"Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialised Studies Establishing the Field of Research." 1976. Analecta Husserliana no. 4.
"Ingardeniana Ii. New Studies in the Philosophy of Roman Ingarden. With a New International Ingarden Bibliography." 1990. Analecta Husserliana no. 30.
Edited by Hans H. Rudnick
"Ingardeniana Iii: Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics in a New Key and the Independent Approaches of Others: The Performing Arts, the Fine Arts, and Literature." 1991. Analecta
Husserliana no. 33.
Ales Bello, Angela. 2004. "The Controversy About the Existence of the World in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenological School A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein."
Analecta Husserliana.The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research no. 79:97-116.
"The aim of the essay consists in analyzing one of the most important points of discussion among some of Husserl's disciples: A. Reinach, R. Ingarden, H. Conrad-Martius, E. Stein,
that is the existence of the world and the way to prove it. The research leads to two consequences: to pinpoint Husserl's particular and original interpretation regarding "existence" that concludes
to the acceptance of it and the difference between his transcendental phenomenology and that one sustained by his disciples that can be called a realistic phenomenology. In this contest E. Stein
assumed a peculiar position that to some extend combines the two attitudes."
"The above outline sought to show very briefly how the discussion about the existence of the world came into being within the phenomenological school. We noted that Husserl's cited
disciples are convinced that, as far as the maestro is concerned, the world - understood as external reality that comprises ourselves as human beings - does exist. but doubt that he succeeded in
justifying this view moving from his theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, the objections are more or less mellow and indistinct and all of them are made within the school, that is to say. within a
common style of search.
The great common terrain is constituted by essential analysis, which nobody wants to do without. but precisely because the philosophical tradition regards the theme of the essence
as related to that of existence, there arises the fear that this latter aspect might he pushed into the background. Furthermore, because for Husserl essential analysis concentrates on subjectivity
and opens the road to the transcendental perspective, what is feared is becoming enclosed in subjectivity and concentrating all of reality in it. as in the great lesson of German idealism.
As can be seen. I have endeavored to defend Flossed against his own disciples, trying to delve into his profound intentions, re-balancing - wherever this proves possible - the
results of his analysis. comforted in this by the observations of Edith Stein, who was probably closest to the maestro and therefore managed to grasp the principal lines of his position more
accurately. The theoretical core always remains the relationship between idealism and realism. with respect to which Husserl's attitude, at least in my opinion, is very balanced, notwithstanding its
peculiarity. On the other hand, it is quite readily understandable that his disciples should have committed the "great parricide," to use the expression that Plato used in connection with Parmenides:
it may well he that without it one does not achieve theoretical autonomy. All the same, one also has to hear in mind a saying that once again involves Plato: amicus Plato. sell magis amica
veritas. which should help us understand the intentions of the other before we raise objections." p. 113
Bartoszynski, Kazimierz. 1989. "The Ontology of Objects in Ingarden's Aesthetics." Analecta Husserliana no. 27:369-383.
Blaszczyk, Piotr. 2005. "On the Mode of Existence of Real Numbers." Analecta Husserliana no. 88:137-155.
"Ingarden's ontology is an ontology of an object. An object, as conceived by Ingarden, is, first of all, something which is a unity of matter (referred to by Ingarden as material
endowment), form (formal structure) and existence (mode of existence). As examples of objects in this meaning one may offer: a physical object, a process, an event, a Platonic idea, a property of a
thing, a negative state of affairs. Yet, not everything is an object. Non-objects are: matter, form and mode of existence as such. The Controversy over the Existence of the World was divided
by Ingarden into Existential Ontology and Formal Ontology in order to deal with existential and formal aspects of objects." p. 137
Bostar, Leo. 1994. "Reading Ingarden Read Husserl: Metaphysics, Ontology, and Phenomenological Method." Husserl Studies no. 10:211-236.
Brogowski, Leszeck. 1999. "Phenomenology and the Aesthetic Experience: Ontological Reflections on Roman Ingarden's Cognition of the Literary Work of Art." Revue
d'Esthétique no. 36:59-73.
Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz. 1999. Die Erkenntnistheorie Von Roman Ingarden. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 1999. "Are Meanings in the Head? Ingarden's Theory of Meaning." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 30:306-326.
"The question in the title should be construed as an epistemological and not an ontological one. Omitting the difficult problems of the ontology of intentionality we will ask if all
what is needed to explain the phenomenon of the meaningful use of words, could be found "in our private head" interpreted as a sphere of specific privileged access, the sphere that is in the relevant
epistemological sense subjective, private or non-public.
There are many "mentalistic" theories of meaning that force us to the answer: "yes". According to these theories our words are meaningful in virtue of certain intentions of the
speaker. And our intentions consist in having some mental states that should be in the relevant sense subjective or private. (Searle, Chisholm) But there are also philosophers (Kripke, Putnam) who
claim to have evidence to the contrary. They argue that the meanings of our words could not be "in the head", because of two important reasons. (I) Very often we don't know exactly the meanings of
the words that we use meaningfully. Furthermore, our "semantical self-knowledge" is principally corrigible by other people, and hence our access to the meanings we use could be by no means
privileged. And secondly (ii) we can imagine a situation in which two subjects with the same mental intention use the same word with the very different meanings.
We will investigate our question on the ground of the Ingarden's philosophy. As we will see, his answer turns out to be in an interesting sense: "yes and no"."
———. 2002. "Von Brentano Zu Ingarden. Die Phänomenologische Bedeutungslehre." Husserl Studies no. 18:185-208.
Reprinted as Chapter 6 in: A. Chrudzimski - Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein und Intersubjektivität. Studien zur Phänomenologie von Brentano bis Ingarden - Frankfurt, Ontos
Verlag, 2005, pp. 135-160.
———, ed. 2005. Existence, Culture, and Persons. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
Contents: Substances, states, processes, events. Ingarden and the analytic theory of objects by Gregor Haefliger and Guido Küng 9; Ingarden and the ontology of dependence by Peter
Simons 39; Roman Ingarden's ontology: existential dependence, substances, ideas, and other things empiricists do not like by Daniel von Wachter 55; Brentano, Husserl und Ingarden über die
intentionalen Gegenstände by Arkadiusz Chrudzimski 83; Ingarden and the ontology of cultural objects by Amie L. Thomasson 115; Concretization, literary criticism, and the life
of the literary work of art by Jeff Mitscherling 137; Ingarden: from phenomenological realism to moral realism by Edward Swiderski159; Roman Ingardens Ontologie und die Welt by
Andrzej Póltawski 191; Notes on Contributors 221; Index of Names 225
"Actually, the majority of philosophers who find Ingarden's work valuable and inspiring belong to the growing community of "naïve" or "straight" realists who typically don't even
consider transcendental idealism as a serious philosophical option. Ironically, the main goal of Ingarden's philosophical struggle - the refutation of idealism - remained something that very few of
his reader are really interested in.
Most of the papers collected in this volume follow this strand of Ingarden's reception. The first three articles concern the basic ontological categories and distinctions. Gregor
Haefliger and Guido Küng concentrate on categories of substance, state, process, and event, and compare Ingarden's solutions with some contemporary developments. Peter Simons investigates several
concepts of ontological dependence that are central for the especially Ingardenian branch of ontology that Ingarden called "existential ontology". Daniel von Wachter proposes "a Europe-in-seven-days
tour through Ingarden's ontology" (p. 55 in this volume). The next three papers concern the topic of Ingarden's philosophy that happened to become the best known of his achievements: the philosophy
of fiction and of cultural objects. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski sketches the general problematic of intentional objects and argues that they are by no means useless fictions. Amie L. Thomasson presents an
Ingardenian ontology of social and cultural objects such as money, churches, and flags.
Finally, Jeff Mitscherling investigates the difficult topic of the "life" of a literary work of art.
The last two papers open a somewhat wider perspective on Ingarden's work. Edward Swiderski points out an interesting change of perspective that occurred in Ingarden's late work,
which was devoted to the problem of responsibility. He argues that there is a tension between the hypothetical scientific and phenomenological sides of his philosophy. Andrzej Póltawski tries to
answer the question of what Ingarden's ontology would look like if he developed it according to his deeply personalist picture of the world."
———. 2005. Intentionalität, Zeitbewusstsein Und Intersubjektivität. Studien Zur Phänomenologie Von Brentano Bis Ingarden. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos verlag.
Contents: Einführung 7; 1. Franz Brentano über die Intentionalität 17; 2. Franz Brentano über die Zeitbewusstsein 39; 3. Anton Marty 53; 4. Wozu brauchte Carl Stumpf Sachverhalte?
89; 5. Alexius Meinong 107; 6. Von Brentaon zu Ingarden 135; 7. Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität 161; Bibliographie 203; Namenregister 211.
———. 2005. "Brentano, Husserl Und Ingarden Über Die Intentionale Gegenstände." In Existence, Culture, and Persons. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden., edited by Chrudzimski,
Arkadiusz, 83-114. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
Dziemidok, Bohdan, and McCormick, Peter, eds. 1989. On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden: Interpretations and Assessments. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Falk, Eugen. 1981. The Poetics of Roman Ingarden. Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Farber, Marvin. 1973. "On Subjectivism and the World Problem. In Memory of Roman Ingarden." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 7:1-7.
Fizer, John. 1976. "Ingarden's Phases, Bergson's Durée Réelle and James' Stream: Metaphoric Variants or Mutually Exclusive Concepts on the Theme of Time." Analecta
Husserliana no. 4:121-139.
Galewicz, Wlodzimierz. 1994. "Das Problem Des Seinsstatus Der Gegenständlichen Sinne Und Ingardens Ontologie Der Rein Intentionalen Gegenstände." In Kunst Und Ontologie. Für
Roman Ingarden Zum 100. Geburstag, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 5-20. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth, and Strózewski, Wladylasw, eds. 1994. Kunst Und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden Zum 100. Geburtstag. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Gierulanka, Danuta. 1977. "The Philosophical Work of Roman Ingarden." Dialectics and Humanism no. 4:117-128.
———. 1989. "Ingarden's Philosophical Work: A Systematic Outline." In On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden: Interpretations and Assesments, edited by Dziemidok, Bohdan and
McCormick, Peter, 1-20. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"Ingarden's philosophical output does not form a closed system in the sense of a set of statements derived from apriori accepted general assumptions. Following the basic
methodological principle of Husserl's phenomenology, Ingarden obtained results in all areas of his philosophy by referring directly to the "things given in experiences" corresponding to the type of
object being investigated (in direct intuitive cognition). In spite of the great breadth of topics studied his results constitute a lucidly organized whole, as I shall presently try to
Ingarden's writings (over two hundred items including twenty-seven large books) belong primarily to three areas of philosophy: epistemology, ontology, and aesthetics (including the
theory of the work of art). This does not, however, comprise all of his work, as I shall show later.
The first decade of Ingarden's philosophic work already included basic results which set the direction and paths of development of his thought.
I shall discuss the main core of Ingarden's philosophy in several sections, indicating the thought processes leading from one to another. Epistemology, being the least known chapter
of his thought, and ontology, which dominates Ingarden's philosophy, will be discussed more extensively." (p. 2).
Golaszewska, Maria. 1976. "Roman Ingarden's Moral Philosophy." Analecta Husserliana no. 4:73-103.
Górniak-Kocokowska, Krystyna. 1989. "Controversy About Actual Existence: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka Contribution to the Study of Roman Ingarden's Philosophy." Analecta
Husserliana no. 27:165-192.
Gumpel, Liselotte. 1994. "Language as Bearer of Meaning: The Phenomenology of Roman Ingarden." In Kunst Und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden Zum 100. Geburstag, edited by
Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 21-58. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Haefliger, Gregor. 1990. "Ingarden Und Husserls Transzendentaler Idealismus." Husserl Studies no. 7:103-121.
———. 1994. Über Existenz: Die Ontologie Roman Ingardens. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
"This book is a monograph study of Ingarden's investigations into existence. Its aim is to give a clear and formally precise account, as well as a critical evaluation, of his
contributions. In the first chapter the basic principles of Ingarden's ontology are reformulated and, contrary to Ingarden, a nominalistic point of view is adopted. Chapters 2 to 4 give a
reconstruction of the arguments for the following Ingardenian theses: (1) Existence is not a property; (2) The concept of existence is a principle sui generis of classification; (3)
"exist(s)"is an equivocal word. On the basis of this critical doxography Chapters 5 and 6 provide a systematic examination of the Ingardenian position, by confronting it with the results of analytic
philosophy (such as early Husserl, Frege, Russell, Moore, Meinong, Bergmann, Hochberg, Castaneda)."
———. 1994. "Ens Multipliciter Dicitur. The Ingardian Variant of an Old Thesis." In Kunst Und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden Zum 100. Geburstag, edited by Galewicz,
Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 59-78. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"Now, one important thesis of Ingarden Das literarische Kuntswerk (1931) is that a literal work exists in a "purely intentional" way. This thesis was later refined in
Ingarden (1964), where a theory of the different ways of being is elaborated. Even today, however, his theory has not yet received widespread attention. This is so despite the originality and
conceptual transparency of the programme he developed for his theory. And more importantly, his position contains novel viewpoints for an answer to the question of the equivocity of 'to be' - a
question that has long been one of the fundamental questions of ontology.
The aim of this paper is to elucidate Ingarden's answer to this "old" question. To this end we must first acquaint ourselves with the fundamentals of his theory of the different
ways or modes of existence. Then we shall consider the unique position that Ingarden's thesis of the equivocity of 'to be' occupies in the history of philosophy. Finally some suggestions towards a
systematic evaluation of Ingarden's position will be made."
Hanneborg, Knut. 1966. "New Concepts in Ontology. A Review Discussion of Roman Ingarden: Der Streit Um Die Existenz Der Welt." Inquiry no. 9:401-409.
"In his Contemporary European Philosophy Bochenski declared Ingarden's work, The Controversy over the Existence of the World to be one of the most important
philosophical publications of our time. The work had then been published only in Polish, a fact which occasioned Bochenski to deplore the widespread habit of publishing professional philosophy in
languages other than the main European ones.
Now Spór o istnienie swiata has become Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, and the decisive language barrier has been broken. Other obstacles may remain: the 1100
pages do offer, even in non-Polish, a certain resistance. Not that the author has not done his share of the work, for he expresses himself with exemplary precision and by no means leaves the reader
with the task of reducing confusion to clarity. But his perseverance in analysis and the wealth of rigorously differentiated concepts give us a complicated whole to survey. It is the limited purpose
of the present paper to give a short outline of this comprehensive system, and some hints of its place in a larger context."
Heffernan, George. 1998. "Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl's Answer to the Question 'Was Die Evidenz Sei': A Contribution to the Phenomenology of Evidence on the Occasion of
the Publication of Husserliana Volume Xxx." Husserl Studies no. 15:1-75.
Hempolinski, Michal. 1975. "On Ingarden's Conception of 'Pure' Epistemology as a Starting Point to His Criticism of So-Called Psychophysiological Epistemology." Dialectics and
Humanism no. 2:49-54.
Jadacki, Jacek. 1989. "On Roman Ingarden's Semiotic Views: A Contribution to the History of Polish Semiotics." Analecta Husserliana no. 27:523-540.
Johansson, Ingvar. 2009. "Roman Ingarden and the Problem of Universals." Metaphysica.International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics no. 10:65-87.
"The paper ends with an argument that says: necessarily, if there are finitely spatially extended particulars, then there are monadic universals. Before that, in order to
characterize the distinction between particulars and universals, Roman Ingarden's notions of "existential moments" and "modes (ways) of being" are presented; and a new pair of such existential
moments is introduced: Multiplicity-Monadicity. Also, it is argued that there are not only real universals, but instances of universals (tropes) and fictional universals, too."
Kalinowski, Georges. 1968. "Ontologie Et Esthétique Chez Roman Ingarden." Archives de Philosophie no. 31:281-287.
Kersten, Fred. 1972. "On Understanding Idea and Essence in Husserl and Ingarden." Analecta Husserliana no. 2:55-63.
Kocay, Victor. 1996. Forme Et Référence: Le Langage De Roman Ingarden. Sprimont: Pierre Mardaga.
Küng, Guido. 1972. "Ingarden on Language and Ontology." Analecta Husserliana no. 2:204-217.
———. 1972. "The World as Noema and as Referent." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 3:15-26.
———. 1975. "Zum Lebenswerk Von Roman Ingarden: Ontologie, Erkenntnistheorie Und Metaphysik." In Die Münchener Phänomenologie: Vorträge Des Internationalen Kongresses in München,
13.-18. April 1971, edited by Kuhn, Helmuth, 159-173. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Phaenomenologica vol. 65
———. 1982. "Roman Ingarden: (1893-1970) Ontological Phenomenology." In The Phenomenological Movement, edited by Spiegelberg, Herbert, 223-233. The Hague: Martinus
Third revised edition
———. 1986. "Brentano and Ingarden on the Experience and Cognition of Values." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no. 10:57-67.
Laskey, Dallas. 1972. "Ingarden's Criticism of Husserl." Analecta Husserliana no. 2:48-54.
Majewska, Zofia. 2002. "The Philosophy of Roman Ingarden." In Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations, Expanding Dynamisms, Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study,
edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 184-199. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Makota, Janina. 1975. "Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Man." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 6:126-130.
Translated from the Polish by the author with the assistance of E. M. Swiderski.
"Ingarden's views concerning man are scattered throughout his writings. But the bulk of them is contained in the chapter entitled "The problem of the form of pure consciousness" in
the second volume of Controversy over the Existence of the World (1) and in the posthumous A Booklet on Man, (2) which is a collection of previously published articles, lectures, etc. The
most advanced considerations on this subject are contained in the essay On Responsibility. Its Ontic Foundations. (3) What is new in this essay and what proves to be theoretically fruitful
is the application, not only to man as a whole, but to his body and to the psychic side of his being as well, of the conception of relatively isolated systems. This notion had been previously
employed by Ingarden to explain various types of connections within the world as a whole. (4)"
(1) Der Streit urn die Existenz der Welt, vol. 11/2, Tubingen: Niemeyer 1965, chap. 16: "Das Problem der Form des reinen Bewusstseins".
(2) Ksiazecka o czlowieku (A booklet on Man), Krakow; Wydownictwo Literackie 1972, 2.ed. 1973.
(3) Ueber die Verantwortung. Ihre ontischen Fundamente, Stuttgart: Reclam 1970.
(4) Cf. Der Streit . . . vol. I, Tubingen: Niemeyer 1964, p. 104, and especially Der Streit . . . vol. III Ueber die Kausale Struktur der realen Welt, Tubingen: Niemeyer
———. 1986. "Nicolai Hartmann's and Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Man." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no. 10:69-79.
Mardas, Nancy. 2003. "Essence and Existence in Phenomenological Ontology: Roman Ingarden." In The Passions of the Soul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming, edited by
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 183-198. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
McCormick, Peter. 1975. "On Ingarden's Account of the Existence of Aesthetic Objects." Dialectics and Humanism no. 4:31-38.
Miskiewicz, Wioletta. 2003. "Réalisme Gnoseoplogique Contre Réalisme Sceptique: Ingarden Et La Réception De Brentano En Pologne." Études Philosophiques no. 64:83-97.
Mitscherling, Jeff. 1985. "Roman Ingarden's the Literary Work of Art: Exposition and Analyses." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 45:351-382.
———. 1997. Roman Ingarden's Ontology and Aesthetics. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.
Foreword by Raymond Klibansky.
Mohanty, Jitendra Nath. 1997. "Roman Ingarden's Critique of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology." In Phenomenology. Between Essentialism and Transcendental Philosophy,
32-45. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
"Roman Ingarden was Husserl's pupil, and remained in lifelong contact with him, continuously questioning Husserl's positions, especially his transcendental idealism. Whereas the
members of the Munich and Göttingen schools simply abandoned the master as having deviated from the path of philosophy as a rigorous science, Ingarden continued his efforts to understand the motives
and the arguments which led Husserl in that direction. In this relentless effort, he seems to have gone a long way toward understanding, and even agreeing with, Husserl's transcendental-constitutive
phenomenology, but he would nevertheless draw a line that he did not want to cross-thereby preserving his own realistic intuitions from being overtaken by what he took to be an idealistic philosophy.
While thus seeking to understand Husserl, Ingarden also undertook first his famous work Das Literarische Kunstwerk, and then the large, carefully argued work on the controversy regarding the
existence of the world, Die Streit um die Existenz der Welt. One could say that Ingarden's central interest lay in the realism-idealism dispute, and it may also be safely said that no one in
the history of philosophy has more carefully analyzed that issue than he. While Das Literarische Kunstwerk is deservedly more famous, Ingarden undertook it as much out of his interest in the
subject matter of art as out of the desire to advance the discussion of the realism-idealism issue." p. 32
Motroshilova, N.V. 1975. "The Problem of the Cognitive Subject as Viewed by Husserl and Ingarden." Dialectics and Humanism no. 2:17-31.
Póltawski, Andrzej. 1972. "Constitutive Phenomenology and Intentional Objects." Analecta Husserliana no. 2:90-95.
———. 1974. "Consciousness and Action in Ingarden's Thought." Analecta Husserliana no. 3:124-137.
———. 1975. "Ingarden's Way to Realism and His Idea of Man." Dialectics and Humanism no. 2:65-76.
———. 1978. "The Idea and the Place of Human Creativity in the Philosophy of Roman Ingarden." Dialectics and Humanism no. 5:129-140.
———. 1986. "Roman Ingarden. Ein Metaphysiker Der Freiheit." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no. 10:43-56.
Przybysz, Piotr. 1993. "Polish Discussions About Reism." In Possible Ontologies, edited by Augustynek, Zdzislaw and Jacek, Jadacki, 179-193. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Reese, William. 1965. "Phenomenology and Metaphysics." Review of Metaphysics no. 19:103-114.
Riska, Augustin. 1974. "The 'a Priori' in Ingarden's Theory of Meaning." Analecta Husserliana no. 3:138-146.
———. 1976. "Language and Logic in the Work of Roman Ingarden." Analecta Husserliana no. 4:187-217.
Rosiak, Marek. 2009. "Formal and Existential Analysis of Subject and Properties." In Essays in Logic and Ontology, edited by Malinowski, Jacek and Pietrsuzczack, Andrzej,
285-299. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"The paper is a contribution to the object ontology. The general approach assumed in the investigation is that of Roman Ingarden's The Controversy Over the Existence of the
World where an object is the subject-of-properties. The analysis of the form and the mode of existence of properties leads to the rejection of both negative and general properties. Each property
is an individual qualitative moment of a particular object. Its form reveals existential heteronomy: the quality of the property is not immanent but refers to the object. The subject of properties
has not its own qualitative content: its form is just the internal causality establishing the unity of an object. An object is not causally isolated from other objects, but external causation differs
from internal either by being ramified in case of the composition and destruction of an object or reciprocal in case of interaction between coexisting objects."
Ruttkowski, Wolfgang. 2007. Essays on Aesthetics, Poetics and Terminology of Literary Studies. München: Grin Verlag.
Essay I: Stratum, structure, and genre (1973) pp. 4-30.
"The concept of genre can be satisfactorily explained only in comparison with the concepts of stratum and structure. Proceeding from this conviction we
shall try here to establish a demarcation of these often used terms and at the same time prove their interdependence."
Essay III: The main differences between Roman Ingarden's and Nicolai Hartmann's Strata systems (1990) pp. 31-48.
"Although both designed strata-models for various kinds of art and especially for literature, the philosophers Nicolai Hartmann and Roman Ingarden never entered into any kind of
dialogue. Also in secondary literature there is no exact comparison of their systems to be found.
For that reason, the two strata systems are compared here for the first time and their respective advantages and deficiencies are being pointed out.
Amongst other things. the following topics are being discussed: 1. In what way Hartmann's "Real Foreground" ("Realer Vordergrund") is more specifically subdivided in Ingarden's
system. - 2. How, on the other hand. Ingarden's "Stratum of Depicted Objects" ("Schicht der dargestellten Gegenstãndlichkeiten") was more thoroughly subdivided by Hartmann. 3. Why there cannot be
found in Hartmann's system a corresponding stratum for Ingarden's ''Stratum of Schematized Aspects" ("Schicht der schematischen Ansichten") - and 4. Why Hartmann's two strata of the Treat Background"
(''Irrealer Hintergrund") are consolidated by Ingarden and expressly not seen as a stratum."
Ryle, Gilbert. 1927. "Review Of: Essentiale Fragen by Roman Ingarden." Mind no. 36:366-370.
Reprinted in: The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 4, 1973 pp. 72-75
Rynkiewicz, Kazimierz. 2008. Zwischen Realismus Und Idealismus. Ingardens Überwindung Des Transzendentalen Idealismus Husserls. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Sancipriano, Mario. 1976. "Ingarden Et Le 'Vrai' Bergsonisme." Analecta Husserliana no. 4:141-148.
Schaeffer, Jean-Marie, and Potocki, Christophe, eds. 2013. Roman Ingarden: Ontologie, Esthétique, Fiction. Paris: Archives Contemporaines Editions.
Schopper, Werner. 1974. Das Seiende Und Der Gegenstand: Zur Ontologie Roman Ingardens. München: Berchmanskolleg Verlag.
Seifert, Joseph. 1986. "Roman Ingarden' Realism and the Motives That Led Husserl to Adopt Transcendental Idealism: Critical Reflections on the Importance and Limits of Roman
Ingarden's Critique of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no. 10:27-42.
Seifert, Joseph, and Smith, Barry. 1994. "The Truth About Fiction." In Kunst Und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden Zum 100. Geburstag, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker,
Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 97-118. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Shusterman, Richard. 1987. "Ingarden, Inscription and Literary Ontology." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 2:103-119.
Reprinted in: On the Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden: Interpretations and Assessments.
Simons, Peter M. 1986. "Categories and Ways of Being." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no. 10:89-104.
Reprinted in: Peter Simons - Philosophy and logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected essays - Dordrecht, Kluwer 1992 pp. 377-394.
"Ingarden's most substantial contribution to philosophy was his ontology. Ontology, the science of being as being, was conceived in Plato's wrestling with the Eleatics' to
on. Its birth to Aristotle was not without complications for it seemed a single science should have a single genus as object, yet Aristotle denied that to on formed a genus. Given the
role Aristotle gives to genera in definition, this is not surprising, but the outcome is that 'to be' is not said according to one genus, and hence has several meanings. Can there then be a science
of being as being? Aristotle's solution lay in the idea that all these meanings revolved around the central one of to be said of substances. However, not all philosophers shared Aristotle's denial of
a single all-embracing class of objects. Plotinus regarded 'ti', 'something', as denoting a highest genus. Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong and Husserl all used univocal term: like
'etwas' and 'Gegenstand' to mark such a class, while Quine has insisted that 'there are' is univocally rendered by the existential quantifier. Ingarden on the other hand follows
The question of the univocity or multivocity of be is still one of the first questions of ontology. In this paper I use historical comparisons to point to where a solution to the
problem may lie. Ingarden's account of the different ways or modes of being (Seinsweisen, modi essendi) is a most important philosophical contribution to the problem. By chance 1985 marks
not only the fifteenth anniversary of Ingarden's death but also the official 700th anniversary of the birth of the greatest of the late scholastics, William of Ockham, who is also celebrated here. My
motive is however primarily systematic: I think be is indeed analogically ambiguous, though for different reasons than Aristotle or Ingarden. (1) But to be precise about what this mean involves
comparisons in which one looks for help and enlightenment to the great minds of the past."
(1) Cf. my Class, Mass and Mereology, "History and Philosophy of Logic" 4 (1983, 157-80, also Ch. 4 of my book Parts. A Study in Ontology.
———. 1994. "Strata in Ingarden's Ontology." In Kunst Und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden Zum 100. Geburstag, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and
Strózewski, Wladylasw. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
"This paper examines the concept of stratum as employed by Ingarden in his ontological investigations of works of art. Attention is focussed on literary works, which are said to
have four strata, two belonging to language itself. I find Ingarden's stratified account of language correct in principle but defective in execution. In the ontology of literary works, the stratum of
schematized aspects is particularly problematic, and I interpret these as complex meanings, correlated with another element of the work not given sufficient recognition by Ingarden: the Reader. I
suggest the terminology of strata for anworks in general is dispensable."
Skolimowski, Henryk. 1967. Polish Analytical Philosophy. A Survey and a Comparison with British Analytical Philosophy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Smith, Barry. 1975. "The Ontogenesis of Mathematical Objects." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 6:91-101.
———. 1976. "Historicity, Value and Mathematics." Analecta Husserliana no. 4:219-239.
———. 1978. "An Essay in Formal Ontology." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 6:39-62.
———. 1979. "Roman Ingarden: Ontological Foundations for Literary Theory." In Language, Literature and Meaning, edited by Odmark, John, 373-390. Amsterdam: Benjamins
———. 1980. "Ingarden Versus Meinong on the Logic of Fiction." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 41:93-105.
———. 1987. "The Ontology of Epistemology." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no. 11:57-66.
Sodeika, Thomas. 1989. "The Ingarden-Husserl Controversy: The Methodological Status of Consciousness in Phenomenology and the Limits of the Human Condition." Analecta
Husserliana no. 27:209-221.
Spiegelberg, Herbert. 1982. The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Third revised edition; first edition 1960; second edition 1965
Steinbach, Heribert. 1968. "Ist Ontologie Als Phänemonologie Möglich? Kritische Betrachtungen Zu Ingardens Existentialontologie." Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung
Strózewski, Wladylasw. 1963. "Gli Studi Di Estetica Di Roman Ingarden." Rivista di Estetica no. 8:131-142.
———. 1976. "Man and Value in Ingarden's Thought." Analecta Husserliana no. 5:109-123.
———. 1988. "Roman Ingarden's Aesthetic Program." Aletheia: an Internation Journal of Philosophy no. 4:226-234.
Swiderski, Edward. 1975. "Some Salient Features of Ingarden's Ontology." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 2:81-90.
"Ingarden conceived and developed his ontology on the basis of the assumed existence of certain ideal entities, namely pure ideal qualities and Ideas. An examination of these
entities provides, according to him, a knowledge of the corresponding individual essences of individual objects. Although his starting point in this matter reproduces Husserl's original conceptions,
what he found in Husserl's writings on the subject proved finally to be neither sufficient nor clear. For example, with respect to the problem of the existence and nature of Ideas, Ingarden wrote in
the second volume of the Controversy over the Existence of the World: "Actually, what he gave us, his students, in this matter was solely the conviction that a rejection of the existence of
Ideas-in some special manner-must lead to contradictions". (1) At the same time, the associated problem of the essences of individual objects was felt, not only by Ingarden, but Hering and
Spiegelberg as well, (2) to have been inadequately dealt with by Husserl in Ideas I, and it became, consequently, a subject of their own extensive investigations. But what was certainly of value in
Husserl, as far as the foundations of ontology were concerned, was his discussion in the Logical Investigations of the a priori, i.e., of the ideal necessities governing the formal and material
aspects of objects. (3) It is rather this side of Husserl's work which prompted Ingarden to inquire further into the nature of ideal entities, for they, according to him, are the foundations of the
ideal necessities regulating the determinations and the structures of objects.
Accordingly, there are several related subjects to be considered. First, it should be seen how Ingarden conceives objects and their structures in general. This discussion will help
clarify the problem whether Ingarden's theory of objects owes its content to the theory of ideal entities, or whether the reverse is true, that the theory of Ideas, etc., is fashioned after the
requirements of the theory of objects. The possibility that they might be independent theories is excluded because Ideas, etc., are supposed to furnish a certain kind of knowledge about all sorts of
entities whose structures, on the other hand, are already described, in a preliminary general way, by the theory of objects. Second, it should be clarified whether, and if so in what sense, the
structures of objects themselves reflect or indeed embody necessary connections of an ideal character. This calls for an analysis of the notions of "concretion" and "moment" and of their relation to
ideal entities. Finally, after these discussions, it will be possible to deal with the central task of ontology according to Ingarden, namely with the analysis of Ideas as the proper field of
investigations in ontology."
(1) Ingarden, Roman: Spór o istnienie swiata (The Controversy over the Existence of the World) vol. 1, 2nd rev. ed., Warsaw: PWN 1961, p. 63; German ed.: Der Streit um
die Existenz der Welt, vol. II/1, Tubingen; Niemeyer, 1965, p. 229.
(2) Hering, Jean: "Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee", Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, vol. 4, Halle 1921; Spiegelberg,
Herbert: "Uber das Wesen der Ideen", op. cit., vol. 11, Halle, 1930.
(3) Cf. especially Investigation III: "On the theory of wholes and parts" in Logical Investigations, trans.: J. N. Findlay, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1970.
———. 1987. "Ingarden's Puzzling Ontology - Metaphysics Distinction." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no. 11:67-85.
"In this paper I will examine the distinction as well as the connection Ingarden drew between ontology and metaphysics. I want to show that the distinction is problematic and that
therefore the connection remains nebulous. The reason Ingarden gives for the distinction is that a philosopher needs to be clear about what in general, for example, a world is and what sorts of
things can in general "furnish" the world before he can claim that the factual world, as apprehended in ordinary and scientific experience, is "really" thus and so. Now Ingarden had comparatively
little to say about the connection of ontology to metaphysics. However, speaking in his name it seems plausible to envisage a negative and a positive connection. On the negative side, as it cannot be
merely assumed that ontology has some special purchase on the factual world, it may be that no, so to speak, "metaphysical commitment" to what is "really real" would be justifiable on ontological
grounds. On the positive side, if metaphysical statements are grounded in the same evidence that sustains ontological statements, arid the latter do have purchase on the facts, then it follows that
ontology has a prima facie metaphysical import to start with."
———. 1994. "Individual Essence in Ingarden's Ontology." In Kunst Und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden Zum 100. Geburstag, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth
and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 183-206. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
———. 1995. "The Problematic Unity of Culture in Ingarden." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 26:171-188.
Swiecimski, Jerzy. 1974. "Scientific Information Function and Ingarden's Theory of Forms in the Constitution of the Real World." Analecta Husserliana no. 4:165-186.
Szczepanska, Anita. 1975. "Perspectives of the Axiological Investigations of the Work of Roman Ingarden." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no.
Translated from the Polish by the author with the assistance of G. Kung and E. Swiderski. The Polish version of this paper appeared in Studia Estetyczyne, Warsaw, vol. 10 (1973),
"It is not my concern here to repeat Ingarden's well-known theses on the aesthetic quality-structure of a work of art. I want, instead, to do the following: (1) to examine the
relationship between Ingarden's axiological investigations and his earlier inquiry into the general "anatomy" of works of art - literature, painting, music, etc., (2) to attempt a more detailed
characterization of the system of aesthetically significant qualities and, in particular, to state what the system is not, (3) to show the wide field of investigations opened up by the concept of the
system of qualities, (4) to show possible directions and make certain suggestions concerning further study of the system of qualities, together with an account of previous attempts and of the
difficulties thus brought to light."
Szylewicz, Arthur. 1993. "Roman Ingarden's Review of the Second Edition of Husserl's Logical Investigations." Husserl Studies no. 10:1-12.
Contains the English translation of Ingarden's Review at pp. 4-12.
"The review of the Second Edition of E. Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen was Roman Ingarden's very first publication. At the time of its appearance, 1915, Ingarden was
still studying in Freiburg, working on his Ph.D. under Husserl. What could have prompted the youthful Ingarden to write such a review? The fact that the review was written in Polish suggests that
Ingarden may simply have grasped an opportunity to arouse the Polish philosophical community's interest in a work that he regarded as monumental and, perhaps more generally, to stir its awareness of
phenomenology as a movement. It may be no accident that the review appears in a section of the journal entitled "Survey of Contemporary Systems". More compelling evidence for this occasional motive
is the fact that Ingarden's first major publication was an extensive "introduction" to phenomenology. It was meant to remedy the deplorable state of almost total ignorance of
phenomenology that Ingarden encountered on his return to Poland following the completion of his studies with Husserl." p. 1
Tarnowski, Karol. 1976. "Roman Ingarden's Critique of Transcendental Constitution." Dialectics and Humanism no. 3:111-119.
Thomasson, Amie L. 2005. "Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural Objects." In Existence, Culture, and Persons. The Ontology of Roman Ingarden., edited by Chrudzimski,
Arkadiusz, 115-136. Frankfurt am Mein: Ontos Verlag.
"While Roman Ingarden is well known for his work in aesthetics and studies in ontology, one of his most important and lasting contributions has been largely overlooked: his approach
to a general ontology of social and cultural objects. Ingarden himself discusses cultural objects other than works of art directly in the first section of "The Architectural Work", where he develops
a particularly penetrating view of the ontology of buildings, flags, and churches. This text provides the core insight into how his more lengthy studies of the ontology of works of art in The
Literary Work of Art and the rest of The Ontology of the Work of Art, combined with the ontological distinctions of Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, may be used to
understand social and cultural objects. The view that results, I will argue, is based in foreseeing problems with the reductivist and projectivist views that remain popular, and is capable of
resolving central problems still thought to plague those who would offer a theory of cultural objects.
Social and cultural objects such as money, churches, and flags present a puzzle since they seem, on the one hand, to be entities that clearly -- in some sense -- depend on minds,
and yet, on the other hand, seem to be objective parts of our world, things of which we may acquire knowledge (both in daily life and in the social sciences), and which we cannot merely modify at
will. But it is hard to see how any entity could exhibit both of those characteristics - if, on the one hand, we take their objectivity and mind-externality seriously, and consider them to be
identifiable with physical objects, we find ourselves saddled with absurd conclusions about the conditions under which such entities would exist and persist, and neglect their symbolic and normative
features. If, on the other hand, we treat them as mere creations of the mind, they seem either reduced to phantasms that could not have the recalcitrance and impact on our lives cultural objects
apparently exhibit, or we seem to be positing 'magical' modes of creation whereby the mind can generate real, mind-external objects.
Ingarden, I will argue, foresees the problems with each of these alternatives and diagnoses of the root of the problem as lying in too narrow an understanding of the senses in which
an entity may be mind-dependent, and too narrow a set of ontological categories for entities there may be.
Once we can make evident the different senses in which something may be mind-dependent, and the different kinds of object there may be, we can find room for cultural objects
considered as entities that are neither mere physical objects nor projections of the mind, but instead depend in complex ways on both foundations. Such a moderate realist view, I will argue, can
provide the means to overcome the problems thought to plague social ontology and show the way to a more comprehensive ontology."
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. 1955. Essence Et Existence. Étude À Propos De La Philosophie De Roman Ingarden Et De Nicolai Hartmann. Paris: Aubier Montaigne.
Second edition 1957
———. 1955. "Un Dessin De La Philosophie De Roman Ingarden." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no. 60:32-57.
———, ed. 1959. For Roman Ingarden: Nine Essays in Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
———. 1965. "Existence Vindicated or the Hundred Real Dollars." Personalist no. 46:211-221.
———. 1975. "Roman Ingarden's Philosophical Legacy and Beyond: The Creative Freedom of the Possible Worlds." Dialectics and Humanism no. 2:71-87.
———. 1976. "Beyond Ingarden's Idealism-Realism Controversy with Husserl: The New Contextual Phase of Phenomenology." Analecta Husserliana no. 4:241-418.
Urchs, Max. 1994. "On Causality. Ingarden's Analysis Vs. Jaskwski Logic." Logic and Logical Philosophy no. 2:55-68.
Wachter, Daniel von. 2005. "Roman Ingarden's Ontology: Existential Dependence, Substances, Ideas, and Other Things Empiricists Do Not Like." In Existence, Culture, and Persons.
The Ontology of Roman Ingarden, edited by Chrudzimski, Arkadiusz, 55-82. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
"Ingarden's ontology is an impressive biotope. It takes Ingarden 1840 pages to set it up. His style is not cryptic, but he writes down not only how he thinks things are and his
arguments for his views, but all his thoughts about the matter, in good phenomenological tradition. The editors of this book have asked me to move on a bit more swiftly. As life is short, let us take
a Europe-in-seven-days tour through Ingarden's ontology. Preparing the travel we need to clarify what ontology is for Ingarden, how it relates to semantics, and how it relates to
metaphysics. Then we shall turn to different kinds of existential dependence and to the distinction between form and matter. Having considered these preliminaries we shall consider
Ingarden's conception of a substance and, more briefly, his other categories. While my main aim is to guide you through Ingarden's ontology I shall also indicate where I think the actual world is not
as Ingarden describes it."
Wallner, Ingrid. 1987. "In Defense of Husserl's Transcendental Idealism: Roman Ingarden's Critique Re-Examined." Husserl Studies no. 4:3-43.
Wegrzecki, Adam. 1975. "On the Absoluteness of Values." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology no. 6:109-115.
Translated from the Polish by E. M. Swiderski.
"In his axiological considerations, undertaken with increasing intensity in the last years of his life, Roman Ingarden devoted much attention to the problem of the relativity of
values. Above all, he attempted to determine what it is that we have in mind when we talk about this particular aspect of values. He also pointed out in a more or less decided way whether and how it
is possible to ascribe "relativity" to a given type of values. He himself was reluctant to accept an axiological relativism, especially in its extreme form according to which all values would be
relative in every possible way. He felt that such a radical view on values leads inevitably to subjectivism, to a denial of various axiological qualifications for various spheres of being. Though he
was indeed opposed to this view it was not only because of its theoretical and practical consequences, but above all because of the far-reaching simplifications it entailed, the superficiality of the
argumentation as well as its disregard for the factual state of affairs accessible to the unprejudiced researcher of value-phenomena.
Nevertheless, Ingarden's opposition to a radical axiological relativism does not mean that he spoke out for a radical axiological absolutism. Such an inference would be too hasty
since, as I shall try to show, it would impute to Ingarden a point of view which has no foundation in his investigations of values. In order to ascertain whether Ingarden's theory of values
eventually does allow for some conception of an axiological absolutism, a closer analysis must be carried out of those of its assertions which directly or indirectly touch upon the absoluteness of
values. In this regard Ingarden's significant methodological postulate must be kept in mind, namely that in axiological considerations the essential differences among types of values are not to be
obscured. This means, in the first place, that a mechanical transference of assertions that apply to one type of values to some other type or types is invalid; and, in the second place, that a
mechanical extension to various types of values of the validity of a series of general axiological theses having the character of pure theoretical possibilities is also invalid. Hence to determine in
what sense Ingarden would be willing to admit an axiological absolutism is not at all the same thing as resolving the question of what kind of absoluteness belongs, according to him, to the given
types of values. Most of the remarks in Ingarden's axiology refer to ethical and aesthetic values which makes it possible to determine more exactly their "absoluteness-character" and, at the same
time, to indicate which purely theoretical possibilities are "realized" in the case of these types of values.
It is possible to infer from certain of Ingarden's statements that he excludes certain forms of the absoluteness of values encountered in axiological thought. Thus he rejects the
view which was once current that values are autonomous objects of a particular kind existing independently of everything and having in themselves the foundation of their continued existence.
According to this view, values are simply ideal objects. Ingarden rejects this form of a radically conceived absoluteness of values if only because he considers that a value is always a value of
something, or in something, or for something. Moreover, it does not possess the form of an object, whether or not it exists ideally or otherwise, and it always requires the appropriate foundation for
its existence. This conviction applies to all values." p. 109.
———. 1994. "The Function of Ontology and Experience in Roman Ingarden's Axiological Investigations." In Kunst Und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden Zum 100. Geburstag, edited
by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker, Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 219-228. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Wolenski, Jan. 1986. "Remarks on Primitivity and Secondarity as Moments of Existence." Reports on Philosophy (Jagiellonian University) no. 10:81-87.
"In the summary I should like to say that various problems of Ingarden's existential ontology can be profitably analysed by means of contemporary modal logic. On the other hand, it
is highly probable that some elements of Ingardenian ontology may be helpful for modal logicians. In spite of the known Ingarden's very critical assesment of formal logic, there is a need for close
cooperation between logicians and philosophers in Ingarden's style. I hope that my considerations justify such an opinion."
———. 1994. "Sentences, Propositions and Quasi-Propositions." In Kunst Und Ontologie. Für Roman Ingarden Zum 100. Geburstag, edited by Galewicz, Wlodzimierz, Ströker,
Elisabeth and Strózewski, Wladylasw, 229-235. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Zeglen, Ursula. 1985. "An Attempt at a Formal Analysis of Pure Qualities in Ingarden's Ontology." In Studies in Logic and Theory of Knowledge, edited by Borkowski, Ludwik,
———. 1996. "Meinong and Ingarden on Negative Judgements." Axiomathes:267-277.