is *on hós aléthes*, "being in the sense of the true." Does Brentano's account of "being in the sense of the true" have significant bearing on Heidegger's response to *alétheia* as the unconcealment of beings in presence? This chapter tries to answer that question by offering (1) a general account of Brentano's thesis, (2) a detailed résumé of its third chapter, concerning *on hós aléthes*, (3) a condensed treatment of what John C. Caputo has called Heidegger's "alethiological" notion of Being, and (4) a summary of results." (p. 67)

72. Kusch, Martin. 1988. "Husserl and Heidegger on meaning." *Synthese* no. 77:99-127.
73. Lafont, Cristina. 2000. *Heidegger, language, and World-Disclosure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Revised and updated edition translated from German by Graham Harman.

Original edition: *Sprache und Welterschliessung* - Verlag am Main, Suhrkamp, 1994.

See in particular Chapter 3: *World-Disclosure and Truth* pp. 109-175.

74. Maly, Kenneth. 1985. "Parmenides: circle of disclosure, circle of possibility." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 1:5-23.
75. ———. 1990. "From Truth to *Alétheia* to Opening and Rapture." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 6:27-42.
76. Margolis, Joseph. 2005. "Heidegger on Truth and Being." In *Heidegger and Plato: toward dialogue*, edited by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 121-139. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
77. Martel, Christoph. 2008. *Heideggers Wahrheiten*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
78. Martineau, Emmanuel. 1986. "Le 'coeur' de l' *alétheia*." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 4:33-86.
79. Marx, Werner. 1971. *Heidegger and the Tradition*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Translated from the German: *Heidegger und die Tradition: Eine problemgeschichtliche Einführung in die Grundbestimmungen de Seins* (1961) by Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene.

See Part III. *The basic traits of Being in the first beginning* - Chapter 4: *Alétheia* pp. 145-152.

80. McGaughey, Douglas R. 1976. "Husserl and Heidegger on Plato's Cave Allegory: a study in philosophical influence." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 16:331-348.

"A historical discussion of the intellectual relationship between Husserl and Heidegger and an analysis of articles on Plato's cave allegory by Heidegger and Fink demonstrates: (1) that Heidegger's project is true to (not contrary to) the spirit of Husserl's phenomenology by its being a more radical quest into "presuppositions" questioning the "givenness" of the structure of intentionality; (2) Fink's "what does the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl want to accomplish," throws light on the discussion of Bildung in Heidegger's "Plato's doctrine of truth." Fink and Husserl perceive the allegory as primarily concerned with "education;" Heidegger perceives the "unsaid" of the shift in the essence of truth from *aletheia* to *adaequatio intellectus et rei*, indicating a difference of focus for both projects rather than contradictions between them; and (3) essay concludes by suggesting that an adequate "phenomenological" description of the constituting of meaning in consciousness requires sensitivity to both moments: Husserl's description of intentionality and Heidegger's Seinfrage."

81. McGrath, Sean J. 2003. "Heidegger and Duns Scotus on Truth and Language." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 57:339-358.
82. Mikulic, Borislav. 1987. *Sein, Physis, Alétheia: zur Vermittlung und Unmittelbarkeit im ursprunglichen Seinsdenken Martin Heideggers*. Würzburg: Königshausen Neumann.

In particular Chapter II. *Sein und Wahrheit* pp. 59-119.

83. Morrison, James C. 1969. "Heidegger's criticism of Wittgenstein's conception of truth." *Man and World* no. 2:551-573.

Reprinted in: Harold A. Durfee (ed.) - *Analytic philosophy and phenomenology* - The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, pp. 125-146.

"In *Being and Time* Heidegger characterizes the traditional concept of truth, which comprises three theses:

- (1) The 'place' of truth is the statement (the judgment).
- (2) The essence of truth lies in the 'correspondence' of the judgment with its object.
- (3) Aristotle held theses (1) and (2).

In a later work, *On the Essence of Truth*, he gives the following account of the traditional concept of truth. "A statement is true if what it means and says corresponds with the thing about which it speaks. Also we say here : it agrees (*es stimmt*). But now, what agrees is not the thing but rather the proposition." (p. 7).

Heidegger goes on to say that this agreeing has a twofold character "... on the one hand the agreement of a thing with is meant in advance about it and on the other hand the correspondence of what is meant in the statement with the thing." (*ibid.*) That is, since the agreement or correspondence is a relation between two "terms" -- the statement and the thing

presupposes that both terms can enter into the relation, i.e., agree with one another. The two-fold character of this agreement is determined by these two "aspects" of the relation: the first is the "objective" aspect, where the thing corresponds to the statement or what is meant by the statement, the second is the "linguistic" aspect where the statement or what

it means corresponds to the thing. The first is "objective truth," the second "propositional truth."

In this essay I propose to discuss Heidegger's first two theses about the traditional concept of truth (1) and (2) above in terms of Wittgenstein's own concept of truth as it is presented in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. My main purpose in doing so is to see to what extent Heidegger's criticism of this concept is relevant to Wittgenstein and what this criticism really is. That is, I wish to generate a philosophical "dialogue" between these two thinkers who, on the face of it, are worlds apart in their philosophical methods, aims, interests, and conclusions. Many philosophers today, especially those in the English-speaking world, would seriously doubt the possibility of such a dialogue. Even if they admitted that Heidegger's views are meaningful and important they might suppose that what he says is not really relevant to the kinds of problems Wittgenstein, or any other philosopher sharing his philosophical tradition, is concerned with. Thus, my first task is to show what Heidegger says about the traditional concept of truth is relevant to Wittgenstein. Second, in order to show the force of his criticisms they must be presented in such a way that they can be seen to meet Wittgenstein on his own terms. To achieve this a mere confrontation of two opposing philosophical positions must be avoided, at least so far as this is possible. Such an arbitrary confrontation would simply beg the question and lead nowhere. Rather, it must be shown that Heidegger's criticisms point out the inadequacies of Wittgenstein's position from within, and that these inadequacies point to, and can only be overcome by, Heidegger's own position. Heidegger's criticism of the traditional ("correspondence") theory of truth is that it is ultimately inadequate, i.e., it is only a partial and hence dependent explication of the nature of truth, and thus requires a foundation in a radically different understanding of truth, which understanding Heidegger claims to provide. Thus, I must try to show the nature of, and reasons for, this partiality and dependence. In the end, I hope to have indicated why a radically new rethinking of the essence of truth is necessary, and that Heidegger himself has opened up the path for this rethinking. I have of this paper. I will begin by discussing thesis (2) (above) - that the essence of truth is a correspondence between judgment and object - and will then turn to thesis (1) -- that the "place" of truth is the judgment. However, I wish to emphasize that this division is adopted only for the purposes of exposition. It will be seen that they are both intimately related, and that this relationship is a necessary one." (Notes omitted). pp. 125-127 of the reprint.

84. Naas, Michael. 1999. "Keeping Homer's word: Heidegger and the epic of truth." In *The Presocratics after Heidegger*, edited by Jacobs, David C., 73-99. Albany: State University of New York Press.
85. Nwodo, Christopher. 1979. "Friedlander versus Heidegger: A-létheia Controversy." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 10:84-93.

"Professor Heidegger is certainly one of the leading philosophers, perhaps the leading philosopher of our time. He has influenced, and continues to influence, in a profound and far-reaching manner, the thinking of contemporary scholars in various fields. He has also given rise to many a controversy particularly in connection with the way he interprets other philosophers and the basic concepts of traditional philosophy. In this article (1) some attempt will be made to analyze one (2) such controversy, namely, Professor Friedlander's disagreement with Heidegger over the latter's interpretation of *a-letheia*. This paper is therefore divided into three parts. Part One deals with a brief analysis of Friedlander's criticism. Part Two attempts a short sketch of the development of the concept of *a-letheia* in the two works of Heidegger cited by Professor Friedlander. Part Three concludes with an evaluation of both views.

Friedlander's criticism is limited to two works of Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (1927) (3) and *Platons Lehre Von der Wahrheit* (1947), (4) where Heidegger deals with the concept of *aletheia*. In these works Heidegger reconstructs *alethes* and *aletheia* as *a-lethes* and *a-letheia* (with the *alpha* privative). Furthermore, he construes the Greek *a-letheia*, as truth



not in the sense of a correspondence or correctness, but as unconcealment or unhiddenness.

In PLW Heidegger claims that the primordial meaning of *a-letheia* was unconcealment and that the current interpretation of it as correspondence is a form of degeneration. More specifically, he situates the beginning of this degeneration in Plato's allegory of the cave (Chapter Seven of the *Republic*). A reasonable thing to do as a contribution to philosophy and to truth would be to reverse this process of degeneration in order to retrieve the original and therefore authentic meaning." p. 84

1. This article developed out of a section of Christopher S. Nwodo: *A Study of Martin Heidegger's Thinking on Art: With Special Reference to "The Origin of the Work of Art."* Louvain University, unpublished doctoral thesis, 1974, pp. 252-257.

2. The word "one" is used in a double sense here. First of all, the *a-letheia* controversy is only one among many. There are others over *Logos* and *Physis*. See J. L. Mehta: *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*, New York, Harper & Row, 1971, p. 46 note 65. Secondly, Paul Friedlander's criticism is not the only one concerning *a-letheia*, G. Kruger is also involved. See Mehta, Ibid.

3. *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1963 (1 Auflage 1927) (Hereafter SZ). English translation, *Being and Time* by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York, Harper & Row, 1962 (7th edition), (Hereafter BT)

4. *Platons Lehre Von der Wahrheit, mit einem Brief über den "Humanismus"*, Bern, Switzerland, Verlag A. Francke, 1954 (1 Auflage 1947), (Hereafter PLW). English translation, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" by John Barlow in *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* edited by Barrett and Aiken, New York, Harper & Row paperback edition, 1971. Vol. III, pp. 173-192, (Hereafter ET).

86. Paredes, Mara del Carmen. 2005. "*Amicus Plato magis amica veritas*: reading Heidegger in Plato's Cave." In *Heidegger and Plato: toward dialogue*, edited by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 108-120. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
87. Partenie, Catalin, and Rockmore, Tom, eds. 2005. *Heidegger and Plato. Toward Dialogue*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
88. Pellicchia, Fausto. 1990. "Martin Heidegger. *Essenza e verità*." *Filosofia e Teologia* no. 4:119-132.

"The essay concerns two central themes of Heidegger's meditation on the essence of truth, which, intertwining and reacting on each other since the era of *Sein und Zeit*, lead to the *Kehre* of asking what implicitly underlies the lecture *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*:

1) the impossibility of the theory, as a genuine discourse on truth, which discounts within its own structure the essence of truth as an auto-presupposition and which inevitably removes the problem;

2) the radical non-identity and, at the same time, co-appendage of *aletheia* and "truth" (*adaequatio*), that obstructs all dialectical "overcoming", in which it still would act as the presupposition of *aletheia* as the truth of "truth"; rather it refers to impropriety and to intimate discarding, concealed in the very possibility (essence) of the *adaequatio*, which the intellect must assume positively as truth of essence (being)."

89. Peperzak, Adriaan T. 1993. "Heidegger and Plato's Idea of the Good." In *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, edited by Sallis, John, 258-285. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

"Heidegger's interpretation of Plato, as defended in his publications from 1927 until 1932 and in "Plato's doctrine of truth" (1942) is analyzed and criticized, especially with regard



to "aletheia, paideia, idea" and "to agathon". Heidegger's characterization of Plato's thinking as "metaphysics" is challenged and some consequences of a different interpretation are indicated."

90. Philippousis, John. 1976. "Heidegger and Plato's notion of truth." *Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review*:502-504.

"This short discussion tries to re-examine Heidegger's famous interpretation of Plato's notion of "truth" ("Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit") and, proposing a new interpretation of the Platonic idea in the myth of the cave, It reaches the conclusion that Plato himself understood the notion of *aletheia* not as exactitude (*orthotes*) but as the unfolding of the *ousia* itself."

91. Polt, Richard. 1996. "Heidegger's topical hermeneutics: the *Sophist* lectures." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 27:53-76.

Reprinted in: Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Wrathall (eds.) - *Truth, realism and the history of Being - Heidegger reexamined* - vol. II - New York, Routledge, 2002, pp. 53-76.

92. Power, Anne-Marie. 1998. "Truth and aletheia in Heidegger's thought." *De Philosophia* no. 14:109-120.

"In response to the controversy in the tradition concerning Heidegger's treatment of truth, I argue that Heidegger's early approach to that concept parallels his later approach to language, both of which seek the broader foundation of our common notions. I show that Heidegger takes us behind "truth as adequation" towards a more primordial conceptualization which is rooted in the Greek term, *aletheia*. Time and translation have deprived that word of much of its original meaning, but Heidegger holds that a deeper understanding of truth requires our recapturing its lost sense."

93. Proimos, Constantinos. 2002. "Reading Platonic and Neoplatonic notions of mimesis with and against Martin Heidegger." In *Neoplatonism and the Arts*, edited by Cheney de Girolami, Liana and Hendrix, John, 65-80. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

"Analyses some of the reasons for Heidegger's condemnation of the Platonic theory of mimesis, which goes hand in hand with the German philosopher's preference for *aletheia* (non-representational "unhiddenness") over *orthotes* (correctness of representation) in the theory of truth. Yet Heidegger underestimates such Neoplatonists as Plotinus, who also criticizes and transforms Platonic mimesis."

94. Radloff, Bernhard. 2000. "Heidegger's critique of Imperial truth." *Existential. An International Journal of Philosophy* no. 10:51-68.

"With particular reference to Heidegger's *Parmenides* of 1942-43, and to the *Contributions to Philosophy*, the author argues that Heidegger offers a critique of imperialism as founded in the transformation of truth from *aletheia* to *veritas*. The "imperial" implicates the falseness and subjection of nature, and of a subject population, to the "imperial subject" of modernity. The

argument of the essay is especially unfolded by reference to the political projects of Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, and concludes that modern technology, and imperial, socio-technical discourses, are intimately linked."

95. ———. 2007. *Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism. Disclosure and Gestalt*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

*Conclusion: Imperial Truth and Planetary Order* pp. 411-428.

96. Richardson, William J. 1963. *Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

With a preface by Martin Heidegger.

97. Riedel, Manfred. 1996. "Verwahrung und Wahrheit des Seins. Heideggers ursprüngliche Deutung der *Alétheia*." In *Denken der Individualität. Festschrift für Josef Simon zum 65. Geburtstag*, edited by Majetschak, Stefan and Hoffmann, Thomas Sören, 275-293. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
98. Rioux, Bertrand. 1963. *L'être et la vérité chez Heidegger et Saint Thomas d'Aquin*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
99. Ruggenini, Mario. 2001. "Veritas e aletheia. La Grecia, Roma e l'origine della metafisica cristiano-medioevale." *Quaestio. Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics* no. 1:83-212.
100. Sallis, John. 1994. "The truth that is not of knowledge." In *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought*, edited by Kisiel, Theodore and Buren, John van, 381-392. Albany: State University of New York Press.
101. Schuh, Franzjosef. 1957. *Aletheia, Vorläufige Untersuchungen zu einer phänomenologischen Destruktion der Seinsgeschichte der Griechen als materiale Vorarbeiten zu einer neuen Bestimmung der Wahrheit als die Idee des Menschen*.

Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis.

102. Schüssler, Ingeborg. 2001. *La question de la vérité. Thomas d'Aquin, Nietzsche, Kant, Aristote, Heidegger*. Lausanne: Editions Payot.

Table des matières: Introduction 5; Première partie: La question de la vérité dans l'histoire de la philosophie. Thomas d'Aquin, Nietzsche, Kant, Aristote Chapitre I. La fondation du concept traditionnel de la vérité chez Thomas d'Aquin. *De Veritate, Quaestio I, Articuli I-II* 19; Chapitre II. L'expérience de la perte de la vérité chez Nietzsche *Fragments choisis* 43; Chapitre III. La fondation transcendentale de la vérité chez Kant. L'essence des concepts *a priori* de l'entendement ou des catégories. *Critique de la raison pure, § 9 e § 10* 80; Chapitre IV. La double essence de la vérité chez Aristote. *Métaphysique, Livre VI, chapitre 4; Livre IX, chapitre 10* 119; Seconde partie: La répétition de la question de la vérité dans la pensée postmétaphysique de Heidegger. *Textes choisis* 167

Indications bibliographiques 287-297.

103. Segura Peraita, Carmen. 2002. "La crítica de Heidegger a la noción tradicional de verdad (desde *Sein und Zeit* hasta los *Beiträge zur Philosophie*). " *Pensamiento* no. 58:255-272.
104. Shin, Sang-Hie. 1993. *Wahrheitsfrage Und Kehre Bei Martin Heidegge*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
105. Sousa, Rui de. 2000. *Martin Heidegger's interpretation of ancient Greek alétheia and the philological response to it*, Mc Gill University, Montreal.

Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express ref. number NQ69866.

Abstract: "This thesis tries to provide a critical review of Heidegger's interpretation of ancient Greek truth in the different stages of his career and it also examines the philological response that his work on this question elicited. The publication of *Sein und Zeit* made Heidegger's views on *alétheia* available to a wide public and thereby launched a heated debate on the meaning of this word. The introduction tries to give an account of the general intellectual background to Heidegger's interpretation of ancient Greek truth. It also looks at the kind of interpretative approach favored by the philologists responding

to Heidegger's views on *alétheia*. The thesis first examines his arguments on ancient Greek truth and language in *Sein and Zeit* from the point of view of the larger philosophical project of Heidegger's seminal work. It then looks at some initial philological responses to Heidegger along with Heidegger's views on *alétheia* in a few works following the publication of *Sein and Zeit*. As a next step, the bulk of the philological work responding to Heidegger is carefully examined with a special focus on the interpretative approaches of the various authors. Heidegger's attempt to respond to some of these philologists is also reviewed. Finally, Heidegger's retraction of his earlier views on *alétheia* is examined in light of a growing critical consensus among philologists. The very latest philological responses to Heidegger are also considered. The conclusion looks at the contributions made by Heidegger and his philological respondents to our knowledge of ancient Greek truth. Some suggestions are also made for future research on this topic."

106. Spanos, William V. 2001. "Heidegger's Parmenides: Greek modernity and the Classical legacy." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* no. 19:89-115.

One of Heidegger's most insistent assertions about the identity of modern Europe is that its origins are not Greek, as has been assumed in discourses of Western modernity since the Enlightenment, but Roman, the epochal consequence of the Roman reduction of the classical Greek understanding of truth, as *a-letheia* (un-concealment), to *veritas* (the correspondence of mind and thing). In the Parmenides lectures of 1942-43, Heidegger amplifies this genealogy of European identity by showing that this Roman concept of truth--and thus the very idea of Europe--is also indissolubly imperial. Heidegger's genealogy has been virtually neglected by Western historical scholarship, including classical. Even though restricted to the generalized site of language, this genealogy is persuasive and bears significantly on the conflicted national identity of modern, post-Ottoman Greece. It suggests that the obsessive pursuit of the unitary cultural ideals of the European Enlightenment, in the name of this movement's assumed origins in classical Greece, constitutes a misguided effort to accommodate Greek identity to the polyvalent, imperial, Roman model of the polity that informs European colonial practice. Put positively, Heidegger's genealogy suggests a radically different way of dealing with the question of Greek national identity, one more consonant with the actual philosophical, cultural, ethnic, and political heterogeneity of ancient Greece (what Martin Bernal has called the "Ancient Model") and, thus, one less susceptible to colonization by *Europe*."

107. Stambaugh, Joan. 1992. *The Finitude of Being*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
108. Starr, David E. 1975. *Entity and Existence. An Ontological Investigation of Aristotle and Heidegger*. New York: Burt Franklin & Co. Inc.

See Chapter IV. *Truth and essence in Heidegger's thought* pp. 107-167.

109. Taminiaux, Jacques. 1995. "La mise en oeuvre de l' *aletheia*. Platon, les Présocratiques et Sophocle dans les leçons de Heidegger (1935 et 1942)." In *Le théâtre des philosophes*, 167-237. Grenoble: Millon.
110. Tanzer, Mark Basil. 1999. "Heidegger on Being's oldest name: "to *chreón*"." *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 15:81-96.
111. Tugendhat, Ernst. 1970. *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
112. ———. 1993. "Heidegger's Idea of Truth." In *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, edited by Wolin, Richard, 245-263. London: MIT Press.

English translation by Richard Wolin of: *Heideggers Idee von Wahrheit* - in: Otto Pöggeler (ed.) - Heidegger: *Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werkes* - Königstein, Athenäum, 1984 pp. 286-297

Reprinted also in: Christopher Macann (ed.) - *Critical Heidegger* - New York, Routledge, 1996, pp. 227-240.

113. Versényi, Laszlo. 1965. *Heidegger, Being, and Truth*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
114. Vigo, Alejandro. 1994. "Wahrheit, Logos und Praxis. Die Trasformation der aristotelischen Wahrheitskonzeption durch Heidegger." *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie* no. 1:73-95.
115. Ward, James F. 1995. *Heidegger's Political Thinking*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

See Chapter 6: Politics at/of the Inception: Plato and the Polis pp. 169-204.

116. White, David A. 1974. "Truth and Being: A Critique of Heidegger on Plato." *Man and World* no. 7:118-134.

"Heidegger has carried on many thoughtful "conversations" with the central figures in the Western philosophical tradition. But one of the sources of this tradition - Plato - is an infrequent protagonist in these conversations. Although a quotation from the Sophist heads *Sein und Zeit* and Heidegger alludes to Plato in a variety of contexts, Plato's work as such is the explicit subject of just a single essay. But that essay expounds an especially important set of interpretations in light of Heidegger's conviction that subsequent philosophy has been a series of distorted variations on Platonic themes. Therefore, an evaluation of Heidegger on Plato is crucial for determining the legitimacy of what Heidegger takes as historically "given" when he attempts to rectify these distortions through his own work!"

Heidegger's conversations with other philosophers are notorious for their apparently arbitrary stresses, omissions, and random divinations. For example, he has himself admitted that Kant must be handled "with violence" before the ultimate significance of his philosophy becomes evident. There is substantial evidence to indicate that a "violence" of sorts has been done to Plato as well. But in this case violence is not just wrenching Plato from the shapes which the standard interpreters claim to apprehend. If interpretive violence is required to establish new perspectives on honorable and ancient philosophy, let there be violence. The violence I wish to describe emerges when Heidegger draws inferences from his interpretations of Plato which he claims are incompatible with his own understanding of being (*Sein*), when in fact he has not given arguments to prove that these inferences must be incompatible. The violence is thus of a rather humble logical form. Plato may well be the primary source of the distortions Heidegger finds in the history of Western philosophy. But Heidegger has not given us reasons to accept the subsidiary claim that these distortions necessarily imply that being is distorted for Plato himself.

My evaluation is divided into three parts. Part I is a summary of Heidegger's essay "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit," with references to other works introduced when relevant. Part II is a commentary on the key steps in Heidegger's argument. Part III is a defense of Plato against Heidegger in light of the "violence" just mentioned." (p. 118)

117. Wiplinger, Fridolin. 1961. *Wahrheit und Geschichtlichkeit. Ein Untersuchung über die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit im Denken Martin Heideggers*. Freiburg / München: Verlag Karl Alber.
118. Wolenski, Jan. 2005. "Aletheia in Greek thought until Aristotle." *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* no. 127:339-360.

"This paper investigates the concept of *aletheia* (truth) in ancient philosophy from the pre-Socratics until Aristotle. The meaning of *aletheia* in archaic Greek is taken as the starting point. It is followed by remarks about the concept of truth in the Seven Sages. The author discusses this concept as it appears in views and works of philosophers and



historians. A special section is devoted to the epistemological and ontological understanding of truth. On this occasion, influential views of Heidegger are examined. The paper is concluded by a review of various meanings of truth in Aristotle."

119. Wolz, Henry. 1966. "Plato's doctrine of truth: *orthótes* or *alétheia* ?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 27:157-182.
120. Wrathall, Mark. 1999. "Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence." *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* no. 7:69-88.

Reprinted in: Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Wrathall (eds.), *Heidegger Reexamined*, Vol. II: *Truth, Realism and the History of Being*, New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 1-20.

"I argue in this paper that Heidegger, contrary to the view of many scholars, in fact endorsed a view of truth as a sort of correspondence. I first show how it is a mistake to take Heidegger's notion of 'unconcealment' as a definition of propositional truth. It is thus not only possible but also essential to disambiguate Heidegger's use of the word 'truth', which he occasionally used to refer to both truth as it is ordinarily understood and unconcealment understood as the condition of the possibility of truth. I then show how Heidegger accepted that propositional truth, or 'correctness', as he sometimes called it, consists in our utterances or beliefs corresponding to the way things are. Heidegger's objection to correspondence theories of truth was not directed at the notion of correspondence as such, but rather at the way in which correspondence is typically taken to consist in an agreement between representations and objects. Indeed, Heidegger took his account of unconcealment as explaining how it is possible for propositions to correspond to the world, thus making unconcealment the ground of propositional truth. I conclude by discussing briefly some of the consequences for Heidegger interpretation which follow from a correct understanding of Heidegger's notion of propositional truth."

121. ———. 1999. "The Conditions of Truth in Heidegger and Davidson." *The Monist* no. 82:304-323.

"In this paper I hope to demonstrate that, despite dramatic differences in approach, Analytic and Continental philosophers can be brought into a productive dialogue with one another on topics central to the philosophical agenda of both traditions. Their differences tend to obscure the fact that both traditions have as a fundamental project the critique of past accounts of language, intentionality, and mind. Moreover, writers within the two traditions are frequently in considerable agreement about the failings of past accounts. Where they tend to differ is in the sorts of positive accounts they give. By exploring the important areas of disagreement against the background of agreement, however, it is possible to gain insights unavailable to those rooted in a single tradition.

I would like to illustrate this in the context of a comparison of Heidegger's and Davidson's accounts of the conditions of truth. I begin, however, with a brief discussion of some crucial differences between the Analytic and Continental ways of doing philosophy. An understanding of these differences provides the basis for seeing how Heidegger and Davidson, all appearances to the contrary, in fact follow a parallel course by resisting theoretical attempts at the redefinition or reduction of our pre-theoretical notion of truth. Indeed, both writers believe that truth is best illuminated by looking at the conditions of truth—that is, they both try to understand what makes truth as a property of language and thought possible in the first place. Both answer the question by exploring how, what we say or think can come to have content. I conclude by suggesting that Heidegger's "ontological foundations" of "the traditional conception of truth" can be seen as an attempt at solving a problem which Davidson recognizes but believes is incapable of solution—namely, the way the existence of language and thought presuppose our sharing a finely articulated structure which only language and thought seem capable of producing." p. 304

122. ———. 2004. "Heidegger on Plato, Truth, and Unconcealment. The 1931-32 Lecture on *The Essence of Truth*." *Inquiry* no. 47:443-463.



"This paper discusses Heidegger's 1931-32 lecture course on The Essence of Truth. It argues that Heidegger read Platonic ideas, not only as stage-setting for the western philosophical tradition's privileging of conceptualization over practice, and its correlative treatment of truth as correctness, but also as an early attempt to work through truth as the fundamental experience of unhiddenness. Wrathall shows how several of Heidegger's more-famous claims about truth, e.g. that propositional truth is grounded in truth as world-disclosure, and including Heidegger's critique of the self-evidence of truth as correspondence, are first revealed in a powerful (if iconoclastic) reading of Plato."

123. ———. 2005. "Unconcealment." In *A Companion to Heidegger*, edited by Dreyfus, Hubert and Wrathall, Mark, 337-357. Oxford: Blackwell.
124. ———. 2006. "Truth and the Essence of Truth in Heidegger's Thought." In *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Second edition)*, edited by Guignon, Charles, 241-267. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
125. ———. 2010. *Heidegger and Unconcealment. Truth, Language, and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
126. Zanatta, Marcello. 1990. *Identità, logos e verità. Saggio su Heidegger*. L'Aquila: Japadre Editore.
127. Zarader, Marlène. 1986. "Le miroir au trois reflets. Histoire d'une évolution." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 3:5-32.

Translated as: *The Mirror with the Triple Reflection* in: Christopher Macann (ed.), *Critical Heidegger*, London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 7-26.

128. ———. 1990. *Heidegger et les paroles de l'origine*. Paris: Vrin.

Translated in Italian as: *Heidegger e le parole dell'origine*, Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1997.

129. Ziegler, Susanne. 1991. *Heidegger, Hölderlin und die Alétheia. Martin Heideggers Geschichtsdenken in seinen Vorlesungen 1934/35 bis 1944*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
130. ———. 1994. "Hölderlin unter dem Ausspruch der Alétheia?" *Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien* no. 10:163-182.