by Raul Corazzon - e-mail: rc[at]ontology.co

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For an overview see the Index of the Pages or the Alphabetical Index of the Philosophers: A-F - G-O - P-Z; you can also download the page as or see the Table of Contemporary Ontologists (click on the image to see the PDF file)

Change of Address: The site www.formalontology.it is now at www.ontology.co

Selected Bibliography on the Meanings of Being in Aristotle

Index of the Section: Metaphysics or Ontology? The Debate about the Subject Matter of First Philosophy

Aristotle's Definition of a Science of Being qua Being
- Selected Bibliography on the Meanings of Being in Aristotle
The Place of Metaphysics in the Ancient Divisions of Philosophy
The Peripatos after Aristotle's and the Origin of the Corpus Aristotelicum
- Bibliography on the Ancient Catalogues of Aristotle and the Corpus Aristotelicum
Ancient Catalogues of Aristotle's Works: English studies
- Diogenes Laërtius, Lives, V 22-27
- Hesychius of Miletus and Ptolemy al-Garib
Listes Anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote: études en français
- Diogène Laërce, Vies V, 22-27
- Hésychius de Milet et Ptolémée el-Garib
The Oblivion of Being After Aristotle: Theophrastus' Metaphysics
The Neoplatonic Commentators on Aristotle's Metaphysics

Index of the Section: "History of Ontology"

INTRODUCTION

An extended and well organized bibliography is available in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle edited by Jonathan Barnes - Cambridge University Press 1995 pp. 295-384.

From page 295: "The thing is meant for Anglophone philosophers. Hence it this bibliography lists relatively few studies which are exclusively historical or philological in character (and offers relatively thin coverage of Aristotle's own scientific and antiquarian researches); and it is powerfully biased in favor of books and articles in English. In addition we have tended to favor more recent items (which are generally more accessible), and we have concentrated on work done in what is sometimes called the 'analytical' tradition in philosophy.

Even within these limits the list is far from comprehensive. We hope that we have missed little of the very first rank (and that we have included little of the very last rank). But we have surely omitted, for one reason or another, many worthy pieces; and other scholars would doubtless have com forward with other selections."

I will try to add the most important references in French, German and Italian languages.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL RESOURCES

On Aristotle's Metaphysics the most complete bibliography is:

Roberto Radice e vari collaboratori - La 'Metafisica' di Aristotle nel XX secolo. Bibliograpfia ragionata e sistematica - Seconda edizione riveduta, corretta e ampliata - Presentazione di Giovanni Reale - Milano, Vita e Pensiero 1997 (827 pagine).
English translation: Roberto Radice and Richard Davies. - Aristotle's Metaphysics. Annotated Bibliography of the Twentieth-Century Literature - Leiden, Brill 1997.

From the Foreword by Giovanni Reale:

"The historiography of philosophy, especially today, with the huge and unpredictable growth in publication, has need of annotated bibliography. Aiming to avoid the Scylla of partialness and the Charybdis of mere cataloguing, the present volume aims not merely to collect most, but to describe much, of the astonishing amount of work that Aristotle's Metaphysics has stimulated and continues to stimulate in our century.

Roberto Radice undertook the labour of putting this bibliography together more than five years ago, and has worked at it tirelessly and with great efficiency ever since, producing the first Italian edition in 1996. This sold out in less than a year, and the second, up-dated, edition appeared in 1997. It is on this latter that Richard Davies has based his translation. My hope is that the reader will appreciate not only their vision of the importance of the instrument they have made available, but also the commitment and passion that they and the other collaborators have brought to this undertaking.

The result of the editors' collaboration with the team of more than forty scholars world wide is a work that will surely be indispensable to anyone seeking to investigate the Metaphysics with an open mind and without the blinkers of methodological or theoretical preconceptions. I am confident, therefore, that Aristotle's masterpiece will be more fruitfully exploited and more clearly seen for what it is-one of the great and abiding legacies of ancient Greece."

CRITICAL EDITIONS OF THE BOOK GAMMA OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

Ross William David. Aristotle's Metaphysics a revised text with introduction and commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1924.
Jaeger Werner. Aristotelis Metaphysica. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1957.
Cassin Barbara and Narcy Michel. La Decision du sens: le livre "Gamma" de la "Metaphysique" d'Aristote. Paris: Vrin 1989.
Introduction, texte, traduction et commentaire.
Hecquet-Devienne Myriam. Aristote. Métaphysique Gamma. Édition, traduction, études. Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions Peeters 2008.
Introduction, texte grec et traductionpar M. Hecquet-Devienne.
Onze études réunies par Annick Stevens.

LEXICON

Readers with Greek will find indispensable:

Hermann Bonitz - Index aristotelicum - First edition Berlin, 1870, reprinted by Walter de Gruyter GMBH & Co. 1961.

A new Greek Lexicon of Aristotle's works is now available:

Aristotle. Edited by Roberto Radice - Electronic edition by Roberto Bombacigno - Biblia, Milano (Italy) 2005.

Readers without knowledge of Greek can see:

Troy Wilson Organ - An index to Aristotle in English translation - Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949 (reprinted in 1966 by Gordian Press, New York).

From the Preface: "It is well-known that the Corpus Aristotelicum contains many passages which throw light on one another, but there has been no method by which the student of Aristotle can easily discover this interrelationship. Bonitz' word index is of great help to advanced students of Aristotle in locating terms, but it is of little value to those who are interested in attaining a well-rounded view of Aristotle's analysis of a particular subject. Students of Plato find Abbott's index to Jowett's translations of the dialogues invaluable; but students of Aristotle, who are in much greater need of a synoptic apparatus, have no such work to which they may refer. Consequently, Aristotle is often studied as a biologist, or an orator, or a metaphysician, or an art critic, or a political and moral philosopher without due attention being given to the light thrown upon a particular view by his other works. When approached in this manner Aristotle is open to unnecessary misinterpretations; for example, he has been unduly Christianized by those who have attempted to comment upon the Politics or the Poetics without appreciating the relevance of his Ethics and Metaphysics. The intricacies of his terminology and the variety of extant translations add to the difficulty. This English topical index should aid not only the philosopher, but also the student of letters, politics, ethics, or psychology who seeks to evaluate Aristotle's contribution in a specific field.

In the preparation of this index the eleven volume English translation edited by W. D. Ross and J. A. Smith and published by the Oxford University Press (1908-1931) was used. The page numbering is that of the Berlin Academy edition of the Greek text (1831-1870) edited by Immanuel Bekker. This pagination is listed in the margins of the Oxford translations and is likewise indicated in most translations of Aristotle's works. In this pagination, 184 b 32, for example, refers to line 32 of the second column on page 1284 of the text."

Titles of Aristotle's works and their abbreviations (by Robin Smith, Texas A & M University).

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS

Aiken Wyatt D., "Essence and existence, transcendentalism and phenomenalism: Aristotle's answers to the questions of ontology," Review of Metaphysics 45: 29-55 (1991).
Ambühl Hans, "Metaphysik und Ontologie bei Aristoteles," Freibürger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 41: 223-228 (1994).
"This is a review of five articles on Aristotelian metaphysics ("Revue Philosophique de Louvain", 90, November 1992). Main results are: 1) there is no conflict between ontology and theology, because in its object the latter also comprises the causes of the being qua being. 2) in the formula "being qua being" the "qua being" does not stand for a specific reality, but for a formal point of view directing the investigation. 3) the train of thought in book Z leads to the establishment of the fundamental structure of being, i.e., the "being in itself". 4) ontology and henology (theory of the one) complement each other; the former relates to reality, the latter provides the corresponding methodical structure. 5) the application of stylometric methods and an in-depth analysis of book K show certain traditional interpretations in a new light."
Angelelli Ignacio, "Analytica priora, I, 38 and reduplication," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19: 295-296 (1978).
"Although many commentators have summarized chapter 38 of Analytica Priora I as if it was perfectly clear to them, I have not found their explanations satisfactory enough. In fact, I think Aristotle's text needs badly some sort of clarification that makes it meaningful to modern logicians. In this note I wish to propose one such reconstruction."
Anton John P., "On Aristotle' principle of contradiction: its ontological foundations and platonic antecedents," Philosophia: 266-280 (1972).
Aristote. Métaphysique livre Gamma. Leuven: Peeters 2008.
Introduction, édition, traduction et notes par Myriam Hecquet-Devienne. Suivie de onze études réunies par A. Stevens.
"Grâce à une nouvelle collation rigoureuse et complète des trois plus anciens témoins de la tradition manuscrite : J, E et Ab, l'édition par Myriam Hecquet-Devienne de Métaphysique Gamma corrige la vulgate imprimée. Le témoignage des lemmes et citations du commentaire d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise est également rectifié sur la base des manuscrits L et A. Après avoir exposé les principes méthodologiques suivis, analysé la tradition imprimée de la Métaphysique, donné une description codicologique et paléographique précise des manuscrits retenus, et examiné le rapport entre les témoins manuscrits, et entre les lemmes et citations d'Alexandre et la tradition directe d'Aristote, la traductrice propose une analyse de l'argumentation développée par Aristote dans le livre Gamma. La traduction qui accompagne ce texte grec fondamentalement révisé le suit de près, sans en gommer les aspérités, afin de le livrer dans toutes ses potentialités aux lecteurs. Des notes éclairent les passages trop abrupts, certains choix interprétatifs, ou les choix éditoriaux inédits.
Les études qui accompagnent cette édition ont pour origine un colloque organisé à l'Université de Liège, dont l'objectif était de profiter de la nouvelle traduction de Myriam Hecquet pour renouveler également l'interprétation de ce texte aussi difficile que fondateur. Il s'agissait en particulier d'examiner si de nouveaux éléments étaient venus modifier les grandes propositions interprétatives publiées ces dernières décennies."
Aubenque Pierre, "Aristoteles und das Problem der Metaphysik," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 15: 321-333 (1961).
Aubenque Pierre. Le problème de l'être chez Aristote. Éssai sur la problématique aristotélicienne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1962.
Aubenque Pierre, "Sens et structure de la Métaphysique aristotélicienne," Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie 58: 1-50 (1964).
Réimprimé dans: P. Aubenque - Problèmes aristotéliciens. I. Philosophie théorique - Paris, Vrin 2009 pp. 131-170
Aubenque Pierre. Sur l'inauthenticité du livre K de la Métaphysique. In Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien zum einigen Dubia. Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin, 7-16. September 1981. Edited by Moraux Paul and Wiesner Jürgen. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1983. pp. 318-344
Réimprimé dans: P. Aubenque - Problèmes aristotéliciens. I. Philosophie théorique - Partis, Vrin 2009 pp. 171-196
Balmes Marc, "Ontologie formelle de l'objet, catégories et philosophie première," Revue Thomiste 108: 259-268 (2000).
Bastit Michel. Les quatre causes de l'être selon la philosophie première d'Aristote. Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions Peeters 2002.
"... le présent ouvrage se devra de préserver l'originalité de la pensée d'Aristote et, pourrait-on dire, toute sa verdeur. Il devra donc entre autre se garder des lectures platoniciennes de la Métaphysique très fréquentes depuis celles de nombreux commentateurs grecs, jusqu'à certains aspects de celles qui sont inspirées aujourd'hui par Heidegger. Sans aucun doute, le texte d'Aristote n'est pas lui-même univoque, il suffit de rappeler la multiplicité des interprétations auxquelles il a donné lieu pour en être persuadé. Néanmoins, notre intention n'est nullement de tenter de projeter, en recourant à telle ou telle philosophie, un sens sur un texte qui par lui-même en serait dépourvu. Nous chercherons plutôt l'originalité génuine de ce texte. Cela implique de penser qu'il peut encore nous éclairer sur les questions que nous avons évoquées. Mais cet espoir n'est pas infondé, dans la mesure où les problèmes que nous rencontrons aujourd'hui pour utiliser les causes dans le cadre d'une philosophie de l'être et d'une philosophie première sont issus d'une remise en cause et d'un oubli progressif de la pensée aristotélicienne. Nous demanderons à Aristote de nous aider à philosopher sur une réalité commune; peut-être est-ce là ce que les doctrines contemporaines de l'interprétation appellent une fusion d'horizon (1).
Notre propos se déroulera selon le plan suivant. Après avoir examiné quelques-unes des interprétations des causes aristotéliciennes les plus autorisées, nous commencerons par marquer nos réserves à l'égard de la présentation habituelle de la causalité aristotélicienne, ou tout au moins nous en ferons ressortir les limites. Nous devrons constater également que celle qui lui a été préférée par Richard Sorabji n'est pas non plus entièrement satisfaisante. Ceci constituera un premier chapitre, à la suite duquel nous nous tournerons vers l'usage des causes tel qu'il est mis en oeuvre dans la Métaphysique. Là nous montrerons que la recherche des causes les plus élevées, leur dénombrement et leurs relations constituent l'un des caractères originaux de la pensée d'Aristote.
Notre projet consistera donc d'abord à examiner la conception aristotélicienne de la causalité là où elle se déploie avec le plus d'intelligibilité pour nous, à savoir en physique et en logique. Cela nous conduira à concevoir la causalité comme une relation de dépendance dans l'ordre de l'intelligibilité ou du devenir. En même temps nous serons conduit à reconnaître l'originalité de l'exercice de chaque genre de causes et le lien de celles-ci avec la cause formelle. Nous devrions donc parvenir à une conception de la causalité beaucoup plus diversifiée que celle qui réduit les causes à la cause matérielle ou efficiente, voire à la cause formelle si on néglige la distinction qui suit. En effet ceci ne sera possible qu'en recourant à la distinction des causes en acte et des causes en puissance qui fait cruellement défaut dans la plupart des interprétations aristotéliciennes, alors qu'elle recouvre pourtant tous les genres de causes. Probablement cette distinction peut-elle faire saisir à la fois l'unité des causes et leur rattachement à la cause formelle.
Muni de ces préalables, nous devrons alors constater que la philosophie première aristotélicienne se donne bien comme une analyse de l'être à la lumière des causes et des principes les plus élevés. Si la quête de ces causes et principes exige une méthode dialectique, celle-ci par sa fécondité même entraîne une connaissance des causes et une science analogique de cet objet analogique qu'est l'être dans la diversité des étants. Nous entreprendrons alors d'examiner l'usage des diverses causes dans la philosophie première. Ce qui nous montrera d'une part la fidélité d'Aristote au programme initial du livre Alpha et d'autre part la spécificité irremplaçable de chacune d'elles pour parvenir à une connaissance satisfaisante de l'être. Mais la connaissance des causes et des principes ne peut en rester à celle des causes universelles et en puissance.
Elle doit, pour parvenir à son terme, à savoir les causes en acte, parvenir jusqu'au principe de cette actualité, lequel ne peut lui-même être que l'être où les causes sont perpétuellement actuelles. L'analyse des causes de l'être devra donc, pour être complète, déboucher sur une théologie. Pour ce faire, nous prendrons en compte essentiellement les textes de la Métaphysique, mais aussi ceux de la Physique et de l'Organon, principalement dans les Analytiques, sans nous interdire les incursions et rapprochements avec d'autres textes du corpus aristotélicien, tels qu'ils ont été lus dans la tradition antique et médiévale et jusqu'aux modernes."

Introduction pp. 5-7.

Cf. Berti (E.), «Les stratégies contemporaines d'interprétation d'Aristote», Rue Descartes, n° 1-2, 1991, p. 33-55.
Bäck Allan, "Syllogisms with reduplication in Aristotle," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23: 453-458 (1982).
"Prior Analytics 1.38 is a difficult text that offers a way of handling qua propositions in formal syllogistic. By 'qua proposition' I mean a proposition that contains a qualifying term, phrase, or clause. Many such propositions have a qua connector like 'qua', 'insofar as', 'in virtue of the fact that', 'with respect to', although in some cases a construction like an accusative of respect occurs
instead of an explicit connective.(1) Still, all qua propositions may be paraphrased by explicit qua connectives. So the class of qua propositions is a grammatical class of propositions of the form 'S is P qua M' The Prior Analytics chapter deals with a specific logical type of qua propositions, and its syllogistic properties.(2)"

(1) Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Commentaria, ed., Wallies, Berlin, 1883.
(2) Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Quae Fertur In Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Paraphrasis, ed., Wallies, Berlin, 1883.
Bäck Allan. On reduplication. Logical theories of qualification. Leiden: Brill 1996.
"This work deals with the logical properties of the 'qua' connective, "that treacherous little word 'as'."' This connective is represented by many expressions in ordinary language, such as 'insofar as', 'in virtue of, and 'in the sense that'. Traditionally, a use of this connective was called a reduplication. I shall trace the development of the theory of reduplication. As I shall show, this theory has its roots in various passages where Aristotle discusses 'qua' propositions. Islamic and Latin medieval philosophers then contributed to the topic. From all this there arose a theory of 'qua' propositions, or a theory of reduplication, in the high medieval period (1250-1350). Although there are of course different philosophers with different views on reduplication in that period, it will become clear that their views are extremely similar, and that it makes sense to talk of the rise of a single theory' of reduplication. Indeed, the similarity of their views is due to their using Aristotle's works as a common reference point: They all heed what Aristotle says about 'qua' propositions, and attempt to offer analyses that demonstrate the truth of those 'qua' propositions that Aristotle (as well as others in the Aristotelian tradition) asserts and the validity of inferences involving 'qua' propositions that he maintains.
So I shall be dealing with propositions of form 'S is P qua M', which, dropping the italics and the single quotes, I shall henceforth call 'qua propositions'. 'Qua' will represent the type of the connective, which has different grammatical forms. When 'qua' appears in italics, it is meant to be the particular connective, 'qua'.
The program that I shall follow is this: First, I shall consider those passages in which Aristotle discusses the use of qua phrases and propositions. Next, I shall discuss Islamic philosophers, who wrote about qua propositions while commenting on those passages in Aristotle. Then I shall consider Latin medieval philosophers of the period of the old logic, when the Analytics and the Sophistical Refutations, which contain important passages on qua propositions, were at best not well known. Next, I shall discuss various versions of what may be loosely called the theory of reduplication. I shall consider various philosophers of the High Middle Ages on the following topics: determination, or the qualification of a sentence by a modifier; the fallacy of secundum quid es simpliciter; the exposition of reduplicative propositions; the conversion of reduplicative propositions; the reduplicative syllogistic; the supposition of terms in qua propositions. I shall also discuss certain uses to which the theory of reduplication was put: notably, the Incarnation, the nominalist reduction of abstract terms, and supposition theory. Next, I shall discuss the post-medieval period, where the medieval theory of reduplication was codified and developed further. I shall consider there the classifications and analysis of qua propositions, the formal features of the logical types distinguished, and applications, including Leibniz's extensive use of qua propositions in his writings. I shall conclude with a survey of current work on qua propositions. Finally, I shall summarize the historical development of the theory of reduplication, offer what I consider to be the best version of that theory, and note some applications of it." (pp. XV-XVI)
Bäck Allan. What is Being qua Being? In Idealization XI: Historical Studies on Abstraction and Idealization. Edited by Coniglione Francesco, Poli Roberto, and Rollinger Robin. Amsterdam: Rodopi 2004. pp. 37-58
Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities - Vol. 82.

"I offer truth conditions for propositions about being qua being in Aristotle's philosophy. I show that in general Aristotle views expressions of the form "qua S" in "S qua S is P" (or "S is P qua S") as making a claim not about the subject "S", but about the predication of "P" of "S". I develop necessary and sufficient truth conditions for propositions of the form "S qua S is P". Finally, I show how this analysis satisfactorily covers what Aristotle says about being qua being in the Metaphysics ."
Bell Ian. Metaphysics as an Aristotelian science. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 2004.
Bolton Robert. Aristotle's conception of metaphysics as a science. In Unity, identity, and explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Edited by Scaltsas Theodore, Charles David, and Gill Mary Louise. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994. pp. 321-354
Brague Rémi. Aristote et la question du monde. Essai sur le contexte cosmologique et anthropologique de l'ontologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 2001.
Brentano Franz. Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles. Freiburg im Bresgau: Herder 1862.
Reprinted Hildesheim, Olms Verlag, 1960.
Translated in English as: On the several senses of being in Aristotle - Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975
Translated in Italian as: Sui molteplici significati dell'essere secondo Aristotele - Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1995
Translated in French as: Aristote. Les significations de l'être - Paris, Vrin, 2000
Brentano Franz. On the several senses of being in Aristotle. Berkeley: University of California Press 1975.
Translation of: Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (1862)
Breton Stanislas, "Sophistique et ontologie," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 90: 279-296 (1992).
Buchanan Emerson. Aristotle's theory of Being. London: William Cloves 1962.
Cassin Barbara. Aristote et le linguistic turn. In Nos Greecs et leurs modernes. Les stratégies contemporaines d'appropriation de l'Antiquité. Edited by Cassin Barbara. Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1992. pp. 432-452
"Les raisons de lire Gamma plutôt ainsi qu'autrement: pour une histoire sophistique de la philosophie.
La question à laquelle Terence Irwin et moi-même avons accepté d'être confrontés, sinon de répondre, est une application du principe de raison leibnizien, sans doute constitutive de l'herméneutique elle-même: quelles sont les raisons de lire un texte plutôt ainsi qu'autrement? Et, s'il y en a, rendez-les-nous, si vous pouvez!
Elle suppose d'abord, qu'il y a plusieurs lectures, plusieurs mondes, possibles; ensuite que ces lectures, ces mondes, sont hiérarchisables selon un classement comparatif auquel préside encore le principe de raison, cette fois sous forme de principe d'économie: maximum d'effet pour un minimum de dépense. Reste à décider ce qu'est un "effet" et ce qu'est une "dépense" en herméneutique: mettons, maximum d'intelligibilité, c'est-à-dire d'oscillation entre fidélité et philosophicité (comme la boiterie du centaure philologue-philosophe que décrit Nietzsche), pour un minimum d'hypothèses, d'anomalies et de déchets.
Tout le problème est de savoir s'il n'y a que des comparatifs, ou bien si l'on peut, si l'on doit, passer au superlatif.
(...)
Ce type de chemin faisant, il me semble qu'on tente de sortir du sillon ontologique de l'herméneutique, pour s'essayer à quelque chose comme: une histoire sophistique de la philosophie.
Je propose d'appeler "histoire sophistique de la philosophie" celle qui rapporte les positions, non pas à l'unicité de la vérité, qu'elle soit éternelle ou progressivement constituée en mode hégélien (la vérité comme telos, dans un temps orienté, ou "comme si" orienté), mais celle qui les rapporte aux instantanés du kairos, occasion, opportunité, grâce à des mékhanai, procédés, ruses, machines, permettant de happer le kairos par son toupet. Et l'agôn est par excellence l'une de ces procédures, vieilles comme le monde.
(...)
Bref, dans l'histoire sophistique de la philosophie, il serait explicite que le meilleur, la performance, est la mesure du vrai.
Le premier intérêt de ce type de série comparative, par différence avec la clôture du superlatif, même réfléchissant, c'est qu'elle n'est, en droit, jamais finie. (...) Le challenge du "encore mieux" (passer à l'étage au-dessus) fait place à la possibilité de l' "autrement mieux" (traverser la cour). Et même, à en croire Deleuze et Lindon, c'est autrement mieux tout simplement déjà parce que c'est autrement. Il ne s'agit plus dans ce cas des "raisons de lire Gamma plutôt ainsi qu'autrement", mais bel et bien des "raisons de lire Gamma autrement".".
Cheng Chung-Hwan. Sophia: the science Aristotle sought. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1976.
Claix René, "L'objet de la métaphysique selon Aristote," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie 44: 454-472 (1982).
Code Alan, "Aristotle's metaphysics as a science of principles," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51: 357-378 (1997).
Couloubaritsis Lambros, "L'Être et l'Un chez Aristote (première partie)," Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 1: 49-98 (1983).
Couloubaritsis Lambros, "L'Être et l'Un chez Aristote (deuxième partie)," Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 1: 143-195 (1983).
Couloubaritsis Lambros, "Le statut de l'Un dans la 'Métaphysique'," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 90: 497-522 (1992).
De Rijk Lambertus Marie. Aristotle: semantics and ontology. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers 2002.
This study intends to show that the ascription of many shortcomings or obscurities to Aristotle is due to the persistent misinterpretation of key notions in his works, including anachronistic perceptions of statement making.
In the first volume Aristotle's semantics is culled from the Organon. The second volume presents Aristotle's ontology of the sublunar world, and pays special attention to his strategy of argument in light of his semantic views.
The reconstruction of the semantic models that come forward as genuinely aristotelian can give a new impetus to the study of aristotelian philosophic and semantic thought.
Desanti Jean-Toussaint. Remarques sur l'ontologie aristotélicienne. In Aristote aujourd'hui. Edited by Sinaceur Mohammed Allal. Paris: Éditions érès 1988. pp. 27-43
Destrée Pierre, "'Physique' et 'métaphysique' chez Aristote. Á propos de l'expression on me on," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 90: 422-444 (1992).
Décarie Vianney. L'objet de la métaphysique selon Aristote. Paris: Vrin 1961.
Seconde édition 1972.
Décarie Vianney. L'objet de la métaphysique selon Aristote. Paris: Vrin 1972.
Décarie Vianney. L'authenticité du livre K de la Métaphysique. In Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien zum einigen Dubia. Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin, 7-16. September 1981. Edited by Moraux Paul and Wiesner Jürgen. Berlin: de Gruyter 1983. pp. 295-317
Reprinted in: Pierre Aubenque (ed.) - Études aristotéliciennes. Métaphysique et théologie - Paris, Vrin, 1985
Dhondt Urbain, "Science suprême et ontologie chez Aristotle," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 59: 5-30 (1961).
Dillens Anne-Marie. Á la naissance du discours ontologique. Étude de la notion de kath'hauto dans l'oeuvre d'Aristote. Bruxelles: Éditions Ousia 1982.
Elders Leo, "Aristote et l'objet de la métaphysique," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 60: 165-183 (1962).
Ferejohn Michael T., "Aristotle on focal meaning and the unity of science," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 25: 117-128 (1980).
In chapter Two of book IV of the "Metaphysics", Aristotle alludes to an argument that the Platonic vision of constructing a science of being "qua" being is made possible by the fact that the verb "to be", while categorially ambiguous, also exhibits a special sort of ambiguity to which he gives the name "focal meaning." This paper contains a reconstruction of the focal meaning analysis of "to be", from which are extracted principles which are shown to form the structure of Aristotle's argument for the science of being "qua" being.
Follon Jacques, "Le concept de philosophie première dans la 'Metaphysique' d'Aristote," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 90: 387-421 (1992).
"In this article the author inquires into the meaning of "First Philosophy" in Aristotle's "Metaphysics". In his view, attentive examination of the passages in which the nature of this discipline is mentioned (essentially "Alpha" 1-2, "Gamma" 1-3 and "Epsilon" 1) shows rather clearly that the Stagirite meant by "First Philosophy" the science of first causes and hence necessarily of divine substances, which are causes of this kind. In other words, First Philosophy, being the supreme aitiology, was theology for him, as the traditional interpretation always held. But, being the science of first causes, it was equally the science of being "qua" being in his eyes, as first causes are precisely those of being "qua" being. The author thus concludes, contrary to the hermeneutic deriving from Suárez, that it is inappropriate to maintain a duality of inspiration and of subject-matter in the "Metaphysics", and that there is no "onto-theological" ambiguity in Aristotle's view of first philosophy."
Follon Jacques, "Le concept de philosophie première chez Aristote: note complémentaire," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 91: 5-13 (1993).
Fraser Kyle A., "Aristoteles ex Aristotele : A response to the analytic reconstruction of Aristotelian ontology," Dyonisius 20: 51-69 (2002).
Fraser Kyle A., "Demonstrative science and the science of Being qua Being," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 22: 43-82 (2002).
Frede Michael. The unity of General and Special metaphysics: Aristotle's conception of metaphysics. In Essays in ancient philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1985. pp. 81-95
Frede Michael. The unity of general and special metaphysics: Aristotle's conception of metaphysics. In Essays in ancient philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1987. pp. 81-95
Gill Mary Louise. First philosophy in Aristotle. In A Companion to Ancient philosophy. Edited by Gill Mary Louise and Pellegrin Pierre. Malden: Blackwell 2006. pp. 347-373
Gomez-Lobo Alfonso, "Sobre "lo que es en cuanto es" en Aristoteles," Revista Latino-Americana de Filosofía 2: 19-26 (1976).
Hahn Robert, "Aristotle as ontologist or theologian? Or, aristotelian form in the context of the conflicting doctrines of being in the Metaphysics," Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10: 79-88 (1979).
"Scholars have believed that there are two apparently conflicting doctrines of being in the "metaphysics" -- one which treats being qua being as the concept of the most general object, comprehending both sensible and supersensible being alike, traditionally identified as the "ens commune"; the other which treats being qua being as the concept of the separate and divine entities, traditionally identified as the "ens perfectissimum". Following Owen, the conflicting positions of the tradition of Greek commentators are contrasted with those Aristotelianizing christians of the middle ages; scholarship, in the last century, on this problem of the conflicting doctrines of being in the "Metaphysics" is considered. Next, it is argued that primary being for Aristotle is understood as formal cause, the meaning of which is considered in terms of the separate and divine entities, the "ens perfectissimum". Finally, an attempt is made to explain the inclusion of the supposedly conflicting doctrine of the "ens commune", as a means of clarifying the nature of primary being as formal cause."
Halper Edward, ""Being qua being" in Metaphysics Gamma," Elenchos: 43-62 (1987).
Harré Rom, "Forward to Aristotle: the case for a hybrid ontology," Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 27: 173-191 (1997).
Huntz Jude, "Some ontological aspect of Aristotle's logic," Lyceum 1995: 29-42 (1955).
Husain Martha, "The multiplicity in unity of being 'qua' being in Aristotle's 'pros hen' equivocity," New Scholasticism 55: 208-218 (1981).
"Pros hen equivocity unquestionably plays a central role in Aristotle's philosophy, both as a linguistic and as an ontological structure. This paper attempts to answer both G.E.L. Owen's charge that the secondary senses of being are reducible to the primary and D. W. Hamlyn's charge that the dependence of secondary on primary being cannot be understood concretely. It shows that Aristotle carries out the program of "Metaphysics" vii, 1 in the "Physics" where the dependence of secondary on primary being can be understood concretely in terms of characteristic ranges within which all processes of quantitative and qualitative change occur. Thus he is able to preserve both the irreducible multiplicity of the categorial senses of being and their unity, and so pros hen equivocity."
Irwin Terence. Quelques apories de la science de l'être. In Nos Greecs et leurs modernes. Les stratégies contemporaines d'appropriation de l'Antiquité. Edited by Cassin Barbara. Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1992. pp. 417-431
"Le quatrième livre de la Métaphysique est divisé en deux sections principales. La première section (chapitres 1-3) est programmatique; Aristote introduit la science de l'être en tant qu'être (ou: de l'étant en tant qu'étant), et décrit les tâches de cette science nouvelle. La deuxième section (chapitres 4 et suivants) est en même temps polémique et constructive; Aristote présente une défense du principe de non-contradiction (PNC), et il combat le subjectivisme de Protagoras. Quel est le lien entre les deux sections du livre? En particulier, Aristote se borne-t-il à décrire la science proposée, ou achève-t-il son programme? Autrement dit: la section polémique de Gamma nous offre-t-elle des raisonnements propres à la science de l'être, ou faut-il conclure qu'ils ne sont que préliminaires à cette science ?
Je voudrais discuter principalement la section programmatique, pour mieux comprendre la tâche et le but qu'impose Aristote à la science de l'être. Ensuite, je vais suggérer que la section polémique de Gamma fait vraiment partie intégrante de la science de l'être ; c'est-à-dire que, après avoir annoncé le programme de la science nouvelle, Aristote commence à le remplir'.
L'interprétation de Gamma que je vais esquisser n'est certainement pas la seule possible; et je voudrais la développer en comparaison avec une interprétation alternative qui a souvent paru être bien fondée. Selon cette interprétation, que j'appellerai "propédeutique", le livre Gamma n'achève aucun raisonnement propre à la science de l'être; bien sûr, la section polémique discute de questions qui sont propres à la science de l'être, mais elle ne présente aucun raisonnement scientifique; au contraire, les raisonnements sont tout à fait préliminaires à la science de l'être (2)
L'interprétation propédeutique peut paraître bien fondée, si nous tenons compte de la conception aristotélicienne de la science (epistêmê). On peut raisonner comme suit :
(I) Aristote exige une forme démonstrative pour chaque vraie science, selon les règles des Seconds Anatytiques; mais
(II) les raisonnements du livre Gamma sont évidemment dialectiques, plutôt que démonstratifs ; donc
(III) ces raisonnements ne peuvent pas appartenir à une science (3).
La première prémisse est hors de contestation, si l'on applique les règles des Anatytiques à la Métaphysique. La deuxième prémisse est hors de contestation, si l'on considère les raisonnements de Gamma en les comparant avec la conception aristotélicienne normale de la dialectique. Donc, si l'on accepte les conceptions de la science et de la dialectique qui sont exposées dans l'Organon, on conclura que les raisonnements de Gamma ne sont point scientifiques.
Cette conclusion laisse, pourtant, un rôle légitime aux raisonnements de Gamma. Car Aristote assigne à la dialectique un rôle sur la route "vers les principes" des sciences démonstratives (Topiques, 101 a 36 - b 4). On ne peut pas saisir les principes par les raisonnements propres à la science elle-même; donc il faut les saisir par l'intuition (nous). La dialectique elle-même n'atteint pas l'intuition des principes, mais elle accomplit une tâche propédeutique qui nous aide à atteindre cette intuition.
On voit alors que l'interprétation propédeutique prétend révéler une certaine unité et stabilité dans la pensée d'Aristote. Selon cette interprétation, il n'y aurait aucune fracture entre l'Organon et la Métaphysique sur la question des rapports entre la science et la dialectique. Il ne faut donc pas rejeter l'interprétation propédeutique, à moins de trouver des objections fortes; et telles sont les objections que je cherche. J'espère montrer comment remplacer l'interprétation propédeutique par une interprétation (pour ainsi dire) "scientifique", selon laquelle les raisonnements de Gamma font partie intégrante de la science de l'être."

(1) Dans les sections I-II, je présente des questions que j'ai plus largement discutées dans Aristotle's First Principles, Oxford, 1988; voir surtout les chapitres 7-9 (avec des renseignements bibliographiques). Dans les sections III-VI je propose des corrections et des développements. Après avoir écrit Aristotle's First Principles, j'ai lu la discussion très provocante de Gamma par Barbara Cassin et Michel Narcy, La Décision du sens, Paris, 1988; mais, pour la circonstance présente, je ne réponds pas aux thèses principales de ce livre (qui portent surtout sur la section VI, infra).
(2) Pour une défense de l'interprétation propédeutique, voir, par exemple, W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford, 1924, p. 252; M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford, 1987, p. 94.
(3) Cette objection est soutenue par P. Aubenque, Le Problème de l'être chez Aristote, Paris, 1962, p. 299: "L'opposition de la dialectique et de la philosophie serait donc justifiée si la philosophie parvenait à se constituer comme science selon le type défini dans les Analytiques."
Kamlah Wilhelm, "Aristoteles Wissenschaft vom Seienden als Seienden und die gegenwartige Ontologie," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 49: 269-297 (1967).
"Methodische Vorbemerkung
Die folgende Untersuchung ist entstanden in Anknüpfung an die von Paul Lorenzen und mir soeben veröffentlichte Logische Propädeutik (LP). Es soll gezeigt werden, wie mit den sprachlichen Mitteln dieser Logik ein bedeutsamer Text unserer philosophischen Tradition interpretiert werden kann (Buch Gamma der Metaphysik des Aristoteles), und zwar unter sparsamem Einsatz dieser Mittel und unter radikalem Verzicht auf die entartete Terminologie unserer traditionellen Bildungssprache. (Weitere hermeneutische Hinweise im Text selbst und LP V, 5 Ende.)
Übersicht:
1. Die heutige Ontologie
2. Die 'erste' Wissenschaft
3. Das Seiende und das Eine, die Gegensätze
4. Der Grundsatz vom Widerspruch, Sein als Wahrsein
5. Das Einzelding als das vorrangig Seiende
6. Ist die antike Ontologie heute wiederholbar?" p. 269
Ketchum Richard, "Being and existence in Greek ontology," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 80 (3): 321-332 (1998).
Leszl Walter. Aristotle's conception of ontology. Padova (Italy): Editrice Antenore 1975.
Louis Pierre. Observations sur le vocabulaire technique d'Aristote. In Mélanges de philosophie Grecque offerts a Mgr Diés par ses élèves, ses collègues, ses amis. Paris: Vrin 1956. pp. 141-150
Ludwig Walter D., "Aristotle's conception of the science of Being," New Scholasticism 63: 379-404 (1989).
Lutz-Bachmann Matthias. Die Frage nach dem Gegenstand der Metaphysik bei Aristoteles. Ontologie und Theologie. In Beiträge zum Problem der Metaphysik bei Aristoteles und Thomas von Aquin. Edited by Lutz-Bachmann Matthias. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 1990. pp. 9-35
Mansion Augustin. L'objet de la science philosophique suprème d'aprés Aristote, Metaphysique, E 1. In Mélanges de philosophie Grecque offerts a Mgr Diés par ses élèves, ses collègues, ses amis. Paris: Vrin 1956. pp. 151-168
Mansion Augustin, "Philosophie première, philosophie seconde et métaphysique chez Aristote," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 56: 165-221 (1958).
Marion Jean-Luc. La science toujours recherchée et toujours manquante. In La métaphysique. Son histoire, sa critique, ses enjeux. Edited by Narbonne Jean-Marc and Langlois Luc. Paris: Vrin 1999. pp. 13-36
Marx Werner. The meaning of Aristotle's 'ontology'. 's Gravenhage: Nijhoff 1954.
"This study forms part of a wider investigation which will inquire into the relationship of Ontology and Anthropology. Since the meaning of the term 'ontology' is far from clear, the immediate task is to ask the 'father of ontology' what he might have understood it to mean.
The introductory chapter emphasizes the fact that Aristotle himself never used the term 'ontology.' It should be stressed at once that, even had be used it, he could not very well have employed it to denote the discipline of ontology. For it was only during the era of the schoolmen that the vast and rich body of the prose philosophia carne to be disciplined into classifications; these classifications reflected the Christian, - not the pagan Greek view of all-that-is. The metaphysica specialis dealing with God (theology), his creatures (psychology), and the created universe (cosmology), was differentiated from the metaphysica generalis, dealing with being-in-general (ens commune). This latter discipline amounted to the 'discipline of ontology' (1).
We are not concerned with the meaning of the metaphysica generalis. We wish to approach our problem with an open mind and want to hear directly from Aristotle - on the basis of the text of the prole philosophia alone - which body of thought he might have called his 'ontology' and what its meaning might have been.
Yet however carefully we may attempt to 'bracket' all preconceived notions, it stili remains true that it is an audacious undertaking to pose a definite question to Aristotle. More than two millenia of changing human thought cannot be eliminated, and we know very well that our question, as such, shapes and compels the answer in a definite direction which might easily be adjudged too 'modem'. Moreover, in concentrating on just one motif out of the many variegated and rich themes of the corpus aristotelicum, we are certain to overstress this one motif at the expense of others.

(1) cf. M. Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, p. 18.
Matthen Mohan, "Greek ontology and the 'Is' of truth," Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 28: 113-135 (1983).
Merlan Philip, "Metaphysik: Name und Gegenstand," Journal of Hellenic Studies 77: 87-92 (1957).
Reprinted in: Philip Merlan - Kleine Philosophische Schriften - Herausgegeben von Franciszka Merlan mit einem begeitwort von Hans Wagner - Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1976 pp. 189-194.
Merlan Philip. From Platonism to Neoplatonism. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1960.
Second revised edition (First edition 1953).
See Chapter VII: Metaphysica generalis in Aristotle? pp. 160-220.
Merlan Philip, "On the terms 'Metaphysics' and 'Being qua Being'," Monist 52: 174-194 (1968).
Reprinted in: Philip Merlan - Kleine Philosophische Schriften - Herausgegeben von Franciszka Merlan mit einem begeitwort von Hans Wagner - Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1976 pp. 238-258.
Modrak Deborah. Theories of meaning and ontology in Aristotle's Metaphysics. In The crossroads of norm and nature. Essays on Aristotle's Ethics and Metaphysics. Edited by Sim May. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 1995. pp. 221-234
Moreau Joseph, "Remarques sur l'ontologie aristotelicienne," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 75: 577-611 (1977).
"The science of being "qua" being dwells on dialectic and from the examination of the conditions of speaking draws the priority of substance towards other categories. Then the analysis of sensible substance exhibits an "aporia" which, through the distinction of act and potency, leads to the concept of immaterial substance or pure act. Theology is connected with ontology by means of "ousiology", and the consideration of hierarchised substances, according with degrees of act and potency, is a way for understanding the role of cognition within realistic ontology."
Narbonne Jean-Marc, "Ontologie et hénologie; divergence ou convergence?," Laval Théologique et Philosophique 51: 541-549 (1995).
Natorp Paul, "Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik," Philosophische Monatschefte 24: 37-65;-540-574 (1887).
Translated in Italian as: Tema e disposizione della "Metafisica" di Aristotele. Con in appendice il saggio sulla inautenticità del libro K della "Metafisica" -Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1995
Natorp Paul, "Über Aristotele's Metaphysik K 1-8," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 1: 178-193 (1888).
Translated in Italian as: Sull'inautenticità di Metafisica, K 1-8, 1065 a 26 (Appendix to: Tema e disposizione della "Metafisica" di Aristotele - Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1995
O'Farrell Frank, "Aristotle's categories of being," Gregorianum: 87-131 (1982).
Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane. Logic and metaphysics in some earlier works of Aristotle. In Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth century. Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum held at Oxford in August, 1957. Edited by Düring Ingemar and Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane. Göteborg: Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 1960. pp. 163-190
Reprinted in: Jonathan Barnes et al. - Articles on Aristotle - vol. 3 - Metaphysics - London, Duckworth, 1979 pp. 13-32.
Reprinted also in: G. E. L. Owen - Logic, science and dialectic. Collected papers in ancient Greek philosophy - Ithaca, Cornell University Press 1986 pp. 180-199.
Owen Gwilym Ellis Lane. Aristotle on the snares of ontology. In New essays on Plato and Aristotle. Edited by Bambrough Renford. New York: Humanities Press 1965. pp. 69-95
Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen - Logic, science and dialectic. Collected papers in ancient Greek philosophy - Ithaca, Cornell University Press 1986 pp. 259-278.
Owens Joseph. The doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. A study of the Greek Background of mediaeval thought. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1951.
Third revised edition 1978
Owens Joseph. The doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics - Revisited. In Philosophies of existence. Ancient and medieval. Edited by Morewedge Parviz. New York: Fordham University Press 1982. pp. 33-59
Owens Joseph, "Is there any ontology in Aristotle?," Dialogue 25: 697-707 (1986).
Owens Joseph. Aristotle's gradations of Being in Metaphysics E-Z. South Bend: St. Augustine's Press 2007.
Edited with a preface by Lloyd P. Gerson
Patzig Günther. Theology and ontology in Aristotle's Metaphysics . In Articles on Aristotle. Vol. 3: Metaphysics. Edited by Barnes Jonathan, Schofield Malcolm, and Sorabji Richard. London: Duckworth 1979. pp. 33-49
Originally published as: Theologie und Ontologie in der "Metaphysik" des Aristoteles - Kant-Studien, 52, 1960/61 pp. 185-205.
Poli Roberto, "Formal aspects of reduplication," Logic and Logical Philosophy 2: 87-102 (1994).
"Aristotle's presentation of ontology advanced at the beginning of the fourth book of Metaphysics is universally known: "there is a science which studies being qua being. . . ". Needless to say, this is a familiar sentence: unfortunately, it is also quite an odd one. Why Aristotle does not simply say that ontology is the theory of being? Is there any difference between 'theory of being' and 'theory of being qua being'?
In brief, the problem is to decide whether the two expressions 'the study of being' and 'the study of being qua being' are equivalent. If they are, the 'qua' does not play any interesting role. On the contrary, if the two expressions are different, that is to say, if there is a difference between the study of being (simpliciter) and the study of being qua being, we should study the role played by the (operator) 'qua'.
Let us remember that 'qua' is a technical term. The word is the Latin translation of the Greek 'he' in the expression 'on he on' which, in the 17th century, gave origin to the term ontology'.
I shall call 'reduplicative' the expressions containing some instance of the functor 'qua'. Theories of reduplicative expressions will also be labelled as qua-theories." (*)

(*) The term 'reduplication' (anadiplosis) is to be found in Aristotle. For a general presentation of reduplication see Roberto Poli, "", (PDF) in Liliana Albertazzi, (ed.), Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1998, pp. 245-256).
Poli Roberto. Qua-theories. In Shapes of forms. From Gestalt psychology and phenomenology to ontology and mathematics. Edited by Albertazzi Liliana. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1999. pp. 245-256
"Reduplicative expressions: some introductory notes.
I shall call a theory of the functor 'qua' a 'qua-theory'. This functor is used in expressions like 'A qua B is C'. Some synonymous expressions are 'as', 'insofar as', 'in virtue of, 'with respect to'.
'Qua' is a technical term. The word is the Latin translation of the Greek 'he' in the expression 'on he on' which in the seventeenth century gave origin to the term 'ontology'. That is to say, a qua-theory is an ontology, and ontology is the heart of philosophy.
The definition of ontology that Aristotle advanced itself involves the functor 'qua'. His definition of ontology at the beginning of the fourth book of Metaphysics is universally known: "there is a science which studies being qua being [...]". My problem is this: why does Aristotle does not simply say that ontology is the theory of being? Is there any difference between 'theory of being' and 'theory of being qua being'?
In brief, the problem is deciding whether the two expressions 'the theory of being' and 'the theory of being qua being' are equivalent. If they are, the 'qua' does not play any interesting role. On the contrary, if the two expressions are different - that is to say, if there is a difference between the theory of being (simpliciter) and the theory of being qua being - we should study the role played by the (operator) 'qua'.
The main reason for distinguishing between theory of being and theory of being qua being rests on Aristotle's opinion that the analysis of being simpliciter cannot be developed in a scientific fashion. Aristotle's intention to submit being to scientific analysis was the principal reason for his adoption of a reduplicative kind of analysis. His position derived from the thesis that being is not a genus.
It is well known that Aristotle believed that scientific analysis can be developed only if there is a common genus for the entities under examination. If being does not have a common genus, the study of being cannot be a science.
From this arises a fundamental difference between study of being and study of being qua being. If ontology is a science, we must admit that there is a common genus for the entities studied by ontology: the main role of 'qua' is precisely that of assigning a surrogate for the lacking common genus to beings by making explicit the context of the being referred to.
Qua-theories will be collectively referred to as reduplicative-theories or as theories of reduplication." pp. 245-246.
Reale Giovanni. Il concetto di 'filosofia prima' e l'unità della metafisica di Aristotele. Con due saggi sui concetti di potenza-atto e di essere. Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1994.
Sixth edition; (First edition: 1961).
The third edition is translated in English as: The concept of philosophy and the unity of Metaphysics of Aristotle
Reiner Hans, "Die Entstehung und usprüngliche Bedeutung des Names Metaphysik," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 8: 210-237 (1954).
Reprinted in: Fritz-Peter Hager (ed.) - Metaphysik und Theologie des Aristoteles - Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969 pp. 139-174; translated as: The Emergence and Original Meaning of the Name "Metaphysics" in: Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 13, 2, 1990 pp. 23-53
Routila Lauri. Die aristotelische Idee der ersten Philosophie. Untersuchungen zur onto-theologischen Verfassung der Metaphysik des Aristoteles. Amsterdam: North-Holland 1969.
Rutten Christian, "La stylometrie et la question de 'Métaphysique' K," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 90: 486-496 (1992).
"Stylometric methods can provide considerable information in regard to the relative chronology of the parts of the Metaphysics and their authenticity. In this article some suggestions are made on the problems raised by book K on the basis of the 'analysis of the materials'. The passage K7, 1064A28 - 1064B14, in which the science of being as being is assimilated to the science of the divine being, is closer, from a stylometric point of view, to the Metaphysics of Theophrastus than to that of Aristotle. The same holds for K10. On the other hand, the classification based on stylometrics corresponds for the other chapters to the evolution which Aristotle's thought underwent in various regards."
Seddon Jr.Frederick A., "The principle of contradiction in Metaphysics, Gamma," New Scholasticism 55: 191-207 (1981).
"The purpose of my paper is an historical-critical examination of the principle of contradiction as it appears in Aristotle, specifically but not exclusively as it appears in "Metaphysics, Book Gamma". to achieve this goal, I have chosen to subject Jan Łukasiewicz's article on this topic in the march 1971 number of "The Review of Metaphysics" to critical exposition and, as it turns out, refutation. Should the essay achieve its intended result, it will have shown that the principle of contradiction to be "...true of being qua being..." rather than, as Łukasiewicz would have us believe, a mere assumption having only a practical-ethical value."
Skousgaard Stephen, "Wisdom and Being in Aristotle's First Philosophy," Thomist 40: 444-474 (1976).
"The thesis of this article is that Aristotle's notion of wisdom is determined by his ontology. Starting with the fact that people do think, and think about being, the argument of the article traces the development of Aristotle's notion of being "qua" being, then decides that the tension between being-itself and the many-ways-of-being structures wisdom as dynamic rather than dogmatic."
Stevens Annick. L'ontologie d'Aristote au carrefour du logique et du réel. Paris: Vrin 2000.
Stevenson J.G., "Being "qua" Being," Apeiron 9: 42-50 (1875).
"It is shown that in the opening chapter of the Fourth Book of the "Metaphysics" (Book Gamma), Aristotle conceives of metaphysics as a very general study, encompassing all being. This is shown by means of a close study of the meaning of the phrase "being "qua" being" which Aristotle uses here. This result is important because it contradicts the claims of Joseph Owens and Philip Merlan, who have argued that there is nothing in Aristotle's "metaphysics" to contradict a conception of metaphysics as theology."
Upton Thomas, "Aristotle on existence: escaping the snares of ontology?," New Scholasticism 62: 373-399 (1988).
van Rijen Jeroen. Some medieval analyses of the logic of 'qua'. In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekte Folgerns. Edited by Jacobi Klaus. Leiden: Brill 1993. pp. 465-482
"The exposition of the properties of logical operators forms a central part of any fully elaborated theory of argumentation. One of the logical operators which play a conspicuous though not always perspicuous role in medieval discussions of philosophical and theological topics is the preposition 'qua' and its equivalents. In this paper I will discuss the logical properties of 'qua' as set out in some logical theories of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
In medieval logic the properties of 'qua' were almost exclusively discussed insofar as this operator occurs in a so-called reduplicative sentence. Let us say, by way of a first and tentative description, that a reduplicative sentence is a sentence in which a reduplicative operator such as 'qua', 'insofar as' or one of their equivalents occurs. An example of a reduplicative sentence then is 'Socrates is rational qua man'.
In the period to which I will confine myself, the logic of this kind of sentences was set out under various headings. A central and detailed treatment was usually given in chapters or tracts on exponible sentences. Further elaborations can be found, among other places, in chapters on conversion and on syllogistic, where sometimes special sections were devoted to conversion of reduplicative sentences and to reduplicative syllogistic. From these various sources, two slightly different standard theories of reduplication each composed of several more or less related segments can be distilled, which were extended or completed by different authors in different ways. As we shall see later, the contents of these segments are simple and hardly need any explication when looked at in complete isolation. Problems arise, however, as soon as one starts assessing the theories composed of these segments, the more so since several of their authors noted with some emphasis that these theories need not account for the logical properties which reduplication has in the actual use of language.
I will put this problem in general terms first. One of the tasks of a logician is to provide an account of the logical properties of certain expressions of natural languages. In modern times, this task is performed by providing some formal method, for example a semantic method or a proof theoretic method, which, together with a certain kind of formal language to which this method is applied, can function as a model of a fragment of the natural language that contains the expression or expressions under examination. In order to determine the adequacy of such an account, the consequences of the formal model are compared with the intuitions of speakers of that language -- usually the intuitions of the logician himself -- about the counterparts of those consequences in the natural language in question, and vice versa."
Verbeke Gérard, "La doctrine de l'être dans la métaphysique d'Aristote," Revue Philosophique de Louvain: 471-478 (1952).
Verbeke Gérard. Aristotle's Metaphysics viewed by the Ancient Greek Commentators. In Studies in Aristotle. Edited by O'Meara Dominic. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press 1981. pp. 107-128
Verbeke Gérard, "L'objet de la métaphysique d'Aristote selon des études récentes," Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 1: 5-30 (1983).
Wedin Michael. The science and axioms of Being. In A Companion to Aristotle. Edited by Anagnostopoulos Georgios. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell 2009. pp. 125-143
"Aristotle's first editor, Andronicus of Rhodes, placed the fourteen books now known as the Metaphysics after the Physics, whence comes the word "metaphysics," which literally means "after the physics." Some have used this fact to buttress the claim that the work as a whole has no focused subject, but rather is a collection of loosely linked essays. There is some warrant for this skeptical assessment. The first chapter of the first Book, Book A, (1) announces that "we" are seeking a certain kind of theoretical knowledge, something Aristotle calls "wisdom" (sophia). Because wisdom is knowledge of first causes and principles, the task is to investigate what sorts of causes and principles are suited to play this role. The reader might expect Aristotle to then proceed on just such a course of inquiry. After A, however, the term "wisdom" effectively disappears from the treatise.(2) In B's set of puzzles we get instead the "science of substance," in G we are introduced to the "science of being qua being," and in Book E preference appears to be given to "first philosophy" and "theology." Are these the same or different enterprises and, if different, are they independent or related, and, if related, how? These questions can be addressed by seeing how Aristotle's treatment of wisdom follows a coherent, if complicated, path through much of the Metaphysics, beginning with the science of being qua being." p. 125

(1) It is customary to indicate books of the Metaphysics by uppercase Greek letters, with the exception of the diminutive second book, which is denoted by lower case Alpha (a).
(2) The term occurs in B.2 but only by way of referring back to A.2's marks of wisdom. It also reappears in K. But K is just a precis of Books B, G, and E (with, in its second half, material from the Physics); plus, some doubt that K was even written by Aristotle.
Yu Jiyuan. The structure of Being in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003.