

Theory and History of Ontology (www.ontology.co) by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co

Selected bibliography on Husserl's Logic and Ontology (First Part: A - J)

Contents of this Section

This part of the section **Ontologists of 19th and 20th centuries** includes the following pages:

Edmund Husserl: Formal Ontology and Transcendental Logic

Selected bibliography on Husserl's Logic and Ontology:

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Bibliography of Husserl's works

The most complete bibliography is: *Edmund Husserl. Bibliography*, Compiled by Steven Spileers, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1999, VI + 450 pages.

From the *General Introduction*: "This bibliography contains the publications of Husserl and the main secondary literature on Husserl, from Husserl's earliest publication (1887) till today (1997), As the collection of material was concluded in June 1997, the list of publications for the year 1997 if of course incomplete.

In this bibliography publications in the following languages have been included: German, English, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch - for both primary and secondary literature. Since this bibliography has been base primarily on the consultation of the included documents (and not restricted to copying already existing Bibliographies), it was not possible to include publications in languages other than those mentioned."

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Bibliography of the studies on Logic and Ontology

1. Albertazzi, Liliana. 1996. "Material and Formal Ontology." In *Formal Ontology*, edited by Poli, Roberto and Simons, Peter M., 199-232. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
2. Ales Bello, Angela. 1981. "Le problème de l'être dans la phénoménologie de Husserl." In *The Great Chain of Being and Italian Phenomenology*, edited by Ales Bello, Angela, 41-50. Dordrecht: Reidel.
3. Ameriks, Karl. 1977. "Husserl's Realism." *Philosophical Review* no. 86:498-519.
4. Aquila, Richard. 1974. "Husserl and Frege on meaning." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 12:377-383.
5. Bachelard, Suzanne. 1968. *A Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
Translation by Lester E. Embree from the original French edition: *La logique de Husserl. Étude sur Logique formelle et transcendente*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957.
Paperback edition 1989.
6. Balaban, Oded. 2002. "Epoché: Meaning, object, and existence in Husserl's phenomenology." In *Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations, Expanding Dynamisms, Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 103-114. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
7. Banchetti-Robino, Marina. 1997. "Husserl's Theory of Language as Calculus Ratiocinator." *Synthese* no. 112:303-321.
"This paper defends an interpretation of Husserl's theory of language, specifically as it appears in the Logical Investigations, as an example of a larger body of theories dubbed 'language as calculus'. Although this particular interpretation has been previously defended by other authors, such as Hintikka and Kusch, this paper proposes to contribute to the discussion by arguing that what makes this interpretation plausible are Husserl's distinction between the notions of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, his view that meaning is instantiated through meaning-intending acts of transcendental consciousness, and his view that the content of meaning-intending acts is ideal meaning simpliciter. As well, the paper argues that the phenomenological method of reduction itself presupposes the notion that reality as such can be reached by subtracting the influence of the language of the natural attitude and its ontological commitments and it, thus, presupposes the conception of language as a reinterpretable calculus." (p. 303)
8. Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua. 1956. "Husserl's conception of a purely logical grammar." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 17:362-369.
Reprinted in: *Aspects of Language. Essays and lectures on philosophy of language, linguistic philosophy and methodology of linguistics*, Jerusalem: The Magnes Press 1970 pp. 89-97.
Reprinted also in: Jitendra Nath Mohanty, *Readings on Husserl's Logical Investigations*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1977 pp. 128-137.
9. Bégout, Bruce. 2000. *La généalogie de la logique. Husserl, l'antéprédictif et le catégorial*. Paris: Vrin.
"Si le concept husserlien de passivité a fasciné toute une génération de philosophes (Merleau-Ponty, Landgrebe, Levinas, Henry), il a rarement fait l'objet d'une étude qui adopte la perspective du fondateur de la phénoménologie. Husserl considère que la passivité appartient sans reste à la sphère de la constitution et qu'elle consolide par conséquent son transcendantalisme. Loin d'être un domaine de sens irréductible à la rationalité, elle représente même le fondement des opérations de la pensée catégoriale. C'est en son sein que doivent être cherchées les "sources" des formes supérieures de la logique. Toute passive et préconsciente qu'elle soit, l'expérience antéprédictive appartient donc pour Husserl au sujet transcendantal. Ce travail s'attache ainsi à montrer que la genèse du catégorial à partir de l'expérience passive entre dans le projet général de Husserl d'asseoir la

- phénoménologie sur le socle originaire de l'expérience du monde."
10. ———. 2001. "La réverbération logique: la phénoménologie des "Prolégomènes à la logique pure" de Husserl." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 99:564-592.
 11. Bell, David. 1989. "A Brentanian philosophy of arithmetics." *Brentano Studien.Internationale Jahrbuch der Franz Brentano Forschung* no. 2:139-144. The aim of this paper is to identify the main respects in which Husserl's early philosophy, and in particular his early writings on the foundation of arithmetic, were influenced by Brentano's thought. It is claimed that the doctrinal, conceptual and methodological perspective within which Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is conceived and executed (but which remains very largely suppressed in Husserl's texts) is that which he inherited, more or less without modification, from Brentano in the period to which *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, *The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, and the lectures on *Descriptive Psychology* belong. That influence was extensive and profound enough to warrant calling Husserl's philosophy of arithmetic 'Brentanian'."
 12. ———. 1991. *Husserl*. New York: Routledge.
 13. Benoist, Jocelyn. 1995. "La découverte de l'a priori synthétique matériel: au-delà du "quelque chose", le tout et les parties (Recherches Logiques III)." *Recherches Husserliennes* no. 3:3-22.
 14. ———. 1996. "Les *Recherches logiques* de Husserl: Le catégorial, entre grammaire et intuition." In *Phénoménologie et logique*, edited by Courtine, Jean-François, 33-63. Paris: Presses de l'École normale supérieure.
 15. ———. 1997. "De Kant à Bolzano: Husserl et l'analyticité." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 100:217-238.
"In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl uses a concept of "analyticity" that seems quite different from the Kantian one. Analyticity is defined as formal and by the possibility of regular variations, so as in mathematical equations which determine relations between variables. In that matter, Husserl is influenced by Bolzano and is much deeply connected with the Austrian tradition of logical studies than with the transcendental tradition of the German Idealism. But he deals also with the problem that Bolzano left unsolved: if analyticity in the "strict" sense means the logical rule, what does "logical" mean?"
 16. ———. 1997. *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie. Husserl et la tradition logique autrichienne*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
 17. ———. 1998. "Qu'est-ce qu'un jugement? Brentano, Frege, Husserl." *Études Phénoménologiques* no. 14 (27-28):169-192.
 18. ———. 1999. "Y a-t-il une "logique de l'expérience"? Remarques sur le contrat phénoménologique dans les *Recherches logiques*." *Recherches Husserliennes* no. 12:47-76.
 19. ———. 2000. "Husserl entre Brentano et Bolzano: jugement et proposition." *Manuscrito* no. 23:11-39.
 20. ———. 2001. *Intentionnalité et langage dans les "Recherches logiques" de Husserl*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
 21. ———. 2002. "Husserl and Bolzano." In *Phenomenology world-wide: foundations, expanding dynamisms, life-engagements. A guide for research and study*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 98-100. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 22. ———. 2002. "The question of grammar in *Logical Investigations*, with special reference to Brentano, Marty, Bolzano and later developments in logic." In *Phenomenology world-wide. Foundations -- Expanding dynamics -- Life-engagements*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 94-98. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

23. Benoist, Jocelyn, and Courtine, Jean-François, eds. 2003. *Husserl. La représentation vide suivi de Les Recherches logiques, une oeuvre de percée*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
24. Bergmann, Gustav. 1960. "The ontology of Edmund Husserl." *Methodos*:359-392.
25. Bernet, Rudolf. 1990. "Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 21:136-152.
26. ———. 2002. "Different concepts of logic and their relation to subjectivity." In *One hundred years of phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations revisited*, edited by Zahavi, Dan and Stjernfelt, Frederik, 19-29. Dodrecht: Kluwer.
27. Bernet, Rudolf, Kern, Iso, and Marbach, Eduard. 1993. *An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology*.
Original German edition: *Edmund Husserl: Darstellung seines Denkens*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1989.
28. Bernet, Rudolf, Welton, Donn, and Zavota, Gina, eds. 2005. *Edmund Husserl. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*. New York: Routledge.
Five volumes: 1. Circumspections: Classic Essays on Husserl's Phenomenology; 2. The Cutting Edge: Phenomenological Method, Philosophical Logic, Ontology, and Philosophy of Science; 3. The Nexus of Phenomena: Intentionality, Perception, and Temporality; 4. The Web of Meaning: Language, Noema, and Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity; 5. Horizons: Life-World, Ethics, History, and Metaphysics.
29. Beyer, Christian. 2004. "Bolzano and Husserl on singular existential statements." In *Phenomenology and analysis. Essays on Central European philosophy*, edited by Chrudzinski, Arkadiusz and Huemer, Wolfgang, 69-88. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
30. Blecksmith, Richard, and Null, Gilbert T. 1990. "Matrix representation of Husserl's part-whole-foundation theory." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 32:87-111.
"This paper pursues two aims, a general one and a more specific one. The general aim is to introduce and illustrate the use of Boolean matrices in representing the logical properties of one- and (mainly) two-place predicates over small finite universes, and hence of providing matrix characterizations of finite models for sets of axioms containing such predicates.
This method is treated only to the extent required to pursue the more specific aim, which is to consider axiomatic systems involving the part-whole relation together with a relation of foundation employed by Husserl."
31. Bosio, Franco. 1966. *Fondazione della logica in Husserl*. Milano: Lampugnani Nigri.
32. Bostar, Leo. 1994. "Reading Ingarden read Husserl: metaphysics, ontology, and phenomenological method." *Husserl Studies* no. 10:211-236.
33. Bredekamp, Horst. 1999. *Thomas Hobbes visuelle Strategien. Der Leviathan: Das Urbild des modernen Staates*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Traduction française: *Stratégies visuelles de Thomas Hobbes. Le Léviathan, archétype de l'Etat moderne*. Illustrations des oeuvres et portraits. Préface de Olivier Christin, traduit de l'allemand par Denise Modigliani, Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2003.
34. Brisart, Robert. 2002. "Husserl et Bolzano: le lien sémantique." *Recherches Husserliennes* no. 18:3-29.
35. ———. 2002. "La logique de Husserl en 1900 à l'épreuve marbourgeois: la recension de Natorp." *Phänomenologische Forschungen*:183-204.
36. ———, ed. 2002. *Husserl-Frege. Les ambiguïtés de l'antipsychologisme*. Paris: Vrin.
"Chacune des études rassemblées ici se propose de jeter sur les rapports de Husserl et de Frege un regard neuf et surtout exempt des nombreux préjugés qui, jusqu'ici, ont déterminé les diverses «lectures fréguennes de la phénoménologie». En pointant

les différences profondes qui, sous le couvert de quelques similitudes de surface, ont en fait, et de très bonne heure, orienté les deux philosophes sur des voies radicalement opposées, ce recueil permet de se faire une idée plus claire de ce que fut en réalité l'antipsychologisme de Husserl dans tout ce qui le sépare de la version logiciste que lui a donné Frege. De cette manière, il concourt également à apporter quelques éclairages nouveaux sur la question des origines de la philosophie contemporaine."

37. Brockdorff, Cay von. 1932. *Eine Thomas Hobbes zugeschriebene Handschrift und ihr Verfasser. Ein verehrer Thomas Hobbes' als interpret des Aristoteles*. Vol. 1, *Veröffentlichungen der Hobbes-Gesellschaft*. Kiel: K. J. Rössler.
38. ———. 1934. *Die Urform der "Computatio sive logica"*. Vol. 2, *Veröffentlichungen der Hobbes-Gesellschaft*. Kiel: K. J. Rössler.
39. ———. 1934. *Des Sir Charles Cavendish Bericht für Joachim Jungius über die Grundzüge der Hobbes'schen Naturphilosophie*. Vol. 3, *Veröffentlichungen der Hobbes-Gesellschaft*. Kiel: K. J. Rössler.
40. Brown, Charles S. 1991. "Problems with the Fregean Interpretation of Husserl." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 22:53-64.
41. Bruzina, Richard. 2004. *Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink. Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928-1938*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
42. Bucci, Paolo. 2000. *Husserl e Bolzano. Alle origini della fenomenologia*. Milano: Edizioni Unicopli.
43. Buonazia, Sabrina. 1996. "Per una formalizzazione della teoria husserliana dell'intero e della parte." *Rivista di Filosofia* no. 87:287-313.
44. Buongiorno, Federica. 2014. *Logica delle forme sensibili: sul precategoriale nel primo Husserl*. Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura.
45. Bussotti, Paolo. 1997. "Alcune note sulla gnoseologia husserliana della "Philosophie der Arithmetik", con particolare riferimento al concetto di numero." *Teoria* no. 17:119-133.
46. Cairns, Dorion. 1973. *Guide for Translating Husserl*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
47. ———. 1976. *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
48. ———. 2002. "The fundamental philosophical significance of Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*." *Husserl Studies* no. 18:41-49.
49. Caputo, Anselmo. 2000. "Gli "Studi psicologici per una logica elementare" di Husserl." *Aquinas* no. 43:31-62.
50. Casadio, Claudia. 1990. "Husserl e il paradigma mereologico." *Lingua e Stile* no. 25:405-423.
51. Casari, Ettore. 2005. "On Husserl's theory of wholes and parts." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 21:1-43.
 "The strongly innovative theory of whole-parts relations outlined by Husserl in his *Third logical Investigation*-to which he attributed a basic value for his entire phenomenology-has recently attracted a renewed interest. Although many important issues have been clarified (especially by Kit Fine) the subject seems still worth being revisited. To this aim *Husserlian universes* are introduced. These are lower bounded distributive lattices endowed with a unary operation of *defect* and a binary relation of *isogeneity*. Husserl's contents are identified with nonzero elements of a *Husserlian universe* and the *dependence relations among contents* are defined and studied starting from the idea that the defect of *x* is what *x* needs in order to "exist" i.e., in order to be "closed" with respect to the closure operation defined as the sup of *x* and its defect. It turns out that there are (at least) eight dependence relations which are worth to be considered. Many other questions concerning the world of contents (among them the proofs of the famous *Husserl's Satze*) may now be

discussed and clarified. Then the theory of species and genera is developed. Ultimate species (for short: *species*) are identified with equivalence classes of contents *modulo isogeneity*, and species in general (for short: *genera*) are identified with arbitrary unions of *species*. On the basis of the relation obtaining among two contents when they are isogeneous to two contents the first of which is a part of the second it becomes possible to develop a rather satisfying interpretation of Husserl's theory of the *dependencies among species and genera and of the material a priori laws*. By strengthening the notion of Husserlian universe into the notion of *rigid Husserlian universe*, the theory of species and genera obtains a stronger version. Three models of the theory are exhibited. The first one, suggested by combinatorial-topological considerations, identifies contents with finite non-empty sets of natural numbers ; the second one identifies contents with non-empty sets of formulas of a formal language; the third one (not totally "rigid") identifies contents with positive integers."

52. Cavallin, Jens. 1997. *Content and Object: Husserl, Twardowski and Psychologism*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
53. Celis, Raphael. 1996. "Le problème de la mathématisation du savoir dans l'oeuvre tardive de Husserl." *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* no. 128:1-24.
"The distinction established by Husserl in 1913 between formal and material ontology constitutes the theoretical basis needed in phenomenology to mathematize knowledge, and physics in particular. In "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", this distinction appears as a subwork in the sections concerned with Galileo and the birth of modern physics. Through its reformulation. Husserl tried to imagine the foundational range of an eidetic interpretation of nature as entrenched in the "Lebenswelt"."
54. Centrone, Stefania. 2009. *Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the early Husserl*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
55. Cobb-Stevens, Richard. 1990. *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
56. ———. 1994. "The beginnings of phenomenology: Husserl and his predecessors." In *Routledge history of philosophy. Volume VIII: Twentieth-century Continental philosophy*, edited by Kearney, Richard, 5-37. New York: Routledge.
57. ———. 1998. "Two stages in Husserl's critique of Brentano's theory of judgment." *Études Phénoménologiques* no. 14 (27-28):193-212.
58. ———. 2002. "'Aristotelian' themes in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*." In *One hundred years of phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations revisited*, edited by Zahavi, Dan and Stjernfelt, Frederik, 79-92. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
59. Cortois, Paul. 1996. "From Apophantics to Manifolds: the structure of Husserl's Formal Logic." *Philosophia Scientiae* no. 1:15-50.
"A global picture of Husserl's architectonic view of the structure of formal science (including formal mathematics) is offered, as the view got its fullest (yet elliptic) articulation in the first three chapters of *Formale und transzendente Logik* (1929). It is shown how Husserl's understanding of the structure of formal science (abstracting from the latter's subjective foundation) requires the independent consideration of at least three dimensions with respect to the formal, in terms, respectively, of 'approaches', epistemic 'interests', and 'successive layers'. First, there is the dimension of apophantic versus ontological approaches; second, the distinction of combinatorial (syntactic) versus truth (semantic) interest; and third, the consideration of the three layers of pure grammar, derivability relations, and systems or manifold theory. Moreover, it is shown how, in Husserl's view, the virtual identity of apophantic and ontological approaches on the top layer (deductive systems and/or manifolds) is supposed to give a kind of technical (if not philosophical) warrant for the unity of formal science."
60. Courtine, Jean-François. 1996. "L'objet de la logique." In *Phénoménologie et logique*, edited by Courtine, Jean-François, 9-31. Paris: Presses de l'Ecole normale

- supérieure.
61. ———, ed. 1996. *Phénoménologie et Logique*. Paris: Presses de l'Ecole Normale Supérieure.
 62. Crosson, Frederick James. 1962. "Formal logic and formal ontology in Husserl's phenomenology." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 3:259-269.
 63. Cunningham, Suzanne. 1976. *Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
 64. Da Silva, Jairo José. 1999. "Husserl conception of logic." *Manuscrito* no. 22:367-397.
 "This paper presents and discusses Husserl's conception of logic, formal logic in particular. A special emphasis is giving to Husserl's idea of a theory of manifolds as the closure of the thematic field of formal logic. Husserl's own version of logicism in the philosophy of mathematics is also presented and some aspects of his conception of formal logic are highlighted and contrasted with Frege's."
 65. ———. 2000. "Husserl's two notions of completeness. Husserl and Hilbert on completeness and imaginary elements in mathematics." *Synthese* no. 125:417-438.
 "In this paper I discuss Husserl's solution of the problem of imaginary elements in mathematics as presented in the drafts for two lectures he gave in Gottingen in 1901 and other related texts of the same period, a problem that had occupied Husserl since the beginning of 1890, when he was planning a never published sequel to "Philosophie der Arithmetik" (1891).
 In order to solve the problem of imaginary entities Husserl introduced, independently of Hilbert, two notions of completeness (definiteness in Husserl's terminology) for a formal axiomatic system. I present and discuss these notions here, establishing also parallels between Husserl's and Hilbert's notions of completeness."
 66. Dahlstrom, Daniel O., ed. 2003. *Husserl's Logical Investigations*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 67. Dangelmayr, Siegfried. 1974. *Methode und System. Wissenschaftsklassifikation bei Bacon, Hobbes und Locke*. Meisenheim am Glain: Hain.
 68. De Oliveira, Nythamar Fernandes. 2000. "Husserl's phenomenology of meaning in the "Logical Investigations"." *Veritas* no. 45:117-134.
 "This article seeks to show that, although emerging out of a so-called traditional, metaphysical view of language, Edmund Husserl's theory of meaning qua ideal species in the "Logical Investigations" cannot be reduced to the linguistic expression of an essentialist, representational adequation, but rather emphasizes the role of intentionality, the ideality of language, and the constitutive character of consciousness in the fulfillment of "meaning" ("Bedeutung")."
 69. Dougherty, Charles J. 1979. "The significance of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*." *Philosophy Today* no. 23:217-225.
 "The purpose of this paper is to explore Husserl's critique of psychologism and his positive theory of mind against both its historical background and the developments that issued from it. The conclusion of the paper is the claim that Husserl's rejection of psychologism led him to ground logic in a realm of ideal relationships made available by way of a new method of non-reductive analysis, phenomenology. Phenomenological analysis itself is shown to be a methodological expression of a theory of mind as an active participant in the constitution of reality."
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 71. Drummond, John J. 1991. "Willard and Husserl on logical form." In *Phenomenology and the formal sciences*, edited by Seebohm, Thomas, Føllesdal, Dagfinn and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

72. ———. 1998. "From intentionality to intensionality and back." *Études Phénoménologiques* no. 27-28:89-126.
73. ———. 2002. "The *Logical Investigations*: Paving the way to a transcendental logic." In *One hundred years of phenomenology: Husserl's Logical Investigations revisited*, edited by Zahavi, Dan and Stjernfelt, Frederik, 31-40. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
74. ———. 2007. *Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
75. Ducat, Philippe. 1996. "Que veut la "grammaire purement logique" de Husserl?" In *Phénoménologie et logique*, edited by Courtine, Jean-François, 65-81. Paris: Presses de l'École normale supérieure.
76. Dufourcq, Annabelle. 2011. *La dimension imaginaire du réel dans la philosophie de Husserl*. Dordrecht: Springer.
77. Dupré, Louis. 1964. "The concept of truth in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 24:345-354.
"It is stated that Husserl's theory of truth is ambiguous. when Husserl attacked psychological interpretations of truth, a logicism seemed to be predominant; later he inclined toward intuitionism, where truth is constituted by the real presence of the object. Purely logical relations in an eternal order of truth, independent of things, seems to conflict with the idea of evidence, which is a psychological experience. It is concluded that truth is the result of an intuition in which the thing itself is given. Finally, parallels are drawn between Husserl's double truth and Leibniz's truths of reason and truths of fact."
78. Edie, James M. 1987. *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology. A Critical Commentary*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
79. Elliston, Frederick A., and McCormick, Peter, eds. 1977. *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
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Second edition with a new introduction: Seattle: Noesis Press, 2000.
81. English, Jacques. 1996. "Husserl et Hilbert: La phénoménologie est-elle axiomatisable?" In *Phénoménologie et logique*, edited by Courtine, Jean-François, 83-107. Paris: Presses de l'École normale supérieure.
82. ———. 1998. "Pourquoi et comment Husserl en est venu à critiquer Brentano." *Études Phénoménologiques* no. 14 (27-28):51-88.
83. ———. 2002. *Le vocabulaire de Husserl*. Paris: Ellipses.
84. Esfeld, Michael. 1995. *Mechanismus und Subjektivität in der Philosophie von Thomas Hobbes*. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.
85. Farber, Marvin. 1943. *The Foundations of Phenomenology. Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Reprinted with a new introduction, Albany: State University of New York Press 1968.
Reprint of the 1968 edition: Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2006.
86. Fiebig, Hans. 1973. *Erkenntnis und technische Erzeugung. Hobbes' operationale Philosophie der Wissenschaft*. Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain.
87. Fine, Kit. 1995. "Part-Whole." In *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, edited by Smith, Barry and Smith, David Woodruff, 463-485. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
88. Fink, Eugen. 1995. *Sixth Cartesian Meditation. The Idea of a Transcendental Method*. Boomington: Indian University Press.
With textual notations by Edmund Husserl.

- Translated with an introduction by Ronald Bruzina.
89. Fisette, Denis. 1994. *Lecture frégéenne de la phénoménologie*. Combas: Éclat.
 90. ———, ed. 2003. *Husserl's Logical Investigations Reconsidered*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 91. ———. 2010. "Descriptive Psychology and Natural Sciences: Husserl's early Criticism of Brentano." In *Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences: Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl*, edited by Ierna, Carlo, Jacobs, Hanne and Mattens, Filip, 221-253. Dordrecht: Springer.
 92. Fisette, Denis, and Lapointe, Sandra, eds. 2003. *Aux origines de la phénoménologie. Husserl et le contexte des Recherches Logiques*. Paris: Vrin.
 "Douze étude ont été réunies dans ce volume afin de souligner le centenaire de la publication de l'ouvrage séminal de la phénoménologie. Fidèles à la vocation que lui assigne le père de la phénoménologie d'être une oeuvre de percée, ces études ouvrent de nouvelles perspectives sur ce monumental *Grundwerk*. Elles se penchent sur les différents aspects des *Recherches logiques* en portant une attention particulière à son contexte historique, à ses sources (bolzaniennes et brentaniennes) dans la philosophie du XIXe siècle et à sa réception, du Cercle de Munich jusque dans la philosophie britannique."
 93. Flores, Luis. 2002. "Husserl's concept of pure logical grammar." In *Phenomenology world-wide: foundations, expanding dynamisms, life-engagements. A guide for research and study*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 100-103. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 94. Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1972. "An introduction to phenomenology for analytic philosophers." In *Contemporary philosophy in Scandinavia*, edited by Paul, Anthony, Olson, Raymond and Wright, Georg Henrik von, 417-429. Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins Press.
 "Phenomenology is a science of noemata.
 An object, for Husserl, is anything toward which an act can be directed. Not all objects are material; there are also immaterial objects, for example, numbers and the other ideal objects of mathematics.
 Mathematics and all natural sciences, including psychology, are sciences about the objects of our acts. But we have just noticed that in addition to possibly having an object, every act also has a noema. And what Husserl wanted to create with his phenomenology was a new science, a science of noemata.
 Noemata are objects, too. In an act of reflection the noema of one act can be made the object of another act.
 Mathematicians and scientists explore what we experience, the world of nature around us. In the phenomenological reduction we disregard this nature, this world of objects toward which our acts are directed. We do not deny that it is there, as if we were sophists, nor do we doubt that it is there, as if we were sceptics, but we, as it were, put it in brackets. We perform an epoché, Husserl said, borrowing a word which the skeptics of antiquity used to denote abstinence from any judgment. The phenomenologist does not worry about what is or is not in the real world around him. He is not disturbed by the fact that some of our acts have objects, others not, but turns to the noemata of our acts. These are the phenomena he considers. The real world is reduced to a correlative of our acts, which constitute it, bring it forth. All that is transcendent is put in brackets together with the other objects of our acts. What is left, purified of all that is transcendent, Husserl called transcendental. The phenomenological reduction hence leads us from the transcendent to the transcendental.
 Phenomenological analysis-
 The phenomenologist analyzes the noemata of his acts in order to clarify how the world is 'constituted' by his consciousness. He observes that he expects a tree to have a back, to continue to be there if he turns away from it for a moment, and so forth. He studies the structure of the noemata of his acts. He elucidates how his

expectations are arranged in patterns, how new sense impressions can change his expectations and sometimes lead to an 'explosion' of the noemata and make him reject his original supposition about the direction of his act. According to Husserl, phenomenology thereby becomes an analysis of something similar to what Kant called the a priori. If one were to describe phenomenology in brief, it would therefore be this: an investigation of the a priori, the necessary. Its aim is similar to that of many other philosophies from antiquity onward. But its methods, and the general framework of acts, noemata, and objects within which it tries to make sense of this aim, are different.

It is also not difficult to see the close connection between analytic philosophy and phenomenology here. For just as analytic philosophers, especially those of the so-called linguistic variety, analyze meaning, meanings of linguistic expressions, so the phenomenologist analyzes noemata, or meanings of acts in general."

95. ———. 1976. "Husserl's notion of noema." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 20:680-687. Reprinted in: Hunert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (eds.), *Husserl. Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, Cambridge: The MIT Press 1982, pp. 73-80.
96. ———. 1991. "The justification of logic and mathematics in Husserl's phenomenology." In *Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences*, edited by Seebohm, Thomas, Føllesdal, Dagfinn and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 25-34. Dordrecht: Kluwer. "The problem of justifying our beliefs, giving evidence for them, is central in Husserl's phenomenology. In his writings he comes back again and again to the notions of justification and evidence.
Husserl is particularly interested in *perfect* evidence, of which he distinguishes two kinds: adequate evidence, which we have when all our anticipations are filled, and apodictic evidence, which we have when the negation of our judgment is self-contradictory. This emphasis on apodictic and adequate evidence, together with Husserl's concern with philosophy as a strict science and with the possibility of establishing absolutely certain and obvious first premisses, might give us the impression that Husserl was a foundationalist: he wanted to establish a firm foundation for science and philosophy of the kind that Aristotle, Descartes, and many others have been striving for.
However, in this paper I shall argue that in spite of appearances, Husserl was not a foundationalist. He was not even a foundationalist in logic and mathematics,- the classical strongholds of foundationalism; on the contrary he was close to the position that was later put forward by Nelson Goodman and some other "holists". (p. 25)
97. ———. 1994. "Husserl and Frege. A contribution to elucidating the origins of phenomenological philosophy." In *Mind, meaning, and mathematics. Essays on the philosophical views of Husserl and Frege*, edited by Haaparanta, Leila, 3-47. Kluwer: Dordrecht.
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Original edition: *Husserl und Frege. Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der Entstehung der phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Oslo: I kommisjon hos Aschehoug 1958.
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99. ———. 1998. "La notion d'objet intentionnel chez Husserl." In *Jaakko Hintikka: questions de logique et de phénoménologie*, edited by Rigal, Élisabeth, 223-233. Paris: Vrin.
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101. ———. 2004. "Husserl and the Categories." In *Categories: historical and systematic essays*, edited by Gorman, Michael. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.

102. ———. 2020. "Brentano and Husserl on Intentionality." In *Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy*, edited by Fisette, Denis, Frechette, Guillaume and Stadler, Friedrich, 23–48. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
 Abstract: "Brentano's lectures attracted a large number of very gifted students who became fascinated with the idea of intentionality and developed it further in several different directions. Brentano followed up Aristotle's view on our mind taking on the form of the object and he was particularly influenced by Thomas Aquinas' approach. His students struggled with how to deal with acts without objects, for example hallucinations, and proposed different solutions. Husserl tried to agree with his teacher as far as he could. He even regarded agreement with one's teacher as a duty, which could only be forsaken for very good reasons. But he thought he had such reasons. These led him to phenomenology, which is briefly presented in this paper. In a short appendix I use the connection between Aristotle and Husserl to examine the controversy between two prominent Aristotle scholars, Myles Burnyeat (1992) and Richard Sorabji (1974, 1992), and their many followers on both sides concerning the interpretation of Aristotle's theory of perception. The appendix was presented in lectures at conferences in 1995 and 1996, but never sent off for publication.
 It was published in Greek translation in 1997. In the following years, Burnyeat, who died on September 20, 2019, modified his view, probably without knowing about my criticism. As far as I know, Sorabji stands by his view."
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 Sorabji, Richard. 1974. Body and soul in Aristotle. In *Philosophy* 49, pp 63–89. Here quoted from the reprint in Michael Durrant, (Ed.), *Aristotle's De Anima in focus*, London: Routledge, 1993.
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103. Gallerand, Alain. 2013. "L'influence de Bolzano sur l'analyse phénoménologique du langage ordinaire chez Husserl." *Philosophie* no. 120:22-44.
104. ———. 2014. *Husserl et le phénomène de la signification*. Paris: Vrin.
105. Gardies, Jean-Louis. 1985. *Rational Grammar*. München: Philosophia Verlag.
 Translated from the original French: *Ésquisse d'une grammaire pure* - Paris, Vrin, 1975 by Kevin Mulligan.
 "This enlarged version of a book which originally appeared in French in 1975 provides an introduction to the project of a rational grammar, as it was sketched out by Husserl and partially developed by Ajdukiewicz. Besides investigating the nature of grammaticality, the distinction between logic and grammar and the relation of grammatical structure to the communicative functions of language, the author analyzes a large number of grammatical phenomena (names, verbs, conjunctions, adverbs, mood, tense, aspect, etc.)."
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107. Gobber, Giovanni. 1985. "Alle origini della grammatica categoriale. Husserl, Lesniewski, Ajdukiewicz." *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica* no. 77:258-295.
108. Haaparanta, Leila. 1988. "Analysis as the Method of Logical Discovery: Some Remarks on Frege and Husserl." *Synthese* no. 77:73-97.
 "There are not too many philosophers who have tried to give a natural explanation for the miracles of nineteenth century logic. We know that a radically new logic came into being in those days. But little, if anything, has been said about the incentives of these innovations. Hans Sluga and Gottfried Gabriel have stressed and worked on the historical perspective of that remarkable period, and I have tried to

give an answer to the question, as far as Frege's logic is concerned, but much can still be done.(1)

If we wish to solve this interpretational puzzle, it is useful and quite instructive to try to find out how the pioneers of modern logic and the philosophers of logic in the nineteenth century did what they did. That is, we must look for the methods which guided their logical studies. This interpretational task amounts to giving a methodological reconstruction of the work of nineteenth century logicians. This paper is an attempt to find out the methods which Frege and Husserl followed in their logical studies." (p. 73)

(1) See Hans D. Sluga: 1980, *Gottlob Frege*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley; and see also Sluga: 1984, 'Frege: the early years', in R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner (eds.): 1984, *Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 329-56; and 1987, 'Frege Against the Booleans', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 29, 80-98. For Gabriel's views, see his 1984, 'Bedeutung, Value and Truth-Value', *The Philosophical Quarterly* 34, 372-76; and his 1986, 'Frege als Neukantianer', *Kant-Studien* 77, 84-101. My philosophical reconstruction of Frege's conceptual notation can be found in my (1985) book *Frege's Doctrine of Being*, *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 39.

109. ———, ed. 1994. *Mind, Meaning, and Mathematics. Essays on the Philosophical Views of Husserl and Frege*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
110. ———. 1998. "L'analyse comme méthode de justification: quelques remarques sur les études logiques de Husserl." In *Jaakko Hintikka: questions de logique et de phénoménologie*, 234-246. Paris: Vrin.
111. ———. 2006. "Husserl's argument against naturalism and his own foundation of pure philosophy." In *Foundations of the formal sciences IV. The history of the concept of the formal sciences*, edited by Löwe, Benedikt, Peckhaus, Volker and Rasch, Thomas, 69-79. London: College Publications.
112. Hamacher, Hermes Adelheid. 1992. "Debate between Husserl and Voigt concerning the logic of content and extensional logic." *Analecta Husserliana* no. 34.
113. Hanna, Robert. 1984. "The relation of form and stuff in Husserl's grammar of pure logic." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 44:323-342.
114. ———. 1993. "Logical cognition: Husserl's "Prolegomena" and the truth in psychologism." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 53:251-275. "Frege's devastating attack on logical psychologism leaves philosophers of logic in a quandary: If logical propositions exist altogether independently of human acts of thinking, then "how" can they be grasped by thinkers? Husserl's "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" contains a thorough critique of psychologism, but manages to avoid Frege's problem by developing a plausible theory of logical cognition. Husserl's account entails that a) logical propositions are essentially knowable by finite rational minds, but also b) those propositions are irreducible to individual human minds. Hence Husserl shows that there can be a weak form of psychologism that is perfectly consistent with anti-psychologism."
115. Hart, James G. 2004. "Edmund Husserl, *Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis*. Lectures on transcendental logic." *Husserl Studies* no. 20:135-159.
116. Harvey, Charles W., and Shelton, Jim D. 1992. "Husserl's phenomenology and the ontology of the natural sciences." In *Phenomenology of natural science*, edited by Hardy, Lee and Embree, Lester. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
117. Heffernan, George. 1989. "In the beginning was the "Logos": hermeneutical remarks on the starting-point of Edmund Husserl's "Formal and transcendental logic"." *Man and World* no. 22:185-213. "According to the leading commentators and the author himself, Edmund Husserl's "Formal and transcendental logic" is the most important work on phenomenological logic ever written. Nonetheless, it has, in general, gained far less attention than the

- "Logical investigations" and the "Ideas on a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy". In particular, the argument of section 1 of the "Logic", namely, that it is fruitful to start with the meanings of the expression "Logos" in order to develop a genuinely transcendental logic, has received virtually no consideration. This paper takes a step towards filling this empty space by analyzing and criticizing the argument of section 1 as a problem to which (a) solution(s) must be found. Throughout, the paper reads Husserl's "descriptions" as 'arguments' for his positions, thereby avoiding any of the obscurity sometimes infecting work in continental philosophy."
118. ———. 1998. "Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl's Answer to the Question "was die Evidenz sei": A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Evidence on the Occasion of the Publication of Husserliana volume XXX." *Husserl Studies* no. 15:1-75.
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 Contents: Abbreviations IX; Preliminary terminological comments XI; Glossary XIII; Acknowledgments XIV; Introduction 1.
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 Introduction 99; 6. Intensions and extensions 103; 7. Presentation and ideas 125; 8. Function and concept 137; 9. On denoting 147; Conclusion: The way *things* are 163; Notes 175; Bibliography 191; Index 215.
 From the Introduction: "As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is both an early work of phenomenology and of logical empiricism. In it Husserl predicted the failure of Frege's attempt to logicize arithmetic and to mathematize logic two years before the publication of the *Basic Laws of Arithmetic* in 1893. I hope to show that Husserl did so in terms that would prefigure both the account Frege would give of his error after Russell encountered the paradoxes ten years later and the discussions of *Principia Mathematica*. Moreover, in locating the source of Frege's difficulties in the ambiguous theory of identity, meaning, and denotation that forms the basis of Frege's logical project and generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions indicate that these contradictions may have as serious consequences for twentieth century philosophy of language as they have had for the philosophy of mathematics.
 This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth century philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic philosophy, about the transmission of Frege's thought to the English speaking world, and about the relevance of Husserl's early criticism of Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic* to some contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about Husserl the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about Husserl the phenomenologist, and it is principally addressed to those members of the philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic.
 This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and attendant issues. The goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that Husserl flagged and Russell endeavored to overcome. One

possible sequel to this book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying the philosophical ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and his successors." (pp. 3-4)

121. ———. 1994. "Frege's attack on Husserl and Cantor." *Monist* no. 77:345-357.
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 "Few have entertained the idea that Georg Cantor, the creator of set theory, might have influenced Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement. Yet an exchange of ideas took place between them when Cantor was at the height of his creative powers and Husserl in the throes of an intellectual struggle during which his ideas were particularly malleable and changed considerably and definitively. Here their writings are examined to show how Husserl's and Cantor's ideas overlapped and crisscrossed in the areas of philosophy and mathematics, arithmetization, abstraction, consciousness and pure logic, psychologism, metaphysical idealism, new numbers, and sets and manifolds."
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138. Iorio, Marco. 2008. "Thomas Hobbes -- der Aristoteliker Überlegungen zu seiner politischen Philosophie." *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie* no. 94:295-310. "Thomas Hobbes is held to be a radical critic of Aristotelian anthropology and social and political theory. This paper aims to refute this claim. Though there are some significant differences between Aristotle's and Hobbes' point of view, it is not true that Hobbes established a new paradigm of political thought."
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