Braga da Silva, André Luiz. 2024. "Does Plato Revise His Ontology in Sophist 256a? Notes on the “being” of the Ideas." In Plato’s Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 341–348.

Abstract: "In the Republic, Socrates affirms that the Good causes the “being” of the other Ideas (R. 509b7-8). It is to some extent noteworthy, however, that the Visitor, in the Sophist, establishes that the “being” of each Idea is caused by participation in Being (256a1-2). Apparently, the same predicate of the Ideas is explained in two works by different causes. To assess that scenario, this paper faces three questions: i) Does “being” have the same meaning in both dialogues? ii) Is it possible to establish a rule for the causation of the predicates within the so-called Theory of the Ideas? iii) Is Plato changing or revising his ontology in Sophist 256a?"
Brisson, Luc. 2011. "Does Dialectic Always Deal with the Intelligible? A Reading of the Sophist 254d5-e1." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 156–172. Praha: Oikoymenh.
Brisson, Luc, Halper, Edward C., and Parry, Richard D., eds. 2024. Plato's Sophist: selected papers of the thirteenth Symposium Platonicum. Baden-Baden: Verlag Karl Alber within Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum, Athens, GA, USA (Jul. 18-22, 2022).

Contents: I. Philosophers and Sophists.

François Renaud: Socrate citateur d’Homère dans le prologue du Sophiste : considérations morales et elenchos 17; Christopher Rowe: The Sophist, Sophists, and Socrates 25; Noburu Notomi: Similarities between the Sophist and the Philosopher 39; Mauro Bonazzi: Of Dogs and Wolves, Fathers and Sons, Sophists and Philosophers 55; Cătălin Enache: The Sophist’s Invisibility vs The Philosopher’s Invisibility 71; Nikos G. Charalabopoulos: Invisible epiphanies in Plato’s Sophist (253c-254b) 79;

II. The Method of Division.

Fernando Muniz and George Rudebusch: Division and Metaphysics in Plato 89; Naoya Iwata: What is the Process of Division for? 99; Verity Harte: Dialectical Know-How: A Deflationary Approach to Sophist 253b-254a 107; Filippo Sirianni: Dynamis, Definition and Division in Plato’s Sophist 125; G.R.F. Ferrari: Plato’s Sophist: Rebarbative by Design? 135; Sebastian Odzuck: Why Should We Assume There is Divine Productive Art? 143;

III. Eleatic Stranger and Noble Sophist.

Jan Szaif: Philosophical paideia in Plato’s Sophist 153; Zdenek Lenner: Erōs-Hunter in the Sophist: who chases whom, how and where? 163; Nestor-Luis Cordero: The Stranger of the Sophist: A Citizen of Elea “Different” from the Eleatic Philosophers 173; Julia Pfefferkorn: Auf der Jagd nach einem Gestaltwandler: Zur Komposition des Sophistes (Chasing a Shape-Shifter: On the Composition of the Sophist) 183; Mario Regali: Platone γενναῖος σοφιστής: per un’interpretazione metaletteraria della sezione sulla “nobile sofistica” (Sph. 226b-231c) 193; Alessandro Stavru: How Socratic Is the “Noble Art of Sophistry”? Tracing the Gennaia Sophistike of the Sixth Diaeresis Back to Old Comedy 201; Franco Trabattoni: Platone confuta Parmenide, senza commettere parricidio. 211; Francesco Ferro: Parmenide padre superficiale e testardo. L’eredità eleatica nel Sofista. 219; Florian Marion: The Late-Learners of the School of Names: Sophist, 251a8-c6: ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος (the good man) and 白馬 (white horse) 227; Simon Noriega-Olmos: The Enigmatic Locus Desperatus at Sophist 244d11–12 237;

IV. Dynamis and Being.

Francisco J. Gonzalez: The Kinêsis of Being in Plato’s Sophist and the Motivation for Aristotle’s Notion of Energeia 249; Carolina Araujo: Power of Connection as the Mark of Beings 257; Lloyd P. Gerson: Being and Power in Plato’s Sophist 265; Yan Lu: Modes of Power and Different Beings in Sophist 246a-249d 273; Raúl Gutiérrez: Koinōnía, Dynamis y Justicia 283; Maurizio Migliori: To Act and to Suffer: Allusions to Plato’s Dialectical Metaphysics in the Sophist 291; Paolo Gigli: Like a Child Begging for Both (Pl. Sph. 248-249) 307; Richard Patterson: Knower and Known: The Making of a Sophistes 315;

V. Being and Non-Being.

John Palmer: What completely is, what in no way is, and what is and is not in Plato’s Sophist and Republic 325; Claudia Gianturco: Malum esse duplex, et le non ens ipsum: la distinzione tra τὸ μὴ ὄν e τὸ μηδαμῶς ν del Sofista di Platone nella soluzione procliana al problema del male 333; André Luiz Braga da Silva: Does Plato Revise His Ontology in Sophist 256a? Notes on the “being” of the Ideas 341; Roberto Granieri: The Referents of ‘Being’ in Plato’s Sophist 349; Jenny K. Strandberg: Finding Certainty in the Being of Non-Being: A Final Rejoinder to Protagoras 357; David J. Murphy: Σκοπός and the Unity of the Sophist 365; Rafael Ferber: The Overt Argument Against Conceptualism in the Parmenides and the Covert Argument for Conceptualism in the Sophist (with a Particular Focus on the Being of Not-Being) 373; Thomas Tuozzo: The Eidos of Non-existence in Plato’s Sophist: 257a11-b4 381; Yuji Kurihara: Two Ontological Functions of the Nature of Difference in Plato’s Sophist 389;

VI. Kinds.

Lesley Brown: Sixty-five years of the communion of kinds: a reappraisal of Ackrill’s ‘Plato and the Copula’ 401; Nicolas Zaks: Why are Change and Stability Different from Difference and Sameness? A Reappraisal of Sophist 255a4-255b7 417; Michael Wiitala: Parts of Difference in Plato’s Sophist, with Help from Republic V 425; Béatrice Lienemann: Self-Participation of Forms in Plato? An Analysis of Sophist 255e3-6 433;

VII. Truth and Falsehood.

Paolo Crivelli: The Sophist on Truth and Falsehood: Between Aristotle and Frege 445; Manfred Kraus: Ἀληθὴς δόξα in the Sophist between Theaetetus and Seventh Letter 461; Monique Dixsaut: L’homme apprend, Théétète est-assis et Théétète vole 469; Michele Corradi: Sulla lotta e le altre τέχναι. Protagora nel Sofista 485;

VIII. Before and After the Sophist.

Ronna Burger: Socratic Philosophy on Trial: Plato’s Sophist and its Homeric Model 495; Claudia Marsico: What is Wrong with Theaetetus’ Flight? Antisthenes and the Eleatic Hints in Plato’s Sophist 511; Harold Tarrant: The Place of the Sophist in Old Academic Theory and Curriculum 527; Anna Motta L’eredità del Sofista nell’isagogica neoplatonica: le testimonianze di Giamblico e Proclo 535;

References 543; Index Nominun 567; Index Subiectium 571-573.
Brown, Lesley. 1986. "Being in the Sophist: A Syntactical Enquiry." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 4:49–70.

Reprinted with revisions in G. Fine (ed.), Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), pp. 455–478.

"Plato's Sophist presents a tantalizing challenge to the modern student of philosophy. In its central section we find a Plato whose interests and methods seem at once close to and yet remote from our own. John Ackrill's seminal papers on the Sophist, (1) published in the fifties, emphasized the closeness, and in optimistic vein credited Plato with several successes in conceptual analysis. These articles combine boldness of 'argument with exceptional clarity and economy of expression, and though subsequent writers have cast doubt on some of Ackrill's claims for the Sophist the articles remain essential reading for all students of the dialogue. I am happy to contribute an essay on the Sophist to this volume dedicated to John Ackrill.

Among the most disputed questions in the interpretation of the Sophist is that of whether Plato therein marks off different uses of the verb einai, 'to be'. This paper addresses one issue under that heading, that of the distinction between the 'complete' and 'incomplete' uses of 'to be', which has usually been associated with the distinction between the 'is' that means 'exists' and the 'is' of predication, that is, the copula." (p. 49)

(1) Symploke Eidon (1955) and Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-59 (1957), both reprinted in Plato I, ed G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), 201-9 and 210-22.
———. 1994. "The Verb 'To Be' in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks." In Companions to Ancient Thought: Language, edited by Everson, Stephen, 212–236. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The existence of at least these three distinct uses of 'is' was taken for granted by commentators and assumed to apply, by and large, to ancient Greek, though with some salient differences. These include the fact that Greek can and regularly does omit esti in the present tense, though not in other tenses, and that the complete 'is' is still very much a going concern, though more or less defunct in modern English. The fact that the esti of the copula can be omitted means that a predicative use of esti can convey a nuance over and above that of the mere copula (for instance connoting what really is F rather than merely appearing F, or what is enduringly F).

And the fact that current English has more or less abandoned the use of the complete 'is' to mean 'exist' (as in Hamlet's 'To be or not to be), while in Greek it is very much a going concern, may lead us to question whether the complete esti really shares the features of the 'is' which means (or used to mean) 'exist'." (p. 215)

(...)

"I cannot offer here a full account of what I take to be the results of the Sophist, far less a defence of such an account, but confine myself to a few points. To the question whether the dialogue distinguishes an 'is' of identity from an 'is' of predication, I have indicated my answer: that it does not, but it does draw an important distinction between identity-sentences and predications (see section I and n. 2 above). Here I focus on the question whether and if so how it distinguishes complete from incomplete uses. I shall suggest that Plato developed a better theory about the negative 'is not' than his argumentation in the Republic suggests, while continuing to treat the relation between the complete use (X is) and the incomplete (X is F) in the way I have described in section IV, that is, by analogy with the relation between 'X teaches' and 'X teaches singing'." (p. 229)
———. 2001. "Innovation and Continuity: The Battle of Gods and Giants, Sophist 245-249." In Method in Ancient Philosophy, edited by Gentzler, Jyl, 181–207. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In Greek mythology, Zeus and the other Olympian deities were challenged in a mighty battle by the race of giants, a battle which, with the help of Herakles, the gods won. Unlike the earlier battle of the Titans, in which Zeus' party defeated and supplanted their own forebears, the Titans, the Gigantomachia ended with the preservation of the old order in the face of the newcomers' challenge.

(...)

Here I focus on the section of the Sophist whose high point is represented by Plato, through his chief speaker, the Stranger, as a Gigantomachia, a debate about being between materialists and immaterialists, or so-called Friends of the Forms. The materialists, cast in the role of 'giants', hold that only the material (what is or has a body) is or exists.

Their opponent the 'gods', labelled 'Friends of the Forms', take the opposite view; they accord the title 'being' only to the immaterial, to 'certain intelligible Forms', and relegate to the status of genesis (coming to be) those material, changing things the giants champion. In this section, in which the Stranger takes on each party in turn and aims at a rapprochement between them, Plato takes what may be thought of as first steps in ontology. in reflective discussion and argument about what there is and about how one should approach the question of what there is. There is considerable disagreement over the upshot of the whole debate, and especially over whether the discussion of the Friends of the Forms' views concludes with the Stranger advocating a radical departure from the treatment of Forms in the middle dialogues: both Owen and Moravcsik advocate a reading whereby the immutability of the Forms is abandoned.(1) Here I re-examine the Gigantomachia, asking what philosophical moves and results it contains. In doing so, I consider what use Plato makes of two innovations in approach which can be detected in the later dialogues, and in particular in the Sophist." (pp. 181-182)
———. 2008. "The Sophist on Statements, Predication, and Falsehood." In The Oxford Handbook of Plato, edited by Fine, Gail, 383–410. New York: Oxford University Press.

"This essay focuses on two key problems discussed and solved in the Middle Part: the Late-learners problem (the denial of predication), and the problem of false statement. I look at how each is, in a way, a problem about correct speaking; how each gave rise to serious philosophical difficulty, as well as being a source of eristic troublemaking; and how the Eleatic Stranger offers a definitive solution to both. As I said above, the Sophist displays an unusually didactic approach: Plato makes it clear that he has important matter to impart, and he does so with a firm hand, especially on the two issues I've selected." (p. 438)
———. 2010. "Definition and Division in Plato' Sophist." In Definition in Greek Philosophy, edited by Charles, David, 151–171. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In Plato's late dialogues Sophist and Politicus (Statesman), we find the chief speaker, the Eleatic Stranger, pursuing the task of definition with the help of the so-called method of division.

(...)

However, there are major and well-known problems in evaluating the method as practised in the two dialogues, but especially so in the Sophist.

(...)

I investigate below some of the many scholarly responses to this bewildering display of the much-vaunted method of division. I divide scholars into a 'no-faction', those who hold that we should not try to discern, in any or all of the dialogue's definitions, a positive outcome to the investigation into what sophistry is (Ryle, Cherniss), and a 'yes-faction': those who think an outcome is to be found (Moravcsik, Cornford, and others).(2) I shall conclude that in spite of the appearance of many answers (Moravcsik) or one answer (Cornford, Notomi), the reader is not to think that any of the definitions give the (or a) correct account of what sophistry is. But while I side with the no-faction, my reasons differ from those of Kyle and Cherniss, who, in their different ways, located the failure in the nature of the method of division. In my view the failure lies not, or not primarily, in the method of division itself; but in the object chosen for discussion and definition. Sophistry, the sophist: these are not appropriate terms to be given, a serious definition, for the simple reason that a sophist is not a genuine kind that possesses an essence to be discerned.(3) If we try to carve nature at the joints, we cannot hope to find that part of reality which is sophistry, for there is no such genuine kind as sophistry-especially not under the genus of techne, art, skill, or expertise." (pp. 151-153).

(2) The views of Moravcsik, Cornford, and Notomi are discussed in the text of section III; those of the 'no-faction' in note 17.

(3) I use 'genuine kind' to indicate something with a wider extension than that of 'natural kind' familiar from Locke, Putnam, etc. I use it to mean the kind of entity which Plato would allow to have an ousia (essence) or phusis (nature) of its own (cf. Tht. 172b). Virtues, senses like hearing and sight, and crafts like angling would be recognized as genuine kinds in the intended sense."
———. 2012. "Negation and Non-Being: Dark Matter in the Sophist." In Presocratics and Plato: Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn, edited by Patterson, Richard, Karasmanis, Vassilis and Hermann, Arnold, 233–254. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

"My aim is to try to understand what I regard as the most difficult stretch of the Sophist, 257–259. In responding to a particularly impenetrable claim made by the Eleatic Stranger (ES), Theaetetus announces at 258b7 that they have found τὸ μὴ ὄν (not being), which they have been searching for on account of the sophist. He is thinking, of course, of what sparked the long excursus into not being and being: the sophist’s imagined challenge to the inquirers’ defining his expertise as involving images and falsehood. Here’s that challenge: speaking of images and falsehood requires speaking of what is not, and combining it with being, but to do so risks contradiction and infringes a dictum of Parmenides. This heralds the puzzles of not being, and of being, which are followed by the positive investigations of the Sophist’s Middle Part. So Theaetetus’ eureka moment ought to signal some satisfying clarification and closure to the discussions. But in fact the stretch it is embedded in is singularly baffling, and the subject of continuing debate among commentators.(2) There is little agreement about what issues Plato is discussing in this section, let alone about any supposed solutions.

My strategy is to try to read the passage without preconceived ideas about what it ought to contain." (pp. 233-234)

(2) I list here and in the next two notes some of the major discussions. I have learned from them all, and from many others not mentioned: M. Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage. Hypomnemata 18 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967). G. E. L. Owen, “Plato on Not-being,” in Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays 1, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1971), 223–267. Owen’s essay is reprinted in Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. G. Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). E. N. Lee, “Plato on Negation and Not-being in the Sophist,” The Philosophical Review 81.3 (1972): 267–304. D. Bostock, “Plato on ‘Is Not’,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984), 89–119. M. Ferejohn, “Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and Semantic Fragmentation,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 71 (1989), 257–282. M. Frede, “Plato’s Sophist on False Statements,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. R. Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 397–424.

(3) J. van Eck, “Falsity without Negative Predication: On Sophistes 255e–263d,” Phronesis 40 (1995), 20–47 (...).

(4) J. Kostman, “False Logos and Not-Being in Plato’s Sophist,” in Patterns in Plato’s Thought, ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1973) (...).
———. 2018. "Aporia in Plato’s Theaetetus and Sophist." In The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, edited by Karamanolis, George and Politis, Vasilis, 91–111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Abstract: "The chief aim of this essay is to examine the development of Plato’s use of philosophical puzzles to guide his enquiries. Labelled aporiai, they are prominent in Sophist, but already found in Theaetetus. Section 2 identifies common features in such puzzles, and explores how in Theaetetus they are presented but left unsolved. In both dialogues the young Theaetetus is characterised as an ideal interlocutor, quick to appreciate a philosophical puzzle, and to respond appropriately. By these means Plato links the otherwise very disparate dialogues: Theaetetus, a formally aporetic attempt to define knowledge conducted by Socrates, and Sophist, whose new protagonist, the Stranger from Elea, confidently announces results both in the Outer Part’s search for the sophist and in solving the problems of the Middle Part.(1) Section 3 traces how the Sophist’s Middle Part is explicitly structured around a series of philosophical puzzles, and notes the plentiful terminology of aporia that signposts this. Plato shows his readers the philosophical payoffs of a serious attempt to diagnose the source of a given aporia: herein (I suggest) lies the real difference between the sophist and the philosopher.

But first Section I explores the famous image in Theaetetus of Socrates as a midwife, where Plato offers what I read as a new approach to the respondent’s subjective aporia."

(1) I follow Szaif’s classification of a formally aporetic dialogue, Chapter 2 [same volume], Section 2. Like other formally aporetic dialogues, This has been the subject of many doctrinal readings, cf. Sedley 2004.

References

Jan Szaif, "Socrates and the Benefits of Puzzlement", G. Karamanolis, V.Politis (eds.), The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, 2018.

David Sedley, The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato’s Theaetetus, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
———. 2024. "Sixty-five years of the communion of kinds: a reappraisal of Ackrill’s ‘Plato and the Copula’." In Plato’s Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 401–415.

Abstract: "I offer a reappraisal of Ackrill’s classic 1957 article ‘Plato and the Copula’ in the light of subsequent scholarship, and celebrate its lasting achievement. In a coda I defend the semantic continuity thesis of einai from some recent objections."
Brown, Ryan Michael. 2024. "Plato on the Goodness of Difference: The Convertibility of the Transcendentals in the Sophist." Journal of Speculative Philosophy no. 38:373–390.

Abstract: "This article argues that Plato’s Sophist can be understood as promoting a rudimentary version of the medieval notion of the “convertibility of the transcendentals,” that is, that there are certain properties of being, such as unity and truth, that have the same extension as being but add conceptual content to being. Histories of the doctrine of the transcendentals tend to trace transcendental thought back no earlier than Aristotle and thus ignore the relevance of Plato generally and the Sophist specifically. This article argues that the Eleatic Stranger’s discourse on the five “greatest kinds” (megista genē) indicates that Sameness and Otherness fulfill the criteria of transcendentality. The article uses this analysis to provide an avenue for further study of Platonic metaphysics in the hope that the notion of “convertibility of the transcendentals” will aid interpreters in understanding how to bring together Plato’s various accounts of what is metaphysically ultimate. This article suggests that, in addition to sameness and otherness, unity, goodness, truth, and beauty are also transcendentals within Platonic metaphysics. The article concludes by implying that difference (i.e., Otherness) must be ontologically good in Platonic thought, contrary to the common criticism that Platonism both denigrates difference and subordinates it to sameness."
Brumbaugh, Robert S. 1983. "Diction and dialectic. The language of Plato's Stranger from Elea." In Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy, edited by Robb, Kevin, 266–276. LaSalle: Open Court.

Reprinted in R. S. Brumbaugh, Platonic Studies of Greek Philosophy: Form, Arts, Gadgets, and Hemlock, Albany: State University Press, 1989, pp. 103-111.

"An interesting effect of Eric Havelock's discussion has been the constant reminder of the location of Plato at the end of a dominant oral tradition, without which there might be the temptation to take Platonic dialogue as a discontinuous leap into literacy, thus leading a modem reader to misread the texts. For example, we easily assume, because we have not thought about it, that reading was done silently in Plato's time; that there were equivalents of our copyrights and publishers; even -in some cases- an axiom that "mature" thought must be expressed in clear, monochrome treatise. All of this helps misunderstand the dialogue form.

(...)

The purpose of my present comments is to relate this framework to the interpretation of Plato's Sophist, with a passing glance at the Statesman. In particular, I want to follow up a suggestion I made earlier, that the principal speaker, the Eleatic Stranger, is an imported bounty-hunter, brought in to shoot the Sophist down (or, more exactly in the absence of the rifle, to catch him in a net). The "weapons" are, perhaps, new (or old) techniques of method and language. (For this simile, compare Socrates' remark in the Philebus that he will now require "weapons of a different kind" to resolve a shifted point under debate.)(2)" (p. 103)

(2) Philebus 23B5
Brunschwig, Jacques. 1994. "The Stoic Theory of the Supreme Genus and Platonic Ontology." In Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy, 92–157. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

English translation by Janet Lloyd of La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et l'ontologie platonicienne (1988).

"The discussion upon which I shall now embark is divided into six parts. In the introduction (i), I shall make a few observations on various structural problems which spring to mind once one examines the TSG doctrine [the doctrine of the τί as the supreme genus]. In part II, which is devoted to the chronology of the TSG doctrine, or more precisely to a kind of chronological topology of this doctrine, I shall be analysing a number of texts which could have been and/or were used as arguments to support the adoption of the TSG doctrine at a relatively late date in the history of Stoic thought, and I shall try to show that these texts do not justify such a conclusion. In the next two parts, I shall try to establish the role that may have been played by the reading of Plato's Sophist (III) and that possibly played by critical reflection upon the Platonic theory of Forms (IV) in the elaboration of the TSG doctrine. In the last two parts, finally, I shall try to put together two kinds of arguments that confirm my general thesis: to refute the idea that the TSG doctrine is the fruit of an induction based upon an analysis of the canonical incorporeals, I shall try to bring to light the disparities that those incorporeals present and the discrepancies between the various arguments used by the Stoics to fix their ontological status (V). To confirm the role played by the mediation of Platonism in the construction of the TSG doctrine, I shall examine some of the objections put to the Stoics by their adversaries on the subject of this doctrine and the varying degrees of attention that the Stoics paid to those objections (VI)." (pp. 95-96)
Bruseker, George. 2018. "The Metaphor of Hunting and the Method of Division in the Sophist." In Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy Volume 2, Section II: Classical Greek Philosophy, edited by Boudouris, Kostantinos, 55–60. Athens: Greek Philosophical Society.

Abstract: "This paper examines the metaphor of hunting as used in Plato’s dialogue, the Sophist. In it, we explore the idea that the example of the ‘angler’ given at the start of the dialogue is no throw-away example, but opens up the metaphor of hunting as an important element of understanding how to use the method of division introduced for coming to definitional knowledge. I argue that the use of the metaphor of hunting is a pedagogical tool that transforms the attentive student’s understanding of the method of division from a dry science of definition, to a manner of approaching the search for truth. Applied reflexively to the search for the definition of the sophist, it helps reveal that the search for knowledge is a non-linear, iterative process which requires passing-through, and abides no shortcuts. It leaves open the suggestion that the true image of knowledge and the philosopher may finally be found in a version of acquisitive rather than productive or separative arts (as they are classified within the dialogue)."
Buckels, Christopher. 2015. "Motion and Rest as Genuinely Greatest Kinds in the Sophist." Ancient Philosophy no. 35:317–327.

"The blending of the greatest kinds (γένη) or forms (εϊδη) is one of the central topics of Plato's Sophist. These greatest kinds, or megista gene, which seem to be either Platonic Forms or very similar to Platonic Forms, are Being, Motion, Rest, Sameness, and Otherness; I take them to be properties that are predicated of other things, for reasons we will examine. Why these five kinds are greatest is not made explicit, but immediately before taking up his investigation, the Eleatic Visitor, the main speaker of the dialogue, says that some kinds are ‘all-pervading’, such that nothing prohibits them from blending with every other kind, i.e., from being predicated of every other kind (254b10-c1). One might think, then, that these five are examples of all-pervading kinds. Almost immediately, however, the Visitor and his interlocutor, Theaetetus, agree that Motion and Rest do not blend with each other, which seems to cut off this explanation of their greatness (252d9-11). For this reason, many commentators suggest that Motion and Rest are simply convenient examples of kinds, garnered from discussions earlier in the text, and only Being, Sameness, and Otherness are special, all-pervading kinds. On this reading. Hot and Cold, which are also examples from earlier in the text (243d6-244b4), would seem to do the job just as well as Motion and Rest, since both pairs are opposites that do not blend with each other but which are (by blending with Being), are self-identical (by blending with Sameness), and are distinct (by blending with Otherness).

I think this reading is incorrect; Motion and Rest are carefully selected as megista gene, greatest kinds, and are not just convenient examples (Reeve [Motion, Rest, and Dialectic in the Sophist] 1985, 57 holds a similar position). In fact, I think the kinds are greatest because they are all-pervading; the Visitor intends us to question the agreement that Motion and Rest do not blend, as is suggested when Theaetetus agrees, later, that if Motion shared in Rest, there would be nothing strange about saying that Motion is at rest (255b6-8). Thus, I argue, Motion and Rest can blend, i.e., they can be jointly predicated of one subject and can be predicated of each other, just as Sameness and Otherness can. While Sameness and Otherness are opposites, a single subject may be the same in one respect, namely, the same as itself, and other in another respect, namely, other than other things. Thus they can be predicated of a single subject, and they can be predicated of each other, as well, since Sameness is other than other things and Otherness is the same as itself." (p. 317)
Campbell, Ian J. 2021. "Plato, the Eristics, and the Principle of Non-Contradiction." Apeiron no. 54:571–614.

Abstract: "This paper considers the use that Plato makes of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) in his engagements with eristic refutations. By examining Plato’s use of the principle in his most detailed engagements with eristic—in the Sophist, the discussion of “agonistic” argumentation in the Theaetetus, and especially the Euthydemus—I aim to show that the pressure exerted on Plato by eristic refutations played a crucial role in his development of the PNC, and that the principle provided him with a much more sophisticated means of demarcating philosophical argumentation from eristic than he is generally thought to have. In particular, I argue that Plato’s qualified formulation of the PNC restricts the class of genuine contradictions in such a way that reveals the contradictions that eristics produce through their refutations to be merely apparent and that Plato consistently appeals to his qualified conception of genuine contradiction in his encounters with eristics in order to demonstrate that their refutations are merely apparent. The paper concludes by suggesting that the conception of genuine contradiction afforded by the PNC did not just provide Plato with a way of demarcating genuine from eristic refutations, but also with an answer to substantive

philosophical challenges that eristics raised through their refutations."
Candiotto, Laura. 2011. "The Children's Prayer: saving the Phenomena in Plato's Sophist." Anais de Filosofia Clássica no. 5:77–85.

Abstract: "Plato builds an ontology capable of saving the Phenomena in the Sophist. By doing so, he distances himself from Parmenides. This article analyses the children's prayer (Soph. 249 d 5) in order to sustain this thesis and evaluate the platonic proposal, along with the role of the negation and the heteron in the communication of the Kinds."
———. 2016. "Negation as Relation: Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's Sophist 257 b3-259 d1." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 75–94. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

"The aim of the present chapter is to discuss and evaluate chapters 78 and 79 of Heidegger's Lectures on Plato's Sophist, which deal with Sph. 257b3-259dl. To this purpose, I will compare these chapters with the more established interpretations concerning the role played by the heteron in Plato's dialogue. Providing my own reading, my main claim is that negation is understood by Heidegger as the foremost shape of relationality.

Moreover, negation as relation is not a dialectical tool but the disclosive power able to show the "things themselves".

My argument will proceed by: 1) providing a short introduction of the major themes within the Sophist; 2) presenting Heidegger's thesis; 3) analyzing the main threads within the Platonic text by referring to the more established interpretations; 4) evaluating Heidegger's interpretation with a special emphasis on where it has to be situated with regard to the text and to other interpretations, thus pointing out the innovative elements proposed by Heidegger." (p. 75)
———. 2018. "Purification through emotions: The role of shame in Plato’s Sophist 230b4–e5." Educational Philosophy and Theory no. 50:576–585.

Abstract: "This article proposes an analysis of Plato’s Sophist (230b4–e5) that underlines the bond between the logical and the emotional components of the Socratic elenchus, with the aim of depicting the social valence of this philosophical practice. The use of emotions characterizing the ‘elenctic’ method described by Plato is crucial in influencing the audience and is introduced at the very moment in which the interlocutor attempts to protect his social image by concealing his shame at being refuted. The audience, thanks to Plato’s literary strategy, realizes the failures of the interlocutor even as he refuses to accept them. As a result, his social image becomes tarnished. Purification through shame reveals how the medium is strictly related to the endorsement of specific ethical and political goals, making the Platonic dialogs the tools for the constitution of a new paideia."
Caplan, Jerrold R. 1995. "The Coherence of Plato's Ontology." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 65:171–189.

"In light of the so-called theory of Forms presented in earlier dialogues and the communion of the greatest kinds in the later dialogues, it has been argued that Plato abandoned his earlier ontology in favor of the more sophisticated scheme of his later period. The criticism is then made that the so-called later ontology is inconsistent with the earlier one and that the two accounts do not cohere.

I argue, to the contrary, that Plato's presentation has been consistent throughout. One might say that the discussion in the Sophist (236-259) is a revision or a refinement or expansion of the theory as found, for example, in the Phaedo (78-9). Although this may suggest that there has been some sort of development in the treatment of the Forms from early to late, it by no means implies any wholesale abandonment of the first formulations nor any inherent inconsistency. The fact that Plato himself raises questions about the Forms indicates the need for a clearer articulation of the relationship between thought and being, which is precisely what is undertaken in the later dialogues." (p. 171)
Carolina, Araujo. 2024. "Power of Connection as the Mark of Beings." In Plato’s Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 257–264.

Abstract: "This chapter argues that in the battle of gods and giants (Soph, 246a4-249d5) the Visitor proposes to both corporealists and formalists that the mark of being is the power of connection. It has two kinds: (i) the power to be added to or separated from something else causing difference according to its nature and (ii) the power to bear such a difference. In neither case does the power of connection entail motion, but it can cause stable states. One substantive outcome of this argument is that ontology must begin with an inclusive concept of being as existence. Another conclusion is that to exist is to have a nature that determines a peculiar set of rules regarding connection to other things. Statements express such connection by the copulative use of the verb “to be”, either saying that “X is Y” or that “X is not Y.” This point paves the way to argue that, as a mode of connection, non-being is also a mark of things that exist. Therefore, in the Sophist, the Visitor is doing more than displaying the distinction between the existential and copulative meanings of being; he is building an ontology in which to exist is to connect. The proposal of such an ontology begins wuth the battle of gods and giants."
Casadesús Bordoy, Francesc. 2013. "Why Is It so Difficult to Catch a Sophist? Pl. Sph. 218d3 and 261a5." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 15–27. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"Suffice it, therefore, in conclusion to this presentation, to return to the passage from the Republic in which the lines of the Odyssey which begin the Sophist are commented on in negative terms, and to ask once again the question Socrates poses in justification of his criticism of the lines of Homer:

‘Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another…?’

In order to answer this question in the negative, Plato has to undertake the writing of the Sophist, in an attempt to expose one who, due to his protean and mimetic character, adopts all kinds of forms, even the most divine. Equipped with his philosophical hunting weapon, the dialectical method and diaresis, he attempts, like Menelaus, to catch the sophist.

Nonetheless, the possibility of success remains in doubt, given Socrates’ disturbing observation that the hard-working hunter, the Stranger from Elea himself, could be yet another of the multiple and polymorphous manifestations of the Sophist …" (p. 27)
Casper, Dennis J. 1977. "Is There A Third One and Many Problem in Plato?" Apeiron no. 11:20–26.

"In a recent article (1), M.J. Cresswell points out that the problem of the one and the many "gets a new twist in three of Plato's later dialogues (Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus) where we discover not one problem but apparently two."(2) The first problem (I) concerns particulars, things subject to generation and perishing (Philebus, 14D-15A); it is " the problem of how the same thing can have many characteristics."(3) The second problem (II) concerns forms, things not subject to generation or perishing; it is the problem how a unitary form can be in many things which come into being ( Philebus, 15B). The first problem is "childish and easy", the second serious and difficult.

Cresswell points out that the formal structure of (I) does not require that it concern particulars. In a sense, forms have "characteristics" — each is one, the same as itself, and so on. So a parallel one and many problem (III) might be raised: How can the same form have many characteristics? Here Cresswell remarks, "However, when Plato actually sets out the one and many problem about the forms it doesn't have the structure of (I) at all."

Rather, it is (II) above. So Cresswell believes apparently that Plato does not set out (III) in the passages he mentions or elsewhere in the Philebus, Parmenides, and Sophist. I shall argue, however, that Plato does raise (III) in these works and that he takes it as seriously as he does (II). " (p. 20, some notes omitted)

(1) 1M.J. Cresswell, "Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems in Plato?", The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXII (1972), pp. 149-154.

(2) Ibid., p. 149.

(3) Ibid. In stating (1) in this way, Cresswell takes his cue from Sophist, 251A-B. In the Philebus and at the opening of the Parmenides (127E; 129A-E), the problem concerning particulars is how the same thing can have opposite characteristics.
Cassin, Barbara. 2017. "The Muses and Philosophy: Elements for a History of the Pseudos." In Contemporary Encounters with Ancient Metaphysics, edited by Greenstine, Abraham Jacob and Johnson, Ryan J., 13–29. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

"Barbara Cassin's "The Muses and Philosophy: Elements for a History of the 'Pseudos"' (1991; translated by Samuel Galson), investigates Plato's attempt in the Sophist to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist. Cassin pinpoints the slippery operation of the pseudos through the texts of Parmenides and Hesiod. Yet Parmenides' rejection of not-being allows the sophist to claim infallibility. Plato's Eleatic Stranger shows that Parmenides' rejection of notbeing is self-refuting (thus the Stranger's famous parricide is just as much Parmenides' suicide). Further, although the Stranger ultimately fails to find a criterion for truth or falsity, he nevertheless establishes a place for the pseudos in the distinction between logos tinos (speech of something) and logos peri tinos (speech about something). Ultimately, Cassin argues that reality of pseudos is a condition for the possibility of language, and indeed involves the very materiality and breath of language." (p. 5)
Cataldo, Peter J. 1984. "Plato, Aristotle and προς εν equivocity." The Modern Schoolman no. 61:237–247.

"One of the brilliant features of Father Joseph Owens' commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics [*] is the way that be traces the integration of the προς ενequivocity of being in Aristotle's work. But Aristotle's concept of προς εν equivocity is not linked with his predecessor Plato in this classic commentary.

The aim of this essay is lo indicate such a link, and one in which Plato 's contribution is more than just an anticipation; for, it will be argued that all of the elements which constitute προς εν equivocity per se are also present in Plato's doctrine of being found in the Sophist.

The nature of this project requires that several texts be presented from both thinkers, but this in no way presumes to be a comprehensive analysis of the texts. I on! y wish to show that Aristotle's concept of προς εν equivocity is traceable to Plato in some definite ways, all the while assuming, of course, that their doctrines of being are essentially opposed." (p. 237)

[*] The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A. Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951, Third revised edition 1978.
Chang, Han-Liang. 2012. "Plato and Peirce on Likeness and Semblance." Biosemiotics no. 5:301–312.

Abstract: "In his well-known essay, ‘What Is a Sign?’(Collected Papers 2.281, 285) Peirce uses ‘likeness’ and ‘resemblance’ interchangeably in his definition of icon. The synonymity of the two words has rarely, if ever, been questioned. Curiously, a locus classicus of the pair, at least in F. M. Cornford’s English translation, can be found in a late dialogue of Plato, namely, the Sophist. In this dialogue on the myth and truth of the sophists’ profession, the mysterious ‘stranger’, who is most likely Socrates’ persona, makes the famous distinction between eikon (likeness) and phantasma (semblance) (236a,b). For all his broad knowledge in ancient philosophy, Peirce never mentioned this parallel; nor has any Peircean scholar identified it. There seems to be little problem with eikon as likeness, but phantasma may give rise to a puzzle which this paper will attempt to solve. Plato uses two pairs of words: what eikon is to phantasma is eikastikén (the making of likeness [235d]) to phantastikén (semblance making [236c]). In other words, icons come into being because of the act of icon-making, which is none other than indexicality. Witness what Peirce says about the relationship between photographs and the objects they represent: “But this resemblance is due to the photographs having been produced under such circumstances that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to nature.” (Ibid.) Thus the iconicity which links the representamen (sign) and its object is made possible not only by an interpretant, but also by indexisation. Their possible etymological and epistemological links aside, the Peircean example of photographing and the Platonic discussion of painting and sculpturing in the Sophist, clearly show the physio-pragmatic aspect of iconicity. The paper will therefore reread the Peircean iconicity by closely analysing this relatively obscure Platonic text, and by so doing restore to the text its hidden semiotic dimension."
Chappell, T. D. J. 2011. "Making Sense of the Sophist. Ten Answers to Ten Questions." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 344–375. Praha: Oikoymenh.

"One notable feature of the method of division is this: every determination in a well-performed division is a positive determination.

See Statesman, 262c9–d7, on an attempted definition by division of barbaros:

“[Our division went wrong because we did] the same sort of thing as those who are trying to make a twofold division of the human race, and do what most of those do who live here: they distinguish on one side the race of Greeks as separate from all others, and then give the single name ‘barbarians’ to all the other races, though these are countless in number and share no kinship of blood or language.

Then because they have a single term, they suppose they also have a single kind.”

A good division will not divide Greeks from non-Greeks, but Greeks from Romans, Britons, Gauls, Teutons, Slavonic tribes, Hyperboreans, islanders of the utmost west, etc. etc. etc. To put it another way, every step of a well-performed division will use “other than” and not “is not”. More about this in due course." (pp. 344-345)

(...)

"In all these ways making sense of the Sophist, and (come to that) making sense of the sophist, is very literally a matter of watching Plato making sense: creating a theory of how, alongside the changeless world of the Forms, there can and must be a changing world of interweavings of those Forms. Not only the gods’ interweavings, which constitute the world, but also our interweavings, which constitute logoi about – representations of – that world: either misleading and false images of it, like the sophist’s, or faithful and accurate images, like those created by the person whom above all the sophist aspires to imitate: the philosopher." (p. 375)
Charlton, William. 1995. "Plato's Later Platonism." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 13:113–133.

"And although on some interpretations the analyses of negation and false statement in the Sophist call precisely for quantification over abstract objects, those passages have also been interpreted as requiring quantification over concrete objects like Theaetetus.

(...)

"But the passages themselves are brief and the issues clear. In what follows I first explain (Section I) why I prefer a Platonizing interpretation, and (Section II) question whether Plato is willing to quantify over concrete objects at all. I then (Section III) consider how he would wish us to understand existential claims to the effect that 'there is' something or that something 'shares in being'. Next (Section IV) I show how, using quantification over abstract but not over concrete objects, and also using the five Greatest Kinds mentioned in the Sophist, Plato could analyse various kinds of statement. He did not, of course, have the concept of quantification logicians have today. But he had strong logical instincts, and the suggestions he throws out lend themselves to development with the aid of quantifiers in a perspicuous and intriguing way. Finally (Section V), I suggest that his analysis of negation in terms of otherness reveals a sort of Platonism that is itself other than that defined by Quine: he believes that the difference between being and not being is independent of our thought in a way it would not be on an analysis similar to that proposed for change in Section IV." (pp. 113-114)
Cherubin, Rose. 1993. "What is Eleatic about the Eleatic Stranger?" In Platoʼs Dialogues: New studies and Interpretations, edited by Press, Gerald A., 215–235. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

"In this paper I would like to pose and to explore the following questions: Why is there an Eleatic Stranger in Plato's Sophist? What if anything does this character say or imply or do that only a "companion of those around Parmenides and Zeno" (216a) would?

I would also like to propose that central to these concerns is the question of how Plato read Parmenides' poem. Did Plato take the daimon's speech as a direct and literal statement of Parmenides' views? What we can discover about this issue could be instructive in our considerations of how we might best read Parmenides.

The Stranger's speeches and behavior include much that seems sophistic, as well as a number of reasons to suspect that he is not, or not only, a sophist. We are led, then, to ask what if any the differences are between Eleatic and sophist, and especially what if any differences between them appear in Plato. (For the latter I will focus on the Sophist.) What would account for the differences, or the lack thereof? And if there are differences, into which group-Eleatic or sophist-does the Stranger fall?" (p. 215)
Chrysakopoulou, Sylvana. 2010. "Heraclitus and Xenophanes in Plato's Sophist: The Hidden Harmony." Ariadne. The Journal of the School of Philosophy of the University of Crete no. 16:75–98.

"The principal aim of the present article is to shed light on Heraclitus’ intellectual kinship with Xenophanes. Although the overlap of fundamental patterns and themes in both thinkers’ worldview could be partly due to the osmosis of ideas in the archaic

era, the intertextual a!nity between them, as transmitted by the history of reception, cannot be regarded as a mere accident of cultural diffusion. Our primary intention is to focus on the common grounds of their criticism against the authority of the epic poets on the theological education of the Greeks and more particularly on its platonic appropriation." (p. 75)

(...)

"In conclusion, Plato in the Sophist uses Xenophanes’ and Heraclitus’ theological a!nity as a trait d’union between the latter and Parmenides, inasmuch as Plato’s ontology is presented as a response to Parmenides’ account on being." (p. 85)
———. 2018. "Xenophanes in Plato’s Sophist and the first philosophical genealogy." Trends in Classics no. 10:324–337.

Abstract: "In this article I intend to show that Plato in the Sophist provides us with the earliest doxographic material on pre-Platonic thinkers. In his account on his predecessors, Xenophanes emerges as the founder of the Eleatic tribe as opposed to the pluralists, while Heraclitus and Empedocles are presented as the Ioanian and the Italian Muses respectively. This prima facie genealogical approach, where Plato’s predecessors become the representatives of schools of different origins paves the way for Plato’s project in the Sophist. In other words the monistic account Xenophanes introduces, prepares for the synthesis between the one and the many set forth by Heraclitus and Empedocles, which is thus presented as a further step towards the ‘interweaving of forms’ (συμπλοκήν εἰδῶν) Plato proposes in the Sophist."
Clanton, J. Caleb. 2007. "From Indeterminacy to Rebirth: Making Sense of Socratic Silence in Plato's Sophist." The Pluralist no. 2:37–56.

"I argue here that, in the Sophist, Plato opens up possibilities for philosophy that lie beyond Socrates's style of discourse. Plato does so by introducing indeterminacy as a way of salvaging determinate discourse itself. In the first section of this article, I explore what the problem of the Sophist seems to be. It appears that in order to preserve discourse, the characters within the dialogue must try to make sense of non-being, which clearly is a problematic undertaking. In the second section, I follow the characters as they try to resolve this issue of not-being. Third, I argue that in saving determinate discourse through resolving the issue of not-being, the characters in the dialogue incorporate indeterminacy into the very enterprise of philosophy. With this reading of the Sophist in mind, I try to make sense of a crucial element that Plato adds -- namely, Socrates's absence in che dialogue. In doing so, I mean to stay closely attuned to the dramatic features of the dialogue as they generate the questions I focus on. Finally, in light of this reading of the Sophist,

I suggest a way to rethink what it means to do philosophy, following Plato's lead in carrying out a philosophical project that is often deemed foreign to Plato." (p. 37)
Clarke, Patricia. 1994. "The Interweaving of the Forms with One Another: Sophist 259e." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 12:35–62.

"At Sophist 259 E the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus agree that 'The loosening of each thing from everything [else] is the complete wiping out of all λόγοι for it is because of the interweaving of the forms with one another that we come to have λόγος. My chief aim in this paper is to air a possible solution to the problem of how this remark might apply to such statements as 'Theaetetus sits' and 'Theaetetus flies', (1) in each of which only one form is referred to. The solution turns on the claim that neither statement could be true unless forms could mix with one another in the sense of being instantiated together in Theaetetus. I do not positively endorse it. I wonder whether there is any definite solution to the problem; Plato does not seem to give sufficiently clear indication of how he is thinking. However, I wish to argue that a solution along the lines indicated cannot be dismissed as easily as has sometimes been supposed. In the first part of my paper I give some general consideration to the remark at 259 E, and examine briefly some alternative solutions to the problem of its application to 'Theaetetus sits' and other such statements." (p. 35)

(1) I use these translations, rather than the more idiomatic 'Theaetetus is sitting', 'Theaetetus is flying', to reflect the fact that in the original at 263 A each example is expressed by means of a two-word sentence composed of proper name and verb. However, even for a statement of the form 'Theaetetus is F', expressed with copula and predicate, a problem arises if for Theaetetus to be F is simply for Theaetetus to partake directly of F, for then again only one form might seem to be involved."
Cordero, Nestor-Luis. 2013. "The relativization of ”separation" (khorismos) in the Sophist." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 187–201. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"It is a commonplace among historians of ancient thought to refer to the “separation” (khorismos) which characterizes Platonic philosophy, and which Aristotle criticized severely. It is true that, like any commonplace, this separation, which is at base a type of dualism, can be the subject of very different understandings, including that of being minimized." (p. 187)

(...)

"All aporiai stem from separation. So, one has to try to suppress it, or at any rate relativize it, and that is going to be the task the Sophist sets itself.

Why the Sophist? Because, as we saw, khorismos separated two modes of being, and the Sophist is a dialogue about being. Steering clear of interpretation, the dialogue’s subtitle is peri tou ontos. And it is normal, if he is going to undertake an in-depth analysis of the figure of the sophist, that he should see himself as obliged, for the first time on his philosophical voyage, now that he is over seventy, to confront his father Parmenides, the venerable and fearsome monopolizer of being, and the confrontation concerns sophistry. This is not the time to expatiate on the “amitiés particulières” that Plato establishes between Parmenides and sophistry. In criticizing the great master all things are allowed, including taking literally images in the poem which are didactic, such as the sphere, and in particular characterizing him as a fellow traveller of sophistry, which is, all in all, a joke in poor taste. But it is undeniable that his changing of porte-parole, in which he replaces Socrates with the Stranger, allows Plato to take certain liberties, and to face problems that his Socrates had never faced, among them precisely the necessity of refuting Parmenides." (p. 191)
———. 2023. The reality of the untrue in Plato's Sophist.

English translation of "La réalité du non-vrai dans le Sophiste de Platon", Archai, 33, 2023, pp. 1-16, available on Academia.edu.

Abstract: "The definition of the sophist as "image-maker" allows Plato to add to the novelties he presents in the Sophist two topics he hadn't deepened in his previous dialogues: (a) a "definition" of being (247e) and (b) the influence this position will have on the relationship between image and truth. From a first definition of the image proposed by Theaetetus in 240a we deduce that, even if it is not true, it is "really" (ὄντως) an image, which does not coincide with the devalued or secondary reality that Plato had always attributed to this notion, from which all truth was absent. This conclusion, indeed, astonishes Theaetetus, attached to the Platonic "orthodoxy". This astonishment is not present in the orthodox version of the text of the passage 240a-c of the Sophist, which inherits from a modification of the widespread text from 1851. Once the original version is restored, the definition of the fact of being proposed in 247e justifies the "really real" character of the image, which respects the condition required to everything that "possesses" being: the possibility of acting or being affected. Indeed, the image is "affected" by the model, that it tries to imitate, because the model "affects" it. The image, even if it is not true, is real."
———. 2024. "The Stranger of the Sophist: A Citizen of Elea “Different” from the Eleatic Philosophers." In Plato’s Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 173–181.

Abstract: “In 1561, the protagonist of the Sophist, a citizen of Elea, became a member of the ‘Eleatic school’. This intrusion had an author: the German philologist J. Cornarius. Indeed, in 1561 J. Cornarius proposed his own version of some passages of Plato’s Sophist. In this version Theodorus presents the Eleatic Stranger as ‘a companion (hetairos) of Parmenideans and Zenonians’ (216a). Since then, this cliché is accepted by all translations. However, when the possibility of justifying the existence of images and appearances is considered, the Stranger himself proposes ‘testing’ Parmenides' thesis. His remarks are rather those of an adversary than of a friend or companion of Parmenides. In fact, in spite of Theodorus’ presentation, the Stranger, albeit citizen of Elea, does not seem to share the theses of the ‘Eleatics’. These anomalies invited us to question the character of ‘companion’ of the ‘Parmenideans’ credited to the Stranger. The questioning is possible if we exploit some valuable greek manuscripts of Plato’s Sophist, neglected by J. Burnet, like Vindobonensis 21 (Y). This manuscript, among others, has the lecture ‘heteros’, 'different’, instead of ‘hetairon’, “companion”. This manuscript permits to maintain the formula ‘tôn hetairôn’, transmitted by all the manuscripts after the first ‘hetairon’, and removed in modern editions. The translation we propose is: the Eleatic Stranger is ‘different (heteros) from the companions (tôn hetairôn) of Parmenides and Zenon’.”
Corey, David D. 2015. The Sophists in Plato's Dialogues. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Chapter Eight: Plato's Critique of the Sophist?

"In this chapter, I consider four such accounts of the sophists: those of Anytus speaking to Socrates in the Meno, Socrates speaking to Adeimantus in the Republic, Socrates speaking to Polus in the Gorgias, and the Eleatic Stranger speaking to Theaetetus in the Sophist. Although all these appear to stand as general critiques of the sophists, none is successful as such, nor, I argue, does Plato mean for us to accept them as such. These accounts are obviously defective both in their own terms and in light of what we know of the sophists from other dialogues. At the same time, however, I want to argue that these passages of general criticism have a broader scope than merely attempting to criticize the sophists. They also call into question the very lines of demarcation between such categories as “sophistry,” “philosophy,” and “good citizenship,” thus leading inevitably to the possibility of self-reflection, whether one understands oneself to be a philosopher or merely a citizen.

In other words, what is usually taken rather facilely to be “Plato’s critique of the sophists” in fact cuts more deeply into common thinking and doing than readers may like to admit. Widely accepted and even cherished political, philosophical, and pedagogical practices are implicated in these accounts. " (pp. 202-203)
Cornford, Francis Macdonald. 1935. Plato's Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato translated with a running commentary. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.

Contents: The Theaetetus, pp. 15-163; The Sophist pp. 165-332.

"My object was to make accessible to students of philosophy who cannot easily read the Greek text, two masterpieces of Plato's later period, concerned with questions that still hold a living interest. A study of existing translations and editions has encouraged also the hope that scholars already familiar with the dialogues may find a fresh interpretation not unwelcome. A commentary has been added because, in the more difficult places, a bare translation is almost certain, if understood at all, to be misunderstood.

This danger may be illustrated by a quotation from a living philosopher of the first rank: It was Plato in his later mood who put forward the suggestion "and I hold that the definition of being is simply power". This suggestion is the charter of the doctrine of Immanent Law.'(1)

Dr. Whitehead is quoting Jowett's translation. If the reader will refer to the passage (p. 234 below), he will see that the words are rendered: 'I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they be nothing but power.'(2) A mark of real things may not be a 'definition of being'. This mark, moreover, is offered by the Eleatic Stranger to the materialist as an improvement on his own mark of real things, tangibility. The materialist accepts it, 'having for the moment no better suggestion of his own to offer'. The Stranger add that Theaetetus and he may perhaps change their minds 0n this matter later on. Plato has certainly not committed himself here to a 'definition of being'. So much could be discovered from an accurate translation; but the word 'power ' still needs to be explained. It has been rendered by 'potency', 'force', 'Möglichkeit', 'puissance de relation'. Without some account of the history of the word dynamis in Plato's time and earlier, the student accustomed to the terms of modem philosophy may well carry away a false impression.

To meet difficulties such as this, I have interpolated, after each compact section of the text, a commentary which aims at discovering what Plato really means and how that part of the argument is related to the rest. There are objections to dissecting the living body of a Platonic dialogue. No other writer has approached Plato's skill in concealing a rigid and intricate structure of reasoning beneath the flowing lines of a conversation in which the suggestion of each thought as it arises seems to be followed to an unpremeditated conclusion. In these later dialogues the bones show more clearly through the skin; and it is likely that Plato would rather have us penetrate his meaning than stand back with folded hands to admire his art. An interpolated commentary, giving the reader the information he needs when and where he needs it, may be preferred to the usual plan of stowing away such information in an introduction at the beginning and notes at the end. It is not clear why we should be forced to read a book in three places at once. This book, at any rate, is designed to be read straight through." (Preface, pp. VII-VIII)

(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, (1933), p, 165. I am not suggesting that Dr. Whitehead fundamentally misunderstands the master who has deeply influenced his own philosophy, but only pointing out how a profound thinker may be misled by a translation.

(2) This rendering is itself doubtful, the construction of the words, as they stand in the MSS, being obscure and difficult.
Cresswell, M. J. 1972. "Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems in Plato?" The Philosophical Quarterly no. 22:149–154.

"How can one thing be many and many things one? This perennial in Greek philosophy gets a new twist in three of Plato's later dialogues (Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus) where we discover not one problem but apparently two. More interestingly, although one of them is a serious and perplexing problem demanding the full insight of the rigorously disciplined philosopher, the other problem is described in the Philebus (14d, e) as commonplace and one such that "almost everyone agrees nowadays that there is no need to concern oneself with things like that, feeling that they are childish, obvious and a great nuisance to argument". And in the Sophist (251b) it is relegated to providing a banquet for the young and for "late learners of old men" who are "poorly endowed with intelligence and marvel at such things, thinking themselves to have come upon all wisdom".

What is the difference between this trivial form and the serious form of the problem of how one thing can be many? In the Philebus (15a) Socrates says that the trivial problem occurs when the one in question is the sort of thing which can come into being and pass away, i.e., is something which belongs to the physical world. The serious problem is when the one is an eternal existent." (p. 149)
Crivelli, Paolo. 1993. "Plato's Sophist and Semantic Fragmentation." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 75:71–74.

"In this journal, Band 71, Heft 3, pp. 257-282, Michael T. Ferejohn [*] proposed to apply to the interpretation of certain parts of Plato's Sophist a methodological principle which I shall call 'principle of joint explanation': given the close relationship between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, in particular circumstances it's possible to use Aristotelian texts to interpret obscure or vague Platonic passages. In this paper I shall criticize Ferejohn's application of the 'principle of joint explanation' to the Sophist and his interpretation of Plato's analysis of negation and of its philosophical aims."

[*] Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and Semantic Fragmentation.
———. 2012. Plato's Account of Falsehood: A Study of the Sophist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Abbreviations of titles of Plato's works X; Note on the text XI; Introduction 1; 1. The sophist defined 13; 2. Puzzles about non-being 28; 3. Puzzles about being 71; 4. The communion of kinds 102; 5. Negation and not-being 177; 6. Sentences, false sentences, and false belief 221; Appendix: The Sophist on true and false sentences: formal presentation 261; References 275; Index of names 290; Index of subjects 294; index of passages cited 296-309.

"In the Sophist Plato presents his mature views on sentences, falsehood, and not-being. These views have given an important contribution to the birth and growth of the subjects now identified as ontology and philosophy of language. I have two main objectives: to offer a precise reconstruction of the arguments and the theses concerning sentences, falsehood, and not-being presented in the Sophist and to gain a philosophical understanding of them. In this introduction I offer an overview of the main problems addressed in i he Sophist and their solutions and then discuss the methodology whereby I pursue my primary goals." (Introduction, p. 1)

"Almost a commentary. The close interconnection of themes and concepts invited by the dialogue-form makes it difficult to address a Platonic dialogue by examining some of its themes and concepts in isolation from the others: if an operation of this sort is attempted, the impression arises that some factor essential for the understanding of the issues under consideration is ignored. Mainly for this reason I decided to have my examination of the Sophist unfolding in parallel with the development of the dialogue. So the present study covers most of the dialogue and follows its progression, almost as a running commentary.

Nevertheless, my examination of the Sophist is selective: not all the themes and concepts emerging from the dialogue are discussed with the same care or depth. The approach I have privileged is that of philosophy of language (in the comprehensive sense in which it addresses also ontological matters). In particular, I ask Plato some of the questions that a modern philosopher of language would regard as important and I consider what answers Plato is committed to offering. Establishing what answers Plato is committed to offering requires an accurate historical reconstruction of what he actually does say: modern questions, Plato’s answers. The present study therefore combines exegetical and philological considerations with a philosophically minded attitude." (p. 11)
———. 2019. "The Sophist's Appearance in Plato's Sophist." In L'éristique: Definitions, Caracterisations et Historicité, edited by Delcomminette, Sylvain and Lachance, Geneviève, 217–266. Bruxelles: Ousia.

"This study has four objectives, all related to the concept of appearing used in the definition of the sophist in the dialogue’s frame section. First, the Visitor and Theaetetus, who are the dialogue’s main speakers, pave the way for their definition of the sophist by describing him as someone who has apparent knowledge. The first objective of the present study is to show that this description had a wide-ranging and long-lasting historical impact. Secondly, the Visitor and Theaetetus develop their account of the sophist’s apparent knowledge by treating false speeches as spoken images (είδωλα λεγόμενα) analogous to painter imitations that often deceive their viewers into judging that they are what they imitate. This study’s second objective is to shed light on the connection between images, imitations, and deception. Thirdly, the Visitor and Theaetetus flesh out their examination of the sophist as a maker of spoken images by distinguishing two kinds of images (είδωλα), namely likenesses (εικόνες) and apparitions (φάντασματα). The third objective of the present study is If clarify this distinction and to reject a widespread interpretation ol it. Fourthly, there is something awkward about the way in which the Visitor and Theaetetus think that the sophist is hard to define. For, shortly before the beginning of the dialogue’s core section, they wonder whether the sophist should be subsumed under the likeness-making or the apparition-making one; but later on, after solving the falsehood paradox, they have no qualms about subsuming the sophist under the apparition-making art. The present study’s fourth objective is to explain this behaviour." (pp. 217-218)
———. 2023. "The Analysis of False Judgement According to Being and Not-Being in Plato’s Theaetetus (188c10–189b9)." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 105:509–566.

Abstract: "The version of the paradox of false judgement examined at Tht. 188c10–189b9 relies on the assumption that to judge falsehoods is to judge the things which are not. The presentation of the argument displays several syntactic ambiguities: at several points it allows the reader to adopt different syntactic connections between the components of sentences. For instance, when Socrates says that in a false judgement the cognizer is “he who judges the things which are not about anything whatsoever” (188d3–4), how should the clause “about anything whatsoever” be construed? In common with “he who judges” and “the things which are not” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not about it”), or exclusively with “he who judges” (in which case the cognizer would be “he who judges about anything whatsoever the things which are not”)? The most plausible answer is that both construals are envisaged. Accordingly, the argument has two branches corresponding to these two alternative construals. In particular, it attempts to show that in both cases the cognizer will address what does not exist – an impossibility.

The idea that a false judgement is concerned with what is not about its reference has a clear echo in the Sophist. The way in which the problem is handled in the Theaetetus provides a hint that can help to find a solution for the hotly debated issue of the interpretation of the Sophist’s account of false statement."
———. 2024. "The Sophist on Truth and Falsehood: Between Aristotle and Frege." In Plato’s Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 445–459.

Abstract: "In the Sophist, the Visitor and Theaetetus agree that to judge (or state) falsehoods is to judge (or state) the things which are not. It is because judging (and stating) the things which are not is allegedly impossible that the dialogue’s central section embarks on a painstaking examination of not-being. It is therefore puzzling to realize that at the point of the dialogue where they examine false judgement (and false statement) as an episode of judging (and stating) the things which are not, the two inquirers agree that falsehood can also be present in a judgement (or statement) that judges (or states) the things which are: in an affirmative false judgement (or statement), the cognizer (or speaker) posits that the things which in fact are not, are; but in a negative false judgement (or statement), the cognizer (or speaker) posits that the things which in fact are, are not. The puzzlement has two reasons: first, one gets the impression that the account of false judgement (or statement) as judging (or stating) the things which are not is supposed to cover all cases (rather than, roughly, half of them); secondly, if, at least in some cases, a false judgement (or statement) judges (or states) the things which are, the possibility of false judgement (and statement) is not threatened by the difficulties that bedevil not-being so that much of the central section of the Sophist turns out to be pointless. A passage of the Parmenides solves the puzzle by showing that the cases of false judgement (or statement) which in the Sophist are described as judging (or stating) the things which are should also be regarded as judging (or stating) the things which are not. It is likely that the reasoning explicitly presented in the Parmenides lies behind the puzzling argument of the Sophist: in the latter dialogue, Plato moves very quickly and offers only scarce signposts of the argumentative route fully expounded in the former one."
Crombie, Ian M. 1962. An Examination of Plato's Doctrines. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Vol. 2: Plato on Knowledge and Reality; Chapter 3: Metaphysical Analysis. § V: The Sophist, pp. 388-421; Chapter 4: Logic and Language § III: The Paradox of False Belief pp. 486-497; § IV: Some Further Problems arising out of the Sophist: the Copula and Existence, etc., pp. 498-516.

"The doctrine of the Sophist is continuous with that which we have been examining. The fact that I have relegated the Sophist to a section of its own must not be allowed to give a contrary impression.

I have given the Sophist a section on its own partly because it is very difficult, and partly because it adds something to the doctrine sketched in the Cratylus and common to the Phaedrus, Statesman and Philebus. There are two parts to this additional material. One of these parts deals with matters which are perhaps more properly called logical than metaphysical, namely the meaning of the verb einai or "to be", and the nature of negation. The discussion of these topics is entangled with that of the others and can only be separated by violence. I shall use violence, however, and postpone the detailed consideration of these topics to the next chapter. The other part of the additional material can perhaps be described as follows. So far the "kinds" whose "sharing" we have been considering have been, on the whole, material or limiting properties. I call, for example, animality a limiting property, because there are certain limits which cannot be transgressed by anything which is to have the property.

We recall however that the discussion in the Parmenides was concerned with the formal or non-limiting property unity—non-limiting in the sense that to be told that X is one is to be told nothing whatever about the nature of X. It is clear that the relation of non-limiting to limiting properties was an important question in Plato's latest phase, and it is in the Sophist that this is first discussed in connection with the sharing of kinds. This is the special material with which this section will be primarily concerned. I may add that it will be impossible in a discussion of this—perhaps of any—length to justify an interpretation of the Sophist." (p. 388)
Curd, Patricia Kenig. 1988. "Parmenidean Clues in the Search for the Sophist." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 5:307–320.

"Does the Parmenides hold clues to a proper understanding of the Sophist? It seems to me that it does; in this paper I shall explore a number of issues that link the two dialogues, arguing that understanding Plato's treatment of these issues in the Parmenides can help us correctly interpret the arguments of the Sophist.

Influential interpretations of Plato's later work hold that there are serious confusions about identity and predication in that work. According to these interpretations some of the arguments in the antinomies of Part II of the Parmenides exhibit this confusion; further, according to these views, it is not until the Sophist that Plato sees his way to distinguish identity and predication adequately, and that it is this that allows him finally to solve the problems of Being and Not Being in that dialogue.(1)

In this paper I want to challenge this view: I shall claim that the arguments of Part II of the Parmenides are not infected with an identity/predication (I/P) confusion. Further, I shall argue that in the second part of the Parmenides Plato explores and investigates certain ideas that are crucial to his solution of the problem of Not-Being in the Sophist (a solution that does not depend on distinguishing identity and predicative "senses" or "uses" of the verb "to be"). (2) I shall begin with some preliminary remarks about the I/P confusion and the earlier dialogues before turning to the Parmenides and the Sophist." (p. 307)

(1) The interpretations I have in mind are primarily those of G. E. L. Owen (in "Notes on Ryle's Plato," in Logic, Science and Dialectic, ed. G. E. L. Owen and M. C. Nussbaum (Ithaca, 1986), pp. 85-103; hereafter NRP; and in "Plato on Not-Being," in LSD pp. 104-137; hereafter PNB); and Malcolm Schofield (in "The Antinomies of Plato's Parmenides," Classical Quarterly, vol. 21 [1977], pp. 139-158). See also M. Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage (Gottingen, 1967).

(2) Here I shall follow the interpretation of the arguments of the Sophist suggested by Jean Roberts in "The Problem about Being in the Sophist," History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 3 (1986), pp. 229-243 (hereafter PBS). What I shall say here about the Sophist is based on an acceptance of Roberts' arguments (which I shall not repeat here) and owes much to her work.

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