Selected Bibliography on Husserl's Logic and Ontology (First Part: A - J)

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HUSSERL'S WORKS


From the General Introduction: "This bibliography contains the publications of Husserl and the main secondary literature on Husserl, from Husserl's earliest publication (1887) till today (1997). As the collection of material was concluded in June 1997, the list of publications for the year 1997 if of course incomplete. In this bibliography publications in the following languages have been included: German, English, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch - for both primary and secondary literature. Since this bibliography has been base primarily on the consultation of the included documents (and not restricted to copying already existing Bibliographies), it was not possible to include publications in languages other than those mentioned."


BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE STUDIES ON HUSSERL'S LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY


After pointing out some of the coincidence between Frege and Husserl about the philosophy of numbers and paying less attention to the subject of psychology, in order to understand the differences between the authors, the analysis that each one made on the nature of number are described, showing the most...
evident divergencies. Immediately afterwards, three objections are examined regarding Husserl's position and a crucial criticism is formulated against Frege's method, related to the one discussed by Husserl. Lastly, it is assumed that it is possible to offer a method of analysis that gathers together the most important aspects of both authors points of view and leaving out the most noticeable defects."


Abstract: "This paper defends an interpretation of Husserl's theory of language, specifically as it appears in the Logical Investigations, as an example of a larger body of theories dubbed 'language as calculus'. Although this particular interpretation has been previously defended by other authors, such as Hintikka and Kusch, this paper proposes to contribute to the discussion by arguing that what makes this interpretation plausible are Husserl's distinction between the notions of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, his view that meaning is instantiated through meaning-acting acts of transcendental consciousness, and his view that the content of meaning-intending acts is ideal meaning simpliciter. As well, the paper argues that the phenomenological method of reduction itself presupposes the notion that reality as such can be reached by subtracting the influence of the language of the natural attitude and its ontological commitments and it, thus, presupposes the conception of language as a reinterpretable calculus."


Si le concept husserlien de passivité a fasciné toute une génération de philosophes (Merleau-Ponty, Landgrebe, Levinas, Henry), il a rarement fait l'objet d'une étude qui adopte la perspective du fondateur de la phénoménologie. Husserl considère que la passivité appartient sans reste à la sphère de la constitution et qu'elle consolide par conséquent son transcendantialisme. Loin d'être un domaine de sens irréductible à la rationalité, elle représente même le fondement des opérations de la pensée catégoriale. C'est en son sein que doivent être cherchées les "sources" des formes supérieures de la logique. Toute passive et préconsciente qu'elle soit, l'expérience antéprédicative appartient donc pour Husserl au sujet transcendantal.

Ce travail s'attache ainsi à montrer que la genèse du catégorial à partir de l'expérience passive entre dans le projet général de Husserl d'assembler la phénoménologie sur le socle originaire de l'expérience du monde."

The aim of this paper is to identify the main respects in which Husserl's early philosophy, and in particular his early writings on the foundation of arithmetic, were influenced by Brentano's thought. It is claimed that the doctrinal, conceptual and methodological perspective within which Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic is conceived and executed (but which remains very largely suppressed in Husserl's texts) is that which he inherited, more or less without modification, from Brentano in the period to which Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, and the lectures on Descriptive Psychology belong. That influence was extensive and profound enough to warrant calling Husserl's philosophy of arithmetic 'Brentanian'.

In his Logical Investigations, Husserl uses a concept of "analyticity" that seems quite different from the Kantian one. Analyticity is defined as formal and by the possibility of regular variations, so as in mathematical equations which determine relations between variables. In that matter, Husserl is influenced by Bolzano and is much deeply connected with the Austrian tradition of logical studies than with the transcendental tradition of the German Idealism. But he deals also with the problem that Bolzano left unsolved: if analyticity in the "strict" sense means the logical rule, what does "logical" mean?

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This paper pursues two aims, a general one and a more specific one. The general aim is to introduce and illustrate the use of Boolean matrices in representing the logical properties of one- and (mainly) two-place predicates over small finite universes, and hence of providing matrix characterizations of finite models for sets of axioms containing such predicates. This method is treated only to the extent required to pursue the more specific aim, which is to consider axiomatic systems involving the part-whole relation together with a relation of foundation employed by Husserl.


Chacune des études rassemblées ici se propose de jeter sur les rapports de Husserl et de Frege un regard
neuf et surtout exempt des nombreux préjugés qui, jusqu'ici, ont déterminé les diverses «lectures frégéennes de la phénoménologie». En pointant les différences profondes qui, sous le couvert de quelques similitudes de surface, ont en fait, et de très bonne heure, orienté les deux philosophes sur des voies radicalement opposées, ce recueil permet de se faire une idée plus claire de ce que fut en réalité l'antipsychologisme de Husserl dans tout ce qui le sépare de la version logiciste que lui a donné Frege. De cette manière, il concours également à apporter quelques éclairages nouveaux sur la question des origines de la philosophie contemporaine.
needs in order to "exist" i.e., in order to be "closed" with respect to the closure operation defined as the sup of $x$ and its defect. It turns out that there are (at least) eight dependence relations which are worth to be considered. Many other questions concerning the world of contents (among them the proofs of the famous Husserl's Satze) may now be discussed and clarified. Then the theory of species and genera is developed. Ultimate species (for short: species) are identified with equivalence classes of contents modulo isogeneity, and species in general (for short: genera) are identified with arbitrary unions of species. On the basis of the relation obtaining among two contents when they are isogeneous to two contents the first of which is a part of the second it becomes possible to develop a rather satisfying interpretation of Husserl's theory of the dependencies among species and genera and of the material a priori laws. By strengthening the notion of Husserlian universe into the notion of rigid Husserlian universe, the theory of species and genera obtains a stronger version. Three models of the theory are exhibited. The first one, suggested by combinatorial-topological considerations, identifies contents with finite non-empty sets of natural numbers; the second one identifies contents with non-empty sets of formulas of a formal language; the third one (not totally "rigid") identifies contents with positive integers."


See in particular: Chapter 3. Husserl and Twardowski: a philosophical encounter pp. 21-42
Appendix I: References to Twardowski in Husserl's published works 241
Appendix III: Kazimierz Twardowski's Nachlass 243-248.


The distinction established by Husserl in 1913 between formal and material ontology constitutes the theoretical basis needed in phenomenology to mathematize knowledge, and physics in particular. In "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", this distinction appears as a subwork in the sections concerned with Galileo and the birth of modern physics. Through its reformulation, Husserl tried to imagine the foundational range of an eidetic interpretation of nature as entrenched in the "Lebenswelt".


A global picture of Husserl's architectonic view of the structure of formal science (including formal mathematics) is offered, as the view got its fullest (yet elliptic) articulation in the first three chapters of Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929). It is shown how Husserl's understanding of the structure of formal science (abstracting from the latter's subjective foundation) requires the independent consideration of at least three dimensions with respect to the formal, in terms, respectively, of 'approaches', epistemic 'interests', and 'successive layers'. First, there is the dimension of apophantic versus ontological approaches; second, the distinction of combinatorial (syntactic) versus truth (semantic) interest; and third, the consideration of the three layers of pure grammar, derivability relations, and systems or manifold
theory. Moreover, it is shown how, in Husserl's view, the virtual identity of apophantic and ontological approaches on the top layer (deductive systems and/or manifolds) is supposed to give a kind of technical (if not philosophical) warrant for the unity of formal science.”


This paper presents and discusses Husserl's conception of logic, formal logic in particular. A special emphasis is giving to Husserl's idea of a theory of manifolds as the closure of the thematic field of formal logic. Husserl's own version of logicism in the philosophy of mathematics is also presented and some aspects of his conception of formal logic are highlighted and contrasted with Frege's.


In this paper I discuss Husserl's solution of the problem of imaginary elements in mathematics as presented in the drafts for two lectures he gave in Gottingen in 1901 and other related texts of the same period, a problem that had occupied Husserl since the beginning of 1890, when he was planning a never published sequel to "Philosophie der Arithmetik" (1891). In order to solve the problem of imaginary entities Husserl introduced, independently of Hilbert, two notions of completeness (definiteness in Husserl's terminology) for a formal axiomatic system. I present and discuss these notions here, establishing also parallels between Husserl's and Hilbert's notions of completeness.


This article seeks to show that, although emerging out of a so-called traditional, metaphysical view of language, Edmund Husserl's theory of meaning qua ideal species in the "Logical Investigations" cannot be reduced to the linguistic expression of an essentialist, representational adequation, but rather emphasizes the role of intentionality, the ideality of language, and the constitutive character of consciousness in the fulfillment of "meaning" ("Bedeutung").


The purpose of this paper is to explore Husserl's critique of psychologism and his positive theory of mind against both its historical background and the developments that issued from it. The conclusion of the paper is the claim that Husserl's rejection of psychologism led him to ground logic in a realm of ideal relationships made available by way of a new method of non-reductive analysis, phenomenology. Phenomenological analysis itself is shown to be a methodological expression of a theory of mind as an active participant in the constitution of reality.


It is stated that Husserl's theory of truth is ambiguous. When Husserl attacked psychological interpretations of truth, a logicism seemed to be predominant; later he inclined toward intuitionism, where truth is constituted by the real presence of the object. Purely logical relations in an eternal order of truth, independent of things, seems to conflict with the idea of evidence, which is a psychological experience. It is concluded that truth is the result of an intuition in which the thing itself is given. Finally, parallels are drawn between Husserl's double truth and Leibniz's truths of reason and truths of fact.
Phenomenology is a science of noemata.

An object, for Husserl, is anything toward which an act can be directed. Not all objects are material; there are also immaterial objects, for example, numbers and the other ideal objects of mathematics. Mathematics and all natural sciences, including psychology, are sciences about the objects of our acts. But we have just noticed that in addition to possibly having an object, every act also has a noema. And what Husserl wanted to create with his phenomenology was a new science, a science of noemata. Noemata are objects, too. In an act of reflection the noema of one act can be made the object of another act.

Mathematicians and scientists explore what we experience, the world of nature around us. In the phenomenological reduction we disregard this nature, this world of objects toward which our acts are directed. We do not deny that it is there, as if we were sophists, nor do we doubt that it is there, as if we were sceptics, but we, as it were, put it in brackets. We perform an epoché, Husserl said, borrowing a word which the skeptics of antiquity used to denote abstinence from any judgment.

The phenomenologist does not worry about what is or is not in the real world around him. He is not disturbed by the fact that some of our acts have objects, others not, but turns to the noemata of our acts. These are the phenomena he considers. The real world is reduced to a correlative of our acts, which constitute it, bring it forth. All that is transcendent is put in brackets together with the other objects of our acts. What is left, purified of all that is transcendent, Husserl called transcendental. The phenomenological reduction hence leads us from the transcendent to the transcendental.

Phenomenological analysis-

The phenomenologist analyzes the noemata of his acts in order to clarify how the world is 'constituted' by his consciousness. He observes that he expects a tree to have a back, to continue to be there if he turns away from it for a moment, and so forth. He studies the structure of the noema of his acts. He elucidates how his expectations are arranged in patterns, how new sense impressions can change his expectations and sometimes lead to an 'explosion' of the noema and make him reject his original supposition about the direction of his act. According to Husserl, phenomenology thereby becomes an analysis of something similar to what Kant called the a priori. If one were to describe phenomenology in brief, it would
therefore be this: an investigation of the a priori, the necessary. Its aim is similar to that of many other philosophies from antiquity onward. But its methods, and the general framework of acts, noemata, and objects within which it tries to make sense of this aim, are different.

It is also not difficult to see the close connection between analytic philosophy and phenomenology here. For just as analytic philosophers, especially those of the so-called linguistic variety, analyze meaning, meanings of linguistic expressions, so the phenomenologist analyzes noemata, or meanings of acts in general.”


The problem of justifying our beliefs, giving evidence for them, is central in Husserl's phenomenology. In his writings he comes back again and again to the notions of justification and evidence. Husserl is particularly interested in perfect evidence, of which he distinguishes two kinds: adequate evidence, which we have when all our anticipations are filled, and apodictic evidence, which we have when the negation of our judgment is self-contradictory. This emphasis on apodictic and adequate evidence, together with Husserl's concern with philosophy as a strict science and with the possibility of establishing absolutely certain and obvious first premises, might give us the impression that Husserl was a foundationalist: he wanted to establish a firm foundation for science and philosophy of the kind that Aristotle, Descartes, and many others have been striving for.

However, in this paper I shall argue that in spite of appearances, Husserl was not a foundationalist. He was not even a foundationalist in logic and mathematics,- the classical strongholds of foundationalism; on the contrary he was close to the position that was later put forward by Nelson Goodman and some other "holists". (p. 25)


Translated from German by Claire Ortiz Hill.


Translated from the original French: *Ésquisse d'une grammaire pure* - Paris, Vrin, 1975 by Kevin Mulligan.

"This enlarged version of a book which originally appeared in French in 1975 provides an introduction to the project of a rational grammar, as it was sketched out by Husserl and partially developed by Ajdukiewicz. Besides investigating the nature of grammaticality, the distinction between logic and
grammar and the relation of grammatical structure to the communicative functions of language, the author analyzes a large number of grammatical phenomena (names, verbs, conjunctions, adverbs, mood, tense, aspect, etc.).


This paper attempts to study the methods which Frege and Husserl followed in their logics. Frege regards the problem of discovering logical laws as a psychological problem but takes the interest in the method of discovering the logical language to belong to logic. Husserl does not intend to construct a new language but he seeks for the epistemological justification of Aristotelian logic. It is shown how Husserl proceeds in his studies of the origins of logic. It is concluded that both Frege and Husserl rely on the method of analysis but they use it for different purposes in their logical studies.


Freges devastating attack on logical psychologism leaves philosophers of logic in a quandary: If logical propositions exist altogether independently of human acts of thinking, then "how" can they be grasped by thinkers? Husserl's "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" contains a thorough critique of psychologism, but manages to avoid Frege's problem by developing a plausible theory of logical cognition. Husserl's account entails that a) logical propositions are essentially knowable by finite rational minds, but also b) those propositions are irreducible to individual human minds. Hence Husserl shows that there can be a weak form of psychologism that is perfectly consistent with anti-psychologism.


According to the leading commentators and the author himself, Edmund Husserl's "Formal and transcendental logic" is the most important work on phenomenological logic ever written. Nonetheless, it has, in general, gained far less attention than the "Logical investigations" and the "Ideas on a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy". In particular, the argument of section 1 of the "Logic", namely, that it is fruitful to start with the meanings of the expression "Logos" in order to develop a genuinely transcendental logic, has received virtually no consideration. This paper takes a step towards filling this empty space by analyzing and criticizing the argument of section 1 as a problem to which (a) solution(s) must be found. Throughout, the paper reads Husserl's "descriptions" as 'arguments' for his positions, thereby avoiding any of the obscurity sometimes infecting work in continental philosophy.
philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic. This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and attendant issues. The goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that Husserl flagged and Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying the philosophical ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and his successors." (pp. 3-4)


Few have entertained the idea that Georg Cantor, the creator of set theory, might have influenced Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement. Yet an exchange of ideas took place between them when Cantor was at the height of his creative powers and Husserl in the throes of an intellectual struggle during which his ideas were particularly malleable and changed considerably and definitively. Here their writings are examined to show how Husserl's and Cantor's ideas overlapped and crisscrossed in the areas of philosophy and mathematics, arithmetization, abstraction, consciousness and pure logic, psychologism, metaphysical idealism, new numbers, and sets and manifolds."


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