Selected Bibliography on Linguistic Relativity (Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis)

BIBLIOGRAPHY


"Against recent arguments, which define alternative conceptual schemes in terms of failure of translatability and insist that since such schemes cannot be translated, they cannot be made intelligible, I argue that even if Whorf is mistaken about the Hopi, he does describe, using the same grammatical criteria as Strawson, a scheme radically different to that described in "Individual's" (our scheme). It seems appropriate to mark the difference by "alternative conceptual scheme." Further, I claim that not translation but rather a process of substitution of, or addition to, a first language is the key to understanding a radically different second language."


"This work concerns the linguistic relativity hypothesis, also known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which, in its most general form claims that 'language' influences 'thought'. Past studies into linguistic relativity have treated various aspects of both thought and language, but a growing body of literature has recently emerged, in this thesis referred to as neo-Whorfian, that empirically investigates thought and language from a cross-linguistic perspective and claims that the grammar or lexicon of a particular language influences the speakers' non-linguistic thought. The present thesis examines the assumptions about language that underlie this claim and criticizes the neo-Whorfian arguments from the point of view that they are based on misleading notions of language. The critique focuses on the operationalization of thought, language, and culture as separate variables in the neo-Whorfian empirical investigations. The neo-Whorfian studies explore language primarily as 'particular languages' and investigate its role as a variable standing in a causal relation to the 'thought'
variable. Thought is separately examined in non-linguistic tests and found to 'correlate' with language.

As a contrast to the neo-Whorfian view of language, a few examples of other approaches to language, referred to in the thesis as sociocultural approaches, are reviewed. This perspective on language places emphasis on practice and communication rather than on particular languages, which are viewed as secondary representations. It is argued that from a sociocultural perspective, language as an integrated practice cannot be separated from thought and culture. The empirical findings in the neo-Whorfian studies need not be rejected, but they should be interpreted differently. The findings of linguistic and cognitive diversity reflect different communicational practices in which language cannot be separated from non-language.


"Presented are virtually unknown contributions to analytical philosophy by 18th and 19th century German philosophers with striking anticipations of Wittgenstein and 20th century analytical thought as well as of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity. Language is seen in its transcendental function; ordinary language as an indispensable metalanguage. An interdependence theory of language and thought leads to regard philosophy as critique of language and cognition. Its task: the elimination of metaphysics and pseudoproblems, The clarification of concepts and the meaning of propositions. The method claims therapeutic consequences."


"This is the first part of a two-part essay on Benjamin Lee Whorf's linguistic relativism: the thesis that the grammatical structure of one's language "shapes" the "form" of one's thoughts. This thesis has often been treated by anthropologists, linguists, and psychologists as an empirical claim, subject to scientific investigation, and a principal aim of this essay is to assess that general view of Whorf's thesis. In this first part of the essay, a number of criticisms of Whorf's relativism are considered and are shown to rest on various misconceptions of Whorf's thesis."


"The works of Plato are examined in the context of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and a number of instances are cited in which the influence of the structure of the Greek language appears to have led him into a faulty line of reasoning."


"Intended as a commemoration of the 60th anniversary of Whorf's death, this paper reviews the revival of the thesis of linguistic relativity (the so-called "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis") in linguistics. If the demise of Whorf's hypothesis, in the early Sixties, was tantamount to an irrevocably condemnation by the philosophical community, then how should philosophers react to the rejuvenation of Whorf's hypothesis? In my opinion philosophers should take seriously the recent attempts to reformulate that hypothesis in order to avoid oversimplifications. I challenge William Harvey, (Philosophy Today, summer 1996, pp. 273-286) by arguing that he is guilty of such an oversimplification."


"Surface and depth structure forms the central focal point of Whorf's creative work. In his developed system surface language-forms are called phenotypes and depth-elements are termed cryptotypes. Meaning is the interplay between the two. Phenotypes are overt categories and cryptotypes are covert categories. Selective categories may be overt or covert but basically they work along lexemic lines. Modulus categories may be overt or covert but basically they work along grammatical lines. Semantic categories tend to be surface groupings of linguistic elements and hence carry no meaning."


"There can be no coherent "Sapir-Whorf" hypothesis. Sapir's mentalism, in contrast to Whorf's associationism, is best understood in the rationalist tradition. His phonology is almost Platonist: "psychological reality" -- i.e., patterns of phonemes -- control both production and perception of speech. His anthropology is also reminiscent of Plato in its insistence on a dialectical relationship with native informants. However his epistemological insight that "syntax modulates understanding" resembles a central theme of Wittgenstein's later philosophy."


"After some general remarks both on the problem of language and thought and on the linguistic relativity debate the present state of research and discussion shall be demonstrated by two examples. The first concerns the relation between colour vision and colour terms, the second some possible differences between China and the West with respect to the linguistic and cognitive use of counterfactuals. A concluding section will contain some systematic reflections."


   Language Sciences no. 25:393-432.

"Probably no contemporary linguist has published as profusely on the connections between semantics, culture, and cognition as Anna Wierzbicka. This paper explores the similarities and differences between her "natural semantic metalanguage" (NSM) approach and the linguistic theory of Benjamin Lee Whorf. It shows that while some work by Wierzbicka and colleagues can be seen as "neo-Whorfian", other aspects of the NSM program are "counter-Whorfian". Issues considered include the meaning of linguistic relativity, the nature of conceptual universals and the consequences for semantic methodology, the importance of polysemy, and the scale and locus of semantic variation between languages, particularly in relation to the domain of time. Examples are drawn primarily from English, Russian, and Hopi."


"The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (that grammar influences world view) is employed to explain the differences between German, French and English philosophical traditions. German philosophy's idealist,
unitary and systematic tendencies are attributed to German's end-verbs, case system, root morphemes and initial qualifiers. French philosophy's dualism and rationalist analysis are ascribed to that language's more abstract signifiers and its description by progressive discrete divisions. And English philosophy's skeptical materialist empiricism is attributed to English's mixing of French and German syntax and lexicons, and to the higher incidence of passive constructions in English.


International Symposium on anthropology prepared under the chairmanship of A. L. Kroeber


"The linguistic relativity (Whorfian) hypothesis states that language influences thought. In its strongest form, the hypothesis states that language controls both thought and perception. Several experiments have shown that this is false. The weaker form of the hypothesis, which states that language influences thought, has been held to be so vague that it is unprovable. The argument presented herein is that the weaker Whorfian hypothesis can be quantified and thus evaluated. Models of cognition developed after Whorf's day indicate ways in which thought can be influenced by cultural variations in the lexical, syntactical, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of language. Although much research remains to be done, there appears to be a great deal of truth to the linguistic relativity hypothesis. In many ways the language people speak is a guide to the language in which they think."


Proceedings of the 29th Chicago Linguistic Society


"This research concerns how children learn the distinction between substance names and object names. Quine (1969) proposed that children learn the distinction through learning the syntactic distinctions inherent in count/mass grammar. However, Soja et al. (1991) found that English-speaking 2-year-olds, who did not seem to have acquired count/mass grammar, distinguished objects from substances in a word
extension task, suggesting a pre-linguistic ontological distinction. To test whether the distinction between object names and substance names is conceptually or linguistically driven, we repeated Soja et al.’s study with English- and Japanese-speaking 2-, 2.5-, and 4-year-olds and adults. Japanese does not make a count-mass grammatical distinction: all inanimate nouns are treated alike. Thus if young Japanese children made the object-substance distinction in word meaning, this would support the early ontology position over the linguistic influence position. We used three types of standards: substances (e.g., sand in an S-shape), simple objects (e.g., a kidney-shaped piece of paraffin) and complex objects (e.g., a wood whisk). The subjects learned novel nouns in neutral syntax denoting each standard entity. They were then asked which of the two alternatives -- one matching in shape but not material and the other matching in material but not shape--would also be named by the same label. The results suggest the universal use of ontological knowledge in early word learning. Children in both languages showed differentiation between (complex) objects and substances as early as 2 years of age. However, there were also early cross-linguistic differences. American and Japanese children generalized the simple object instances and the substance instances differently. We speculate that children universally make a distinction between individuals and non-individuals in word learning but that the nature of the categories and the boundary between them is influenced by language.


"Objects and substances bear fundamentally different ontologies. In this article, we examine the relations between language, the ontological distinction with respect to individuation, and the world. Specifically, in cross-linguistic developmental studies that follow Imai and Gentner (1997), we examine the question of whether language influences our thought in different forms, like (1) whether the language specific construal of entities found in a word extension context (Imai and Gentner, 1997) is also found in a nonlinguistic classification context; (2) whether the presence of labels per se, independent of the count-mass syntax, fosters ontology-based classification; (3) in what way, if at all, the count-mass syntax that accompanies a label changes English speakers' default construal of a given entity? On the basis of the results, we argue that the ontological distinction concerning individuation is universally shared and functions as a constraint on early learning of words. At the same time, language influences one's construal of entities cross-linguistically and developmentally, and causes a temporary change of construal within a single language. We provide a detailed discussion of how each of these three ways language may affect the construal of entities, and discuss how our universally possessed knowledge interacts with language both within a single language and in cross-linguistic context."


Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Sciences and the Humanities, Vol. 89.


An extended and updated version is included as Chapter 10 in E. F. K. Koerner - Professing linguistic historiography - Amsterdam, John Benjamins, 1995 pp. 203-240.


"Examining the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the author addresses the questions whether language affects perception and whether grammatical categories affect conceptual categories. He argues that advocates of linguistic relativity have attributed to language an unjustified degree of causal efficacy and that linguistic idealism is contradicted by the results of experimental psychology. Then, considering the claimed correlation between grammatical and conceptual categories, he argues that grammar has no metaphysics and does not influence thought. The author concludes that language in use embodies a point of view only in the weak sense that relations and distinctions implicit in necessary concepts constitute a philosophical theory about reality."


In evaluating the linguistic relativity hypothesis, it is necessary to avoid using terms in such a way as to empty the hypothesis of empirical content; it is also necessary to separate related but distinct issues. There is no reason to accept any strong version of the hypothesis when this is understood to pertain to differences in cognition due to non-universal aspects of language structure. Generative grammarians have been led by their orientation and findings to reject the hypothesis, but their ideas on the relation between language and thought have often been confused and burdened by gratuitous assumptions. It is argued that 'semantic representations', the semantic objects determined by linguistic principles, cannot be equated with the primary structures manipulated in cognition, termed 'conceptual structures'. It is further argued, with lexical and grammatical examples from various languages, that semantic representations are not universal, even granted essential uniformity of cognition for all speakers and the viability of an informal notion of semantic equivalence between sentences.


A collection of nine papers.


"Language relativism can be associated with two major conceptions: that "each language has or is a particular spirit" and that "each language has or is a real or imagined-territory." Spirituality and territoriality combined give rise to the ideology of a language as a realm. This ideology of Modern Greek as a regime language has become dominant after the official establishment of a standard norm (demotic) and the resolution of the perennial "Greek Language Question." As it is evidenced by a host of "language issues" raised in the Greek newspapers since 1976, relativism has determined what counted as a "language issue" that was worth publishing, which language issues were eligible for public debates, and the extent to which language issues were allowed to penetrate "public opinion".


Papers presented at the 11th International Conference on Historical Linguistics, held August 1993 at the University of California.


Proceedings of a Colloquium on the Sapir-Whorf hypotheses [sic]


Martin Pütz and Marjolijn H. Verspoor: Preface; Introduction IX; E.F.K. Koerner: Towards a 'full pedigree' of the 'Sapir-Whorf hypothesis': From Locke to Lucy 1; Jürgen Trabahn: How relativistic are Humboldt's "Weltansichten"? 25; Penny Lee: When is 'linguistic relativity' Wort's linguistic relativity? 45; Juliane House: Linguistic relativity and translation 69; Peter Mühlhäusler: Humboldt, Whorf and the roots of ecolinguistics 89; Wallace Chafe: Loci of diversity and convergence in thought and language 101; Nick J. Enfield: On linguocentrism; Paul R. Hays: From the Jurassic dark: Linguistic relativity as evolutionary necessity 159; Sydney M. Lamb: Neuro-cognitive structure in the interplay of language and thought 173; David B. Kronenfeld: Language and thought: Collective tools for individual use 197; Gary B. Palmer and Claudia Woodman: Ontological classifiers as polycentric categories, as seen in Shona class 3 nouns 225; Robert E. MacLaury: Linguistic relativity and the plasticity of categorization: Universalism in a new key 249; Bruce Hawkins: Linguistic relativity as a function of ideological deixis 295; Linda L. Thornburg and Klaus-Uwe Panther: Why we subject incorporate (in English): a post-Whorfian view 319; Minglang Zhou: Metalinguistic awareness in linguistic relativity: Cultural and subcultural practices across Chinese dialect communities 345; Subject index 365.


"Everything leads us to believe that an 'exotic' language produces exotic metaphors, which in turn condition those modes of thought different from our own. Comparative analysis of a metaphorical field common to Greece and China (light and the mirror) shows that the philosophical differences do not proceed from the various material of the metaphors used, but rather from the different attitudes to language. The hypothesis of linguistic relativism far from being either weakened or confirmed by this comparative analysis, appears itself to depend on the manner in which Greek and Occidental thought conceived the relation of thought to language."


Proceedings of a Colloquium on the Sapir-Whorf hypotheses [sic]


"The long tried methods of Indo-European linguistics have proved themselves by the success with which they have been applied to other fields, for instance Central Algonkian and Athabaskan. An increasing interest in linguistics may be noted among workers in anthropology, culture history, sociology, psychology, and philosophy. For all of them linguistics is of basic importance: its data and methods show better than those of any other discipline dealing with socialized behavior the possibility of a truly scientific study of society. Linguists should, on the other hand, become aware of what their science may mean for the interpretation of human conduct in general."


"Three experiments assessed the possibility, suggested by Quine (1960, 1969) among others, that the
ontology underlying natural language is induced in the course of language learning, rather than constraining learning from the beginning. Specifically, we assessed whether the ontological distinction between objects and non-solid substances conditions projection of word meanings prior to the child's mastery of count/mass syntax. Experiments 1 and 2 contrasted unfamiliar objects with unfamiliar substances in a word-learning task. Two-year-old subjects' projection of the novel word to new objects respected the shape and number of the original referent. In contrast, their projection of new words for non-solid substances ignored shape and number. There were no effects of the child's knowledge of count/mass syntax, nor of the syntactic context in which the new word was presented. Experiment 3 revealed that children's natural biases in the absence of naming do not lead to the same pattern of results. We argue that these data militate against Quine's conjecture.


"The thesis of "linguistic relativity" argued for by Whorf is by no means novel. The main elements of Whorf's views can be found as far back as the writings of Wilhelm von Humboldt, and more lately in those of Ernst Cassirer. But among those who have espoused the thesis of linguistic relativity Whorf, at least, has attempted to give some empirical content to the theory through his investigations of certain American Indian languages. And it is to the stimulation of Whorf's writings that the renewed interest in the doctrine of linguistic relativity in the last few years can be traced. In this paper I shall not attempt an exegesis of Whorf's somewhat obscure writings, but rather propose three different interpretations of the notion of linguistic relativity without attempting to relate them to Whorf's writings except in a casual way. My chief concern will be to furnish an analysis or explication of the thesis of linguistic relativity, not a study of Whorf's writings."


Eight edition.


"This paper is an attempt to make sense of the idea that different languages embody or reflect different "conceptual schemes," different ways of experiencing or perceiving the world. The following (apparent) dilemma is discussed: if a language is translatable into English it cannot embody a scheme different from ours, but if it is not translatable we cannot know that it embodies a different scheme, even if it does; hence it is impossible to find examples which confirm the thesis that different languages embody different conceptual schemes. An account of one kind of difference of conceptual scheme is developed which avoids this dilemma."


Edited and with an introduction by John B. Carroll. Foreword by Stuart Chase.
RELATED PAGES

On the website "Theory and History of Ontology"

Linguistic Relativism (Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis) vs. Universal Grammar

Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal Medium (two traditions in 20th century philosophy)