When Ockham's logic arrives in Italy, some Dominican philosophers bring into question Ockham's ontological reductionist program. Among them, Franciscus de Prato and Stephanus de Reate pay a great attention to refute Ockham's claim that no universal exists in the extra-mental world. In order to reject Ockham's program, they start by reconsidering the notion of "real", then the range of application of the rational and the real distinction. Generally, their strategy consists in re-addressing against Ockham some arguments extracted from Hervaeus Natalis's works. Franciscus's and Stephanus's basic idea is that some universals are not acts of cognition, but extra-mental, predicable things. Such things are not separable from singulars, nonetheless they are not the same as those singulars. Consequently, it is not necessary to allow, as Ockham does, that if two things are not really identical, they are really different and hence really separable. According to them, it is possible to hold that two things are not really identical without holding that they are also really non-identical and hence really different. Basically, their reply relies on a different notion of the relation of identity. Identity is regarded as an intersection of classes of things, so that it is possible to say that two things are really identical without saying that they also are the same thing. Franciscus and Stephanus, however, do not seem to achieve completely their aim.

In this essay I argue that Aristotle is committed to a sortal analysis of the universal. According to this analysis something is a universal ("to katholou") just in case it is predicated "essentially" of a plurality of entities. I find evidence for such an analysis in the Categories, Posterior analytics, and Metaphysics Gamma. Finally, I suggest that an appeal to this analysis may help resolve a longstanding difficulty in Metaphysics Zeta, viz., Aristotle's commitment to (a) substances are not universals; (b) forms ("eide") are substances; and (c) forms ("eide") are predicted of a plurality of entities.

Bibliography on the Problem of Universals in the Middle Ages

BIBLIOGRAPHY


"The Stoics did not have a single, unified account of concepts and universals, but with respect to Platonic Forms they were eliminativist rather than reductionist. According to virtually all Stoic accounts, Platonic Forms are literally nothing."


Contents:

Riccardo Chiaradonna, Gabriele Galluzzo: Introduction 1; Mauro Bonazzi: Universals before Universals: Some Remarks on Plato in His Context 23; Francesco Ademollo: Plato's Conception of the Forms: Some Remarks 41; Marwan Rashed: Plato's Five Worlds Hypothesis (*Ti. 55cd*), Mathematics and Universals 87; David Sedley: Plato and the One-over-Many Principle 113; Laura M. Castelli: Universals, Particulars and Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Forms 139; Mauro Mariani: Universals in Aristotle's Logical Works 185; Gabriele Galluzzo: Universals in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 209; Ada Bronowski: Epicureans and Stoics on Universals 255; Riccardo Chiaradonna: Alexander, Boethus and the Other Peripatetics: The Theory of Universals in the Aristotelian Commentators 299; Peter Adamson: One of a Kind: Plotinus and Porphyry on Unique Instantiation 329; Michael Griffin: Universals, Education, and Philosophical Methodology in Later Neoplatonism 353; Riccardo Chiaradonna: Universals in Ancient Medicine 381; Johannes Zachhuber: Universals in the Greek Church Fathers 425; Bibliography 471; Index locorum 509; Index of names 537.


"Aristotle's theory of universals is expounded by contrast with Plato's. Where Plato had said that X is F iff X participates in the form of F, Aristotle has two analyses. If F is a substance predicate then X is F iff X is specifically identical with an F. If F is an accidental predicate then X is F iff there is a Y in X which is specifically identical with an individual in the appropriate category for F."


"Scotus's belief that any created substance can depend on the divine essence and/or divine persons as a subject requires him to abandon the plausible Aristotelian principle that there is no merely relational change. I argue that Scotus's various counterexamples to the principle can be rebutted. For reasons related to those that arise in Scotus's ailed attempt to refute the principle, the principle also entails that properties cannot be universals."


"In this article, the author tries to explain the central aspects of Ockham's arguments on the nature of universals, giving attention to the analysis of the semantic properties of signification and supposition as they were exposed by Ockham in the first part of his *Summa logicae*. After presenting the doctrine of intuitive and abstractive knowledge, the author discusses Ockham's critics to realism and his specific way of conceiving universals."


"This work presents the information that John of Salisbury provides us in his *Metalogicon* about the problem of the universals in the 12th century. He is especially careful when he treats Aristotle's solution, philosopher for whom he shows great admiration."


"Le présent livre propose l'étude de la constitution, durant le haut Moyen Âge latin, d'une position philosophique: le réalisme de l'immanence à propos des universaux. Cette position est fondée sur la conviction qu'il existe, dans le monde qui nous entoure, certes des individus particuliers -- ce tilleul, cette tortue --, mais aussi des entités universelles. Ces entités n'existent pas séparées des individus, mais intégralement réalisées en eux, sans variation ni degré. Cet engagement philosophique résulte d'une exégèse des *Catégories* d'Aristote, réinterprétées selon des philosophèmes issus de la pensée de Porphyre. La généalogie de cette position est ici retracée en abordant successivement ses sources tant grecques que latines et ses ancêtres patristiques (avant tout Grégoire de Nysse), puis son élaboration conceptuelle durant les premiers siècles du Moyen Âge latin jusqu'à la critique qu'en donnera Pierre Abélard, et ce, par l'analyse de l'ontologie des quatre philosophes qui l'ont soutenue: Jean Scot Érigène, Anselme de Canterbury, Odon de Cambrai et Guillaume de Champeaux. Ce parcours permet de dessiner les contours d'un projet philosophique: comprendre, analyser et décrire le monde sensible au moyen des concepts issus de la logique aristotélicienne."


"In this paper, I explore the origins of the 'problem of universals'. I argue that the problem has come to be badly formulated and that consideration of it has been impeded by falsely supposing that Platonic Forms were ever intended as an alternative to Aristotelian universals. In fact, the role that Forms are supposed by Plato to fulfill is independent of the function of a universal. I briefly consider the gradual mutation of the problem in the Academy, in Alexander of Aphrodisias, and among some of the major Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle, including Porphyry and Boethius."


"The medieval version of the Problem of Universals centers around propositions such as '"man" is a species' and '"animals" is a genus'. One of C. Lejewski's analyses of such propositions shows that semantic status of their terms by means of Ajdukiewicz-style categorical indices having participial or infinitive forms as their natural-language counterparts. Some medievals certainly used such forms in their corresponding analyses, thus avoiding the alleged referential demands generated by nominally-termed propositions. Boethius exemplifies the confusion which may still arise from the traditional definition of "universal" in terms of predication "of many". Unnecessary adherence to nominally-termed analyses not only grounded a tendency towards Nominalism and Platonism, but also towards the moderns' 'way of ideas'."


Edited by Karl Barthlein

"This paper analyzes Hobbes's understanding of signification, the process whereby words come to have meaning. Most generally, Hobbes develops and extends the nominalist critique of universals as it is found in Ockham and subsequently carried forward by early moderns such as Descartes. Hobbes's radicality emerges in comparison with Ockham and Descartes, as, unlike them, Hobbes also reduces the intellectual faculty entirely to imagination. According to Hobbes, we have nothing in which a stabilizing, prediscursive mental language could inhere. Hobbes thus concludes that all thinking is affective and semiotic, and depends on the regulation of conventionally established regimes of signs. Establishing this regulation is one of the central functions of the Hobbesian commonwealth."


"Aristotelian science seeks to define the essential nature of a thing and then to demonstrate the features the thing must have because of that nature. A philosophically inevitable question thus arises for Aristotelians: what is a nature? Is it a reality over and above (or perhaps "in" the things whose nature it is? Is it a mental construction, existing only in our understanding of things, if so, on what basis is it constructed? This is the medieval problem of universals, or at least one way of thinking about the problem. In a classic formulation, Boethius states the problem in terms of the reality of genera and species, two main types of universals involved in an Aristotelian definition of essential nature (as in "a human being is a reasoning / speaking animal," which places us in the genus of animals and marks off our species by reference to our "difference" from other animals in reasoning or using language): "Plato thinks that genera and species and the rest are not only understood as universals, but also exist and subsist apart from bodies. Aristotle, however, thinks that they are understood as incorporeal and universal, but subsist in sensibles." A rigorous tradition of, mainly Aristotelian, discussion originates from Boethius's tentative exploration of the problem thus stated. But a more Platonic solution had been put into play about a century before Boethius by Augustine, and this, too, would have a rich development."


"This article offers the first edition of the beginning of the *Communia logice ( et grammatic*), a substantial didascalical compilation emanating from the Arts faculty of the University of Paris during the..."
first half of the thirteenth century and preserved in a manuscript bequeathed by master Peter of Limoges (d. 1306) to the old library of the Sorbonne. After a general presentation (section I) and before some clarifications on the Ratio edendi (section III), the doctrinal study (section II) which precedes this edition (section IV) shows how the author-compiler of the Communia logice answers - while reformulating it - to the well known porphyrian set of questions about the universals.


"William Ockham's ontology as outlined in Summa Logicae and elsewhere is sufficiently like the trope nominalism described in D.M. Armstrong's Universals: An Opinionated Introduction to warrant the attention of contemporary metaphysicians, so long as one bears in mind (a) Ockham's fundamentally theological presuppositions, and (b) his Aristotelian logic and philosophy of language."


Chapters about: Boethius, John Scot Erigene, Roscelin of Compiègne, William of Champeaux, Adelard of Bath, Abelard, John of Salisbury.


"In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes makes a remarkable claim about the ontological status of geometrical figures. He asserts that an object such as a triangle has a 'true and immutable nature' that does not depend on the mind, yet has being even if there are no triangles existing in the world. This statement has led many commentators to assume that Descartes is a Platonist regarding essences and in the philosophy of mathematics. One problem with this seemingly natural reading is that it contradicts the conceptualist account of universals that one finds in the Principles of Philosophy and elsewhere. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of the notion of a true and immutable nature which reconciles the Fifth Meditation with the conceptualism of Descartes's other work. Specifically, I argue that Descartes takes natures to be innate ideas considered in terms of their so-called 'objective being'."


"I argue that Descartes holds a conceptualist account of both the ontology and the origin of universals. Universal mathematical objects, such as the number two, are merely innate ideas that are made occurrent by a process of abstraction. Although Descartes's conceptualism is fairly explicit textually, the details of his theory are not. I recover this theory by linking it to his account of attributes—an attribute being something which we distinguish from a substance within our thought where there is no distinction in real. This approach uncovers Descartes's diagnosis of how the realist goes wrong in positing universals outside thought."


While the medievals spilled much ink over the 'problem of individuation', the moderns scarcely mention it. My aim here is to explore what philosophical reasons, as opposed to historical or sociological ones, might lie behind the disappearance of a philosophical problem that vexed minds for centuries. I argues that Ockham clearly saw that a commitment to nominalism removes the need to take seriously the problem of individuation. Suarez, who took seriously the problem, but who also advocated nominalism, will be shown to be subject to important Ockham-inspired arguments. To the extent, then, that Ockham's nominalism carried the day into the moderns, it is understandable, philosophically, that the moderns should turn a deaf ear to the problem of individuation.
weaker than the Indiscernibility of identicals.

universal is numerically identical with its singulars, but numerical identity is governed by something
theory of universals is less extreme than Walter Burley's, as Wyclif himself observes. For Wyclif, the
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realism. Again pending further study, neither do Wyclif's views appear to assign philosophically extreme
universals postulate new and non-standard entities besides those recognized by more usual versions of
one in terms of being metaphysically common to many. On neither approach does Wyclif's theory of
medieval notions of a universal, the Aristotelian/Porphyrian one in terms of predication and the Boethian
obvious that the actual content of his view is especially extreme. The paper distinguishes two common
accept it. It is certainly true that Wyclif is extremely vocal and insistent about his realism, but it is not
preliminary assessment of that judgment and argues that, pending further study, we have no reason to
discuss. The most important of these early mediaeval discussions is undoubtedly Boethius's.

In addition to works of Aristotle, Boethius also translated Porphyry's Isagoge and wrote two
commentaries on it. (His first commentary was based on an earlier translation by Marius Victorinus, who
is known to readers of Augustine's Confessions VIII. 2 & 4.) Although Boethius addressed the problem of
universals in several places, the discussion in his Second Commentary on Porphyry was the longest and
probably the most influential. The relevant portion of that commentary is translated below.

Abelard wrote on the problem of universals in several places. The most well known of them is in the "
Glosses on Porphyry" in his Logica 'ingredientibus'. Once again the relevant passage is a discussion of
Porphyry's three unanswered questions.

By the time of the last two authors represented below, John Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308) and William of
Ockham (c. 1285-1347), philosophy had become a specialized and highly technical academic discipline,
carried on almost exclusively in a university context. These last two texts are here translated into English
for the first time, and are by far the longest and most intricate in this volume. " pp. VII-XI.

Spade, Paul Vincent, ed. 1994. Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius,

Contents: Introduction VII; Note on the text XVI; Porphyry the Phoenician: Isagoge 1; Boethius: From
his Second Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge 20; Peter Abelard: From the " Glosses on Porphyry" in
His Logica 'ingredientibus' 26; John Duns Scotus: Six questions on individuation from his Ordinatio II. d.
3, part 1, qq. 1-6 57; William of Ockham: Five questions on universals from his Ordinatio d. 2, qq. 4-8
114; Glossary 232; Bibliography 235-238.

"It is well known that the problem of universals was widely discussed in mediaeval philosophy --indeed,
some would say it was discussed then with a level of insight and rigor it has never enjoyed since. The five
texts translated in this volume include the most influential and some of the most sophisticated treatments
of the problem in the whole Middle Ages. The first text is Porphyry's Isagoge, translated here in its entirety. Porphyry was a third-century Greek
neo-Platonist, a pupil and the biographer of Plotinus, and the one who arranged Plotinus's writings into
six groups of nine essays (the " Enneads").

Despite its importance in this respect, perhaps the main influence of the Isagoge lies not in what it says,
about the predicables or anything else, but in what it does not say. For in his introductory remarks,
Porphyry raises but then modestly refuses to answer three questions about the metaphysical status of
universals, saying only that they belong to "another, greater investigation". [ Isagoge, 2] It is this brief
passage that raised the problem of universals in the form in which it was first discussed in the Middle
Ages. It contains some of the most consequential lines in the entire history of philosophy.

Porphyry's silence means that there really is no detailed theory of universals in the Isagoge -- or for that
matter in his other writings. Taken by himself, therefore, Porphyry would not have been a very important
figure in the history of our problem. But he cannot be taken by himself. His importance lies in the fact
that his Isagoge was translated into Latin in the early Middle Ages and used as the occasion for
discussing the problem of universals directly and in detail. It was as though commentators found his
silence intolerable and were irresistibly drawn into the very questions Porphyry himself had declined to
discuss.

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commentaries on it. (His first commentary was based on an earlier translation by Marius Victorinus, who
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"John Wyclif has been described as "ultrarealist" in his theory of universals. This paper attempts a
preliminary assessment of that judgment and argues that, pending further study, we have no reason to
accept it. It is certainly true that Wyclif is extremely vocal and insistent about his realism, but it is not
obvious that the actual content of his view is especially extreme. The paper distinguishes two common
medieval notions of a universal, the Aristotelian/Porphyrian one in terms of predication and the Boethian
one in terms of being metaphysically common to many. On neither approach does Wyclif’s theory of
universals postulate new and non-standard entities besides those recognized by more usual versions of
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or novel roles to the entities he does recognize as universal. On the contrary, by at least one measure, his
theory of universals is less extreme than Walter Burley's, as Wyclif himself observes. For Wyclif, the
universal is numerically identical with its singulars, but numerical identity is governed by something
weaker than the Indiscernibility of identicals."


"This work shows how Abailard elaborated and defended the view that universals are words, avoided the pitfalls of an image theory of thinking, and propounded a theory of "status" and "dicta" as objects of thought without treating them as subjects of predication. His defense of these views is shown to depend on certain fundamental departures from the Aristotelian term logic of his day, including a proposal for subjectless propositions, the treatment of copula plus predicate noun as equivalent to a simple verb, and a transformation of the 'is' of existence into the 'is' of predication."


"This paper is devoted in the main to arguing for certain negative theses of the general form: Aristotle did not himself hold such and such a view of universals; but in the course of the discussion some points about Aristotle's own positive conception of universals, to the limited extent that he had one, will emerge. In fact, Aristotle's negative remarks about universals, e.g. that they are not substances, not separate, not in addition to the particulars, etc., are much clearer and less tentative than any of his positive ones, and it is little wonder that interpreters through the ages have attributed to him radically different and opposed positive theories. The words they found in their authority could not easily be used to decide the issue between their competing interpretations.

In order to clarify the aim of this essay I want first of all to distinguish with regard to any topic Aristotle treats the question of what view he himself held, if any, from the question of what view he should have held given the basic tenets and thrust of his whole philosophy. The views which are definitely not, as I shall claim, ones Aristotle himself held, i.e. not defensible answers to the first question, may well be tenable answers to the second. Indeed, I am rather inclined to think there are several mutually incompatible theories that will answer as well as any the question of what view Aristotle should have taken of universals. On that whole matter I shall have nothing more to say in this place.

The two interpretations I shall discuss see Aristotle as a nominalist and a conceptualist respectively. By 'nominalism' I mean any theory which says that what is universal is universal only in so far as it is a certain sort of sign. In other words, being a sign is necessary to being a universal, although the converse is not true. Just what the things are which serve as universal signs is left entirely open on this definition of nominalism. Signs may be spoken sounds, written marks, mental images, mental states or any thing you please. Also the definition is non-committal on just what sort of a sign it is that is universal; theories about this will vary with the semantic theory the nominalist adopts. There is perhaps a place for a narrower sense of 'nominalism' in which the nominalist must maintain that universals are all certain expressions of a written or spoken language. In this narrower sense Ockham, for example was not a nominalist since the signs he thought of as universal were primarily those of a mental language, although he was certainly a nominalist in the broader sense I first proposed.

By 'conceptualism' I mean the view that nothing could be a universal unless there were in existence thought and cognition of an intellectual sort. In this broad sense all nominalists are conceptualists, since presumably there could not be signs unless there were thought. But there is a narrower sense of 'conceptualism' too, in which the conceptualist must maintain that universality applies only to mind-dependent entities, e.g. concepts, mental images, etc. (Even words when they are conceived as not identifiable with their physical manifestations are things that cannot exist unless there are minds and so are mind-dependent in my sense.)

The difference between the broad and narrow senses has this noteworthy consequence: someone can be a conceptualist in the broad sense and believe that what is universal is some entity independently existing outside the mind as long as they also accept that it is a universal only when it is thought of or conceived in some way. But such a person is not a conceptualist in the narrow sense. Also nominalists need not be
conceptualists in the narrow sense since they can hold that the things which are signs are mind-independent objects with a wholly physical existence, for example sounds or marks. My task will be to convince the reader that Aristotle was neither a nominalist nor a conceptualist in any of these senses. I shall begin with the nominalist proposal, but to some extent my refutation of it will be incomplete until I have finished with conceptualism. From the fact that Aristotle was not a conceptualist in the broad sense it will follow that he was not a nominalist, so the evidence against broad conceptualism argues against nominalism as well." pp. 412-413.


Texts translated into English with commentary.


I. Da sant'Agostino al XII secolo; II. Secoli XIII e XIV.


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