Ackrill, John. 1972. "Aristotle on "Good" and the Categories." In Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays Presented by His Friends and Pupils to Richard Walzer on
His Seventieth Birthday, edited by Stern, S.M., Hourani, Albert and Brown, Vivian, 17-25. London: Bruno Cassirer.
Allen, Reginald E. 1969. "Individual Properties in Aristotle's Categories." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 14:31-39.
———. 1973. "Substance and Predication in Aristotle's Categories." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 1:362-373.
Supplementary vol. I: Exegesis and argument. Studies in Greek philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos - Edited by E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty - Assen, Van
Annas, Julia. 1974. "Individuals in Aristotle's Categories: Two Queries." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 19:146-152.
"This article criticizes the attempt by Barrington Jones (Phronesis 1972) to apply Aristotle's analysis of 'One' in Metaphysics I to the problem of non-substantial
individuals in the Categories, to use his account to explain the role of paronymy in the Categories. Doubts are raised about interpreting Aristotle to support either claim."
Anton, John Peter. 1957. Aristotle's Theory of Contrariety. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Reprinted 1987 and 2000.
———. 1968. "The Aristotelian Doctrine of 'Homonyma' in the Categories and Its Platonic Antecedents." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 6:315-326.
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton - Categories and experience. Essays on Aristotelian themes - Oakdale, N.Y., Dowling College Press, 1996, pp. 87-114.
"The doctrine of 'homonyma' formulated in the Categories and found in other early works was seriously debated in ancient times. The earliest detection of 'homonyma' as a
source of ambiguity goes back to Plato. Although he made use of the concepts that figure in later formulations, there is no evidence that he offered a technical view of 'homonyma,' based on their
logical properties. The main portion of this article is given to an examination of the sources in Plato's, Speusippus's, and Aristotle's interpretations of the use and nature of 'homonyma,' and the
place of this doctrine in their philosophies. The author defends the first chapter of the Categories as having theoretical relevance and significance as a counter-Speusippean thesis. This is the
first of two related articles; in its sequel the author discusses the diverse ancient interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine as found in the writings of the Commentators." [see: J. P. Anton -
Ancient interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine of homonyma - Journal of the History of Philosophy, 7, 1969, pp. 1-18]
———. 1968. "The Meaning of ' O Logos Tes Ousias' in Categories 1a." Monist no. 52:252-267.
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton - Categories and experience. Essays on Aristotelian themes - Oakdale, N.Y., Dowling College Press, 1996, pp. 61-85.
———. 1975. "Observations on Aristotle's Theory of Categories." Diotima.Epitheoresis Philosophikes Ereunes no. 3:66-81.
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton - Categories and experience. Essays on Aristotelian themes - Oakdale, N.Y., Dowling College Press, 1996, pp. 153-174.
———. 1992. "On the Meaning of Kategoria in Aristotle's Categories." In Aristotle's Ontology, edited by Preus, Anthony and Anton, John Peter, 3-18. Albany:
State University of New York Press.
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton - Categories and experience. Essays on Aristotelian themes - Oakdale, N.Y., Dowling College Press, 1996, pp. 175-201.
"In a paper written in 1974 and subsequently published in 1975, (1) I argued that the Aristotelian texts, particularly that of the Categories, allow for a parallel yet
distinct interpretation to the traditional and prevalent one that takes the categories to be terms, ultimate classes, types, and concepts. (2) My position there was that the primary use of
kategoria refers to well-formed statements made according to canons and, to be more precise, to fundamental types of predication conforming to rules sustained by the ways of beings.
In trying to decide how Aristotle uses the term kathegoria in the treatise that bears the same name, Categories, (3)provision must be made for the fact that there
is nothing in the text to justify the meanings that ancient commentators and also modern writers assigned to it and that found their way both into translations of Aristotle's works and into the
corpus of established terminology. (4) The present article is written in the hope that it will contribute in some small measure to understanding why certain distinctions in the treatise
Categories should have prevented interpreters from assigning the traditional meaning of "genera of being" to the term category, hence giving it the meaning of "highest predicate"
rather than "fundamental type of predication"."
(1) Anton 1975, 67-81.
(2) The paper published here was presented at the December 28, 1983, meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, Boston, MA.
(3) The title of the treatise was a subject of considerable dispute in antiquity. For a recent survey on this problem see M. Frede 1987b, 11- 28. According to Frede "the question of
authenticity is crucially linked to the question of unity" (12). The problem of the unity covers the relation of the early part of the treatise to the part that discusses the postpredicamenta.
(4) There are many surveys of interpretations concerning the categories. I do not plan to offer another survey, for my main interest lies in the investigation into what we can learn
about the theory of categories in the Categories. Nor am I concerned with reproducing and commenting on the table of enumeration of the "categories" in Aristotle's works. The list can be
readily found in Apelt 1891, conveniently reproduced in Elders 1961, 194-96. One can still raise the question about the intent of the list or lists. If a defense of objections can be made to the
reading that makes the list of "categories" refer to classes of being, then we have an alternative before us, which has not been adequately explored, namely whether the list refers not to classes of
being or classes of predicates, but to the types of statements that pertain to the attribution of genuine features present in the entity named in the subject position. It is the existence of the
concrete individual qua subject that sets the context for the selective lists of relevant types of attribution.
———. 1996. Categories and Experience. Essays on Aristotelian Themes. Oakdale: Dowling College Press.
Table of Contents: 1. Introduction 7; 2. Aristotle's Principle of Contradiction: Its Ontological Foundations and Platonic Antecedents (1972) 35; 3. The Meaning of 0 Logos tes
Ousias in Categories 1a (1968) 61; 4. The Aristotelian Doctrine of Homonyma (1968) 87; 5. Ancient Interpretations of Aristotle's Homonyma (1969) 115; 6. Observations
on Aristotle's Theory of Categories (1975) 153; 7. On the Meaning of Kategoria in Aristotle's Categories (1992) 175; 8. Aristotle's Theory of Categories and Post-Classical
Ontologies (1981) 203; 9. The Unity of Scientific Inquiry: The Scope of Ousia (1989) 215; 10. Revolutions and Reforms (1988) 237; 11. Politeia and Paideia: The Structure of
Constitutions (1988) 249; 12. Aristotle on Justice and Equity (1989) 279; 13. Ideal Values and Cultural Action (1991) 293; 14. Timely Observations on Aristotle's Architectonic of Politike
Techne (1994) 307; Bibliography 325;
Index 333; About the Author 337-338;
Apelt, Otto. 1891. "Die Kategorienlehre Des Aristoteles." In Beiträge Zur Geschichte Der Griechischen Philosophie, 101-216. Leipzig: Teubner.
Reprint of the book: Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1975
Aubel, Madeleine van. 1963. "Accident, Catégories Et Prédicables Dans L'œuvre D'Aristote." Revue Philosophique de Louvain no. 61:361-401.
Aubenque, Pierre. 1962. Le Problème De L'être Chez Aristote. Éssai Sur La Problématique Aristotélicienne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
———. 1967. "Aristote Et Le Langage." Annales de la Faculté des Lettres d'Aix no. 43:85-105.
Avec une "Note annexe sur les Catégories d'Aristote. Á propos d'une article de M. Benveniste" (pp. 103-105) - Émile Benveniste - Catègories de pensée et catégories de langage
- Études Philosophiques, 4, 1958).
Repris dans: P. Aubenque, Problèmes aristotéliciens. I. Philosophie théorique, Paris: Vrin, 2009, pp. 11-30
Bäck, Allan. 2000. Aristotle's Theory of Predication. Leyden: Brill.
Barnes, Jonathan. 1971. "Homonymy in Aristotle and Speusippus." Classical Quarterly no. 21:65-80.
"1. 'There are important differences between Aristotle's account of homonymy and synonymy on the one hand, and Speusippus' on the other; in particular, Aristotle treated homonymy
and synonymy as properties of things, whereas Speusippus treated them as properties of words. Despite this difference, in certain significant passages Aristotle fell under the influence of Speusippus
and used the words "homonymous" and "synonymous" in their Speusippean senses.'
These sentences are a rough expression of what I shall call the Hambruch thesis. The thesis was advanced by Ernst Hambruch in 1904 in his remarkable monograph on the relation
between Academic and early Aristotelian logic. (*)
Hambruch singled out Topics A 15 as peculiarly Speusippean, and he conjectured that it was based on some written work of Speusippus." p. 65
Ernst Hambruch, Logische Regeln der platonischen Schule in der aristotelischen Topik, Berlin, 1904, pp. 28-29. [Reprinted, with Curt Arpe, Das ti en einai bei
Aristoteles (1938), New York: Arno Press, 1976].
———. 2005. "Les Catégories Et Les Catégories." In Les Catégories Et Leur Histoire, 11-80. Paris: Vrin.
Barthlein, Karl. 1986. "Zur Aristotelischen Kategorienlehre." Philosophische Rundschau no. 33:281-291.
Baumer, Michael R. 1993. "Chasing Aristotle's Categories Down the Tree of Grammar." Journal of Philosophical Research no. 18:341-349.
"This paper addresses the problem of the origin and principle of Aristotle's distinctions among the categories. It explores the possibilities of reformulating and reviving the
'grammatical' theory, generally ascribed first to Trendelenburg. the paper brings two new perspectives to the grammatical theory: that of Aristotle's own theory of syntax and that of contemporary
linguistic syntax and semantics. I put forth a provisional theory of Aristotle's categories in which 1) I propose that the categories sets forth a theory of lexical structure, with the ten categories
emerging as lexical or semantic categories, and 2) I suggest conceptual links, both in Aristotle's writings and in actuality, between these semantic categories and certain grammatical
Belardi, Walter. 1985. "Le Categorie Aristoteliche Tra Grammatica E Linguaggio." In Filosofia Grammatica E Retorica Nel Pensiero Antico, 147-165. Roma: Edizioni
Versione riveduta di: Le categorie aristoteliche e la cultura linguistica dell'epoca, De Homine, 57, 1976 pp. 3-24.
Benveniste, Émile. 1958. "Catégories De Pensée Et Catégories De Langue." Les Études Philosophiques no. 13:419-429.
Reprinted in: É. Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale, Paris: Gallimard, 1966, pp. 63-74; Translated in English by Mary E. Meek as: Problems in general
linguistics, Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1971.
Blackwell, Richard J. 1957. "The Methodological Function of the Categories in Aristotle." New Scholasticism no. 31:526-537.
Block, Irving. 1978. "Predication in Aristotle." Philosophical Inquiry no. 1:53-57.
"This article traces briefly the development of Aristotle's thoughts on predication as this progressed from the Categories to the Posterior Analytics with the
Topics coming somewhere in between. In the Categories predication is only of essential attributes and the subject of a predicating statement need not be a substance. In the
Posterior Analytics, predication is the attribution of either essential or accidental attributes and the subject must be a substance, otherwise it is not predication in the true sense. The
Topics represents a half-way house in between as it makes no mention of the predication-inherence distinction of the Categories on the one hand, and on the other gives no
predominance to the notion of substance when discussing the subject of predication, as we find in Posterior Analytics."
Bodéüs, Richard. 1984. "Aux Origines De La Doctrine Aristotélicienne Des Catégories." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 2:121-137.
———. 1995. "Sur L'unité Stylistique Du Texte Des Catégories." In Aristotelica Secunda. Mélanges Offerts a Christian Rutten, edited by Motte, André and Denooz,
Joseph, 141-154. Liège: Université de Liège. Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres.
———. 1996. "En Relisant Le Début Des Catégories. L'expression Logos Tés Ousias." Revue des Études Grecques no. 109:709-718.
———. 1997. "Le Texte Grec Des "Catégories" D'Aristote Et Le Témoignage Du Commentaire De Porphyre." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no.
———. 2005. "La Substance Première Des Catégories À Métaphysique." In La Métaphysique D'Aristote. Perspectives Contemporaines, edited by Narcy, Michel and
Tordesillas, Alonso, 131-144. Paris: Vrin.
Bonelli, Maddalena, and Guadalupe Masi, Francesca, eds. 2011. Studi Sulle Categorie Di Aristotele. Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert.
Bonitz, Hermann. 1853. "Über Die Kategorien Des Aristoteles." Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften no. 10:591-645.
Reprinted Darmstadt, Wissenchaftliche Buch-Gesellschaft, 1967.
Translated in Italian: H. Bonitz - Sulle categorie di Aristotele - Prefazione, introduzione, progettazione e impostazione editoriale di Giovanni Reale. Traduzione del testo
tedesco e indici di Vincenzo Cicero - Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1995.
Brakas, George. 1988. Aristotle's Concept of the Universal. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Contents: Acknowledgments 1; Preface 3; I. Recent Views of Aristotle's Universal 11; II. The Definition of Aristotle's Early Concept of the Universal 17; III. Interpretations of
Aristotle's Doctrine of the Categories in Recent Times 21; IV. A Consideration of the Main Interpretations 31; V. The Categories and the Meaning of 'an Existent' at the Time of the Prior
Analytics 55; VI. Fundamentals of Aristotle's Theory of the Simple Statement at the Timer of the De Interpretatione and Prior Analytics 65; VII. Interpretations of 'Is Said of'
in the Recent Literature 77; VIII. The Senses of 'Is Asserted of' 87; IX. Aristotle's Early, Middle and Late Views of the Universal 97; Selected Bibliography 111-113.
"A few years ago Edward Regis, Jr. pointed to a serious gap in Aristotelian studies:
The centrality of the 'one-many' problem or 'problem of universals' to epistemology and metaphysics is hardly an issue for argument. Questions regarding the metaphysical status of
universals and their relation to individuals, the process of 'concept formation', and the epistemological function of universals in predication are classic ones in philosophy having originated with
Socrates and Plato. In view of the contemporary interest in these problems as well as the numerous studies of other topics treated of by Aristotle, it is a matter for at least initial surprise that
there exists no systematic account of his views on universals. This is partially explicable by the fact that these questions are not dealt with by Aristotle in any single treatise or place in his
works; indeed, texts relevant to these problems are scattered throughout them all, from the Categories to the Poetics, and even the fragments. In addition, many of the texts are, as one might expect,
obscure, and some apparently contradict others. Another factor which might help explain the situation is that there is a traditional, 'orthodox' interpretation of Aristotle's thinking on these
matters, which gives rise to the impression that whatever he has to say on the topic is already known in sufficient detail, has been fully considered, evaluated, and refuted, so that it would be
pointless to pursue the matter further. This impression has little basis in fact. The 'orthodox' interpretation has it that Aristotle is a 'moderate realist', holding that universals exist somehow
'in' individuals. Taken as it stands, this interpretation is worse than unhelpful. It does not tell us what a universal is, just that whatever it is, it exists 'in' things. The truth is that
Aristotle's theory of universals has never been satisfactorily stated by his interpreters...(1)
The following essay attemps to fill this gap in Aristotelian studies partially.(2) As I shall argue, Aristotle's view of the universal went through three phases, and the essay
attemps to give a systematic account of his early concept of it, as well as a brief account of his middle and late views.
To claim that Aristotle's view of the universal went through three stages is to commit oneself to a certain chronology, and I adopt the following in this essay.
(1) The Categories, Topics, Metaphysics Delta, De Interpretatione, and Prior Analytics are early works, and (2) were written in that order. (3) The Parts of
Animals and Metaphysics Z are later than this group, and (4) the Parts of Animals is earlier than Metaphysics Z. Finally, (5) the De Anima and Metaphysics
Lambda and M are later than this second group. These claims, however, are not intended to deny that some parts of the works may have been added later than the chronology adopted here
would allow if interpreted strictly." (pp. 3-4)
(1) 'Aristotle on Universals', Thomist 40 (1976), p. 135.
(2) After this essay was written a small book dealing with universals in Aristotle was brought to my attention: A. C. Lloyd's Form and. Universal in Aristotle (Liverpool:
Francis Cairns, 1981). The main contention of this work is that Aristotle was a conceptualist. This interpretation is stated and criticized later in this essay (see pp. 15-16, 40-41 and 55-63).
Lloyd's book is reviewed by D. K. Modrak in The Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (October 1983): 559-61.
Brentano, Franz. 1862. Von Der Mannigfachen Bedeutung Des Seienden Nach Aristoteles. Freiburg im Bresgau: Herder.
Reprinted by Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1960, 1963, 1984.
English translation: F. Brentano - On the several senses of Being in Aristotle - Edited and translated by Rolf George - Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975.
Butler, Travis. 1997. "The Homonymy of Signification in Aristotle." In Aristotle and After, edited by Sorabji, Richard, 117-126. London: Institute of Classical Studies,
University of London.
Calogero, Guido. 1927. I Fondamenti Della Logica Aristotelica. Firenze: Le Monnier.
Second edition with appendixes by Gabriele Giannantoni and Giovanna Sillitti - Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1968.
Carr, Jeffrey. 2009. Aristotle's Use of 'Genos' in Logic, Philosophy and Science. Bern: Peter Lang.
Carson, Scott. 2000. "Aristotle on Existential Import and Nonreferring Subjects." Synthese no. 124:343-360.
Caujolle-Zaslawsky, Françoise. 1980. "Les Relatifs Dans Les Catégories." In Concepts Et Catégories Dans La Pensée Antique, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 167-195.
Chen, Chun-Hwan. 1957. "On Aristotle's Two Expressions: Kath' Hypokeimenou Leghesthai and En Hypokoimeno Einai." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient
Philosophy no. 2:148-159.
Cicero, Vincenzo. 1994. "L'interpretazione Linguistica Delle Categorie Aristoteliche in E. Benveniste." In La Dottrina Delle Categorie in Aristotele, 285-353. Milano: Vita
Code, Alan. 1985. "On the Origins of Some Aristotelian Theses About Predication." In How Things Are. Studies in Predication and the History of Philosophy and Science,
edited by Bogen, James and McGuire, James E., 101-131. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Cohen, S.Marc. 2008. "Kooky Objects Revisited: Aristotle's Ontology." Metaphilosophy no. 39:3-19.
"This is an investigation of Aristotle's conception of accidental compounds (or ''kooky objects,'' as Gareth Matthews has called them) -- entities such as the pale man and the
musical man. I begin with Matthews's pioneering work into kooky objects, and argue that they are not so far removed from our ordinary thinking as is commonly supposed. I go on to assess their utility
in solving some
familiar puzzles involving substitutivity in epistemic contexts, and compare the kooky object approach to more modern approaches involving the notion of referential opacity. I
conclude by proposing that Aristotle provides an implicit role for kooky objects in such metaphysical contexts as the Categories and Metaphysics."
Colin, Bernard, and Rutten, Christian. 1993. Aristote. Categoriae. Index Verborum. Liste De Fréquence. Liège: Centre Informatique de Philosophie et Lettres.
Corkum, Phil. 2009. "Aristotle on Nonsubstantial Individuals." Ancient Philosophy no. 29:289-310.
"Aristotle's concerns, in his Categories, are disjoint from the problem of recurrence of properties, so there is no way to determine, on the basis of the
Categories alone, whether Aristotle was committed to the possibility of recurrence or whether he held that properties are non-recurrent."
Couloubaritsis, Lambros. 1986. " Legomenon Et Katégoroumenon Chez Aristote." In Philosophie Du Langage Et Grammaire Dans L'antiquité, 219-238. Bruxelles: Ousia.
Courtine, Jean-François. 1980. "Note Complémentaire Pour L'histoire Du Vocabulaire De L'être. Les Traductions Latines D' Ousía Et La Compréhension Romano-Stoïcienne De
L'être." In Concepts Et Catégories De La Pensée Antique, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 33-87. Paris: Vrin.
Reprinted and updated in: J-F. Courtine - Les catégories de l'être. Études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale - Paris, Press Universitaires de France, 2003, pp.
———. 2004. "La Question Des Catégories: Le Débat Entre Trendelenburg Et Bonitz." In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis, 63-80. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses
Unversitaires du Septentrion.
Derrida, Jacques. 1972. "Le Supplément De Copule. La Philosophie Devant La Linguistique." In Marges De La Philosophie, 211-246. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.
Dévéreux, Daniel. 1992. "Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle's Categories." Ancient Philosophy no. 12:113-131.
Reprinted in: L. P. Gerson (ed.) - Aristotle. Critical assessment. Volume I: Logic and metaphysics - London, Routledge, 1999, pp. 52-72.
"I argue that Aristotle is committed to non-substantial particulars' in the Categories, i.e. entities predicable of one, but not more than one, substance. I also offer an
account of what Aristotle means by 'in a subject' which allows for universal as well as particular attributes to be in a subject. The key element in the account offered is using the way in which
parts of a substance can exist separately (i.e., on their own) as a guide for understanding the inseparability of things 'in a subject'. Things in a subject cannot exist 'on their own', apart from
the subject in which they inhere; this sort of inseparability applies to universal as well as particular attributes. Towards the end, I discuss some implications of the Categories doctrine
that parts of primary substances (especially the soul and body) are themselves primary substances."
Driscoll, John. 1979. "The Platonic Ancestry of Primary Substance." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 24:253-269.
"In this article I call attention to the fact that five of the characteristics of primary substances mentioned by Aristotle in chapter V of the Categories correspond to
characteristics of the spatial receptacle postulated by Plato at Timaues 49-52. I then argue that the most important differences between the Timaues 49-52 and Categories
ontologies can be accounted for on the basis of G. E. L. Owen's thesis that the Sophist, among other dialogues, was written after the Timaues."
Duerlinger, James. 1970. "Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's Categories." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 15:179-203.
Duhot, Jean-Joël. 1994. "L'authenticité Des Catégories." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne no. 12:109-124.
Dumoulin, Bertrand. 1980. "Sur L'authenticité Des Catégories D'Aristote." In Concepts Et Catégories Dans La Pensée Antique, edited by Aubenque, Pierre, 23-32.
———. 1983. "L'ousia Dans Les Catégories Et Dans La Métaphysique." In Zweifelhaftes Im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien Zu Einigen Dubia. Akten Des 9. Symposium
Aristotelicum, Berlin, 7-16 September 1981, edited by Moraux, Paul and Wiesner, Jürgen, 57-72. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Dupréel, Eugène. 1909. "Aristote Et Le Traité Des Catégories." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 22:230-251.
Ebert, Theodor. 1985. "Gattungen Der Prädikate Und Gattungen Des Seienden Bei Aristoteles: Zum Verhältnis Von Kat. 4 Und Top. I.9." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
Edel, Abraham. 1975. "Aristotle's Categories and the Nature of Categorial Theory." Review of Metaphysics no. 29:45-65.
Elders, Leo. 1961. Aristotle's Theory of the One. A Commentary on Book X of the Metaphysics. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Erginel, Mehmet. 2004. "Non-Substantial Individuals in Aristotle's Categories." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philsophy no. 26:185-212.
"The non-substantial individuals of Cat. 1 A 24-5 may be "in" several individual substances. The interpretation commonly held by proponents of the traditional view is
inconsistent with what Aristotle actually says in the Categories, nor does it enjoy any other textual support."
Ermano, Andrea. 2000. Substanz Als Existenz. Eine Philosophische Auslegung Der Prote Ousia. Mit Text, Übersetzung Und Diskussion Von Aristoteles, Categoriae 1-5.
Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Esposti Ongaro, Michele. 2005. "Dialettica E Grammatica Nella Dottrina Delle Categorie Di Aristotele." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 26:33-64.
"In a critical response to R. Bodéüs (2001) recent conclusions regarding the title, authenticity and relation to the Topics of the Categories, emphasizes the role
of rhetorical practice and grammatical doctrine in the deduction of the ten categories."
Fait, Paolo. 2004. "La Predicazione Linguistica Nelle Categorie Di Aristotele." Rivista di Estetica no. 44:23-36.
"The paper deals with the relations of being said of and being in which are indirectly introduced in Aristotle's' Categories. Is Aristotle distinguishing two kinds
of ontological predication, corresponding respectively to essential predication and accidental predication, or not? Unlike many interpreters who answer this question in the affirmative, I deny
being in to be a kind of predication at all. My aim is to show that in the few passages of the Categories in which Aristotle has recourse to a generic concept of predication,
covering both essential and accidental predication, what he has in mind is just linguistic predication. The problem with linguistic predications, however, is that sometimes they do not
mirror their ontological underpinnings, thereby misleading people into such absurd positions as that held by the "late-learners" depicted in Plato's Sophist."
Findlay, John N. 2006. "Aristotle and Eideticism." Philosophical Forum no. 37:333-386.
Notes from a lecture given by the author in 1978 in which he summarizes his views on the first three sections of Aristotle's Metaphysics 13 (M); Categories 1-9;
Metaphysics Zeta, Eta, and Theta; Posterior analytics ; and Physics.
Flannery, Kevin L. 1999. "The Synonymy of Homonyms." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 81:268-289.
"Simplicius reports in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories that Claudius Nicostratus and a certain Lucius argued that there is a problem with Aristotle's definition of
homonyms in the first chapter of the Categories. If homonyms fall under that definition, they, qua homonyms, are not homonyms at all but synonyms, since they share the name 'homonym' and
also the definition of homonyms. The author of the present article discusses a number of ancient and modern attempts to resolve this paradox, arguing that none of them is fully satisfactory. He
proposes, rather, the elimination of the words 'of being' from lines 1a2 and 1a4, a solution that finds support in some of the oldest evidence regarding manuscripts that exists in Aristotelian
Fonfara, Dirk. 2003. Die Ousia-Lehren Des Aristoteles. Untersuchungen Zur Kategorienschrift Und Zur Metaphysik. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Fraser, Kyle. 2003. "Seriality and Demonstration in Aristotle's Ontology." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philsophy no. 25:131-158.
" Metaphysics G and Z support a distinction between 'seriality' and 'focality' in demonstrations of ontological structure, and a precise account of the categories as they
appear in these books of the Metaphysics can be given in the serial mode of demonstration. In appendix: On the Neoplatonist 'deduction' of the Categories."
From the review by Michael Pakaluk in Bryn Mawr Classical Review 06.18.2006: "It is commonly thought that Aristotle distinguishes just two ways of classifying things: genus-species
hierarchies; and pros hen or 'focally related' analogues. Fraser considers whether we might take Aristotle's mention, at Met. IV.2.1005a11, of classification "with reference to a serial ordering"
(tôi ephechês), to be indicating a third. Aristotle's famous remarks in De Anima, about how types of soul form a sequence (414b20-415a3), presumably refer to just that sort of ordering. But the bulk
of Fraser's paper is an examination of whether Aristotle regarded the categories, too, as displaying that sort of ordering -- especially, that some categories are related to substance through the
mediation of other categories. It turns out that the evidence that Aristotle thought this is surprisingly good. Fraser's program in examining this evidence is to develop, ultimately, an account of
the method of the Aristotelian metaphysics as being systematic and scientific; Fraser rejects the 'dialectical' interpretations of the last several decades as over-influenced by ordinary language
Frede, Michael. 1981. "Categories in Aristotle." In Studies in Aristotle, edited by O'Meara, Dominic, 1-25. Washington: Catholic University Press.
Reprinted in: M. Frede - Essays in Ancient Philosophy - Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 29-48.
———. 1987. "The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of the Aristotelian Categories." In Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 11-28. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
English translation of: Titel, Einheit und Echtheit der aristotelischen Kategorienschrift - in: Paul Moraux, Jürgen Wiesner (eds.), Zweifelhaftes im Corpus
Aristotelicum. Studien zu einigen Dubia. Akten des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin, 7-16 September 1981, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1983, pp. 1-29.
———. 1987. "Individuals in Aristotle." In Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 49-71. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
English translation of: Individuen bei Aristoteles - Antike und Abendland, 24, 1978, pp. 16-39.
Fritz, Kurt von. 1931. "Der Ursprung Der Aristotelischen Kategorienlehre." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 40:449-496.
Reprinted in: K. von Fritz, Schriften zur griechischen Logik, Stüttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1978, vol. 2, pp. 9-61 and in: Fritz-Peter Hager (ed.), Logik und
erkenntnislehre des Aristoteles, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buch-Gesellschaft, 1972.
———. 1935. "Zur Aristotelischen Kategorienlehre." Philologus no. 90:244-248.
Reprinted in: Fritz-Peter Hager (ed.) - Logik und Erkenntnislehre des Aristoteles - Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972.
———. 1954. "Review Of: The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's Philosophy by L. M. De Rijk." Philosophical Review no. 63:600-605.
Furth, Montgomery. 1988. Substance, Form and Psyche. An Aristotelean Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Garver, Newton. 1974. "Notes for a Linguistic Reading of the Categories." In Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations. Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium on
Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972, edited by John, Corcoran, 27-32. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"1. If Aristotle's Categories provide a classification of things and not of sayings, as is traditionally insisted, the things classified are at any rate 'things that can be
said'. It is interesting, therefore, to inquire whether the Categories may be regarded as containing, in rudimentary form, results that might be more appropriately and more completely
presented in terms of current methods of linguistic analysis, applied to a level of language or discourse that linguists usually ignore.
2. Both the name 'categories', which signifies predications or sayings, and the position of the work at the beginning of the Organon, which deals with matters of logic and
language, reinforce the temptation to interpret the Categories linguistically. Although neither the title nor the position of the work in the corpus is directly due to Aristotle, they do
show that the inclination to treat the Categories as at least partially linguistic goes back to the very earliest tradition of Aristotelian scholarship." p. 27
Gercke, Alfred. 1891. "Ursprung Der Aristotelischen Kategorien." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 4:424-441.
Gillespie, Charles Melville. 1925. "The Aristotelian Categories." Classical Quarterly no. 19:79-84.
Reprinted in: J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (eds.) - Articles on Aristotle - Vol. 3 - Metaphysics - London, Duckworth, 1979, pp. 1-12
Graeser, Andreas. 1977. "Probleme Der Kategorienlehre Des Aristoteles." Studia Philosophica.Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Philosophischen Gesellschaft no. 37:59-81.
———. 1983. "Aspekte Der Ontologie in Der Kategorienschrift." In Zweifelhaftes Im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien Zu Einigen Dubia. Akten Des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin,
7-16 September 1981, edited by Moraux, Paul and Wiesner, Jürgen, 30-56. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Graham, Daniel W. 1987. Aristotle's Two Systems. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gregoric, Pavel. 2006. "Quantities and Contraries : Aristotle's Categories 6, 5b11-6a18." Apeiron no. 39:341-358.
Hacking, Ian. 2001. "Aristotelian Categories and Cognitive Domains." Synthese no. 126:473-515.
"This paper puts together an ancient and a recent approach to classificatory language, thought, and ontology.It includes on the one hand an interpretation of Aristotle's ten
categories, with remarks on his first category, called (or translated as) substance in the Categories or What a thing is in the Topics. On the other hand is the idea of
domain-specific cognitive abilities urged in contemporary developmental psychology. Each family of ideas can be used to understand the other. Neither the metaphysical nor the psychological approach
is intrinsically more fundamental; they complement each other. The paper incidentally clarifies distinct uses of the word 'category' in different disciplines, and also attempts to make explicit
several notions of 'domain'. It also examines Aristotle's most exotic and least discussed categories, being-in-a-position (e.g., sitting) and having-(on) (e.g., armour). Finally the
paper suggests a tentative connection between Fred Sommers' theory of types and Aristotle's first category."
Hamlyn, David W. 1961. "Aristotle on Predication." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 6:110-126.
———. 1978. "Focal Meaning." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no. 78:1-18.
"The Aristotelian doctrine of focal meaning or "pros hen" homonymy involves a doctrine of primary and secondary meanings, as distinct from primary and secondary cases, such that the
secondary meaning is derivative from the primary. Aristotle seems to want to use this idea to establish an "ontological" dependence of the secondary on the primary. Since he holds a realist theory of
meaning there is circularity in this. Aristotle's use of 'cosmological' types of argument is discussed, together with the question how far this kind of argument can be supported by considerations
about meaning. The general limitations on the use of the notion of focal meaning are set out."
Heimsoeth, Heinz. 1952. "Zum Geschichte Der Kategorienlehre." In Nicolai Hartmann, Der Denker Und Sein Werk. Fünfzehn Abhandlungen Mit Einer Bibliographie, edited by
Heimsoeth, Heinz and Heiss, Robert, 144-172. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Heinaman, Robert. 1981. "Non-Substantial Individuals in the Categories." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 26 (295):307.
"There is a dispute as to what sort of entity non-substantial individuals are in Aristotle's Categories. The traditional interpretation holds that non-substantial
individuals are individual qualities, quantities, etc. For example, Socrates' white is an individual quality belonging to him alone, numerically distinct from (though possibly specifically identical
with) other individual colors. I will refer to these sorts of entities as 'individual instances.'
The new interpretation (1) suggests instead that non-substantial individuals are atomic species such as a specific shade of white that is indivisible into more specific shades. On
this view, non-substantial individuals are what we would call universals (2) which can be present in different individual substances, but are labelled 'individuals' by Aristotle because, like
individual substances, there is nothing they are said of. (3)
In this paper I will defend the traditional account by attempting to show that it is supported by the slender textual evidence that is available. I will begin by stating three
serious objections to the traditional interpretation. Next I will show that in works later than the Categories Aristotle accepted individual instances of properties of the sort found in the
Categories by the traditional interpretation. Finally, I will set out the evidence that supports the traditional interpretation and answer the three objections."
(1) G. E. L. Owen, "Inherence," Phronesis (1965), pp. 97-105; Michael Frede, "Individuen bei Aristoteles," Antike and Abendland (1978), pp. 16-31. In fact, it is not clear to me
what Professor Frede considers non-substantial individuals to be. While he refers approvingly to Owen, Owen's account collapses the distinction between eidei en and arithmo en in the case of
non-substances whereas it appears that Frede wishes to retain this distinction (pp. 23-24). Since he does not explain what individual non-substances which are numerically different but specifically
identical are supposed to be or in virtue of what they are numerically different, by the "new interpretation" I will mean solely that explained in the text.
(2) This is not, as Allen, Matthews and Cohen think, an objection to the new interpretation (R. E. Allen, "Individual Properties in Aristotle's Categories," Phronesis (1969), p. 37;
Gary Matthews and S. Marc Cohen, "The One and the Many," Review of Metaphysics (1968), pp. 640-41). There is no justification for the presupposition that Aristotle must have used the terms
'individual' and 'universal' in the Categories in the same way as in later works or as they are used today. (Of course, the word 'katholou' does not appear in the Categories).
(3) That is, for any individual x there is no y such that the name and definition of x are predicable of y (2a19-27).
Hetherington, Stephen. 1984. "A Note on Inherence." Ancient Philosophy:218-223.
"Aristotle's Categories quarters the world via the interaction of two relations -- the said-of relation and the inherence relation. Aristotle's definition
of the latter is unperspicuous, and many scholars have attempted its clarification. The matter's still unresolved; for instance, Owen's important account is vague. I construct an Aristotelian account
of conceptual inherence; I then make Owen's account precise. Plausibly, the result is that Aristotle's view of the world's structure is a little clearer."
Hinitkka, Jaakko. 1959. "Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity." Inquiry no. 2:137-151.
Reprinted as Chapter 1 in: J. Hintikka - Time and necessity. Studies in Aristotle's theory of modality - Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973 pp. 1-26.
———. 1971. "Different Kinds of Equivocation in Aristotle." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 9:368-371.
———. 1983. "Semantical Games, the Alleged Ambiguity of 'Is' and Aristotelian Categories." Synthese no. 54:443-468.
Reprinted in: J. Hintikka - Analysis of Aristotle - Selected Papers - Vol. 6, Dordrecht, Springer, 2004, pp. 23-44.
———. 1986. "The Varieties of Being in Aristotle." In The Logic of Being: Historical Studies, edited by Knuuttila, Simo and Hinitkka, Jaakko, 81-114. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Hirschberger, Johannes. 1960. "Paronymie Und Analogie Bei Aristoteles." Philosophisches Jahrbuch no. 68:191-203.
Hood, Pamela M. 2004. Aristotle on the Category of Relation. Washington: University Press of America.
Many philosophers believe that Aristotle does not have, and indeed could not have, a theory of relation, even one that accounts for relations involving two terms, i.e., dyadic
relations. Aristotle's logical, metaphysical and ontological views, especially his substance-accident ontology, are seen as restricting Aristotle to only one-place or monadic relations, and
prohibiting the logical space for a separate entity, relation, to exist. Hence, Aristotle's conception of relation is perceived to be so divergent from our own that it does not count as a theory of
relation at all. I aim to show that the critics are wrong to speak so poorly of Aristotle's account of relation.
I argue that Aristotle's theory has some of the basic features that a theory of relation must have. I begin in Part One by sketching out the critics' charges. I then outline the
main features of Aristotle's philosophy that inform his treatment of the category of relation, and briefly survey Aristotle's discussion of relational issues scattered throughout the corpus. Next, I
present an exegesis of Aristotle's two central texts on relation, Categories 7 and Metaphysics V 15, and discuss the various accounts of relational entities or relatives therein. In
Part Two, I examine two problems. First, I address the problem of how best to interpret Aristotle's relatives. Second, I explore the epistemological difficulties stemming from Aristotle's view in the
Categories that relation involves two relative items or terms and that if one relative item is known definitely the other item must also be known definitely.
I conclude that Aristotle's treatment of relatives reveals his commitment to the view that there be a dyad, i.e., at least two items, involved in a relation. Furthermore, I show
that Aristotle includes in his theory something that accounts for the relation itself, i.e., something approaching a logical relational predicate. I do not suggest that Aristotle attempts to
construct a relational theory comparable to our own. But I do suggest that given Aristotle's grasp of the dyadic nature of relation, we have good reason to believe Aristotle's theory of relation is
more robust than many suspect."
Husik, Isaac. 1904. "On the Categories of Aristotle." Philosophical Review no. 13:514-528.
Reprinted (conjointed with Husik 1939) in: I. Husik - Philosophical essays, ancient, mediaeval, and modern - Edited by Milton C. Nahm and Leo Strauss, Oxford, Blackwell,
1952, pp. 96-112.
———. 1939. "The Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories." Journal of Philosophy no. 36:427-433.
Reprinted (conjointed with Husik 1904) in: I. Husik - Philosophical essays, ancient, mediaeval, and modern - Edited by Milton C. Nahm and Leo Strauss, Oxford, Blackwell,
1952, pp. 96-112.
Irwin, Terence H. 1981. "Homonymy in Aristotle." Review of Metaphysics no. 34:523-544.
"In the works of Aristotle, homonymy and multivocity are often the same, and neither is intended to mark different senses of words. Aristotle searched for homonymy not to encourage
skepticism, but to forestall skepticism which might result from rejection of Plato's belief that every name had one essence."
———. 1982. "Aristotle's Concept of Signification." In Language and Logos. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen, edited by Schofield, Malcolm and
Nussbaum, Martha, 241-266. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jacobs, William. 1979. "Aristotle and Nonreferring Subjects." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 24:282-300.
"It is a widely accepted view amongst scholars that Aristotle believed that the subject of an assertion might fail to refer. Two texts, De interpretatione XI 21 a 25-28 and
Categories X 13 b 12-35, are generally cited as evidence for this belief. In this paper I argue that both passages have previously been misunderstood and that Aristotle did not accept the
possible referential failure of the subject of an assertion. In section I, after first discussing the standard interpretations of both texts, I note the difficulties which result from these accounts.
In section II I offer a brief general argument showing that Aristotle's own account of what an assertion is implies that it is impossible for the subject of an assertion to fail to refer. In section
III I present my own analysis of each passage and show that when properly understood neither is in any way concerned with the problem of referential failure."
Janko, Richard. 1982. "A Fragment of Aristotle's Poetics from Porphyry, Concerning Synonymy." Classical Quarterly no. 32:323-326.
Jansen, Ludger. 2011. "Aristotle's Categories." Topoi no. 26:153-158.
Jones, Barrington. 1972. "Individuals in Aristotle's Categories." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy:107-123.
"It is argued that the notion of an individual, whether substantial or non-substantial, in Aristotle's Categories can be satisfactorily explicated by taking seriously their
characterization as things that are 'one in number'. This is interpreted as 'what can be a unit in an enumeration'. 'A particular white' will then be 'some particular substance's white'. On the basis
of this account the notions of homonymy, synonymy and paronymy are explicated in such a way that the three are on a par one with each of the others and that there is a clear connection between the
introduction of these notions and the remainder of the Categories."
———. 1975. "An Introduction to the First Five Chapters of Aristotle's Categories." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 20:146-172.