

Theory and History of Ontology (www.ontology.co) by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co

Roman Ingarden: English translations

Contents

This part of the section [Ontologists of 19th and 20th centuries](#) includes of the following pages:

[Roman Ingarden and the Realism/Idealism Debate](#)

[Roman Ingarden: German works, French and Italian translations](#)

[Roman Ingarden: English translations \(Current page\)](#)

[Roman Ingarden: Selected Bibliography A - M](#)

[Roman Ingarden: Selected Bibliography N - Z](#)

Polish ontologists:

[Kazimierz Twardowski on the Content and Object of Presentations](#)

[Stanislaw Leśniewski's Logical Systems: Protothetic, Ontology, Mereology](#)

[Tadeusz Kotarbinski from Ontological Reism to Semantical Concretism](#)

[Roman Ingarden and the Realism/Idealism Debate](#)

[Roman Suszko and the Non-Fregean Logics](#)

[Bogusław Wolniewicz on the Formal Ontology of Situations](#)

[Jerzy Perzanowski: Modal Logics, Ontology and Ontologies](#)

Bibliography

1. Ingarden, Roman. 1948. "The Scientific Activity of Kazimierz Twardowski." *Studia Philosophica 1939-1946* no. 3:17-30.

2. ———. 1958. "The Hypothetical Proposition." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 18:435-450.
Translated by Fritz Kaufmann.
"It is well known that the proper meaning and function of the hypothetical proposition became a problem as early as Theophrastus and Eudemus. Since that time numerous conceptions and interpretations have been propounded. Fundamentally, however, the problem has never been solved. It is characteristic that the interpretation which is perhaps the best known and most widely recognized one, that of contemporary symbolic logic, is at the same time the one that says least of all about the structure of this type of judgment. At bottom, it abandons any attempt to clarify its meaning - and prides itself on this renunciation even as its greatest merit. Nonetheless, this interpretation plays an extremely important role in the way systems of symbolic logic are constructed. In close connection with the concept of the so-called "material implication," it leads to a number of propositions which are considered "paradoxical," as, for instance, by C. I. Lewis, one of the leading symbolic logicians. Both this result and the fact of a large variety of interpretations which differ from it as well as amongst each other, suggest a new attempt to understand the meaning and function of the hypothetical proposition in a more adequate way.(1)" (p. 435)
(1) I have listed and, to some extent, critically examined the main types of the prevalent theories in "O sadzie warunkowym," *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny*, vol. XVIII, Cracow, 1949. In the present article I restrict myself to representing my own interpretation of the hypothetical proposition.
3. ———. 1960. "Reflections on the subject matter of the history of philosophy." *Diogenes* no. 7:111-121.
Also in French as: *Note sur l'objet de l'histoire de la philosophie*, pp. 130-140.
"One must distinguish the object of study of a certain science regarded as something which should be examined-the discovery and knowledge of which constitute in various respects the duty of one branch of human knowledge-from the state it is in when encountered at a given moment, which, having been furnished to the scholar, constitutes the points of departure for scientific investigations and becomes the source of knowledge regarding the object of study in the preceding sense.
The object of study of the history of philosophy is therefore:
A. Philosophy itself, in the historical sense-hence the content and characteristics (structural, for example) of the philosophic conceptions and theories that have actually existed in the history of philosophy.
B. The numerous processes related to the existence and development of philosophy in the historic sense, the most significant variations of which we have pointed out above." (p. 119)
"The reconstruction of the conceptions or philosophic works alone does not constitute the history of philosophy; it is only the taking into consideration and examination of facts in the evolution of philosophy which gives a historic character to the history of philosophy. Yet, on the other hand, to omit the reconstruction, in the elaboration of the history of philosophy, of philosophic conceptions themselves in their real aspect under which they had appeared at a given time would deprive the history of philosophy of its specific character as a special study of philosophy. To understand that the object of the study of the history of philosophy possesses this particular double character of process and at the same time of a certain product, arising in the course of history and always in evolution, is one of the indispensable conditions for taking clear cognizance of the cognitive means which the history of philosophy can employ and for being able to constitute the methods proper to its investigation." (p. 121)
4. ———. 1960. "The General Question of the Essence of Form and Content." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 57:222-233.
"This is a translation of section 2 of the chapter "Form and Content of the Literary Work," contained in Vol. 2 of "Studia z estetyki" (Studies in Esthetics) published by

the State Institute of Scientific Publications, in Warsaw, 1958." (p. 222)

"Among the groups of problems that I have distinguished thus far the question of the essence of form and content is relatively least dependent on the solution of the remaining questions and its solution constitutes the basis of their solution. I shall therefore start my further considerations from it.

I have made detailed investigations of this topic elsewhere.(1)

Here I shall be satisfied to give the most important results, taking into consideration especially those things that have a special meaning for the literary work.

As I have mentioned, the words "form" and "content" (matter) have been used with many meanings. These meanings must be distinguished and made more precise if possible.

1. The leading idea of one of the most ancient contrasting conceptions of "form" (morphe) and "content" (matter, *hyle*) is the concept of determining something by something else. In this case the determining factor is the "form"; what is determined, qualified by form, is "matter" (contents). Within this meaning every property of something, for instance the redness of a sphere, its smoothness, its weight, etc., is "form" while the things which these properties serve are matter.(2) This is the main concept of form (3) as used by Aristotle." (pp- 222-223)

(1) Compare R. Ingarden, *Spor o istnienie swiata* (Argument about the Existence of the World), Krakow, 1947-48, Chapter VIII.

(2) This answer can be stated in another way. One could say that every property of something is its form. But in this formulation we have to do already not with the problem of essence but with a certain solution of the constitutive problem of form.

(3) "Main concept" because even in Aristotle this concept is not unequivocal, because it is possible to find with him also other meanings of these terms.

5. ———. 1961. "A Marginal Commentary on Aristotle's *Poetics*. Part 1." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* no. 20:163-173.

Translated by Helena Michejda.

Reprinted in *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*, pp. 45-50.

"My aim here is not historical inquiry. It is not my purpose to evaluate Aristotle in the light of Greek thought or to consider his role in its development, leaving him all the while in a world distant and apart from us. Instead, it is my intention to bring Aristotle's views closer to our own by asking him questions that are important to us today, and thus to discover whether or not he can help solve some of our problems—in short, whether the theories we propound today cannot be found already in embryo in his thought. Through such an approach, it is possible that some of his observations shall appear more significant than they have in the past to scholars who had not yet elaborated a clear formulation of these questions. In particular, I shall discuss some of the statements made by Aristotle in his *Poetics* from the vantage point of the principles developed for the study of literature by Polish theoreticians in the period between the First and Second World Wars." (p. 163) (...)

"First of all, let us try confronting Aristotle's ideas about the literary work of art, which he set forth in the *Poetics*, with the questions that engage us today. Let us ask what general statements about the literary work of art we should accept if certain of his assertions prove to be true. Aristotle was acquainted - as will be seen - with at least some of the issues that interest modern theoreticians of literature; as to others, he seems to have been conversant with them and, although he did not deal with them *expressis verbis*, to have solved them indirectly. Finally, there are problems and views of which Aristotle was not aware at all, but these are such that they are not excluded by his basic approach, lying, rather, within the scope of his investigations." (p. 167)

6. ———. 1961. "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 21:289-313.

Translated by J. Makota and S. Moser.

Reprinted in *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*, pp. 107-132.

"As I have already stated, an aesthetic experience is not - contrary to what is often heard - a momentary experience, a momentary feeling of pleasure or displeasure, arising as a response to some data of sense perception, but a composite process having various phases and a characteristic development which contains many heterogeneous elements. That the opposed theory seems plausible is due to the fact that, many a time - in consequence of some irrelevant factors - the process does not attain its full development: it is either interrupted before the aesthetic object has been constituted and before the experience of it has culminated, or in consequence of an artificial preparation, or of some professional habits, it does not commence from the beginning, but from the moment in which an aesthetic object is already constituted (e.g., when we look at a painting which we have already seen many times and which we have learned to see in the way it had been once constituted to us as an aesthetic object of peculiar properties). The duration and the complexity of this process depend, of course, on whether we have before us in a given case a complicated or a simple aesthetic object. Sometimes it is simply a quality of colour or a sound of voice which alone become such objects: than the process of aesthetic experience is correspondingly a more "fleeting" one, but even then it is not a momentary "feeling of pleasure" or "displeasure". (p. 295)

Note: This paper is a small part of my book in Polish about the cognition of a literary work (Lwow, 1937). It is a complementary study to the book *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, Halle: 1931.

A literary work, and especially a literary work of art can be read in many different ways: with a pure cognitive attitude as when we read, for example, a scientific work to obtain knowledge, and likewise with an aesthetic attitude, when we read it as literary consumers. It was therefore necessary to study the aesthetic experience (in German: "Erlebnis") in general to make clear what occurs in us during an aesthetic perception of a literary work of art.

7. ———. 1962. "A Marginal Commentary on Aristotle's *Poetics*. Part 2." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* no. 20:273-285.

Translated by Helena Michejda.

Reprinted in *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*, pp. 51-78.

"Let us examine now, in turn, which of the statements in the *Poetics* deal with the question: Is there a difference between literary works of art and other written works, and, if so, what is that difference?

But first, let us recall that those of our contemporaries who deny that there is any essential difference between the writings under consideration, and who also contend that the study of "literature," and of its history in particular, embraces all written productions indiscriminately, take the position that predicative sentences in a literary work are the same kind of judgments as the analogous sentences in scientific works, and therefore that both the first and the second are to be examined as to their being "true" or "false". Consequently, they also believe that literary works of art fulfill the function of supplying certain information to the reader, and that the value of such works fundamentally hinges upon this function - that is, if being "untrue", they do not supply such information, they are "bad" or worthless", and, in the opposite case, they acquire value.

But what can we find on this subject in the *Poetics*?) "Even when a treatise on medicine or natural science is brought out in verse, the name of poet is by custom given to the author; and yet Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common but the meter, so that it would be right to call one poet, the other physicist rather than poet. On the same principle, even if a writer in his poetic imitation were to combine all the meters, as Chaeremon did in his *Centaur*, which is a medley composed of meters of all kinds, we should bring him too under the general term poet. So much then for these distinctions" (1447 b, 16-23).

Reading these words of Aristotle, we can be satisfied that he definitely distinguished "poetic" works from the unpoetic, the scientific in particular. " (p. 273)

8. ———. 1962. "Edith Stein on Her Activity as an Assistant of Edmund Husserl. Extracts from the Letters of Edith Stein with a Commentary and Introductory Remarks." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*:155-175.
Extracts from the Letters of Edith Stein with a Commentary and Introductory Remarks. [The text of the Letters is published in German, without and English translation].
An English translation is available: *Edith Stein Letters to Roman Ingarden: Edith Stein Self-Portrait in Letters* (The Collected Works of Edith Stein Book 12), Washington, D.C. ICS Publications 2014 (162 letters).
"I became acquainted with Edith Stein in 1913 when she came to Göttingen to study the tutorship of Edmund Husserl. But it was only in 1916, when she came to Freiburg to pass her doctor's degree examination, that we made a closer personal acquaintance and became friends. From the summer of 1916 till the beginning of January 1917 we conversed together every day on many subjects, but especially on various details of her personal activities as an assistant. When eventually I went for several months to my own country, a lively correspondence took place between us. At the end of September 1917 I came back to Freiburg, and remained there till the end of January 1918. Hardly a day passed during that period in which we did not meet and talk together. Having passed my doctor's degree examination I returned to Cracow, and from that time till the outbreak of war in 1939 we only met twice, for a few days at a time; but during the whole of that period we continually wrote letters to each other.
After the end of the war I was told that she had been killed.
I have intended several times to select and to publish some excerpts from her letters, considering that she writes a great deal not only about her personal activity as an assistant of Husserl's but also about Husserl himself and his work. However it is an undertaking that would require a great deal of work, and would be a very bulky publication.(1) So I kept putting it off for some other time in the future." (p. 155)
(1) There are over 150 letters, often of two or three sheets of paper each.
9. ———. 1964. *Time and Modes of Being*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas.
Translated by Helen Mischejda.
Selected part of the first volume of the Polish edition of: *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt* (1947).
Contents: Author's Preface V; Translator's Preface VII; Chapter I: Preliminary Considerations 3; Introduction 3; The Foundations and the Tentative Formulation of the Question at Issue 8; Different Groups of Problems Requiring Delimitation 17; Chapter II: Introduction 22; Three Main Groups of Ontological Problems 22; Chapter III: Basic Existential Concepts 28; The Problem of the Possibility of Analyzing Existence 28; Modes of Being and Moments of Existence 32; Autonomy and Heteronomy 43; Existential Originality and Existential Derivation 52; Existential Separateness and Inseparateness 82; Existential Self-Dependence and Existential Contingency 89; Absolute Being - Relative Being 92; Chapter IV: Time and Modes of Being 99; Preliminary Observations Regarding Concrete Time 99; The Mode of Being of Events 102; The Mode of Being of Processes 107; The Mode of Being of Objects Enduring in Time 124; Chapter V: The Consequences for the Possible Solutions of the Controversy over the Existence of the World When Time Is Taken into Account 157; New Concepts of Modes of Being 157; Name Index 165; Subject Index 167-170.
"In 1946/47, my two-volume work, *The Controversy over the Existence of the World* (*Spor o istnienie swiata*, Vol. I, 297 pages, Vol. II, 848 pages) was published under the imprint of the Polish Academy of Sciences and Letters.
The present volume contains the English translation of parts selected from Volume I of this work: the Introduction, Chapter III (with its introduction), Chapter VI, and Section 31 from chapter VII.
This selection covers my most important ontological analyses of modes of being and of time, as it is involved with these, which lead to the establishment of fundamental concepts of modes of existence. These investigations constitute the

existential-ontological preparation for Volume II, which contains formal-ontological studies clarifying a number of basic formal concepts that are indispensable to an adumbration of prospective possible solutions of the controversy between idealism and realism. Volume III is in preparation." (From *Author's Preface*)

10. ———. 1964. "Artistic and Aesthetic Values." *British Journal of Aesthetics* no. 4:198-213.

Reprinted in R. Ingarden, *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*, pp. 91-132.

"In this lecture I shall be concerned mainly, with the differentiation of artistic and aesthetic values. With this in view it will be necessary for me to make various other distinctions: first that between the work of art and the aesthetic object, and also a distinction between an aesthetically valuable quality on the one hand and value and its further determinations on the other. These distinctions have been elaborated in my various writings on aesthetics and theory of art, beginning with the book *Das Literarische Kunstwerke* (1931), but I shall here try to take further than before the differentiation between artistic and aesthetic values." (p. 198)

(...)

The work of art is the true object to the formation of which the creative acts of the artist are directed, while the fashioning of its existential substrate is a subsidiary operation ancillary to the work of art itself which is to be brought into being by the artist.

Every work of art of whatever kind has the distinguishing feature that it is not the sort of thing which is completely determined in every respect by the primary level varieties of its qualities, in other words it contains within itself characteristic lacunae in definition, areas of indeterminateness: it is a schematic creation.

Furthermore not all its determinants, components or qualities are in a state of actuality, but some of them are potential only. In consequence of this a work of art requires an agent existing outside itself, that is an observer, in order—as I express it—to render it *concret.*" (pp. 198-199)

(...)

"In composing his work the artist as it were sees ahead by creative intuition into possible complexes of aesthetically valuable qualities and how they will conduce to the emergence of an over-all aesthetic value in the work as a whole.

At the same time he tries to find the technical means to realize a particular complex by his choice of those aesthetically neutral qualities (colours, sounds, shapes, etc.) which by forming the skeleton of a work create the objective conditions (i.e. those on the side of the work of art) necessary for the realization of the subjective conditions, that is the existence of a suitable observer and the achievement of an aesthetic experience, without which neither these neutral qualities could be exhibited nor the aesthetically valuable qualities which together cause the emergence of a particular complex of qualities and the constitution of a corresponding aesthetic value determined by this whole complex substrate.

It will be apparent from what has been said that aesthetic value, made concrete on the basis of a given work of art, is nothing else but a particular quality determination markedly a selection of interacting aesthetically valuable qualities which manifest themselves on the basis of the neutral skeleton of a work of art reconstructed by a competent observer." (p. 213)

11. ———. 1967. "Jean Hering 1890-1966." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* no. 27:308-309.

"Hering was the first to present the phenomenological style of investigation to France in his book, *Phénoménologie et la Philosophie Religieuse*, and he developed an interesting and profound analysis of religious knowledge. Along with the prolific activity of Alexander Koyré, Hering's work as writer and teacher helped Husserl's phenomenology to win its first adherents in France. The Paris lectures of Husserl (1928) which were later published as *Méditations Cartésiennes* are closely associated with this result. Both Jean Hering and Alexander Koyré represented the viewpoint of the "younger" Husserl and could not identify themselves with the

- transcendental idealism of Husserl. But Hering was the intimate friend of Husserl until his last years and visited him in Freiburg even in the worst years." (p. 309)
12. ———. 1969. "The Physicalistic Theory of Language and the Work of Literature." In *Problems of Literary Evaluation: Yearbook of Comparative Criticism, Vol. 2*, edited by Streckla, Joseph P., 80-98. University Park: Penn State University Press. Translated by Maria Pelikan.
Reprinted in *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*, pp. 163-179.
"The physicalistic theory of language does not, strictly speaking belong to the theory of art and is not part of aesthetics. However, questions about the nature of language, and about the physicalistic concept of language especially, are important ingredients of contemporary philosophy. This latter theory is not an isolated phenomenon of the twentieth century. As we know, there is a certain interplay of philosophy, science, art, and so on in every cultural epoch. Thus, towards the end of the nineteenth century we can see a relationship between, for instance, impressionism and Bergsonism, as in their treatment of the dimension of time. Certain works of literature are also related: Marcel Proust's novel in France, and Thomas Mann's *Magic Mountain* in Germany, and so on. There are analogous situations in the twentieth century. You can see it beginning with post-impressionist painting which led to abstract art. In literature, too, there was Dada in France, and there were other, similar attempts at creating a kind of "abstract" literature—that is, at tracing the work of art back to a mere combination of sounds or to a combination of verbal sounds." (p. 80)
(...)
"Thus, I simply cannot accept the formalistic theory of language and literature because it contradicts my experience. You may now say: "Well, yes, you may be right, there are such experiences and one must give in to them. But what is being experienced? Does that which one experiences exist? Do the people who are depicted exist? No, they are not really existing persons, real people are encountered only in real life and in real surroundings". And then I must answer: of course, they are not realities. They are not autonomously existing objects; they are, if you like, fictions. But there are such fictions - and this is the core of the matter. It is something I can relate to. And if I were now to think: "There are no depicted worlds, they do not exist in any sense; all these fictions that have been created in European literature for the last three thousand years, and many other fictions, do not exist at all" - well, then I simply lose all of human civilization. There is nothing left but the people who love or do not love each other, who kill each other, and who do not even have anything over which they could fight one another. What is the manner of existence of these fictions? How is it possible that these non-existent, non-real objects can move me, that they can delight me or awaken hatred in me? That is a problem, I admit. But it is a problem worth considering, worth clarifying. Let us not say right away: "It is so difficult that we do not want to work on it, we would rather work on signs and numbers, which is much easier". Yes, unfortunately it is true that it is hard to say just how these fictions exist and in what sense they belong to our world, how it is possible that something non-existent can somehow transform me when I am in touch with it. That is the problem, that is the problem of civilization, its existence and its role. And I cannot renounce the possibility of somehow coming to grips with this problem, if I can find the approach to it, and of somehow, in no matter how small a way, making it clear to myself." (pp. 97-98)
13. ———. 1970. "Letters Pro and Con." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* no. 28:541-542.
Letter to Professor John Fizer with a reply by Fizer.
"The problem of areas of indeterminateness in a literary work and particularly in the objects represented in it was important for me in connection with the transcendental idealism of Husserl. It was important to demonstrate that real things must be determinate in all their aspects and also in their individuality, whereas pure intentional objects projected from language means or from conscious acts have

necessarily areas of indeterminateness in their content -they contain them not only because they are correlates of language creations but also because a literary work of art (and every literary work) contains only a finite number of propositions and other linguistic determinations. In consequence of it, if there is not difference between the principal functions of language creations and the direct perception (which I mentioned above) in the sense that they both leave areas of indeterminateness, then it is necessary that a finite number of proposition and other modes of determination of a literary work cause the existence of gaps, areas of indeterminateness in the work. And the finiteness of the set of direct perceptions of one and the same things causes only some inadequacy of our knowledge of the object (thing) which in itself is determined in all its parts as aspects; "schematism" in this case is only a "partiality" of what is effectively given; but that which is given is always concrete and strictly individual, and also in these properties and moments which are common to things of the same kind." (p. 542)

14. ———. 1970. "On Responsibility. Its Ontic Foundations." In *Man and Value*, 53-117. München Wien: Philosophia Verlag.

"Main Thesis of the Study

The problem of responsibility has heretofore been treated primarily as a special problem of ethics, without any more precise investigation of its wider contexts. The main contention of the present discussion is that this is insufficient and that other underlying factual matters (*Tatbestände*), that lead into deeper problems, have to be taken into account before we can discover the conditions under which one can speak of responsibility in a meaningful way. It also seems that responsibility comes up in realms other than the moral. Moral responsibility is only a certain special case. Thus, the range of cases and examples to be taken into consideration has to be expanded." (p. 53)

(...)

"The circle of problems and of possible solutions which stand in connection with the problem of responsibility in its various forms and contexts is hereby closed. They seem to me to be the most important problems to come into question in this connection, although I would not wish to state that they have been entirely exhausted. The thesis which I should want to defend affirms only that the essence of responsibility in its various forms and contexts not only points to the questions discussed here, but at the same time also demands definite answers. But should it turn out in further investigations that these questions must be answered otherwise, then the danger would arise that the generally accepted postulates for responsible acting, for assuming responsibility and for the right to call to account would have to be put in question. Yet, perhaps the further course of the analysis could show that in order to be better able to ground the meaningfulness and possibility of the realization of responsibility, not the solutions to the problems given here would have to be improved but rather their linguistic formulations." (pp. 112-113)

15. ———. 1970. "Man and Nature." In *Man and Value*, 17-20. München Wien: Philosophia Verlag.

A contribution to the discussion of the problem "Man and Nature" during the plenary session of the XII. International Congress of Philosophy, Venice, 1958. The main speaker on this theme was Professor Johannes B. Lotz, S.J.

"I agree with the speaker, Prof. Lotz, that man transcends nature, and that by the "power of his essence" he "projects (*entwirft*) a world, which, despite its always self-sustaining, fundamental form, takes on countless historical guises." It is also true that his "conscious activeness [*Wirken*] is expressed primarily in three basic forms: as the cognition of what is true, the doing of good and the shaping of beauty." But it still remains to be explained what makes up his creative activeness, and the relation between the world created by man and the nature in which he finds himself at the inception of his activity. The essence of man can be clarified by explicating, among other things, the sense and mode of existence of his works, which find their support in nature. It is not important for this problem how one conceives nature itself: whether as the totality of things, or as the totality of what is

- visible or, finally, as the totality of what is [*Gesamtheit des Seienden*], The only important thing is the fact that nature exists prior to any activity by man and that it changes within itself, for the most part independently not only of man's activity, but also of his existence. Nature is also the ultimate foundation of his being, as well as of the existence of his works. This is apparent not so much in the fact of human knowledge as in the intrinsic content and mode of existence of the products of human culture." (p. 17)
16. ———. 1970. "On Human Nature." In *Man and Value*, 21-24. München Wien: Philosophia Verlag.
 "It is surely difficult to define the nature of man. Through his deeds, sometimes heroic but at times horrifying, through the immense diversity of his character and the goals he strives to realize, through the inexhaustible novelty of his works and admirable capacity to regenerate after almost every fall - man transcends the confines of every imposed definition. All efforts at comprehending the plenitude of his essence with a satisfactory and adequate definition have proven vain. Every feature we find in his essence can be juxtaposed to concrete facts appearing to demonstrate something diametrically contrary. And it is certain that there are many irrefutable facts of man's reality, in the annals of humanity as a whole, which, though real and in fact actualized by him, are still something less than his true nature. But at the same time, there is occasionally in man's life an occurrence so lofty and exceptional that it could not possibly mark anything but some direction along the path of his noblest evolution, and not a commonly realized goal. Though we are well aware of the great difficulties inherent in the attempt to grasp man's very nature, to make the attempt once more is, after all, something enticing - even at the risk of giving, at best, only a partial definition, or one which points to features that are only very seldom realized." (p. 21)
17. ———. 1970. "Man and His Reality." In *Man and Value*, 25-31. München Wien: Philosophia Verlag.
 "I once heard a paper by an eminent biologist concerning man's status on earth. One of the paper's main theses was the assertion that man was able to conquer nature to a greater extent than any other species of animal and that his exceptional status among living beings on earth is based precisely on this fact. I then entertained the question whether the unquestionably higher degree of man's dominion over nature, and for that very reason his greater independence of what happens in it, is really what distinguishes him from beasts in an essential way. This would perhaps be true only if the conception of man defined as *homo faber* had to be employed as the basis of this contrast. But such a conception does not indeed touch on what is essential for his humanity. Man's exceptional status in the world does, in fact, depend on something else, so that the fact of his domination over nature and beast is only a certain phenomenon which is, if not altogether derivative, still not the most important. I wish to share a few thoughts with the reader on this topic. Man is distinguished from the beasts in that, among other things, he not only dominates nature within limits that are incomparably wider than those attainable by animals, and even transforms and adapts it to suit his needs and demands, but more importantly - and in this lies his essential feature - in that he creates for himself an entirely new reality or, one might say, *quasi*-reality. Once created, it becomes a significant constituent of the world surrounding him." (p. 259)
18. ———. 1970. "Man and Time." In *Man and Value*, 33-52. München Wien: Philosophia Verlag.
 "We all live in time, and we know it. There are, however, two fundamentally different ways of experiencing time and ourselves in time. According to the first it seems that what 'truly' exists is we ourselves', time, on the other hand, is only something derivative and merely phenomenal (*erscheinungsmäßig*). But according to the second it is time and the changes occurring in it which make up the sole reality; we, on the other hand, are, as it were, subject to complete annihilation by

these changes. At best we sustain ourselves in existence as a pure phenomenon, as a certain kind of phantom produced by the changes occurring in the present. The extreme polarity of these experiences and their apparently equal claim to veracity makes them the ultimate (sometimes unarticulated) basis of mutually opposed metaphysical standpoints. Thus for example at the very beginning of European philosophy the view of Heraclitus on the one hand, and the metaphysics of the Eleatics on the other, have their origin in these experiences. In modern philosophy, the conflict between realism and transcendental idealism is a manifestation of this opposition. More detailed historical analyses could likewise show how two different experiences of time play their role in the particular views concerning time which have appeared in the course of the history of European philosophy. Yet, perhaps the difference between the two experiences of time is most acutely reflected in the problem of the essence of the self, in the conception of the human being in general, and makes this essence into the central problem of philosophy. Let us examine this matter in greater detail." (p. 33)

19. ———. 1970. "What we do not know about Values." In *Man and Value*, 131-164. München Wien: Philosophia Verlag.
 "Interest in various problems concerning values has grown considerably in the post-war years. Some progress even appears to have been made in this direction. Nonetheless, there has been little success in finding satisfactory answers to a series of important questions and in overcoming difficulties encountered by value theory. Great effort is being expended in the treatment of various special problems, mainly within particular realms of values, whereas fundamental, general problems lie fallow."
 (...)
 "The following are the problems to which I wish to devote some attention here:
 (1) On what basis are we to distinguish the fundamental types of values and the realms of values that are correlated with these?
 (2) What is the formal structure of a value and its relation to what 'possesses' the value (to the 'bearer' of the value)?
 (3) In what way do values exist, insofar as they exist at all?
 (4) What is the basis for the differences between values in regard to their 'rank', and is it possible to establish a general hierarchy amongst them?
 (5) Are there 'autonomous' values?
 (6) What is the status of the so-called 'objectivity' of values?(1)" (pp. 131-132)
 (1) The problem of the so-called 'relativity' of values is discussed in a separate paper. [*Remarks on the Relativity of Values*]
20. ———. 1970. "An Analysis of Moral Values." In *Man and Value*, 165-178. München Wien: Philosophia Verlag.
 "Let us review the main results of the previous lecture. I tried to establish a series of necessary conditions for some conduct or fact to have a moral value. They are actually the conditions for the realization of the kind of value which characterizes some human virtue or conduct as moral. There were six such conditions in all. The question came up, however, whether all of them taken together provide a sufficient condition for some value to be of a moral nature. That issue was left open. Let us then first of all recall these six conditions (there was still another, whose necessity was not really settled).
 1. In every situation where it makes sense to speak of a moral value, an alert, acting subject must participate in the realization of this value, and 'in functioning as the subject' of his action [Handeln], this conscious subject must fulfill some further conditions. That is to say, the subject must guide or direct his action, while at the same time recognizing certain facts - in particular, certain values. Both presuppose not only the existence of the subject of action, but also his conscious awareness.
 2. Some sort of conduct must be effected by the conscious subject, conduct in a very wide sense of the word, which could also be covered by the expression: some sort of behaviour by the subject. In a special case this will be some active doing, that is an activity that changes something in the world.

3. Values must somehow come into play when this conduct is placed within the context of a more encompassing situation. To the question as to what sort of values these have to be, I answered that they can be of various types. They can be values related to matters of life and death, economic or, more generally, utilitarian values, cultural values, and the like, but I do not exclude the possibility that these can also be moral values. I carried out my analysis within the scope of the problem of fairness. Being fair involves some sort of judgment or the appropriation of some sort of values to someone; these values can be extra-moral just as well as moral ones.
4. There has to be accountability on the part of this alert subject who behaves in a particular manner. There can be no question of any fact or behaviour, in particular of any deed, falling under the category of moral values, without the presence of this accountability. Accountability, for its part, requires the fulfillment of certain conditions for its realization. Some sort of conscious awareness of the acting subject belongs among these conditions, along with his self-identity, which needs to be preserved in the course of an action that may extend over a period of time. Responsibility weighs on the subject even after the action has terminated. And in order to be able to weigh on him, his self-identity must have been preserved. Sometimes we speak of a collective responsibility. There were times in European culture when such a notion was operative. There was collective responsibility in the guise of clan law; the whole clan was responsible for any one of its members. In such a case, irrespective of how many accountable subjects there are, there ultimately exists some super-ordinate collective subject, and this too must retain its self-identity if any of this is to make sense.
5. The fifth necessary condition, in my opinion, is the freedom of decision and conduct. Freedom must of course be maintained in the course of executing the decision, that is during the subject's behaviour, in the course of some prospectively carried out activity and its performance. The subject must also have the option of withdrawing from an action he has already initiated. Once someone is uninvolved, so that from a particular moment on everything runs its course independently of him, he ceases from that instant to be responsible. But if he is to be responsible, if his being morally responsible is to come into play at all, he must be free to behave as he wishes.
6. The sixth point is the thesis that the person himself, the 'I' governing in this person, must be the source of decision and the basis of responsibility in the course of executing the given activity. Not only the making of the decision comes from the person, but also backing it in the course of its implementation. This is not to be regarded as some peripheral, external or only physical source of behaviour. The subject's behaviour ought to have its starting point in the very centre of his whole psycho-physical organization." (pp. 165-166)
21. ———. 1970. "Some Words Concerning Fruitful Discussion." In *Man and Value*, 179-181. München Wien: Philosophia Verlag.
 "Freedom of discussion? - Why, yes, of course. That is a necessary condition of all progress in science, and an equally essential factor in all cultural and social development. Surely there is no need to write anything more about it.
 Still, if the discussion is to be essentially fruitful, its freedom cannot be purely formal, cannot consist merely in the fact that one does not beset the discussion with any external, formal obstacles. Fruitful discussion must be characterized by other essential features. First of all, it must emanate from the genuine, inner need of all the participants, and must be conducted under observance of their inner freedom. This inner freedom is borne of the absolute earnestness of thinking, of honesty toward oneself and of striving, undaunted by any circumstances, to attain to an explanation of unexplained matters, matters which are sometimes dogmatically accepted on faith or on the strength of authority. It is borne of the need to check accepted assertions or nurtured beliefs through critical, unbiased research." (p. 179)
22. ———. 1972. "What is New in Husserl's 'Crisis'?" In *The Later Husserl and the Idea of Phenomenology. Idealism-Realism, Historicity and Nature*, edited by

Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 23-47. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Analecta Husserliana. Vol. 2.

"It is now almost common-place to speak of the 'later' Husserl, as if this 'later' Husserl had assumed an entirely new position. In this connection one usually thinks of his *Crisis* [*The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*]. What are the facts of the matter?" (p. 23)

(...)

"In the *Crisis* there is a tendency which was never expressed so clearly before, to view phenomenology as it were as the end state for which European philosophy was yearning, to see phenomenology as the mature state of European philosophy. Husserl's personal situation makes this understandable. But the interpretations of various schools of modern philosophy which he actually carries out are not persuasive, mainly because there is almost a complete lack of precise textual analysis of the works under discussion. Only the discussion of the manner in which Galileo placed modern natural science upon a mathematical foundation, and the related tendency of a rationalizing nature, forms an important enlargement of our stock of knowledge. Together with the Galileo researches of Alexandre Koyré it is among the true achievements of phenomenology." (p. 25)

(...)

"Husserl has reduced all reality to purely intentional objects (*Gegenstandlichkeiten*) but he never inquired into the mode of being, and the peculiar form of, intentional objects; he consequently overlooked that they are essentially different in both these aspects from objects with autonomous being (particularly real objects). Thus he also did not see that purely intentional objects have a strange ambivalence of form; on the one hand, they have an intentionally formed content; as such they are supposed to be e.g., a tree, a man, etc. On the other hand, they have a structure which belongs to them *qua* intentional structures.(9)" (p. 44)

(9) It was no accident that I chose the product of literary art as the topic of the book which I published in 1931. I had supposed that literary productions and the objects which are depicted in them are purely intentional structures (*Gebilde*) and that they differ in their mode of being as well as in their form from the mode of being and form of real objects in such a way that the latter must not be reduced to the former. My inquiries have confirmed this supposition, and this was the first step in the dispute with transcendental idealism. In that book I made for the first time a distinction between the content and the structure of purely intentional objects (l.c. §20). But the formal difference between (purely intentional) objects of autonomous and of heteronomous being was first conclusively demonstrated with the *Streit um die Existenz der Welt*.

23. ———. 1973. *The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic and Theory of Literature*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

With an Appendix on the Functions of Language in the Theatre.

Translated and with an introduction by George G. Grabowicz.

The main subject of the investigations presented here is the basic structure and the mode of existence of the literary work, and in particular of the literary work of art. Their primary purpose is to indicate its peculiar construction and to free the concept of the work from the various kinds of blurring that in the studies to date stem, on the one hand, from the still strong psychologistic tendencies and, on the other, from considerations of a general theory of art and art works. I will deal with the former at greater length in Part I of this book, so it will suffice for me merely to mention it here. Concerning the latter, however, one has wavered, since the time of Lessing, between two opposite conceptions. Either one brought the literary work, and in particular the literary work of art, into too close a relationship with the "visual arts" (above all with painting), or one sought—following Lessing's first impulse—(as, for instance, T. A. Meyer did) to lay too much stress on the purely linguistic element of the literary work and hence deny the intuitive elements of the literary work of art.

(1) In my opinion these two extremes arose from the fact that the literary work was

always considered to be a formation having one stratum, whereas in fact it consists of a number of heterogeneous strata; in consequence, one always considered some—and, according to the various theories, always different—elements of the work as the only constitutive ones. Since my study attempts to bring out the many-layered structure, and consequently the attendant polyphony, as that which is essential for the literary work and thus to take into consideration all the elements appearing in it, my position occupies a middle ground between the two conflicting camps. To avoid undue expansion of my already sizable book and to enable the reader to take a pure attitude toward the object of investigation, I have dispensed with providing extensive connections to existing theories. Usually this has the effect of making the reader attune himself primarily to already existing conceptual schemata, with the result that the pure observation of situations that are really at hand is substantially impeded." (pp. LXXi-LXXII)

(1) For a history of this problem see, among others, Jonas Cohn, *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, II, no. 3 (1907); in addition, see R. Lehmann, *Deutsche Poetik* (Munich, 1908), § 8.

24. ———. 1973. *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Translated by Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson.

"Scholars discussed methods of investigation or of "criticism" without even having asked themselves two crucial questions: (i) How is the object of cognition—the literary work of art—structured? and (2) What is the procedure which will lead to knowledge of the literary work; that is, how does the cognition of the work of art come about and to what does or can it lead? Only after having answered these two questions can one meaningfully ask how the literary work of art should be cognized in order to achieve satisfactory results.

In my book *The Literary Work of Art* I tried to answer the first question. It is now time to take up the second question, before we can even begin to consider methodological problems. I proffered an answer to this question as early as 1936, in the Polish version of my book *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*. I do not doubt that much has changed since that time, in Germany as well as other western European countries. Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is still no satisfactory treatment of the problems concerning the cognition of the literary work of art, and thus my book, now in an expanded edition, can be useful even today." (p. 4)

(...)

"The main question which I am trying to answer is: How do we cognize the completed literary work set down in writing (or by other means, e.g., in a tape recording)? Cognition is, however, only one kind of intercourse a reader can have with the literary work. To be sure, we will not completely ignore the other ways of experiencing the work, but neither will we pay particular attention to them at the moment. Even "cognition" itself can take place in many different ways, which can bring about various results. The type of work read also plays an essential role in determining how cognition takes place." (pp. 5-6)

25. ———. 1973. "On So-Called Truth in Literature." In *Aesthetics in Twentieth-Century Poland. Selected Essays*, edited by Harrel, Jean and Wierzbianska, Alina, 164-204. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press.

Translated by J. G. Harrel.

Reprinted in *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*, pp. 133-162.

"Are declarative sentences in a literary work judgments in the strict sense of the word?

In my book *Das literarische Kunstwerk* I argued that declarative sentences, and especially predicating sentences, in literary works are not strictly judgments but quasi-assertive sentences, and that all other types of sentence, like, say the interrogative sentence, undergo an analogous modification. I then said that in quasi-assertive sentences "nothing is seriously asserted". As a result of this, objects presented in a literary work acquire the character of reality, but this is merely an external apparel which has no pretension to be taken quite seriously by the reader,

- although in practice literary works are often read improperly and readers think that they are joining the author in judgments and seriously but mistakenly regard the presented object as real.
The question is whether my position is correct and whether, assuming that quasi-assertive sentences appear in literary works judgments in the strict sense also appear." (p. 133 of the reprint)
(...)
"In conclusion I would like to make two further observations.
(1) The distinction that I have just drawn amounts to a diagnosis based on observation of actual works of art and it is not a value judgment or a statement of principles according to which literary works of art ought to be composed.
(2) Those who maintain that even pure works of literary art contain either general or singular judgments regard the rejection of such a view as tantamount to denying that literature can have a fundamental and positive influence on man's life. They say that this amounts to taking up a formalistic attitude, according to which the so-called content of the work is of no consequence, and that they ought to oppose such so-called "aestheticism". (p. 160 of the reprint)
26. ———. 1973. "About the Motives that Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism." In *Phenomenology and Natural Existence: Essays in Honor of Marvin Farber*, edited by Riepe, Dale, 95-117. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Partial translation; for the full translation see: *On the Motives which Led Edmund Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*.
27. ———. 1973. "'A priori' Knowledge in Kant versus 'a priori' Knowledge in Husserl." *Dialectics and Humanism*:5-18.
28. ———. 1974. "Main Directions in Polish Philosophy." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 1:91-103.
Originally written in German in 1936.
"The beginning of philosophical research in Poland dates from the end of the XV century. The Polish philosophy from the Renaissance period has to its credit more than one important achievement, highly appreciated in that period, also abroad. This philosophy is connected with the first period of the blossoming of the Cracow Jagiellonian University." (p. 91)
(...)
"Twardowski, a pupil of Franz Brentano and once Privatdozent in Vienna, and then in the years 1895-1931 professor of the Lwow University, unfolded in Lwow a very lively and most effective activity in the field of pedagogics. In the course of only a few years he created there a big philosophical research centre which was constantly gaining in importance, and was predominant in Poland in the first decades of the 20th century. Twardowski educated several generations of independently working philosophers who are today teaching at numerous Polish universities. Naturally, part of them are following other ways than his." (p. 95)
29. ———. 1974. "Psychologism and Psychology in Literary Scholarship." *New Literary History: A Journal of Theory and Interpretation* no. 5:215-223.
Translated by John Fizer.
Reprinted in R. Ingarden, *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*, pp. 79-90 and in J. Fizer, *Psychologism and Psychoaesthetics: A Historical and Critical View of Their Relations*, Amsterdam: Benjamin Press 1981, pp. 202-216.
"I. Psychology and Psychologism.
First of all, we tend to confuse psychologism with psychology in its application to certain literary matters. As a result, we consider the opponents of psychologism to be enemies of psychology. Whereas in fact they are two different things.
Psychology is a science which investigates mental phenomena and subjects and which has its own field of investigation, its own more or less well-defined methods and aims; it is, moreover, a science that has authority not only in its own field but is also one of the important and fundamental branches of science about reality, a branch which can be neither eliminated nor "relegated" to anything else (as, for

example, the so-called physicalists wanted to do). However, when psychological research begins to transcend its own field and to dominate, the competence of psychology is terminated. At this point, as for example in logic, epistemology, etc., we begin to deal with "psychologism" in the sense in which it was historically introduced by Husserl. "Psychologism" is a certain philosophical point of view whose essence lies in the fact that it ascribes psychological characteristics to certain objects." (pp. 215-216)

(...)

"IV. The Goal of Psychology in Literary Scholarship.

Finally, there is a group of psychological problems which enters into literary scholarship. The work per se is not psychological. But in its contents there is a stratum of presented objects in which, among other things, there are presented psycho-physical subjects - people or animals. Even though these persons (or animals) are only presented and are derivative-intentional in their ontological essence, determined by the work's text, in their contents they are nevertheless persons with their own mental life and their own structure which in the investigation of the work must be analyzed as carefully as other components of the work. ... The following has to be kept in mind: (1) In this case the only source is the text of a given work; (2) it is an investigation of certain components of the work rather than some independent thing; (3) finally, it is a preparation for the subsequent study of the work. While studying the experiences and structure of the persons presented in the literary work, we must not use information acquired elsewhere...." (pp. 221-222)

30. ———. 1975. *On the Motives which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Translated from Arnór Hannibalsson.

Contents: Translator's Preface VII; Introduction 1; Part I: Husserl's Position 4; Part II. Critical Remarks 34; Index 72.

"I have often asked myself why Husserl, really, headed in the direction of transcendental idealism from the time of his *Ideas* whereas at the time of the *Logical Investigations* he clearly occupied a realist position. In later years he at last reached a solution whose correctness he could not doubt.

For everyone who knows Husserl's methods of work it will not be surprising that various arguments emerging from his investigations should move him in this direction. For a long time Husserl worked on a certain set of problems which he elaborated according to his interests at the time without being explicitly conscious of the broad connections between them. Only as the years went by did there begin to emerge a certain unified pattern of philosophical problems which Husserl tried to grasp either from a single methodological point of view or by studying the clusters of problems themselves and the relations between them. The totality of this set of problems reached at once in Husserl's eyes such vast dimensions that a single person could not be expected to solve them. Husserl makes many attempts to draw up the outlines of this totality but - in spite of all his efforts - he has to be contented with more or less detailed sketches of parts of it. After he had worked out each of them there followed usually long periods of physical exhaustion and during these periods he never succeeded in organizing any work of great dimensions. These fragments are elaborated in various periods of Husserl's life and differed from each other in various details and crystallized themselves around different central problems or fundamental theses. When we look now at the whole of Husserl's investigations (which are now known to us) it appears necessary to make distinctions between different groups of motives or arguments which, in the last resort, result in transcendental idealism whose total picture is, perhaps, painted most carefully in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and in the *Cartesian Meditations* but which is nevertheless never finally substantiated by Husserl. It will be useful to isolate these groups of arguments or motives which led Husserl to transcendental idealism. It will be of help for a critical consideration of the foundations of his solution. These groups are, to mention only the most important ones, as follows:

1. Assertions regarding Husserl's concept of philosophy as rigorous science.
2. Postulates defining the right method of the theory of knowledge.
3. Positive results of the analysis of outer perception of material objects and also the so-called constitutive analysis.
4. Some fundamental assertions regarding formal ontology.

Before discussing these assertions and their role in the argument for transcendental idealism it may be useful to make clear whether and to what extent it is possible to argue for the view that Husserl was a realist during the period of his *Logical Investigations*." (pp. 1-3, note omitted)

31. ———. 1975. "On the Ontology of Relations." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 6:75-80.
- "In previous chapters I have occupied myself almost exclusively with the states of affairs holding "within" an object or, to put it more accurately, with those involving only one subject, i.e. those states in which it is only one individual object or one object of a higher order which functions as the subject of an inhering property or as the subject of a process or an action which takes place. But there exist also other states of affairs in which partake more than one object, be it that they all function as a foundation for the inherence of a property in one or more of the objects or that they all function as the foundation for the occurrence of a process or an action." (p. 75)
- (...)
- "1. A relation of the lowest degree, and in particular its core, has its ontic basis in, at least, two individual, non-relational objects which are included in it as its terms. A relation of a higher degree has its ontic basis in at least two relations which are its terms and which determine its core.
- An individual non-relational object, on the other hand, has no such ontic basis.
2. The relation taken in its primary form and before its objectification is one single state of affairs involving two or more genuine subjects in the manner explained earlier. The relation taken as an object which possesses a number of properties is constituted secondarily on the basis of the relation in its primary form. An individual non-relational object, on the other hand, contains an infinite multiplicity of states of affairs with one subject, which states coalesce with one another because the subject is the same. Actually, in this respect there is a formal similarity between an individual, non-relational object and a relation taken as an object (as a subject of properties).
3. Relations differ materially, by the specific moments of their constitutive nature, from nonrelational objects; and also by the possession of properties such as symmetry, transitivity, the having of many places, etc., whose matter is of such a kind that the non-relational objects cannot possess these properties. Inversely, the non-relational objects possess some properties whose matter excludes their appurtenance to relations.
- What could be the sense of saying, e.g., that a certain relation was green or heavy, or that it was a good conductor of electricity? The question whether it is possible to detect a general law distinguishing all the non-relational properties (resp. constitutive natures) from the relational ones, could only be answered by a material ontology." (p. 80)

32. ———. 1975. "Remarks Concerning the Relativity of Values." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* no. 6:102-108.
- Translated by Guido K ung and E. M. Swiderski.
- New translation by Arthur Szylewicz with the title *Remarks on the Relativity of Values* in R. Ingarden, *Man and Value*, M nchen Wien: Philosophia Verlag 1983, pp. 119-130.
- "The old problem of the relativity of values depends on a number of theoretical attitudes and commitments which as a rule remain hidden beneath the plane of analysis. In striving for a deeper treatment of this problem, we have to proceed carefully, and attempt to unveil the obscurities and ambiguities in the proposed

solutions to the attendant problems, solutions which are quite frequently accepted without a detailed and conscientious discussion.

There are three auxiliary problems that are important in connection with the problem of relativity. First, what is the sense of 'relativity'? Secondly, what are the differences between the particular kinds or types of values, assuming that a multiplicity of values is to be admitted at all? Thirdly, should the problem of the relativity of values be treated quite generally, hence for all values, or should it be formulated separately for each kind of values?" (p. 119)

33. ———. 1975. "Phenomenological Aesthetics: An Attempt at Defining Its Range." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* no. 33:257-269.

Translated by Adam Czerniawski.

Reprinted in R. Ingarden, *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*, pp. 25-44 and in Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle (eds.), *Critical theory since 1965*, Tallahassee: University Press of Florida 1986, pp. 185-197.

"We now began to hear about "a general science of literature" ("allgemeine Literaturwissenschaft") and in Poland about "theory of literature". In Germany, as far as I know, only Ermatinger used the expression "philosophy of literature" in a collection of essays entitled *Philosophie der Literatur* (1930).

It is not clear how one is to interpret these three concepts. Nor is the meaning of that generality clear, especially of the way in which "general" predication was to be arrived at. Was it to be by empirical generalizations based on the experience of specific works, and what sort of "experience" was it to be? Was it, for instance, to be achieved in the way that it is done in comparative literature studies, or in some other manner: for instance, through a consideration of specific works, through an analysis of the general content of a work of art, as the phenomenologists themselves wished to do?

When in 1927 I began writing my first book on this subject it was quite clear to me that one cannot employ the method of empirical generalization in aesthetics, but that one must carry through an eidetic analysis of the idea of a literary work of art or a work of art in general. So I thought it a mistake to set against each other the two lines of enquiry: (a) the general enquiry into a work of art, and (b) the aesthetic experience, whether in the sense of the author's creative experience or as a receptive experience of the reader or observer. I had therefore suitably shaped the thesis of my book, even though its title was *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, and even though the German edition of my *Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst* (*Ontological Investigations in Art*) published thirty years later also has a title suggesting a purely object-directed aesthetic enquiry, with not a word about aesthetics." (p. 259)

34. ———. 1976. "The Letter to Husserl about the *VI Logical Investigation* and Idealism." In *Ingardeniana: A Spectrum of Specialised Studies Establishing the Field of Research*, edited by Tyminiecka, Anna-Teresa, 419-438.

Analecta Husserliana, Volume 4.

"Miss [Edith] Stein wrote to me a few weeks ago that you are working again on the problem of 'Idealism'. (2) I immediately sat down to work since I am especially interested in the subject. Unfortunately, my finishing touches on the last part of the Bergson-thesis had to suffer from this, but the working hours of the last weeks will actually be for the thesis' benefit. I have once more very thoroughly studied the 5th and 6th *Investigation* besides having thought over everything essential in this respect from the Ideas. (3) Certainly, and unfortunately too, I cannot say that I have come to a conclusion. But at least I know what I cannot hold as defensible.

Perhaps it will be of interest to you, dear Professor, if I write something about it." (p. 420)

(...)

"But to come to the problem of Idealism, about which I actually wanted to write and which has tormented me already several years. It seems to me that under this name different and fundamentally different problems are concealed. Usually in literature these problems run into one another, and often a system is called 'idealistic' which

actually would not so be named. I do not want to talk here about the equivocations, respectively about all the problems laying here, but, with respect to the things interesting us, it seems to me that one has to differentiate three groups of problems: (1) the ontological, (2) the metaphysical (in a slightly different sense as you use this word), (3) the epistemological problems. Naturally, between all groups essential relationships do exist." (p. 422)

(...)

"Presupposed, to begin with, that the meaning of reality is actually to be conceived as I have done, and that it also would be maintained in the constitutive consideration; (in other words, that everything real would be a 'being-in-itself' and the real external world something essentially alien to consciousness). First of all an ontological question arises: is the essence of reality an autonomous essence and especially an essence autonomous over against the essence of consciousness - as essence -, or not?

Principally spoken, four possibilities are given:

- (1) Reality (as essence) is dependent and the essence of consciousness is autonomous, i.e. the latter could exist without the essence of reality.
- (2) The essence of reality and the essence of consciousness are autonomous.
- (3) The essence of reality is autonomous. Consciousness is dependent.
- (4) Both are dependent and dependent on each other." (pp. 435-436)

Notes

(2) The letter is dated 24.VI.1918.

(3) It concerns the Investigations of the Vol. II of *Logische Untersuchungen*.

35. ———. 1978. "On Moral Action." In *The Human Being in Action: The Irreducible Element in Man: Part II Investigations at the Intersection of Philosophy and Psychiatry*, edited by Tyminiecka, Anna-Teresa, 151-162.

Analecta Husserliana. Volume 7.

This section and the following are the first English translations, by Dr Barbara Haupt Mohr, from Roman Ingarden's work entitled *Ueber die Verantwortung*, which appeared originally in German, Reclam Universai-Bibliothek, Stuttgart, 1970.

"We have treated the question of the responsibility that exists after the completion of an action. But how does the problem of responsibility that grows out of action present itself? How does action take place when it is undertaken in the first place with regard to (or for) the fact that it will result in a particular responsibility on the part of the actor?

It is possible to act without concerning oneself at all with any "responsibility" that one may have for the action. One may simply surrender to the action and aim at bringing about a result. Nevertheless, a person who acts in this way incurs the responsibility for having acted in this way, unconcerned about anything. But one can direct all one's action in such a way that it can result in something evil or something good, aiming to avoid the former and to achieve the latter. One who acts in this manner also takes into consideration that - aside from the possible harm that may ensue - guilt or merit may be assigned to him, the actor. One can act in such a manner that one asks himself at every step of the way whether one's action is "just." The actor must then retain the overview of the values that may be achieved or destroyed in this way, for it is on the scope of this overview that not only the course of his actions but also his responsibility for them depends." (p. 151)

36. ———. 1983. *Man and Value*. München Wien: Philosophia Verlag.

Translation by Arthur Szylewicz of *Über die Verantwortung*.

Table of Contents: Foreword to the Original Polish Edition 9; Foreword to Man and Value 11; Translator's Preface 16; Man and Nature 17; On Human Nature 21; Man and His Reality 25; Man and Time 33; On Responsibility. Its Ontic Foundations 53; I. Main Thesis of the Study 53; II. Differentiation of Various Situations Involving Responsibility 53; III. Bearing Responsibility 54; IV. Assuming Responsibility 66; V. Responsible Action 67; VI. Value as Ontic Fundament of Responsibility 69; VII.

Responsibility and the Identity of its Subject 77; VIII. The Substantial Structure of a Person and Responsibility 80; IX. Freedom and Responsibility 84; X. The Causal Structure of the World 101; XI. The Temporality of the World and Responsibility 105; Remarks on the Relativity of Values 119; What we do not know about Values 131; An Analysis of Moral Values 165; Some Words Concerning Fruitful Discussion 179; Index 183-185.

"Some words about the genesis of this volume.

It was the author's intention to have it published at some future time. This intention was born at the beginning of 1969, when it was necessary to make a final decision as to which works (including some previously published and scattered in various periodicals and conference acts) were to be included in vol. III of *Studies in Aesthetics*, the next in the series of Roman Ingarden's *Collected Philosophical Works*, issued by the Polish Scientific Publishers (PWN). Several very small papers fell into the author's hands at the time (primarily, the first four contained in the present little volume) which he did not want to include in the projected volume (*Aesthetics* III), due to its cohesive composition. A somewhat different thematic thread ties these papers together: the nature of man." (Danuta Gierulanka, from the *Foreword to the Original Polish Edition*, p. 9)

(...)

"The three last major essays of the collection primarily illustrate Ingarden's approach relative to problems of the first group, i.e. problems concerning the essence of values. As with the pieces that made up the Little Book, these essays differ in their analytical style (from the attempt at a conceptual ordering of the relevant issues in "Remarks on the Relativity of Values", through a setting out of the general approach to fundamental problems in "What we do not know about Values", to an attempt at specific phenomenological analyses in "An Analysis of Moral Values") and make up a small but representative selection of the author's approach, a fragment of his researches in the domain of axiology. Ingarden never tried systematically to develop axiological investigations in complete generality - in accord with the standpoint of axiological pluralism that emerges in these essays, which dictates that we reckon with the need for separate investigations in each sphere of values."

(...)

"It so happens that thus far I have not mentioned the essay "Man and Time", the fourth piece in the collection. In a certain sense, more so than all the others, it speaks for itself. It speaks both through the way it was written (most vibrant, and perhaps most fascinating to the reader) and the 'existential' (as some are wont to say today) commitment of the author, especially in that part of it that was added on during the War, a part that is most fervently searching and culminates in a solution. This solution, indeed, strikes the most perspicuous chord in the whole book, which binds what is perhaps of the greatest importance to man - the selfrealization of his person, threatened by the annihilating experience of passing on - with the relation of man to values." (Danuta Gierulanka, from the *Foreword to Man and Value*, p. 12 and 14)

37. ———. 1983. "On Philosophical Aesthetics." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 10:55-59.

Translated by A. Póltawski and A. Potocki.

Reprinted in R. Ingarden, *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*, pp. 17-24.

"Philosophical aesthetics comprises the following subordinate fields of investigation:

- (a) The ontology of different works of art (e.g. paintings, literary works, musical compositions).
- (b) the ontology of the aesthetic object so far as it is the aesthetical concretization of a work of art, i.e. the ontology of its form and mode of existence.
- (c) The phenomenology of creative aesthetic behaviour (of the creative process).
- (d) The philosophical investigation of the style of a work of art and of its relation to value.

(e) The phenomenology and ontology of values inherent in works of art and aesthetic objects, i.e. of artistic and aesthetic values; this includes the possible foundation of values in a work of art or in an aesthetic object and also the constitution of values in the aesthetic experience whereby they are actively discovered.

(f) The phenomenology of the receptive aesthetic experience and of its function in the constitution of an aesthetic object.

(g) The theory of cognition of a work of art and of an aesthetic object, in particular the cognition of artistic and aesthetic values; the theory of aesthetic valuation.

(h) The philosophical theory of the meaning and function of art (or aesthetic objects) in human life. (The metaphysics of art?)

All these fields stand in different relations one to another and none can be studied entirely apart from the problems and achievements of others. This interdependence is the basis for the systematic unity of the whole of philosophical aesthetics." (pp. 18-19)

38. ———. 1983. "Lectures on Aesthetics." *Literary Studies in Poland* no. 11:15-37. "Last time I talked about the ontological foundation of a work of literature in contrast with itself and I distinguished between the vocal material from the sounding of word (analogically, it is necessary to separate writing from auditory form of word). Writing can either be equally diversified, non-homogenous, as the vocal material of particular individuals reading or singing a given work, or in a certain way it can approximate the sound of word. Namely. I was saying that the sound of word in a language is a certain typical form, typical sound quality, one and the same, appearing on diverse backgrounds of voice material. The writing of individual persons is as variable and diversified as voice is, a concrete voice material or manners of speaking. On the other hand, printing or even the writing used in copying books e.g. in medieval times, are both equally typified to the same extent as word sound is. The point is to retain possibly the same graphic shape that is repeated multiply as very similar." (pp. 23-24)
(...)
"The relation occurring between a work of literature and its ontological foundation in fact concerns only some elements or some aspects of the sound stratum of a literary work while the semantic stratum, strata of presented objects and their external appearance go fully beyond that ontological foundation and beyond any relationship or similarity to it." (p. 37)
39. ———. 1985. *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
Edited by Peter J. McCormick.
Contents: On Ingarden's Selected Papers in Aesthetics: An Introduction by Peter J. McCormick 7; On Philosophical Aesthetics 17; Phenomenological Aesthetics: An Attempt at Defining its Range 25; A Marginal Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics 45; Psychologism and Psychology in Literary Scholarship 79; Artistic and Aesthetic Values 91; Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object 107; On So-Called Truth in Literature 133; The Physicalistic Theory of Language and the Work of Literature 163; Roman Ingarden Bibliography by R. Jagannathan, P. J. McCormick, A. Poltawski and J. Sidorek 181; Introduction 183; Works by Roman Ingarden: Polish 185; German 209; English 217; French 221; Works about Roman Ingarden 224; Index 262; Editor's Note 268.
"A number of [Ingarden's] shorter pieces on aesthetics are collected in Polish under the title *Studia z estetyki* in three volumes, and some of these too have been translated into English. It is the purpose of this volume to gather this material together in one place and, with the help of an extremely comprehensive bibliography of Ingarden's writings and of writings about him in English, French, and German, to situate this work in the development of his thought in general.

(...)

Some idea, however fragmentary, of the range of his work may be gathered from the analysis Ingarden gave of the different areas of philosophical aesthetics in his late and important paper "Asthetik und Kunstphilosophie" presented at the 14th International Congress of Philosophy at Vienna in 1968.

Philosophical aesthetics involves the following areas of discussion: (1) The ontology of the work of art, and indeed a) the general philosophical theory of the structure and the mode of being of the work of art in general, b) Ontology of the work of art in the several arts (painting, architecture, literary works of art, etc.). (2) Ontology of the aesthetic object as an aesthetic concretization of a work of art. (3) Phenomenology of the creative artistic behaviour. (4) The problem of the style of the work of art and its relation to its own value.

(5) Aesthetic value doctrine (artistic and aesthetic values, their founding in the work of art and their constitution in aesthetic experience). (6) Phenomenology of aesthetic experience and the constitution of the aesthetic object. (7) Theory of knowledge of the work of art and the cognition of aesthetic objects and especially the cognition of aesthetic values (critique of evaluation). (8) Theory of meaning and the function of art (with respect to aesthetic objects in the life of human beings (metaphysics of art?)).(10)

(10) "Asthetik und Kunstphilosophie", Akten des XIV. Internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie, Wien, 2-9 September 1968, 4, Vienna: 1969, p. 216.

40. ———. 1985. "Reminiscences of Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz." *Dialectics and Humanism* no. 12:53-59.
41. ———. 1985. "On the Cognition of the Literary Work of Art." In *The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present*, edited by Mueller-Vollmer, Kurt, 187-213. New York: Continuum.
 Selections taken from the first section of *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*.
 "Preliminary Sketch of the Problem
 The main question which I am trying to answer is: How do we cognize the completed literary work set down in writing (or by other means, e.g., in tape recording)? Cognition is, however, only one kind of intercourse a reader can have with the literary work. To be sure, we will not completely ignore the other ways of experiencing the work, but neither will we pay particular attention to them at the moment. Even "cognition" itself can take place in many different ways, which can bring about various results. The type of work read also plays an essential role in determining how cognition takes place." (pp. 187-188)
42. ———. 1986. *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity*. London: Macmillan.
 Translated by Adam Czerniawski.
 "The starting point for our reflections upon the musical work will be the unsystematized convictions that we encounter in daily life in our communion with musical works before we succumb to one particular theory or another. Naturally, I do not intend in advance to accept these convictions as true. On the contrary, I shall submit them to critical investigations at specific points. But, for the moment at least, they must indicate the direction of further investigations.
 For how else could this direction be indicated? These convictions, although naively acquired and perhaps burdened with various mistakes, do after all stem from an immediate aesthetic communion with musical works, a communion that furnishes us, or at least may furnish us, with an ultimate experience of those works, thus endowing with truth the views that match the given of the experience. However fully developed, every theory of musical works that is not mere speculation but seeks a base in concrete facts must refer to the presystematic convictions that initially gave direction to the search. It seems that there is another reason why we must refer to the given of the immediate musical experience. It is that various theories in the realm of so-called aesthetics or the psychology of music are conditioned too powerfully by the general state of

philosophy and of sciences particular to a given epoch and therefore too heavily burdened with theoretical prejudices that make it difficult to reach the experientially given facts. In addition I intend to discuss various problems which have not been raised within the existing literature on musical theory." (p. 1)

43. ———. 1988. "Theory of Knowledge as Phenomenology of the "Essence" of Cognitive Experiences and Their Correlates." *Aletheia: An International Journal of Philosophy* no. 4:1-106.

Translated by Arthur Szylewicz.

"The following text constitutes a translation of Chapter IV from Roman Ingarden's *U podstaw teorii poznania* [Foundations of Epistemology], Part I, PWN, Warszawa, 1971. (Part II, announced in the Preface to this volume, has not yet appeared in print.)

Ingarden suggests in his "Introductory Remarks" that epistemology is still relatively young as a self-aware, distinct science. Consequently, it is still struggling to consolidate both a definition of its realm of objects and suitable methods of their investigation. "The truth is . . . that the factual state of research, which in view of the problems it treats has to be assigned to epistemology, is inadequate. We cannot today [1948] point to a single set of epistemological assertions that are adequately grounded or universally accepted. This is doubtless tied up with the fact that thus far epistemology has not been clearly enough bounded off from other disciplines. For neither its domain of research, nor its tasks or methods have been defined in a manner free from basic doubts and objections . . .""In this theoretical situation", he continues further on, "epistemological investigations proper have to be preceded by considering whether and how epistemological problems can be formulated in a way that would avoid the fundamental difficulties which it has thus far encountered in the course of its development; we also need to elucidate what kind of cognitive means can or have to be applied toward their solution. The present book is devoted to this task.... It will turn out in the course of our considerations, however, that we shall have to present and critically discuss certain epistemological standpoints which have with greater or lesser clarity been formulated to this point in the evolution of philosophy."

After having discussed some of the difficulties involved in circumscribing a theory of knowledge, Ingarden proceeds to differentiate five such attempts in the annals of the history of philosophy and, distinguishing them in accordance with their objects of investigation, gives them the following titles:

- I. Psychophysiological theory of knowledge.
- II. Descriptive phenomenology of knowledge.
- III. Apriori-phenomenological theory of knowledge.
- IV. Logicistic theory of knowledge.
- V. Autonomous theory of knowledge."

"... each successive attempt", according to Ingarden, "will try to avoid the errors and difficulties encountered by the preceding ..."

The titles of the three Chapters of the Foundations which precede the one offered here are:

- I. The Psychophysiological Theory of Knowledge
- II. Critique of the Psychophysiological Theory of Knowledge
- III. A Second Attempt at Defining a Theory of Knowledge. Descriptive Phenomenology of Conscious Experiences and their Correlates.

Thus, as the reader may easily convince himself, Chapters I and II correspond to title I, Chapter III to title II, and Chapter IV to title III. Presumably, the unpublished Part II of the Foundations contains discussions of theories corresponding to the remaining two titles." (from *Translator's Introduction*, pp. IX-X).

"The Issue of "Eidetic" Cognition and Its Employment in a Theory of Knowledge
A new delineation of a theory of knowledge has to take into account the results of the discussion regarding the psychophysiological theory of knowledge as well as eliminate the flaws that surfaced in the descriptive-phenomenological theory of knowledge. Thus, with this new attempt, we have to acknowledge the

indispensability of the phenomenological *epoché*, that is the adoption of a stance of cognitive reserve with respect to all pieces of knowledge acquired in transcendent cognition (1); in addition, we have to satisfy the requirement that follows from the necessity of preserving the rigorous character of a theory of knowledge as well as from the function that the latter is supposed to perform over against all the remaining investigative disciplines, the special sciences in particular. Finally, its domain of research needs to be defined so as to encompass all the factors necessary for a treatment of the problem of the "objectivity" [*obiektywnosci = Objektivität*] of knowledge in general." (p. 1)

44. ———. 1989. *Ontology of the Work of Art: the Musical Work, the Picture, the Architectural Work, the Film*. Athens: Ohio University Press.
Translated by Raymond Meyer with John T. Goldthwait.
"The studies collected in this volume were written, in their first version, in the early months of 1928, immediately after, and as an appendix to, my book *The Literary Work of Art*. However, as I prepared that book for the press in 1930, it became apparent that the volume had become too bulky, so that I had to forego publication of the appendix. In 1933 I translated a large part of the essay on "The Musical Work" into Polish and published it under the title "The Problem of the Identity of the Musical Work." The preparation of other publications at that time made it impossible for me to publish these studies before the outbreak of war in 1939. Immediately after the war, in the year 1946, I expanded somewhat the works "On the Structure of the Picture" and "The Architectural Work" and published them here in Polish. In the year 1956, when I was preparing the two volumes of my *Studies in Aesthetics* for the press, I once again expanded somewhat the study on "The Picture" and published it in Polish in the second volume, together with the study on the architectural and the musical work. In 1957 I rewrote these three works in German, but only now has the opportunity to publish them presented itself. The article on the film was first published in French under the title "Time, Space, and the Feeling of Reality"; it appeared later in Polish in the second volume of *Studies in Aesthetics*, and is given here in exact translation.
Despite later revisions, all the fundamental ideas of the three first-named studies were already contained in the versions of 1928. They stand in a very close relation with the chief assertions of *The Literary Work of Art*, and form only an extension of the investigations of that volume. The principal problem with which I was concerned at that time was that of the structure and the mode of being of works of art as determinately constituted, purely intentional objectivities. From the first, clarification of these questions was intended as preparation for unraveling the problem of reality. The continuation of these investigations was in fact given in my work *The Controversy over the Existence of the World*, in the form of existential and formal-ontological reflections which sought to lay the foundation for working out the problem of idealism versus realism. In consequence of this aspect of my investigations of the ontology of art, as well as of the relationship of these investigations with fundamental philosophical problems, considerations of the problem of artistic or aesthetic value fell outside the focus of the work, as had also been the case in *The Literary Work of Art*. This was tied in with the conviction I held already that ontological problems must be attacked first in order to create an ontological foundation for the investigation of the problem of value. This, however, does not mean that I wished to exclude or belittle the problem of value, as was often said about *The Literary Work of Art*. Investigation of the above-mentioned problems of value, however, requires still another basis, namely, clarification of the structure of aesthetic experience, and of the cognitive acts contained in it, with reference to the aesthetic value that is revealed in aesthetic experience." (pp. IX-X, notes omitted)
45. ———. 1991. "On Translations." In *Ingardeniana III: Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics in a New Key and the Independent Approaches of Others: the Performing Arts, the Fine Arts, and Literature*, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 139-192.
Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Analecta Husserliana. Volume 33.

"1. General Definition of Translation of the Literary Work of Art

All written ("literary") works of art are characterized by the fact that they are many-layered and multi-phase due to the successive arrangement of their parts. There are at least four strata: (a) the stratum of word sounds and phonetic formations; (b) the stratum of semantic units of various orders; (c) the stratum of represented objects; and, finally, (d) the stratum of schematized aspects. According to widely known theories of language, there is no necessary connection between the sound of a word and its meaning. It seems therefore, possible to "tie" the same meaning to different word sounds. And conversely, it happens that some word sounds are "tied" to two different meanings. This constitutes the phenomenon of polysemy. It is, therefore, conceivable to substitute all actual sounds in a given work of art with the altogether different sounds taken from another language and thus produce what is commonly known as a "translation" of a work from one language to another. If in the course of this procedure the meanings in the semantic stratum remain unaltered, we usually say the translation is "faithful."

This general definition of translation and its fidelity, however, will have to be subjected to certain alternations, especially in the context of the translation of the literary work of art. It is necessary then to take a look at the structure of the literary work of art and how it differs from the work of scholarship." (p. 131)

46. Szylewicz, Arthur. 1993. "Roman Ingarden's Review of the Second Edition of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*." *Husserl Studies* no. 10:1-12.
Contains the English translation of Ingarden's *Review* at pp. 4-12.
"The review of the Second Edition of E. Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* was Roman Ingarden's very first publication. At the time of its appearance, 1915, Ingarden was still studying in Freiburg, working on his Ph.D. under Husserl. What could have prompted the youthful Ingarden to write such a review? The fact that the review was written in Polish suggests that Ingarden may simply have grasped an opportunity to arouse the Polish philosophical community's interest in a work that he regarded as monumental and, perhaps more generally, to stir its awareness of phenomenology as a movement. It may be no accident that the review appears in a section of the journal entitled "Survey of Contemporary Systems". More compelling evidence for this occasional motive is the fact that Ingarden's first major publication was an extensive "introduction" to phenomenology. It was meant to remedy the deplorable state of almost total ignorance of phenomenology that Ingarden encountered on his return to Poland following the completion of his studies with Husserl." (Arthur Szylewicz, *Introduction*, p. 1)
"We may give a general characterization of the new edition of the *Investigations* by noting that, worked out as it is with the utmost scrupulousness, it offers, aside from the radical changes (whose correctness I cannot go into here), considerably greater clarity in the formulation of statements, as well as a better adaptation of expressions to the intuitively given objects under consideration.
Numerous supplementations with new analyses (such as, e.g., that of nominal presentation and its relation to the judgment, or those concerning the structure of the various forms of the matter of judgments, or the analysis of "thetic" and "synthetic" acts); a more detailed analysis of the problems previously investigated (e.g., that of the association of presentations, or the analysis of the relation between "das Bedeuten" and the intentional presentations fulfilling (*erfüllend*) it); finally, a precise distinction of the noematic and the noetic "sides" of investigation, accompanied by sharpened assertions and a greater decisiveness in resolving earlier doubts - all this shows that the years separating the two editions brought not only a clarification of the essential significance and goals of phenomenology, but also a rich harvest of newly attained truths. The depth of these truths, and their links to the broadest horizons of philosophical problems, leaves far behind the results obtained fifteen years earlier, but this [maturation] does not emerge in fullest relief until the *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology*." (p. 9)

47. Ingarden, Roman. 2013. *Controversy over the Existence of the World. Volume I*. Bern: Peter Lang.
Translated and annotated by Arthur Szylewicz.
Table of Contents: Translator's Note 7; Jan Woleński: Introduction 11; Preface 19; Addendum to the German Edition 25; Chapter I: Preliminary Relections 27; Chapter II: Partition of the Three Major Problem Groups 47; Part I. Existential-Ontological Problems of the Controversy over the Existence of the World 93; Chapter III: Basic Existential Concepts 95; Chapter IV: Provisional Survey of the Currently Feasible Variants of a Solution to the Controversy 167; Chapter V: Time and Mode of Being 227; Chapter VI: Consequences of the Time Analysis for the Solution Possibilities of the Idealism / Realism Problem 279; Appendix A - K 301-320.

"Ingarden intended to give a systematic account of realist phenomenology in a work with the general title *Spór o istnienie świata* (*Controversy over the Existence of the World*). He projected five volumes, but completed only three.

Volumes I and II appeared in 1947-48. The 2nd, corrected (and supplemented by additional notes) edition of both volumes was published in 1960-61. In 1964-65, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Ingarden's life-long publisher, issued a German "translation" (by Ingarden himself) as *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, Vol. I:

Existentialontologie and Vol. II: *Formalontologie, Welt und Bewusstsein*. On Ingarden's own admission, it was not a straightforward translation, but involved considerable revision – especially in Vol. I. The same house published Vol. 3 (*Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt: Über die die kausale Struktur der realen Welt*) in 1974; this volume deals with the causal structure of the real world. The last Polish edition of Vols. I and II of *Spór* appeared in 1987 in an edition that represents a splicing by Danuta Gierulanka, Ingarden's assistant, of the Polish and German versions; her Polish translation of Vol. III of *Streit* appeared in 1981." (Jan Wołoski, *Introduction*, pp. 13-14)

"The two volumes I hereby present to the public constitute but a fragment of the analyses needed to bring to a resolution the controversy over the existence of the world. They do, however, deal with a sphere of intimately connected problems which, when solved in a particular way, contribute to narrowing the scope of possible options relative to the mode of existence of the real world, so that the further course of research begins to be more sharply delineated. In that sense therefore the two volumes constitute a unified whole containing a closed range [Umkreis] of findings that may prove significant for future research." (From the *Preface* (1946), p. 24)

(...)

"The Material Ontology of the Real World, which had initially been envisioned as the third volume, had meanwhile to be postponed, because it turned out that a yet more extensive formal-ontological analysis of the world had to be undertaken relative to its causal structure. Thus, I spent the years 1952-54 working on a third volume that was devoted to the problem of causation. The purely ontological treatment of this problem (as a problem pertaining to the structure of the world) had also been concluded sometime toward the

end of 1954. But these ontological conclusions have to confront the findings of contemporary natural science. And this I have not yet managed to do. Hence, this volume will still have to wait for some time before being completed and published.

(16) For the time being then, the first two volumes make their appearance (as three volumes in the German version) as a self-contained whole, and may they pave the way for further investigations into the entire problem-complex." (from the *Addendum to the German Edition* (1962), p. 25)

(16) [Vol. III of the *Streit* appeared as *Über die kausale Struktur der realen Welt*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1974.]

48. ———. 2016. *Controversy over the Existence of the World. Volume II*. Bern: Peter Lang.
Translated and annotated by Arthur Szylewicz.

Table of Contents: Translators's Note 6;
 Part II/1. VII: The Problem Pertaining to the Essence of Form and its Foundational Concepts 19; VIII. The Form of the Existentially Autonomous Object 71; IX: The Form of purely Intentional Object 171 ; X. The Form of the Idea 225 ; XI: The Form of the State of Affairs. State of Affairs and Object 267; XII: The Form of the Relation. The Relative and non-Relative (Absolute) Characteristics of the Individual Object 311; XIII: The Essence of the Existentially Selfsufficient Object 357; Part II/2. XIV. The Problem of the Identity of an Individual Temporally Conditioned Object 425; XV. The Form of a Existential Domain and the Form of the World 507; XVI. The Problem of the Form of Pure Consciousness 645; XVII. Application of the Formal-Ontological Results to the Problem of the Existence of the World 743; Index of Names 773-775.

"§ 81. Outlook on the Possible Ontological Resolutions of the Controversy over the Existence of the World with the Findings Obtained Taken into Account

In Sections 26 and 33 [of Vol. I] I gave a summary of the potential resolutions of the controversy over the existence of the world that are suggested on the basis of our existential-ontological investigations. Since we now have at our disposal some formal-ontological results pertaining to the world and pure consciousness, it is time to ponder the consequences that follow from these for the main issue of our controversy.

Perhaps the most important result to emerge from our formal considerations is that every world must be existentially self sufficient, but that it can at the same time be dependent on some external factor – thus, for example, on pure consciousness, provided it does not belong to the world. On the other hand, however, the thesis is important that the constituents of the world must be temporally determined objects, and precisely therewith also autonomous – if they are to exist at all. The autonomy of the (potentially existing) world also follows from other peculiarities of its formal structure, namely from its being everywhere dense and cohesively linked internally, as well as from its being so ordered that it does not permit any completely isolated objects within its realm." (pp. 383-384)