Selected Bibliography on Husserl's Logic and Ontology (First Part: A - J)

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HUSSERL'S WORKS


From the General Introduction: "This bibliography contains the publications of Husserl and the main secondary literature on Husserl, from Husserl's earliest publication (1887) till today (1997). As the collection of material was concluded in June 1997, the list of publications for the year 1997 if of course incomplete.

In this bibliography publications in the following languages have been included: German, English, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch - for both primary and secondary literature. Since this bibliography has been base primarily on the consultation of the included documents (and not restricted to copying already existing Bibliographies), it was not possible to include publications in languages other than those mentioned."


BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE STUDIES ON HUSSERL'S LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY


4. Angelelli, Ignacio. 1989. "Husserl-Frege: Filosofia Del Numero." Análsis Filosófica no. 9:139-145. After pointing out some of the coincidence between Frege and Husserl about the philosophy of numbers and paying less attention to the subject of psychologism, in order to understand the differences between the authors, the analysis of which one made on the nature of number are described, showing the most evident divergencies. Immediately afterwards, three objections are examined regarding Husserl's position and a crucial criticism is formulated against Frege's method, related to the one discussed by Husserl. Lastly, it is assumed that it is possible to offer a method of analysis that gathers together the most important aspects of both authors points of view and leaving out the most noticeable defects."


Abstract: "This paper defends an interpretation of Husserl's theory of language, specifically as it appears in the Logical Investigations, as an example of a larger body of theories dubbed 'language as calculus'. Although this particular interpretation has been previously defended by other authors, such as Hintikka and Kusch, this paper proposes to contribute to the discussion by arguing that what makes this interpretation plausible is Husserl's distinction between the notions of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, his view that meaning is instantiated through meaning-intending acts of transcendental consciousness, and his view that the content of meaning-intending acts is ideal meaning simpliciter. As well, the paper argues that the phenomenological method of reduction itself presupposes the notion that reality as such can be reached by subtracting the influence of the language of the natural attitude and its ontological commitments and it, thus, presupposes the conception of language as a reinterpretable calculus."


Si le concept husserlien de passivité a fasciné toute une génération de philosophes (Merleau-Ponty, Landgrebe, Levinas, Henry), il a rarement fait l’objet d’une étude qui adopte la perspective du fondateur de la phénoménologie. Husserl considère que la passivité appartient sans reste à la sphère de la constitution et qu’elle consolide par conséquent son transcendentalisme. Loin d’être un domaine de sens irréductible à la rationalité, elle représente même le fondement des opérations de la pensée catégoriale. C’est en son sein que doivent être cherchées les "sources" des formes supérieures de la logique. Toute passive et préconsciente qu’elle soit, l’expérience antéprédicative appartient donc pour Husserl au sujet transcendantal.
Ce travail s’attache ainsi à montrer que la genèse du catégorial à partir de l’expérience passive entre dans le projet général de Husserl d’asseoir la phénoménologie sur le socle originaire de l’expérience du monde."


The aim of this paper is to identify the main respects in which Husserl's early philosophy, and in particular his early writings on the foundation of arithmetic, were influenced by Brentano's thought. It is claimed that the doctrinal, conceptual and methodological perspective within which Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is conceived and executed (but which remains very largely suppressed in Husserl's texts) is that which he inherited, more or less without modification, from Brentano in the period to which Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, and the lectures on Descriptive Psychology belong. That influence was extensive and profound enough to warrant calling Husserl's philosophy of arithmetic 'Brentanian'."


In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl uses a concept of "analyticity" that seems quite different from the Kantian one. Analyticity is defined as formal and by the possibility of regular variations, so as in mathematical equations which determine relations between variables. In that matter, Husserl is influenced by Bolzano and is much deeply connected with the Austrian tradition of logical studies than with the transcendental tradition of the German Idealism. But he deals also with the problem that
Bolzano left unsolved: if analyticity in the "strict" sense means the logical rule, what does "logical" mean?
Chacune des études rassemblées ici se propose de jeter sur les rapports de Husserl et de Frege un regard neuf et surtout exempt des nombreux préjugés qui, jusqu’ici, ont déterminé les diverses «lectures frégéennes de la phénoménologie». En pointant les différences profondes qui, sous le couvert de quelques similitudes de surface, ont en fait, et de très bonne heure, orienté les deux philosophes sur des voies radicalement opposées, ce recueil permet de se faire une idée plus claire de ce que fut en réalité l’antipsychologisme de Husserl dans tout ce qui le sépare de la version logiciste que lui a donné Frege. De cette manière, il concours également à apporter quelques éclairages nouveaux sur la question des origines de la philosophie contemporaine."
48. Carvalho, Vargas Carlos Eduardo de. 2007. A Teoria Das Multiplicidades (Mannigfaltigkeitslehre) Na Lógica Pura Dos Prolegômenos As Investigações Lógicas De Edmund Husserl. This research aims to explain the Theory of Manifolds (Mannigfaltigkeitslehre) since its mathematical genesis until its meaning in the pure logic (reine Logik) as theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre), reaching its philosophical consequences relating to phenomenology. The manifold (Mannigfaltigkeiten) are analysed in the Husserl's development on the view of the elements of the philosophical theory described in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic (Prolegomena zur reinen Logik), first volume of the Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen). After a description of the psychologism's problematic on the debate about objectivity in the fields of logics, mathematics and general knowledge, the work presents the division of the issues concerned to the theory of manifolds considering the categories of meaning and objects investigated by logics, mathematicians and philosophers."
The strongly innovative theory of whole-parts relations outlined by Husserl in his Third logical Investigation—to which he attributed a basic value for his entire phenomenology—has recently attracted a renewed interest. Although many important issues have been clarified (especially by Kit Fine) the subject seems still worth being revisited. To this aim Husserlian universes are introduced. These are lower bounded distributive lattices endowed with a unary operation of defect and a binary relation of isogeneity. Husserl’s contents are identified with nonzero elements of a Husserlian universe and the dependence relations among contents are defined and studied starting from the idea that the defect of \( x \) is what \( x \) needs in order to "exist" i.e., in order to be "closed" with respect to the closure operation defined as the sup of \( x \) and its defect. It turns out that there are (at least) eight dependence relations which are worth to be considered. Many other questions concerning the world of contents (among them the proofs of the famous Husserl’s Satze) may now be discussed and clarified. Then the theory of species and genera is developed. Ultimate species (for short: species) are identified with equivalence classes of contents modulo isogeneity, and species in general (for short: genera) are identified with arbitrary unions of species. On the basis of the relation obtaining among two contents when they are isogeneous to two contents the first of which is a part of the second it becomes possible to develop a
rather satisfying interpretation of Husserl’s theory of the dependencies among species and genera and of the material a priori laws. By strengthening the notion of Husserlian universe into the notion of rigid Husserlian universe, the theory of species and genera obtains a stronger version. Three models of the theory are exhibited. The first one, suggested by combinatorial-topological considerations, identifies contents with finite non-empty sets of natural numbers; the second one identifies contents with non-empty sets of formulas of a formal language; the third one (not totally “rigid”) identifies contents with positive integers.


52. Celis, Raphael. 1996. "Le Problème De La Mathématisation Du Savoir Dans L’oeuvre Tardive De Husserl." *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* no. 128:1-24. The distinction established by Husserl in 1913 between formal and material ontology constitutes the theoretical basis needed in phenomenology to mathematize knowledge, and physics in particular. In "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", this distinction appears as a subwork in the sections concerned with Galileo and the birth of modern physics. Through its reformulation, Husserl tried to imagine the foundational range of an eidetic interpretation of nature as entrenched in the "Lebenswelt".


58. Cortois, Paul. 1996. "From Apophantics to Manifolds: The Structure of Husserl's Formal Logic." *Philosophia Scientiae* no. 1:15-50. A global picture of Husserl's architectonic view of the structure of formal science (including formal mathematics) is offered, as the view got its fullest (yet elliptic) articulation in the first three chapters of *Formale und transzendentale Logik* (1929). It is shown how Husserl's understanding of the structure of formal science (abstracting from the latter's subjective foundation) requires the independent consideration of at least three dimensions with respect to the formal, in terms, respectively, of 'approaches', epistemic 'interests', and 'successive layers'. First, there is the dimension of apophantic versus ontological approaches; second, the distinction of combinatorial (syntactic) versus truth (semantic) interest; and third, the consideration of the three layers of pure grammar, derivability relations, and systems or manifold theory. Moreover, it is shown how, in Husserl's view, the virtual identity of apophantic and ontological approaches on the top layer (deductive systems and/or manifolds) is supposed to give a kind of technical (if not philosophical) warrant for the unity of formal science.


63. Da Silva, Jairo José. 1999. "Husserl Conception of Logic." *Manuscrito* no. 22:367-397. This paper presents and discusses Husserl's conception of logic, formal logic in particular. A special emphasis is giving to Husserl's idea of a theory of manifolds as the closure of the thematic field of formal logic. Husserl's own version of logicism in the philosophy of mathematics is also presented and some aspects of his conception of formal logic are highlighted and contrasted with Frege’s."
In this paper I discuss Husserl's solution of the problem of imaginary elements in mathematics as presented in the drafts for two lectures he gave in Gottingen in 1901 and other related texts of the same period, a problem that had occupied Husserl since the beginning of 1890, when he was planning a never published sequel to "Philosophie der Arithmetik" (1891).

In order to solve the problem of imaginary entities Husserl introduced, independently of Hilbert, two notions of completeness (definiteness in Husserl's terminology) for a formal axiomatic system. I present and discuss these notions here, establishing also parallels between Husserl's and Hilbert's notions of completeness.
Logic and Formal Ontology in Husserl. A bibliography (First part) http://www.ontology.co/biblio/111305/12/22.46
supposition about the direction of his act. According to Husserl, phenomenology thereby becomes an analysis of something similar to what Kant called the a priori. If one were to describe phenomenology in brief, it would therefore be this: an investigation of the a priori, the necessary. Its aim is similar to that of many other philosophies from antiquity onward. But its methods, and the general framework of acts, noemata, and objects within which it tries to make sense of this aim, are different. It is also not difficult to see the close connection between analytic philosophy and phenomenology here. For just as analytic philosophers, especially those of the so-called linguistic variety, analyze meaning, meanings of linguistic expressions, so the phenomenologist analyzes noemata, or meanings of acts in general.


———. 1991. "The Justification of Logic and Mathematics in Husserl's Phenomenology." In *Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences*, edited by Seebohm, Thomas, Follesdal, Dagfinn and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 25-34. Dordrecht: Kluwer. The problem of justifying our beliefs, giving evidence for them, is central in Husserl's phenomenology. In his writings he comes back again and again to the notions of justification and evidence. Husserl is particularly interested in *perfect* evidence, of which he distinguishes two kinds: adequate evidence, which we have when all our anticipations are filled, and apodictic evidence, which we have when the negation of our judgment is self-contradictory. This emphasis on apodictic and adequate evidence, together with Husserl's concern with philosophy as a strict science and with the possibility of establishing absolutely certain and obvious first premisses, might give us the impression that Husserl was a foundationalist: he wanted to establish a firm foundation for science and philosophy of the kind that Aristotle, Descartes, and many others have been striving for. However, in this paper I shall argue that in spite of appearances, Husserl was not a foundationalist. He was not even a foundationalist in logic and mathematics, the classical strongholds of foundationalism; on the contrary he was close to the position that was later put forward by Nelson Goodman and some other "holists". (p. 25)


Gardies, Jean-Louis. 1985. *Rational Grammar*. München: Philosophia Verlag. Translated from the original French: *Ésquisse d'une grammaire pure* - Paris, Vrin, 1975 by Kevin Mulligan. "This enlarged version of a book which originally appeared in French in 1975 provides an introduction to the project of a rational grammar, as it was sketched out by Husserl and partially developed by Ajdukiewicz. Besides investigating the nature of grammaticality, the distinction between logic and grammar and the relation of grammatical structure to the communicative functions of language, the author analyzes a large number of grammatical phenomena (names, verbs, conjunctions, adverbs, mood, tense, aspect, etc.)."


Haaparanta, Leila. 1988. "Analysis as the Method of Logical Discovery: Some Remarks on Frege and Husserl." *Synthese* no. 77:73-97. This paper attempts to study the methods which Frege and Husserl followed in their logics. Frege
regards the problem of discovering logical laws as a psychological problem but takes the interest in the
method of discovering the logical language to belong to logic. Husserl does not intend to construct a
new language but he seeks for the epistemological justification of Aristotelian logic. It is shown how
Husserl proceeds in his studies of the origins of logic. It is concluded that both Frege and Husserl rely
on the method of analysis but they use it for different purposes in their logical studies."


Logiques De Husserl." In Jaakko Hintikka: Questions De Logique Et De Phénoménologie, 234-246.

104. ———. 2006. "Husserl's Argument against Naturalism and His Own Foundation of Pure Philosophy."
In Foundations of the Formal Sciences Iv. The History of the Concept of the Formal Sciences, edited by

of Content and Extensional Logic." Analecta Husserliana no. 34.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 44:323-342.

and Phenomenological Research no. 53:251-275.
Frege's devastating attack on logical psychologism leaves philosophers of logic in a quandary: If logical
propositions exist altogether independently of human acts of thinking, then "how" can they be grasped
by thinkers? Husserl's "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" contains a thorough critique of psychologism, but
manages to avoid Frege's problem by developing a plausible theory of logical cognition. Husserl's
account entails that a) logical propositions are essentially knowable by finite rational minds, but also b)
those propositions are irreducible to individual human minds. Hence Husserl shows that there can be a
weak form of psychologism that is perfectly consistent with anti-psychologism."

on Transcendental Logic." Husserl Studies no. 20:135-159.

Natural Sciences." In Phenomenology of Natural Science, edited by Hardy, Lee and Embree, Lester.

Das Verhältnis zwischen der Bedeutungs- und der Evidenztheorie in den "Logischen Untersuchungen"
dern "Formalen und transzendentalen Logik" : ein Vergleich anhand der Identitätsproblematik

111. ———. 1989. Isagoge In Die Phänomenologische Apophantik. Eine Einführung In Die
Phänomenologische Urteilslogik Durch Die Auslegung Des Textes Der Formalen Und

112. ———. 1989. "In the Beginning Was the "Logos": Hermeneutical Remarks on the Starting-Point of
According to the leading commentators and the author himself, Edmund Husserl's "Formal and
transcendental logic" is the most important work on phenomenological logic ever written. Nonetheless,
has, in general, gained far less attention than the "Logical investigations" and the "Ideas on a pure
phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy". In particular, the argument of section 1 of the
"Logic", namely, that it is fruitful to start with the meanings of the expression "Logos" in order to
develop a genuinely transcendental logic, has received virtually no consideration. This paper takes a
step towards filling this empty space by analyzing and criticizing the argument of section 1 as a problem
to which (a) solution(s) must be found. Throughout, the paper reads Husserl's "descriptions" as
'arguments' for his positions, thereby avoiding any of the obscurity sometimes infecting work in
continental philosophy."

Und Transzendentalen Logik Von Edmund Husserl. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing
Company.

114. ———. 1998. "Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl's Answer to the Question "Was Die Evidenz Sei":
A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Evidence on the Occasion of the Publication of Husserliana
Volume Xxxx." Husserl Studies no. 15:1-75.

Reflections on the Sprachvergessenheit of the Later Husserl." New Yearbook for Phenomenology and

Contents: Abbreviations IX; Preliminary terminological comments XI; Glossary XIII; Acknowledgments XIV; Introduction 1.

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Introduction 99; 6. Intensions and extensions 103; 7. Presentation and ideas 125; 8. Function and concept 137; 9. On denoting 147; Conclusion: The way things are 163; Notes 175; Bibliography 191; Index 215.

From the Introduction: "As a book by the founder of phenomenology that examines Frege's ideas from Brentano's empirical standpoint, Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is both an early work of phenomenology and of logical empiricism. In it Husserl predicted the failure of Frege's attempt to logicize arithmetic and to mathematize logic two years before the publication of the *Basic Laws of Arithmetic* in 1893. I hope to show that Husserl did so in terms that would prefigure both the account Frege would give of his error after Russell encountered the paradoxes ten years later and the discussions of *Principia Mathematica*. Moreover, in locating the source of Frege's difficulties in the ambiguous theory of identity, meaning, and denotation that forms the basis of Frege's logical project and generates Russell's contradictions, Husserl's discussions indicate that these contradictions may have as serious consequences for twentieth century philosophy of language as they have had for the philosophy of mathematics.

This book is about these Austro-German roots of twentieth century philosophy. It is mainly about the origins of analytic philosophy, about the transmission of Frege's thought to the English speaking world, and about the relevance of Husserl's early criticism of Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic* to some contemporary issues in philosophy. It is more about Husserl the philosopher of logic and mathematics than it is about Husserl the phenomenologist, and it is principally addressed to those members of the philosophical community who, via Russell, have been affected by Frege's logic.

This makes it very different from work on Husserl and Frege that has focused on the importance of Frege's criticism of Husserl's *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and attendant issues. The goal of this book is quite the opposite. It studies the shortcomings in Frege's thought that Husserl flagged and Russell endeavored to overcome. One possible sequel to this book would be a thorough study of Husserl's successes and failures in remedying the philosophical ills he perceived all about him, but that goes beyond the scope of this work, which follows the issues discussed into the work of Russell and his successors." (pp. 3-4)


RELATED PAGES

Second Part of the Bibliography: K - Z
Edmund Husserl: Formal Ontology and Transcendental Logic
Ontologists of the 19th and 20th Centuries

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