Roman Ingarden: Ontology and Metaphysics. Selected Bibliography

INTRODUCTION

A bibliography of Roman Ingarden's works for the years 1915-1989 is published in: Analecta Husserliana - The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research - vol. 30: Ingardeniana II. New studies in the philosophy of Roman Ingarden. With a new international Ingarden bibliography, edited by Hans Rudnik and Jolanta Wawrzycka; the bibliography (pp. 225-296) contains in the first part ("primary sources") 368 items, inclusively of translations and reprints; the second part ("secondary sources") contains 821 references (many in Polish) concerning Ingarden.

I will give an updated bibliography of the most relevant references for Ingarden's ontology.

STUDIES ABOUT INGARDEN'S PHILOSOPHY


"The aim of the essay consists in analyzing one of the most important points of discussion among some of Husserl's disciples: A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein, that is the existence of the world and the way to prove it. The research leads to two consequences: to pinpoint Husserl's particular and original interpretation regarding "existence" that concludes to the acceptance of it and the difference between his transcendental phenomenology and that one sustained by his
disciples that can be called realistic phenomenology. In this contest E. Stein assumed a peculiar position that to some extent combines the two attitudes."

"The above outline sought to show very briefly how the discussion about the existence of the world came into being within the phenomenological school. We noted that Husserl's cited disciples are convinced that, as far as the maestro is concerned, the world - understood as external reality that comprises ourselves as human beings - does exist. But doubt that he succeeded in justifying this view moving from his theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, the objections are more or less mellow and indistinct and all of them are made within the school, that is to say, within a common style of search.

The great common terrain is constituted by essential analysis, which nobody wants to do without, but precisely because the philosophical tradition regards the theme of the essence as related to that of existence, there arises the fear that this latter aspect might be pushed into the background. Furthermore, because for Husserl essential analysis concentrates on subjectivity and opens the road to the transcendental perspective, what is feared is becoming enclosed in subjectivity and concentrating all of reality in it, as in the great lesson of German idealism.

As can be seen, I have endeavored to defend Flossen against his own disciples, trying to delve into his profound intentions, re-balancing - wherever this proves possible - the results of his analysis. Comforted in this by the observations of Edith Stein, who was probably closest to the maestro and therefore managed to grasp the principal lines of his position more accurately. The theoretical core always remains the relationship between idealism and realism, with respect to which Husserl's attitude, at least in my opinion, is very balanced, notwithstanding its peculiarity. On the other hand, it is quite readily understandable that his disciples should have committed the "great parricide," to use the expression that Plato used in connection with Parmenides: it may well be that without it one does not achieve theoretical autonomy. All the same, one also has to hear in mind a saying that once again involves Plato: amicus Plato. sell magis amica veritas. which should help us understand the intentions of the other before we raise objections." (p. 113)


Abstract: "It is accepted that certain mereological concepts and phenomenological conceptualisations presented in Carl Stumpf’s Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung and Tonpsychologie played an important role in the development of the Husserlian formal ontology. In the third Logical Investigation, which displays the formal relations between part and whole and among parts that make out a whole, one of the main concepts of contemporary formal ontology and metaphysics is settled: ontological dependence or foundation. My main objective is to display Stumpf’s concepts of partial content, independent content, spatial wholes, sound wholes, and the different kinds of connection among parts, in particular, fusion. Second, I will show how Husserl improved this background, in particular with regards to the exact nature of the theory of manifolds, in discussion with Georg Cantor, the father of set theory. Third, I will focus on Ingarden’s use of formal ontology and on the different modes of being that can be justified by appealing to the
concept of ontological dependence in its Ingardenian variations. If my interpretation is adequate, it should be inferred that formal ontology is the operative theory of phenomenological philosophy, and this must be acknowledged in its full significance with respect to the supposed independence of the phenomenological method since 1913. A further consequence, not developed in this essay, is that formal ontology can be mathematised.

   Abstract: "The purpose of the paper is demonstrate the thesis that Ingarden's ontological system allows a better understanding of the "part-whole" problem then previous theories. Especially, if we take into account the existential ontology of Ingarden, which refers to Husserl "part-whole" theory, we can see that development of terms made by Ingarden sheds new light on old problem. In this context, particularly important is to distinguish between two existential moments: contingency/inseparatness, because thanks to them we can talk about many different types of relationships and hence many types of objects."


   Abstract: "Roman Ingarden and Nicolai Hartmann developed an ontology of the real world in which the analysis of human responsible action and its presuppositions plays an essential role. In this analysis, several common elements can be identified, such as the acknowledgement of the objectivity of values and the centrality of the concept of person, which for both philosophers refers exclusively to the real man in the real world. The aim of the study is to analyze the way in which both Ingarden and Hartmann, on common grounds, explore the specific phenomenon of free will and deal with the issue of its ontological possibility within a deterministically structured world. Despite the differences, what emerges in both cases is a theoretical model that refuses the rigid alternative determinism-indeterminism with the aim of providing the foundations of the self-determination of man."


Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no. 10:5-41.


Abstract: "In its examination of the intersection of ethics and ontology, Roman Ingarden's philosophy bears a striking resemblance to the thought of the contemporary French philosopher Alain Badiou. Though no formal influence is claimed, this paper explores several ways in which Badiou's theory of the event and existential agency is foreshadowed in the writings of Ingarden. In so doing, the author suggests the continued importance of this unjustly neglected philosopher for contemporary thinking on questions of value."


"Ingarden's ontology is an ontology of an object. An object, as conceived by Ingarden, is, first of all, something which is a unity of matter (referred to by Ingarden as material endowment), form (formal structure) and existence (mode of existence). As examples of objects in this meaning one may offer: a physical object, a process, an event, a Platonic idea, a property of a thing, a negative state of affairs. Yet, not everything is an object. Non-objects are: matter, form and mode of existence as such. The Controversy over the Existence of the World was divided by Ingarden into Existential Ontology and Formal Ontology in order to deal with existential and formal aspects of objects." (p. 137)


   Abstract: "The question in the title should be construed as an epistemological and not an ontological one. Omitting the difficult problems of the ontology of intentionality we will ask if all what is needed to explain the phenomenon of the meaningful use of words, could be found "in our private head" interpreted as a sphere of specific privileged access, the sphere that is in the relevant epistemological sense subjective, private or non-public.
   There are many "mentalistic" theories of meaning that force us to the answer: "yes". According to these theories our words are meaningful in virtue of certain intentions of the speaker. And our intentions consist in having some mental states that should be in the relevant sense subjective or private. (Searle, Chisholm) But there are also philosophers (Kripke, Putnam) who claim to have evidence to the contrary. They argue that the meanings of our words could not be "in the head", because of two important reasons. (I) Very often we don't know exactly the meanings of the words that we use meaningfully. Furthermore, our "semantical self-knowledge" is principally corrigible by other people, and hence our access to the meanings we use could be by no means privileged. And secondly (ii) we can imagine a situation in which two subjects with the same mental intention use the same word with the very different meanings.
   We will investigate our question on the ground of the Ingarden's philosophy. As we will see, his answer turns out to be in an interesting sense: "yes and no".


   "Actually, the majority of philosophers who find Ingarden's work valuable and
inspiring belong to the growing community of "naïve" or "straight" realists who
typically don't even consider transcendental idealism as a serious philosophical
option. Ironically, the main goal of Ingarden's philosophical struggle - the refutation
of idealism - remained something that very few of his reader are really interested in.
Most of the papers collected in this volume follow this strand of Ingarden's
reception. The first three articles concern the basic ontological categories and
distinctions. Gregor Haefliger and Guido Küng concentrate on categories of
substance, state, process, and event, and compare Ingarden's solutions with some
contemporary developments. Peter Simons investigates several concepts of
ontological dependence that are central for the especially Ingardenian branch of
ontology that Ingarden called "existential ontology". Daniel von Wachter proposes "a
Europe-in-seven-days tour through Ingarden's ontology" (p. 55 in this volume). The
next three papers concern the topic of Ingarden's philosophy that happened to
become the best known of his achievements: the philosophy of fiction and of cultural
objects. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski sketches the general problematic of intentional
objects and argues that they are by no means useless fictions. Amie L. Thomasson
presents an Ingardenian ontology of social and cultural objects such as money,
churches, and flags.
Finally, Jeff Mitscherling investigates the difficult topic of the "life" of a literary
work of art.
The last two papers open a somewhat wider perspective on Ingarden's work. Edward
Swiderski points out an interesting change of perspective that occurred in Ingarden's
late work, which was devoted to the problem of responsibility. He argues that there is
a tension between the hypothetical scientific and phenomenological sides of his
philosophy. Andrzej Półtawski tries to answer the question of what Ingarden's
ontology would look like if he developed it according to his deeply personalist
picture of the world." (pp. 7-8)

Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos verlag.
Contents: Einführung 7; 1. Franz Brentano über die Intentionalität 17; 2. Franz
Brentano über die Zeitbewusstsein 39; 3. Anton Marty 53; 4. Wozu brauchte Carl
Stumpf Sachverhalte? 89; 5. Alexius Meinong 107; 6. Von Brentaon zu Ingarden
135; 7. Husserl und die transzendente Intersubjektivität 161; Bibliographie 203;
Namensregister 211.

Gegenstände." In Existence, Culture, and Persons. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden,
edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, 83-114. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
Abstract: "Philosophers who, like Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden, introduce
intentional objects are often criticised. An efficient theory of intentionality, it is
claimed, can be developed within the framework of a theory assuming a much more
parsimonious
ontology, like the theory of mental content proposed by the early Husserl. In this
paper it is shown that this critique is unfair. The theory of mental content faces
certain formidable difficulties which don't affect the theory of intentional objects.
The most serious of them is that the relation between the mental content and the
external target object has to be construed as a primitive (and cognitively accessible)
relation, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined and in a
sense explained away."

Abstract: "The majority of Polish phenomenologists never found Husserl’s transcendental idealism attractive. In this paper I investigate the source of this rather surprising realist attitude. True enough the founder of Polish phenomenology was Roman Ingarden – one of the most severe critics of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, so it is initially tempting to reduce the whole issue to this sociological fact. However, I argue that there must be something more about Ingarden’s intellectual background that immunized him against Husserl’s transcendental argumentation, and that the same background made his students so sympathetic to his “naive” realism. My claim is that this “something” is Ingarden’s realist concept of truth that he learned (at least partially) from Tarski as opposed to Husserl’s epistemic construal that he took from Brentano."

Abstract: "Ingarden’s official ontology of states of affairs is by no means reductionist. According to him there are states of affairs, but they are ontologically dependent on other entities. There are certain classical arguments for the introduction of states of affairs as extra entities over and above the nominal objects, that can be labelled “the problem of composition,” “the problem of relation” and “the problem of negation.” To the first two Ingarden proposes rather traditional solutions, while his treatment of negation proves to be original and interesting. Ingarden doesn’t deny the existence of negative states of affairs altogether, but he (i) accepts only a restricted group of them and (ii) ascribes to them an extremely weak mode of being. Negative states of affairs are construed as supervenient entities, and their supervenience-basis involves two factors: on the one hand the appropriate positive states of affairs, and on the other hand certain mental acts of conscious subjects. They enjoy thus a curious “half-subjective” mode of being."

Abstract: "In Reinach’s works one finds a very rich ontology of states of affairs. Some of them are positive, some negative. Some of them obtain, some do not. But even the negative and non-obtaining states of affairs are absolutely independent of any mental activity. Despite this claim of the "ontological equality" of positive and negative states of affairs, there are, according to Reinach, massive epistemological differences in our cognitive access to them. Positive states of affairs can be directly "extracted" from our experience, while to acquire a negative belief we must pass through a quite complicated process, starting with certain positive beliefs. A possible and reasonable explanation of this discrepancy would be a theory to the effect that these epistemological differences have their basis in the ontology of the entities in question. Our knowledge of the negative states of affairs is essentially dependent on our knowledge of the positive ones precisely because the negative states of affairs are ontologically dependent on the positive ones. Such a theory has, in fact, been formulated by Roman Ingarden. According to him, negative states of affairs supervene on some positive ones and on certain mental acts of the conscious subjects."

Abstract: "In this paper I present a sketch of a theory of intentionality introducing special entities called "intentional objects." Elaborated theories of this kind can be found in the works of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. Nowadays those philosophers who are sympathetic to intentional objects are accused of planting an ontological jungle. All the problems of the theory of intentionality, it is claimed, can be resolved within the framework of a theory assuming a much more parsimonious ontology, like the theory of mental content proposed by the early Husserl or the so-called "adverbial" theory of intentionality. However, I show that the competitors of the theory of intentional objects face serious difficulties, the most important being that within their framework the relation between the representing entity (mental content or "adverbially specified" mental property of the subject) and the external target object has to be construed as primitive, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined. The consequence is that the partisans of mental contents and adverbialists are forced to require a distinguished kind of epistemic access not only to the representing entity but also to this "representing relation." This consequence, which is very seldom made explicit, seems indeed to be fatal. Intentional objects appear in this light not as products of an ontological extravagance but instead as entities that are indispensable, if we are to be able to explain the phenomenon of intentionality at all. Moreover, it turns out that we gain nothing if we introduce mental contents in addition to intentional objects. The approach to intentionality that I finally advocate postulates an external relation between a conscious subject and an intentional object, and is thus at bottom Brentanian."
Abstract: "I deal with the relation between phenomenology and realism while examining Ingarden's critique towards Husserl. I exhibit the empiricist nucleus of Husserl's phenomenology, according to which the real is what can be sensuously experienced. On this basis, I argue that Husserl's phenomenology is not idealistic, in opposition to the realistic phenomenology, according to which reality consists in entities which cannot be sensuously experienced and are thus ideal. Finally, I attempt to show that the idealistic elements of Husserl's thinking do not originate from the transcendental turn, but from a remainder of psychologism that contradicts his empiricism."


Abstract: "This essay reconstructs the cultural and historical context in which the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) articulated his reflection on values. Starting from the survey conducted in 'The Literary Work of Art' (his best-known work, dated 1931), in which the value is defined as "metaphysical quality," the author shows in what sense the value does not have, according to Ingarden, a self-sustaining "mode of being," but on the contrary, is always in need of an object to inhere to. The interpretative hypothesis is that Ingarden's reflection on the concept of "value" is strongly affected by its being originated in the field of aesthetics. The model referred to by the Polish philosopher for his general theory of value is, in fact, that of the relationship between the "object" and its being an "art object." This approach gives several elements of originality to the reflection on values, which has traditionally taken as its paradigm the ethical practical sphere."


49. ———. 1981. "Ingarden's Concept of the Aesthetic Object." *Comparative Literature*


Inhalt: Introduction 1; Wlodzimierz Galewicz: Das Problem des Seinsstatus der gegenständlichen Sinne und Ingardens Ontologie der rein intentionalen Gegenstände 5; Liselotte Gumpel: Language as bearer of meaning: The phenomenology of Roman Ingarden...
Ingarden 21; Gregor Haefliger: Ens multipliciter dicitur. The ingardian variant of an old thesis 59; Andrzej Poltawski: Painting and the structure of consciousness. Remarks on Roman Ingarden’s Theory of Painting 79; Josef Seifert and Barry Smith: The truth about fiction 97; Peter M. Simons: Strata in Ingarden’s ontology 119; Elisabeth Ströker: Fiktive Welt im literarischen Kunstwerk. Zu einer Kontroverse zwischen Roman Ingarden und Käte Hamburger 141; Wladyslaw Strozewski: Art and participation 167; Edward M. Swiderski: Individual essence in Ingarden’s ontology 183; Pawel Taranczewski: What Ingarden has to say to painters 207; Adam Wegrzecki: The function of ontology and experience in Roman Ingarden’s axiological investigations 219; Jan Wolenski: Sentences, propositions and quasi-propositions 229-235.


"Ingarden's philosophical output does not form a closed system in the sense of a set of statements derived from apriori accepted general assumptions. Following the basic methodological principle of Husserl's phenomenology, Ingarden obtained results in all areas of his philosophy by referring directly to the "things given in experiences" corresponding to the type of object being investigated (in direct intuitive cognition). In spite of the great breadth of topics studied his results constitute a lucidly organized whole, as I shall presently try to demonstrate. Ingarden's writings (over two hundred items including twenty-seven large books) belong primarily to three areas of philosophy: epistemology, ontology, and aesthetics (including the theory of the work of art). This does not, however, comprise all of his work, as I shall show later. The first decade of Ingarden's philosophic work already included basic results which set the direction and paths of development of his thought. I shall discuss the main core of Ingarden's philosophy in several sections, indicating the thought processes leading from one to another. Epistemology, being the least known chapter of his thought, and ontology, which dominates Ingarden's philosophy, will be discussed more extensively." (p. 2).


67. Golaszewska, Maria. 1975. "Ingarden's World of Values (Selected Problems in


73. ———. 1994. Über Existenz: die Ontologie Roman Ingardens. Dordrecht: Kluwer. "This book is a monograph study of Ingarden's investigations into existence. Its aim is to give a clear and formally precise account, as well as a critical evaluation, of his contributions. In the first chapter the basic principles of Ingarden's ontology are reformulated and, contrary to Ingarden, a nominalistic point of view is adopted. Chapters 2 to 4 give a reconstruction of the arguments for the following Ingardenian theses: (1) Existence is not a property; (2) The concept of existence is a principle sui generis of classification; (3) "exist(s)"is an equivocal word. On the basis of this critical doxography Chapters 5 and 6 provide a systematic examination of the Ingardenian position, by confronting it with the results of analytic philosophy (such as early Husserl, Frege, Russell, Moore, Meinong, Bergmann, Hochberg, Castaneda)."

74. ———. 1994. "Ens multipliciter dicitur. The Ingardian Variant of an Old Thesis." In Kunst und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden zum 100. Geburstag, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 59-78. Amsterdam: Rodopi. "Now, one important thesis of Ingarden Das literarische Kunstwerk (1931) is that a literal work exists in a "purely intentional" way. This thesis was later refined in Ingarden (1964), where a theory of the different ways of being is elaborated. Even today, however, his theory has not yet received widespread attention. This is so despite the originality and conceptual transparency of the programme he developed for his theory. And more importantly, his position contains novel viewpoints for an answer to the question of the equivocity of 'to be' - a question that has long been one of the fundamental questions of ontology. The aim of this paper is to elucidate Ingarden's answer to this "old" question. To this end we must first acquaint ourselves with the fundamentals of his theory of the different ways or modes of existence. Then we shall consider the unique position that Ingarden's thesis of the equivocity of 'to be' occupies in the history of philosophy. Finally some suggestions towards a systematic evaluation of Ingarden's position will
be made."


80. Hanneborg, Knut. 1966. "New Concepts in Ontology: A Review Discussion of Roman Ingarden: Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt." Inquiry no. 9:401-409. "In his Contemporary European Philosophy Bochenski declared Ingarden's work, The Controversy over the Existence of the World to be one of the most important philosophical publications of our time. The work had then been published only in Polish, a fact which occasioned Bochenski to deplore the widespread habit of publishing professional philosophy in languages other than the main European ones. Now Spór o istnienie świata has become Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, and the decisive language barrier has been broken. Other obstacles may remain: the 1100 pages do offer, even in non-Polish, a certain resistance. Not that the author has not done his share of the work, for he expresses himself with exemplary precision and by no means leaves the reader with the task of reducing confusion to clarity. But his perseverance in analysis and the wealth of rigorously differentiated concepts give us a complicated whole to survey. It is the limited purpose of the present paper to give a short outline of this comprehensive system, and some hints of its place in a larger context." (p. 401)


90. Johansson, Ingvard. 2009. "Roman Ingarden and the Problem of Universals." Metaphysica. International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics no. 10:65-87. "The paper ends with an argument that says: necessarily, if there are finitely spatially extended particulars, then there are monadic universals. Before that, in order to characterize the distinction between particulars and universals, Roman Ingarden's notions of "existential moments" and "modes (ways) of being" are presented; and a new pair of such existential moments is introduced: Multiplicity-Monadicity. Also, it is argued that there are not only real universals, but instances of universals (tropes) and fictional universals, too."


92. ———. 2010. "Fictions and the Spatiotemporal World -- in the Light of Ingarden." Polish Journal of Philosophy no. 4:81-103. Abstract: "The paper is an attempt to take Ingarden’s unfinished critique of idealism one step further. It puts forward a schematic solution to the external-world realist’s problem of how to explain the fact that we can identify and re-identify fictions, entities that in one sense do not exist. The solution contains three proposals: to accept, with Husserl and Ingarden, that there are universals with intentionality (Husserl’s “intentional essences”), to accept, contra Husserl and Ingarden, an immanent realism for universals, and to accept Ingarden’s view that there is a mode of being distinct from those put forward in traditional metaphysics, that of purely intentional being. Together, these views imply that all the instances of a specific intentional universal are directed towards the same intentional object; be this object a really existing object or a fiction, a purely intentional being."

93. ———. 2013. "The Basic Distinctions in Der Streit." Semiotica no. 194:137-157. Abstract: "The paper presents Ingarden’s views on what he calls “modes of being” (“ways of existence”) and “existential moments”; the latter being constitutive parts of the former. Mainstream analytic philosophy has been dominated by the view that “existence” can mean only existence simpliciter. Ingarden, on the other hand, discerns four possible modes of being, one of which is of special interest to semiotics: purely intentional being. It is of relevance for the ontological understanding not only of texts, but also of pictures and other sign-related entities. At the end, an extrapolated Ingardenian semiotic triangle is presented."


Abstract: "From recent work on Ingarden it is apparent that values are central to his philosophy, even in the context of his realist ontology. In this evaluation of Ingarden’s work we consider his principal philosophical notions (i.e. his realist ontology, his aesthetics, his reflections on language, and his consideration of values) in the light of what Nietzsche referred to in his own philosophy as the “re-evaluation” or the “inversion” of all values. It is argued that two of Ingarden’s most fundamental values are the notion of communication and the aesthetic dimension of thought."


127. ———. 2016. "Quelques remarques autour de l’identité des objets intentionnels." In *Forme(s) et modes d’être / Form(s) and Modes of Being: L’ontologie de Roman Ingarden / The Ontology of Roman Ingarden*, edited by Malherbe, Olivier and Richard, Sébasiten, 137-162. Bern: Peter Lang.


"Ingarden's views concerning man are scattered throughout his writings. But the bulk of them is contained in the chapter entitled "The problem of the form of pure consciousness" in the second volume of Controversy over the Existence of the World (1) and in the posthumous A Booklet on Man, (2) which is a collection of previously published articles, lectures, etc. The most advanced considerations on this subject are contained in the essay On Responsibility. Its Ontic Foundations. (3) What is new in this essay and what proves to be theoretically fruitful is the application, not only to man as a whole, but to his body and to the psychic side of his being as well, of the conception of relatively isolated systems. This notion had been previously employed by Ingarden to explain various types of connections within the world as a whole. (4)"

(1) Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, vol. 11/2, Tubingen: Niemeyer 1965, chap. 16: "Das Problem der Form des reinen Bewusstseins".

134. ———. 2016. "Quelques avatars de la Gestalt dans la philosophie d’Ingarden." In Forme(s) et modes d’être / Form(s) and Modes of Being: L’ontologie de Roman Ingarden / The Ontology of Roman Ingarden, edited by Malherbe, Olivier and Richard, Sébastien, 163-196. Bern: Peter Lang.
137. Malherbe, Olivier, and Richard, Sébastien, eds. 2016. Forme(s) et modes d’être.
L'ontologie de Roman Ingarden / Form(s) and Modes of Being. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden. Bern: P.I.E. Peter Lang.
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Roman Ingarden: Extrait d’une lettre de Roman Ingarden à Guido Küng du 12 juillet 1969 243;

Abstract: "With great sympathy for Roman Ingarden and his work, Edith Stein edited his book project 'The Literary Work Of Art'. In the letters she exchanges with him she reflects on relationship between reality and ideality; she writes that those who do not see the world as a reality must be fools. The political events in the 1930s had an impact on phenomenology. While Edmund Husserl dissociates himself from his protégé Martin Heidegger with regard to the content of his philosophy, as well as with regard to his ideology, Edith Stein distances herself more and more from the phenomenological method, seeing it as removed from reality, and she eventually become a Carmelite nun. Roman Ingarden, on the other hand, reconsiders interpreting phenomenology as aesthetic theory. Literature and film are being reanalysed in terms of phenomenological mediality and as factors of human communication."

143. ———. 1989. "Literary Truths and Metaphysical Qualities." In On the Aesthetics of

144. Millière, Raphaël. 2016. "Ingarden’s Combinatorial Analysis of the Realism-Idealism Controversy." In Forme(s) et modes d’être / Form(s) and Modes of Being: L’ontologie de Roman Ingarden / The Ontology of Roman Ingarden, edited by Malherbe, Olivier and Richard, Sébasiten, 67-98. Bern: Peter Lang.


"In the Preface to the second edition of The Literary Work of Art, Roman Ingarden calls attention to one of the unfortunate but unavoidable shortcomings of his book: “I am quite conscious of the fact that for literary critics this book would be much more accessible and plastic if I had devoted a series of concrete analyses to individual works of art. But I had to abandon this from the first, since the book would have become unmanageable.” In this paper I present, as briefly as possible, two such concrete analyses. Throughout my analyses, I employ Ingarden’s terminology. For the reader who is unfamiliar with this terminology, and perhaps with Ingarden’s work in general, these analyses must prove difficult to follow, if not entirely incomprehensible. For this reader, I have added, as Part I of this paper, a preliminary exposition of The Literary Work of Art. The reader who is already acquainted with Ingarden’s work may wish to skip this and turn immediately to Part II, in which I present my analyses. In Part III, I conclude with a few remarks on the material presented in both the previous parts.” (p. 351)


Roman Ingarden was Husserl's pupil, and remained in lifelong contact with him, continuously questioning Husserl's positions, especially his transcendental idealism. Whereas the members of the Munich and Göttingen schools simply abandoned the master as having deviated from the path of philosophy as a rigorous science, Ingarden continued his efforts to understand the motives and the arguments which led Husserl in that direction. In this relentless effort, he seems to have gone a long way toward understanding, and even agreeing with, Husserl's transcendental-constitutive phenomenology, but he would nevertheless draw a line that he did not want to cross-thereby preserving his own realistic intuitions from being overtaken by what he took to be an idealistic philosophy. While thus seeking to understand Husserl, Ingarden also undertook first his famous work *Das Literarische Kunstwerk*, and then the large, carefully argued work on the controversy regarding the existence of the world, *Die Streit um die Existenz der Welt*. One could say that Ingarden's central interest lay in the realism-idealism dispute, and it may also be safely said that no one in the history of philosophy has more carefully analyzed that issue than he. While *Das Literarische Kunstwerk* is deservedly more famous, Ingarden undertook it as much out of his interest in the subject matter of art as out of the desire to advance the discussion of the realism-idealism issue." (p. 32)
On the website "Theory and History of Ontology" (www.ontology.co)

Roman Ingarden: Ontology as a Science on the Possible Ways of Existence
POLISH ONTOLOGISTS

Kazimierz Twardowski on the Content and Object of Presentations

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Tadeusz Kotarbinski from Ontological Reism to Semantical Concretism

Roman Suszko and the Non-Fregean Logics

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