Editions and translations of the Metaphysical Works of Francisco Suárez

Contents

The Rise of Ontology in the Modern Era

This part of the section History of Ontology includes of the following pages:

Birth of a New Science

The History of Ontology from Suárez to Kant

Selected bibliography on the History of Continental Ontology from Suárez to Kant

Jacob Lorhard (1561-1609): The Creator of the Term "Ontologia"

Bibliography of the Ontologists from 16th to 18th Centuries:

I. From Fonseca to Poinset (1560 - 1644)

II. From Scheibler to Lambert (1645 - 1777)

Francisco Suárez on Metaphysics as the Science of Real Beings

Selected bibliography on Suárez' Metaphysics

Editions and translations of the Metaphysical Works of Francisco Suárez (Current page)

Suárez A - F

Suárez G - Z

Index of the Pages on Modern Philosophy

Metaphysical works
The standard edition of Suárez's works is: André Michel and Charles Berton (eds.), *R. P. Francisci Suárez e societate Jesu, Opera omnia*, Parisiis apud Ludovicum Vivès (1856-1861) in 26 volumes, with two additional volumes of indexes (27-28).

The main philosophical works are:

a) *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (DM): The first edition was published in Salamanca (Spain) in 1597 (two volumes) with the title *Metaphysicarum disputationum, in quibus et universa naturalis theologia ordinate traditur, et quaestiones omnes ad duodecim Aristotelis libros pertinentes accurate disputantur*, and reprinted Mainz 1605.

The standard edition, edited by Charles Berton who adopted the current title, is part of the edition of the *Opera omnia*, voll. 25 (I-XXVII) and 26 (XXVIII - LIV). This edition is reprinted by Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 2009.


**English translations of the *Disputationes metaphysicae***

   Translated with an introduction (pp. 7-19) and notes by John P. Doyle.
   The *Index* is the preface to the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*.
   Content: English translation: 20-247; Corresponding Latin texts: I. Ad lectorem 248; II. Disputatio II: Prooemium 250; III. Index Locupletissimus 252; IV. Index Disputationum 390; Persons Mentioned in the Index 410; Bibliography 413; Index of Names 424-426.
   "Balancing the system in the *Disputationes*, the Index amounts to a late medieval commentary, “by way of question,” on the first 12 books of the *Metaphysics*. Shorter in length than, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas’ (1225–1274) commentary on the same 12 books, Suárez’s *Ample Index* more than makes up for that by cross-referencing the *Disputationes* itself hundreds of times. In fact, the *Index* and the *Disputationes* are exactly as Suárez intended them to be, complementary of one another and mutually supportive." (Doyle, p. 8).
   "However, because there will be very many who will desire that this whole doctrine be collated with the books of Aristotle, not only in order to better perceive on what principles of the so great Philosopher it is based, but also in order that it be more easily and usefully employed for understanding Aristotle himself, I have also sought to provide the reader in this matter with an elaborate index, in which, if it is attentively read, most easily (if I am not mistaken) all those things which Aristotle treated in the books of *Metaphysics* can be comprehended and retained in memory."
And again, [with that index] all questions can be at hand which are customarily raised among the expositors of these books." (Suárez, p. 21).

2. ———. 2021. *Metaphysical Disputation I: On the Nature of First Philosophy or Metaphysics*. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press. Translated and annotated, with corrected Latin text, by Shane Duarte. "Section 1: Identifying the adequate object or subject of metaphysics. Suárez classifies metaphysics or first philosophy as a natural science (*scientia naturalis*) (DM 1.2.17). In so classifying it, he in no way means to identify it with a branch of physics or natural philosophy. Rather, “natural” is here contrasted with “supernatural,” so that in this sense of the expression mathematics also counts as a natural science, whereas sacred or supernatural theology, based on divine revelation, does not.

Suárez further classifies metaphysics as a real science (*scientia realis*), since it is about things (*res*) or real beings (DM 1.2.13). The implicit contrast here is with a rational science (*scientia rationalis*) such as logic, which is not about any thing or real being, but is commonly thought to deal with objective second intentions (e.g., genus, species, subject, predicate, antecedent, consequent), which are beings of reason or items existing only objectively in the mind as objects of thought. Suárez also classifies metaphysics as a theoretical or speculative science (*scientia speculativa*) (DM 1.2.13), since it has the contemplation of truth as its highest end, unlike the practical and productive sciences, whose truths are ordered to some further goal (i.e., action or production)." (pp. XXVI-XXVII)

3. ———. 1982. *Suárez on Individuation. Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity and Its Principle (De unitate individuali, elusque principio)*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Translated from the Latin with introduction (pp. 1-27), notes, glossary (pp. 175-279), and bibliography (pp. 281-287) by Jorge J. E. Gracia. "When thinking about an individual concrete thing such as a man or a tree, one may consider those features that the thing has or seems to have in common with other things, or alternatively, those features that are peculiar or unique to the thing under consideration. If the common features are part of what distinguishes the thing from a larger group of things and at the same time makes it part of a smaller group of things, the members of which can be distinguished only in terms of individual features, then one is thinking of what was commonly known in the Middle Ages as the thing's "nature." If, on the other hand, one considers those features that set a thing apart from all other things, including those falling together with it into a group, then one is considering the thing's individuality. In either case the content of the thought seems to be different. Take Peter, for instance. A consideration of his nature focuses on his humanity; that is, the feature or group of features such as rationality, capacity to laugh, etc., that make him human and in respect of which he is both indistinguishable from other human beings and distinguishable from non-human beings such as dogs, trees and rocks. A consideration of Peter's individuality, on the other hand, will focus only on that feature or group of features which separate Peter from Paul and any other individual being, whether human or not. In the first case we think of the ways in which Peter is the same as other human beings, In the second of the ways in which Peter is unique. The cluster of philosophical problems concerned with the nature of a thing is usually designated as "the problem of universals," those concerned with individuality are gathered under the term "the problem of individuation," Suárez's attention in Disputation V is directed toward the latter.

Contrary to a widespread misconception, the complexity of the problem of individuation was not ignored by scholastics. Most were aware that there is more than one issue related to individuality, and a few of them isolated and discussed the four most important ones. These are, in logical order: the nature of individuality, the extension of individuality, the ontological status of individuality in the individual and its relation to the nature, and, finally, the cause or causes that bring about individuality. When references to the medieval or scholastic problem of
individuation are found in contemporary literature, it is usually the last that is meant. And not without reason because up to the fourteenth century one seldom finds a careful and clear distinction between these four different issues, and much more effort is put into the solution of the last than any of the others. Yet, it is also evident that as the age progresses they become more and more defined until we find late scholastics like Suárez carefully separating them in their discussions. Some never became quite independent in treatment, however. The first one, the nature of individuality, was usually discussed in the context of the second, the extension of individuality. And even the second does not become the subject of separate investigation until late in the Middle Ages. Only the last two issues, the ontological status of individuality and its cause or causes, were generally discussed in isolation from the others. Suárez's treatise is consistent with this practice. He deals with the nature of individuality in the context of its extension (Sect. I), giving separate analyses of the ontological status of individuality (Sect. II) and it cause in various entities (Sects. III-VII). The last two Sections of the Disputation take up a problem related to the individuality of accidents: whether numerically different accidents can be present in the same subject simultaneously and successively." (Introduction, pp. 1-2)

"In Conclusion I would like to stress four important points. The first is the completely philosophical character of Suárez's analysis. Although some theological considerations and examples creep in once in a while, the discussion is guided wholly by philosophical principles. The arguments given are philosophical, and the criteria by which various views and arguments are judged are also philosophical. Often Suárez will explicitly make the point that an argument is not philosophical enough, meaning that it is based on theological assumptions, or that a particular problem that had surfaced in the discussion is theological and therefore outside the scope of his discussion (Sect. II, §§ 30 and 37). It is clear, then, that at this time, and for Suárez at least, philosophy and in particular metaphysics had a place of its own among the sciences, independent of theology. In this Suárez is no less modern than Descartes or Leibniz who, as it is well known, read the Metaphysical Disputations avidly.

The second point is that Suárez's analysis of individuality is ontological in character. He is not primarily concerned with the discernibility of the individual and its cause, although he is aware both of the problems related to the knowledge of the individual and the epistemological problems related to the way we distinguish between two individuals (Sect. III, § 28 and VII, § 4). The roots of discernibility are always referred to by Suárez, as they are in the scholastic tradition dating back to Thomas, as "signs" or "indications" of individuality rather than its causes or principles.(38) The latter are prior to the former both logically and ontologically, even though the former are prior in human experience. This is why Suárez, like most of philosophers who put ontology before epistemology, cannot adhere to what in contemporary philosophy goes by the name of "the principle of identity of indiscernibles," since such a principle implies a reversal of what Suárez would regard as the proper order between these two sciences. His primary concern is with individuality as it independent of human consideration.

Thirdly, I would stress Suárez's contribution to the controversy surrounding the problem of individuation. Besides the subtlety and originality of many of the arguments he proposes, four factors stand out: (1) His identification of the nature of individuality as indivisibility, and of distinction as a result of individuality rather than a constituent of it. (2) His explicit discussion of the extension of individuality, a problem seldom treated separately by his predecessors, whose views on the subject were in many cases no more than implicit uncritical assumptions rather than explicitly discussed philosophical commitments. (3) His original interpretation of Scotus' doctrine of haecceitas as an answer to the problem of the ontological status of individuality rather than to the problem concerned with the cause individuality. (4) The merits of his own view on the causal analysis of individuality, which avoids some of the most obvious pitfalls of other views and presents a unified and
economic solution to this most vexing philosophical problem. The numerous other merits of Suárez's analysis will become evident, no doubt, to the careful reader. The fourth most important point I would stress in closing is the centrality of this problem within Suárez's metaphysics. This is evident from the place that the discussion of individuation has within the whole framework of the *Metaphysical Disputations*. As a kind of unity, individuality is discussed just after the general notion of transcendental unity in Disputation IV. This indicates that he considered it the most important kind of the first of the three basic attributes of being (unity, truth, goodness). Universal and formal unit are discussed only after individual unity, in Disputation VI. For it is individual unity that makes all other unity possible. As such, the Disputation V reveals the core of Suarecan metaphysics." (Introduction, pp. 23-24)


"The unity of the scholastic tradition on universals is illustrated by a list of metaphysical points on which Aquinas, Scotus, Ockam, and Suárez all agree and an indication of the one or two major points on which there is substantial disharmony, although there existed a common tradition as to mode of discussion. All four authors are agreed that: (1) There are no universals to be found existing independently both of the operations of the mind and of the existence of singular things; and further that such a notion is inconsistent. (2) Anything that really exists (that is, exists independently of consideration by the human mind and of any mind other than the Divine Mind) is a particular or singular thing, a primary substance. (3) Whatever is actually universal is an *ens rationis*, a mental being called a "concept," whose existence (analogically speaking) is derived from the operations of the conceiving mind. (4) There is a foundation *in re* and independently of the operations of the mind for the universality of the concept which is actually universal. (5) The foundation *in re* is, at least in part, the form found in the individual. (6) The foundation *in re* can be called a universal by extrinsic denomination, i.e., by analogy of attribution based upon the causal relation which holds between the foundation *in re* and the actual universal found in the mind. (7) The universal concept is formed by the mind through a process called "abstraction"; (on this point there are many important distinctions and differences which will not be treated herein). (8) There is a real similarity in things of the same nature, a similarity which is the foundation of the "commonness" of the nature or quiddity. Other than differences in psychology which we must gloss over, the chief discrepancies among these authors are found in the following areas: (1) the manner in which the forms in individuals are the foundation *in re* for the universal concept and (2) the analysis of the claim that two things are similar because they have something in common. There are several notions of commonness or community involved, several interpretations of the expression "common nature" and consequently several analyses of the expression "the form in the individual is the foundation *in re* for the universality of the concept." These two points are intimately connected, since for each of the four authors, and especially for Suárez, the explanation of the similarity of things is directly connected with the explanation of the foundation of universality.

In brief, Suárez and Scotus are very similar in their psychological doctrine of universals, whereas Aquinas, Ockam, and Suárez are all much closer together on the metaphysics of the matter than any one of them is to Scotus, who stands closer to Plato and Augustine. Suárez's view is truly a synthesis of the work of his predecessors, and comparison with those writers should not be used to make him join some older "camp," but should function merely to clarify the various strands of tradition woven into his original design.(49)

Finally a comparison of starting points is useful:

https://www.ontology.co/biblio/suarez-editions.htm
1) Scotus says we must postulate community (which is a logical consequence of possibility) of natures and must seek causal explanations of universality and singularity, which are logically posterior to community.
2) Occam says we must postulate singularity as a principle of explanation, not itself explicable, and proceed to explain universality and community, which are logically posterior.
3) Suarez and Aquinas say we must have a principle of individuation to explain singularity and must also seek explanations of community and universality, which are logically posterior to the principles of composition (essence-existence, matter-form) through which we solve the problem of the one and the many. As a result, all three factors, universality, communicability, and individuation must be explained in terms of prior metaphysical principles. (Introduction, pp. 26-27).

(48) At first sight it might appear that Occam would deny this; but his statement that nothing extra-mental is to be called universal, clearly had in mind literal or proper predication. He had no interest in analogous talk and might still have resisted the point; but his own position compels acquiescence, since he holds for causal dependence of concepts upon particular things. Scotus, too, might seem to resist; but by the same arguments would have to agree, since his position is stronger and entails this one.

(49) The richness of Suárez's Disputation on Universals cannot be tapped in an introduction. A much more extensive analysis of Suárez's theory will be forthcoming from the author in a general history of the discussion of universals during the middle ages.


Translation from the Latin, with an introduction (pp. 1-15) by Cyril Vollert (reprinted 1976).
"Disputation VII has been chosen as a sample of the metaphysics of Suárez for two reasons. First, it is typical both of his method and of his philosophical thought; many of his characteristic doctrines are briefly treated in it, or at least are indicated. Secondly, it introduces his teaching on the modes, without which much of his philosophy is unintelligible, and above all propounds his theory on distinctions, a point of capital importance for a grasp of Suarezian metaphysics. As the views of Suarez on distinctions and modes are clearly brought out in the Disputation itself, there seems to be no need of a preliminary exposition of these tenets in survey form.(28)

Suarez treats of distinctions in the context of his discussion on the unity of being, Disputations IV to VII. Disputation IV deals with unum in general, Disputation V with individual unity and the principle of individuation, Disputation VI with universals, and Disputation VII with the various kinds of distinctions. The connection between the question of unity and that of distinctions is explained by Suarez himself in the introduction to Disputation VII. Section 3 of this Disputation, on "the same" and "other," is added to the treatise on distinctions in order to round out the general discussion of unity.

The main reason why a philosopher's theory of distinctions is important is that his solution to the problem of distinctions is a key to his concept of being. For distinctions are based on the nature of being; therefore a metaphysician's view of the nature of distinctions leads to an understanding of his doctrine of being itself.

(29) In reading Disputation VII, the student can profitably ponder whether any ideas developed in it support the suggestion put forth by a scholar of our own day, who is both a profound philosopher and a shrewd appraiser of intellectual trends: Everything is accounted for if we recall that Suarez lived in a nominalistic milieu, and that, despite his avowed reaction in favor of realism in logic, he did not fully succeed in keeping his metaphysics free from this influence.(30)

Indispensable, too, for an appreciation of Suarezian metaphysics, is his modal theory. Suarez perceived that most things are highly complex, composed as they are of distinct entities, substantial and accidental. Hence he concluded that their
essential union is tenuous, or even impossible, without some ultimate bond. This bond is a mode of being. He saw, further, that every created being is subject to numberless determinations which lie outside its essence, but do not contribute new reality to it. The mode supplies the complement of finality. It closes and terminates an essence; it is not a formal, but a completing act.

The Suarezian system is coherent in its complicated structure. Suarez remains faithful to his primary concepts of entity, unity, existence, and distinction, and traces out their implications to the ultimate conclusion. No greater mistake could be made than to attempt to "purify" the system by suppressing the modes. Take away the modes, and the Suarezian structure collapses; just as, in his view, without the unifying function of the modes, finite beings themselves would fall apart. Whether for a mind craving for reality the modes provide satisfying fare, is another question. A study of Disputation VII should help toward an answer." (Vollert, Introduction, pp. 12-13).

(28) A sufficiently detailed account of these two questions may be found in P. E. Nolan, "The Suarezian Modes," Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Convention of the Jesuit Educational Association (Chicago: Loyola U. Press, 1931), pp. 184-200.

(29) This point has been fully discussed by Michael V. Murray, S.J., in his hitherto unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Theory of Distinctions in the Metaphysics of Francis Suarez, Fordham University, 1944. Dr. Murray advances cogent reasons, well fortified by historical research, for his conclusion that Suarez was thoroughly imbued with the widespread nominalism of his time.


X: De Bono seu bonitate transcendentali; XI: De Malo; XXXIII: De substantia creata in communi.


Translation, with introduction (pp. 17-101), notes and glossary (pp. 217-265) by Jorge J. E. Gracia, Douglas Davis.

"The subject matter of Disputations X an XI concerns the metaphysical issues that surrounds good and evil. Other matters, also of interest both to philosophers and theologians, such as the problem concerning the foundation of moral judgments, and the problem that the existence of evil poses for those who believe in the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and good supreme being, are largely omitted. These and related issues were as important in Suarez's times as they are today, and he addressed them explicitly and in some detail, but not in the Disputationes metaphysicae. Following his lead, we have in general omitted reference to these matters with one exception: in order to give the reader a more complete view of Suarez's overall doctrine of evil, we have selected from his opera various texts that address some theological issues which have received considerable attention in contemporary philosophical circles, and which reveal Suarez's views on these matters and complement the views presented in Disputation xi. These texts have been placed in the Appendix.

In spite of the relative brevity, systematic organization, and clarity of thought of Disputations X and XI, the text is not easy to understand for a modern reader. As in many scholastic texts of the late medieval and Renaissance periods, the discussion is carefully organized, but the issues and arguments are so intricate and the number of technical terms so large, that even those familiar with the philosophical literature of the times are likely to find the text difficult to follow at times. Since the translator should avoid altering the style and general tone of the text, we have had to use other means to facilitate its understanding: we have added an Introduction,
notes where they seemed appropriate and, in order to keep their number down, a
glossary of technical terms at the end. The Introduction has been kept general; it
presents a summary and interpretation of Suarez's position and places it within a
philosophical and historical framework. Its aim is propaedeutic. The purpose of the
notes is primarily to identify the references to other authors made by Suarez, but in
a few instances they are used also to solve particular problems that arise in the text
or to clarify important uses of terms that appear infrequently in the Disputations.
The texts contained in the Appendix are presented without notes, except for those
that identify their origin, because they are fragments of works which may
eventually appear in more complete translations; we leave their annotation then for
the translator of the complete works. The Glossary, in contrast with the notes, deals
with recurring difficulties of interpretation arising from the use of technical
terminology. Its purpose is not only to clarify Suarez's use of these terms, but also
to identify the common understanding of them by scholastics and, when possible, to
point to their source in Aristotle or in his Latin commentators. It is intended
primarily to help non-specialists, and thus also makes clear how particular Latin
terms have been translated into English. In the English-Latin Index the reader will
find the Latin equivalent or equivalents of the English terms used in the text, which
in turn will facilitate the use of the Glossary. Finally, the Bibliography lists the
works cited in order to help the location of references, and author and subject
indexes should aid the reader in locating pertinent materials."


(De Causa formali substantiali). Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Translated by John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy; Introduction (pp. 7-16) and
explanatory notes by John Kronen.

"The Specific Problems Addressed in Disputation XV
One of the things that made Suárez, a great thinker was his impatience with
vagueness of any sort and his systematic thoroughness. In this regard Disputation
XV is no exception. Never before or since has there been so thorough a treatment of
the Aristotelian notion of form. In the course of the Disputation Suárez considered
the existence and nature of substantial forms, their eduction, their causality and
effect, and their unity. Finally, to be complete, Suárez, treated what he called the
"metaphysical form," though this is only analogous to the substantial form in the
proper sense. We shall briefly summarize Suárez's views with respect to each of
these issues, and discuss the main reasons he gave for them. But we must warn the
reader that no summary of Suárez, much less one this brief, can give any idea of the
exhaustiveness and sophistication of his discussion of substantial form; to get the
proper sense of these, one must turn to Suárez himself.

Section I: The existence of substantial forms
The first question Suárez treated in Disputation XV concerns the existence of
substantial forms. This might seem a rather odd procedure. One might think it
suitable first to give a definition of what substantial forms are, before attempting to
prove their existence. Disputation XV does have a short section which presents a
very thorough definition of substantial form, but it is the fifth section in Disputation
XV. Why did Suárez wait so long to give this definition? The reason is simple:
substantial forms are inferred entities, not observables. Their very nature, therefore,
can only be established on the arguments which present reasons for believing they
exist. Accordingly, Suárez first gave arguments for the existence of substantial
forms, and answered objections to positing them, before defining them.
Furthermore, he regarded some of these objections as important enough to merit
sections of their own; hence, he did not give a definition of substantial forms until
he had both argued for their existence and responded, to his own satisfaction, to
objections against positing them.

The arguments Suárez gave for supposing substantial forms exist are of two sorts, a
posteriori and a priori. The a posteriori arguments briefly are: 1) Human beings are
constituted by matter and a substantial form; therefore, other material substances
are as well; 2) Substantial forms are necessary to root the various essential properties of things; 3) Substantial forms are necessary to provide an explanation for the return of a thing to its connatural state after it has been altered from without; 4) Substantial forms are necessary to explain why the intense application of one power impedes the application of another power; and 5) Substantial forms are necessary to provide proper termini of substantial changes. The single a priori argument is that substantial forms are not intrinsically impossible, and are demanded by the order of the universe, the perfection of the universe, and the perfection and unity of material substances.

Sections 2-4: The eduction of substantial forms

Suárez gave several objections to positing the existence of substantial forms. The one he regarded as the most grave focuses on their origin. It takes the form of a dilemma: 1) If substantial forms exist, then they come to be either a) by creation or b) not by creation. Not (a), since this would require continual miracles. Not (b), since when substantial change occurs the form itself must come to be from nothing; but to come to be from nothing is to be created. Hence, there are no substantial forms.

Suárez accused this argument of laboring under a false dilemma since it fails to consider that forms could come to be without being either 1) created or 2) made out of something. In the course of making his case, Suárez argued that creation is opposed not only to making something out of something, but also to making something in something. Thus, though he admitted that substantial forms are not made out of anything, as that would lead to an infinite regress, he argued that they are made in something, that is, in a matter properly organized to receive a them. In so arguing Suárez gave a very clear notion of what it means for a substantial form to be educed from the potency of matter. It is for it to be made with a dependency, both in coming to be and being, in a properly disposed bit of matter.

After having given a clear account of the nature of eduction in general, Suárez took up some very particular problems concerning the eduction of substantial forms. The first problem is whether or not matter always temporally precedes form in every eduction, and the second is whether or not forms are made as such. Without going into his reasons here, Suárez's answer to the first question is that matter need not temporally precede form, but need only ontologically or logically precede it, insofar as matter is the subject of form. His answer to the second question is that form, as a proper part of a complete substance, is not made as such, though it is itself made from nothing, but rather the composite, which the form partially constitutes.

Section 5: The nature of substantial forms

Having given a barrage of arguments to prove forms exist, and having answered crucial objections against supposing that they exist, Suárez gave a very precise definition of substantial forms. According to Suárez, a substantial form is "a simple and incomplete substance which, as the act of matter, constitutes with it the essence of a composite substance." This differs from the traditional definition of form, which is "an intrinsic cause giving being to a thing." Though Suárez used this definition in defining formal causality in DM XII, he did not favor it here because of his disagreement with Thomistic metaphysics. For Suárez form completes the being of a composite, giving it powers particular to a specific sort of substance, but it does not give complete substantial being to a thing; in particular, it does not give the being of matter to a thing. Since, according to Suárez, the Thomists held that form channels the act of existing to matter and thus, in some sense, gives matter its own proper being,(11) Suárez decided not to give the traditional definition of form here, preferring instead one that is more in harmony with his own doctrine of a merely conceptual distinction between essence and existence in finite beings.

Sections 6-9: The causality and effects of substantial forms

In accordance with the general method Suárez adopted in treating the causes of being, after he proved the existence of substantial form and gave a clear definition of it, Suárez went on to treat, in a typically exhaustive manner, of its causality and its effects. The first topic Suárez discussed with respect to a form's causality is its principle of causing. The principle of causing of a thing is the faculty or power in
virtue of which it causes when it causes. Thus the principle of causing of June Anderson's singing is her vocal chords and her trained musical ability. According to Suárez, the principle of causing of a form is nothing other than the form itself. This is related to the actual causality of the form. For Suárez form, as an intrinsic cause of being, does not cause by creating something distinct from itself in a composite substance; rather, it causes by simply uniting its own essence to the other constituent of the composite. Thus the causality of form is simply its union with matter.

The conditions required for a form to cause are: 1) its existence; 2) its spatial proximity to its subject; and 3) appropriate dispositions on the part of its subject. The first two of these are absolutely necessary (i.e., not even God could bring it about that form causes in their absence); the last is only naturally necessary (i.e., in the natural order dispositions on the part of matter are necessary for the form to inform it, but God could bring it about that form informs in the absence of these. For example, He could bring it about that a human soul informs the body of a cat). The effects of form are: 1) the actualization of matter and 2) the composite. These are in reality [ex natura rei] the same effect taken from the point of view of different relations, in the way that getting a majority of the vote in the general election and being elected president are the same. That is to say, the actualization of matter's potency to be something, say a pig, is nothing other than the very constitution of the composite substance of a pig. For Suárez, form gives being to matter only in a certain respect. For example, it may give being to matter by actualizing its potential to be a pig. However, form does not give being to matter by giving matter its own being qua matter. In this, Suárez disagreed with the Thomists and their doctrine of the real distinction between essence and existence. Nevertheless, though form does not give being intrinsically to matter by actually constituting that being, matter has such a minimal existence that it cannot naturally exist without a dependency on form; only by the absolute and infinite causal power of God can matter exist denuded of all form.

Section 10: The unicity of substantial form

A much debated question in the middles ages was whether or not there is more than one substantial form to each substance. The Franciscans held that there is more than one substantial form in higher substances such as human beings and animals. Their reasons for holding this were diverse, and each of them was treated by Suárez in section 10. However, there seems to have been two main reasons for their doctrine. The first is that, as higher substances share certain powers and properties with lower beings but also possess powers peculiar to their own levels of being, several forms must be posited in them to account for their similarity with and difference from lower beings. The second main reason is that there is evidence that lower forms remain in compounds (e.g., it seems that water is present in plants, animals and humans); therefore, it would seem that compounds are characterized by the forms of the elements that make them up as well as by their own peculiar forms. Scotus added a new argument for the view that there is more than one form in humans based upon the metaphysical distance between the human soul and the body. The human soul, he reasoned, is too perfect to immediately inform naked prime matter; hence, in order for the soul to inform a certain piece of matter, it is necessary that matter be first informed with the form of corporeity, which gives it extension and the required organic structure. Scotus thought his theory confirmed by the fact that human bodies do not immediately corrupt after death.

The Franciscan tradition came under strong attack on these points from Thomas Aquinas and his followers. Aquinas argued, in the first place, that it is impossible for there to be more than one substantial form in a single composite since, as substantial form gives substantial being, a plurality of substantial forms yields a plurality of substantial beings. But each substance can only have one substantial being since it is impossible for a single thing in a category to be many things in that category. Further, Aquinas argued that, as a higher form can do anything a lower can, there is no need to posit many substantial forms to account for the higher powers of humans and animals; one form will give the human being, for example,
not only the higher powers of reason, but also the lower powers of sensation, growth, reproduction, etc. (15)

Suárez agreed with the Thomistic tradition in holding that there can only be one complete substantial form in each composite, and he further agreed with the reasons the Thomistic tradition gave in support of this view. However, Suárez disagreed with Aquinas and the Thomists in one major respect. Aquinas had argued that all substantial forms are simple and without entitative parts, apparently on account of their function as unifiers of the composite substance. (16) His view seemed to be that a substantial form cannot give substantial unity to a thing unless it is itself fully one. Suárez, however, held that all substantial forms other than the human are composed of parts, and he thought these parts are incomplete substantial forms. This disagreement with the Thomists probably is related to Suárez's view that essence and existence are not really distinct. Such a view forced Suárez to grant more independence to the parts making up a substance, for example, form and matter, and this made him more open to the possibility that a composite substance that is truly essentially one could be constituted out of really distinct, albeit incomplete, substantial parts.

Section 11: Metaphysical form

For the sake of completeness, Suárez rounded off his discussion of substantial form with an account of the nature and reality of metaphysical form. Suárez noted, however, that metaphysical form, in whatever sense it is taken, is not a true form because it is not an entity which, by informing some being really distinct from it, constitutes a complete substantial essence. Metaphysical form is, then, form only by analogy.

Suárez distinguished two sorts of metaphysical form. The first is the complete essential nature of a thing, taken as an individual. Thus, as a human nature is constituted out of form and matter, an individual person's metaphysical form is her body informed by her soul. Such a "form," though it could be said to give a person being, is not really distinct from the person whose form it is, and it does not constitute the being of anything by informing some subject really distinct from it. Nevertheless, Suárez did not hold that any individual's essence is precisely identical with her since she is constituted, not simply by her essence, but by a substantial mode terminating her essence and making it incommunicable to another in the way in which Christ's human essence was communicated to His Divine Essence. For Suárez complete individual essence along with substantial mode constitutes the supposite or hypostasis.

The second sort of metaphysical form Suárez discussed is logical form. This form is equivalent to the difference in a "genus-difference" definition of a thing. Thus, in the traditional definition of human being as "rational animal," "animal" is the genus which is informed or determined by the difference "rational." So "rational" is said to be the formal element in the definition and "animal" the material element. But, as Suárez did not believe that universals really exist and held rather that they are mind-dependent relations, he did not think of differences as really combining with genera to form the real essences of things. Hence, he did not regard logical form as being a form in the true sense of the word. It is rather a form only by a kind of analogy with real, physical forms, i.e., with forms which actually exist and inform a subject really distinct from themselves." (Introduction, pp. 9-14).

(11) Whether or not Aquinas held this view, Suárez was less certain. But he was certain it was the view of the Thomists. See the present disputation, sect. 8, para. 2.

(12) It should be noted that the existence of the form, though necessary for it to cause, is not a causal condition in the most proper sense of the word, according to Suárez. The reason is that a causal condition must be really distinct from that of which it is a causal condition, and nothing, according to Suarez, is really distinct from its existence.

(13) For Suárez form gives matter the property "being actualized by such and such a form," and the property "being a human body"; it does not give it the property "being such and such a form" or the property "being the substance constituted by such and such a form and such and such matter." Thus my soul gives my body the
property "being actualized by a human form," but it does not give it the property "being a human soul" or the property "being a human being."


(15) *Summa theologiae*, Part I, Q. 76, a. 4.


XVII: *De causa efficiente in communi*; XVIII: *De causa proxima efficiente, ejusque causalitate, et omnibus quaer ad causandum requirit*; XIX: *De causis necessario, et libere seu contingenter agentibus, ubi etiam de fato, fortuna et casu*.

Translated with an introduction (pp. XIII-XX) by Alfred J. Freddoso.

"Of the six disputations dealing with efficient causality, the first triad (17-19), contained in the present volume, is concerned mainly with creaturely efficient causality, while the second triad (20-22) deals with the three modes of God's efficient causality: namely, creation, conservation, and general concurrence. Disputations 17-19 constitute, as far as I know, the longest, most profound, and most thorough tract ever written on creaturely efficient causality from an Aristotelian perspective. Let me briefly describe each of these disputations.

Disputation 17, entitled "On the Efficient Cause in General," provides a general characterization of efficient causality and its various modes. In section 1 Suárez expounds and modifies Aristotle's definition of an efficient or agent cause as that "whence there is a first beginning of change or rest," carefully distinguishing the efficient cause from the other three Aristotelian causes: namely, the formal, material, and final causes. He concludes that an efficient cause is an extrinsic per se principle that communicates esse, or being of some sort, to an effect by the mediation of an action. In section 2 Suárez goes on to discuss the main divisions of efficient causes: namely, (i) *per se* versus *per accidens*, (ii) physical versus moral, (iii) principal versus instrumental, (iv) univocal versus equivocal, and (v) primary versus secondary. Along the way he also makes some illuminating remarks about the important distinction between agent causes or principles properly speaking and the sine qua non conditions required in order for those agents to exercise their causal power.

Disputation 18, entitled "On the Proximate Efficient Cause and on its Causality and on All the Things that it Requires in order to Cause," deals with the metaphysics of creaturely causation in general and especially with the efficient causality proper to material substances and their accidents. Section contains Suárez's reply to occasionalism and other theories that either deny that material substances are efficient causes at all or else severely limit the general range of effects that can be produced by them. Sections 2-6 treat general metaphysical issues concerning the efficient principles involved in the production of new substances and accidents. Then in sections 7-9 Suárez discusses the three most disputed sine qua non conditions for efficient causality: namely (i) the condition that the thing acting (agent) be distinct from the thing acted upon (patient), (ii) the condition that the agent be spatially proximate to the patient, and (iii) the condition that the agent be initially dissimilar to the patient. Having completed his treatment of the principles and prerequisites of efficient causality, he next (section 10) takes up the ontological question of what it is that formally constitutes a substance or accident as an actual efficient cause. Finally, in section 11 he lays out the metaphysics of destructive or corrupting efficient causality.

Disputation 19, entitled "On Causes that Act Necessarily and Causes that Act Freely or Contingently; also on Fate, Fortune, and Chance," turns to issues concerning causal necessity and contingency. In sections 1-3 Suárez gives a precise characterization of the distinction between causes that act by a necessity of nature and causes that act without necessity; in addition, he takes up the disputed question of whether there could be any causal contingency in the created world if, contrary to
fact, God acted only by a necessity of nature. Sections 4-9 go into great depth on the nature of free choice and include an extended treatment of controversial issues surrounding the relationship between intellect and will in free action. Finally, sections 10-12 take up a series of questions concerning fate, fortune, and chance." (Introduction, pp. XVII-XIX).


XX: De Prima Causa efficiente, primaque ejus actione quae est creatio; XXI: De Prima Causa efficiente, et alter ejus actione, quae est conservatio; XXII: De prima Causa, et alia ejus actone, quae est cooperatio, seu concursus cum causis secundis. Translation, notes, and introduction (pp. XI-CXXIII) by Alfred J. Freddoso.

"Efficient causality in the Disputationes Metaphysicae: context and overview

I will now provide an overview of Suárez's treatment of efficient causality in Disputations 17-22. My intent is to give the reader some initial idea of the range of questions Suárez deals with and in this way to set a context within which to situate my later discussions of scholastic metaphysics and of the disputations on divine action. I will introduce a few technical terms here, but will defer an explication of them to Parts 2 and 3 of this introductory essay.

The treatment of efficient causality falls into the first half of the Disputationes Metaphysicae (Disputations 1-27), which treats of being in general prior to its division into infinite being and finite being and, a fortiori, prior to the further division of finite being into substance and accident. After the initial investigations into the nature of metaphysics in Disputation 1 and into the essential notion of being in Disputation 2, Suárez turns in Disputation 3 to a general discussion of the transcendental properties (passiones) of being, which he identifies as one (being as undivided in itself), true (being as an object of cognition) and good (being as an object of love and desire). Disputations 4-7 deal with oneness or unity, focusing on individual unity (or individuality), formal unity (or universality), and the various types of distinctions among beings. Disputations 8-9 deal with truth and falsity and Disputations 10-11 with good and evil.

It is at this juncture, in Disputation 12, that Suárez begins his treatment of the causes of being. Since metaphysical inquiry is often said to aim at a knowledge of the principles of being, he first discusses the notion of a principle and its relation to the notion of a cause. The term 'principle', he tells us, can be used in a wide sense to designate the first element in any sort of ordering, real or merely conceptual, and in this sense it is obviously more inclusive than the term 'cause'. However, 'principle' is used most properly in a narrower metaphysical sense to designate "that which truly and directly communicates (influens) some sort of being (esse) to that of which it is the principle," or, in other words, that on which a real entity depends in some way for its existence. Suárez is careful to point out, however, that even on this narrower reading the notion of a principle is still broader than the notion of a cause, since within the Blessed Trinity there is a communication of being without causality. For the Father is a true principle eternally 'generating' the Son, and the Father and Son together are true principles eternally 'spiraling' the Holy Spirit, despite the fact that these intra-Trinitarian 'relations of origin' involve no causality, strictly speaking. The reason for this, Suárez explains, is that in these relations the principle's own being is in no way distinct from the being of which it is the source; that is, the being (or, nature) which the Son receives from the Father is the Father's very own being and nothing else, and the being (or nature) which the Holy Spirit receives from the Father and the Son is their very own being and nothing else.

A cause, on the other hand, is a principle that communicates being or esse distinct from its own being to that of which it is a cause. And a cause's causality is just "that influence or concurrence by which a cause, within its own genus, actually gives being to the effect." These definitions are meant to apply to every Aristotelian genus of cause material, formal, efficient, and final. Material and formal causes are called 'intrinsic' causes because they do in a sense communicate their own being to the composite...
which they constitute by their union; however, they satisfy the notion of a cause because the being or esse of the composite substance which results from their union is distinct from the being of either the matter or the form. Efficient and final causes, by contrast, are wholly extrinsic to the entities to which they communicate being. (36)

It is within this general framework that Suárez situates his tract on efficient causality, the longest and most meticulous such tract in the history of scholasticism. Of the six disputations dealing with efficient causality, the first triad (17-19) is concerned mainly with efficient causality as exercised by creatures,(37) while the second triad (20-22), contained in the present volume, focuses on the three modes of divine efficient causality that can be investigated by the natural light of reason, viz., creation, conservation, and general concurrence. I will now give brief descriptions of each of these six disputations, bearing in mind that in Parts 5-7 below I will be giving a more detailed analysis of the three disputations on divine action (20-22).

Disputation 17, entitled "On the efficient cause in general," provides a broad characterization of efficient causality and its various modes. In Section 1 Suárez expounds and modifies Aristotle's definition of an efficient or agent cause as that "whence there is a first beginning of change or rest," carefully distinguishing the efficient cause from the other three Aristotelian causes. An efficient cause, he concludes, is an extrinsic per se principle that communicates esse or being of some sort to an effect by means of an action. In Section 2 he lays out the main divisions of efficient causes, namely, (a) \textit{per se} (immediate) vs. \textit{per accidens} (mediate) causes, (b) physical vs. moral causes, (c) principal vs. instrumental causes, (d) univocal vs. equivocal causes, and (e) primary or first cause vs. secondary causes, where this last distinction is equivalent to the distinction between God as an agent and creatures as agents. Along the way he also makes some illuminating remarks about the important distinction between an agent cause or efficient principle, properly speaking, and the sine qua non conditions that are prerequisites for an agent's exercising its causal power.

Disputation 18, entitled "On the proximate efficient cause, and on its causality, and on all the things which it requires in order to cause," deals with the metaphysics of creaturely causality in general and especially with the efficient causality proper to material substances and their accidents. Section 1 contains Suárez's reply to occasionalism and other theories that either deny that material substances are efficient causes or else put severe a priori limitations on the range of effects that can be produced by them. Sections 2-6 treat certain metaphysical issues concerning the efficient principles involved in the production of new substances and accidents. Then in Sections 7-9 Suárez discusses in detail the three prerequisites for efficient causality that stand in most need of careful unpacking, namely, (a) the condition that the thing acting (agent) be distinct from the thing acted upon (patient), (b) the condition that the agent be spatially proximate to the patient, and (c) the condition that the agent be initially dissimilar to the patient. Having completed his treatment of the principles and prerequisites of efficient causality, he next (Section 10) takes up the ontological question of what it is that formally constitutes a substance or accident as an actually acting efficient cause. Finally, in Section 11 he propounds the metaphysics of destructive or corruptive efficient causality.

Disputation 19, entitled "On causes that act necessarily and causes that act freely or contingently, and also on fate, fortune, and chance," turns to issues concerning causal necessity and contingency. In Sections 1-3 Suárez gives a precise characterization of the distinction between agents that act by a necessity of nature and agents that act without necessity; in addition, he takes up the disputed question of whether there could be still be causal contingency in the created world if, contrary to fact, God acted only by a necessity of nature. Sections 4-9 go into great depth about the nature of free choice and include an exhaustive treatment of scholastic debates over the relation between intellect and will in free action. Finally, Sections 10-12 take up a series of questions concerning fate, fortune, and chance.
Disputation 20, entitled "On the First Efficient Cause and on his first action, which is creation," begins in Section 1 by asking whether natural reason can prove that creation ex nihilo is possible. Here Suárez argues that (a) there is no incoherence either in the concept of creation itself or in the concept of the power to create, and that (b) if we assume the existence of God, we can prove that such a power in fact exists and has been exercised. Along the way he tries to show, against the ancient philosophers, that matter is created, and he ends with an interesting discussion of whether Aristotle himself believed in creation ex nihilo. Section 2 takes up the disputed question of whether creation requires an absolutely unlimited power, or whether instead some creature could have the limited power to create at least some entities as a principal cause; and in Section 3 Suárez tries to answer the related, but distinct, question of whether any creature could act as an instrumental cause in God's creative action. Section 4 investigates the ontological status of the action of creation, an issue that will become clearer when I talk about the ontology of action in Part 3 of this introductory essay. Finally, Section 5 asks whether creation presupposes the prior non-existence of the thing created, or whether instead it is possible that some entities should have been created from eternity without any beginning.

Disputation 21, entitled "On the First Efficient Cause and on his second action, which is conservation," begins in Section 1 by investigating whether natural reason can prove that created beings depend for their existence on the continual actual influence of the First Cause. Section 2 explicates the relation between creation and conservation, while Section 3 asks whether conservation is a divine prerogative.

Disputation 22, entitled "On the First Cause, and on his third action, which is cooperation, or concurrence, with secondary causes," begins in Section 1 by asking whether in order for a created agent to act, it is necessary that God, in addition to creating and conserving that agent along with its causal powers, should also cooperate with it in its very acting. After concluding that the answer is affirmative, Suárez asks in Section 2 whether this cooperation on God's part consists in his giving to the secondary cause itself some power or principle of action that it did not previously have on its own, or whether instead God's actual cooperation has its terminus just in the effect produced by that agent. Section 3 pursues this matter further by asking how God's concurrence is related to the secondary cause's action and to the subject of that action. Section 4 turns to the manner in which God concurs. Here Suárez tries to show that God's manner of granting concurrence to freely acting agents must differ from his manner of granting concurrence to naturally acting agents. Finally, in Section 5 Suárez gripes that secondary agents do not depend essentially in their acting on any beings other than God.

With this brief overview in hand, we are now ready to look more closely at the ontological framework within which Suárez works out his account of efficient causality in general and God's causality in particular." (Introduction, pp. XXV-XXIX).

(31) See DM 12.1.25.
(32) See especially DM 12.2.6-10. In a moment I will contrast this intra-Trinitarian communication of being with that of the 'intrinsic' causes of creatures.
(33) DM 12.2.4-7.
(34) DM 12.2.13.
(35) Suárez also asks whether exemplar causes — that is, the ideas that serve as paradigms for intellectual agents and specify their actions — constitute a separate genus of cause. He treats this matter at length in Disputation 25, which is devoted exclusively to exemplar causality. There he identifies the exemplar cause as a certain antecedent condition of efficient causality that precedes the actions of intelligent agents.
(36) In Disputation 23 Suárez argues for the claim that, despite their peculiarities, final causes fully satisfy the definition of a cause.
(37) An English translation of these three disputations is available in Francisco Suárez, On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17-19, translated by Alfred J. Freddoso (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).
As mentioned, the two Disputations that are translated in the present work open the second part of the Disputationes metaphysicae and mark the turn from being in general to particular beings. Their concern is with, first in Disputation 28, a comprehensive division of being in general, and after in Disputation 29, the existence of the principal member of this division, namely, that being which is God. Disputation 28 is divided into three Sections, which ask about the legitimacy and the sufficiency of the division, as well as whether the dividend, i.e. being, is univocal or analogous between God and creatures. In the first Section (Vives: vol. 26, pp. 1-8), the question is whether being is rightly divided into infinite and finite being? Doubts arise from the fact that "infinite" and "finite" on their face do not appear to cover the whole range of being but rather look to be restricted to accidental being in the category of quantity (§ 1). In addition, the terms of the proposed division seem obscure, especially the term "infinite" (§ 2). Suárez's answer is to analyze the terms (§ 3) and then to defend the division as one that is good and necessary (§ 4) as well as first and most evident (§ 5). It is equivalent to other divisions such as being by itself (ens a se ) and being from another (ens ab alio ) (§§ 6-7) or, with clarifications, necessary being and contingent being (§§ 8-12). It is also equivalent to: essential being and being by participation (§ 13), created being and uncreated being (§ 14), or being in act and being in potency (§§ 15-16). Suárez next compares the first division with the rest (§ 17), explains the terms of the first division by comparison with quantity (§ 17), and closes the first Section (§ 18) with a reply to objections raised at its beginning.

Section 2 (vol. 26, pp. 8-13) opens with reasons for doubting the sufficiency of the division. These include that fact that relations, because they are found both in creatures and in God, seem to be neither finite nor infinite and do not therefore fit the division (§ 1). Again, there is question regarding the free acts of the Divine Will, which would apparently be at once both contingent and necessary (§ 3). Then there is an opinion of Duns Scotus to the effect that being should first be divided into quantified and non-quantified being, and that the division into finite and infinite is a subdivision of quantified being (§ 4). After addressing this last opinion (§§ 5-6), Suárez goes on to defend the sufficiency of the divisions proposed in Section 1, especially that in terms of being by itself and being from another (§ 7). He then gives extended expositions of and answers to the difficulties proposed about relations, Christ, and Divine free acts (§§ 8-16).

Section 3 of Disputation 28 (vol. 26, pp. 13-21) begins with a rejection of the view that the term being as used between God and creatures is simply equivocal (§ 1). A quite opposite view, which was held by Duns Scotus (1266-1308), is that being is said univocally of God and creatures (§ 2). After explaining the reasons for this view and for its opposition to analogy in this context (§§ 3-4), Suárez himself presents an opinion that the term being is indeed said analogously of God and creatures (§ 5), discusses arguments in support of this (§§ 6-8), and replies to objections that may be raised against these arguments (§ 9). Subsequently, he inquires about the kind of analogy that is present here (§ 10) and rejects Cajetan's doctrine that there is "a proper analogy of proportionality" between God and creatures (§ 11). Also rejecting any "analogy of attribution to a third thing," that is, any position that would affirm that God and creatures are called being only by reference to something else, he next affirms that there is here "an analogy of one to another," which is to say that creatures are being in reference to God and the term being is said more principally of God than of creatures (§ 12). At this point, he brings in the "Platonic" opinion that God is not being but rather above being, which
occasions a brief explanation of the name of God in Exodus 3,14 (§ 13). Following this, he explains and affirms that the analogy of being here is intrinsic inasmuch as creatures are designated beings from their own intrinsic being and not just extrinsically from God (§§ 14-17). Finally, his reply to objections and arguments in support of univocity closes the third Section and the Disputation itself (§§ 18-22).

IV. A Summary of Disputation 29:

Though almost twice as long, Disputation 29 like the one before is again divided into three Sections. Section 1 (vol. 26, pp. 21-34) begins after two introductory paragraphs (§§ 1-2) in which Suárez gives reasons for the location of the subject matter of the Disputation in this place and remarks how he will leave aside as much as possible items which depend for their understanding on Revelation. The first Section then asks whether and/or by what means the existence of God can be demonstrated. Among the Scholastic Doctors, Peter d'Ailly (1350-1420) has denied the possibility of such a demonstration. To this Suárez makes the brief but revealing reply that already by the various divisions of being that have been presented in the previous Disputation the existence of "some being which is uncreated or not produced" has been proven (§ 1). The obvious implication is that by now the existence of God has in effect been proven. But immediately the question arises: by what means, physical or metaphysical, is this properly done? On one side, the opinion of Averroes is that the means is physical, namely the motion of the heavens (§ 2). The contrary opinion, that of Avicenna and later of Duns Scotus among others, holds that the means must be metaphysical (§ 3) — that is, not motion but being itself. A third and a fourth opinion hold in different ways that the task must belong to both physics, that is natural philosophy, and metaphysics (§§ 4-5). In different ways the means would thus be both physical and metaphysical. In Suárez's judgment the second opinion is certainly the true one but there can be some probability in the fourth position, if it is rightly explained (§ 6).

At this juncture, he examines at length the physical argument that proceeds by the medium of motion and for various reasons he finds it wanting (§§ 7-17). Then he considers another physical argument, from the operations and the essence of the rational soul (§ 18). This too comes up short, unless we first pose a question about the soul's being, which is a metaphysical question (§ 19). Here Suárez gives the metaphysical argument that is based upon a broader and deeper principle than the physical one, "Whatever is moved is moved by another." The metaphysical principle is "Whatever is made or produced is made by another" and the argument itself concludes to an unmade Maker (§§ 20-21). An objection of a possibly circular chain of causes is dismissed as every bit as inadmissible as a thing's causing itself (§ 22). Other objections involve an infinite number of causes that would preclude any arriving at a first uncaused or unmade cause. There are different ways to conceive such an infinity of causes. Suárez explains such ways in detail and shows their insufficiencies (§§ 23-40). The first Section ends (§§ 41-42) with a brief rehearsal of and summary judgment upon the opinions listed at the beginning.

Section 2 (pp. 34-47) gets more exact and asks: whether one can show in an a posteriori way that there is only one uncreated being which will in fact be God? The thought here is that although the basic demonstration has been displayed in the previous Section or even in the previous Disputation, it needs precision. For it might be the case that while by now an unmade or uncreated being has been proven to exist, perhaps there is more than one such, which would mean that we have not reached the true God, who is unique (§§ 1-2).

In a totally opposite direction is a position, which has been associated with St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109), to the effect that the existence of God is self-evident and therefore need not and in fact cannot be demonstrated (§ 3). Suárez's own view is that the existence of God can be demonstrated but it is necessary first to be clear about what we mean by God, that is to say what it is we are attempting to demonstrate (§ 4). This he tells us is "a certain most noble being which both surpasses all the rest and from which as from a first author all the rest depend, which, accordingly, should be worshipped and venerated as the supreme deity" (§ 5). There are, he says, two ways to prove the existence of such a God: "one is
completely a posteriori and from effects; the other is immediately a priori, although remotely it also is a posteriori” (§ 7). In the first way, "the beauty of the whole universe and the wonderful connection and order of all things in it sufficiently declare that there is one first being, by whom all things are governed and from whom they draw their origin" (ibid). Four objections are that (1) this may prove that there is one governor of the world but not necessarily that there is one creator, (2) this proof does not rule out a number of rulers who might govern the world by consensus, (3) it says nothing about spiritual beings themselves or their connection with the present material world, and (4) this proof does not foreclose on there being another world besides this one (§ 8). Suárez goes on in paragraphs following to answer these objections in detail. In reply to the first, he draws from the ancient Christian writer, Lactantius (ca. 240-320), the lesson that "the universe can be governed only by him by whose counsel and power it has been created" (§ 9). He then devotes eleven paragraphs (§§ 10-20) to further explain this in the cases of the elements, mixed bodies (more or less perfect), and especially the heavens. In this last regard, he pays special attention to the causality between the heavens and sublunar natural things. The second objection is met through nine paragraphs (§§ 21-29) in which Suárez argues that a number of world rulers would require that such be at once intelligent but also imperfect and liable to disagreement among themselves. The third objection is presented in more detail (§ 30) and answered over six paragraphs (§§ 31-36) in which Suárez treats the Aristotelian separate substances. From the motion of the heavens their existence is at best only probable, and even if they do exist they must be creatures of God. Finally, in reply to the fourth objection, Suárez shows the reasonable character of the Christian doctrine that God is not limited to making only one world and could indeed be the creator of any number of worlds besides this one, with the result that the objection has no force (§ 37).

Nevertheless, at this point Suárez tells us: "from this and the preceding objection I am convinced that the reasoning made to prove that there is only one unproduced being and that all the rest of beings have been made by that being does not conclude absolutely about all beings, but only about those which can fall under human cognition by way of natural reasoning or philosophy. Therefore, in order that the argument conclude universally, there necessarily must be employed a demonstration a priori, which ... we will pursue in the following Section" (ibid.)

Section 3 (pp. 47-60) first affirms the impossibility of demonstrating the existence of God in a priori manner from cause to effect, since obviously God has no cause (§ 1). Nevertheless, once He has been, in an a posteriori way, demonstrated to exist, it is possible secondarily to use a priori demonstrations to arrive at some of his properties or attributes (§ 2). However, this is not easy to do, as Suárez shows by rejecting an argument which has been offered to prove God's unicity on the basis that being can belong first and through itself only to a single unproduced being (§§ 3-7). He then proposes two more arguments that purport to prove that there cannot be several beings that exist of themselves. However, objections can be made to both of these arguments (§§ 8-10). A fourth argument, which Suárez finds "very probative," is to the effect that singularity must belong by nature to an unproduced being; therefore such a being cannot be multiplied (§ 11). While objection may be made to this reasoning, Suárez thinks it can be defended (§ 12) and indeed, if it is rightly understood, it may strengthen the first argument offered (§ 13). He further infers that being can belong to other things only by way of efficient causality or effective emanation from the first unproduced being (§ 14). Suárez then considers at length a fifth argument, which he thinks is "enough by itself and also confirms the preceding argument" (§ 15) to the effect that two or more unproduced beings could be neither the same nor diverse in species (§§ 15-22). This leads to an explanation of a text from Aristotle that seems at variance with this (§ 23). At this point, a sixth argument is introduced to show that a first unproduced being which is supreme and infinite in its perfection and most powerful in its acting produces "all things that are" (§ 24). An objection is raised to the effect that if it were to produce all things it would produce itself (§ 25), which, of course, is absurd. Suárez answers that it
belongs to the perfection of that being and subsequently to its power "that it is not itself producible by itself" while all else is produced by it (§ 26). Yet another argument can be taken, says the Doctor eximius, "from the causality of the ultimate end" (§ 27) and objections to this are raised and answered (§§ 28-31). Now Suárez states his conclusion - "From all of this, it has been sufficiently demonstrated that God exists" - and reaffirms its metaphysical character (§ 32). "Lastly," he says, "from all that has been said it can be clear by, so to speak, a certain most evident experience how far from truth is the opinion ... which asserted that the existence of God is so self-evident that, for that reason, it could not be demonstrated" (§ 33). This occasions a final discussion of self-evident propositions (§ 34) as well as of reasons that could motivate such an opinion (§§ 34-37)." (Introduction, pp. XIV-XVIII).

(11) What follows is meant to be little more than an outline. Readers are advised to look at what Suárez has to say for himself, albeit in the present poor English version, rather than rely upon any synopsis of that.


XXXI. De essentia entis finiti ut tale est, et de illius Esse, eorumque distinctione. Translated from the Latin with an introduction (pp. 3-43) by Norman J. Wells. "The bulk of Suárez's written work, edited as well as unedited, reflect his various teaching positions as philosopher and as theologian. However, a number are inspired directly by his state as a religious and a member of the Society of Jesus. Still others have their origin in the legal and political disputes of the day. The structure and contents of most of these works, their extent and quality, can be viewed with convenience in the twenty-six (or twenty-eight) volume edition of Vivés.

A. Disputationes Metaphysicae

It is against this over-all backdrop, especially the theological tracts, that Suárez's famous Disputationes Metaphysicae must be seen, if for no better reason than that this is the way Suarez viewed his metaphysical investigations themselves. For in both the Ad Lectorem as well as the Prooemium to this work, Suarez indicates the occasion and purpose of his metaphysical work with explicit consideration of its relation to his theological inquiries.

Sensitive to the pedagogical demands upon a discipline, Suarez confesses that in the course of his theological teaching, he has had to make rather spontaneous, frequent and extensive reference to metaphysical considerations. And this was required for the simple reason that "metaphysical principles and truths are so closely interwoven with theological conclusions and arguments, that if knowledge and full understanding of the former are lacking, knowledge of the latter must necessarily suffer."(Prooemium, XXV, 1ab) Such asides, Suárez finds, are not only burdensome to the legentes, but personally embarrassing, since it demanded of his hearers a blind faith in his judgment.

In addition to these immediate pedagogical problems, there are more substantive and overriding reasons presiding at the origins of the Disputationes Metaphysicae. Suárez sees clearly that, though sacred and supernatural theology is founded upon divine illumination and principles revealed by God, due to its human condition, such theology must utilize truths which are naturally known as well. It is in this latter area that metaphysics proves so indispensable, for of all the sciences known to man, it comes closest to the science of divine things. Moreover, without any proper knowledge of metaphysical problems, the Christian mysteries could scarcely be probed and discussed. In short, Suárez is convinced that "our philosophy ought to be Christian and the servant of divine theology." (DM, Ad Lectorem, XXV).

In the matter of the internal organization of such a discipline as metaphysics, Suárez takes a stand that is significant both historically and methodologically. For he finds himself at odds with the then current practice in the history of Western metaphysics: the medieval technique of commenting on an authoritative text by way of the
quaestio elaborated, somewhat erratically, within the context of the books of Aristotle's Metaphysics. By way of a methodological corrective, Suarez insists that the ordo doctrinae, required and demanded by the very object of this discipline, must be heeded in the sequence and hierarchical arrangement of problems and discussions. On this latter score, Suárez also finds himself quite disenchanted and critical of Aristotle's own method, sequence and organization. Consequently, observing the ordo doctrinae as Suárez sees it, the Disputationes Metaphysicae begin with an initial consideration of the object of the metaphysical enterprise, its dignity and utility. This is followed by an extensive consideration of the meaning and significance of that object, ens, its properties and its causes. This, in turn, is complemented by a consideration of the inferiores rationes of ens, i.e., the division of ens into creatum-creator and further divisions including all the special genera and grades of ens, closing with a consideration of ens rationis in Disputation 54.

B. Disputation Thirty-One

As part of this latter division, the thirty-first Disputation, comprised of fourteen separate sections of varying length, is explicitly concerned with laying bare the structure of finite being.

The first section serves as a general introduction to the historical as well as the doctrinal dimensions of this problem. Sections two to four constitute a more specialized introduction wherein Suarez's own basic and guiding principles are set down and established. Sections five to seven are, for the most part, of a critical character, negatively as well as positively. The remaining bulk of the discussion, comprising sections eight to fourteen, deals with the consequences and particular difficulties arising from the various historical traditions in this matter. Hence, they are meant to bolster and confirm, directly and indirectly, Suarez's own principles and conclusions as well as support his negative criticisms. (Introduction, pp. 4-6, notes omitted).


XLVII: De relationibus realis creatis.

A translation from the Latin, with an introduction (pp. 9-35) and notes by John P. Doyle.

"Summaries of the Sections of Disputation 47.

This portion of my Introduction owes much to the summary given by Sergio Rabade Romeo and his associates in their edition with Spanish translation of the Disputationes metaphysicae.(95) As they correctly lay it out, the Forty-Seventh Disputation can be articulated as follows:

1. Relation in general — its existence, its essence, and its division (Sections 1-4).
2. Categorical Relation — its essential definition, its subject, foundation, and terminus (Sections 5-9).
3. The Aristotelian division of relative beings, based on a threefold foundation (Sections 10-15).
4. The question of whether one relation can be the terminus of another (Section 16).
5. The structure of the category of relation (Section 17).
6. The properties of relation (Section 18).

And then descending to the different Sections in turn:

Section I

Beginning with the issue of the real existence of relation, Suárez enumerates up to five reasons for doubting such existence (paragraphs 1-7). He then presents three different opinions: (1) there are no true real relations (paragraph 8); (2) relations exist, but they do not constitute a special category of being (paragraph 9); and (3) in created things there are real relations, which make up a proper and special category (paragraph 10). This last is the most accepted opinion and it is demonstrated by the teachings of the Catholic Faith and by rational arguments (paragraphs 11-15).

Section II
This is the key Section, in which the reality of a relation is directly addressed. It is first necessary to clarify how a real categorical relation is distinguished from substance and all absolute accidents in order to explain the reality and the nature of created relations (paragraph 1). In this regard, Suárez presents and rejects four different opinions (paragraphs 2-10). He then lingers with another opinion—held by many, especially Nominalists—which defends a distinction of reason with a basis in reality between relation and its absolute foundation (paragraphs 11-17). Next, without approving the distinction between the "being in" and the "being toward" of a relation, he admits the indicated Nominalist opinion (paragraph 22). Finally, he answers the arguments of the other opinions (paragraph 23) and the arguments remaining from Section 1 (paragraphs 24-25).

Section III
The Third Section treats the divisions of relation (paragraph 1). The first division is into real relation and relation of reason. It is only real relation which constitutes the category "toward something" (paragraphs 2-5). The second division is into relation "according to being said" and relation "according to being" (paragraphs 6-9). The third division is into transcendental relation and categorical relation (paragraphs 10-13).

Section IV
Suárez tells us that it is very difficult to explain the difference between categorical and transcendental relations (paragraph 1). It is possible to think of some differences that should be rejected (paragraphs 2-8). Others can be admitted (paragraphs 9-15). From this the inference is that the category "toward something" includes only relations that are categorical in a proper sense (paragraph 16). The remaining paragraphs (17-21) of this Section contain the reply to a difficulty raised in Section 1.

Section V
In this Section the Doctor eximius explains the essence and the proper definition of a categorical relation (paragraphs 1-4), and also explains as well as resolves the difficulties which the mentioned division encounters (paragraphs 5-13).

Section VI
This short Section is limited to proving that a categorical relation requires a subject, a foundation, and a terminus (paragraphs 1-6).

Section VII
As was said in the just preceding Section, a categorical relation needs a foundation (paragraph 1), which in some way is distinguished from the subject of a relation (paragraphs 2-3). This foundation can be either an accident or the substance itself (paragraphs 4-9). Although the question is discussed, Suárez prefers not to separate a foundation from a reason for being founded (paragraphs 10-14).

Section VIII
For a categorical relation there is also required a real terminus (paragraph 1). But must this terminus exist in actuality? There are reasons to doubt that (paragraph 2), and one author has thought that a terminus that is real and really existing is not necessary (paragraph 3). Suárez maintains the contrary, and in so doing he follows the common opinion of philosophers and theologians (paragraphs 4-7). He answers the arguments of Gregory of Rimini (paragraph 8), and he rejects the opinion that the terminus belongs to the essence of a relation (paragraphs 9-12). Finally, he affirms that not even by the absolute power of God can a relation remain without a terminus (paragraphs 13-14).

Section IX
For a real relation it is necessary that the foundation and the terminus, formally considered, be distinguished with a real distinction, although this does not have to be equal in all cases (paragraphs 1-6).

Section X
Suárez proposes to examine the division which Aristotle has made of relation looking at a threefold foundation (paragraph 1). Having first explained the Aristotelian doctrine (paragraphs 2-4), he raises the two main questions which arise with respect to that doctrine: (1) whether each one of the members of the stated
division is designated in a fitting manner, and (2) whether the division includes the whole range of categorical relations. With regard to the first, there are various arguments which present difficulty (paragraphs 5-10), and the same is true with regard to the second (paragraph 11). Nevertheless, the two questions are answered in the sense of approving the division which Aristotle has made (paragraphs 12-16).

Section XI
It is necessary to answer each one of the difficulties of the preceding Section (paragraph 1). Beginning with the first class of relations, which is founded on unity (paragraphs 2-3), it is affirmed that a relation of unity can be founded on the realities of all the categories (paragraph 4) and there is explained the sense in which one relation can be the foundation of another (paragraphs 5-13). In passing, he explains to which class relations of identity, similarity, and equality belong (paragraphs 14-15). The Section ends by affirming that generic unity can found a real relation (paragraphs 16-19) and by indicating the characteristics of relations of the first class (paragraphs 20-21).

Section XII
In order to treat the second class of relations (paragraph 1), the problem is tithed of whether all the relations of this class are real (paragraph 2). Suárez replies by setting up some distinctions (paragraphs 3-4). He concerns himself then with the proximate foundation of paternity (paragraphs 5-6), and of the relation of agent (paragraphs 7-8), whether it is in act (paragraph 9) or in potency (paragraphs 10-14).

Section XIII
Regarding the third class of relations, founded upon the character of measure (paragraph 1), Suárez presents and resolves a difficulty about the authentic ought of Aristotle (paragraphs 2.9).

Section XIV
Is the Aristotelian division sufficient and adequate? (paragraph 1). To answer this question, Suárez indicates how all real relations are reduced to the three kinds, which make up the stated division (paragraphs 2-8).

Section XV
After indicating the double sense in which non-mutual relations can be taken (paragraph 1), Suárez makes a division between reciprocal and non-reciprocal relations (paragraph 2) and raises a difficulty in their regard (paragraphs 3-7). To resolve this difficulty, he affirms that there are some non-mutual relations, which are properly found in the third Aristotelian class of relations (paragraph 8). Then he replies to opposing arguments (paragraphs 9-12) and resolves difficulties proposed at the beginning (paragraphs 13-15). Next, he presents the opinion of the Nominalists about relations in God from time (paragraph 16) and, against them, denies that such relations are real (paragraphs 17-29).

Section XVI
This Section concerns the question of whether the formal terminus of one relation is another relation or has an absolute character (paragraph 1). Having explained the title of the Section (paragraph 2), Suárez presents and explains different opinions (paragraphs 3-5). He crystallizes his thought in the following assertions: (1) in non-mutual relatives, the reason why one extreme is the terminus of the relation of the other is not a relation that is opposite to that of the other, but the very entity itself or a property of that terminus (paragraphs 6-13); (2) In mutual relations, the raison d'être of a terminus is also some absolute character that constitutes the formal foundation of the opposite relation (paragraphs 14-22). With this an answer is given to the bases of the other opinions, explaining the sense in which relatives are simultaneous in nature, in knowledge, and in definition (paragraphs 23-34), and finally treating of the termini of the divine relations (paragraphs 35-38), and of relative opposition (paragraphs 39-40).

Section XVII
It is proposed to treat the structuring of the category, "toward something" (paragraph 1). The first difficulty is in knowing how all relatives can be reduced to one single genus (paragraph 2). There is accepted the possibility of one single
The supreme genus which includes all relatives (paragraph 3) and there is adduced the solution which some offer to the motive for doubting (paragraphs 4-5). This solution is probable even though it supposes a false basis (paragraphs 6). Suárez affirms that the relative in general is not in an order to another as to its correlative (paragraphs 7-8), that the relative in general has a terminus in general which corresponds to it (paragraph 8), and that the common character of terminus does not constitute a proper category (paragraph 10). Afterwards, he raises the question of the contraction of the supreme genus of relatives into its inferiors (paragraphs 11-14), the question of the origin of the essential and specific difference of relations (paragraph 15), and the question of the simultaneity of various relations—which differ only numerically—in the same subject (paragraphs 16-23). He ends the Section by rejecting an opinion about the relation that a son has with respect to a father and a mother (paragraphs 24-28).

Section XVIII

This is the shortest Section. It designates as properties of all relatives: not having a contrary; being susceptible of more or less; receiving the designation of "convertibles"; being simultaneous in nature; and also being simultaneous in knowledge and definition (paragraphs 1-6). (Introduction, pp. 28-33).


"B. The Prologue and Division of the Disputation:

In a brief prologue to his 54th Disputation, the Doctor Esimius notes that beings of reason are not real beings and that they are thus excluded from the direct and proper object of metaphysics. Along with this, however, he remarks how necessary their study is and offers some justification for their inclusion in his metaphysical work. (24) Of interest here is his assessment of them as "not true beings, but as quasi-shadows of being." As such, they have no intrinsic intelligibility, but must be known only indirectly through other things. Immediately flowing from this is the fact that they, like Meinong's later "homeless objects,"(25) are not of direct and primary concern for any science.

All the same, inasmuch as beings of reason are of use in a variety of sciences, they can be grasped and must be treated in some way. In fact, Suarez believes, their treatment is exclusively the concern of the metaphysician. For, even though beings of reason have no true being, they are, as mentioned, "shadows" of being. Like being then they have what he calls a "quasi-transcendentality,"(26) which by itself would remove them from the province of any science other than metaphysics. It is true that more particular disciplines, such as physics or logic, sometimes treat certain beings of reason (e.g., privation, the void, or second intentions such as species or genus ) in connection with their proper scientific objects. But only metaphysics is wide enough to consider, albeit obliquely and concomitantly with its proper object, the whole range of beings of reason as such.

After the Prologue, the Disputation splits into six Sections. Of these, the first two treat the existence, the nature, and the causes of beings of reason. Sections 3 and 4 consider how such beings of reason are divided. As Suárez sees it, the traditional listing of negations, privations, and relations of reason will exhaust the types that divide beings of reason. Section 5 will then more closely examine negations and privations and Section 6 will go on to treat relations of reason." (Introduction, 20-21).

(24) For this exclusion and justification, see also DM 1, s. 1, n. 6; XXV, 3-4. For Aristotle's earlier exclusion of "being as true" from the concern of metaphysics, cf. note 10, above [See Metaphysics VI, c. 4, 1027b 34-1028a 3; ibid., XI, c. 8, 1069a 22 ff.].

(26) Suárez's frequent employment of the prefix "quasi" is worth noting. Thus in the sections to follow, he will speak of "quasi-essence," "quasi-essential features," "quasi-essential foundation," "quasi-disposition," "quasi-difference," "quasi-passion," and a "quasi-material" cause of beings of reason (as well as imply quasi-formal and quasi-efficient causes for them). Again, he will speak of "quasi-induction" as well as "quasi-intrinsic," "quasi-extrinsic," and "quasi-common" characteristics in their regard. Without pushing it, I cannot help but think of Meinong (in *Ueber Annahmen* [Leipzig, 1910]), speaking of *Quasi-Transzendenz* (220, 228), *Quasi-Wirklichkeit* (224, 226, 263-4, 266), *Quasibedeutung* (59), *Quasinhalt* (264, 277, 286, 312), etc.


On the Nature of the Soul in General - On the Immateriality and Immortality of the Rational Soul.

Translated by John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy.

Introduction and explanatory notes by John Kronen.

Table of Contents: Introduction 9; Disputation I: On the Substance of the Soul in General; Question 1: Whether the soul is act in the sense of being a substantial form 30; Question 2: Whether and in what way the soul is first act 45; Question 3: Whether the soul possesses an essential ordination to an organic body 65; Question 4: What the quidditative definition of the soul is and how one definition is proven through another 84; Disputation II 108; Question 3: Whether the principle of understanding in humans is something incorporeal, subsistent, and immortal 108; Bibliography 177-188.

"Suárez's *De anima*, like his *Metaphysical Disputations*, is not a commentary on Aristotle, though Suárez, in a general way, follows the order of topics laid out by Aristotle in his *De anima*, and he refers to Aristotle's seminal work with great frequency. In the first Disputation of Suárez's *De anima*, translated here in its entirety, Suárez treats of living beings taken as a whole. In this Disputation he links his psychology to his general metaphysics. This is particularly clear in the first question of the Disputation, which gives a brief proof of Aristotelian hylomorphism, as well as giving a proof of the existence of a special class of material substances which are distinguished from other material substances in that they are capable of immanent actions, i.e. actions which begin and end in the same substance.(9) Even plants, in this way, are "self moving" in the actions of nutrition and growth. In the later questions of this Disputation Suárez answers questions pertaining to the nature of the substantial form (i.e. the soul) characteristic of all living beings. Throughout the Disputation Suárez is chiefly committed to defending a substantivalist view of the nature of the soul and, hence, of the human person, against notions of the person that adumbrate the psychological concept of it found in Locke's writings, and that echo the ancient Buddhist "no-self" doctrine. But Suárez is equally committed to defending, against dualism, that the soul is an incomplete substance, which is by its nature ordered to informing an appropriately disposed matter in order to constitute with it a living substance.

We have translated all of Disputation I because it casts light on how Suárez, and the Scholastics in general, understood the science of the soul. They did not understand it to be an investigation of immaterial substances à la Descartes, because souls are not substances. They are, at best, incomplete substances which, with matter, constitute a living organism. In this respect it might be better to speak of "the science of living beings" or even of "biology", rather than of "the science of the soul". But even that would not be quite right either since, although the Scholastics
were more interested than is often thought with the physical structures of living beings, as well as in the essential roles these structures play in explaining the powers of living beings,(10) they were not very advanced in these questions and, unlike most contemporary biologists, they did not conceive of the "principle of life" in living beings as a complex set of relations between inanimate substances, but as a "thing" or res. In short, though for them the soul is an incomplete substance, it is nevertheless an incomplete substance, not an instance of an especially complex way of arranging inanimate substances." (pp. 16-17)

(9) For an excellent account of the Scholastic notion of "immanent action" see Des Chene, Life's Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 57-67. Des Chene notes that some Scholastics preferred to define living actions as "intrinsic", i.e. such that no being other than the being doing the action could produce the effect of the action. On this definition, for example, growth would not be a vital action since God could produce in the plant the result of the act of growing (i.e. He could produce the greater quantity), but seeing would be a vital action since not even God could do "my seeing" for me.

(10) See Des Chene, Life's Form, pp. 34-39.

---

Introduzione, traduzione e note di Costantino Esposito. In appendice Le "disputazioni Metafisiche" nella critica contemporanea. Nuova edizione riveduta e ampliata (prima edizione, Milano, Rusconi, 1996)


Translated with an Introduction by R. von Specht.

German translation


Translated with an Introduction by R. von Specht.

Complete Spanish translation


Seven volumes edited and translated by Sergio Rabade Romeo, Salvador Caballero Sánchez, Antonio Piucerver Zanón (1960-1966)