Theory and History of Ontology

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Annotated Bibliography on Aristotle's Categories. Second Part: K - Z

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  1. Kahn, Charles H. 1978. "Questions and Categories. Aristotle's Doctrine of Categories in the Light of Modern Research." In Questions, edited by Hiz, Henry, 227-278. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    "The categories of Aristotle do not represent a complete logical inventory, a classification of all terms or concepts represented in language. They do attempt to classify all the terms of a basic object language, where these terms are specified by the questions that can be asked or answered concerning an individual subject. Hence the number of categories will be determined by the number of fundamentally distinct questions that can be raised concerning such a subject. As has often been pointed out, the full list of ten given in the Categories and in Topics 1.9 suggests that Aristotle must have taken a human being as his specimen subject, for only in this case would the two minor categories, Posture and Having (or Clothing) be natural topics of inquiry.

    There is, then, a factual connection between Aristotle's list of categories and the linguistic forms of question or inquiry. But what is the philosophical significance of this connection? Reflection on this matter may proceed along two quite distinct lines of thought, each of which could provide material for a study devoted to questions and categories. On the one hand, we might consider Aristotle's doctrine simply as an early example of the genre, and widen the concept of category to include modern theories of logical, conceptual, and grammatical categories. Our topic would then become: the connection between interrogative forms and categorial distinctions in general. On the other hand, we may keep our attention fixed on Aristotle's doctrine but generalize the remark about interrogative forms to include other grammatical or linguistic considerations. Our topic will then be: the significance of the connections between Aristotle's scheme of categories and certain facts of grammar, including the grammar of questions in Greek. It is this second topic that I propose to study here: I will discuss Aristotle's theory, not category theories in general." pp. 227-228 (notes omitted)

  2. Kapp, Ernst. 1942. Greek Foundations of Traditional Logic. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Contents: I. The origin of logic as a science 3; II. Concepts, terms, definitions, ideas, categories 20; III. Judgments, subject and predicate 43; IV. Syllogisms 60; V. Induction; ancient and modern logic 75; Books cited 89; Index 91-95.

  3. ———. 1968. "Die Kategorienlehre in Der Aristotelischen Topik." In Ausgewählte Schriften, edited by Diller, Hans and Diller, Inez, 215-253. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    Written in 1920, but first published in 1968.

  4. Kenny, Anthony John Patrick. 1983. "A Stylometric Comparison between Five Disputed Works and the Remainder of the Aristotelian Corpus." In Zweifelhaftes Im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien Zu Einigen Dubia. Akten Des 9. Symposium Aristotelicum, Berlin, 7-16 September 1981, edited by Moraux, Paul and Wiesner, Jürgen, 345-366. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

  5. Kohl, Markus. 2008. "Substancehood and Subjecthood in Aristotle's Categories." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 53:172-179.

    "About Aristotle's criteria for "being a substance" in the Categories. On the basis of close textual analysis, it is argued that subjecthood, conceived in a certain way, is the criterion that explains why both concrete objects and substance universals must be regarded as substances. It also explains the substantial primacy of concrete objects. But subjecthood can only function as such a criterion if both the subjecthood of concrete objects and the subjecthood of substance universals can be understood as philosophically significant phenomena. By drawing on Aristotle's essentialism, it is argued that such an understanding is possible: the subjecthood of substance universals cannot simply be reduced to that of primary substances. Primary and secondary substances mutually depend on each other for exercising their capacities to function as subjects. Thus, subjecthood can be regarded as a philosophically informative criterion for substancehood in the Categories".

  6. Kosman, Louis Aryeh. 1967. "Aristotle's First Predicament." Review of Metaphysics no. 20:483-506.

    Reprinted in: Mary L. O'Hara (ed.), Substances and Things. Aristotle's Doctrine of Physical Substance in Recent Essays, Washington: University Press of America, 1982.

  7. Kwan, Tze-Wan. 2008. "The Doctrine of Categories and the Topology of Concern." In The Logic of the Living Present, edited by Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa, 243-301. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Analectas Husserliana - Vol. 46

  8. Lallot, Jean. 1988. "Origines Et Développement De La Théorie Des Parties Du Discours En Grèce." Langages no. 92:11-23.

  9. Lewis, Frank A. 1991. Substance and Predication in Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  10. ———. 2004. "Aristotle on the Homonymy of Being." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 68:1-36.

    "Critical discussion of C. Shields (1999). An examination of Aristotle's theory of homonymy shows that, on the version of homonymy presented in the Categories, the sorts of beings distinguished by the categories cannot be defined by the usual strategy of definition by genus and differentia. The more-developed theory of homonymy, and the expanded ontology, of books Z and H of the Metaphysics, however, provide the necessary solution to this problem."

  11. Lugarini, Leo. 1955. "Il Problema Delle Categorie in Aristotele." Acme.Annali della Facolta di Filosofia e Lettere dell'Universita di Milano no. 8:3-107.

    Reprinted as volume, Milano, Nuvoletti, 1955.

  12. Maier, Heinrich. 1896. Die Syllogistik Des Aristoteles. Tübingen: H. Laupp.

    Vol. 1. Die logische Theorie des Urteils bei Aristoteles. Berichtigte Neuausgabe mit einem Anhang: Die Echtheit der aristotelischen Hermeneutik (1896); Vol. 2. Die logische Theorie des Syllogismus und die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik: 1. Formenlehre und Technik des Syllogismus (1897); 2. Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik (1900).

    Reprint: Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1969-1970.

  13. Majolino, Claudio. 2004. "De La Grammaire À L'ontologie Et Retour. Le Rapport Entre Catégories De L'être Et Grammaire Philosophique Selon Trendelenburg Et Marty." In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Unversitaires du Septentrion.

  14. Malcolm, John. 1981. "On the Generation and Corruption of the Categories." Review of Metaphysics no. 33:662-681.

  15. Mann, Wolfgang-Rainer. 2000. The Discovery of Things. Aristotle's Categories and Their Context. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  16. Mansion, Suzanne. 1949. "La Doctrine Aristotélicienne De La Substance Et Le Traité Des Catégories." In Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy. Amsterdam (11-18th August, 1949), edited by Beth, Evert Willem, Pos, H.J. and Kollah, J.H.A., 1097-1100. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

    Vol. I, fasc. 2.

    Reprinted in: S. Mansion - Études aristoteliciennes. Recueil d'articles - Louvain-la-Neuve, Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1984, pp. 305-308

  17. ———. 1968. "Notes Sur La Doctrine Des Catégories Dans Les Topiques." In Aristotle on Dialectic: The Topics. Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum (Oxford, 1963), edited by Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane, 189-201. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Reprinted in: S. Mansion - Études aristoteliciennes. Recueil d'articles - Louvain-la-Neuve, Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1984, pp. 169-182.

  18. Matthen, Mohan. 1978. "The Categories and Aristotle's Ontology." Dialogue.Canadian Philosophical Review no. 17:228-243.

    "What where Aristotle's aims in the Categories? We can probably all agree that he wanted to say something about different uses of the verb 'to be' -- something relevant to ontology. The conventional interpretation goes further: it has Books Gamma and Zeta of the Metaphysics superseding theories put forward in the Categories. We should expect then that the Categories and these books of the Metaphysics try to do the same sort of thing. Most exegetes do indeed ascribe to the earlier work fairly elaborate ontologies, though they are in disagreement as to what theory Aristotle held while writing it. I shall argue in this paper that the whole enterprise of reconstructing the ontology of the Categories from its small stock of clues is misguided; that the business of the Categories is to set out data for which the Metaphysics tries to account. This view is not without consequence relevant to some widely held theses. I shall claim that the difference between the Categories and the Metaphysics cannot uncritically be used to trace the development of Aristotle's ontology, that the differences between the two doctrines has been greatly exaggerated."

  19. Matthews, Gareth B. 1989. "The Enigma of Categories 1a20ff and Why It Matters." Apeiron no. 22:91-104.

    "I discuss three interpretations of Aristotle's definition of 'in a subject' at Categories 1a24-5 -- one associated with Michael Frede, one with G. E. L. Owen and one with John Ackrill. I consider whether Ammonius's commentary on the Categories -- particularly his treatment of the fragrance in the apple that leaves the apple and comes to us -- should lead us to settle on one of the three interpretations. Finally, I sketch the 'metaphysics of containers' presented in the Categories and try to explain why the definitional question is important for assessing that metaphysical doctrine."

  20. ———. 2009. "Aristotelian Categories." In A Companion to Aristotle, edited by Anagnostopoulos, Georgios, 144-161. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

    "That which is there to be spoken of and thought of, must be.

    Parmenides, Fragment 6 (McKirahan trans.)

    The short treatise entitled Categories enjoys pride of place in Aristotle's writings. It is the very first work in the standard edition of Aristotle's texts. Each line of the thirty columns that make up this treatise has been pored over by commentators, from the first century BCE down to the present. Moreover, its gnomic sentences still retain their fascination for both philosophers and scholars, even today.

    In the tradition of Aristotelian commentary, the first works of Aristotle are said to make up the Organon, which begins with the logic of terms (the Categories), then moves on to the logic of propositions (the De Interpretatione) and then to the logic of syllogistic argumentation (the Prior Analytics). But to say that the Categories presents the logic of terms may leave the misleading impression that it is about words rather than about things. That is not the case. This little treatise is certainly about words. But it is no less about things. It is about terms and the ways in which they can be combined; but this "logic" of terms is also meant to be a guide to what there is, that is, to ontology, and more generally, to metaphysics.

    The Categories text was not given its title by Aristotle himself. Indeed, there has long been a controversy over whether the work was even written by Aristotle. Michael Frede's discussion of this issue in "The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories" (Frede 1987: 11-28) is as close to being definitive on this issue as is possible. Frede concludes that the Categories can only be the work of Aristotle himself or one of his students.

    The question of authenticity is often connected with the issue of whether the last part of the Categories, chapters 10-15, traditionally called the "Postpraedicamenta," and the earlier chapters really belong to the same work. We shall have very little to say about the Postpraedicamenta here."

  21. Matthews, Gareth B., and Cohen, S.Marc. 1968. "The One and the Many." Review of Metaphysics no. 21:630-655.

    "We discuss Aristotle's Categories as an answer to Plato's one-over-many argument. For Plato, F-ness is something "over against" particular F things; to predicate "F" of these things is to assert that they all stand in a certain relation to F-ness. Aristotle answers that predication is classification; and there being a classification of a certain sort is a fact correlative with there being things classifiable in the way the classification in question would classify them."

  22. Menn, Stephen. 1995. "Metaphysics, Dialectic and the Categories." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no. 100:311-337.

  23. Mignucci, Mario. 1986. "Aristotle's Definitions of Relatives in Categories Chapter 7." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 31:101-127.

  24. Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo. 1945. "The Text of the Categoriae: The Latin Tradition." Classical Quarterly no. 39:63-74.

    Reprinted in: L. Minio-Paluello - Opuscola: the Latin Aristotle - Amsterdam, Adolf M. Hakkert, 1972, pp. 28-39.

  25. Morales, Fabio. 1994. "Relational Attributes in Aristotle." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 39:255-274.

    "Aristotle's theory of relations involves serious difficulties of interpretation. By attempting to solve some of the problems posed by J. L. Ackrill in his famous commentary on the Categories (Ackrill, 1963), I hope to contribute to a better understanding of Aristotle's statements on the nature and status of relational attributes. In general, my procedure has been to analyze the criteria by which entities are supposed to fall under the category of 'the relative'. The following topics will be considered: i) Aristotle's two definitions of relatives in Categories 7, ii) the pseudo-relational character of the parts of substances, and iii) the threefold classification of relatives in Metaphysics chapter 15. A corollary of these discussions will be that relations may have played for Aristotle a far more conspicuous role in the 'definition' of substances and attributes than has been hitherto acknowledged."

  26. Moravcsik, Julius. 1967. "Aristotle on Predication." Philosophical Review no. 76:80-96.

    "In the Topics, Categories, and De Interpretatione, Aristotle is struggling with a variety of problems that span the fields of metaphysics and philosophy of language. Both the problems and the attempted solutions have much relevance to some of the main issues in contemporary British and American philosophy. Thus it is unfortunate that though there is a large number of ancient commentaries on these texts, little has been written on these matters in modern times that is of genuine philosophical significance. Professor Ackrill's new translation and notes' make a fine contribution toward remedying this deficiency. (...)

    It is impossible to write a complete review of Ackrill's book, for, not being able to assume familiarity with Aristotle's theories, the reviewer would have to cover simultaneously Aristotle's views, the quality of the new translation, and the quality of Ackrill's notes. As an alternative, the reviewer hopes to introduce the reader to this volume by selecting one of the key nest of problems that Aristotle discusses in these works and discussing Aristotle's views, the translation, and Ackrill's views in this limited context. Unfortunately, even this limited task is too large for the size of a paper to be expected under these circumstances. Nevertheless, this sketchy introduction might be of some value to those interested in the problems at hand."

  27. ———. 1967. "Aristotle's Theory of Categories." In Aristotle. A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Moravcsik, Julius, 125-145. New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc.

  28. Morison, Benjamin. 2005. "Les Catégories D'Aristote Comme Introduction À La Logique." In Les Catégories Et Leur Histoire, edited by Bruun, Otto and Corti, Lorenzo, 103-119. Paris: Vrin.

  29. Morrison, Donald. 1992. "The Taxonomical Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories: A Criticism." In Aristotle's Ontology, edited by Preus, Anthony and Anton, John Peter, 19-46. Albany: State University of New York Press.

  30. Narcy, Michel. 1981. "L'homonymie Entre Aristote Et Ses Commentateurs Néo-Platoniciens." Études Philosophiques:35-52.

  31. Nowak, Michael. 1965. "Toward Understanding Aristotle's Categories." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research no. 26:117-123.

    "It is maintained that three positions must be assumed in order to interpret the first five chapters of Aristotle's Categories. This includes the meaning and role of "present in a subject." These positions are: 1) a rejection of univocity, 2) a dual conception of accident, 3) the principle of discrimination. There are some comments on Aristotle's attempts to work out a notion of science that would account, at the same time, for the flux of individuals and the necessity and universality proper to science. It is concluded that within the individual or the concrete, particular present, is grasped the necessity required for science. Also, from insight flows the concept or definition, which is the universalization of the insight."

  32. O'Brien, Denis. 1978. "Aristote Et La Catégorie De Quantité. Divisions De La Quantité." Études Philosophiques:25-40.

  33. Oehler, Klaus. 1976. "Peirce Contra Aristotle. Two Forms of the Theory of Categories." In Proceedings of the C. S. Peirce Bicentennial International Congress, edited by Ketner, Kenneth Lane, 335-342. Lubbock: Texas Tech Press.

  34. O'Farrell, Frank. 1982. "Aristotle's Categories of Being." Gregorianum no. 63:87-131.

  35. Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane. 1960. "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle." In Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century. Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum Held at Oxford in August, 1957, edited by Düring, Ingemar and Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane. Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag.

    Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, Edited by Martha Nussbaum, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 180-199.

  36. ———. 1965. "Inherence." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 10:97-105.

    Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, Edited by Martha Nussbaum, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 252-258.

  37. ———. 1965. "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology." In New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, edited by Bambrough, Renford, 69-95. New York: Humanities Press.

    Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, Edited by Martha Nussbaum, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. pp. 259-278.

  38. ———. 1965. "The Platonism of Aristotle." Proceedings of the British Academy no. 50:125-150.

    Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, Edited by Martha Nussbaum, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 200-220.

  39. ———. 1978. "Particular and General." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no. 78:1-21.

    Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, Edited by Martha Nussbaum, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 279-294.

  40. Owens, Joseph. 1951. The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. A Study of the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

    Third revised edition 1978

  41. ———. 1960. "Aristotle on Categories." Review of Metaphysics no. 14:73-90.

    "The author argues that the Aristotelian doctrine of categories was based upon the natures of things, and not, as has been contended, upon the use of words. Therefore, category definition or construction was not an arbitrary procedure. However, the natures of things exist both in reality and in cognition; accordingly, logical as well as metaphysical features are involved in Aristotle's presentation of the categories. The author suggests in explanation that the natures upon which the categories bear are common to both logic and metaphysics. He then analyzes three types of category mistake in terms of Aristotle's treatment."

  42. Palu, Chiara. 2000. "Le Definizioni Dei Relativi Nelle Categorie Di Aristotele: Una Risposta a David Sedley." Dianoia no. 5:39-55.

    "This paper analyzes the two definitions of relatives in chapter 7 of Aristotle's Categories starting from David Sedley's recent article on this topic. In particular, using Simplicius's Commentary, I suggest some new arguments for Sedley's emendation at 8b18, which make it possible to read the expression ' aute e kephale' in the sense of the head in itself (a substance) in opposition to the head as a part of the body ('per accidens'). The consequence of this interpretation is that it changes the meaning of the second definition of relatives, making it able to distinguish between what is a relative as such and what is a relative accidentally."

  43. Patzig, Günther. 1973. "Bemerkungen Zu Den Kategorien Des Aristoteles." In Einheit Und Vielheit. Festschrift Für Carl Friedrich V. Weizsachker Zum 60. Geburstag, edited by Scheibe, Erhard and Süssmann, Georg, 60-76. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

  44. Pelletier, Yvan. 1987. "Le Propos Et Le Proème Des Attributions ( Catégories) D'Aristote." Laval Théologique et Philosophique no. 43:31-47.

    "Le but de cet article est de manifester qu'Aristote, dans ses Attributions (Catégories), a pour propos de fournir le prémier principe systématique de toute recherche de definition. Ce but est atteint en deux temps: 1) par l'exposé direct de la conception que s'en fait l'auteur de l'article; 2) par la verification de cette conception à travers une lecture rigoureuse des quatre premiers chapitres formant le proème aux Attributions."

  45. Perin, Casey Carlton. 2007. "Substantial Universals in Aristotle's Categories." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philsophy no. 33:125-144.

    "For Aristotle in the Categories, the general notion of a substance is the notion of a subject for inherence. Inherence is one of the two relations of metaphysical predication he introduces in Categories 2. But a universal is a subject for inherence if and only if it satisfies a disclosure condition for secondary substance. Not all universals satisfiy this condition, so certain universals but not others are substances."

  46. Pronay, Andreas. 2005. "Die Echtheit Der Aristotelischen Kategorienschrift." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 26:421-441.

    "After an overview of the structure of the treatise, studies the question of the authenticity of each of the work's three subsections (pre-categories, categories, post-categories). Both linguistic and conceptual considerations point to the authenticity of the entire work, which, like Topics books 2-7, will have been written approximately 350-345 B.C."

  47. Ragnisco, Pietro. 1871. Storia Critica Delle Categorie, Dai Primordi Della Filosofia Greca Sino Ad Hegel. Firenze: Cellini.

    Two volumes.

  48. Reale, Giovanni. 1957. "Filo Conduttore Grammaticale E Filo Conduttore Ontologico Nella Deduzione Delle Categorie Aristoteliche." Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica no. 49:423-458.

    Revised edition with the title: Filo conduttore grammaticale, filo conduttore logico e filo conduttore ontologico nella deduzione delle categorie aristoteliche e significati polivalenti di esse su fondamenti ontologici - in: Adolf Trendelenburg - La dottrina delle categorie in Aristotele - Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1994, pp. 17-70.

  49. Reisinger, Klaus. 1974. "Kategorien Und Seinsbedeutung Bei Aristoteles." In Sein Und Geschichtlichkeit. Sein Und Geschichtlichkeit. Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck Z. 60 Geburtstag, edited by Schüssler, Ingeborg and Janke, Wolfgang, 37-41. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann.

  50. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1951. "The Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories." Mnemosyne no. 4:129-159.

    "Most scholars either deny Aristotle's authorship of the first treatise of the Organon, or else consider the problem of authorship to be insoluble. I maintain, however, that such judgements are wrong and that the treatise is of genuine Aristotelian authorship, and of considerable importance for our knowledge both of Aristotle's own development, and also that of later Platonism. I shall try to show the authenticity of the treatise in the following study, and shall divide my investigation into the following main divisions:

    A. The view of the ancient commentators concerning the authenticity of Categories Chs. 1-9 ;

    B. Modern criticism of the authenticity of Categories Chs. 1-9;

    C. The authenticity of Categories Chs. 10-15 ."

    [See also the following note to Ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics (Second part) - Vivarium, November, 1978, p. 85: "Unlike some 30 years ago (see my papers published in Mnemosyne 1951), the present author has his serious doubts, now, on the authenticity of the first treatise of the Organon"].

  51. ———. 1952. The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's Philosophy. Assen: Van Gorcum.

    Ph.D. thesis, Utrecht University.

    From the Introduction: "It seems to be the fatal mistake of philology that it always failed to get rid of Kantian influences as to the question of the relation of logic and ontology. Many modern mathematical logicians have shown that the logical and the ontological aspect not only are inseparable but also that in many cases it either lacks good sense or is even impossible to distinguish them. Accordingly, the distinction of logical and ontological truth (especially of propositional truth and term-truth), that of logical and ontological accident and that of logical and ontological categories, has not the same meaning for modem logic as it seems to have for 'traditional' logic (for instance the logic of most Schoolmen).

    I hope to show in this study that the distinction of a logical and an ontological aspect (especially that of logical and ontological categories) can be applied to the Aristotelian doctrine only with the greatest reserve. A sharp distinction carried through rigorously turns out to be unsuitable when being applied to Aristotelian logic. For both aspects are, for Aristotle, not only mutually connected but even interwoven, and this in such a way that the ontological aspect seems to prevail, the logical being only an aspect emerging more or less in Aristotle's generally ontological way of thinking." pp. 6-7.

    Contents: Bibliography I-III; Introduction 1-7; Chapter I. Aristotle's doctrine of truth 8-35; Chapter II. The distinction of essential and accidental being pp. 31-43; Chapter III. Logical and ontological accident 44-52; Chapter IV. The nature of the categories in the Metaphysics 53-66; Chapter V. The doctrine of the categories in the first treatise of the Organon 67-75; Chapter VI. The use of the categories in the work of Aristotle 76-88; Appendix. The names of the categories 89-92; Index locorum 93-96.

  52. ———. 1978. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part Ii. The Multiplication of Being in Aristotle's Categories." Vivarium no. 16:81-117.

    " 3. The multiplication of being in Aristotle's Categories;

    3.1. Introduction. One of the results of the preceding section may be that Lloyd (1956, p. 59) seems to be wrong in asserting that in Plato's view the rôle of the universal is played by the Idea exclusively, and that only by the time of the Middle Academy, that is, for the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., the performers of this rôle have been multiplied. As a matter of fact the distinction between Plato and his followers of the Middle Academy on this score would seem to be a different one. The ontological problems of participation were felt as early as in the Platonic dialogues (see our section 2), as well as the logical ones concerning predication (which will be discussed in a later section). Well, the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., introduced explicitly a threefold distinction of the Platonic Form or rather of its status which was (only) implied with Plato. I think, Lloyd is hardly more fortunate in ascribing (ibid.) this introduction chiefly to the influence of Aristotelian logic on Platonic interpretation. It is true, in stating the basic distinction between en hypokeimenôi and kath' hypokeimenou Aristotle tried to face the same cluster of fundamental problems which induced later Platonists to the distinction of the Forms as taken before or after the methexis (cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Categ. 79, 12ff.). However, Plato's disciple, Aristotle (the most unfaithful one, in a sense, as must be acknowledged) was as deeply engaged on the same problems as were his condisciples and the Master himself in his most mature period. It is certainly not Aristotle who played the rôle of a catalyst and was the first to provoke the multiplication of the Platonic Form in order to solve problems which were not recognized before in the Platonic circle. On the contrary, Plato himself had saddled his pupils with a basic and most intricate problem, that of the nature of participation and logical predication. It was certainly not left quite unsolved in the later dialogues, but did still not have a perspicuous solution which could be accepted in the School as a scholastic one. So any of his serious followers, (who were teachers in the School, at the same time) was bound to contrive, at least, a scholastic device to answer the intricate question. To my view, Aristotle's solution should be discussed in this framework. For that matter, Aristotle stands wholly on ground prepared by his master to the extent that his works on physic and cosmology, too, are essentially discussions held within the Academy (Cp. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the history of his development, Oxford 1949, 308)." pp. 81-82

    3.2. Aristotle's classification of being as given in the Categories; 3.2.1. The common view: categories = predicates; 3.2.2. The things said 'aneu symplokés'; 3.2.3. The doctrine of substance given in the Categories; 3.2.4. The ontological character of the classification; 3.2.5. Some obscurities of the classification; 3.2.6. The different status of the 'things' meant; 3.2.6.1 The first item of the classification; 3.2.6.2. The second item of the classification; 3.2.6.3. The third item of the classification; 3.2.6.4. The ontological status of the 'things' meant in the items (2) and (3); 3.2.6.5. The fourth item of classification; 3.2.7. The relation between the different 'things'; 3.3. Categories and predicables; 3.3.1. The opposition of category and predicable; 3.3.2. The impact of the opposition; 3.3.3. The obscure position of the differentia; 3.3.4. Conclusion.

  53. ———. 1980. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part Iii. The Categories as Classes of Names." Vivarium no. 18:1-62.

    " 4. The categories as class of names; 4.1. Status quaestionis. The previous sections contain several hints to the close interrelation between three major issues in Plato's doctrine, viz. the question about the true nature of the Forms and those about participation and predication. Indeed, for the founder of the theory of the Forms, predication was bound to become a problem. Forms are immutable and indivisible; yet other Ideas have to participate in them; they are unique, by themselves and subsistent; yet, when saying 'John is man' (or white) , 'Peter is man' (or white) , should there be one perfect, eternal, immutable etc. Form of MAN (or WHITE) in the one and another in the other? Or, as I have put it above [1977: 85]: if John, Peter, and William are wise, does this mere fact mean that there must be something which they are all related to in exactly the same manner, namely WISDOM itself? And if 'John is wise', 'Peter is wise', and 'William is wise' are all true statements, what exactly is the meaning of the predicate name 'wise'? The former question is concerned with participation, the latter with predication. Well, that the crux of the latter problem is not the separate existence of the Forms ( chôrismos) clearly appears from the fact that also the author of the Categories, who had entirely abandoned all kind of chôrismos, could apparently not get rid of a similar problem: if the categories really are classes of 'things there are' (1 a 20) (i.e. 'real' substances, 'real' natures, and 'real' properties), rather than concepts (i.e. logical attributes), what kind of 'thing' is meant by a term qua 'category'? So for Aristotle the semantic problem still remained. His distinction between en hypokeimenôi and kath' hypokeimenou could only hide the original problem. It is often said that these phrases refer to different domains, the metaphysical and the logical one, respectively. We have already found some good reasons to qualify this opposition (see [1978], 84; 88). It seems to be useful now to collect all kind of information from Aristotle's writings, not only the Categories, about the proper meaning of the categories. This will be the aim of our sections 4.2-4.7." pp. 1-2

    4.2. On some modern interpretations of 'kata symplokên'; 4.3. Aristotle's use of the categories; "For this section see also my Utrecht dissertation, The place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's philosophy, Assen 1952 pp. 76-88. I have to correct or to adjust my former views on several points."; 4.31. The categories as a classification of reality; 4. 32. The categories as a classification of sentence predicates; 4.33. The categories as a classification of 'copulative being'; 4.4. How did Aristotle arrive at his list of categories?; 4.5. Are the categories the 'highest predicates'?; 4.6. The categories taken as names in Metaph. Z 1-6 and Anal. Post. I 4; 4.7. An attempt at a reinterpretation of Categories, chs. 1-5; 4.8. Aristotle's view on relatives; 4.9. Conclusion.

  54. ———. 2002. Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume I: General Introduction. The Works on Logic. Leiden: Brill.

    From the Preface: "In this book I intend to show that the ascription of many shortcomings or obscurities to Aristotle resulted from persistent misinterpretation of key notions in his work. The idea underlying this study is that commentators have wrongfully attributed anachronistic perceptions of 'predication', and statement-making in general to Aristotle. In Volume I, what I consider to be the genuine semantics underlying Aristotle's expositions of his philosophy are culled from the Organon. Determining what the basic components of Aristotle's semantics are is extremely important for our understanding of his view of the task of logic -- his strategy of argument in particular.

    In chapter 1, after some preliminary considerations I argue that when analyzed at deep structure level, Aristotelian statement-making does not allow for the dyadic 'S is P' formula. An examination of the basic function of 'be' and its cognates in Aristotle's philosophical investigations shows that in his analysis statement-making is copula-less. Following traditional linguistics I take the 'existential' or hyparctic use of 'be' to be the central one in Greek (pace Kahn), on the understanding that in Aristotle hyparxis is found not only in the stronger form of 'actual occurrence' but also in a weaker form of what I term 'connotative (or intensional) be' (1.3-1.6). Since Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour', in spite of his skilful manipulation of the diverse semantic levels of expressions, is in fact not explicitly organized in a well-thought-out system of formal semantics, I have, in order to fill this void, formulated some semantic rules of thumb (1.7).

    In chapter 2 I provide ample evidence for my exegesis of Aristotle's statement-making, in which the opposition between 'assertible' and 'assertion' is predominant and in which 'is' functions as an assertoric operator rather than as a copula (2.1-2.2). Next, I demonstrate that Aristotle's doctrine of the categories fits in well with his view of copula-less statement-making, arguing that the ten categories are 'appellations' ('nominations') rather than sentence predicates featuring in an 'S is P' formation (2.3-2.4). Finally, categorization is assessed in the wider context of Aristotle's general strategy of argument (2.5-2.7).

    In the remaining chapters of the first volume (3-6) I present more evidence for my previous findings concerning Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour' by enquiring into the role of his semantic views as we find them in the several tracts of the Organon, in particular the Categories De interpretatione and Posterior Analytics. These tracts are dealt with in extenso, in order to avoid the temptation to quote selectively to suit my purposes."

  55. ———. 2002. Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume Ii: The Metaphysics, Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument. Leiden: Brill.

    From the Preface to the first volume: "The lion's part of volume two (chapters 7-11) is taken up by a discussion of the introductory books of the Metaphysics (A-E) and a thorough analysis of its central books (Z-H-O). I emphasize the significance of Aristotle's semantic views for his metaphysical investigations, particularly for his search for the true ousia. By focusing on Aristotle's semantic strategy I hope to offer a clearer and more coherent view of his philosophical position, in particular in those passages which are often deemed obscure or downright ambiguous.

    In chapter 12 1 show that a keen awareness of Aristotle's semantic modus operandi is not merely useful for the interpretation of his metaphysics, but is equally helpful in gaining a clearer insight into many other areas of the Stagirite's sublunar ontology (such as his teaching about Time and Prime matter in Physics) .

    In the Epilogue (chapter 13), the balance is drawn up. The unity of Aristotelian thought is argued for and the basic semantic tools of localization and categorization are pinpointed as the backbone of Aristotle's strategy of philosophic argument.

    My working method is to expound Aristotle's semantic views by presenting a running commentary on the main lines found in the Organon with the aid of quotation and paraphrase. My findings are first tested (mainly in Volume II) by looking at the way these views are applied in Aristotle's presentation of his ontology of the sublunar world as set out in the Metaphysics, particularly in the central books (ZHO). As for the remaining works, I have dealt with them in a rather selective manner, only to illustrate that they display a similar way of philosophizing and a similar strategy of argument. In the second volume, too, the exposition is in the form of quotation and paraphrase modelled of Aristotle's own comprehensive manner of treating doctrinally related subjects: he seldom discussed isolated problems in the way modern philosophers in their academic papers, like to deal with special issues tailored to their own contemporary philosophic interest."

  56. Rohr, M.D. 1978. "Aristotle on the Transitivity of Being Said Of." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 16:379-385.

    "According to Aristotle, the relation "being said of" is transitive. Categ. VIII,11a 20-32 and Topics IV,4,124b 15-19 would be inconsistent with its transitivity if categories were summa genera, but the idea that they are is not as well supported in Aristotle's writings as the idea that "being said of" is transitive."

  57. Ross, William D. 1939. "The Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories." Journal of Philosophy no. 36:427-433.

  58. Rutten, Christian. 1985. "Stylométrie Des Catégories." In Aristotelica: Mélanges Offerts À Marcel De Corte, edited by Motte, André, 315-336. Bruxelles: Éditions Ousia.

  59. Sainati, Vittorio. 1968. Storia Dell'organon Aristotelico. Firenze: Le Monnier.

    Vol.1: Dai Topici al De interpretatione (1968); vol. 2: L'analitica. La crisi epistemologica della Topica (1973)

  60. Sanford, Jonathan J. 2004. " Categories and Metaphysics: Aristotle's Science of Being." In Categories: Historical and Sistematic Essays, edited by Gorman, Michael and Sanford, Jonathan J., 3-20. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

  61. Scaltsas, Theodore. 1981. "Numerical Versus Qualitative Identity of Properties in Aristotle's Categories." Philosophia no. 10-11:328-345.

  62. Scheu, Marina M. 1944. The Categories of Being in Aristotle and St. Thomas. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.

    Contents: List of tables VIII; Preface IX; List of abbreviations XIII; Part I. Categories in Aristotle. I. The history and general nature of the categories 3; II. The logical aspect of the categories in Aristotle 13; III. The metaphysical aspect of the categories in Aristotle 23; Part II. Categories in St. Thomas. IV. The history of the categories from Aristotle to St. Thomas 38; V. General nature of the categories in Thomistic philosophy 46; VI. The nature of substance 64; VII. The nature of accident 77; Summary and conclusion 96; Bibliography 98; Index 102-109.

    ""Knowledge to be of value must be founded on reality. Hence it follows that unless our ideas faithfully reflect reality, our judgments about it will be false. One of the most evident illustrations of this fact is found in the divergent views philosophers have taken with regard to our widest universal concepts, the categories of being. It is, therefore, an important task of metaphysics to inquire into the modes which characterize the being that these concepts represent.

    Aristotle, the first philosopher known to have undertaken this task, presents a classification of categories in his logical treatise entitled Categories. Nor does he confine his doctrine to but this one of his works. Numerous references to the categories are found in practically all of his writings, especially in the Metaphysics.

    To St. Thomas Aquinas, however, we owe the development and perfection of the theory of the categories. He, it is true, wrote no authentic logical treatise' on the subject as did Aristotle, but his doctrine of the categories can be culled from his numerous discussions of them throughout his more metaphysical works in particular, especially from the Quaestiones Disputatae, the Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, and the Summa Theologica.

    It is the purpose of this study, which is to be primarily metaphysical and Thomistic in character, to present the general teaching of St. Thomas on the categories. Our treatment of Aristotle, then, is to give the proper background, since obviously it is the Aristotelian plan that is the point of departure for all Thomistic study of the subject. Without this Aristotelian environment in which St. Thomas worked, his position would be much less clear. In a word, the Thomistic section of this study will reveal that St. Thomas developed and perfected Aristotelian thought.

    The problem of the categories is twofold: logical, in so far as it involves a classification of our generic concepts ; metaphysical, in that it must necessarily regard and classify the objects of those concepts, that is, real beings Therefore, after considering the history and general nature of the categories in the first chapter of the Aristotelian section, we shall examine the logical and metaphysical aspect in the two chapters following. Chapter four will present the historical transition from Aristotle to St. Thomas. Since St. Thomas wrote no logical treatise on the categories, nor any commentary on Aristotle's logical treatment of them, it will be necessary for us to proceed in a somewhat different manner in the Thomistic section of our work. In keeping with the primarily metaphysical trend in St. Thomas' thought, which is particularly evident in his treatment of the categories, we propose to present in the last three chapters respectively the general character of his teaching on the categories and a consideration of the nature of substance and the nature of accidents." PP. IX-X (note omitted)

  63. Sedley, David. 2002. "Aristotelian Relativities." In Le Style De La Pensée. Recueil D'hommages À Jacques Brunschwig, edited by Canto-Sperber, Monique and Pellegrin, Pierre, 324-352. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

    Originally published in Italian as: Relatività aristoteliche - Dianoia, 2, 1997 pp. 11-15 (first part) and 1998, 3, 11-23 (second part).

    "This study of relativity in Aristotle and his successors, examines Aristotle's contrast in Categories chapter 7 between two rival criteria for relativity. It is widely held that the first is a specifically linguistic criterion, the second an ontological one. Against this the paper argues that, while the first permits the inclusion of things for which a relation to something else is no more than 'part' of what it is to be them, the latter restricts relativity to things which consist in a relation 'and nothing more'.

    The second half of the study starts from the conclusion in the previous part that the second kind of relativity distinguished at the end of Categories chapter 7 marks off things which consist in a relation 'and nothing more'. It is argued that this notion of relativity originated in the early Academy, from which it also passed to the Stoics.

  64. Segalerba, Gianluigi. 2001. Note Su Ousia. Pisa: Edizioni ETS.

    Vol. 1 (Only published)

  65. Seminara, Lauretta. 2004. "Omonimia E Sinonimia in Platone E Speusippo." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 24:289-320.

  66. Sharples, Robert William. 2008. " Habent Sua Fata Libelli: Aristotle's Categories in the First Century B.C." Acta Antiqua.Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae no. 48:273-287.

    "A re-examination of the question why, in the revival of interest, in the first century B.C. in Aristotle's esoteric works, as opposed to his doctrines, the work Categories played so large a part. The answers suggested are that the work aroused interest just because it did not easily fit into the standard Hellenistic divisions of philosophy and their usual agendas, and that, more than Aristotle's other works with the possible exception of the Metaphysics, it revealed aspects of Aristotle's thought that had become unfamiliar during the Hellenistic period."

  67. Shields, Christopher. 1999. Order in Multiplicity. Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  68. Sillitti, Giovanna. 1985. "La Concezione Del Pros Ti E Il Problema Degli Enti Astratti in Aristotele." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 6:357-377.

  69. Stevens, Annick. 2000. L'ontologie D'Aristote. Au Carrefour Du Logique Et Du Réel. Paris: Vrin.

  70. Stough, Charlotte L. 1972. "Language and Ontology in Aristotle's Categories." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 10:261-272.

  71. Studtmann, Paul. 2004. "Aristotle's Category of Quantity: A Unified Interpretation." Apeiron no. 37:69-91.

    Studies Aristotle's two different treatments of the category of quantity: one in Categories 5 and one in Metaphysics 5, 7, with emphasis on how these conceptions represent hierarchical structures found in the physical world.

  72. ———. 2007. "Aristotle, Science and the Plenitude of Being." Apeiron no. 40:245-266.

    "An examination of Categories, Metaphysics 7-9, and Physics shows that an appreciation of the way plenitude influenced Aristotle's thought is crucial in understanding his approach to various inquiries. Although he does not explicitly state plenitude as a principle, his allegiance to it is nonetheless clear."

  73. ———. 2008. The Foundations of Aristotle's Categorial Scheme. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

  74. Surdu, Alexander. 2006. Aristotelian Theory of Prejudicative Forms. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

  75. Tarán, Leonardo. 1978. "Speusippus and Aristotle on Homonymy and Synonymy." Hermes.Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie no. 106:73-99.

    Reprinted in: Leonardo Tarán - Collected Papers 1962-1999 - Leyden - Brill, 2001, pp. 421-454.

    "The evidence about Speusippus's classification preserved by Simplicius can lead to no conclusion other than that Speusippus made an exhaustive classification of names and that for him homonymy and synonymy are properties of linguistic terms, not of things. Probability is in favor of thinking that in this respect Speusippus exercised some influence on Aristotle."

  76. Thiel, Rainer. 2004. Aristoteles' Kategorienschrift in Ihrer Antiken Kommentierung. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

  77. Thillet, Pierre. 1960. "Remarques Sur Les Catégories D'Aristote." Mélanges de la Bibliothèque de la Sorbonne no. 8:28-36.

  78. Thompson, Manley. 1953. "On Aristotle's Square of Opposition." Philosophical Review no. 62:251-265.

  79. Thorp, J.W. 1974. "Aristotle's Use of Categories." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 19:238-256.

  80. Thouard, Denis. 2004. "Une Métacritique Des Catégories: L'usage Critique D'Aristote Chez Trendelenburg." In Aristote Au Xix Siècle, edited by Thouard, Denis, 37-62. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Presses Unversitaires du Septentrion.

  81. Touratier, Christian. 1992. "Catégories De Langue Et Catégories De Pensée: (Benveniste Lecteur D'Aristote)." Lalies.Actes des Sessions de Linguistique et de Littérature no. 10:367-376.

  82. Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolf. 1846. Geschichte Der Kategorienlehre, Zwei Abhandlungen. Berlin: G. Bethge.

    I: Aristotle Kategorienlehre; II: Die Kategorienlehre in der Geschichte der Philosophie.

    Reprinted Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1963 and 1979.

    Traduzioni italiane:

    A. Trendelenburg - La dottrina delle categorie in Aristotele - Con in appendice la prolusione accademica del 1833 De Aristotelis categoriis - Prefazione e saggio introduttivo di Giovanni Reale. Traduzione e saggio integrativo di Vincenzo Cicero - Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1994.

    F. A. Trendelenburg - La dottrina delle categorie nella storia della filosofia. Profilo e valutazione critica - A cura di Renato Pettoello - Monza, Polimetrica, 2004.

  83. Tugendhat, Ernst. 1958. Ti Kata Tinos. Eine Untersuchung Zu Struktur Und Ursprung Aristotelischer Grundbegriffe. Freiburg: Alber.

  84. Ushida, Noriko. 2003. "Before the Topics?: Isaak Husik and Aristotle's Categories Revisited." Ancient Philosophy no. 23:113-134.

    "I. Husik, in arguing for the authenticity of the Categories (in: Philosophical Review 13, 1904, pp. 514-528), substantially overstated the case for the similarity of that treatise to the Topics. The two works differ greatly in their treatment of the theory of substance ( Cat. 5, 3 B 10-21; SE 22, 178 B 38ff.)."

  85. Vollrath, Ernst. 1969. Studien Zur Kategorienlehre Des Aristoteles. Ratingen bei Dusseldorf: A. Henn.

  86. Vuillemin, Jules. 1967. "Le Sistème Des Catégories D'Aristote Et Sa Signification Logique Et Métaphysique." In De La Logique À Al Théologie. Cinq Études Sur Aristote, 44-125. Paris: Flammarion.

  87. Ward, Julie K. 2007. Aristotle on Homonymy. Dialectic and Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Contents: Acknowledgments VII; Abbreviations IX; Introduction 1; 1. Aristotle's theory of homonymy in Categories 1 and its precursors 9; 2. Homonymy in the Topics 43; 3. Systematic homonymy 77; 4. The homonymy of Being 103; 5. Physis, Philia, and homonymy 137; 6. Homonymy and science 168; Afterword 201; Bibliography 207; Index of passages 215; General index 219-220.

  88. Wardy, Robert. 2000. Aristotle in China. Language, Categories and Translation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  89. Wedin, Michael. 1978. "Aristotle on the Existential Import of Singular Sentences." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 23:179-196.

    "Aristotle is sometimes held to the thesis [T1] that singular affirmative sentences imply the existence of a bearer for the grammatical subject of the sentence. Thus the truth of 'Ssocrates is sick' requires that something exist which is identical with Socrates. attribution of T1 to Aristotle can be justified by appeal to Categories 13 b 27-33 which seems to contain a straightforward statement of the thesis. Unfortunately, T1's status becomes problematic in light of "On interpretation" 21 a 24-28, for here Aristotle seems to deny T1 explicitly. This, at least, is the consensus among his commentators. We are thus faced with a serious inconsistency in Aristotle's account of singular sentences, an inconsistency most interpreters are content merely to mention, if they notice it at all. The first part of this paper advances some suggestions for reconciling the troublesome passages. In the second part I draw out certain related features of Aristotle's theory of singular sentences."

  90. ———. 1979. " Said of and Predicated of in the Categories." Philosophical Research Archives no. 5:23-34.

  91. ———. 1993. "Nonsubstantial Individuals." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 38:137-165.

    "Wedin addresses the debate over whether nonsubstantial individuals, that inhere in a subject but are not said of a subject, i.e. accidents, such as the pallor of Socrates, are nonrecurring particulars or a kind of determinate universal. Wedin examines the secondary literature on this topic and divides it into two schools of thought, determined by the contributions of J.L. Ackrill and G.E.L. Owen. According to Ackrill, individuals in non-substance categories are particular to the substance they are in; Owen critiques Ackrill's view, and proposes that these items can recur in more than one subject and hence are a sort of universal. Wedin finds Owen's thesis unsatisfactory, even after supplementing it with an improved version due to Michael Frede; instead, Wedin argues for a revised version of Ackrill's interpretation of nonsubstantial individuals as nonrecurrent particulars. According to Wedin, Aristotle is committed to individuals only -- e.g. to Socrates and to the particular bit of pallor in him: this conclusion has an important bearing on the ontological status of individuals and on the primacy of substance to nonsubstantial items."

  92. ———. 1997. "The Strategy of Aristotle's Categories." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 79:1-26.

    "This provides a systematic account of the framework of Aristotle's Categories, showing how the early chapters (including chapter one) provide essential features of a precise and deliberately worked-out theory."

  93. ———. 2000. Aristotle's Theory of Substance. The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta. New York: Oxford University Press.

  94. Wehrle, Walter E. 2000. The Myth of Aristotle's Development and the Betrayal of Metaphysics. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

  95. Weil, Eric. 1951. "La Place De La Logique Dans La Pensée Aristotelicienne." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale no. 56:283-315.

    Reprinted in: E. Weil - Essais et Conférences - Paris, Vrin, 1991, vol. I, Philosophie, pp. 43-80.

  96. ———. 1975. "The Place of Logic in Aristotle's Thought." In Articles on Aristotle. Vol. 1 Science, edited by Barnes, Jonathan, Schofield, Malcolm and Sorabji, Richard, 88-112. London: Duckworth.

    English translation of: La place de la logique dans la pensée aristotélicienne.

  97. Wesoly, Marian. 1984. "Verso Un' Interpretazione Semantica Delle Categorie Di Aristotele." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 5:103-140.

  98. Wheeler, Mark Richard. 2001. " Kategoria in the Topics and the Categories." Journal of Neoplatonic Studies no. 8:37-60.

    "The term kategoria in Aristotle's Topics and Categories denotes predicates. Hence the categories are best understood as classifying predicates and not predications. The equivocal use of the term in Top. 1, 9 is related to its use in signifying either linguistic or non-linguistic entities, and not because it can be used to mean predication."

  99. Zaslawski, D. 1969. "Termes, Propositions, Contrariété Et Contradiction." L'Âge de la Science no. 2:21-54.

  100. Zemb, Jean-Marie. 1996. "Prédicaments, Postprédicaments Et/Ou Prédicables, 'Catégories' Thématiques, Rhématiques Ou Phématiques?" In Aristotelica Secunda. Mélanges Offerts À Christian Rutten, edited by Motte, André and Denooz, Joseph, 366-374. Liège: Université de Liège, C.I.P.L.

  101. Zingano, Marco. 1997. "L'homonymie De L'être Et Le Projet Métaphysique D'Aristote." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 201:333-356.

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