Dancy, Russell M. 1999. "The Categories of Being in Plato's Sophist 255c-e." Ancient Philosophy no. 19:45–72.

"Sophist 255c-e contains a division of beings into two categories rather than a distinction between the "is" of identity, existence, and/or predication; this emerges from an analysis of the argument that employs the division. The resulting division is the same as that ascribed to Plato in the indirect tradition among the so-called "unwritten doctrines"; there the two categories are attached to the One and the Indefinite Dyad." (p. 45)

(...)

"Conclusion. Perhaps it is not so bad if the later Plato sounds more like Aristotle. But there remains an enormous difference of ontology between Plato and Aristotle, if any of the reports of Plato's 'unwritten doctrines' can be believed.

We have already noticed that Plato thinks the distinction between beings and others can be put by saying that while beings partake of both the Forms Standalone and Relative, others partake only of the Form Relative. The partition of beings into Standalone ones and Relative ones, as I have construed it, is a categorial scheme: the scheme of Old Academic Categories adverted to in the introductory section of this article. Hermodorus (or whoever) was there quoted as saying that Plato says 'of the beings, some are by virtue of themselves, and some are relative to something'; that much we have the Eleatic Stranger saying in 255c13-14. But Hermodorus gives us examples, where the Stranger does not: a man and a horse are by virtue of themselves; large and small [things] are relative to things. If we unpack these examples, we presumably find ourselves saying: Bucephalus is a horse by virtue of himself; it is because he is Bucephalus that he is a horse, or, perhaps better, it is not because of some other thing that Bucephalus counts as a horse, whereas the fact that Bucephalus is large is something whose explanation requires us to introduce other, relatively smaller, horses which are the norm for horses as far as size goes. This then leads to categorizations of the terms man and horse under the heading Standalone and large, small, good, and bad under the heading Relative. And it seems a sound conjecture that where I am speaking of 'terms', Plato would speak of 'forms': the division is a division of forms, if that is right.

But that is not the end of the story. The Hermodorus text, along with other texts, (1) would have us believe that Plato rooted the two categories Standalone and Relative in two super-Forms that stood above all the others: the mysterious entities known as the One and the Indefinite Dyad, from which the more ordinary Forms derived as numbers. I think this, too, should be taken seriously. But that is a large undertaking, not to be entered on here." (pp. 69-70)

(1) Including, besides the others quoted in I, many in Aristotle, and also the rather strange and somewhat garbled stretch of text in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos X 257-276 purporting to report on the views of 'Pythagoras and his circle'.
De Brasi, Diego, and Fuchs, Marko J., eds. 2016. Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25). Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Table of Contents: Acknowledgements VII; Diego De Brasi and Marko J. Fuchs: Introduction. Heidegger’s Lectures on Plato’s Sophist and their Importance for Modern Plato Scholarship 1; Jens Kristian Larsen: Plato and Heidegger on Sophistry and Philosophy 27; Catalin Partenie: Heidegger: Sophist and Philosopher 61; Laura Candiotto: Negation as Relation: Heidegger’s Interpretation of Plato’s Sophist 257b3–259d1 75; Nicolas Zaks: Is the ‘In-Itself’ Relational? Heidegger and Contemporary Scholarship on Plato’s Sophist 255c–e 95; Argyri G. Karanasiou: The Term symplokē in Symposium 202b1 and in Sophist 240c1ff, 259d-261c: Heidegger's Interpretation of the Concept of "Interconnection" in Platonic Thought 113; Maia Shukhoshvili: Tékhnē in Plato's Sophist (Discussing Heidegger's Opinion) 131; Olga Alieva: Ὀρθολογία περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν: Heidegger on the Notion of Falsehood in Plato's Sophist 143; Contributors 157.

"This volume offers a selection of papers presented at the international Symposium “Sophistes: Plato’s Dialogue and Heidegger’s Lectures in Marburg (1924–25)” held at the University of Marburg in April 2013. At that meeting young classicists and philosophers discussed the possibility of a re-evaluation of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of the Sophist, and argued for a more nuanced reconstruction of his relationship with Plato." (p. VII)
———. 2016. "Introduction. Heidegger’s Lectures on Plato’s Sophist and their Importance for Modern Plato Scholarship." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 1–26. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

"This introductory essay hence focuses on four aspects. First of all, it will offer an overview on the current state of research. Second, it will argue for a relativization of Heidegger’s alleged misunderstanding of Plato. This will be achieved by arguing against some of the criticism expressed by Werner Beierwaltes [*] towards Heidegger’s reading of Plato. Third, it briefly examines the “Transition” in the 1924 Marburg Lectures between Heidegger’s analysis of the Nicomachean Ethics and the interpretation of Plato’s Sophist, the “Preliminary Remarks” and the “Introduction” to the actual interpretation of the dialogue, describing Heidegger as a somehow unconscious ‘forerunner’ of the modern dialogical approach. Finally, it will present an overview of the contributions in the volume and suggest further possible research developments." (p. 2)

[*] Beierwaltes, Werner. “EPEKEINA. A Remark on Heidegger’s Reception of Plato.” Trans. Marcus Brainard, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 17, no. 1-2 (1994): 83–99 (orig.: “EPEKEINA. Eine Anmerkung zu Heideggers Platon-Rezeption.” In Transzendenz: zu einem Grundwort der klassischen Metaphysik. Festschrift für Klaus Kremer, edited by Ludger Honnefelder and Werner Schüßler, 39–55. Paderborn: Schöning, 1992).

—. “Heideggers Rückgang zu den Griechen.” Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, Jg. 1995, Heft 1 (Munich: Beck).

—. “Heideggers Gelassenheit.” In Amicus Plato magis amica veritas. Festschrift für Wolfgang Wieland zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by Rainer Enskat, 1–35. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998.

The three essays are reprinted in:

Beierwaltes, Werner. Fußnoten zu Platon. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 2011.
De Garay, Jesús. 2013. "Difference and Negation: Plato’s Sophist in Proclus." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 225–245. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"We do not have a specific commentary on the Sophist, and it is doubtful whether he ever wrote one. What we do have is the Commentary on the Parmenides, from which some have hypothesized that he also wrote one on the Sophist. Whatever the case, the explicit references to this dialogue are many, and they affect crucial issues in Proclus’ thought. In particular, The Elements of Theology aside (which, because of its axiomatic treatment does not include textual references of any kind), allusions to the Sophist are very frequent in his three most relevant systematic works: the Commentary on the Parmenides, the Platonic Theology, and the Commentary on the Timaeus (9)." (p. 227)

(...)

"However, as has been pointed out by Annick Charles-Saget, to understand Proclus’ interpretation of the Sophist we cannot pay attention solely to explicit quotations from the dialogue; but we must also consider his silences and significance shifts. In other words, on the one hand there are important questions in the dialogue which Proclus hardly adverts to: for example, the sophist as deceiver, and purveyor of falsehood in general; on the other hand, there are matters which Proclus presents in a different way, such as the vindication of poetic production in light of the definition of the sophist. Also significant is the way in which a number of very short passages from the Sophist are adduced over and over and again in support of his thesis." (p. 228)

(9) An exhaustive documentation of references to the Sophist can be found in Guérard (1991). My own exposition will focus strictly on the Commentary on the Parmenides and Platonic Theology.

References

Charles-Saget, A., “Lire Proclus, lecteur du Sophiste”, in P. Aubenque (éd.), Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon (1991), 475 – 494 = Charles-Saget (1991).

Guérard, Ch., “Les citations du Sophiste dans les oeuvres de Proclus”, in P. Aubenque (éd.), Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon, 1991, 495 – 508 = Guérard (1991).
de Harven, Vanessa. 2024. "Something Stoic in Plato’s Sophist." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 63:237–298.

Abstract: "The Stoics have often been compared with the earthborn Giants in the Battle of Gods and Giants in Plato’s Sophist, but with diverging opinions about the lessons they drew in reaction to Plato. At issue are questions about what in the Sophist the Stoics were reacting to, how the Stoics are like and unlike the Giants, the status of being for the Stoics, and the extent to which they were Platonizing with their incorporeals. With these open questions in mind, this paper re-examines the Sophist from the Stoic perspective, finding Eighth distinct challenges that are likely to have been salient to the Stoics, and offers a new account of the Stoics as responding to these challenges with an innovative ontology that prises apart something from being to make room for what is not, and a sophisticated one-world metaphysics that grounds everything there is in two fundamental bodies."
de Vries, Willem. 1988. "On "Sophist" 255B-E." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 5:385–394.

"At Sophist 255b7-e the Eleatic Stranger gives two arguments, one to show that being and identity are not the same, and one to show that being and otherness are not the same. Scholars have not paid them particularly close attention, but it seems generally agreed that the two arguments are quite different. In this paper I shall offer an interpretation which shows that the two arguments, though superficially quite different, are intrinsically and importantly related. Specifically, in the first argument the Stranger elicits an obvious falsehood from the hypothesis that being and identity are the same. I claim that in order to distinguish being and otherness an exactly parallel argument could have been given instead of the second argument we actually find. However, there are sound dramatic reasons why this was not done, for in this case the falsehood would not be obvious.

Instead, the argument we are given takes us deeper and analyzes the source of the falsehood by introducing a distinction between absolute and relative uses of "being." This distinction, which has been misinterpreted in the literature, is then applied to the problem at hand and is used to distinguish being from otherness. Thus the fuller and apparently different argument to distinguish being and otherness succeeds by giving the deeper reasons for the success of the argument to distinguish being and identity.

As a corollary to my interpretation, we can see that in these arguments other senses of "is," whether the "is" of existence or the "is" of identity, do not come into play, as other commentators have held.

The first section will discuss the first argument of our text, along with a recent interpretation of it. In the second section I shall introduce the argument to distinguish being and otherness and argue against Owen's interpretation.

The third section contains my interpretation of this argument, and is followed by a summary fourth section." (p. 385)
———. 1988. "On "Sophist" 255B-E." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 5:385–394.

"AT Sophist 255b7-e the Eleatic Stranger gives two arguments, one to show that being and identity are not the same, and one to show that being and otherness are not the same. Scholars have not paid them particularly close attention, but it seems generally agreed that the two arguments are quite different. In this paper I shall offer an interpretation which shows that the two arguments, though superficially quite different, are intrinsically and importantly related. Specifically, in the first argument the Stranger elicits an obvious falsehood from the hypothesis that being and identity are the same. I claim that in order to distinguish being and otherness an exactly parallel argument could have been given instead of the second argument we actually find. However, there are sound dramatic reasons why this was not done, for in this case the falsehood would not be obvious. Instead, the argument we are given takes us deeper and analyzes the source of the falsehood by introducing a distinction between absolute and relative uses of "being." This distinction, which has been misinterpreted in the literature, is then applied to the problem at hand and is used to distinguish being from otherness. Thus the fuller and apparently different argument to distinguish being and otherness succeeds by giving the deeper reasons for the success of the argument to distinguish being and identity.

As a corollary to my interpretation, we can see that in these arguments other senses of "is," whether the "is" of existence or the "is" of identity, do not come into play, as other commentators have held." (p. 385)
Delcomminette, Sylvain. 2014. "Odysseus and the Home of the Stranger from Elea." Classical Quarterly no. 64:533–541.

"Not very long ago, Plato’s Sophist was often presented as a dialogue devoted to the problem of being and not-being, entangled with limited success in an inquiry into the nature of the sophist. Thanks to the renewal of interest in the dramatic form of Plato’s dialogues, recent works have shown that this entanglement is far from ill conceived or anecdotal.(1) However, the inquiry into the sophist is itself introduced by another question, concerning the nature of the Stranger from Elea himself. I would like to show that this question and the way in which it is raised in the prologue may themselves shed light on the relations between the many threads which run across this very complex dialogue."

(1) See especially N. Notomi, The Unity of Plato’s Sophist (Cambridge, 1999).
Denyer, Nicholas. 1991. Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy. London: Routledge.

"How can one say something false? How can one even think such a thing?

Since, for example, all men are mortal, how can one either say or think that some man is immortal? For since it is not the case that some man is immortal, how can there be any such thing for one to say or think? That, in a nutshell, is the problem of falsehood. It, and some of its many ramifications in ancient philosophy, will be the topic of this book." (p. 14)

(...)

"In the Sophist Plato sorts out, once and for all, the problems about falsehood that still lingered in the Theaetetus. His strategy is one of unite and conquer. What has made falsehood so problematic hitherto is, he suggests, the fact that it has been treated in isolation. We have thought that not being was uniquely difficult to understand, not realising how wrong we are to think that we understand being (243 b 7 - c 5, 245 e 8 - 246 a 2). Once however we realise that both being and not being should by rights be found equally difficult, we will be able to make progress (250 e 5 - 251 a 3). Plato thus examines all the many and diverse questions and answers about being that were bequeathed him by his philosophical predecessors. How many things are there? Just one? Just two? Or more? What sorts of things are there? Only changing and tangible things? Only changeless and intangible ones? Or are there things of both sorts? If we are to speak and think at all, argues Plato, we must acknowledge the existence of many things, both tangible and intangible.

Above all, we must acknowledge the existence of the five Greatest Kinds: Change, Rest, Being, Same and Other. By the end of Sophist 255 those kinds have been isolated and distinguished from one another. Plato thereupon puts them to work. He starts to explore some of the connections between them, and in so doing solves the problem of how we can speak of that which is not." (Chapter 8, p. 147)

(...)

"Plato has explained how we can negate both predications and identifications. He has explained how both those ways of speaking about what is not are perfectly legitimate and free from paradox. His explanations seemed plausible enough, so far as they went. But did they go far enough? In particular, did they go far enough to solve our problem about falsehood? Plato thought not. By Sophist 258 b 7 he has legitimated talk of what is not. It is not however until Sophist 263 d 4 that he takes himself to have legitimated talk of falsehood. In the meantime, much other work is done; and even though the problem of falsehood was that to charge someone with falsehood requires talk of what is not, nevertheless the eventual solution to that problem is not a simple application of the earlier result that talk of what is not can make perfectly good sense. Why does Plato proceed in this way? Why does he not declare the problem of falsehood solved the moment he has given his account of negation?" (Chapter 9, p. 166)
Desmond, William. 1979. "Plato's Philosophical Art and the Identification of the Sophist." Filosofia oggi no. 2:393–403.

Summary: "The author starts from an interpretation of continuity in the dramatic character of Plato's dialogue (a trait to be found in the Sophist as well, also in account of those images helpful to outline the nature of the philosopher), thus bringing forward a reading of the dialogue based on the statement that Plato's philosophical purpose cannot be either dried up or fulfilled on the range of logical analysis."
Di Iulio, Erminia. 2023. "Gorgias and Plato’s Sophist." Rhizomata no. 11:208–226.

Abstract: "My aim is to investigate the link between Plato’s Sophist and Gorgias’s treatise On What Is Not. This relationship is worth examining because Gorgias’s treatise constitutes an essential, but insufficiently studied stage in the intellectual journey leading from Parmenides to the Sophist. My claims are that 1) Plato’s agenda in the Sophist perfectly meets the challenges Gorgias raises in the first thesis of his treatise, that 2) this becomes clear once we focus on Gorgias’s and Plato’s respective use of the verb ‘to be’ and, finally, that 3) Plato is able to overcome Parmenides’s impasse precisely because he deals with Gorgias’s treatise."
Diggle, James. 2020. "Two Conjectures in Plato (Laches 183e, Sophist 261a)." Hermes. Zeischrift für Klassische Philologie no. 148:381–382.
Dinan, Matthew. 2013. "On Wolves and Dogs. The Eleatic Stranger’s Socratic Turn in the Sophist." In Socratic Philosophy and Its Others, edited by Dustin, Christopher and Schaeffer, Denise. Lanham: Lexington Books.

" I argue that in adopting a kind of Socratic “virtuosity,” the shortcomings of the Eleatic alternative to Socrates are put in dramatic relief. Not only does the Stranger’s appropriation of Socratic elenchos ultimately fail to produce clarity with respect to the sophist, but the drama of the dialogue suggests that the Stranger is critically lacking in self-knowledge. We see this most clearly in the Stranger’s philosophical parricide of “Father” Parmenides; certainly, it is through this parricide that the Stranger is able to produce an internally consistent account of being and logos, but the Stranger’s consistency only serves to attenuate his abstraction from a satisfactory account of the human things. At the end of the dialogue the Stranger thus produces a conclusion no more satisfying than the Athenian jury of the Apology—that Socrates looks awfully similar to a sophist. The specific ways in which Plato problematizes the Stranger’s investigation and conclusions, however, provide us with some insights into why Plato made Socrates the philosophical hero of the dialogues, particularly insofar as the Stranger seems lacking in Socrates’ characteristic self-knowledge. In the last analysis, while Plato opens the Sophist by dividing philosophy like from like, he closes it by dividing it better from worse, vindicating Socrates." (p. 117)
Dominick, Yancy Hughes. 2018. "The Image of the Noble Sophist." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 22:203–220.

Abstract: "In this paper, I begin with an account of the initial distinction between likenesses and appearances, a distinction which may resemble the difference between sophists and philosophers. That distinction first arises immediately after the puzzling appearance of the noble sophist, who seems to occupy an odd space in between sophist and philosopher. In the second section, I look more closely at the noble sophist, and on what that figure might tell us about images and the use of images. I also attempt to use the insights provided by the noble sophist in an investigation of the kind of images that Plato the author produces. This raises the question of the general notion of image as it appears in the Sophist, and especially of the dual nature of all images, which in turn invites reflection on certain features of the examination of being and non-being late in the dialogue. Finally, I return to the deception inherent in images, and I argue that this dialogue does not present the possibility of completely honest images. Nevertheless, I hope to show that some uses of deceptions and images are better than others."
Dorion, Louis André. 2012. "Aristotle’s definition of elenchus in the light of Plato’s Sophist." In The Development of Dialectic from Plato to Aristotle, edited by Fink, Jakob L., 251–269. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Translated from the French by Michael Chase.

"There are certainly several ways to approach the question of the relations between the Platonic and Aristotelian dialectic.(1) They can be compared from the angle of their objects, their method, their functions, the relations they maintain with opinion, science, the truth, rhetoric, and so on. I have chosen to compare and confront them on a precise point, which does not seem to me to be less essential, viz. the conception of the elenchus, more precisely the conception of the elenchus found in the Sophist and the definition set forth in the Sophistici Elenchi. I think it is possible to show that the Aristotelian definition of the elenchus is directly inspired by a passage from the Sophist, of which it nevertheless retains only one part and one dimension. The close parallel between these two texts establishes an unquestionable continuity between Plato and Aristotle, but this continuity is also accompanied by a significant discontinuity, as I shall try to demonstrate.(2)" (p. 251)

(1) Cf., inter alia, the studies by Pater 1965; Moreau 1968; Narcy 2000; and Brunschwig 2000.

(2) Fait 2007: xliv–xlv also deals with the relation between the Sophist and the Sophistical Refutations, but he offers no detailed comparison between the conception of elenchus in the Sixth definition of the Sophist (226a–231c) and the definition of elenchus found in the Sophistical Refutations.

References

Brunschwig, J. (2000) ‘Dialectique et philosophie chez Aristote, à nouveau’, in: Ontologie et dialogue. Mélanges en hommage à P. Aubenque (ed. N. L. Cordero), Paris, 107-30.

Fait, P. (2007) Aristotele. Le confutazioni sofistiche, Introduzione, traduzione e commento, Rome/Bari.

Moreau, J. (1968) ‘Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne’, in: Aristotle on Dialectic. the Topics (ed. G. E. L. Owen), Clarendon, Oxford, 80-90.

Narcy, M. (2000) ‘La dialectique entre Platon et Aristote’, in: Ontologie et dialogue, Mélanges en hommage à P. Aubenque (ed. N. L. Cordero), Paris, 69-89.

Pater, W. A. De (1965) Les Topiques d’Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne, Fribourg.
Dorter, Kenneth. 1990. "Diairesis and the Tripartite Soul in the Sophist." Ancient Philosophy no. 10:41–61.

"It has not generally been observed that there are remarkable differences between the way that the Eleatic stranger defines the sophist in the dialogue of that name, and the way that Socrates had characterized him in the earlier dialogues. These differences entail some serious consequences, and by paying attention to these we will be able to notice important implications of the Sophist's treatment of its theme. More generally, it will help us evaluate the claim that the dialogue represents a fundamental departure from Plato's earlier thinking." (p. 41)
———. 1994. Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues: the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman. Berkeley: University of California Press.

"The four dialogues examined here form a natural group with sequential concerns. Since the aim of the present study is to try to understand the group as a whole, I have sacrificed the advantage of greater detail that book-length commentaries would provide, in order to present a more synoptic picture. But although the treatment of individual dialogues will not be as extensively detailed as in book-length studies, I have tried to pay careful attention both to the conceptual arguments and to the dramatic and literary events, and have tried to ensure that the lessening of detail would not mean a lessening of attentiveness." (from the Preface, p. IX)

(...)

"In the middle dialogues such as the Phaedo and Republic, Plato defines reality with reference to the criterion of rationality. Reason apprehends what is universal and unchanging, but not what is particular and in flux. The senses apprehend what is particular and in flux, but not what is universal and unchanging. Since reason is a more trustworthy guide to truth than are the changeable and deceptive senses, true reality is to be identified with "being" (the universal and unchanging) rather than "becoming" (the particular and fluid). This is the dichotomy represented later in the Sophist by the gods (friends of the forms) and giants (materialists), respectively. The former maintain against the materialists that "through the body we have intercourse with becoming by means of the senses, and by means of reason through the soul we have intercourse with real being, which always remains the same in the same respects, whereas becoming is different at different times" (248a). The leader of this dialogue is not Socrates but an unnamed stranger from Elea, who apparently is proposing to give up this dichotomy by neutralizing the difference between the gods and giants—in which case he would destroy the theory of forms in one of its most fundamental features.

Consequently it is more important in the case of the Sophist than with most other dialogues to consider its standpoint in relation to that of its predecessors. There are in fact notable differences between the way sophistry—the defining focus of the present dialogue—is portrayed here and in the Socratic dialogues." (pp. 121-122)
———. 2013. "The Method of Division in the Sophist: Plato’s Second deuteros plous." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 87–99. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"I have suggested that the trilogy [Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist], like the Phaedo, approaches the good indirectly, by a deuteros plous. The reason the good cannot be presented directly is indicated in the final definition. The visitor concedes that it is difficult to know in which of the two species of images – distorted “semblances” or accurate “likenesses” – the sophist’s products belong (Sophist 236c – d). He goes on to locate that difficulty in the problem that to say what is false is to attribute existence to “what is not”, and although at first he raises this point with regard to semblances rather than likenesses (236e– 239e), he proceeds to broaden the problem: since any image (ειδωλον) differs from the true thing (άληθινον) that it imitates, it must be not true (μή άληθινον), which means it really is not (ούκ όντος). When Theaetetus points out that it “really is a likeness (εικόν),” the visitor replies, “Without really being, then, it really is what we call a likeness (εικόνα)?” (239d – 240b). Although the passage began as if only semblances were problematic, the problem was eventually extended to images in general, and by the end even likenesses were expressly included." (p. 97)
Driscoll, John. 1979. "The Platonic Ancestry of Primary Substance." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 24:253–269.

"In this paper I will not examine the three-sided relationship between the Receptacle, primary substance, and primary matter. Such an examination would afford an interesting perspective from which to study the development of Aristotle's theory of substance from the Categories to the Metaphysics, but it would raise many difficult issues not easily resolved in a short paper. I will instead simply list the properties shared by the Receptacle and primary substance and discuss one important consequence of the link thereby established between Timaeus 49-52 and Categories V: that the well-known controversy between G. E. L. Owen and Harold Cherniss over the dating of the Timaeus must be decided in favor of Owen, at least with respect to the relative dating of the Timaeus and the Sophist. I propose to show, in other words, that Categories V owes a much greater debt to Plato than is usually thought and that an examination of this debt increases our understanding not only of Aristotle's theory of substance but also of the development of Plato's later philosophy." (pp. 253-254)
Duerlinger, James. 1988. "The ontology of Plato's Sophist: I. The problems of falsehood, non-being and being." The Modern Schoolman no. 65:151–184.

Second part: The Modern Schoolman, LXV, March, 1988, 170-184.

"This is the first part of a two-part article in which Plato's discussion of the problems of falsehood, non-being and being, as presented in his Sophist, 236D9-25908, is explained from an ontological perspective. A new, unifying account of Plato's discussion is introduced that place it squarely within the framework of his theory of forms as it was understood by Aristotle and the ancient Platonists instead of the linguistic frameworks in which it has been placed by modern scholars. Because these linguistic frameworks have dominated both the modern translations and interpretations of Plato's text, readers will need to take special care not to presuppose the correctness of one or another of them when assessing this explanation. In particular to understand what is said here readers must free themselves of the habit of assuming that we are concerned with interpretations of " is" in positive statements of existence, predication, or identity, or with interpretations of "is not" in negative statements of existence, predication, or identity. The result of their effort, I believe, will be a clearer understanding of the novelty of my account, and consequently, a better understanding of the place of Plato's discussion within the history of ancient Greek ontology.

In the first part of this article I shall explain Plato's presentations of the problems of falsehood, non-being, and being, and in the second I shall explain his solutions t0 these problems in the context of his reply to those who deny that something can be both one and many. As Plato presents the problems of falsehood and non-being, I claim, he intends that we should realize that they rely on the assumption that because non-being is the contrary of being nothing can be both a being and a non-being. For this reason his solution to these problems is to argue, first of all, that non-being is not the contrary of being, but instead the form of otherness than another being, and secondly, that because every being, including being itself, partakes of this form, something can be both a being and a non-being." (p. 151)
Duncombe, Matthew. 2012. "Plato's Absolute and Relative Categories at Sophist 255c14." Ancient Philosophy no. 32:77–86.

"Beginning at Sophist 255c9 the Eleatic Stranger attempts a proof that ‘being’ (τὸ ὄν) and ‘other’ (τὸ θάτερον) are different very great kinds. The key step in this proof is to group beings (τῶν ὄντων) into those that are themselves in themselves (αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά) and those that are in relation to other things (πρὸς ἄλλα). Much effort has been made to understand this distinction between αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά and πρὸς ἄλλα. The prevailing approach takes the former to name the class of ‘absolute’ terms and the latter to name the class of ‘relative’ terms, categories described in Diogenes Laertius’ Life of Plato. Some, however, have argued that this category approach fails because it cannot say into which class some terms, such as ‘sameness’, fit. This represents a longstanding interpretive impasse. In this paper I show that an alternative manuscript reading can preserve the general category approach, whilst allowing ‘sameness’ to fit into the scheme, and thereby end the interpretive deadlock. I then defend my alternative reading against the possible objection that certain terms do not fit into the new scheme by appealing to a range of texts where Plato discusses relative terms." (p. 77, notes omitted)

"For a good overview of the literature on this distinction, see John Malcolm, "A Way Back for Sophist 255c12-13", Ancient Philosophy 26: 275-289. 2006, p. 276."
Eisenberg, Paul D. 1976. "More on Non-Being and the One: A Response to Bondeson." Apeiron no. 10:6–14.

"In a recent issue of this journal, Prof. William Bondeson has argued(1) that previous translations of το μηδαμώς ου will not do (or, in some cases, are even seriously misleading); and he proposes to translate that phrase by 'that which has no characteristics at all'. In the second section of his paper, he seeks to show that there is "a close resemblance" (p.17) — indeed, "a direct parallel" (p. 18)—between the Sophist's το μηδαμώς όν and the ostensible subject of the first and sixth hypotheses of the second part of the Parmenides. Although, to be sure, he raises a number of other points as well—and although I am inclined to agree with much else that he says or suggests in his paper—what I have just indicated seem to me to be the principal theses in his paper. In any case, in this paper I shall deal almost exclusively with them—and I shall take issue with both of them. Or, more exactly, I shall argue that Bondeson's proposal for a new translation is quite untenable; and, while agreeing that there is indeed a "direct parallel" between the materials in the two dialogues that he considers, I shall question what seems to be his interpretation of the significance of those materials or arguments." (p. 13)

(1) "Non-Being and the One." Apeiron, Vol. VII, No. 2 (1973). 13-21.
El Murr, Dimitri. 2006. "Paradigm and Diairesis: A Response To M.L. Gill’s 'Models In Plato’s Sophist and Statesman'." Plato: The Internet Journal of the International Plato Society no. 6:1–9.

"In her interesting and stimulating paper, Mary-Louise Gill addresses one of the central issues in Plato’s Sophist and Statesman: what is a model (paradeigma) and how does one become useful in a dialectical inquiry? Gill’s main thesis is clear: a paradeigma becomes truly useful when not only the sameness between the example and the target but also their difference are recognized (“the inquirers need to recognize, not only the feature that is the same in the example and the target, but also the difference between the two embodiments and the procedural difference those different embodiments entail”)." (p. 1)
El_Bizri, Nader. 2004. "On και κώρα. Situating Heidegger between the Sophist and the Timaeus." Studia Phaenomenologica no. 4:73–98.

Abstract: "In attempting to address the heideggerian Seinsfrage, by way of situating it between the platonic conception of ̉όν in the Sophist and of χώρα in the Timaeus, this paper investigates the ontological possibilities that are opened up in terms of rethinking space. Asserting the intrinsic connection between the question of being and that of space, we argue that the maturation of ontology as phenomenology would not unfold in its furthermost potential unless the being of space gets clarified. This state of affairs confronts us with the exacting ontological task to found a theory of space that contributes to an explication of the question of being beyond its associated temporocentric determinations. Consequently, our line of inquiry endeavors herein to constitute a prolegomenon to the elucidation of the question of the being of space as “ontokhorology.”
Ellis, John. 1995. "Δύναμις and Being: Heidegger on Plato's Sophist 247d8-e4." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 3:43–78.

"This definition of being is proposed by the Stranger in the course of his discussion of the "gigantic battle."

One side maintains that only tangible, visible bodies have being (οὐσία), while the other claims that being is limited to only incorporeal, invisible Forms, the bodies of the opponents being relegated to the realm of becoming (δύναμις)." (p. 43)

(...)

"There is hardly a line in the above summary of the setting for 247d-e that is uncontroversial. The crux of the controversy is of course whether Plato is offering a definition of being as δύναμις;. Should we take this seriously, or is it merely a mark of being, used to refute the corporealists? After all, it looks as if the Stranger merely suggests that the known is changed by the knower-it is in fact one of three options mentioned so the friends of the Forms may not be forced to accept it. And if we do take the definition seriously, this surely entails that Plato has radically altered his view on the nature of the Forms.

The issue still divides scholars. Heidegger's interpretation of this passage in his lecture course on the Sophist is one that takes the definition seriously.

(...)

What is most interesting, however, is his relation to an unnamed interpreter, whom, as we shall see, Heidegger no doubt wants to take issue with, but who also fundamentally shaped Heidegger's own reading. This kind of problematic relationship is even more so because he remains unnamed. He is none other than Paul Natorp, whose name explicitly occurs only one other time in the course of the lecture (with the obvious exception of the eulogy at the very beginning), and that is with respect to his article on Antisthenes [*]." (p. 44)

(...)

"The essay is divided into three subsequent sections. I will give a review of Natorp's interpretation in section II. In section III, we shall turn to Heidegger's reading in the Sophist lecture, pointing out, along the way, influences of, and divergences from, Natorp. And in section IV, we will briefly consider the issue of destruction." (p. 45)

References

[*] Natorp, Antisthenes, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft I 2, (1894), 1538-1545.

Natorp, Paul. Platos ldeenlehre. 1903. Reprint of the 2nd (1921) edition. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1961
Esposti Ongaro, Michele. 2009. "The Ontological Ground of Syntax: An Analysis of Plato's Sophist, 262c2-5. A Reply to Bruno Centrone." Les Études Platoniciennes no. 6.

"In his most recent translation of the dialogue, B. Centrone(1) argues that the expressions οὐσία ὄντος and οὐσία μή ὄντος can be interpreted in different ways, according to how we interpret the noun οὐσία, either as an indication of what a thing is or as an indication of the fact that it is.

Therefore, Centrone remarks that the meaningful λόγος can assert (a) that a thing which is, or a thing which is not, are (the horse is; the chimera is); (b) what a thing which is (exists) is, or what it is not (the horse is a quadruped, it isn’t a biped); (c) what a thing which is (exists) is, or what a thing which is not (doesn’t exist) is (a swallow is winged; a chimera is winged); or (d) that a particular nature is or is not.

Centrone suggests that the first is the right interpretation. Nevertheless I am not sure that he really gives a complete range of choices. I don’t believe that the expression οὐσία μή ὄντος could refer to a non-existing entity like “a chimera”, for the simple reason that Plato had previously excluded not being as an entity: “not being” is rather an expression which means the idea of Difference, in relation to a subject. I will therefore try to demonstrate that the expressions ὄντος and οὐσία μή ὄντος aren’t equivalent and that the first refers to a particular entity, while the second has a completely different function." (p. 178)

(1) Platone, Sofista, Translation of B. Centrone, Torino, Einaudi, 2008, note 146 p. 223.
Esses, Daniel. 2019. "Philosophic appearance and sophistic essence in Plato’s Sophist. A New Reading of the Definitions." Ancient Philosophy no. 39:295–317.

"Why does the Eleatic Visitor present so many definitions of sophistry in Plato's Sophist? Is the final definition complete, or should it be qualified and supplemented with further research? These are long-standing questions in scholarship on Plato's Sophist, and they have been the subject of lively debate.(1) I develop a new reading of the dialogue's definitions and provide fresh answers to these questions.

The distinguishing features of my reading are the following. First, I read the Sophist as a drama, paying special attention to how the dialogue's participants are portrayed and its place in a trilogy that also includes the Theaetetus and the Statesman. Second, rather than simply casting aside the first six definitions of sophistry as erroneous and irrelevant due to the success of the seventh definition, I examine what they each contribute to !he search for the sophist. The multiple definitions not only help highlight the sophist's deceptiveness and manifold appearances, but they also though subtly and gradually turn our attention to the challenge of distinguishing Socrates and sophists. Last, I strike, middle course in my assessment of the Visitor's final definition. I accept it as an adequate disclosure of the sophist's essence, but I also grapple with the possibility that it fails to provide adequate guidance for differentiating between Socratic philosophizing and sophistry." (p. 295)

(1) See Rickless 2010 for a recent intervention in this debate. Brown 2010 and Gill 2010 are also notable for their focus on the dialogue's divisions and definitions. Though studies focusing on this particular aspect of the dialogue are relatively recent, interpretations of the dialogue as a whole generally address the status and significance of the definitions, with varying conclusions.

References

Brown, Lesley 2010. "Definition and Division in Plato' Sophist ." In Definition in Greek Philosophy , edited by Charles, David, 151-171. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gill, Mary Louis. 2010. "Division and Definition in Plato's Sophist and Statesman ." In Definition in Greek Philosophy, edited by Charles, David, 172-199. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rickless, Samuel C. 2010. "Plato's Definition(s) of Sophistry." Ancient Philosophy no. 30:289-298.
Ferber, Rafael. 2024. "The Overt Argument Against Conceptualism in the Parmenides and the Covert Argument for Conceptualism in the Sophist (with a Particular Focus on the Being of Not-Being)." In Plato’s Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 373–380.

Abstract: "This contribution begins by analysing the argument against conceptualism in the Parmenides and then extends it to “the not-being” (to mê on) in the Sophist, or that which “is what is not” (258c2-3). It concludes with the puzzle that, in this case, the being of “the not-being” also has “understanding (nous), life (zôê) and soul (psychê)” (249a9). The main new points are (1) if “the not-being” has understanding (nous), “the not-being” – according to the ontological argument of the Parmenides – also has thought (noêma), which has a second “not-being” as its object and (2) the question of wether Plato would have interpreted Fragment 3 of Parmenides, to gar auto estin noein te kai einai, not only in the sense that thinking implies being, but also in the sense that being implies thinking”.
Ferejohn, Michael T. 1989. "Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and Semantic Fragmentation." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 71:257–282.

"This paper opened with the proposal of a somewhat unorthodox approach to reading the Sophist (as a close companion to certain Aristotelian texts), to which can now be added a further methodological prescription which needs no apology whatsoever. Simply put, it is that the Sophist should be read as a single and continuous whole. This may not seem to need saying, but in fact it is all too tempting (and has been too common) to think of the dialogue almost as if it were two separate works: an "outer shell" (216 — 36 and 264 — 8) in which Plato is concerned primarily to show off his method of division (and secondarily to continue his sustained invective against the sophists), and a more philosophical "inner core" (237 — 64) where the aim is to vindicate the possibility of false thought and speech against Eleatic attack. This bifurcation is an excessive reaction to an unexceptionable fact.

For one can quite readily agree that there is a vast difference in philosophical content between the two parts of this alleged division without committing the correlative errors of regarding the "inner" section as self-contained, and dismissing the "outer" sections as so much optional reading when trying to puzzle out the discussion of negation, falsity, and related topics which occurs at 237 — 64.

Besides the general point that this false partition denies justice to Plato both as a philosopher and as a master of the dramatic craft, there are very powerful reasons pertaining to the specific issues involved for suspecting that the parts in question must be more connected than the explicit transitions at 236,7 and 264 make it seem.

Chief among these is the fact that whereas the particular application of the method of division to the very special case of the sophist might depend on the intelligibility of false statement, Plato's very conception of the method itself presupposes the coherence of negative predication." (pp. 264-265)
Ferg, Stephen. 1976. "Plato on False Statement: Relative Being, a Part of Being, and Not-Being in the Sophist." Journal of The History of Philosophy no. 14:336–342.

"Recently Plato's account of not-Being in the Sophist has received considerable attention, notably in papers by David Wiggins, (1) G. E. L. Owen, (2) and Edward N. Lee. (3)

Lee's discussion is especially important because it emphasizes (in my opinion, correctly) the analogy of the partitioning of Knowledge at 257c-d. Nevertheless even Lee seems to me to fail to give a correct explanation of the Sophist's discussion of this matter." (p. 336)

(1) David Wiggins, "Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of Non-Being," in Plato, A Collection of Critical Essays, Vol. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 268-303.

(2) G. E. L Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," also in Vlastos, pp. 223-267. (Henceforth referred to as "Owen.')

(3) Edward N. Lee, "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist," Philosophical Review, LXXXI, 3 (July, 1972), 267-304. (Henceforth referred to as "Lee.")
Ferreira, Fernando. 2001. "A Two-Worlds, Two-Semantics Interpretation of Plato's Sophist." In Greek Philosophy and Epistemology. Vol. II, edited by Boudouris, Costantin, 61–68. Athens: Ionia Publications.

"The avowed purpose of Plato’s Sophist is to characterize the sophist. In the first part of his book, Plato employs the method of divisions to obtain this characterization, and eventually arrives at the conclusion that the sophist is an imitator and that “there is an art, concerned with speeches, by which it is possible to beguile the young” (234c). From here it is short shrift to arrive at the problem of falsity. This problem is, I claim, the philosophical leitmotiv that drives the discussions in the second part of Plato’s Sophist (after 236d). One should be clear about what exactly this problem consists of. In the Sophist, Plato is not concerned with the problem of the meaningfulness of false statements concerning some high-minded realm of objects (e.g., forms) - quite to the contrary (see the epilogue). Plato is concerned with falsity in ordinary statements. This is worth emphasizing: Plato’s main problem in the Sophist is to account for the meaningfulness of such simple and prosaic (false) statements as ‘Theaetetus is flying’ (263a)." (p. 61)
Figal, Gunter. 2000. "Refraining from Dialectic: Heidegger's Interpretation of Plato in the Sophist Lectures (1924/25)." In, edited by Scott, Charles E. and Sallis, John, 95–109. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"We should begin with a general characterization of the Sophist and Heidegger's reading of the dialogue. The aim of the long and extremely difficult discussion between the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetos is to find out how something like sophistry is possible. To find an answer to this question is equivalent to investigating the human way of being in the world. In this way Plato's dialogue is a contribution to ontology. Nearly needless to say that it is an ontology of a very special kind and that the ontological investigation also turns out to be very special because of the nature of its subject. As Heidegger puts it, from the attempt to hold up a mirror "to the sophist's concrete Dasein within Greek life" (GA, 19:189) soon arises the suspicion, that sophists are connected with "deception and fraud," and so the investigation has to determine the status of deception and fraud. A quite simple reflection makes clear that every deception makes a pretense of being something that it is not, it passes off "non-being for being." Accordingly, the question of the being of the sophist's form of life is the question of the being of non-being. And, as Heidegger stresses, this means "a revolution in the previous way of thinking, even in the previous way in which Plato himself put forward the meaning of being"; the demonstration of non-being in being "is nothing less than the more radical conception of the meaning of being itself' (GA, 19: 192)." (pp. 96-97)

References

GA 19 = Martin Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, edited by Ingeborg Schüßler, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992.
Fine, Gail. 1977. "Plato on Naming." The Philosophical Quarterly no. 27:289–301.

"Plato is sometimes criticized for having failed to distinguish names and sentences, and naming and stating, until the Sophist, and this failure is thought to underlie both his supposed perplexity about false belief in the Cratylus, Theaetetus, and elsewhere, and his claim, in the Cratylus, that names can be true and false" (p. 289)

(...)

"This does not imply that Plato is clear about the differences between names and sentences; but we shall at least find that there is no evidence committing him to any confusion here. Nor, as we shall see, does Plato conflate stating and naming, in either of the alleged ways. Finally, we shall see that neither his account of true names nor his account of false belief in the Cratylus rests on the crude views ascribed to him. The account of true names says no more than that names are true or false of things, and that correct assignments of names depend upon the descriptive content of names. The account of false belief, so far from depending on the atomist "hit or miss" model, in fact matches the Sophist's later, supposedly more mature, account." (pp. 290-291)
Flower, Robert. 1980. "G. E. L. Owen, Plato and the Verb To Be." Apeiron no. 14:87–95.

"When it comes to Plato, the question which Aristotle tells us has plagued philosophers from the beginning — namely, "What is being?" (1) — has been reduced by certain contemporary commentators to the question, "How many syntactically distinct uses of the verb "to be" can be discerned in Plato's Sophist.(2) Over this latter question there has arisen something of a controversy of interpretation between two camps, so to speak. The first camp, from which I have chosen as representative, J.L. Ackrill (3), claims to have discerned three distinct uses: the "is" of identity, the "is" of the copula, and the "is" of existence. The second camp, represented here by G.E.L. Owen,(4) claims that there are only two uses of the verb "to be" in the Sophist: the "is" of identity and the "is" of the copula. To quote Professor Owen,

"The Sophist will turn out to be primarily an essay in problems of reference and predication and in the incomplete uses of the verb associated with these. The argument neither contains nor compels any isolation of an existential verb."(5)

I should like to argue in this paper that both camps are mistaken. There is only one use of the verb "to be" in the Sophist — namely, the "is" of participation — and it is this and this use alone that constitutes Plato's answer to Aristotle's question.

Being, for Plato of the Sophist, is participation or, perhaps better, the "power of participating". Thus, while Owen is, I shall argue, quite correct when he inveighs against discerning a substantive, existential use of the verb "to be" in the Sophist, his own account (and the arguments he offers in favor of it) warrants, shall we say, a "friendly amendment".

Whether one has adopted Ackrill's position or been persuaded by Owen, the evidence in question is minimally two-fold. Either interpretation must account for, first, the various passages wherein Plato either employs or seems to imply the expression, "participates in being" and, second, the passage from 255b7 to 255e where the Eleatic Stranger distinguishes Being from the Same and the Other."

(1) Aristotle, Metaphysics, Z 1.7, 1028b3-8.

(2) While this is not the time to argue about the advisability of such a "reduction". I must admit to the suspicion that the approach to Plato inherent in such a reduction does generate certain confusions; if only because it fails to preserve the issue of the initial question.

(3) J.L. Ackrill, "Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-259", Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, 1971), pp. 210-222. For further representatives of Ackril's position see P.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935),

p. 296; P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, 1933), p.298; M.K. Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the Sophist", Acta Philosophica Fennica xiv (1962), pp. 23-78; I.M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines (London, 1962), vol. II, pp. 498-499.

(4) G.E.L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being", Vlastos, pp. 223-267. See also Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology", New Essays on Plato and Aristotle ed. R. Bambrough (London, 1965), pp. 69-95. For others who tend to share Owen's position see J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of το v and το μη δν in the Sophist", Phronesis xii (1967), pp. 130-146; M. Frede, "Pradikation und Existenzaussage" Hympomnemata xviii (1967), pp. 1-99; W.O. Runciman, Plato's Later Epistemology (Cambridge, 1962), ch, iii; C. Kahn, "The Greek Verb "To Be" and the Concept of Being", Foundations of Language ii (1966), p. 261.

(5) Owen, op. cit., p. 225.
———. 1984. "The number of being." The Modern Schoolman no. 62:1–26.

"It is to my mind no accident that the primary interlocutor of both the Theaetetus and the Sophist, is the young mathematician, Theaetetus. In the former dialogue Theaetetus· in-roads into a theory of proportion that would include incommensurables constitute the model in terms of which Plato would have us understand the "fluid" logic of "maieutic" inquiry. I should here like to argue that the "object" of Theaetetus' own mathematical studies - namely incommensurables - offer Plato, if not the literal truth with regard to Being, at least a revealing metaphor in terms of which the nature and logic of Being can be articulated." (p. 1)
Foley, Sean. 2022. "Sophistic Speech and False Statements in Plato’s 'Sophist'." Illinois Classical Studies no. 47:383–405.

Abstract: "Plato’s Sophist features a discussion of false statements, the literal sense of which has been the source of much scholarly controversy. Two readings of the discussion, the Oxford Interpretation and the Incompatibility Range Interpretation, seem especially plausible. This essay enters the exegetical debate by placing the discussion of false statements in the broader context of the dialogue, which is principally concerned with sophistic speech, not false statements. When the discussion of false statements is understood as contributing to an inquiry into sophistic speech, the Incompatibility Range Interpretation—with slight modification—emerges as the clear favorite."
Foshay, Raphael. 2017. "Plato at the Foundation of Disciplines: Method and the Metaxu in the Phaedrus, Sophist, and Symposium." IAFOR Journal of Arts & Humanities no. 4:15–23.

Abstract: "This paper situates the interpretation of Plato in its 2500-year trajectory toward a significant change in the mid-twentieth century, away from the attempt to establish Plato’s metaphysical doctrines to a recognition of the intrinsic value of their literary-dramatic dialogue form. I discuss the lingering presence of doctrinal interpretation in the Nietzschean-Heideggerian tradition of Plato interpretation as it manifests in Derrida’s reading of Plato’s Phaedrus. I then give two examples of the transformative power of attention to the literary-dramatic structure of the dialogues in the work of two quite different but mutually confirming kinds of contemporary Plato interpretation, those by Catherine H. Zuckert and William Desmond, respectively. The Plato that emerges from their work confirms the growing recognition that the tradition of Platonism does not represent the thinking embodied in Plato’s dialogues."

References

Desmond, W. (1979). Plato’s philosophical art and the identification of the sophist. Filosofia Oggi, 11, 393–403.

Zuckert, C. H. (2009). Plato’s philosophers: The coherence of the dialogues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Fossheim, Hallvard J. 2013. "Development and Not-Being in Plato’s Sophist." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:318–327.

Abstract: "Plato’s dialogue the Sophist seems to contribute to two separate projects that are not easily reconciled: on the one hand, defining the sophist, and, on the other hand, developing a theory of being and process. In this article, it is argued that the two undertakings come together in what is a main focus for the dialogue’s interlocutors and a major issue in Plato’s writings overall, namely, education or development. This is an issue which in the Sophist finds expression in two separate but intimately interconnected questions, concerning the “who” and “how,” respectively, of the educational process."
Foster, Bennett. 2018. "Platonic Agonism: A Dialogical Addendum to Plato’s Sophist." Sophia and Philosophia no. 1:1–28.

"The following addendum to Plato’s Sophist was fabricated as a kind of experimental answer to a specific contextual question: What is the relation of Plato’s conception of philosophy to the practice of the agōn in Ancient Greece? For the “contest-system,”(1) to adopt Gouldner's phrase, has long been recognized as one of the salient features of Greek culture in the centuries leading up to Plato’s time.(2)" (p. 1)

(...)

(1) By “contest-system,” Gouldner means to convey the sense that the agōn is a systematic cultural entity, almost on the level of a formal institution. By agōn there is certainly meant more here than the sum of the various types of contests in Ancient Greece, let alone a particular type or instance of contest. Alvin Gouldner, “The Greek Contest System,” in Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965), 41-77.

(2) Jacob Burkhardt is credited with popularizing the notion of the “Agonal Age” of Greek history, during which the agōn was a “motive power ... capable of working on the will and potentialities of each individual .... and indeed became the paramount feature of life.” While the agōn was on the wane in Plato’s time, its influence was formative and lasting, and it was still a live issue whether traditional values such as the agōn represented should be retained. [Jacob Burkhardt, The Greeks and Greek Civilization, trans. by Sheila Stern, ed. by Oswyn Murray (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 162, 166.]
Frank, Daniel H. 1985. "On What there Is: Plato's Later Thoughts." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 6:5–18.
Frede, Michael. 1992. "Plato's Sophist on False Statements." In The Cambridge Companion to Plato, edited by Kraut, Richard, 397–424. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"...I want in what follows to focus on the discussion of false statements. Hence I will, only very briefly, comment on the remarks about being, and, in somewhat more detail, consider the remarks about what it is to be not being, to the extent that this seems necessary to understand Plato's resolution of the difficulty concerning false statements." (p. 399)

(...)

"Conclusion. In fact one thing that is striking about the Sophist, in comparison to the earlier dialogues, is its "dogmatic" and systematic character. It sets out carefully constructing a series of puzzles, aporiai. In this respect its first half resembles the early dialogues or even its immediate predecessor, the Theaetetus. But then it turns toward a resolution of these aporiai. In this regard the procedure of the dialogue reminds one of the methodological principle Aristotle sometimes refers to and follows, the principle that on a given subject matter we first of all have to see clearly the aporiai involved before we can proceed to an adequate account of the matter, which proves its adequacy in part by its ability both to account for and to resolve the aporiai (cf. De An. I, 2, 403b2o-21; Met. B1, 995a27 ff.). And the Sophist proceeds to resolve these difficulties in a very systematic and almost technical way. By careful analysis it tries to isolate and to settle an issue definitively. In this regard it does stand out among all of Plato's dialogues. And because of this it also is more readily accessible to interpretation. If, nevertheless, we do have difficulties with this text, it is in good part because in his day Plato was dealing with almost entirely unexplored issues for whose discussion even the most rudimentary concepts were missing. Seen in this light, Plato's solution of the difficulty presented by false statements is a singular achievement." (p. 423)
———. 1996. "The Literary Form of the Sophist." In Form and Argument in Late Plato, edited by Gill, Christopher and McCabe, Mary Margaret, 135–152. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

"If one considers the literary form of the Sophist, one is primarily interested in what is characteristic of, or distinctive about, the literary form of this particular dialogue, as opposed to other Platonic dialogues. But this should not make us overlook the fact that the Sophist, first of all, is a dialogue, and that, in the case of the Sophist, there is something particularly puzzling about this. So I will first consider the question why Plato wrote the Sophist as a dialogue, and then turn to two other literary features of the text.

The puzzle is this. If we look at the early aporetic dialogues, we have a number of readily available explanations why Plato wrote them as dialogues. But, as we proceed to the middle and then the late dialogues, these explanations become less and less plausible. And they seem to be particularly implausible in the case of the Sophist. For the Sophist, in a way, is the most dogmatic of all of Plato's dialogues. And it might seem that Plato could as well have written at least the central part of this dialogue as a treatise on falsehood." (p. 135)
Friedländer, Paul. 1969. Plato. Vol. III: The Dialogues, Second and Third Period. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Second edition, with revisions (First edition 1958) Chapter XXVI: Sophist, pp. 243-279.

Translated from the German Platon: Seinswaheheit und Lebenswirklichkeit, 3 vols. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1954 by Hans Meyerhoff.

Publisher's note: "The first volume of this work, Plato: An Introduction (1958), contains seventeen chapters, each an independent study of an aspect of Plato’s thought, his creative work, and his relation to modern thinkers, and a chapter on Plato as jurist by Huntington Cairns. A new edition is in preparation, with revisions and additional annotation.

The second volume, Plato: The Dialogues, First Period (1964), contains Chapters I-XIX, which interpret the works of Plato’s early creative period, the “ascent.”

The third volume, Plato: The Dialogues, Second and Third Periods, contains Chapters XX-XXXI. These take up the central and late dialogues, the works of Plato’s major creative periods. At the end of this final volume, there is an Afterword, “On the Order of the Dialogues.”

"We know that the task of clarifying the meaning of pseudos— falsehood, deception, and lie—occupied Plato from his beginnings as a philosopher. It did not grow out of a special interest in a difficult logical problem. It occupied him because (to speak in the concrete imagery of the Sophist) both sophistic and eristic hide in this darkness and confusion—everything, in other words, that is hostile to philosophy and that, because of its dangerously similar appearance, jeopardizes the reputation of philosophy and the life of the philosopher. Even one of the earliest of Plato’s works, the Hippias Minor, deals with the problem of deception, involuntary and voluntary, sophistic and Socratic deception. Then, with the Cratylus, language becomes the instrument of positive enlightenment. There (Cratylus 431bc; cf. 385bc) discourse is explained as the “juxtaposition” of noun and verb. In the Sophist, it is the “combination” of the two, and this change is more than a mere difference in expression. In the Cratylus, we are shown that just as the elements of a sentence, the “names,” may be used wrongly, so may the juxtaposition of these elements. The Sophist derives discourse not simply from “naming”; discourse has a new and autonomous structure. As a unique kind of being it has the structure of being itself, characterized by “communion.” In the Cratylus, the “names” have the function of revealing (δήλωμα, 433b et seq.}; in the Sophist, it is the statement that has this function. Hence, the Cratylus seeks to discover falsehood in the elements of language; the Sophist seeks it more deeply, in the structure of language."
Fronterotta, Francesco. 2011. "Some Remarks on the Senses of Being in the Sophist." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 35–62. Praha: Oikoymenh.

Abstract: "In this paper I examine the question of the different senses of the verb "to be" and the notion of "being" in Plato's Sophist, discussing the relevant passages and bibliography."
———. 2013. "Theaetetus sits - Theaetetus flies. Ontology, predication and truth in Plato’s Sophist (263a-d)." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 205–223. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"After solving the problem of “what is not” (259a–b) by elucidating the relations between the γένη that give rise to their reciprocal κοινωνία (259d-e), the next step, before getting back to hunting the sophist, is to clarify whether this also helps disentangle the difficulty connected with the possibility of falsehood in λόγοι, as the examination of what is not was introduced for precisely this purpose: once the logical aporia of falsehood has emerged from the ontological paradox of what is not, solving the latter would also solve the former. So, if what is not, whose form the Stranger has succeeded in identifying, “blends with thinking and discourse” (δοξη και λογω μειγνυται), there will be no contradiction in allowing falsehood in λόγοι, thus making approachable the dark place of images and appearances that are only similar to the truth, where the sophist has taken refuge; but if this were not the case, any λόγος would always have to be considered necessarily true and the inaccessibility of falsehood would make the sophist’s refuge safe from any threat (260d –261b). The section of the dialogue that opens in this way contains some of the fundamental premises of what can fairly be seen as Plato’s philosophy of language (259e –264b)." (p. 205)
Gacea, Alexandru-Ovidiu. 2019. "Plato and the “Internal Dialogue”: An Ancient Answer for a New Model of the Self." In Psychology and Ontology in Plato, edited by Pitteloud, Luca and Keeling, Evan, 33–54. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

"The theme of the dialogic relationship that the ψυχή entertains with itself appears explicitly in the Theaetetus and the Sophist.(10) Naturally, one could argue that “dialogicity” represents one of Plato’s main concerns throughout the dialogues.

However, I prefer to isolate the way the issue is treated in these two dialogues, because stating explicitly that thought is the “dialogue of the soul with itself” appears to be indicative of a particular Platonic outlook on thought and selfhood. I claim that Plato is subtly moving away from a descriptive perspective, the way thought has always been conceived in Greek culture, toward a prescriptive one, the philosophical appropriation and reinterpretation of this cultural trait. I thus propose not to treat this notion as being self-explanatory." (p. 35, a note omitted)

(...)

"In the Sophist, the description is couched in different terms, making the distinctions more explicit and adding some other elements: “Thought (διάνοια) and speech (λόγος), says the Visitor, are the same, except that what we call thought (διάνοια) is dialogue (διάλογος) that occurs without the voice (διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς), inside the soul (ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς) in conversation with itself. […] And the stream of sound from the soul that goes through the mouth is called speech (λόγος)” (263e3-8). We find out that dialogic thought and speech are not identical but of the same kind, namely, λόγος. Διάλογος is a type of λόγος but not in the same way uttered speech is λόγος, i.e., doxic λόγος. The dialogue “placed inside the soul” occurs “without sound or voice,” but speech is always uttered, it is something that is “breathed out.”

Not all speech is thought or dialogue, but all thought can become speech when it is accompanied with sound or when it is exteriorized. Furthermore, the λόγος that is exteriorized, “breathed out,” is not the dialogue but its “conclusion,” i.e., the δόξα.

The belief marks the cessation of the conversation, the moment when the soul doesn't doubt anymore." (p. 40)

(10) There is a third passage about the “internal dialogue” in the Philebus (38c-e), but this is more of an example than a description of dialogic thought.
Galligan, Edward M. 1983. "Logos in the Theaetetus and the Sophist." In Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Volume Two, edited by Anthon, John P. and Preus, Anthony, 264–278. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"In this paper I am concerned with the Theaetetus' dreamed theory [(201d-206b)] and its refutation in that dialogue. From the vantage point of the Sophist, I ask (1) whether and how Plato changed the theory's view of logos and (2) whether and how he might have been able to loosen the dilemma that refutes the theory." (p. 265)

(...)

"The dreamed theory and the Sophist differ about logos in rather much the way they differ about syllables. Though the Theaetetus contains a distinction of letters into kinds, not much was made of these distinctions. But according to the Sophist, vowels make non-vowels pronounceable. The latter dialogue claims part-part asymmetry for syllables. As for logos, the dreamed theory does not clearly have any part-part asymmetry, whereas the Sophist articulates just such a distinction. On the other hand, concerning the whole-part aspect of logoi, the dreamed theory and the Sophist are closer. According to the dreamed theory, by means of a statement we can express our knowledge of complexes, but what we can only name, elements, we can neither know nor state. According to the Sophist, we can name beings by means of a name or a verb, but in doing so we do not state anything of anything.

The Sophist's view of both statement and syllable seems to be that they are wholes that come to be when their parts are put together and that the wholes have a character that their parts do not have. This suggests that syllables and statements are open to whatever force there is in the second horn of the dilemma brought against the dreamed theory." (p. 270)
Ge, Tianqin. 2022. "Is dynamis a definition or a criterion of being in Plato's Sophist? Reinterpreting Sophist 247d-e in light of the Hippocratic method in the Phaedrus." Convivium no. 35:5–24.

Abstract: "This paper discusses the issue of whether the power (dynamis) is a criterion of being, or a definition of being at Plato’s Sophist 247d8-e4. I propose a new solution to this problem in light of the Hippocratic Method Passage at Plato’s Phaedrus 270d, arguing that, when one takes this parallel passage into account seriously, the dynamis proposal at Sophist 247d8-e4 only provides a criterion of being. This paper first gives some preliminary remarks on Plato’s discussion of the notions of ‘definition’ and of ‘criterion’.

Then I argue that the Phaedrus passage is a proper parallel passage of the dynamis proposal passage. After establishing the understanding of physis as essence in both the Hippocratic Corpus and Plato’s dialogues, this paper provides a detailed textual analysis between the Hippocratic Method Passage and the dynamis proposal passage. I demonstrate that the dynamis proposal at most provides a necessary condition of being, which falls short of being a proper definition of being. Therefore, the dynamis proposal only points to a criterion of being."
Gerson, Lloyd P. 1986. "A Distinction in Plato's Sophist." The Modern Schoolman no. 63:251–266.

Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.), Plato: Critical Assessments Vol. IV: Plato's Later Works, London: Routledge 1998, pp. 125-141.
———. 2006. "The 'Holy Solemnity' of Forms and the Platonic Interpretation of Sophist." Ancient Philosophy no. 26:291–304.

"There is a famous passage in Plato's Sophist which serves-as well as any, I believe-to indicate perhaps one of the most fundamental divides among Plato scholars. The division is between those who do and those who do not take seriously the ancient Platonic tradition's interpretations of Plato. The passage is the Eleatic Stranger's response to the claim of the 'Friends of the Forms' that 'real being' (τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, 248a11) is immovable."

(...)

"The argument leading up to this rhetorical question is this: if knowing is a case of 'acting' (ποιείν) on something, then being known is a case of 'being acted upon' (παρχειν). Since the Friends of the Forms agree that real being is known, they would seem to be forced to admit that the Forms, insofar as they are known, are acted upon. But that which is acted upon is 'in motion' (κινεισθαι). So, the Forms would seem to be in motion insofar as they are acted upon. But the Friends have maintained that Forms are not in motion; on the contrary, they are completely immovable. So, the Friends are faced with an apparent dilemma: either Forms are not known or else their claim that real being is immovable must be abandoned." (p. 291)

(...)

"In sum, the Platonic interpretation of Sophist maintains that the Friends of the Forms - both ancient and modern - do not grasp full-blown Platonism. Perhaps Plato himself at one time in his career did not grasp its nature either. Platonism is, among other things, the view that οὐσία must never be supposed to have its own separate reality. It is always and necessarily understood as embedded in the matrix Demiurge-οὐσία-Idea of the Good. From the Platonists' perspective, Aristotle wrongly collapsed or telescoped this matrix into the Prime Unmoved Mover, thereby making it unsuitable to be the absolutely simple first principle of all. The inseparability of ontologically primary thinking and being is a doctrine shared by Plato and Aristotle." (p. 302)
———. 2024. "Being and Power in Plato’s Sophist." In Plato’s Sophist: Selected Papers of the Thirteenth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Luc, Brisson, Edward, Halper and Richard, Perry, 265–272.

Abstract: "At Sophist 247D8-E4, the Eleatic Stranger offers as a “defining characteristic” (ὅρος) of what is “really being” (ὄντως εἶναι) “power” (δύναμις), that is, the ability to affect or be affected by anything in any way, to any degree, and at any time, even once. This defining characteristic is later applied to the argument between the materialists and the idealists, but it is not subjected to further analysis. This definition takes on particular significance in the light of Republic VI 509B8-9, for there the Idea of the Good is “beyond ousia,” surpassing it both “in seniority” (πρεσβείᾳ) and “in power” (δυνάμει). In this paper, I explore some of the connections between the two passages."
Gevorkian, Arasi T. 1987. "Idealism in Plato's Sophist." Russian Studies in Philosophy no. 26:43–63.

Abstract. "Marxist studies in the history of philosophy are based on the assumption that all philosophical schools and currents fall into two main traditions, materialism and idealism, and that the whole of the history of philosophy can be described as an opposition between the two. Lenin observed that this distinction goes back to antiquity, and that even then the "tendencies" of Democritus and Plato were already in evidence."
Giannopoulou, Zina. 2001. ""The Sophistry of Noble Lineage" Revisited: Plato's Sophist 226 b1 - 231 b8." Illinois Classical Studies no. 26:101–124.

"This paper deals exclusively with the sixth logos of sophistry, which depicts the sophistic art as "noble" and its practitioner, the sophist, as a teacher with apparently similar educational characteristics as those possessed by Socrates, the greatest enemy of sophistic practices. My aim is to shed some new light on the identity of the "sophist of noble lineage." Some of the methodological questions which will shape my argumentation are the following: is "noble sophistry" a suitable characterization of Socrates' elenctic method? If the answer to this question is positive, then how can one explain the fact that the Socratic method seems to be reflected in otherwise straightforward definitions of the sophists which condemn and repudiate their practices? If, on the other hand, the sixth definition does not intend to present Socrates as a "noble sophist" but simply reveals a more positive aspect of the σοφιστική τέχνη which could be seen as Socratic, what are the distinctive boundaries that clearly separate the elenchos from even the noblest eristic? In order to conduct my examination, I have divided this paper into three parts. In Part I, I attempt a close reading of the method used by the Eleatic Stranger and demonstrate its limitations; it is, I suggest, the nature of these limitations which contributes significantly to the ambiguity of the logos provided in the sixth definition. In Part II, I explore the main methodological tool of the definition, namely the "body and soul" analogy, and assess its impact on the quality of the logos provided. Finally, in Part III, I offer my own interpretation; its novelty lies in the fact that it contextualizes this part of the Sophist in the broader frame of the dialectical quest conducted by the Stranger and attempts to account for its intentional definitional ambiguity." (pp. 101-102)

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