Aaron, Richard I. 1952. The Theory of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Agassi, Joseph, and Sagal, Paul T. 1975. "The Problem of Universals." Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition no. 28:289–294.
Allen, Sophie. 2016. A Critical Introduction to Properties. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
Alvarado, José Tomás. 2020. A Metaphysics of Platonic Universals and their Instantiations: Shadow of Universals. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
Armstrong, David Malet. 1974. "Infinite regress arguments and the problem of universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 52:191–201.
———. 1975. "Towards a Theory of Properties: Work in Progress on the Problem of Universals." Philosophy no. 50:145–155.
———. 1978. Universals and Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Two volumes.
———. 1986. "In defence of structural universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 64:85–88.

"1. The central issue. At the heart of David Lewis' case against structural universals lies his contention that two different things cannot be composed of exactly the same parts.

Here is what I take to be a counter-example to his principle. Let a and b be two particulars, and R be a non-symmetrical relation. Let it be the case that a has R to b, and that b has R to a. We have two distinct states of affairs ('two different things'), yet, in a clear sense of the word 'composed', they are composed of exactly the same parts: a, b and R.

The two states of affairs may be called structures. In his important recent book The Categorical Structure of the World (1983, Section 101), Reinhardt Groomsman offers the following identity-conditions for structures. S1 and S2 are the very same structure if and only if (a) they contain- the very same nonrelational parts; (b) they contain the very same relations; (c) the same parts stand in the same relations to each other. In my counter-example, the two structures contain the very same non-relational parts, the very same relations, but it is not the case that the same parts stand in the same' relation to each other.

My counter-example to Lewis' principle was chosen because, although it involves structures, it does not involve structural universals. This shows, I think, that the difficulty raised by Lewis is best thought of as an argument against postulating any universals, structural or otherwise; or, at least, as an argument against postulating relations which are universals.

Lewis, of course, would not allow the counter-example. By far the simplest way for him to deal with it is by adopting a philosophy of what, following D. C. Williams (1953), and, more recently, K. K. Campbell (1981), he calls 'tropes'. Tropes are properties and relations, but they are properties.' and relations conceived not as universals but as particulars.;-On this; view 'of relations, my alleged counter-example becomes two states of affairs, a R1 b, and b R2 a, where R1 and R2 are not identical, although they may, resemble exactly. (The universal R perhaps reduces to an equivalence-class of exactly resembling tropes.) Given this account, I have certainly not produced a counter-example to Lewis' view that two different things cannot: be composed of exactly the same things.

But is not the dispute now a stand-off? Lewis can use his principle against a philosophy of universals. I can use universals to produce a counter-example to his principle. Indeed, is not Lewis close to begging the question against me?

It may be replied that Lewis' view is the more economical. He puts forward an attractive-sounding principle. I have to deny that the principle holds in all cases, and my reason is that it is defeated by those suspicious characters: universals.

To this I reply that economy in a metaphysics can only be judged, as Mark Johnston has put it to me, `in the end-game'. For myself, I believe that universals are great explainers. The loss on the roundabouts as a result of having to deny Lewis' principle may well be made up with interest on the swings. In any case, as the great Dr. Tarrasch said, `before the end-game, the Gods have placed the middle-game'.

What it would be nice to have, but what I cannot supply, is formal description of an operation which will take one from any unordered set of universals to possible structural universals which involve nothing but members of the set.' (I say `possible' in order to respect the Principle of Instantiation which I believe should apply to all universals.) Such an operation will permit the one universal in the original set to appear in more than one `place' in the structural universal. (E.g. an F having R to an F which has R to a third F.) A parallel is the way that, in a set of sets, the very same individual may be found as a member of different sub-sets." (pp. 85-86)
———. 1989. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press.

Contents: Preface XI-XII; 1. The problem 1; 2. Primitive natural classes 21; 3. Resemblance nominalism 39; 4. Particulars as bundles of universals 59; 5. Universals as attributes 75; 6. Tropes 113; 7. Summing up 135; references 131; Index 145.

"This book is intended to be intelligible to the advanced undergraduate student and should also be suitable for graduate seminars. However, I hope that it will also be of interest to professional philosophers, particularly those who are sympathetic to the project of an empirical metaphysics. Since the publication of my book Universals and Scientific Realism in 1978, although my views have remained the same in broad outline, I have become aware of various mistakes and omissions in what I said then. The present work, therefore, besides introducing the topic, tries to push the subject further ahead.

I now think that a particular type of moderate Nominalism, moderate because it admits properties and relations, but a Nominalism because it takes the properties and relations to be particulars rather than universals, can be developed as an important and quite plausible rival to a moderate Realism about universals. In the earlier book I gave such a Nominalism only brief consideration. By contrast, in this work a battle between Nominalists and Realists over the status of properties and relations becomes one main theme.

In general, I have largely confined myself to moderate Nominalisms and moderate Realisms. That host of contemporary philosophers who unreflectively substitute classes of particulars for properties and relations I take to be immoderate Nominalists. However, many of the arguments that I bring against the more moderate Natural Class theory are also arguments against this orthodoxy." (From the Preface)

"It is time to bring the matter to a conclusion. Metaphysicians should not expect any certainties in their inquiries. One day, perhaps, the subject will be transformed, but for the present the philosopher can do no more than survey the field as conscientiously as he or she can, taking note of the opinions and arguments of predecessors and contemporaries, and then make a fallible judgment arrived at and backed up as rationally as he or she knows how.

Of all the results that have been argued for here, the most secure, I believe, is the real existence of properties and relations. Whether they be universals or particulars is a more delicate matter, and just what properties and relations are required may be obscure, and in any case not for the philosopher to determine. But I hope that the arguments of Chapters 2 and 3, criticizing the versions of the Natural Class and Resemblance theories that try to do without properties and relations, will be thought weighty. Blobs are out; we require layer cakes. Reality must have more fundamental structure than the stricter Nominalisms allow. The introduction of properties and relations then involves, I argued, the admission of states of affairs (facts) into our ontology." p. 135

(...)

"Therefore, the fate of the Universals theory may turn on the questions of the inexact resemblance of universals and of the nature of laws. But if both questions go as I surmise that they will go, the Universals theory seems ahead of even the best Trope theory.

Drawing a figure from the game of chess, Mark Johnston has suggested to me that the dispute between a suitably sophisticated theory of universals and a suitably sophisticated theory of tropes can only be decided in the end game. Maybe. We are probably only at the beginning of the middle game as yet.

We have seen in Chapter 6 the remarkable way that the Universals and Trope theories, when thought through, turn out to run parallel in many respects. We may in the end have to reconsider an idea of H. H. Price's (Thinking and experience, Hutchinson, 1953, Ch. 1, pp. 30-32) that Universals and Resemblance theories are no more than "alternative languages," although, unlike Price, we will surely need to move to a trope version of a Resemblance theory.

At any rate, the Problem of Universals is alive and well and may commend itself to those happy few who feel the intellectual fascination in what D. C. Williams called "grubbing around in the roots of being." p. 139
———. 1989. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1991. "Classes are state of affairs." Mind no. 100:189–200.
———. 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2004. "How do particulars stand to universals?" Oxford Studies in Metaphysics no. 1:139–154.
Armstrong, David Malet, Martin, Charles Burton, and Place, Ullin Thomas. 1996. Dispositions. A Debate. New York: Routledge.

Edited and with an introduction by Tim Crane.
Aune, Bruce. 2002. "Universals and predication." In The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, edited by Gale, Richard M., 131–150. Malden: Blackwell.

"Theories of universals, the supposed referents of general terms,(1) fall into three basic classes, which I shall call P-theories, A-theories, and T-theories. The theory featured in Plato’s Republic is an example of a P-theory; the theory commonly ascribed to Aristotle is an A-theory; and the “trope” theories expounded by Donald Williams and Keith Campbell are T-theories. (If the reader associates “P” with Plato, “A” with Aristotle, and “T” with trope, my exposition will be easier to follow.) T-theories and A-theories are more commonly held today than P-theories, but they involve a serious error about predication, which P-theories easily avoid. In this essay I shall support the claim that T and A-theories involve this error, and I shall develop and defend a P-theory that avoids it." (p. 131)

(1) I speak loosely of universals here. The term is best applied to the objects of A-theories or P-theories, but T-theories provide an alternative account of what general terms supposedly denote, and it is convenient to have a word that applies to the supposed objects of all such theories. My choice of “universal” seems well-suited for this limited purpose.
Azzouni, Jody. 2004. Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bacon, John. 1986. "Armstrong's theory of properties." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 64 (1):47–53.

"At the heart of D. M. Armstrong's theory of universals in [N], [U] and [L] is a set of basic theses about monadic universals, or properties, as he calls them. The theses lay down the a priori conditions under which a one, place predicate simple or compound) may stand for a property. Thus there are predicates standing for no property. We may nevertheless say for convenience that they stand for `features', without here attempting a closer semantic analysis of this way of speaking. The rough idea is that a `feature' is a class-concept. As (placeholders for) one-place predicates, I use F, G.

That F is a property or a universal will be expressed by the (closed) sentence UF. The theory of U, of universalhood, is the metaphysical core of Armstrong's theory of universals. My purpose here is to clarify the core so far as formal means -permit."

[N] Nominalism and realism vo. 1 of Universals and scientific realism, Cambridge 1978.

[U] A theory of universals, vol. 2 of same.

[L] What is a law of nature?, Cambridge 1983.
———. 1995. Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of Being. London: Blackwell.

Review essay by Donald W. Mertz in The Modern Schoolman, 74, 1996, pp. 55-62.
Bambrough, Renford. 1960–1961. "Universals and Family Resemblances." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no. 61:207–222.
Baxter, Donald L. M. 2018. "The Problem of Universals and the Asymmetry of Instantiation." American Philosophical Quarterly no. 55:189–202.

Abstract: "Oliver’s and Rodriguez-Pereyra’s important interpretation of the problem of universals as one concerning truthmakers neglects something crucial: that there is a numerical identity between numerically distinct particulars. The problem of universals is rather how to resolve the apparent contradiction that the same things are both numerically distinct and numerically identical. Baxter’s account of instantiation as partial identity resolves the apparent contradiction. A seeming objection to this account is that it appears to make instantiation symmetric, since partial identity is symmetric. Armstrong’s standard reply is that the difference between a particular and a universal is what makes instantiation asymmetric. Brown suggests, though, that the instantiation of a universal by a universal is sometimes symmetric. However, the examples on which he relies are not universals."
Bealer, George. 1993. "Universals." The Journal of Philosophy no. 90:5–32.
———. 1998. "Propositions." Mind no. 107:1–32.
———. 1998. "Universals and Properties." In Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, edited by Laurence, Stephen and Macdonald, Cynthia, 131–147. Malden: Blackwell.
Beardsmore, Richard W. 1992. "The theory of family resemblances." Philosophical Investigations no. 15:131–146.
Bennett, Karen. 2013. "Having a part twice over." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 91:83–103.
Benocci, Matteo. 2018. "The repeatability argument and the non-extensional Bundle Theory." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 96:432–446.
Benovsky, Jiri. 2006. "A modal bundle theory." Metaphysica. International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics no. 7:19–33.
Benson, Hugh H. 1990. "Misunderstanding the "What-is-F-ness?" question." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 72:125–142.
Berman, Scott. 2008. "Universals: ways or things?" Metaphysica. International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics no. 9:219–234.
Bigelow, John. 1986. "Towards structural universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 64:94–96.
Bigelow, John, and Pargetter, Ribert. 1989. "A theory of structural universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 67:1–11.

Reprinted in Stephen Laurence and Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of

Metaphysics, Malden: Blckwell 1998, pp. 219-229.
Bird, Alexander. 2003. "Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts." Analysis no. 63:221–228.
Bochenski, Joseph M., Church, Alonzo, and Goodman, Nelson. 1956. The Problem of Universals: A Symposium. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.

Contents; Alonzo Church: Propositions and Sentences 3; Nelson Goodman: A World of Individuals 15; Joseph Bochenski: The Problem of Universals 35-54.

"The papers contained in this publication were read at the Aquinas Symposium sponsored by the Department of Philosophy of the University of Notre Dame on March 9-10, 1956. Leo R. Ward, C.S.C., of the University of Notre Dame, coordinator of the Aquinas Symposium, had invited scholars representing several divergent views on the nature of Universals to present, within the limits of a relatively short paper and a subsequent discussion period, some aspects of the problem of Universals. Response to his invitation was very gratifying.

Out of the meeting came three papers that literally make up a symposium: Professor Alonzo Church of Princeton University, Professor Nelson Goodman of the University of Pennsylvania, and Professor I. M. Bochcnski, 0.P., of the University of Fribourg and Visiting-Professor at the University of Notre Dame read papers that converge on the Problem of the Universals from three different philosophic positions. Professor Richard McKeon of the University of Chicago was the discussion leader at all of the sessions. These papers, with a minimum of editing by the respective participants, are now made available in this edition."
Boolos, George. 1985. "Nominalist platonism." The Philosophical Review no. 94:327–344.
Bordes, Montse. 1998. "Abstract particulars in a four-dimensional ontological frame." Dialectica no. 52:3–12.
Brody, Howard. 1982. "Commentary on "error, malpractice, and the problem of universals"." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy no. 7:251–258.
Brownstein, Donald. 1973. Aspects of the problem of universals. Vol. 24: University of Kansas.
Butchvarov, Panayot. 1966. Resemblance and Identity: An Examination of the Problem of Universals. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Calemi, Francesco Federico. 2016. Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Campbell, Keith. 1990. Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Cargile, James. 1999. "On an argument against closure." Noûs no. 33:239–246.
Carmichael, Chad R. 2010. "Universals." Philosophical Studies no. 150:373–389.
———. 2016. "Deep Platonism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 92:307–328.
Charlton, William. 2019. "Speaking and signifying." Philosophy no. 94:3–25.
Chihara, Charles. 1968. "Our ontological commitment to universals." Noûs no. 2:25–46.
Churchland, Paul M. 1985. "Conceptual Progress and Word/World Relations: In Search of the Essence of Natural Kinds." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 15:1–17.
Clarke-Doane, Justin. 2023. "Replies to Rosen, Leiter, and Dutilh Novaes." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 107:817–837.
Cocchiarella, Nino. 1986. Logical Investigations of Predication Theory and the Problem of Universals. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

"Predication theory has been a subject of philosophical concern since at least the writings of Plato and Aristotle. It is in its way the locus of a number of philosophical issues both in metaphysics and epistemology, not the least of which is the problem of universals.

The latter problem, sometimes all too simply put as the question of whether there are universals or not, is especially germane to the notion of predication since a theory of universals is at least in part a semantic theory of predication; and it is just to such a theory that we must turn in any philosophical investigation of the notion of predication.

In doing so, however, we need not assume the truth or superiority of any one theory of universals over another. Indeed, an appropriate preliminary to any such assumption might well consist of a comparative analysis of some of the different formal theories of predication that can be semantically associated with these different theories of universals: for just as the latter provide a semantics for the former, it is only through the logical syntax of a formal theory of predication that the logical structure of a theory of universals can be rendered perspicuous. That, in any case, is the principal methodological assumption for the approach to the problem of universals we shall undertake in the present monograph where we will be more concerned with the construction and comparison of the abstract logical systems that may be associated with different theories of universals than with the metaphysical or epistemological issues for which they were originally designed. It is our hope and expectation, however, that these comparative formal analyses will be instrumental toward any philosophical decision as to whether to adopt a given theory of universals or not.

The original use of the term "universal" goes back to Aristotle according to whom a universal is that which can be predicated of things (De Interpretatione, 17 a 39). We shall retain the core of this notion throughout this essay and assume that whatever else it may be a universal has a predicable nature and that it is this predicable nature which is what constitutes its universality.

Nothing follows from that assumption, however, regarding whether a universal is (1) merely a predicate expression (nominalism) of some language or other; (2) a concept (conceptualism) in the. sense of a sociobiologically based cognitive ability or capacity to identify, collect or classify, and characterize or relate things in various ways; or (3) a real property or relation existing independently of both language and the natural capacity humans have for thought and representation (realism). We propose to take each of these interpretations or theories of universals seriously in what follows at least to the extent that we are able to associate each with a formal theory of predication. Our particular concern in this regard, moreover, will be with the explanation each provides of the predicable nature of universals, i.e., of that in which the universality of universals consists.

Our discussion and comparison of nominalism, conceptualism and realism, accordingly, will not deal with the variety of arguments that have been given for or against each of them, but with how each as a theory of universals may be semantically associated with a formal theory of predication. Our assumption here, as indicated above, is that insofar as such an associated formal theory of predication provides a logically perspicuous medium for the articulation of the predicable nature of universals as understood by the theory of universals in question, then to that extent the formal theory may itself be identified with the explanation which that theory of universals provides of the predicable nature of universals. It is in the sense of this assumption, moreover, that we understand a philosophical theory of predication to be a formal theory of predication together with its semantically associated theory of universals." (pp. 11-12)
Conee, Earl, and Sider, Theodore R. 2005. Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Chapter 8: Universals, pp. 154-180.
Couvalis, George. 2025. The Science of Being as Being: Metaphysics through Aristotle. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Chapter 4: Universals, Particulars and Dispositions, pp. 49-64.

"In chapter 4, I discuss whether some essences and attributes are to be understood to be universals which are multiply instantiated, rather than particulars. Crucial parts of Aristotle’s Metaphysics seem to argue for the view that there are multiply instantiated universals in the world. This view has been taken up by recent philosophers who argue that there are categorical properties, and that laws of nature are to be best understood as relations between universals. I argue that there are no good reasons for believing in the existence of universals. Universals are not an addition to being, and they do not explain scientific laws.

Scientific laws are to be explained through the causal powers of things, not through the universals they supposedly instantiate." (Introduction, p. XIV)
Crockett, Campbell. 1954. "Contemporary interpretations of the problem of universals." The Philosophical Review no. 63 (2):241–249.
Cumpa, Javier. 2012. "Observation and Interpretation: the Problem of the Problem of Universals." Metaphysica. International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics no. 13:131–143.
———. 2013. "“In One”: The Bearer Issue and the Principles of Exemplification." Axiomathes no. 23:201–211.
———. 2018. "Are properties particular, universal, or neither?" American Philosophical Quarterly no. 55:165–174.
Curtis, Benjamin L. 2020. "The repeatability argument poses no new threat for Bundle Theorists. A reply to Benocci." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 98:826–830.
Dejnožka, Jan. 2001. "Butchvarov: phenomenology, ontology, universals, and goodness." Philosophia no. 28:445–454.
Denkel, Arda. 1997. "Universals, resemblances and partial identity." Philosophie analytique (31-32):259–267.
Deutscher, Max. 1992. "Forms, Qualities, Resemblance." Philosophy no. 67:523 – 541.
Đorđević, Strahinja. 2018. "Fictionalism and the Problem of Universals in the Philosophy of Mathematics." Filozofija I Društvo no. 29:415–428.
Dorr, Cian. 2004. "Non-symmetric relations." Oxford Studies in Metaphysics no. 1:155–192.
Durham, James M., Jr. 2002. "The permeability of causal criteria of identity for universals." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly no. 83:16–37.
Eberle, Rolf. 1970. Nominalistic Systems. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Eddon, Maya. 2007. "Armstrong on quantities and resemblance." Philosophical Studies no. 136:385–404.
Edgington, Dorothy. 1997. "Mellor on chance and causation." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science no. 48:411–433.
Ehring, Douglas. 2002. "Spatial relations between universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 80:17–23.
———. 2004. "Distinguishing universals from particulars." Analysis no. 64:326–332.
Elder, Crawford L. 1996. "Realism and determinable properties." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 56:149–159.
Ellis, Brian David. 2005. "Katzav on the limitations of dispositionalism." Analysis no. 65:90–92.
———. 2005. "Universals, the essential problem and categorical properties." Ratio no. 18:462–472.
Ettari, Dario. 1997. "The Indian wife puzzle, Russell on universals." Metalogicon no. 10:41–45.
Ewing, A. C. 1971. "The problem of universals." The Philosophical Quarterly no. 21:207–216.
Fales, Evan. 1990. Causation and Universals. New York: Routledge.
Ferrari, Francesco Maria. 2024. "Formal Issues of Trope‑Only Theories of Universals." Erkenntnis no. 89:919–946.

Abstract: "The paper discusses some formal difficulties concerning the theory of universals of Trope-Only ontologies, from which the formal theory of predication advanced by Trope-Only theorists seems to be irremediably affected. It is impossible to lay out a

successful defense of a Trope-Only theory without Russellian types, but such types are ontologically inconsistent with tropes’ nominalism. Historically, Tropists’ first way to avoid the problem is appealing to the supervenience claim, which however fails on its terms and, thus, fails as a ground for a solution to the higher-order or ‘type’ problem. A later solution involves the invariance of primitive equivalence relations in order to make universals ontologically innocuous. However, I argue that this latter solution fails to meet the requirements imposed on an ontologically unbiased nominalist attitude. So, this paper discusses how Trope-Only theories alter standard formal moves in Nominalism, and also is interested in clarifying further the formal assumptions for these problems."
Fine, Kit. 2017. "Form." Journal of Philosophy no. 114:509–535.

"This paper is a belated sequel to my paper on Cantorian abstraction.(1) In that paper, I attempted to defend Cantor’s account of cardinal numbers as sets of units, using a theory of arbitrary objects that I had previously developed to explain what the units were.(2) Of course, no one now adopts Cantor’s own account of cardinal number, preferring instead von Neumann’s elegant treatment of cardinal numbers as initial ordinals; this may have led some readers—or potential readers—of my earlier paper to dismiss it as being of purely scholarly interest. But as I had already mentioned in the paper on Cantorian abstraction, “the Cantorian theory can be extended to provide a more general theory of types—covering not merely the abstract formal types of mathematics but also the more concrete types of ordinary and scientific discourse” [p. 602]; in the present paper, I wish to consider the extension of the account to these other kinds of types (or what I now also wish to call forms)." (p. 509)

(1) Kit Fine, “Cantorian Abstraction: A Reconstruction and Defense,” this journal, xcv, 12 (December 1998): 599–634.

(2) Kit Fine, Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
Forrest, Peter. 1986. "Ways Worlds could be." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 64:15–24.
———. 1986. "Neither Magic nor Mereology: A reply to Lewis." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 64:89–91.

"In 'Against Structural Universals', David Lewis provides an important critique of the theory of structural universals developed by D.. M. Armstrong, and which I use in 'Ways Worlds Could Be'. Lewis' chief criticism is based on the thesis that the only unanalysable, sui generis, :mode of composition is that of mereology. (1) I call that the Either Mereology or Magic Thesis. Lewis claims that the 'generation of sets out of their elements is not some unmereological form of composition'. He, rightly in my opinion, treats a set as the mereological sum of unit sets. And -- here' I disagree -- -he insists that the generation of unit sets is 'not composition at all.'

In reply to Lewis I shall attack the Either Mereology `or Magic Thesis by arguing:

(1) That it does not follow from a conceptual analysis. (2)

(2) Although it has considerable prima facie ;appeal it is not robust enough to be used to argue against structural universals

and (3) Lewis himself is committed to counter-examples lo, it.

I conclude that Either Mereology or Magic Thesis is merely' an interesting conjecture, which would hold for some ontologies, but which Lewis should not advance and which has no power to refute my own theory of possibility."

(1) Against Structural Universals', this issue of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy pp. 25-46.

(2) Nor is it obvious that Lewis intended it to be.
———. 2005. "Universals as sense-data." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 71:622–631.
———. 2018. "A speculative solution to the instantiation and structure problems from universals." American Philosophical Quarterly no. 55:141–151.
———. 2018. "Operators solve the many categories problem with universals." International Journal of Philosophical Studies no. 26:747–762.
Friesen, Lowell. 2006. "Natural classes of universals. Why Armstrong's analysis fails." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 84:285–296.

Abstract: "Realists, D. M. Armstrong among them, claim, contrary to natural class nominalists, that natural classes are analysable. Natural classes of particulars, claim the realists, can be analysed in terms of particulars having universals in common. But for the realist, there are also natural classes of universals. And if the realist's claim that natural classes are analysable is a general claim about natural classes, then the realist must also provide an analysis of natural classes of universals. For Armstrong, the unity (or naturalness) of a natural class of universals is analysed in terms of universals resembling each other. I argue that Armstrong's account fails. His account fails for the same reason all other resemblance accounts of natural classes fail: some arbitrary classes satisfy the analysis for natural classes."
Galluzzo, Gabriele, and Loux, Michael J., eds. 2015. The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: List of contributors IX; Acknowledgments X; Gabriele Galluzzo and Michael J. Loux: Introduction 1; 1 Michael J. Loux: An exercise in constituent ontology 9; 2 Peter van Inwagen: Against ontological structure 46; 3 E. J. Lowe: In defense of substantial universals 65; 4 Gabriele Galluzzo: A kind farewell to Platonism: for an Aristotelian understanding of kinds and properties 85; 5 John Heil: Universals in a world of particulars 114; 6 Robert K. Garcia: Is trope theory a divided house? 133; 7 Sophie Gibb: Tropes and the generality of laws 156; 8 Fraser MacBride: On the origins of order: non-symmetric or only symmetric relations? 173; 9 Anna-Sofia Maurin: States of affairs and the relation regress 195; References 215; Index 225-229.

"All but one of the chapters in this volume had their origin in a conference on the problem of universals in contemporary analytic philosophy held at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa, Italy in July 2010. The conference was part of a larger project under the direction of Francesco Del Punta on the problem of universals across the whole history of philosophy. The aim of the conference was to give a broad overview of the contemporary debate on universals, and to indicate the issues that promise to be crucial to future metaphysical investigation." (Introduction, p. 1)

(...)

"This volume is characterized by a distinctively metaphysical approach to the problem of universals. Contributors to the volume share the common assumption that the problem of universals is primarily a metaphysical and ontological issue, mainly concerned with how many categories of things we should introduce into our ontology: is the furniture of the world confined exclusively to particular entities? Or do we need to include in the catalogue of things that there are universals as well, i.e. entities that are shared or at least shareable by many particulars? To take this approach does not mean to deny that the problem of universals may be significantly linked with a number of central areas in semantics and epistemology. However, semantic and epistemic issues are here regarded as interesting consequences of a fundamentally metaphysical problem." (Introduction, pp. 1-2)
García Encinas, María José. 2009. "Tropes for causation." Metaphysica. International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics no. 10:157–174.
Garcia, Robert K. 2015. "Is Trope Theory a Divided House?" In The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Galluzzo, Gabriele and Loux, Michael, 133–155. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Giaquinto, Marcus. 2012. "Russell on knowledge of universals by acquaintance." Philosophy no. 87:497–508.
Gibbons, Stephanie, and Legg, Catherine. 2013. "Higher-order one–many problems in Plato's Philebus and recent Australian metaphysics." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 91:119–138.
Giberman, Daniel. 2018. "A reason for the non-specialist to care about the metaphysics of properties and persistence." Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy no. 61:162–177.
Giladi, Paul. 2014. "Ostrich nominalism and peacock realism. A Hegelian critique of Quine." International Journal of Philosophical Studies no. 22:734–751.
Gilmore, Cody S. 2003. "In defence of spatially related universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 81:420–428.
Goldstick, Daniel. 2023. "Towards a defensible nominalism." International Philosophical Quarterly no. 63:109–117.
Gosselin, Mia. 1990. Nominalism and Contemporary Nominalism: Ontological and Epistemological Implications of the Work of W. V. O. Quine and of N. Goodman. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Gould, Paul. 2012. "The Problem of Universals, Realism, and God." Metaphysica. International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics no. 13 (2):183–194.
Grygianiec, Mariusz. 2013. "Two approaches to the problem of universals by J. M. Bocheński." Studies in East European Thought no. 65:27–42.
Guigon, Ghislain, and Rodriguez-Pereyra, eds. 2015. Nominalism about Properties: New Essays. New York: Routledge.

Contents: 1 Ghislain Guigon and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra: Introduction 1;

Part I: The Historical Development of the Problem of Universals and Nominalism

2 Paolo Crivelli: Aristotle’s Definitions of Universals and Individuals in de Interpretatione 7 19; 3 John Marenbon: Abelard’s Theory of Universals 38; 4 Clasude Panaccio: Ockham’s Ontology 63; 5 Jano Hakkarainen: Hume on Spatial Properties 79;

Part II: Systematic Discussion

6 A. C. Paseau: Six Similarity Theories of Properties 95; 7 Douglas Ehring: The Trope Coextension Problem 121; 8 Ghislain Guigon: Coextension and Identity 135; 9 Markku Keinanen: A Trope Nominalist Theory of Natural Kinds 156; 10 Joseph Melia: Nominalism, Naturalism and Natural Properties 175; 11 Nicholas Mantegani: Avoiding Ad Hoc Ontology 189;

Contributors 209; Index 213-217.

"There are two kinds of nominalisms in contemporary philosophy. One of them asserts that everything is concrete and there are no abstract objects. The other asserts that everything is particular and there are no universals. This volume collects papers from various sides, historical, systematic, sympathetic and critical, that are concerned with the latter kind of nominalism. The reason why we have called it nominalism about properties is that universals are typically thought to be what properties are, or what certain properties are." (Introduction, p. 1)

(...)

"Thus nominalism is not the view that there are no properties. It is the view that there are no universals and, consequently, that if there are properties, they are not universals. Some nominalists reject the existence of properties, others accept it; all of them reject the existence of universals and believe that there are only particulars." Introduction, p. 3)
Hale, Bob. 1987. Abstract Objects. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hass, Lawrence. 2005. "Rays of the world. Merleau-Ponty and the problem of universals." Chiasmi International no. 6:225–236.
Hawley, Katherine. 2010. "Mereology, modality and magic." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 88:117–133.
Heil, John. 2014. "Accidents, modes, tropes, and universals." American Philosophical Quarterly no. 51:333–344.
Hennig, Boris. 2015. "Instance is the converse of aspect." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 93:3–20.
Henry, Desmond Paul. 1986. "Universals and particulars." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 7:177–183.
Higgins, Kathleen Marie. 2006. "The cognitive and appreciative import of musical universals." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 60:487–503.
Hochberg, Herbert. 1988. "A Refutation of Moderate Nominalism." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 66:188–207.

"Russell offered what has become a classic argument for the existence of universal properties in his 1911 paper 'On the Relations of Universals and Particulars. (1) My concern in this paper is not with the cogency of the argument he offered there, but with a moderation of the nominalist's position that concedes a point to Russell. (1) Some nominalist's have recently acknowledged Russell's claim that a universal 'connection' or `relation' of similarity is involved in taking qualities to be particular-instances, or 'quality-moments' in Husserl's terminology, and have argued as follows. The realist recognises particulars and universals. In addition, the realist acknowledges a universal connection or tie or nexus or predication relation - exemplification, say. Thus, the realist recognises three distinct kinds of things: particulars, universal qualities (including relations) and a connection between particulars and universals. The 'moderate' nominalist recognises particular quality-instances and a universal connection - exact similarity. Consequently, Russell's argument, at best, does not force a universal relational quality upon the nominalist, but merely forces the nominalist to recognise a universal connection that is a correlate of the realist's exemplification connection, and not of the realist's universal qualities and relations.(2) In a way, the modification of the nominalist's position is a tribute to Bradley's 'paradox', which can be taken to force one to recognise, as Russell sometimes did, that there is a basic predication relation that cannot be included as a relation among relations without initiating a vicious regress. (3)

The moderate nominalist can then reject Russell's claim that a universal relational quality must be recognised. Since the similarity relation is the analogue of the realist's exemplification connection, it is not a 'standard' universal. And, as any view must recognise such a connection, giving Bradley his due, the nominalistic advocate of quality-instances merely recognises, in his way, what the realist must also recognise: a 'connection' exemplification `tie' (or several `ties'): the nominalist recognises particular quality-instances and a universal `similarity tie'. Thus, while Russell's argument is neither blocked nor denied, it is seemingly deprived of its sting.

I shall argue that the moderate nominalist's argument fails for a number of reasons. (It is worth noting that Wilfrid Sellars has long advocated a variant of this kind of nominalism, though he sought to avoid explicitly accepting either a universal tie or quality-instances.) (4) One reason the argument fails is that it tries to avoid one kind of entity by giving another type of entity a two-fold function. The realist's exemplification connection performs only one function. It serves to connect particulars to universals so that we have states of affairs (5) to provide truth conditions for atomic sentences. In short, it combines elements into complexes. The nominalist's connection is not merely a connection in that sense. It not only connects exactly similar quality instances into what we may call 'similarity-facts', but, by so doing, it provides the qualitative content for an object. This is readily seen when we note that the realist's connection may or may not obtain, in the sense that a state of affairs may or may not obtain, given the elements - the particular and the quality - that enter into it. The nominalist's similarity fact must obtain, given the elements that enter into it, and is thus necessary, just as the similarity relation may be said to be 'internal', as opposed to an 'external' tie of exemplification. Thus, the relation of exact similarity is quite different from a connecting tie like exemplification." (pp. 188-189)

(1) Russell's classic argument will not do as it was presented. It will do in an amended form. On this point see my 'Russell's Proof of Realism Reproved', Philosophical Studies 37, 1980.

(2) I am indebted to D. M. Armstrong for calling my attention to this variant of nominalism and to discussion of it with him.

(3) Russell's concern with the Bradley paradox was partially responsible for his holding, in the manuscript of 1913 entitled Theory of Knowledge, that facts involved logical forms which were not constituents. See Chapter VII of the manuscript, published as vol. 7, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, ed. E. Eames et. al. (London: 1984).

(4) On Sellars' nominalism see my 'Logical Form, Existence, and Relational Predication', in Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, ed. H. Wettstein, et. al. (Minneapolis: 1981), reprinted in my book Logic, Ontology and Language (Munich: 1984).

(5) Questions arise regarding 'possible' facts or states of affairs that do not 'obtain'. Such issues, though relevant to the dispute between realists and nominalists, will be avoided in this paper.
———. 1995. "Particulars and universals. Russell's ontological assay of particularity and phenomenological space-time." Journal of Philosophical Research no. 20:83–111.
———. 1996. "Particulars, universals and Russell's late ontology." Journal of Philosophical Research no. 21:129–137.
———. 2001. "Individuation and individual properties. A study of metaphysical futility." The Modern Schoolman no. 79:107–135.
———. 2004. "Russell and Ramsey on Distinguishing Between Universals and Particulars." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 67:195–207.
———. 2006. "Ramsey and Russell on facts and forms." History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis no. 9:134–155.
Hochberg, Herbert, and Mulligan, Kevin, eds. 2013. Relations and Predicates. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

Contents: Herbert Hochberg, Kevin Mulligan: Introduction 7; Lars Gustafsson: Absurd Claims 11; Herbert Hochberg: Relations, Properties and Particulars 17; Ignacio Angelelli: Predication Theory: Classical vs Modern 55; Fred Wilson: Bareness, as in ‘“Bare” Particulars’: Its Ubiquity 81; Donald W. Mertz: Objects as Hierarchical Structures: A Comprehensive Ontology 113; Erwin Tegtmeier: The Ontological Problem of Order 149;

Ingvar Johansson: On the Transitivity of the Parthood Relations 161; Christian Kanzian: Warum es die Früher-Später Beziehung nicht gibt 183; Käthe Trettin: Tropes and Relations 203; Benjamin Schnieder: Once More: Bradleyan Regresses 219-256.

"Predication and the problems of universals and individuation have preoccupied philosophers from Plato (if not before) to the present.

Concerns about relations and the special problems posed by relational predication came later—along with the explicit recognition of “facts” as purported entities that “make” a judgment true, rather than false, and resultant questions about the structure of such grounds of truth. The essays in the volume explore aspects of the history of the classic issues raised as well as alternative attempts to deal with such issues." (Introduction, p. 7)
Hoffman, Joshua, and Rosenkrantz, Gary S. 2003. "Platonistic Theories of Universals." In The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, edited by Loux, Michael J. and Zimmerman, Dean W., 46–74. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hofweber, Thomas. 2016. Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Holdcroft, D. 1975. "Aspects of the problem of universals." Philosophical Books no. 16 (1):10–12.
Hossack, Keith. 2000. "Plurals and complexes." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science no. 51:411–443.
Imaguire, Guido. 2018. Priority Nominalism: Grounding Ostrich Nominalism as a Solution to the Problem of Universals. Edited by Imaguire, Guido. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
———. 2022. "What Is the Problem of Universals About?" Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 30 (1):71–89.
Irmak, Nurbay. 2024. "Against the property theory of musical works." Res Philosophica no. 101:531–547.
Ishikawa, Shiro. 2022. "The Problem of Universals from the Scientific Point of View: Thomas Aquinas Should Be More Appreciated." Open Journal of Philosophy no. 12:86–104.

Abstract: "Recently we proposed the linguistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is called quantum language or measurement theory. This theory is valid for both quantum and classical systems. Thus, we think that quantum language is one of the most powerful scientific theories, like statistics, and thus, it is the scientific completion (i.e., the destination) of dualistic idealism. If so, we can introduce the concept “progress” in the dualistic idealism. For example, we can assert that [Plato → Descartes → Kant → Wittgenstein → quantum language], where [“X” → “Y”] means that “Y” is more like quantum language than “X”. In this paper, we will study the problem of universals from the perspective of quantum language (i.e., from the scientific perspective of ignoring any religious perspective). And we can be confident of the progress of both of the two time series [Plato → Anselmus → Thomas Aquinas → quantum language] and [Descartes → Thomas Aquinas → quantum language] in dualistic idealism. The reader may find it surprising that Scholastic philosophy is more scientific than Cartesian-Kantian philosophy. However, this is because Descartes gave up the pursuit of “universals” and presented dualism as a visible “mind-matter dualism” so that it could be familiar to the general public. This made the Cartesian-Kantian philosophy socially successful, but unscientific. The problem of universals has not always been clear in the long history of philosophy. The reader should be convinced that the reason is that the problem of universals has been discussed in an incomplete non-scientific dualism to this day."
Jacquette, Dale. 2006. "Bochenski on property identity and the refutation of universals." Journal of Philosophical Logic no. 35:293–316.

"An argument against multiply instantiable universals is considered in neglected essays by Stanislaw Lesniewski and I. M. Bochenski. Bochenski further applies Lesniewski's refutation of universals by maintaining that identity principles for individuals must be different than property identity principles. Lesniewski's argument is formalized for purposes of exact criticism, and shown to involve both a hidden vicious circularity in the form of impredicative definitions and explicit self-defeating consequences. Syntactical restrictions on Leibnizian indiscernibility of identicals are recommended to forestall Lesniewski's paradox."
Johansson, Ingvar. 2000. "Determinables as Universals." The Monist no. 83:101–121.
———. 2009. "Proof of the existence of universals – and Roman Ingarden's ontology." Metaphysica. International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics no. 10:65–87.

Abstract: "The paper ends with an argument that says: necessarily, if there are finitely spatially extended particulars, then there are monadic universals. Before that, in order to characterize the distinction between particulars and universals, Roman Ingarden’s notions of “existential moments” and “modes (ways) of being” are presented, and a new pair of such existential moments is introduced: multiplicity–monadicity. Also, it is argued that there are not only real universals, but instances of universals (tropes) and fictional universals too."
Kalhat, Javier. 2008. "Structural universals and the principle of uniqueness of composition." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 76:57–77.
Kates, Carol A. 1979. "The problem of universals: An empiricist account of ideal objects." Man and World no. 12:465–485.
Katz, Jerrold, and Postal, Paul. 1991. "Realism vs. Conceptualism in linguistics." Linguistics and Philosophy no. 14:515–554.
Kistler, Max. 2004. "Some problems for Lowe's four-category ontology." Analysis no. 64 (2):146–151.
Klima, Gyula. 2014. "The problem of universals and the subject matter of logic." In The Metaphysics of Logic, edited by Rush, Penelope, 160–177. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Knight, Helen. 1933. "A Note on "The Problem of Universals"." Analysis no. 1:7–9.
Koch, William H. 2020. "Phenomenology and the Problem of Universals." Studia Phaenomenologica no. 20:147–166.
Kraut, Robert. 2010. "Universals, metaphysical explanations, and pragmatism." The Journal of Philosophy no. 107 (11):590–609.
Küng, Guido. 1967. Ontology and the Logistic Analysis of Language: An Enquiry into the Contemporary Views on Universals. Dordrecht: Reidel.

English translation by E. C. M. Mays, revised by the author, of: Ontologie und logistiche Analyse der Sprache. Eine Untersuchung zur zeitgenössischen Universaliendiskussion, Wien: Springer, 1963.
LaBossiere, Michael C. 1996. "Reply to Hochberg." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 74:162–170.

Reply to "A Refutation of Moderate Nominalism".
———. 1996. "Laws and universals." The Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 34:65–82.
Lafrance, Jean-David. 2015. "A bundle of universals theory of material objects." The Philosophical Quarterly no. 65:202–219.
Lamb, Andrew W. 2002. "No longer the cave of history. Knowing the universal in context." International Philosophical Quarterly no. 42:41–62.
Landesman, Charles, ed. 1971. The Problem of Universals. New York: Basic books.

Contents: Introduction: The Problem of Universals 3;

Part One: The Theory of Universals

1 Bertrand Russell: On the Relations of Universals and Particulars 21; 2 H. H. Price: Universals and Resemblances 36; 3 Gottlob Frege: On Concept and Object 56; 4 Gustav Begmann: Frege’s Hidden Nominalism 67, 5 F. P. Ramsey: Universals 84; 6 Alan Donagan: Universals and Metaphysical Realism 98; 7 Renford Bambrough: Universals and Family Resemblances 119;8 P. F. Strawson: Particular and General 131;

Part Two: The Theory of Abstract Particulars

9 G. F. Stout: The Nature of Universals and Propositions 153; 10 G. E. Moore and G. F. Stout Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular? 167; 11 Panayot Butchvarov: The Relation of Resemblance 184;12 Nicholas Wolterstorff: Qualities 200;

Part Three: Abstract Entities, Meaning, and Language

13 W. V. Quine: On What There Is 215; 14 Rudolf Carnap: Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology 228; 15 Richard B. Brandt: The Languages of Realism and Nominalism 243; 16 Wilfrid Sellars; Grammar and Existence: A Preface to Ontology 261; 17 Nelson Goodman: A World of Individuals 293; Bibliographical notes pp. 307-308.
Landini, Gregory, and Foster, Thomas. 1991. "The Persistence of Counterexample: Re-examining the Debate over Leibniz Law." Noûs no. 25:43–61.
Lawande, Ganesh Narayan. 1943. The problem of Universals: A Metaphysical Essay. Bombay: New Book Company.
Leftow, Brian. 2006. "God and the Problem of Universals." Oxford Studies in Metaphysics no. 2:325–356.
Legg, Catherine. 2001. "Predication and the Problem of Universals." Philosophical Papers no. 30:117–143.
Lewis, David. 1983. "New Work for a Theory of Universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 61:343–377.

Reprinted in Stephen Laurence and Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of

Metaphysics, Malden: Blckwell 1998, pp. 163-197 and in D. Lewis, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999, pp. 8-55.
———. 1986. "Against structural universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 64:25–46.

Reprinted in Stephen Laurence and Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of

Metaphysics, Malden: Blckwell 1998, pp. 198-218.
———. 1986. "Comment on Armstrong and Forrest." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 64:92–93.
Linsky, Bernard, and Zalta, Edward. 1995. "Naturalized Platonism versus Platonized naturalism." The Journal of Philosophy no. 92 (10):525–555.
Loux, Michael J., ed. 1970. Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Second revised edition 1976.

Contents: UNIVERSALS. Michael J. Loux: The existence of universals 3; Bertrand Russell: The world of universals 25; W. V. O. Quine: On what there is 33; D. F. Pears: Universals 44; P. F. Strawson: Particular and general 59; Nicholas Wolterstorff: Qualities 87; Renford Bambrough: Universals and family resemblances 106; Alan Donagan: Universals and metaphysical realism 125; Wilfrid Sellars: Abstract entitites 156; Nicholas Wolterstorff: On the nature of universals 206;

PARTICULARS. Michael J. Loux: Particulars and their individuation 235; Max Black: The identity of indiscernibles 250; A. J. Ayer: The identity of indiscernibles 263; D. J. O'Connor: The identity of indiscernibles 271; Edwin B. Allaire: Bare particulars 281; V. C. Chappell: Particulars re-clothed 291; Edwin B. Allaire: Another look at bare particulars 296; J. W. Melland: Do relations individuate? 304; D. C. Long: Particulars and their qualities 310; Irving Copi: Essence and accident 331; Hugh S. Chandler: Essence and accident 347; Alvin Plantinga: World and essence 353; Bibliography 387-396.

"Few philosophical issues have proved as persistent as the problem of universals. In virtually every period in the history of philosophy the existence of universals has been a central focus of philosophical concern; and like any recurrent issue, the problem has received different interpretations in different historical contexts. It is, nonetheless, possible to abstract a common theme from the variety of interpretations; for whatever else has been at issue, the concept of a multiply exemplifiable object has always been pivotal in the debate over universals. One party to the dispute (the Platonist or metaphysical realist) contends that

our ordinary notions of property, action, relation, and kind all presuppose an ontology of multiply exemplifiable objects. Different objects, realists have claimed, can possess one and the same property; different persons can perform one and the same action; different things can belong to one and the same kind; and different n-tuples (i.e., pairs, triples, etc.) of objects can enter into one and the same relation. According to the realist, their jointly possessing, performing, belonging to, and entering into are all cases of multiple exemplification; and what they jointly possess, perform, belong to, or enter into is a universal.

Nominalists, on the other hand, have denied the possibility of multiple exemplification and with it the reality of universals." (p. 3)
Loux, Michael J., and Crisp, Thomas M. 2017. Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge.

Fourth edition.
Lowe, Ernest Jonathan. 2003. "Individation." In The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, edited by Loux, Michael J. and Zimmerman, Dean W. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2004. "The Four-Category Intology. Reply to Kistler." Analysis no. 64 (2):152–157.
———. 2004. "The particular - universal distinction. A reply to MacBride." Dialectica no. 58:335–340.
———. 2006. The Four-Category Ontology. A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 2008. "Metaphysics." In The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, edited by Moran, Dermot, 438–468. New York: Routledge.
Lynch, Timothy J. 1976. "Aspects of the Problem of Universals." Philosophical Studies (Dublin) no. 25:272–277.
MacBride, Fraser. 1998. "Where are particulars and universals?" Dialectica no. 52:203–227.
———. 1998. "On how we know what there is." Analysis no. 58:27–37.
———. 1999. "Could Armstrong have been a universal?" Mind no. 108:471–501.
———. 2001. "Four new ways to change your shape." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 79:81–89.
———. 2002. "The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Truth-Making." Philosophical Papers no. 31:27–37.
———. 2004. "Whence the Particular-Universal Distinction?" Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 67:181–194.
———. 2004. "Particulars, modes and universals. An examination of E.J. Lowe's four-fold ontology." Dialectica no. 58:317–333.
———. 2005. "The particular-universal distinction. A dogma of metaphysics?" Mind no. 114 (455):565–614.
———. 2008. "Can ante rem structuralism solve the access problem?" The Philosophical Quarterly no. 58:155–164.
———. 2018. On the Genealogy of Universals. The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Macdonald, Cynthia. 2005. Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics. Malden: Blackwell.
Maclean, Duncan. 2012. "Armstrong and van Fraassen on probabilistic laws of nature." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 42:1–13.
Magalhães, Ernâni. 2006. "Armstrong on the spatio-temporality of universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 84:301–308.
Manser, Anthony. 1967. "Games and Family Resemblances." Philosophy no. 42:210–225.
Manthey, F. 1969. "Belief, Knowledge and Cognition. The Problem of Universals in Past and Present." Philosophy and History no. 2:173–173.
Maurin, Anna-Sofia. 2002. If Tropes. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 2008. "The One over Many." Acta Philosophica Fennica no. 84:37–49.

Andtract: "This paper investigates the One over Many, first as it was first introduced by Plato. Here, it is argued, the One over Many can be understood in at least two senses, both different from, but in a sense included in, the sense in which the One-over-Many is regarded as an argument for the existence of universals. In both of these senses, it is argued, it is possible to accept the One-over-Many while denying the existence of universals. This established, I examine the argument from the One-over-Many as given within the framework of Armstrong’s theory of universals. Within this framework there is another thesis of great import, that of scientific realism. I will try to show that there exists a problematic tension, if not an outright contradiction, between this thesis and that of the argument from the One-over-Many. It seems that, as soon as you accept a scientific realism, the support provided by the argument from the One-over-Many dissolves, or, vice versa, if you claim support from the argument the results of your scientific realism seem to be contradicted. I will argue that the way to resolve this tension is to give up the argument from the One-over-Many. In particular, this will results in a weakening of Armstrong’s case for the existence of universals. In general, discussing the argument from the One-over-Many brings to the fore a feature common to all senses given to the One-over-Many, and thereby a feature affecting all theories of properties (since all theories of properties in one sense or another refer on the One-over-Many)."
———. 2015. "States of Affairs and the Relation Regress." In The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Galluzzo, Gabriele and Loux, Michael J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McCloskey, H. J. 1964. "The philosophy of linguistic analysis and the problem of universals." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 24:329–338.
McDaniel, Kris. 2009. "Structure-making." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 87:251–274.
McMullin, Ernan. 1958. "The Problem of Universals." Philosophical Studies (Dublin) no. 8:122–139.
Mellor, D.H. 1992. "There are no conjunctive universals." Analysis no. 52:97–103.

"In short, just calling particulars and universals 'parts' of facts will not distinguish them even from functions like conjunctions, negation and disjunction, let alone from each other. Nor will it tell us whether there are conjunctive universals. For the answer to that question will now depend on whether the specifically universal type of parts of facts includes non-ultimate parts. If it does, there will be conjunctive universals; if not, not. So to say that there are such universals, just because parts are generally taken to include non-ultimate parts, would simply beg the question. Moreover this answer to it will now give advocates of conjunctive universals far more than they want. (...)

I conclude that none of Oliver's models of how particulars and universals constitute facts will tell us whether, and if so why, there are conjunctive universals." (p. 99)
Mellor, D. H., and Oliver, Alex, eds. 1997. Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: D. H. Mellor and Alex Oliver: Introduction 1; I. Gottlob Frege: Function and Concept 34; II. Bertrand Russell: The World of Universals 45; III. Bertrand Russell: On our Knowledge of Universals 51; IV. F. P. Ramsey: Universals 57; V. W. V. Quine: On What There Is 74; VI. Frank Jackson: Statement about Universals 89; VII. Michael Devitt: 'Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? 93; VIII. D. M. Armstrong: Against 'Ostrich' Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt 101; IX: Donald C. Williams: On the Elements of Being: I 112; X. Keith Campbell: The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars 125; XI. Chris Daly: Tropes 140; XII. D. M. Armstrong: Properties 160; XIII. David Lewis: Modal Realism at Work: Properties 173; XIV.New Work for a Theory of Universals 188; XV. Sydney Shoemaker: Causality and Properties 228; XVI. D. H. Mellor: Properties and Predicates 255; Notes on Contributors 268; Select Bibliography 270; Index of Names 275-276.

"Particular objects have properties, respects in which they may be alike or differ. People running are alike in motion, if not in shape or size, and differ in that respect from people standing still; spheres are alike in shape, not in size or motion, and differ in that respect from cubes; and so on. Similarly with relations. Take Don and his son Bill, and Kim and her daughter Ann. Don's parent -- child relation to Bill holds also between Kim and Ann. In this respect these so-called ordered pairs-written (Don,Bill) (Kim,Ann) -- are like all other parent-child pairs, and differ from any other pair, like (Don, Ann) or the child-parent pair (Bill,Don), whose first member is not a parent of the second.

Similarly with relations of three or more particulars. These are respects which ordered triples, quadruples etc. (n-tuples in general) may be alike or differ. Suppose Don is older than Kim, who is older than Bill, who is older than Ann. Then (Don,Kim,Bill) and (Ann,Bill,Don) are alike in that the middle member of each triple is between the other two in age -- if not perhaps in height or weight -- and differ in this respect from triples, like (Don,Bill,Kim), whose members are not ordered by age. Describing relations in this way, as properties of n-tuples of particulars, if of course course artificial, but the artifice has a point. The point is to remind us that properties and relations raise similar questions, about what it is for particulars and groups of particulars to differ or to be alike, questions that are best tackled together. And the answers to these questions matter both themselves and in their implications, e.g. for change: since to change in some respect is just to differ in that respect at different times. Thus a particular that differs in colour but not in shape at different times thereby changes its colour but not its shape, just as Bill's outgrowing his father is (Don,Bill) changing by ceasing to be an instance of the taller than relation. In what follows, we shall usually work with properties for ease of presentation. When what we say about properties does not apply to relations we shall say so and when there is something distinctive to be said about relations we shall say it.

The most important questions about the kinds of sameness, difference and change that properties embody concern their reality and objectivity. Do particulars change or stay the same, resemble or differ from each other, independently of how we think of or describe them? That is, do properties exist in their own right-and if so which?

But if these are the important questions about properties, they can hardly be our first ones. For just as we cannot know that unicorns do not exist (but that if they did they would do so independently of our thinking so) without knowing what unicorns are, so we cannot know whether and which properties exist without knowing what properties are. So our first question is this: what sort of entities are properties like running and relations like being taller than?

This question involves at least two comparisons. First, how do properties relate to the predicates that apply to the particulars (and n-tuples of particulars) which have those properties: how are running and being taller than related to what `runs' and `is taller than' mean? And second, how do properties differ from and relate to the particulars that have them?

These questions would be hard enough to answer if everyone agreed on the meanings of predicates, on what fixes their meanings and on the nature of the particulars they apply to. But these too are contentious matters, a fact which complicates our questions by making answers to them parts of semantic and metaphysical package deals, which need to be assessed en bloc. This fact, and the long history of the subject, also makes different writers use different terms for what we are calling `properties', `predicates' and 'particulars'-and also use these terms to mean different things. So to help readers understand the readings that follow and relate them to each other, we shall note in passing some of these other uses." (from the Introduction).
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Minogue, Brendan P. 1982. "Error, malpractice, and the problem of universals." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy no. 7:239–250.
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———. 1991. "How to be a Nominalist in Realist Clothing." Grazer Philosophische Studien no. 39:75–101.
———. 1996. "Issues and options in exemplification." American Philosophical Quarterly no. 33:133–147.
———. 2001. Universals. Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Contents: Preface and acknowledgements VII; 1. The problem(s) of universals 1; 2. Extreme nominalism and properties 23; 3. Moderate nominalism ands properties 50; 4. Minimalist realism: Wolterstorff's kinds and Armstrong's properties 74; 5. Traditional realism: properties are abstract objects 97; 6. Traditional realism: issues and objections 114; 7. The individuation of particulars 140; Notes 158; Bibliography 170; Index 181.

"This book is a study in analytic ontology with a focus on issues and options at the core of the problem of universals. The problem of universals is actually a cluster of related issues central to debates among extreme nominalists, moderate nominalists and advocates of various forms of realism about the ontological status of properties. The book is intended to be an introduction to the topic and I have aimed the level of exposition at upper level undergraduates, graduate students and professional philosophers, and I believe the book should be of value to all three groups. Given the intended audience, the book is an introduction, not in the sense of being aimed at beginning students in philosophy, but in the sense of seeking to focus on the most important issues central to the subject matter. Because of this focus and space limitations, I have of necessity refrained from addressing certain topics in the study of universals that have been prominent in the past ten years, specifically: the relationship between higher and lower order universals; the relationship between universals and causation, laws of nature and scientific explanation; the use of moderate (especially trope) nominalism to do work in various areas of philosophy. As interesting as these topics may be, those who study them bring to their reflections positions on the more fundamental topics about universals. And, often, philosophers who discuss these current issues seem unfamiliar with or inadequately appraised of important distinctions and arguments at the core of those more fundamental topics. For these reasons, I have chosen to focus in this book on those subjects that have been of perennial importance to the study of universals. There is a gap in the recent literature in these areas on which I focus, and I have tried to make a contribution to filling that gap." (from the Preface).
Morganti, Matteo. 2007. "Ressembling particulars: what nominalism?" Metaphysica. International Journal for Ontology & Metaphysics no. 8 (2):165–178.
Newman, Andrew. 1992. The Physical Basis of Predication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O'Connor, Timothy, and Jacobs, Jonathan D. 2003. "Emergent individuals." The Philosophical Quarterly no. 53:540–555.
O'Leary-Hawthorne, John, and Cover, Jan A. 1998. "A world of universals." Philosophical Studies no. 91:205–219.
Okwa, Augustine. 2021. "The Problem of Universals from a Contemporary perspective." Journal of Arts and Social Sciences no. 12:1–4.

Abstract:"The difference inherent in every existing ‘thing’ is so overwhelming and yet we find a way of categorizing them. The question, “What is a tree?” might seem pseudo prima facie, but in an attempt to proffer a laudable answer to this question, one is immediately confronted with myriads of difficulties.

The name ‘tree’ refers to a tall perennial woody plant having a main trunk and branches forming a distinct elevated crown. Now, does this phenomenal description bring to light a plant that serves as a quintessence for categorizing all others that possess the same properties or, these properties summing up to a single ‘thing’ are mere concepts without factual existence? If they possess factual existence, where do these quintessential ‘things’ reside? If we presume that their existence is not real, how do we account for the epiphenomenal representation of multifarious things in the world understood within the confines of a single concept? From the foregoing, it is evident that regardless of the fact that the alias of the problem of universals is the problem of one and many, the problem of Universals is not just one problem but many. Consequently, in this paper, I shall try to beam light on the problem by attempting to state the problem in clear terms, then engender into a phenomenological exposé of the problem, thereof, I shall strive to illuminate the arguments proffered on the subject."
Oliver, Alex. 1992. "Could there be conjunctive universals?" Analysis no. 52:88–103.

"Recently D. H. Mellor (1) has revived an argument of Ramsey's against the existence of complex universals. Although he believes in simple universals, Mellor argues that negative, disjunctive and conjunctive universals do not exist. I will show that his argument rests on a contentious identity criterion for facts. Despite the recent renewal of interest in a metaphysics of facts, conspicuously little has been said about the relationship between a fact and its constituents. I sketch three models of this relationship, only one of which sanctions the identity criterion. It turns out that this model does not fit Mellor's interpretation of Ramsey's theory of facts. I conclude by showing that Ramsey's argument does nothing to rule out one kind of conjunctive universal." (p. 88)

(1) D. H. Mellor, Properties and predicates, in his Matters of metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991 pp. 170-182.
———. 1996. "The Metaphysics of Properties." Mind no. 105:1–80.
Ou, Chiao-Li. 2024. "Amphibians and the particular-universal distinction." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 102:278–292.
Pagès Martinez, Juan. 2002. "Structural universals and formal relations." Synthese no. 131:215–221.
Pautz, Adam. 1997. "An argument against Armstrong's analysis of the resemblance of universals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 75:109–111.
Peacock, Howard. 2009. "What's Wrong with Ostrich Nominalism?" Philosophical Papers no. 38:183–217.
Peri, S. 1977. "The problem of universals and its perceptual correlates." Synthese no. 35 (4):447–456.
Persson, Johannes. 2005. "Tropes as mechanisms." Foundations of Science no. 10:371–393.
Putnam, Hilary. 1969. "On Properties." In Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, edited by Laurence, Stephen and Macdonald, Cynthia, 235–254. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Reprinted in Stephen Laurence and Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of

Metaphysics, Malden: Blckwell 1998, pp. 148-162.
Quinton, Anthony. 1973. The Nature of Things. London: Routldge & Kegan Paul.
Raatikainen, Panu. 2008. ""Mirage realism" or "positivism in naturalism's clothing"?" Acta Philosophica Fennica no. 84:63–70.
Raven, Michael J. 2022. "A problem for immanent universals in states of affairs." American Philosophical Quarterly no. 59:1–9.
Rayo, Agustin, and Uzquiano, Gabriel, eds. 2006. Absolute Generality. New York: Oxford University Press.

Contents: List of Contributors IX; 1. Agustín Rayo and Gabriel Uzquiano: Introduction 1; 2. Kit Fine: Relatively Unrestricted Quantification 20; 3. Michael Glanzberg: Context and Unrestricted Quantification 45; 4. Geoffrey Hellman: Against ‘Absolutely Everything’! 75; 5.Shaughan Lavine: Something About Everything: Universal Quantification in the Universal Sense of Universal Quantification 98; 6. Øystein Linnebo: Sets, Properties, and Unrestricted Quantification 149; 7. Vann McGee: here’s a Rule for Everything 179; 8.Charles Parsons: The Problem of Absolute Universality 203; 9. Agustín Rayo: Beyond Plurals 220; 10. Stewart Shapiro and Crispin Wright: All Things Indefinitely Extensible 255; 11. Gabriel Uzquiano: Unrestricted Unrestricted Quantification: The Cardinal Problem of Absolute Generality 305; 12. Alan Weir: Is it too much to Ask, to Ask for Everything? 333; 13. Timothy Williamson: Absolute Identity and Absolute Generality 369; Index 391-396.
Reicher, Maria Elisabeth. 2001. "Predicable and non-predicable universals." In Metaphysik im postmetaphysischen Zeitalter / Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age: Akten des 22. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums 1999, edited by Meixner, Uwe, 89–98.
Robert, Gastón. 2019. "Can the realist bundle theory account for the numerical difference between qualitatively non-discernible concrete particulars?" Teorema no. 38:25–39.
Rodríguez-Consuegra, Francisco A. 2004. "Ontology from Language? Ramsey on Universals." In F.P. Ramsey. Critical Reassessments, edited by Frápolli, María José, 220–236.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2000. "What is the Problem of Universals?" Mind no. 109:255–273.

"In this article I address the Problem of Universals by answering questions about what facts a solution to the Problem of Universals should explain and how the explanation should go. I argue that a solution to the Problem of Universals explains the facts the Problem of Universals is about by giving the truthmakers (as opposed to the conceptual content and the ontological commitments) of the sentences stating those facts. I argue that the sentences stating the relevant facts are those like "a has the property F", that is, sentences stating that a particular has a certain properly. Finally I show how answering these questions in this way transforms the Problem of Universals, traditionally conceived as the One over Many, that is, the problem of explaining how different particulars can have the same properties, into the Many over One, that is, the problem of explaining how the same particular can have different properties. The Problem of Universals is the problem of the Many over One."
———. 2002. Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 2002. "The problem of Universals and the limits of conceptual analysis." Philosophical Papers no. 31:39–47.
Rodríguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2003. "Resemblance nominalism and counterparts. Reply to Bird." Analysis no. 63:229–237.
———. 2004. "The bundle theory is compatible with distinct but indiscernible particulars." Analysis no. 64:72–81.
———. 2017. "Indiscernible universals." Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy no. 60:604–624.
Sanford, David. 1968. "Resemblance and Identity: An Examination of the Problem of Universals." The Philosophical Review no. 77:386–389.
Schneider, Susan. 2001. "Alien individuals, alien universals, and Armstrong's combinatorial theory of possibility." The Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 39:675–593.
Schoedinger, Andrew B. 1992. The Problem of Universals. Atlanta Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
Seargent, David A. 1985. Plurality and Continuity: An Essay in G. F. Stout's Theory of universals. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
Sharpe, Matthew. 2002. "Do universals have a reference?. On the critical theory of Herbert Marcuse." Philosophy Today no. 46 (2):193–208.
Shields, George W. 2004. "Rescher on Process and Universals." In After Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics, edited by Weber, Michel, 135–145. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Shwayder, D. S. 2011. Modes of Referring and the Problem of Universals: An Essay in Metaphysics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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Sontag, Frederick. 1973. "Being and God: Universal Categories and One Particular Being." Religious Studies no. 9:437–448.
Stapledon, O. 1924. "The Problem of Universals." The Monist no. 34:574–598.
Stegmüller, Wolfgang. 1977. "The Problem of Universals Then and Now." In Collected Papers on Epistemology, Philosophy of Science and History of Philosophy. Vol. I, 1–65. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Original German: Das Universalienproblem eisnt und jetzt, in: Archiv für Philosophie, 6 (1956) pp. 192-225 and 7 (1957) pp. 45-81.
Stemmer, Nathan. 2007. "On universals: an extensionalist alternative to Quine’s resemblance theory." Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie no. 38:75–90.
Strawson, Peter Frederick, and Chakrabarti, Arindam, eds. 2006. Universals, Concepts and Qualities: New Essays on the Meaning of Predicates. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Contents: List of Contributors VII; Acknowledgements IX; 1 Arindam Chakrabarti: Introduction 1; 2 Pranab Kumar Sen: Strawson on Universals 17; 3 P.F. Strawson: Reply to Pranab Sen 49;4 Jonardon Ganeri: Universals and Other Generalities; 5 Fraser McBride: Predicates and Properties: An Examination of P.K. Sen's Theory of Universals 67; 6 Mark Siderits: Buddhist Nominalism and Desert Ornithology 91; 7 Richard Sorabji: Universals Transformed: The First Thousand Years After Plato 105; 8 Chris Swoyer: Conceptualism 127; 9 Harold W. Noonan: The Concept Horse 155; 10 Bob Hale: Universals and Particulars: Ramsey's Scepticism 177; 11 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra: How Not to Trivialize the Identity of Indiscernibles 205; 12 George Bealer: Universals and the Defence of Realism 225; 13 David Armstrong: Particulars Have Their Properties of Necessity 239; 14 Wolfgang Künne: Properties in Abundance 249; 15 P.F. Strawson: A Category of Particulars 301; 16 Arindam Chakrabarti: On Perceiving Properties 309; Index 319-324.
Stroll, Avrum. 1961. "Meaning, referring, and the problem of universals." Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy no. 4:107–122.
———. 1973. "Linguistic Clusters and the Problem of Universals." Dialectica no. 27:219–260.
———. 1976. "Truth‐Bearers, Propositions and the Problem of Universals." Dialectica no. 30:17–34.
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Swinburne, Richard. 2006. "Relations between universals, or divine laws?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 84:179–189.

Abstract: "Armstrong’s theory of laws of nature as relations between universals gives an initially plausible account of why the causal powers of substances are bound together only in certain ways, so that the world is a very regular place. But its resulting theory of causation cannot account for intentional causation, since this involves an agent trying to do something, and trying is causing. This kind of causation is thus a state of an agent and does not involve the operation of a law. It is simpler to suppose that non-intentional causing is also causing by substances (and not events) in virtue of their powers to act. That raises again the question of why their powers are bound together only in certain ways. The most probable answer is that God, the simplest kind of person there could be, brings this about because it is necessary for the existence of finite rational creatures such as ourselves."
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Abstract: "Mr. Bambouugh's claim (Proc. Arist. Soc., 1960) that the Theory of Family Resemblances solves the Problem of Universals is, I think, extremely unsound, for it is based upon misunderstandings of both the Theory of Family Resemblances and the Problem of Universals as it has traditionally been undertaken."
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Abstract: "In this paper I argue that if one subscribes to dispositionalism—the view that natural properties are irreducibly dispositional in character—then one ought to favour a Platonic view of properties. That is, dispositionalists ought to view properties as transcendent universals. I argue for this on the grounds that only with transcendent universals in play can two central dispositionalist platitudes be accounted for in a satisfactory way. Given that dispositionalism is becoming an increasingly influential view in the metaphysics of science, my argument, if successful, suggests that Platonism will see something of a revival in contemporary metaphysics.

This new kind of Platonism is shown to have some striking metaphysical and epistemological consequences."
van Cleve, James. 1994. "Predication Without Universals? A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 54:577–590.

"In this paper I wish to consider the merits of Realist theories of predication vis-à-vis three varieties of Nominalism, which Armstrong has dubbed Predicate Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism, and Ostrich Nominalism) In Part I, I shall argue that Ostrich Nominalism is the most satisfactory position of these four, and that the Realist view favored by Armstrong and many others is prone to the same fundamental difficulty as the other two varieties of Nominalism. In Part II, I shall consider difficulties for the argument of Part I."
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"The somewhat dusty problem on which I engage us here is about as inclusive and 'ontological' as any, and I would introduce it by developing some implication of the remark that our philosophical object, the world, and each part of it, is (naturally enough) a totality of what is. The italicized phrase at once brings to the pedagogic mind certain further catchwords which point up the contrast between what a thing is and that it is. The 'what' here however has itself stood for two meanings. By 'what it is' we may mean it, the thing, the particular case it is, the individual subject, denoted by an` ordinary proper name, so that what exists when Socrates exists is Socrates; but we may mean again its nature, the kind it is, the character generally said to be connoted by a common noun or conveyed by descriptive adjectives and denoted by an abstract noun, so that to answer what exists when Socrates exists is to say that it is a man, is wise, is snubnosed, and so forth, or even that the 'what' of it is Humanity, Wisdom, Snubnosedness, etc. The dichotomy here is sometimes signalized by distinguishing within the import of the present 'what', considered in contrast with the 'that', a narrower sense of 'what' which we pedagogues sometimes express by '(the) such', viz., the kind or character, in contrast with '(the) this', viz., the case or instance. The, problem of universals, which is the clearer and easier of the problems associated with the opposition of 'essence and existence', is that of the real distinction and connection of the two referents of our more inclusive 'what', the such and this, and especially the assessment of the view that these involve an entity of one category, an abstract universal, which inheres in or qualifies an entity of another category, a concrete particular." (p. 1)

Editor's note: This article by the late Professor Donald C. Williams (1899-1983) dates from about 1959.
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Edited by A. R. J. Fisher.
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