Selected Bibliography on Husserl's Logic and Ontology (Second Part: K - Z)

BIBLIOGRAPHY


   "The indications provided by Heidegger himself in his course on 'Phenomenological interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason' make it possible to pinpoint his debt to Husserl. It turns out that this course followed the same main steps in its argument as Husserl in 'Formal logic and transcendental logic': a) formal logic and transcendental logic; b) the subordination of formal logic to transcendental logic; c) regional unity as a basis for formal logic; d) transcendental subjectivity as ultimate basis. The account of this parallel structure makes it possible to interpret from a different point of view Heidegger's reading of Husserl and provides the proof of the phenomenological closeness of these two texts as regards the basis of their 'logic'."


   Contents: Preface IX-XI; Part I. Introduction: Language as calculus vs. language as the universal medium 1; Part II. Husserl's phenomenology and language as calculus 11; Part III. Heidegger's ontology and language as the universal medium 135; Part IV. Between Scylla and Charybdis -- Gadamer's hermeneutics 229; Notes to Part I 259; Notes to Part II 260; Notes Part III 290; Notes to Part IV 310; Bibliography 315; Index of names 343; Index of subjects 353.


   Edited and with an introduction by Donn Welton.


"Psychologism in logic holds that logic is a branch of psychology. This view has been vigorously defended by John Stuart Mill and by a number of German philosophers of logic, notably Erdmann. Its chief critics have been Husserl and Frege and, to a lesser extent, Russell. Husserl set forth a profound and detailed critique of psychologism in "Logical Investigations". This paper examines this critique. First, I explain why the psychologistic theory is attractive. Then I show that Husserl's critique is not convincing, partly because he does not take the theory in its most plausible form and partly because he ignores certain important distinctions (for example, between what a statement is about and what it is true in virtue of).

Then I raise two new objections to the psychologistic theory. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the psychologistic theory remains an important and serious position from which we can learn much about the status of logic."

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Translation of an article published in Neue Hefte für Philosophie 1, 1971, pp. 12-32.


"The paper deals with the phenomenological roots of logic, and suggests a strict link of such roots with concepts of category theory. The project stems from a new consideration of the philosophy of logic developed by Husserl. Differences between this approach and intuitionism are examined. The objectivity of logical constructions is seen from the viewpoint of natural epistemology. An essential complementarity of descriptive and constructive components is reached and related to formal developments in category theory."


European Journal of Philosophy no. 5:162-182.

"The paper argues that Husserl's criticism of Sigwart's normative conception of logical laws rests on an absolutist conception of truth and content which is itself in need of justification. Also the contrast between psychological laws of holding true and logical laws of being true used by Frege in his criticism of psychologism fails to explain the epistemological status of logical laws. A better understanding of the latter is to be found in Frege's conception of truth and justification. Sigwart's psychologism comes to the fore in the privileged role he assigned in his logic to judgments of recognition and naming. While the attention paid to the indexical component of certain utterances enables Sigwart to give an original account of the import of impersonal judgments, his concentration on a first-person account of sentence meaning prevents him from appreciating the public dimension of meaning, which alone renders communication possible."


"The concept of formal ontology was first developed by Husserl. It concerns problems relating to the notions of object, substance, property, part, whole, predication, nominalization, etc. The idea of formal ontology is present in many of Husserl's works, with minor changes. This paper provides a reconstruction of such an idea. Husserl's proposal is faced with contemporary logical orthodoxy and it is presented also an interpretative hypothesis, namely that the original difference between the general perspective of usual model theory and formal ontology is grounded in the fact that this latter starts from an intended interpretation and not from the set of all the possible interpretations."

1. Introduction

The term 'formal ontology' has been given two different interpretations. The first of these, entirely in keeping with the mainstream of contemporary philosophy, has been what I shall call analytic: formal ontology is that branch of ontology which is analysed within the framework of formal logic. The leading exponent of this approach has undoubtedly been Nino Cocchiarella. (1) On the premise that each particular science has its own 'mode of being', Cocchiarella has written that `metaphysics [...] - or what we might instead call formal ontology - is concerned with the study and development of alternative formalizations regarding the systematic co-ordination of all the "modes" or "categories of being" under the most general laws' (1974, 29-30). From this point of view, formal ontology studies the logical characteristics of predication and the various theories of universals. The other interpretation, which I shall call phenomenological, developed from Husserl's early works, in particular Logical investigations. As a first approximation, we may say that this approach mainly addresses the problems of parts and wholes and of dependence. Despite their differences, these two varieties of formal ontology quite frequently overlap each other, although to date there has been no systematic study of the categories and layers that constitute formal ontology and no systematic analysis of the issues addressed by it." p. 1.


"We began by tentatively defining logic as a science of meanings, distinguishing between meanings and their objects (references). We established that meanings exist concretely in psychic acts, thus allowing logic to be seen also as the science of thinking. After further consideration we concluded that logic is only
concerned with true meanings, and is therefore a practical normative science. Its normative character, however, is limited to formal truths. In addition logic can also be defined as the science of objects taken in their most general sense. Indications were given how this general science of objects includes various mathematical disciplines.


"In his influential paper 'Mathematical Truth' (1) Paul Benacerraf states two requirements for any account of mathematical truth to be worth considering, namely: (i) that the semantic treatment of mathematical statements does not differ essentially from the semantic treatment of non-mathematical statements, and (ii) that the account of mathematical truth harmonize with what he calls a reasonable epistemology. According to him, combinatorial accounts of mathematical truth, which tend to identify mathematical truth with derivability in a formal system, violate the first requirement, whereas, platonist philosophies of mathematics (like Gödel's) violate the second requirement. Such a violation of the second requirement, however, depends on Benacerraf's understanding of, 'reasonable epistemology'. It should be clear that if one identifies 'reasonable epistemology' with empiricist theory of knowledge (causal or not), platonist philosophies of mathematics are not easy to reconcile with reasonable epistemologies. But such an
identification need not be taken for granted.

In this paper, however, we are not interested in discussing the merits of Benacerraf's sketch of a causal theory of mathematical truth, but would like to state a third requirement (i.e. a third necessary condition) for a semantics plus epistemology of mathematics, which in our opinion is not satisfied by any causal account. (iii) A semantics plus epistemology of mathematics must give a satisfactory account of the equivalence -- in the sense of interderivability -- of apparently unrelated mathematical statements -- like the Axiom of Choice and its many mathematical equivalents.

The best known representatives of platonism in the philosophy of mathematics, i.e. Cantor, Frege and Gödel, did not develop enough -- so far as we know -- an epistemology of mathematics. Husserl, however, whose philosophy of mathematics (as developed in Logische Untersuchungen (2) and Formate und transzendentale Logik (3) can also be considered as a sort of platonism, tried to develop in his Sixth Logical Investigation and in Erfahrung und Urteil (4) such an epistemology of mathematics. It is our opinion that Husserl's sketchy epistemology of mathematics plus his somewhat scattered remarks of a semantical nature can be elaborated further to produce a semantics plus epistemology that satisfies all three requirements stated above. In this paper, however, we will limit our consideration to some of Husserl's semantical insights and will try to show rather sketchily how some of these insights can be fruitfully applied in a semantics of mathematics that satisfies the first and third of the above requirements (i.e. those which are more properly of a semantic nature, since the second is rather a requirement on epistemologies of mathematics).

(2) See Logische Untersuchungen, I, Ch. XI.
(3) See Formate und transzendentale Logik, Chs. 1-3.
(4) See Erfahrung und Urteil, Part II, Ch. 2 and Part III, Chs. 2 and 3.


"Philosophy as Universal Science

Husserl insisted from the very beginning that the concept of philosophy involves two different, yet equally essential elements. Philosophical knowledge is both absolutely valid and completely universal. The first aspect concerns the way in which philosophical truths are known, i.e. the quality of philosophical cognition. Philosophy, Husserl says, is apodictic, evident and radical; it yields absolutely legitimized knowledge whose evidence flows from ultimate sources of cognition and is founded upon definitive fundaments. Philosophy, in short, is a rigorous science. The second aspect concerns the object of philosophical knowledge, i.e. the quantity of its field. The range of philosophy, as Husserl conceives it, is the universe of whatever can be known. Philosophy is all comprehensive knowledge or "universal knowledge of what is". Husserl thereby takes up the traditional definition of philosophy as the science of
being qua being. But he also goes along with the traditional division of philosophy into a number of special disciplines, which together constitute philosophy as such.

Two main divisions of philosophical disciplines are to be found in Husserl's writings, which at first sight seem to have no connection with one another. On the one hand, he divides philosophy into a theoretical and a practical branch. Philosophy is, first of all, theoretical because it defends the idea of absolute knowledge and is to issue forth in 'pure theory'. The philosopher is from this perspective an uninterested spectator watching over subjective acts and their objective correlates. On the one hand, however, philosophy is practical also because its goal is absolute ethical life and rational practice, and from this perspective philosophy aims at a revolution in our life and habits in order to make us perfect personalities. Its purpose is to bring about a philosophical culture in which reason alone will determine the will and decisions of mankind.

In addition to this however Husserl also, and indeed more frequently, adopts a tripartite division into theoretical, axiological and practical philosophy. This division agrees with the three main areas of reason - cognitive (logical) reason, evaluative and practical. Since the phenomenological elucidation of reason is at the same time a critique of the possibilities of reason, Husserl also says that phenomenology aims at a critique of knowledge, of value and of practice.

Let us first turn to theoretical philosophy. According to Husserl, it is natural that philosophy should "set out from what is most general and from there pass over to the particulars contained under it". Correspondingly he introduces into theoretical philosophy a distinction between a discipline of general forms and the doctrine of their material specifications. The first he calls 'formal ontology'; it deals with the forms of objects. The second he divides into a number of different 'material ontologies', each one of which relates to a region of objects circumscribed by certain features they have in common.

Formal ontology - or, as he also sometimes calls it, *mathesis universalis* - is, Husserl says, the science of the pure forms of something-in-general and of its modalities or derivations. It treats formal categories such as state of affairs, genus and species, identity and difference, number, whole and part. This shows that formal ontology is the sphere to which Husserl devoted most of his work in the period ranging from the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891) to the *Logical Investigations* (1901). He distinguishes between several sub-disciplines of formal ontology, reflecting diverse formal aspects of the object-as-such. Thus as parts of formal ontology he mentions logic (i.e. the formal doctrine of meanings), pure arithmetic and the pure theory of manifolds or sets.

Only in later years did Husserl turn to material ontologies, e.g., in his lectures on nature (1907), on intersubjectivity (1910/11) or in *Ideas II* (1912ff.), as well as in his various lectures and seminars on *Natur* and *Geist*. Nowhere does he give an exhaustive list of disciplines which together would make up the realm of material ontology in its entirety. He does, though, repeatedly mention nature, soul and society as delimiting three corresponding material ontologies." pp. 274-275 (Notes omitted).


"It is sometimes said that questions of form are questions of logic or language. In his "Logical Investigations" Husserl, however, clearly distinguished formal ontology from formal grammar and formal logic. The article attempts to explain Husserl's notion of formal ontology. It investigates the relation between formal and material ontology as well as the relation between epistemic and metaphysical necessity. The article provides an interpretation of Husserl's claim that there are metaphysical necessities which are necessarily recognized by the human mind on the basis of Husserl's well-known distinction between the meanings of mental acts and their objective correlates."


"I have the highest admiration for this effort and its result, much higher than for all other Husserl translations known to me. But it would be too bad if the users of this translation were denied the chance of minor emendations which I would like to suggest as a result of an intensive reading of the translation in a seminar at Washington University along with the German text. I shall therefore select some of the more important ones as follows:

2. On page 225 in the first line of paragraph 62 the phrase "unified item in anthropology" (as a characterization of science) for "anthropologische Einheit" might better be rendered as "cultural system". In Husserl's framework anthropology, as introduced in Chapter VII ("Anthropologismus") has no relation to the science of anthropology, at the time mostly physical, but to the emphasis on human factors.
3. In the title of Chapter I in Investigation II (p. 535) the rendition of the German *Bestand* ("Bewusstsein als phaenomenologischer Bestand des Ich . . .") by "Subsistence" ("Consciousness as Phenomenological Subsistence of the Ego") is misleading, since here the German word (of many meanings) clearly refers to the composition or content of the ego, rather than to any mode of its existence in the sense of Meinong's *Bestand* of his *Objektive* (states of affairs).
4. In the title and text of Chapter IV in Investigation VI the rendition of the German *Verträglichkeit* and *Unverträglichkeit* by "Compatibility and Incompatibility" seems to me debatable, since their German equivalents are *Widerspruchsfreiheit* and *Widerspruchlichkeit*. Closer English equivalents of the words in the German title are "Compatibility" and "Incompatibility".
5. On p. 804 line 17 from the bottom the word "own" (repeated in the following line) ought to be dropped.
6. On p. 812 line 10 the proper translation of the idiomatic *Mit nichten, wurden wir einwenden* would be "By no means, we would object" (rather than "Binding them with nothing . . .")."

I have only one serious regret about these two volumes. The distribution of the two very unequal German volumes of the first and even of the second edition (subdividing volume II) may be technically defensible, provided that it does not conceal the fact that the German volumes appeared separately in two subsequent years (1900 and 1901 respectively). It is also only a minor incongruency that volume II begins on the back page of volume I, thus minimizing the break by not even inserting a new page; whereas each of the
six Investigations within volume II is preceded by a special title page. But what is really unfortunate is that the title of volume II (Untersuchungen zur Phaenomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis) is missing both on p. 248 and in the Table of Contents, this all the more since the title of volume I ("Prolegomena to Pure Logic") appears correctly in both places. Among other things this conceals the important historical fact that it was in the title of the second volume that Husserl for the first time used the term "phenomenology," still absent from volume I, explicitly and conspicuously. While it is controversial whether the undeniable historical impression was correct that Volume II meant a new departure in Husserl's development, as it was certainly interpreted at the time, the fact that there was definite reason for this impression must not be forgotten." p. 196.


"This article is an attempt to displace many of the traditional, overly Cartesian (epistemological) interpretations of Husserl's transcendental turn, and to replace them with an interpretation based on Husserl's formal ontology as developed in the "Logical Investigations". In particular, the theory of wholes and parts in conjunction with Husserl's principle of intuitive, eidetic rationality, it is argued, lead directly to transcendental idealism. And as a consequence, the fundamental unity of Husserl's entire philosophical project, from the pre-transcendental through the transcendental period, is established."


"In a lecture manuscript written around 1961 Gödel describes a philosophical path from the incompleteness theorems to Husserl's phenomenology. Using this manuscript as a basis, I present and discuss the arguments in Gödel's recently published papers that led him to the work of Husserl. In particular, I focus on arguments concerning Hilbert's program and an early version of Carnap's program."


"In this paper I try to identify the deficiency of logic which Husserl refers to in the "Forward" to his "Logical Investigations" of 1900. Logics known to him were unable to explain how formal systems of signs function to advance knowledge, as in the case of formal arithmetic. Simultaneous efforts to elucidate the procedures of general arithmetic (in the last part of his "Philosophy of arithmetic") and to write a review of Schroder's "lectures on the algebra of logic", made Husserl (by 1891) forsake Weierstrass's program of reconstructing mathematics from the concept of number alone, which he had hoped to carry out with tools drawn from Brentano's psychology."


"This book attempts to explain the path by which Husserl's concern for an elucidation of mathematical, chiefly arithmetical, knowledge led to an analysis of the mental act which allows for a realist interpretation of science and ordinary perceptual experience. It attempts to go more thoroughly than has been done into the content and significance of his first book, "The philosophy of arithmetic". It provides discussion of many Husserlian texts not available in English and little discussed in the English literature. Its aim is not merely historical, but systematic as well."


"The presentation of the formal conception of noemata is the main aim of the article. In the first section, three informal approaches to noemata are discussed. The goal of this chapter is specifying main controversies and their sources concerned with different ways of the understanding of noemata. In the second section, basic assumptions determining the proposed way of understanding noemata are presented. The third section is devoted to the formal set-theoretic construction needed for the formal comprehension of noemata. In the fourth section, definitions of noemata and their various kinds, as well as definitions of other phenomenological notions are formulated. In the last section, possibilities of further developing the proposed formal conception are indicated."


"This paper investigates the role of Edmund Husserl in the development of formal or model-theoretic semantics through glasses of the distinction of language as calculus vs. language as universal medium, introduced by Jaakko Hintikka and Martin Kusch. In particular, the paper raises the question of possible Husserl's influence on the conception of language accepted in Polish philosophy, in particular by Lesniewski and Tarski."

"One of the major exegetical difficulties in connection with Husserl's Logical Investigations has always been the clarification of his ontological position and the closely related concept of constitution. Ever since the publication of the first edition - which will be the point of departure - in 1900-1, there has been an ongoing discussion as to which concept of reality Husserl had committed himself, initiated with a realistic interpretation by his Gottingen students. My aim in the following paper will be a critical evaluation and interpretation of this relationship, thereby also taking Husserl's philosophical development - especially as concerns his idea of phenomenology - into consideration."


"In this paper, the author compares passages from two philosophically important texts and concludes that they have fundamental ideas in common. What makes this comparison and conclusion interesting is that the texts come from two different traditions in philosophy, the analytic and the phenomenological. In 1912, Ernst Mally published *Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik*, an analytic work containing a combination of formal logic and metaphysics. In 1913, Edmund Husserl published *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, a seminal work in phenomenology in which noemata are defined and given a crucial role in directing our mental states. In the passages from these two texts reproduced below, the author shows that the abstract 'determinates' postulated by Mally in 1912 are assigned much the same role that Husserl assigned to noemata in 1913. Though Mally's determinates are not as highly structured as Husserl's noemata, they have a feature that explains how they manage to play the role assigned to them. The corresponding feature is missing, or at least, not emphasized in Husserl's account of noemata. Therefore, insights from both philosophers, and thus from both the analytic and phenomenological traditions, are needed to give a more complete account of directed mental states."
On the website "Theory and History of Ontology"

Second Part of the Bibliography: A - J

Edmund Husserl: Formal Ontology and Transcendental Logic