Roman Ingarden: Selected Bibliography A - M

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Introduction

A bibliography of Roman Ingarden's works for the years 1915-1989 is published in: Analecta Husserliana - The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research - vol. 30: Ingardeniana II. New studies in the philosophy of Roman Ingarden. With a new international Ingarden bibliography, edited by
Hans Rudnik and Jolanta Wawrzycka; the bibliography (pp. 225-296) contains in the first part ("primary sources") 368 items, inclusively of translations and reprints; the second part ("secondary sources") contains 821 references (many in Polish) concerning Ingarden.

I will give an updated bibliography of the most relevant references for Ingarden's ontology.

Bibliography A - M


"The aim of the essay consists in analyzing one of the most important points of discussion among some of Husserl's disciples: A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein, that is the existence of the world and the way to prove it. The research leads to two consequences: to pinpoint Husserl's particular and original interpretation regarding "existence" that concludes to the acceptance of it and the difference between his transcendental phenomenology and that one sustained by his disciples that can be called a realistic phenomenology. In this contest E. Stein assumed a peculiar position that to some extend combines the two attitudes."

"The above outline sought to show very briefly how the discussion about the existence of the world came into being within the phenomenological school. We noted that Husserl's cited disciples are convinced that, as far as the maestro is concerned, the world - understood as external reality that comprises ourselves as human beings - does exist. but doubt that he succeeded in justifying this view moving from his theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, the objections are more or less mellow and indistinct and all of them are made within the school, that is to say, within a common style of search.

The great common terrain is constituted by essential analysis, which nobody wants to do without. but precisely because the philosophical tradition regards the theme of the essence as related to that of existence, there arises the fear that this latter aspect might be pushed into the background. Furthermore, because for Husserl essential analysis concentrates on subjectivity and opens the road to the transcendental perspective, what is feared is becoming enclosed in subjectivity and concentrating all of reality in it. as in the great lesson of German idealism.

As can be seen. I have endeavored to defend Flossed against his own disciples, trying to delve into his profound intentions, re-balancing - wherever this proves
possible - the results of his analysis. comforted in this by the observations of Edith Stein, who was probably closest to the maestro and therefore managed to grasp the principal lines of his position more accurately. The theoretical core always remains the relationship between idealism and realism. with respect to which Husserl's attitude, at least in my opinion, is very balanced, notwithstanding its peculiarity. On the other hand, it is quite readily understandable that his disciples should have committed the "great parricide," to use the expression that Plato used in connection with Parmenides: it may well he that without it one does not achieve theoretical autonomy. All the same, one also has to hear in mind a saying that once again involves Plato: amicus Plato. sell magis amica veritas. which should help us understand the intentions of the other before we raise objections." (p. 113)


5. Banega, Horacio. 2012. "Formal Ontology as an Operative Tool in the Theories of the Objects of the Life-World: Stumpf, Husserl and Ingarden." Symposium. The Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy no. 16:64-88. Abstract: "It is accepted that certain mereological concepts and phenomenological conceptualisations presented in Carl Stumpf’s Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung and Tonpsychologie played an important role in the development of the Husserlian formal ontology. In the third Logical Investigation, which displays the formal relations between part and whole and among parts that make out a whole, one of the main concepts of contemporary formal ontology and metaphysics is settled: ontological dependence or foundation. My main objective is to display Stumpf’s concepts of partial content, independent content, spatial wholes, sound wholes, and the different kinds of connection among parts, in particular, fusion. Second, I will show how Husserl improved this background, in particular with regards to the exact nature of the theory of manifolds, in discussion with Georg Cantor, the father of set theory. Third, I will focus on Ingarden’s use of formal ontology and on the different modes of being that can be justified by appealing to the concept of ontological dependence in its Ingeardenian variations. If my interpretation is adequate, it should be inferred that formal ontology is the operative theory of phenomenological philosophy, and this must be acknowledged in its full significance with respect to the supposed independence of the phenomenological method since 1913. A further consequence, not developed in this essay, is that formal ontology can be mathematised."

6. Barska, Katarzyna. 2015. "Theory of the Whole and the Part - Ontological Perspective (E. Husserl, R. Ingarden)." Studia Humana no. 4:12-25. Abstract: "The purpose of the paper is demonstrate the thesis that Ingarden's ontological system allows a better understanding of the "part-whole" problem then previous theories. Especially, if we take into account the existential ontology of Ingarden, which refers to Husserl "part-whole" theory, we can see that development of terms made by Ingarden sheds new light on old problem. In this context, particularly important is to distinguish between two existential moments: contingency/inseparatness, because thanks to them we can talk about many different types of relationships and hence many types of objects."


Abstract: "The purpose of the paper is to describe Roman Ingarden’s detailed study of essence and idea, in terms of their relation to individual objects. This study, which plays a central role in the context of Ingarden’s ontology, is carried out both in Essential Questions (Ingarden’s habilitation thesis published in 1925) and in the second volume of Controversy over the Existence of the World. What emerges from the comparison of these works is a complex ontological structure in which Jean Hering’s considerations on the same subject matter, published in Husserl’s “Jahrbuch” in 1921, are maintained and at the same time developed."

Abstract: "Roman Ingarden and Nicolai Hartmann developed an ontology of the real world in which the analysis of human responsible action and its presuppositions plays an essential role. In this analysis, several common elements can be identified, such as the acknowledgement of the objectivity of values and the centrality of the concept of person, which for both philosophers refers exclusively to the real man in the real world. The aim of the study is to analyze the way in which both Ingarden and Hartmann, on common grounds, explore the specific phenomenon of free will and deal with the issue of its ontological possibility within a deterministically structured world. Despite the differences, what emerges in both cases is a theoretical model that refuses the rigid alternative determinism-indeterminism with the aim of providing the foundations of the self-determination of man."


Abstract: "In its examination of the intersection of ethics and ontology, Roman Ingarden's philosophy bears a striking resemblance to the thought of the contemporary French philosopher Alain Badiou. Though no formal influence is claimed, this paper explores several ways in which Badiou's theory of the event and existential agency is foreshadowed in the writings of Ingarden. In so doing, the author suggests the continued importance of this unjustly neglected philosopher for contemporary thinking on questions of value."


"In the present work I will focus on Ingarden’s theory of the literary work of art, with the special emphasis on its ontology, identity, and value, as well as on the nature of readers’ interactions with literary works, such as aesthetic experience, scholarly cognition, and literary criticism. I will also discuss Ingarden’s attempts to defend the validity of value judgments against the theories that undermine them, such as psychologism, subjectivism, and relativism. All these themes are discussed in Ingarden’s first book, *The Literary Work of Art*, to be followed by the more detailed analyses of the various types of cognitive, critical and aesthetic experiences of literary works in *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*. Paradoxically, Ingarden’s first and more well-known book was written as a preliminary study for his larger concern over the problem of realism and idealism, to which he devoted his next and much larger three volume work, *The Controversy Over the Existence of the World*. (5) Reversing Ingarden’s concerns, I will discuss the latter work only to throw some light on Ingarden’s ontological analyses in the
first book. Like all of Husserl’s students who initially embraced Husserl’s new “presupposition-less philosophy”, Ingarden was only willing to make a few steps and did not follow his great teacher all the way. In fact, none of Husserl’s students followed him beyond his initial and still largely ontological analyses of the Logical Investigations, stopping before the gateways into the transcendental phenomenology, i.e., the famed phenomenological reduction or epoché which Husserl initiated in the Ideas.(6) In the Preface to the first German edition of The Literary Work of Art Ingarden admits that although the subject of his investigation was the literary work of art, his ultimate motives were “connected to the problem of idealism-realism”. He was especially worried about “the attempt of Husserl’s transcendental idealism to conceive the real world and its elements as purely intentional objectivities which have their ontic and determining basis in the depths of the pure consciousness that constitutes them”.(7) In order to prove Husserl wrong, Ingarden set out to show that the structure of the purely intentional objects, an example of which is a literary work, is radically different than the nature and the mode of existence of the real objectivities.(8)" (pp. 2-3)
(5) Ingarden, Der Streit
(8) Ibid.

26. Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 1999. "Are Meanings in the Head? Ingarden’s Theory of Meaning." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 30:306-326. Abstract: "The question in the title should be construed as an epistemological and not an ontological one. Omitting the difficult problems of the ontology of intentionality we will ask if all what is needed to explain the phenomenon of the meaningful use of words, could be found "in our private head" interpreted as a sphere of specific privileged access, the sphere that is in the relevant epistemological sense subjective, private or non-public. There are many "mentalistic" theories of meaning that force us to the answer: "yes". According to these theories our words are meaningful in virtue of certain intentions of the speaker. And our intentions consist in having some mental states that should be in the relevant sense subjective or private. (Searle, Chisholm) But there are also philosophers (Kripke, Putnam) who claim to have evidence to the contrary. They argue that the meanings of our words could not be "in the head", because of two important reasons. (i) Very often we don't know exactly the meanings of the words that we use meaningfully. Furthermore, our "semantical self-knowledge" is principally corrigeable by other people, and hence our access to the meanings we use could be by no means privileged. And secondly (ii) we can imagine a situation in which two subjects with the same mental intention use the same word with the very different meanings.
We will investigate our question on the ground of the Ingarden's philosophy. As we will see, his answer turns out to be in an interesting sense: "yes and no"."


"Actually, the majority of philosophers who find Ingarden's work valuable and inspiring belong to the growing community of "naïve" or "straight" realists who typically don't even consider transcendental idealism as a serious philosophical option. Ironically, the main goal of Ingarden's philosophical struggle - the refutation of idealism - remained something that very few of his reader are really interested in. Most of the papers collected in this volume follow this strand of Ingarden's reception. The first three articles concern the basic ontological categories and distinctions. Gregor Haefliger and Guido Küng concentrate on categories of substance, state, process, and event, and compare Ingarden's solutions with some contemporary developments. Peter Simons investigates several concepts of ontological dependence that are central for the especially Ingardenian branch of ontology that Ingarden called "existential ontology". Daniel von Wachter proposes "a Europe-in-seven-days tour through Ingarden's ontology" (p. 55 in this volume). The next three papers concern the topic of Ingarden's philosophy that happened to become the best known of his achievements: the philosophy of fiction and of cultural objects. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski sketches the general problematic of intentional objects and argues that they are by no means useless fictions. Amie L. Thomasson presents an Ingardenian ontology of social and cultural objects such as money, churches, and flags. Finally, Jeff Mitscherling investigates the difficult topic of the "life" of a literary work of art.

The last two papers open a somewhat wider perspective on Ingarden's work. Edward Swiderski points out an interesting change of perspective that occurred in Ingarden's late work, which was devoted to the problem of responsibility. He argues that there is a tension between the hypothetical scientific and phenomenological sides of his philosophy. Andrzej Półtawski tries to answer the question of what Ingarden's ontology would look like if he developed it according to his deeply personalist picture of the world." (pp. 7-8)


Abstract: "Philosophers who, like Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden, introduce intentional objects are often criticised. An efficient theory of intentionality, it is claimed, can be developed within the framework of a theory assuming a much more parsimonious
ontology, like the theory of mental content proposed by the early Husserl. In this paper it is shown that this critique is unfair. The theory of mental content faces certain formidable difficulties which don't affect the theory of intentional objects. The most serious of them is that the relation between the mental content and the external target object has to be construed as a primitive (and cognitively accessible) relation, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined and in a sense explained away."

Abstract: "The majority of Polish phenomenologists never found Husserl"s transcendental idealism attractive. In this paper I investigate the source of this rather surprising realist attitude. True enough the founder of Polish phenomenology was Roman Ingarden – one of the most severe critics of Husserl"s transcendental idealism, so it is initially tempting to reduce the whole issue to this sociological fact. However, I argue that there must be something more about Ingarden"s intellectual background that immunized him against Husserl"s transcendental argumentation, and that the same background made his students so sympathetic to his “naive” realism. My claim is that this “something” is Ingarden"s realist concept of truth that he learned (at least partially) from Tarski as opposed to Husserl"s epistemic construal that he took from Brentano."

Abstract: "Ingarden’s official ontology of states of affairs is by no means reductionist. According to him there are states of affairs, but they are ontologically dependent on other entities. There are certain classical arguments for the introduction of states of affairs as extra entities over and above the nominal objects, that can be labelled “the problem of composition,” “the problem of relation” and “the problem of negation.” To the first two Ingarden proposes rather traditional solutions, while his treatment of negation proves to be original and interesting. Ingarden doesn’t deny the existence of negative states of affairs altogether, but he (i) accepts only a restricted group of them and (ii) ascribes to them an extremely weak mode of being. Negative states of affairs are construed as supervenient entities, and their supervenience-basis involves two factors: on the one hand the appropriate positive states of affairs, and on the other hand certain mental acts of conscious subjects. They enjoy thus a curious “half-subjective” mode of being."

Abstract: "In Reinach's works one finds a very rich ontology of states of affairs. Some of them are positive, some negative. Some of them obtain, some do not. But even the negative and non-obtaining states of affairs are absolutely independent of any mental activity. Despite this claim of the "ontological equality" of positive and negative states of affairs, there are, according to Reinach, massive epistemological differences in our cognitive access to them. Positive states of affairs can be directly "extracted" from our experience, while to acquire a negative belief we must pass through a quite complicated process, starting with certain positive beliefs. A possible and reasonable explanation of this discrepancy would be a theory to the effect that these epistemological differences have their basis in the ontology of the entities in question. Our knowledge of the negative states of affairs is essentially dependent on our knowledge of the positive ones precisely because the negative states of affairs are ontologically dependent on the positive ones. Such a theory has, in fact, been formulated by Roman Ingarden. According to him, negative states of affairs supervene on some positive ones and on certain mental acts of the conscious subjects."
Abstract: "In this paper I present a sketch of a theory of intentionality introducing special entities called "intentional objects." Elaborated theories of this kind can be found in the works of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. Nowadays those philosophers who are sympathetic to intentional objects are accused of planting an ontological jungle. All the problems of the theory of intentionality, it is claimed, can be resolved within the framework of a theory assuming a much more parsimonious ontology, like the theory of mental content proposed by the early Husserl or the so-called "adverbial" theory of intentionality. However, I show that the competitors of the theory of intentional objects face serious difficulties, the most important being that within their framework the relation between the representing entity (mental content or "adverbially specified" mental property of the subject) and the external target object has to be construed as primitive, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined. The consequence is that the partisans of mental contents and adverbialists are forced to require a distinguished kind of epistemic access not only to the representing entity but also to this "representing relation." This consequence, which is very seldom made explicit, seems indeed to be fatal. Intentional objects appear in this light not as products of an ontological extravagance but instead as entities that are indispensable, if we are to be able to explain the phenomenon of intentionality at all. Moreover, it turns out that we gain nothing if we introduce mental contents in addition to intentional objects. The approach to intentionality that I finally advocate postulates an external relation between a conscious subject and an intentional object, and is thus at bottom Brentanian.

"This is the first English translation of a review by Leon Chwistek of Roman Ingarden’s Das literarische Kunstwerk, (1931), published in Polish as “Tragedia verbalnej metafizyki (Z powodu książki Dra Ingardena: Das literarische Kunstwerk),” Kwartalnik Filozoficzny, Vol. X, 1932, 46–76. Ingarden’s book was translated as The Literary Work of Art (1979). Quotations from the original are taken from this translation. Chwistek’s page references are to the original German version. References to the translation are added to Chwistek’s page references, e.g. “(371 / 357 en)”. B. Linsky assisted the translator with the notes and some points of translation." (Adam Trybus, Translator's note, p. 1)

Abstract: "I deal with the relation between phenomenology and realism while examining Ingarden's critique towards Husserl. I exhibit the empiricist nucleus of Husserl's phenomenology, according to which the real is what can be sensuously experienced. On this basis, I argue that Husserl's phenomenology is not idealistic, in opposition to the realistic phenomenology, according to which reality consists in entities which cannot be sensuously experienced and are thus ideal. Finally, I attempt to show that the idealistic elements of Husserl's thinking do not originate from the transcendental turn, but from a remainder of psychologism that contradicts his empiricism."

First online 3 October 2021.


Abstract: "This essay reconstructs the cultural and historical context in which the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) articulated his reflection on values. Starting from the survey conducted in 'The Literary Work of Art' (his best-known work, dated 1931), in which the value is defined as "metaphysical quality," the author shows in what sense the value does not have, according to Ingarden, a self-sustaining "mode of being," but on the contrary, is always in need of an object to inhere to. The interpretative hypothesis is that Ingarden's reflection on the concept of "value" is strongly affected by its being originated in the field of aesthetics. The model referred to by the Polish philosopher for his general theory of value is, in fact, that of the relationship between the "object" and its being an "art object." This approach gives several elements of originality to the reflection on values, which has traditionally taken as its paradigm the ethical practical sphere."


"This book is meant to introduce the serious student of literature as art to a subject he can no longer afford to ignore. Several classes of graduate students at Chapel Hill have furnished the incentive to prepare this work, and their inquisitive and critical minds have helped to fashion its composition over many years. Almost at the outset of this undertaking it became obvious that we could not achieve a sufficient understanding of Ingarden’s poetics if we limited our study to the two works that have been published in English in the meantime. The notes to the following chapters specify some of Ingarden’s sources and especially parts of his other writings which had to be consulted. In a few instances I felt obliged to develop some points that were left merely implied in Ingarden’s texts, and to smooth out a few wrinkles that resulted from modifications in his evolving conceptions.

I must emphasize that my sole purpose here has been to give an exposition of Ingarden’s works on literature. When the student has clearly grasped Ingarden’s own position, he may wish to assess its merits in relation to different conceptions. My first chapter contains formulations of basic problems and assumptions, and simplified definitions of terms. It is meant to provide information similar to highway markers indicating principal routes and to the colored lines that explain road classifications. It also contains a geometric theorem which will frequently be used to illustrate some of Ingarden’s typical analyses and syntheses and his conception of structure. The first chapter also hints at the reasons why Ingarden asks certain questions and why he seeks answers that will reveal the essential nature of a literary work of art—of any literary work of art—and what obligations this essential nature imposes on the reader. All the other chapters trace the map (or blueprint) of the “anatomical” structure of the literary work of art, of the functional relations of its elements, of its layers, and of its order of sequence. They also describe the attitude and the procedures a reader of a literary work of art should adopt when he has become acquainted with that map. Literary scholars and critics will find their own functions mapped out." (from the Preface, pp. XI-XII)


68. ———. 1989. "Ingarden's Philosophical Work: A Systematic Outline." In On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden: Interpretations and Assessments, edited by Dziemidok, Bohdan and McCormick, Peter, 1-20. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Reprint of D. Gierulanka (1977). "Ingarden's philosophical output does not form a closed system in the sense of a set of statements derived from a priori accepted general assumptions. Following the basic methodological principle of Husserl's phenomenology, Ingarden obtained results in all areas of his philosophy by referring directly to the "things given in experiences" corresponding to the type of object being investigated (in direct
intuitive cognition). In spite of the great breadth of topics studied his results constitute a lucidly organized whole, as I shall presently try to demonstrate. Ingarden's writings (over two hundred items including twenty-seven large books) belong primarily to three areas of philosophy: epistemology, ontology, and aesthetics (including the theory of the work of art). This does not, however, comprise all of his work, as I shall show later. The first decade of Ingarden's philosophic work already included basic results which set the direction and paths of development of his thought. I shall discuss the main core of Ingarden's philosophy in several sections, indicating the thought processes leading from one to another. Epistemology, being the least known chapter of his thought, and ontology, which dominates Ingarden's philosophy, will be discussed more extensively." (p. 2).


"I. Meaning — Removing the Shroud from a Mysterious "Mental Residue"

Roman Ingarden’s work has been generally recognized in the area of ontology, but the same cannot be said about his great contribution to the field of semantics. In appreciation of those endeavors, I have referred to him occasionally as the latter-day “Copernicus of Semantics”, an accolade I hope to justify by the end of this study.(1) The majority of contemporary critics, among them his former Marxist countrymen as well as the various proponents of analytic philosophy this side of the Atlantic, have largely considered Ingarden’s ideas on phenomenological semantics too abstruse, his nomenclature too esoteric, much as they themselves have failed to make any progress in this rather complex field.(2) I shall first reveal some of these crucial problem areas and subsequently explain how they can be solved with the aid of Ingarden’s thesis. Certainly, with Western civilization about to enter its third millennium, the time seems ripe!(3) In the limited space afforded me here, I shall have to put the problematic issues before their eras. Nor is a strictly chronological
order called for precisely because there has been no genuine step-by-step advancement in ideas." (pp. 21-22)


(2) Some of these reservations and objections are cited in Robert Fieguth, ed., *Roman Ingarden, Gegenstand und Aufgaben der Literaturwissenschaft: Aufsätze und Diskussionsbeiträge* (1937-1964) (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1976), pp. xi, xxvi, 30, 153, and 139, where Ingarden contends with Marxists attacking his “Häresien.” This work will be identified as “Fieguth, 1976.”

(3) Indeed, my work on metaphor (Gumpel, 1984) based on a new premise of "non-Aristotelian semantics," ha been dedicated to that new millennium.


"Introduction

"The main subject of the investigations presented here is the basic structure and the mode of existence of the literary work, and in particular of the literary work of art." [cited in German by Haeflinger]

This is the first sentence in the preface of Ingarden’s *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (1931), with which he began his extensive work towards a phenomenological aesthetics.(1) But already in this preface Ingarden stated clearly that his interest in an ontology of the work of art is founded on quite different motives.(2) In fact, on an more general philosophical level, Ingarden (1931) was intended as a “Vorstudie” for an extensive critical examination of Husserl’s transcendental idealism.(3)

Now, one important thesis of Ingarden (1931) is that a literal work exists in a “purely intentional” way. This thesis was later refined in Ingarden (1964), where a theory of the different ways of being is elaborated. Even today, however, his theory has not yet received widespread attention. This is so despite the originality and conceptual transparency of the programme he developed for his theory. And more importantly, his position contains novel viewpoints for an answer to the question of the equivocity of ‘to be’ — a question that has long been one of the fundamental questions of ontology.

The aim of this paper is to elucidate Ingarden’s answer to this “old” question. To this end we must first acquaint ourselves with the fundamentals of his theory of the different ways or modes of existence. Then we shall consider the unique position that Ingarden’s thesis of the equivocity of ‘to be’ occupies in the history of philosophy. Finally some suggestions towards a systematic evaluation of Ingarden’s position will be made." (pp. 59-60)

(1) Later Ingarden published in German *Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst* (1962), *Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks* (1968) and *Erlebnis, Kunstwerk und Wert* (1969). By this publications Ingarden tried to show to a german public “die Umrisse einer phanomenologisch behandelten Asthetik, wie ich sie verstehe” [the outlines of a phenomenologically treated aesthetic, as I understand it] (Ingarden 1931, XIX).

(2) See Ingarden (1931), XII.

(3) Incidentally, Husserl himself was quite aware of this; see, for example, Husserl, 61 ff. (letter XLVI) — Concerning Ingarden’s critical studies on Husserl’s idealism
see — from a genetical point of view — Haefliger (1991b); and — from a systematical point of view — Haefliger (1991a).

References


"This book is a monograph study of Ingarden's investigations into existence. Its aim is to give a clear and formally precise account, as well as a critical evaluation, of his contributions. In the first chapter the basic principles of Ingarden's ontology are reformulated and, contrary to Ingarden, a nominalistic point of view is adopted. Chapters 2 to 4 give a reconstruction of the arguments for the following Ingardenian theses: (1) Existence is not a property; (2) The concept of existence is a principle *sui generis* of classification; (3) "exist(s)" is an equivocal word. On the basis of this critical doxography Chapters 5 and 6 provide a systematic examination of the Ingardenian position, by confronting it with the results of analytic philosophy (such as early Husserl, Frege, Russell, Moore, Meinong, Bergmann, Hochberg, Castaneda)."


"In his *Contemporary European Philosophy* Bochenski declared Ingarden's work, *The Controversy over the Existence of the World* to be one of the most important philosophical publications of our time. The work had then been published only in Polish, a fact which occasioned Bochenski to deplore the widespread habit of publishing professional philosophy in languages other than the main European ones.

Now *Spór o istnienieświata* has become *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, and the decisive language barrier has been broken. Other obstacles may remain: the 1100 pages do offer, even in non-Polish, a certain resistance. Not that the author has not done his share of the work, for he expresses himself with exemplary precision and by no means leaves the reader with the task of reducing confusion to clarity. But his perseverance in analysis and the wealth of rigorously differentiated concepts give us a complicated whole to survey. It is the limited purpose of the present paper to give a short outline of this comprehensive system, and some hints of its place in a larger context." (p. 401)


89. Heffernan, George. 1998. "Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl's Answer to the Question 'was die Evidenz sei': A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Evidence on the Occasion of the Publication of Husserl's Studies no. 15:1-75.


Abstract: "The paper is an attempt to take Ingarden’s unfinished critique of idealism one step further. It puts forward a schematic solution to the external-world realist’s problem of how to explain the fact that we can identify and re-identify fictions, entities that in one sense do not exist. The solution contains three proposals: to accept, with Husserl and Ingarden, that there are universals with intentionality (Husserl’s “intentional essences”), to accept, contra Husserl and Ingarden, an immanent realism for universals, and to accept Ingarden’s view that there is a mode
of being distinct from those put forward in traditional metaphysics, that of purely intentional being. Together, these views imply that all the instances of a specific intentional universal are directed towards the same intentional object; be this object a really existing object or a fiction, a purely intentional being.

99. ———. 2013. "The Basic Distinctions in Der Streit." Semiotica no. 194:137-157. Abstract: "The paper presents Ingarden's views on what he calls "modes of being" ("ways of existence") and "existential moments"; the latter being constitutive parts of the former. Mainstream analytic philosophy has been dominated by the view that "existence" can mean only existence simpliciter. Ingarden, on the other hand, discerns four possible modes of being, one of which is of special interest to semiotics: purely intentional being. It is of relevance for the ontological understanding not only of texts, but also of pictures and other sign-related entities. At the end, an extrapolated Ingardenian semiotic triangle is presented."


115. ———, 2010. "An Evaluation of Ingardenian Values." Polish Journal of Philosophy no. 4:105-121. Abstract: "From recent work on Ingarden it is apparent that values are central to his philosophy, even in the context of his realist ontology. In this evaluation of Ingarden’s work we consider his principal philosophical notions (i.e. his realist ontology, his aesthetics, his reflections on language, and his consideration of values) in the light of what Nietzsche referred to in his own philosophy as the “re-evaluation” or the “inversion” of all values. It is argued that two of Ingarden’s most fundamental values are the notion of communication and the aesthetic dimension of thought."


Dordrecht: Reidel.


133. ———. 2016. "Quelques remarques autour de l’identité des objets intentionnels." In Forme(s) et modes d’être / Form(s) and Modes of Being: L’ontologie de Roman Ingarden / The Ontology of Roman Ingarden, edited by Malherbe, Olivier and Richard, Sébasiten, 137-162. Bern: Peter Lang.


Analecta Husserliana. Volume 80.
138. Makota, Janina. 1975. "Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Man." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 6:126-130. Translated from the Polish by the author with the assistance of E. M. Swiderski. "Ingarden's views concerning man are scattered throughout his writings. But the bulk of them is contained in the chapter entitled "The problem of the form of pure consciousness" in the second volume of Controversy over the Existence of the World (1) and in the posthumous A Booklet on Man, (2) which is a collection of previously published articles, lectures, etc. The most advanced considerations on this subject are contained in the essay On Responsibility. Its Ontic Foundations. (3) What is new in this essay and what proves to be theoretically fruitful is the application, not only to man as a whole, but to his body and to the psychic side of his being as well, of the conception of relatively isolated systems. This notion had been previously employed by Ingarden to explain various types of connections within the world as a whole. (4)"
(1) Der Streit urn die Existenz der Welt, vol. 11/2, Tubingen: Niemeyer 1965, chap. 16: "Das Problem der Form des reinen Bewusstseins".


142. ———. 2016. "Quelques avatars de la Gestalt dans la philosophie d’Ingarden." In Forme(s) et modes d’être / Form(s) and Modes of Being: L'ontologie de Roman Ingarden / The Ontology of Roman Ingarden, edited by Malherbe, Olivier and Richard, Sébasiten, 163-196. Bern: Peter Lang.


144. ———. 2018. "Roman Ingarden: phénoménologie génétique et ontologie réaliste." Studia Phaenomenologica no. 18:153-181. Abstract: "Roman Ingarden, one of Husserl’s most gifted students, devoted several thousand pages to the development of an ontological, epistemological, aesthetical and even anthropological framework that would allow him to firmly reject the so-called “idealistic turn” of his master Husserl. This paper aims at reconstructing an often overlooked side of his philosophy: his theory of consciousness and his analysis of the constitutive process involved in sense perception. After emphasizing the distinctive character of Ingarden’s ontological frame and its impact on understanding concepts as fundamental as consciousness or intentionality, this paper tries to sketch Ingarden’s answers to several genetic questions raised by Husserl: the relation between time and consciousness, the nature of the ultimate sense data and the question of motivation."

145. Malherbe, Olivier, and Richard, Sébastien, eds. 2016. Forme(s) et modes d’être. L'ontologie de Roman Ingarden / Form(s) and Modes of Being. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden. Bern: P.I.E. Peter Lang.
Table des matières/Table of contents: Olivier Malherbe, Sébastien Richard: Introduction 9; Liste des abréviations 21; List of abbreviations 23; Sébastien Richard.


Abstract: "With great sympathy for Roman Ingarden and his work, Edith Stein edited his book project 'The Literary Work Of Art'. In the letters she exchanges with him she reflects on relationship between reality and ideality; she writes that those who do not see the world as a reality must be fools. The political events in the 1930s had an impact on phenomenology. While Edmund Husserl dissociates himself from his protégé Martin Heidegger with regard to the content of his philosophy, as well as with regard to his ideology, Edith Stein distances herself more and more from the phenomenological method, seeing it as removed from reality, and she eventually become a Carmelite nun. Roman Ingarden, on the other hand, reconsiders interpreting phenomenology as aesthetic theory. Literature and film are being reanalysed in terms of phenomenological mediality and as factors of human communication."


Chapter 11: Ingarden and Aesthetic Structures, pp. 274-304.
"In this final chapter I look at still another aspect of the problematic notion of the aesthetic and draw on still another figure in the realist backgrounds of modern aesthetics, in the interest of exploring further reflections on aesthetic objects. In dealing with these complicated issues, as we have seen in the cases of Twardowski and Meinong, some unity has seemed especially requisite. Hence I have decided to treat the issues largely with the help of critical and argumentative contrasts. Although others who deal with these topics are also brought in when their views seem particularly relevant, I have tried to center this discussion mainly on the extremely rich and profound work of Roman Ingarden. This work for some years has strongly influenced that of more widely known theorists such as Mikel Dufrenne in France, Wolfgang Iser in Germany, René Wellek in the United States, and Stefen Morawski in Poland. And now the work deserves a careful rereading in the changing contexts of contemporary aesthetics.

It will be useful to begin with some generalities about Ingarden's work in order to situate the much narrower examination into questions about aesthetic structure that follows. I will turn to the exposition of that doctrine in section 2, reserving a long appendix for the key issue of aesthetic objects, then use section 3 to contrast it with the important alternative views of Monroe Beardsley. Finally, I will attempt to defend Ingarden's position against these particular criticisms and alternatives while leaving the general question about the existence of aesthetic objects open for further reflection. Throughout, my aim will be to draw attention to many of the interesting perspectives Ingarden's work opens up on questions that too often continue to be viewed only in terms of either analytic or hermeneutic approaches." (pp. 274-275, notes omitted)

154. Millière, Raphaël. 2016. "Ingarden's Combinatorial Analysis of the Realism-Idealism Controversy." In Forme(s) et modes d'être / Form(s) and Modes of Being: L'ontologie de Roman Ingarden / The Ontology of Roman Ingarden, edited by Malherbe, Olivier and Richard, Sébasiten, 67-98. Bern: Peter Lang.


"In the Preface to the second edition of The Literary Work of Art, Roman Ingarden calls attention to one of the unfortunate but unavoidable shortcomings of his book: "I am quite conscious of the fact that for literary critics this book would be much more accessible and plastic if I had devoted a series of concrete analyses to individual works of art. But I had to abandon this from the first, since the book would have become unmanageable." In this paper I present, as briefly as possible, two such concrete analyses. Throughout my analyses, I employ Ingarden’s

https://www.ontology.co/biblio/ingarden-biblio.htm
terminology. For the reader who is unfamiliar with this terminology, and perhaps with Ingarden's work in general, these analyses must prove difficult to follow, if not entirely incomprehensible. For this reader, I have added, as Part I of this paper, a preliminary exposition of The Literary Work of Art. The reader who is already acquainted with Ingarden's work may wish to skip this and turn immediately to Part II, in which I present my analyses. In Part III, I conclude with a few remarks on the material presented in both the previous parts." (p. 351)


165. Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1997. "Roman Ingarden's Critique of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology." In Phenomenology: Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy, 32-45. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. "Roman Ingarden was Husserl's pupil, and remained in lifelong contact with him, continuously questioning Husserl's positions, especially his transcendental idealism. Whereas the members of the Munich and Göttingen schools simply abandoned the master as having deviated from the path of philosophy as a rigorous science, Ingarden continued his efforts to understand the motives and the arguments which led Husserl in that direction. In this relentless effort, he seems to have gone a long way toward understanding, and even agreeing with, Husserl's transcendental-constitutive phenomenology, but he would nevertheless draw a line that he did not want to cross-thereby preserving his own realistic intuitions from being overtaken by what he took to be an idealistic philosophy. While thus seeking to understand Husserl, Ingarden also undertook first his famous work Das Literarische Kunstwerk, and then the large, carefully argued work on the controversy regarding the existence of the world, Die Streit um die Existenz der Welt. One could say that Ingarden's central interest lay in the realism-idealism dispute, and it may also be safely said that no one in the history of philosophy has more carefully analyzed that issue than he. While Das Literarische Kunstwerk is deservedly more famous, Ingarden undertook it as much out of his interest in the subject matter of art as out of the desire to advance the discussion of the realism-idealism issue." (p. 32)

