Pinchard, Alexis. 2024. "Plato’s Catuṣkoṭi and Nāgārjuna’s Parmenides." In Crossing the Stream, Leaving the Cave: Buddhist-Platonist Philosophical Inquiries, edited by Carpenter, Amber D and Harter, Pierre-Julien, 117–141. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: "In the dialectical exercise of Plato’s Parmenides, the intrinsically contradictory deductions drawn from the hypotheses about the One imply that the One is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither endowed with an essence nor deprived thereof. Does this symmetrical negation constitute a self-refutation of Plato’s metaphysics, or is it evidence that “the One” refers to the same thing as the sovereign “Good” of the Republic, which is also supposed to stand beyond essence? Rewriting the Parmenides with Nāgārjuna’s concepts could help to answer this question. It looks as if Plato used the various predicative combinations of the Mādhyamika tetralemma, especially the symmetrical negation, in order to remove our native oblivion concerning the axiological status of the One, just like Nāgārjuna used it to remove our hypostatizing habits concerning the phenomena of everyday life. Conversely, the soteriological purpose of Mādhyamika dialectic becomes clearer when contrasted with the Platonic project to reach an unconditioned principle."
Pleše, Zlatko. 2010. "Plato and Parmenides in Agreement: Ammonius’s Praise of God as One-Being in Plutarch’s The E At Delphi." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 93–114. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"Plutarch’s dialogue De E apud Delphos (The E at Delphi) is one of his better known philosophical works, primarily because of its sublime encomium of God delivered by Ammonius, the Platonist from Alexandria and Plutarch’s teacher(καθηγητής). Ammonius’s discourse concludes a series of solutions aimed at elucidating the meaning of a letter “E” erected on the Delphic temple of Apollo.

The final position assigned to the speech seems to indicate Plutarch’s endorsement of its central tenets." (p. 93, a note omitted)

(...)

"The present study proposes to reexamine the alleged link between Ammonius’s exalted praise of God as One-Being and Eudorus’s derivational monism by pointing to other sources that might have played a more important role in articulating Ammonius’s position. Among these sources, one neglected passage from Plutarch’s anti-Epicurean treatise Adversus Colotem (Against Colotes) deserves special attention. The appeal of this passage, in which Plutarch defends the historical Parmenides against Epicurean attacks and relates his ideas to Plato’s philosophy, lies in its lexical and conceptual affinities with Ammonius’s discourse.

These affinities, if proven true, may seriously undermine the whole “Alexandrian hypothesis” and bring forward some other important lineages, including that of Parmenides and Plato’s eponymous dialogue." (p. 94)
Pleshkov, Aleksei. 2022. "Eternity for Plato: The Dialogue between Parmenides and Timaeus." In Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 371–377. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The distinction of time and eternity plays a crucial role in Plato’s ontology. Nevertheless, up to the Timaeus, Plato does not offer a more or less complete analysis of the concept, and even in this late dialogue, his definition is still ambiguous. The two most common interpretations of eternity in philosophical literature, temporalism and traditional eternalism, I believe, are not suitable for Plato’s philosophy. The third interpretation, neo-eternalism, which considers eternity as atemporal duration, i.e., the present that endures without slipping into a succession of past-future, fits Plato’s concept of eternity much better. Basing my approach on the analysis of the unique status of the present (ὁ νῦν χρόνος or τὸ νῦν) in the flow of time in the Parmenides and the eternity (αἰών) of the Paradigm which abides exclusively in the present (τὸ ἔστιν) in the Timaeus, I adapt the neo-eternalistic interpretation of the concept for Plato’s eternity. According to such reading, eternity for Plato is not transcendent to time, but the principle and necessary condition of time always given in the present, hic et nunc. In other words, eternity is the fundamental intuition of being expressed in a simple ‘is’ regardless of temporal differentiation."
Plochmann, George Kimball. 1954. "Socrates, the Stranger from Elea, and Some Others." Classical Philology no. 49:223–231.

"My principal thesis is that the dramatis personae of the Platonic dialogues constitute an important clue to interpreting Plato, that to neglect the hints he has provided by using the speakers he does is to risk being unplatonic. This is true even of the so-called "late" dialogues, where the persons are seemingly mere names and the drama is no more vivid than a syllogism. But the drama throughout is of a piece with the methods and the doctrines of these great colloquies; it is only in seeing how it is of a piece that we may penetrate these works, so deceptively translucent and so stubbornly opaque.

This conviction, if carried through into living practice, would help solve one of the most vexing of all Platonic problems, that of how much the philosopher was doing his own philosophizing.

How often was he reporting earlier scientific views, or narrating history, as many describe the Apology, or telling a rattling good joke, as some call the Parmenides? It is my impression that throughout his dialogues, the Apology and Symposium included, Plato persisted in trying to discover and demonstrate truth - I do not say precisely the same truth. Now to maintain this view entails my having to show that the incessant verbal and doctrinal disparities, the backings and fillings and abrupt transitions, have a meaning in terms of the peculiar form in which Plato wrote his philosophy." (p. 223, notes omitted)
Poetsch, Christoph. 2023. Conceptual Patterns in Plato's Parmenides. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

"Plato’s Parmenides is hence a text to which – obviously – all the characteristics mentioned at the outset apply, while roughly 2,400 years of intense discussion and careful research have not brought us anywhere close to a broader scholarly consensus. I dare not claim to end these discussions (I suspect they never will, which is in fact a good sign in some sense). But I claim to provide some evidence by help of the conceptual patterns that might be of general interest for every approach to this difficult text. In the following, I shall therefore try to clearly distinguish between, on the one hand, observations on these patterns and conclusions I consider as fairly uncontroversial with regard to the evidence (chapter 3) and, on the other hand, such arguments and conclusions that imply more far-reaching claims and a more concrete interpretation of the given evidence (chapters 4–5). Thus, I hope, the evidence and results of the former will still be valuable to those who will not follow every aspect of my further interpretation in the latter chapters. Those are the two first main steps of this study. Subsequent to them, in a concluding third main step, I shall then exemplarily address the question as to how these results might actually be able to tackle the difficulties and problems that are raised in the first part of the dialogue with regard to the Theory of Forms (chapter 6). Hence, this study aims to address, in a general manner, the two main questions that scholars are facing with regard to Plato’s Parmenides: What is its second part all about? How can the second part provide a solution to the problems in the first part?" (pp. 10-11)
Polansky, Ron, and Cimakasky, Joe. 2013. "Counting the Hypotheses in Plato’s Parmenides." Apeiron no. 46:229–243.

Abstract: "Parmenides’ exercise assists Socrates who is perplexed about forms and participation. The exercise assumes the one is and is not, and traces consequences for the one with respect to itself and the others and for the others with respect to themselves and the one. There appear to be Eighth or nine hypotheses. Counting the third makes all the odd-numbered hypotheses draw neither … nor … conclusions, while the even-numbered draw both … and … conclusions. Odd and even thus link with limit and unlimited principles, so the third hypothesis on the instant clarifies forms and all beings. We also cast light on the Presocratic origin of the theory of forms."
Priest, Graham. 2012. "The Parmenides: a Dialetheic Interpretation." Plato Journal no. 12:1–63.

Abstract: "In this paper, I offer a new (dialetheic) interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides. The key idea is to take the last speech of the dialogue seriously. The forms indeed have contradictory properties. Defending

this idea is what Plato is up to in the second half of the dialogue. And, suitably fleshed out, the idea can be used to answer the objections that Parmenides brings against the theory of forms in the first part."
———. 2014. One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness. New York: Oxford University Press.

Part II. Chapter 6: Enter Parmenides: Mereological Sums, 79; Chapter 7: Problems with the Forms—and their Solutions, 101, Chapter 8: The One—and the Others, 118-139.

"The problem of the one and the many around which Part I turns has often been overlooked as a serious problem. Where it has been taken very seriously is in Ancient Greek philosophy. Aristotle and Plato, in particular, were much concerned with it. Aristotle’s solution is discussed in Part I. There is much ore to be said about Plato’s. This is the focus of Part II.

The behaviour of parts is intimately connected both with Parmenides’ partless One, and with Plato’s form of Oneness. Both come in for scrutiny in this part. In particular, both of these are involved in Plato’s Parmenides. This dialogue is one of his most important and influential. It is also one of the most tantalizing and obscure. Many commentators despair of a coherent interpretation. The centrepiece of Part II is an interpretation based on gluon theory. This, it seems to me, provides just such an interpretation.

These are not the only issues traversed in Part II, however. This part concerns itself with the application of gluon theory to questions of meaning, truth, intentionality, and formal mereology. (An interlude after Chapter 6 provides an account of the mereology of nothing.) These are, of course, central issues in contemporary philosophy. However, I have chosen to approach them through the lens of Plato.

This gives the material a unity it might otherwise lack. More importantly, it will remind readers that contemporary problems sink deep into the history of the subject." (Preface, p. XVII)
Prior, William J. 1985. Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics. London: Croom Helm.

Contents: Acknowledgments; Introduction: The problem of Plato's development 1; The metaphysics of the early and middle Platonic dialogues 9; 2. The challenge of the Parmenides 51; 3. The response of the Timaeus 87; 4. The Sophist 127; Appendix: The doctrinal maturity and chronological position of the Tmaeus 168; Bibliography 194; Index 199-201.

"This book contains an account of the development of Plato's metaphysics. I focus on two metaphysical doctrines of central importance in Plato's thought: the Theory of Forms and the doctrine of Being and Becoming. I discuss Plato's epistemology, psychology, theology and other topics only when they are relevant to the metaphysical doctrines just mentioned. My approach is therefore selective. It is selective also in that I deal primarily with only six dialogues: the Euthyphro, Phaedo, Republic, Parmenides (part I), Timaeus and Sophist. I discuss other dialogues only when their contents illuminate or augment the metaphysics of these six." (Introduction, p. 1)

(...)

"The Theory of Forms receives its first real treatment in the Euthyphro, an early dialogue. The theory is developed and the Being-Becoming distinction introduced in the Phaedo and Republic, dialogues of Plato's middle period. In the first part of the Parmenides, these doctrines are subjected to criticism. This criticism does not constitute a refutation of either doctrine, but it does raise serious questions about both, questions to which the middle dialogues do not contain definitive answers. In the post-Parmenides dialogues, and in particular, in the Timaeus and Sophist, Plato does deal with the questions raised in the Parmenides. Without altering either the Theory of Forms or the doctrine of Being and Becoming in their essential natures, he augments and clarifies his metaphysics in such a way that the objections of the Parmenides are met. Thus, the dialogues I shall deal with exhibit a genuine development in Plato's metaphysics, a movement from an initial statement of his views through a critique of them to a refined final position." (pp. 1-2)
Priou, Alex. 2018. Becoming Socrates: Political Philosophy in Plato’s Parmenides. Rochester (N. Y.): University of Rochester Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Chapter 1: The Problem of the Parmenides 1; Chapter 2: Parmenides on Socrates’ “Platonism”: Parmenides 126a1–137c4 17; Chapter 3: Parmenides on Eleatic Monism: Parmenides 137c4–166c5 74; Chapter 4: The Problem of Socrates 193; Notes 207; Bibliography 241; Index 245-246.

"Famously, however, Parmenides submits Socrates’ εἴδη to thorough critique.

Though Parmenides appears to maintain that his critique is not fatal, how it is to be overcome remains unclear, for it requires making sense of how the dialogue’s two parts fit together. As discussed, this is the foremost interpretive task facing the reader, but with whose accomplishment comes Plato’s meditation on the necessary centrality of political philosophy. The following interpretation of the Parmenides aims to understand how this “greatest impasse” relates both to the arguments that precede it, including the famous “third man” argument, and to the complex dialectical training that subsequently ensues. The specific thesis is that because this generally disregarded passage is explicitly situated as the culmination of Parmenides’ critique of the εἴδη and the problem that the subsequent, dialectical training is meant to address, it is the key to understanding how the two divergent parts of the Parmenides fit together, and thus to understanding the dialogue as a whole. More generally, however, our concern will be the same as that of Socrates and Parmenides: the question of the possibility and character of philosophy.

(...)

More fundamentally, however, the present study seeks to show that Plato presents metaphysics as the highest aspiration of politics, an aspiration that puts a burden on λόγος and being that neither can fulfill. In this way, Plato shows political philosophy to be first philosophy, as the excavation of reality out of the cave of common opinion." (p. 16)
Protopopova, Irina. 2022. "The Parmenides and the Typology of eide (according to Plato’s Hippias Major, Protagoras, Republic, and Sophist)." In Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 229–237. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The paper deals with the typology of eide in Plato considered through the prism of the problems posed in the Parmenides. Parmenides asks Socrates how do things participate in eide, as in something divisible or otherwise? Already in the Hippias Major, Plato differentiates between qualitative, or indivisible, eide (beauty, gold, the identical), which can only be divided into homogeneous parts, and assembling ones, in which the parts are not homogeneous in relation to each other and to the whole (numbers, the pleasure of hearing and seeing).

Eide of the second type look divisible, but if we try to divide them, we will completely destroy them as a ‘whole’; they may be called quasi-divisible, and partial participation in them is impossible. In the Protagoras, the question is raised, how do virtues relate to each other, as gold or as parts of the face? The first is impossible because wisdom, courage, etc. are different from each other, and the second too, because the owner of one virtue may not have another, and then the ‘face’ (virtue) would be imperfect, which is unacceptable. In the Republic, both soul and polis consist of three different principles dissimilar to each other but constituting a ‘whole’ with a new quality; and the perfect soul and polis have all the four main virtues. We see here a certain mixture of quasi-divisible eide (from the point of view of three parts) and assembling eide defined by the idea of perfection as a virtue. In the Sophist, the interaction of the five summa genera is presented: ‘Movement-Rest-Identical-Other-Being’ interact as inseparable and undivided eide by participating in each other through the Other.

I call this pentad an ‘intelligible atom’, in which the activity of nous is demonstrated and thus the unity of eidos as both divisible and indivisibly perfect is achieved."
Radde-Gallwitz, Andrew. 2010. "Pseudo-Dionysius, the Parmenides, and the Problem of Contradiction." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 243–254. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"For some time now, scholars have acknowledged the influence upon Denys of Neoplatonism generally, and of the Neoplatonist commentaries on the Parmenides in particular.(4) Eugenio Corsini’s 1962 work on Denys and the Parmenides commentaries has garnered scholarly consensus. In this paper, I want to take up the issue of the influence of this commentary tradition upon Denys and frame some questions about Denys’s use of the Parmenides commentary tradition and the impact this has on his view of the LNC [Law of Non-Contradiction] and LEM [Law of the Excluded Middle]." (p. 244)

(4) The influence of Proclus upon Denys was established in 1895 by Stiglmayr and Stiglmayr 1895, 253–73, 721–48; Koch 1895, 438–54. The first to note the influence of the Parmenides upon Denys (so far as I know) was Ivanka 1964, 234–35. The classic statement of the influence of the Neoplatonic commentaries on the Parmenides upon Denys is Corsini 1962.

See also Lilla 1994, 117–52.

References

Corsini, E. 1962. Il Trattato De Divinis nominibus dello Pseudo-Doinigi e i Commenti Neoplatonici al Parmenide. Università di Torino Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia XII,4. Torino: Giappichelli.

Ivanka, E. 1964. Plato Christianus: Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonisms durch die Väter. Einsieldeln: Johannes Verlag.

Lilla, S. R. C. 1997. Pseudo-Denys L’ Aréopagite, Porphyre et Damascius. Pages 117–52 in Denys L’ Aréopagite et sa Postérité en Orient et en Occident. Edited by Y. de Andia. Actes du Colloque International, Paris, 21–24 septembre 1994. Paris: Études augustiniennes.

Stiglmayr, J. 1895. Der Neuplatoniker Proclus als Vorlage des sog. Dionysius Areopagita in der Lehre vom Übel. Historisches Jahrbuch 16, 253–73, 721–48.
Rancadore, Maria Antonia. 2024. "Gilbert Ryle and Plato’s theory of forms." Filosofia no. 69:285–304.

Abstract: "This essay is dedicated to the interpretation that Gilbert Ryle gave to Plato’s theory of forms. Despite having distinguished himself as an exponent of Analytic Philosophy and Ordinary Language Philosophy in the context of the University of Oxford, Ryle qualified as a philologist by reading the vast production of Plato’s dialogues. Among Ryle’s most significant essays are those referring to the dialogues of Plato’s maturity (Theaetetus, Sophist, Parmenides), where the ancient Athenian philosopher expounded his conception of the art of dialectics.

Then Ryle highlighted the relationship between the theory of forms and the theory of being, on the basis of an original rereading of the concept of idea, i.e. of form, separated from the traditional ontologism attributed to both Parmenides and Plato."
Rangos, Spyridon. 2014. "Plato on the Nature of the Sudden Moment, and the Asymmetry of the Second Part of the Parmenides." Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review no. 53:538–574.

Abstract: "In this paper, Plato’s notion of the sudden moment is fully explored. In the Parmenides, the “now” (nun) and the “sudden” (exaiphnês), it is argued, refer to one and the same entity from the distinct perspectives of timeless Being and temporal Becoming, respectively. This interpretation tallies well with, and enriches, the Platonic views on time and eternity found in the Timaeus. Finally, the paper highlights the pivotal role of the third deduction, where the sudden moment appears, for an understanding of the entire dialectical exercise of the Parmenides."
Rasimus, Tuomas. 2010. "Porphyry and the Gnostics: Reassessing Pierre Hadot’s Thesis in Light of the Second- and Third-Century Sethian Treatises." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 81–110. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"What does this new Sethian evidence mean for Hadot’s thesis, and for our understanding of the history of Neoplatonism? I will argue in this article that Hadot’s thesis is in itself inconclusive—even problematic—and that Sethian Gnostics were probably the innovators of most of the “Porphyrian” concepts that we find in Hadot’s fragments. This seems all the more likely as many of these “Porphyrian” features are already present—some implicitly, others explicitly—in a pre-Plotinian Sethian text, the Apocryphon of John. It will be argued that advocates of Sethian Gnosticism brought with them innovative ideas, including the famous being–life–mind triad, to Plotinus’s seminars; and that a fruitful exchange of ideas between the Gnostics, and Plotinus and his students, took place before (and perhaps even after) the somewhat exaggerated Gnostic controversy in the 260s." (p. 282, a note omitted)
Reagan, James T. 1964. "The Metaphysical Function of the Parmenides." The Modern Schoolman no. 41:262–272.
Reynard, Jean. 2010. "Plato’s Parmenides among the Cappadocian Fathers: The Problem of a Possible Influence or the Meaning of a Lack?" In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 217–235. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"Far from what one can see among contemporary Neoplatonic philosophers, it seems a priori difficult to find a direct influence of Plato’s Parmenides in the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers. First, my paper will focus particularly on Gregory of Nyssa, who is rightly considered the most profoundly influenced by Plato and Neo-platonic interpretations. There is no explicit quotation of the dialogue in his works, but some themes exhibit a possible link with certain of its passages: for example, the spiritual ubiquity of God, participation as resemblance, or the impossibility of giving a name or definition of the first principle. But, whether the influence of this dialogue is direct or indirect seems difficult to say.

Only a precise inquiry will allow one to confirm actual borrowings from the dialogue hat are not merely general notions inherited from the Platonic tradition, and to indicate the possible influence of Neoplatonic references to the dialogue on Gregory." (p. 217)
Rickless, Samuel C. 1998. "How Parmenides Saved the Theory of Forms." The Philosophical Review no. 107:501–554.

"Here is a brief sketch of the interpretation I propose to defend. In the dialogues of his Middle Period (principally, the Phaedo and the Republic), Plato had put forward a theory of Forms (call it "MPTF", for "Middle Period Theory of Forms") and had used it to argue for various philosophically significant conclusions (including the thesis that the soul is immortal). In Part I of the Parmenides, Socrates appeals to MPTF in order to rebut a troubling argument of Zeno's to the paradoxical conclusion that things are not many. Parmenides then proposes a series of arguments designed to prove that every plausible version of MPTF is inconsistent. (A version of a theory is obtained by adding one or more theses to the axioms of the theory.) Taking these arguments to be sound, Socrates recognizes that at least one (perhaps all) of the axioms of MPTF must be rejected. But it is not yet clear to him which (or how many) of them must go. In Part II, Parmenides embarks on a series of deductions in order to prove that a particular axiom of MPTF (call it "X") is false. Having followed Parmenides' arguments in Part II, Socrates should be able to see that X should be rejected, that the result of removing X from MPTF is a leaner and meaner theory of Forms, and that this leaner and meaner theory can meet at least four of the five main challenges to MPTF raised by Parmenides in Part I. The overall message of the Parmenides, then, is that, despite having suffered bruises in the first part of the dialogue, the Forms are still very much alive." (pp. 502-503)
———. 2007. Plato's Forms in Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The project of writing this book began with the realization that my article [*[ had provided a cursory, and in the end inaccurate, interpretation of the second half of the Parmenides. The article had also failed to draw Plato’s various statements about the forms into a coherent theory, with independent axioms and with theorems following deductively from the result of combining these axioms with auxiliary assumptions. The pages that follow are the result of my attempt to atone for these deficiencies by providing a complete logical reconstruction of all the arguments of the dialogue. As I argue below, such a reconstruction provides the key needed to solve the enduring mystery of the Parmenides." (Preface, p IX)

[*] How Parmenides Saved the Theory of Forms (1998).
Rist, John M. 1962. "The Parmenides Again." Phoenix no. 16:1–14.

About Runciman, Plato's Parmenides (1959).

"There is one further question that should be mentioned. Why did Plato write the Parmenides in such an obscure form that it has always been an enigma to its readers? The answer to this cannot be a matter of proof, but there are certain indications that may help towards a solution.

The two dialogues nearest in time to the Parmenides are the Theaetetus and Sophist. In the former of these Plato refuses to discuss the theories of the Eleatics for fear of misinterpreting them (183DE); in the latter he introduces the Eleatic Stranger criticizing some of the most important tenets of his "father" Parmenides (e.g. 237A). It is clear that at this stage of his life Plato first faced up to the theories of the Eleatics theories which, though he recognized their worth, in many ways clashed with his own. Here in the Parmenides he is presenting the full force of this rival doctrine in the persons and methods of its most distinguished representatives. There is a correlation of theme and form in the second part of the Parmenides. The form is that of Eleatic logic; the theme is, in part, the inadequacy of Eleatic conclusions. And together with a

demonstration of this inadequacy Plato is able to include a revision of his own theory, and in particular of that part of it which is most relevant to a consideration of Parmenides, namely the role of absolute Unity." (p. 14, a note omitted)
———. 1962. "The Neoplatonic One and Plato's Parmenides." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association no. 93:389–401.

"As Dodds has remarked, Moderatus must still have had considerable importance in the third century.(32) He was read in the schools of both Plotinus and Origen.(3?3 If we have interpreted the matter aright, his great importance in the history of ancient philosophy rests on his interpretation of the Parmenides on Pythagorean lines. This interpretation was read and accepted by Plotinus, who, in doing so, took a decisive step for the future of Platonism by dethroning the Aristotelian νοῦς from the rank of First Cause. Though other writers, such as Albinus, may have derived theories of "negative theology" from the Parmenides either directly or indirectly, only Moderatus before Plotinus explained the second part in a way which was to become, through the metaphysical genius of Plotinus, fundamental for Neo-platonic thought."(p. 401)

(32) Dodds, ["The Parmenides of Plato and the Origins of the Neoplatonic One", Classical Quarterly 22 (1928) 129-42] 139, note 3.

(33) Cf. Porphyry, Vita Plot. 20 and Euseb., HE 6.19.8
———. 1970. "Parmenides and Plato's Parmenides." The Classical Quarterly no. 20:221–229.

"In two of his dialogues especially, the Sophist and the Parmenides, Plato concerns himself at length with problems presented by the Eleatics. Despite difficulties in the interpretation of individual passages, the Sophist has in general proved the less difficult to understand, and since some of the problems at issue in the two works indicate the same or similar preoccupations in Plato's mind, it is worth considering how far an interpretation of the 'easier' dialogue can be used to forward an interpretation of the more difficult. First, therefore, we must identify problems common to the two works; then we must see whether we can understand what Plato understood Parmenides to have done—this may help towards an understanding of what he did in fact do; finally we can apply our findings to the Parmenides itself, particularly to the problem of the unity of the dialogue, in the hope that Plato's intentions may become clearer." (p. 221)
Robichaud, Denis J.-J. 2019. "Tearing Plato to Pieces: Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino on the History of Platonism." Renaissance and Reformation = Renaissance et Réforme no. 42:103–133.

Abstract: "This article considers Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola’s understanding of the history of Platonism in his Examen vanitatis. It analyzes his sources and methods for understanding the history of philosophy—genealogical source criticism, historiographical analysis, and comparative history—and argues that his approach is shaped by anti-Platonic Christian apologetics. It documents how Gianfrancesco Pico closely studies Marsilio Ficino’s and his uncle Giovanni Pico’s understandings of Platonism and its history, and how his contextualization of their work within the broader history of Platonism is part of a larger endeavour to turn the page and even close the book on this chapter of the Quattrocento. Although neither Ficino nor Gianfrancesco finds universal agreement among ancient Platonists, Ficino explains their history as one of inquiry and interpretation, in which Platonism and Christianity are inexorably united, whereas Gianfrancesco characterizes it as a history of lies and disagreements that threaten Christianity. In trying to protect sacred history, Gianfrancesco Pico helped develop the tools that would eventually critique it."
Robinson, Richard. 1942. "Plato' Parmenides I." Classical Philology no. 37:51–76.

"This study discusses and recommends the following propositions about Plato's Parmenides: (1) The arguments in the first part are directed against the existence of Forms, not of sensibles. (2) The theory of Forms discussed in the first part is that of Plato's own middle dialogues. (3) Plato regarded these arguments as neither fatal nor negligible, but serious difficulties requiring serious attention. (4) Plato never answered these arguments in his dialogues. (5) The second part of the Parmenides contains no statement of doctrine, either directly or indirectly. (6) The second part of this dialogue contains no statement of method, either directly or indirectly. (7) Both parts of the dialogue are intended to provide Plato's pupils with practice in dialectic and in the detection of errors in reasoning. (8) Professor Cornford's recent interpretation of the dialogue combines this view with another view; but the two are really incompatible." (p. 51)
———. 1942. "Plato' Parmenides II." Classical Philology no. 37:159–186.

"The second part of the Parmenides, then, is not a statement of doctrine, either directly or indirectly. Is it a direct or indirect statement of method? There is one extremely good reason for holding it to be a direct statement of method, a straightforward example of a method that Plato recommends us to practice, and this is that Plato makes Parmenides deliberately and seriously introduce it as such. The transitional passage says, with every appearance of earnestness, that Socrates' difficulties about the Forms are due to his want of training. Parmenides prescribes for him a training which he defines as Zeno's procedure with certain modifications. He then gives the illustration." (p. 159)
———. 1953. Plato's Earlier Dialectic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Second edition (first edition 1941).

See the chapter XIII: Hypothesis in the Parmenides pp. 223-280, previously published in Classical Philology, 37, 1942, pp. 51-76.
Rochol, Hans. 1971. "The Dialogue “Parmenides”: An Insoluble Enigma in Platonism?" International Philosophical Quarterly no. 11:496–520.
Rodriguez, Evan. 2019. "More than a Reductio: Plato's Method in the Parmenides and Lysis." Études Platoniciennes no. 15:1–19.

Abstract: "Plato’s Parmenides and Lysis have a surprising amount in common from a methodological standpoint. Both systematically employ a method that I call ‘exploring both sides’, a philosophical method for encouraging further inquiry and comprehensively understanding the truth. Both have also been held in suspicion by interpreters for containing what looks uncomfortably similar to sophistic methodology. I argue that the methodological connections across these and other dialogues relieve those suspicions and push back against a standard developmentalist story about Plato’s method. This allows for a better understanding of why exploring both sides is explicitly recommended in the Parmenides and its role within Plato’s broader methodological repertoire."
———. 2022. "A Long Lost Relative in the Parmenides? Plato’s Family of Hypothetical Methods." Apeiron no. 55:141–166.

Abstract: "The Parmenides has been unduly overlooked in discussions of hypothesis in Plato. It contains a unique method for testing first principles, a method I call ‘exploring both sides’. The dialogue recommends exploring the consequences of both a hypothesis and its contradictory and thematizes this structure throughout. I challenge the view of Plato’s so-called ‘method of hypothesis’ as an isolated stage in Plato’s development; instead, the evidence of the Parmenides suggests a family of distinct hypothetical methods, each with its own peculiar aim. Exploring both sides is unique both in its structure and in its aim of testing candidate principles."
Roecklein, Robert J. 2011. Plato versus Parmenides: the Debate over Coming-into-Being in Greek Philosophy. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; 1. Parmenides' Argument 13; 2. Parmenides and the Milesian Philosophies: "Nothing Comes from Nothing" --- Physics or Logic? 37; 3. Parmenides' Influence of Empedocles and Anaxagoras 57; 4. Plato's Socrates and His Theory of Causation 83; 5. The Parmenides: Plato's Proof of Coming to Be 121; 6. The Theaetetus: Plato's Proof That the Objects of Knowledge Are Indivisible 159; Bibliography 187; Index 195-199.

"At the core of this investigation into Plato and Parmenides, one may observe that there is not only a massive and irreducible tension between these two philosophical models: it is also clear that this distinction is one heavily frEighthed with political implications. Parmenides, as indicated previously, supplies us with a model of scientific knowledge which does not rest upon evidence and fact which is available to the ordinary speakers, and which is not contained in the ordinary opinions. By contrast, Plato’s Socrates, and his theory of cause, recognize an irrefutable and diamond-hard intelligence operative in the substance of the ordinary opinions. In the case of the science that Plato’s Socrates presents and develops, expert knowledge is wholly dependent upon the knowledge of fact which is held, in Plato’s doctrine, to belong to ordinary opinions, and to in fact be constitutive of what are now commonly referred to as natural languages." (p. 11)
Rossvær, Viggo. 1983. The Laborious Game: A Study of Plato's Parmenides. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

"How can irony tell us about the meaning of the doctrine of ideas?

In Parmenides, where Plato at least pretends to say something definite about the ideas, Socrates is made to leave the scene in the second part when the real discussion starts. Socrates’ practice seems too poor to handle the intricacies of the dialectical tours-de-force in the second part of this dialogue. The hair-raising effects of the Socratic paradoxes may easily seem out of place if one wishes to understand the notion of idea.

Still, the art and play of Socrates may teach us something important about the second part of the Parmenides. Maybe the greatest obstacle to an understanding is our inability to notice what is shown on the surface, so to speak. Instead, we press forward in order to reformulate what we think lies beyond the surface.

The investigation into the nature of the One in the Parmenides can be seen as an attempt to register what happens when we try to say what the nature of the One is. When we do this, we will experience an intellectual shock: if we state, in Plato’s words, that the One is, we are forced to the conclusion that it isn’t. And if we state that it is not, we are forced to conclude that it is.

But this is not all. If we take the above argument as presenting us with an internal inconsistency which may force us to give up the doctrine of ideas, Plato’s irony will anticipate the move and urge us to write it down as a new hypothesis. He will then show that the argument to the effect that the doctrine of ideas must be given up cannot itself be formulated without implying the opposite conclusion.

But it would be pointless to try and state the general philosophy of the Parmenides. There is no general theory in that dialogue that can be abstracted from the particular arguments. What by way of introduction is suggested about the general theory can be properly demonstrated." (pp. 9-10)
Rousakis, Evangelos. 2024. "Parmenides and the horse of Ibycus. The hidden meaning of the personification and its role in the dialogue of the Parmenides." ΣΧΟΛΗ. Philosophical Antiquity and the Classical Tradition no. 18:44–55.

Abstract: "In this essay, the function of the personification of Parmenides himself with the horse of Ibycus in Plato’s Parmenides will be elaborated. The analytical process of this reference by Parmenides will focus to demonstrate that the personification is an allegorical element of Plato whose role in the dialogue is crucial for the understanding of the author's objective about the second more extended part of the Parmenides."
Runciman, Walter Garrison. 1959. "Plato's Parmenides." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology no. 64:89–120.

"My purpose in adding to the already considerable literature on the Parmenides is as follows: I think it can now be satisfactorily established that the dialogue contains no fundamental modification of the theory of forms, but that it nevertheless represents serious expression of Plato's own comments on the theory. Further, I wish to suggest that the second part contains no explicit exposition of doctrinal or metaphysical teaching, but that its moral is to be deduced from the fact that its contradictions are possible at all; that this moral is both more than the need for dialectical gymnastics and less than the abandonment of the theory of forms; that it can be drawn from the consideration of the second part in its relation to the first; and that the dialogue can accordingly be seen as a coherent and serious whole." (p. 89, a note omitted)
Runia, David T. 2010. "Early Alexandrian Theology and Plato’s Parmenides." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 175–187. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"When I was first asked to speak about Philo’s interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides, I was rather hesitant. My initial response was to say that to my knowledge Philo never makes any reference to this particular Platonic dialogue and that it was hard to talk at any length about nothing. It must of course be agreed that not everyone finds this difficult in equal measure. Philosophers as a rule do not find it at all hard to speak about nothing. In fact some of them appear to revel in it.

Theologians have a little more difficulty in doing this, and are not amused when people say that they do little else. Historians find it much harder, while philologists find it flatly impossible. Both of them, it would seem, need a subject on which to focus their musings. But perhaps on reflection it is possible to say something on the subject, if it is taken in a broader sense than just concentrating on direct use of the original Platonic text. This will be my approach in the remarks that follow." (p. 175, a note omitted)
Ryle, Gilbert. 1939. "Plato's Parmenides." Mind no. 48:129–151.

Second part: Mind, 48, PP. 302-325.

Reprinted in: R. E. Allen, Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965 pp. 97-147; G. Ryle, Collected Papers. Volume I. Critical Essays, London: Hutchinson 1971 (reprint: New York, Routledge, 2009), Essay I pp. 1-44.

"The following observations are arguments in favour of a certain interpretation of Plato’s dialogue, the Parmenides. According to this interpretation the dialogue is philosophically serious, in the sense that its author thought that its arguments were valid and that its problem was one of philosophical importance. Further, it will be maintained that he was right on the latter point and predominantly right on the former point. The problem is important and most of the arguments are valid.

It will be suggested that the obvious obscurity of the dialogue is due to a very natural cause, namely that Plato could not with the logical apparatus accessible to him propound in set terms what is the general conclusion or even the main drift of the dialogue. For the construction of the required logical apparatus could not be taken in hand until after the inevitability of the sorts of antinomies which the dialogue exhibits had been realised." (p. 1 of the reprint)
Sabrier, Pauline. 2019. "Parts, Forms, and Participation in the Parmenides and Sophist: A Comparison." Études platoniciennes no. 15:1–13.

Abstract: "This paper addresses the vexed question of the outcome of the second horn of the dilemma of participation in Plato’s Parmenides bringing in Sophist 257c7-d5 where the Eleatic Stranger accepts what he seems to reject in the Parmenides, namely that a Form can have parts and nevertheless remain one. Comparing Plato’s treatment of parts of Forms in both passages, and in particular the relation among Being, Change and Rest at Sophist 250a8-c8, I argue that unlike in the Parmenides, in the Sophist, parts and wholes are seen as offering a structure that can explain how things that may, at first, appear unrelated nevertheless belong together."
Sanday, Eric . 2009. "Eleatic Metaphysics in Plato's Parmenides: Zeno's Puzzle of Plurality." The Journal of Speculative Philosophy no. 3:208–226.

"If you were to assert that there are many beings in the world—many houses, trees, people, objects, and so on—there is an obvious sense in which this would be true. What is harder to see, however, is the sense in which this is false. The discrete intelligibility and integrity of individual things obscure the deeper sense in which being and intelligibility are prior to individuals, which is a basic insight motivating Socrates’ so-called theory of forms. In this article I argue that Zeno’s puzzle of plurality in the Parmenides is a device for turning attention away from individual beings toward their being and intelligibility and that this metaphysical turn of Zeno’s radicalizes a Socratic insight into the “mixing” of particulars.

The first section of this article shows that the historical Zeno was involved in a project of critiquing the incoherent but unavoidable ways we have of describing our world. It is important to see this project of Zeno’s as profoundly Eleatic in character and consistent with the “study of the one” outlined by Socrates in book 7 of the Republic. In the second part of the article this parallel between Zeno’s and Socrates’ “study of the one” is used to interpret the implications of Zeno’s puzzle of plurality in the Parmenides. I conclude by proposing a metaphysics significantly different from the one normally attributed to Plato." (p. 209)
Sanday, Eric. 2015. A Study of Dialectic in Plato's Parmenides. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

"The basic aim of this book is intended to be bold: to show that Plato’s “theory of forms” is true and relatively intuitive once we have done the hard work of clearing away misconceptions about the nature of “is.” There is perhaps no single idea in the history of philosophy that has been subject to such a wide range of conflicting interpretations, and in some notable cases it has been considered simply implausible. I will argue that the chief obstacle standing in the way of the theory of forms is the distorting effect that our everyday privileging of individual things has on understanding. Furthermore, I will claim that this privileging of what we can own, produce, and exchange, and through which we gain mastery of our surroundings, is understood in Platonic philosophy and the Parmenides in particular to be a significant obstacle to philosophical education. The chief philosophical work in the dialogue, in my view then, is to destabilize the false privileging of individual things that stands at the core of our everyday attitude. Once we do this, some version of the “theory of forms” will become relatively intuitive and easily understood." (p. 4)
———. 2018. "Being In Late Plato." In A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, edited by Kirkland, Sean D. and Sanday, Eric, 147–159. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

"This chapter examines the shift in Plato’s account of the eidē or ‘forms’ from the Republic to the Parmenides. Forms in the Republic are characterized in terms of perfection, purity, and changelessness, with the form being an ultimate explanatory principle for being-X. Participants, while being-X, are also capable of not-being-X, either through qualitative change and coming-to-be, or through external changes in perspective or opinion, by which they “appear [φανήσεται]” not-X (R. V. 479a7). The form is treated as prior to participant and as prior to mixture with what would deny what it is. It is intrinsically changeless and not subject to changes in appearance.

In the Parmenides, the account of form shifts to accommodate the types of admixture demanded for combination with and division from other forms.

In the Fifth Hypothesis, forms are subject to determinate “bonds of being and not-being,” which permits the form to present itself as an object of discursive knowing, being-X, - Y, and - Z, and not-being not- X, not- Y, and not- Z. Forms are still treated as pure and perfect, but now with the power of gathering together intelligible bonds of being and not- being. Thus, in the Parmenides, forms are the gathering source and the gathered terms subject to the admixture; they are that by which true speech is explained. In this chapter, I argue that the “turning of the soul from becoming to truth and being” (R. VII.525c) announced in the Republic is partially fulfilled through the account of veridical speech in the Parmenides." (p. 147)
———. 2022. "The Subject and Number of Hypotheses in Plato’s Parmenides." In Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 309–316. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "I address two seemingly unrelated topics: the first is the subject and formulation of the hypotheses and the second is the number of hypotheses. On the topic of the subject of the hypotheses, my position is that we are initially given an indefinite monad, a “one”, which is in no case “the one”, “the one itself”, or the form of unity. We are meant to read the hypotheses with the question in mind, “what one is this?” If we do so, we are confronted with strikingly different answers, which, when taken together, point us toward key insights into the nature of intelligibility. On the topic of the number of hypotheses: we are led to expect four, but we are given Eighth. My position is that we are meant to disarm apparent contradictions between paired hypotheses, especially H1-H2 but also H3-4, 5-6, and 7-8, because doing so will help us further determine the different types of monad Parmenides has in view. In the end, two primary types of monad emerge from the process of disambiguation, namely, form and sensible particular, and we, having differentiated these types of “one”, will have gathered resources for understanding how sensible particulars are grounded in forms."
Santoro, Alessio. 2022. "Eleatic training. The aim and uses of dialectic in Plato’s Parmenides and Aristotle’s Topics." In Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 201–208. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "This paper analyses the “transitional” section of Plato’s Parmenides by focusing on the explicit aim and uses of Parmenides’ exercise and by comparing them with Aristotle’s description of the aim and uses of dialectic in the Topics. In short, it suggests that, in the Parmenides, Plato displays not merely a dialectical exercise, but more specifically a method of philosophical inquiry. It begins by analysing how Plato introduces Parmenides’ exercise (gymnasia) at 135c-136e. It then clarifies the relationship between this exercise and the method used by the character Zeno of Elea in the first part of the work. Finally, it turns to the description of dialectic in Aristotle’s Topics 1.2 and 8.14, which bears striking similarities with Parmenides 135c-136e. Based on this line of argument, on the one hand, it concludes that Aristotle’s dialectic can be regarded as a refinement of the Zenonian method described in the Parmenides; on the other, it suggests that the second part of the dialogue showcases an example of good dialectic at the service of philosophical investigation."
Sanzotta, Valerio. 2014. "Some unpublished notes by Marsilio Ficino on Plato’s Parmenides in MS Laur. 89 sup. 71." Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes no. 77:211–224.

"It is well established that Marsilio Ficino's account of Plato's Parmenides depends on the onto-theological reading of it endorsed by Proclus and other Neoplatonists. Already in antiquity, this approach stood opposed to that of Albinus and Alcinous, who both held that the Parmenides should be interpreted as a logical treatise. It was Proclus's commentary on the dialogue which Ficino had on his desk, as his main source, while working on his own full-scale commentary, written between 1492 and 1494 and published in 1496. The work was the fruit of Ficino's reflections on the Parmenides over thirty years, developing from his early reading of Proclus. References to the theological interpretation of the Parmenides can already be found in his autograph notes on Proclus's Platonic Theology in Florence, Biblioteca Riccardiana MS 70 (folios 1^{r -} 4^v), copied by Matthaeus Camariota; this manuscript contains Proclus's Platonic Theology, Elements of Theology and Elements of Physics, as well as Ocellus Lucanus's On the Nature of the Universe, which Ficino

studied and probably translated before 1463." (p. 211, notes omitted)
Sattler, Barbara M. 2019. "Time and Space in Plato’s Parmenides." Études platoniciennes no. 15:1–33.

Abstract: "In this paper I investigate central temporal and spatial notions in the second part of Plato’s Parmenides and argue that also these notions, and not only the metaphysical ones usually discussed in the literature, can be understood as a response to positions and problems put on the table by Parmenides and Zeno. Of the spatial notions examined in the dialogue, I look at the problems raised for possessing location and shape, while with respect to temporal notions, I focus on the discussion of ‘being in time’ and exaiphnês (the latter notion will be shown to be also an important influence for Aristotle’s Physics).

In displaying a paradoxical character and taking up crucial notions from Parmenides, the second part of the Parmenides seems to display some resemblance to Zeno’s paradoxes. I will show, however, that in contrast to Zeno, the second part of Plato’s Parmenides also demonstrates Parmenides’ One to be problematic on its own terms. Furthermore, the dialogue presents not only important problems that these spatial and temporal notions seem to lead us into, but also establishes some positive features necessary to think of time and space.

In this way, Plato’s Parmenides can be seen as contributing to the development of temporal and spatial conceptualisations in ancient Greek thought."
Sayre, Kenneth M. 1978. "Plato's Parmenides: Why the Eighth Hypotheses Are Not Contradictory." Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 23:133–150.

"One purpose of this paper is to argue (1) that the order of pairing assumed by the commentators in fact is erroneous, and can be seen to be erroneous on textual grounds. Another purpose is to show (2) that the Eighth hypotheses properly paired are not contradictory.

It is not among the purposes of this paper to argue for or against any of the standard interpretations of the Eighth hypotheses. If I am correct in claiming that all these interpretations rest upon a mistaken conception of how the hypotheses are related, it is reasonable to presume that each interpretation itself is to some extent mistaken. To test this presumption in each individual case, however, would be far too ambitious for the present project. My own view is that the second part of the Parmenides has as one of its primary aims the development of a number ontology, similar in scope but not in detail to the Pythagorean system.(6) But this also is more than can be argued in a single article." (pp. 133-134)

(6) Evidence for this interpretation includes (i) the language and content of Parmenides 140B-E and 149D-151B, which reflect Eudoxus's method of defining ratios, allowing the construction of both rational and irrational numbers on the basis of measure (great and small) and (ii) the progression of the several theorems under the second hypothesis from the generation of numbers out of the unlimited multitude (143A-144A) to the derivative definition of things admitting shape (145A-B), motion (145E-146A), self-identity (146A-147C) and ultimately change in time (155E-157B). Interpreted in detail, these and associated passages may be construed as substantiating Aristotle's claim that Plato "agreed with the Pythagoreans in saying that the One is substance and not a predicate of something else; and in saying that the Numbers are the causes of the reality of other things he agreed with them; but positing a dyad and constructing the infinite out of great and small, instead of treating the infinite as one, is peculiar to him; and so is his view that the Numbers exist apart from sensible things. . ." This passage from Metaphysics 987B 23-8 (Random House edition), which generally has been understood to refer to an unwritten doctrine of Plato, instead describes succinctly what Plato appears to be trying to accomplish in his development of the consequences of the second hypothesis of the Parmenides.
———. 1983. Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

New edition with a new Introduction and the Essay “Excessa and deficiency at Statesman 283c-85c", Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing 2005.

"Be this as it may, I am convinced that Parmenides II was written after the Timaeus and close in time to the Philebus. My reasons for this conviction are (i) that Parmenides II contains a massive and formally conclusive refutation of the Eleatic conception of Being which stood behind the Timaeus, and (ii) that it provides a number of important links in the conceptual development leading to the ontology of the Philebus. According to the viewpoint of the present study, in brief, the Parmenides as a whole is a transitional link between the old theory of the middle period, inadequately repaired in the intermediate dialogues,

and the radically new theory of the Philebus—Plato’s final discussion of ontological topics. The primary task of Chapter 1 is to establish the Parmenides in this transitional role." (p. 16)

(...)

"The present section develops my reasons for thinking that Parmenides’ arguments against the early theory represented by Socrates were not intended by Plato to be conclusive at all, but that they were intended to serve a rhetorical function instead.

To this end, I argue that the main purpose of Parmenides I is to highlight those aspects of the theory of Forms in the middle dialogues which Plato thinks must be reexamined if an adequate theory is to be forthcoming. The following section shows how Parmenides II explores the conditions of the required alterations, thereby establishing continuity between the two parts of the dialogue." (p. 20)
———. 1992. "A maieutic view of five late dialogues." In Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues, edited by Klagge, James C. and Smith, Nicholas D., 221–243. New York: Oxford University Press.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Supplementary volume.

"There are five dialogues of Plato's late period, each consisting of a conversation with a master philosopher, in which the conversation is organized by methodological principles explicitly proposed by the philosopher himself. In the case of the Theaetetus, the method was stated by Socrates in earlier dialogues, notably the Phaedo and book 6 of the Republic. In each of the remaining four, however, the method is expounded and applied within the same conversation-by the Stranger from Elea in the Sophist and the Statesman, by Parmenides himself in his namesake dialogue, and by a renovated Socrates in the late Philebus. I shall refer to these five as the methodological dialogues." (p. 221)

(...)

"I have made two claims concerning the methodological dialogues.

The first is that the conversational format of these dialogues is intended to serve the maieutic function described by Socrates in the Theaetetus, and characterized in the Seventh Letter as the only path to the flame-like revelation of philosophic knowledge. The second is that the respective methods of these conversations provide the structure by which they are enabled to lead the reader to that state of fulfilment.

The first claim is supported by the texts involved, the second by the experience of the attentive reader. Neither claim by itself, perhaps, is particularly adventuresome. I have suggested further, however, that together these claims answer the question posed at the beginning of this discussion: namely, how the conversational format of these five late dialogues relates to the methods they severally illustrate. The answer, in summary, is that the method in each case provides the discipline by which the reader is enabled to follow the path of the conversation, to the state of wisdom that can be found at its end." (p. 243)
———. 1996. Parmenides' Lesson: Translation and Explication of Plato's Parmenides. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

"It is time now to explain, by way of anticipation, how the present approach differs from its many predecessors. Despite their many differences, all previous interpretations of Parmenides II of which I am aware share the assumption that the Eighth hypotheses are properly paired for interpretive purposes according to the order of their respective appearances. Thus we find hypothesis 1 paired with 2, 3 with 4, etc., which is the source of the apparent contradictions that have exercised commentators across the centuries. But there is no clear warrant for this pairing in Plato’s text. What a careful reading of the relevant passages indicates, to the contrary, is an importantly different pairing schema associating hypotheses 1 and 6, 2 and 5, 3 and 7, and 4 and 8 in turn. While the textual basis of this alternative pairing-schema is examined in detail below, its vindication lies primarily with its success in making sense of Plato’s arguments." (Introduction p. XVIII)

(...)

"Another positive result of this alternative pairing is that it indicates with greater clarity than before the historical contexts relevant to the interpretation of the various hypotheses. For reasons examined at length below, it now appears (i) that the arguments of hypotheses 1 and 6 are to be understood as pertaining to the conception of a singular Being associated with the historical Parmenides, (ii) that the arguments of hypotheses 2 and 5 pertain to the traditional Pythagorean program of deriving sensible properties from numerical quantities based on a mathematical unity, (ili) that those of hypotheses 3 and 7 relate to a particular feature of Plato’s version of this Pythagorean program (as reported by Aristotle) according to which such quantities are generated by Unity in combination with the Indefinite Dyad, and (iv) that those of hypotheses 4 and 8 in turn expose further problems associated with the alleged unity of the Forms according to the theory espoused by Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue. If these claims can be sustained, the effect is not only to vindicate Cornford’s judicious insight that Parmenides II takes sides in the ancient debate between the Eleatics and the Pythagoreans, but also to suggest that the surface-level arguments of Parmenides II resolve the aporia induced in the first part of the dialogue with more success than Miller estimates." (Introduction p. XIX)
———. 2005. "The method revisited: Parmenides 135e9-136c." In Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlícek, Ales and Karfík, Filip, 125–140. Prague: Oikoymenh.
Schofield, Malcolm. 1972. "The Dissection of Unity in Plato's Parmenides." Classical Philology no. 67:102–109.

"At the beginning of the second deduction in part two of the Parmenides, Parmenides argues that his premise, "one is," implies that the one consists of two elements, one (or unity) and being (142B5-D9). He goes on to offer a proof that the whole they constitute must contain infinitely many elements of this sort (142D9-143A3). From this he passes to a long proof that not only this complex whole, but also the element one or unity which forms a part of it is infinitely many, inasmuch as it is distributed and divided up among the infinitely many parts of being (143A4-144E7). Here is his argument, in barest outline: If unity is, unity, being, and difference (that in virtue of which unity and being are different things) must be (143A4-B8). But to speak of these things naturally involves one in treating them each severally as one, and together as two or three (143C1-D7); and if there are these numbers, there must be all numbers (143D7-144A5). So all the numbers exist. Now each number (or alternatively, each unit in every number) is part of being, and so one part of being. But the only way that unity can be distributed among all these parts of being is by being divided into parts itself, into infinitely many parts (144A5-E7)." (p. 102)

(...)

"So Plato is at 144A-E concerned with the specifically Eleatic tendency to treat reality as necessarily extended. But-and here I come to my final point-his interest in this Eleatic characteristic was no doubt developed partly because he saw it as a philosophically sophisticated elaboration of a very common mode of thinking among ordinary people.

(...)

I am accordingly inclined to suppose that Plato is absorbed here in something he took to be a very widespread form of mistake about numbers. It was a mistake on which notoriously the Pythagoreans built a whole philosophy, at least on Aristotle's account,(20) and it may be that Plato had them in mind when he wrote this passage." (pp. 108-109)

(20) See e.g., Metaph. 1, 985b32-986a3, 986a1S-21, 987b27-28; 13, 1083b8-13 (with e.g., W. Burkert, Weisheit und Wissenschaft [Nuremberg, 1962], pp. 28-37).
———. 1973. "A Neglected Regress Argument in the Parmenides." The Classical Quarterly no. 23:29–44.

"In recent years a great deal of scholarly and philosophical discussion has been devoted to the interpretation and evaluation of the regress arguments which Parmenides is made to deploy against the theory of Ideas in the first part of the dialogue which takes its name from him. By contrast, scarcely anything has been written about the infinite regress argument which Parmenides presents at the start of the second of the deductions which make up the dialogue's second part. Yet while it may contain less to reward the philosopher than the earlier regresses, it can hardly fail to perplex the scholar. In this paper I aim to expound and resolve some of the difficulties attaching to the passage in which the argument occurs (142 c 7-143 a 3); and in particular to examine the interpretation of the argument offered by Professor Owen, and provide an alternative account of my own." (p. 29)
———. 1973. "Eudoxus in the Parmenides." Museum Helveticum no. 30:1–19.

"If any of Plato's dialogues was written exclusively for the Academy, then the Parmenides must have a strong claim to be such a work. Parmenides' critique of the Ideas in the first part of the dialogue is very plausibly read as Plato's contribution to the debate in the Academy (known to us from Aristotle) about the viability of the theory(1). And he must have expected the huge and baffling dialectical exercise of the second part to appeal to readers in the Academy and to hardly anyone else: certainly that is where it made an impact, as Aristotle's exploitation of the dialogue proves(2). It seems reasonable, therefore, to scrutinize the Parmenides for signs that Plato is not merely discussing topics which interested or were to interest other members of the Academy, but actually responding to theories already presented by them. It has sometimes been felt that he makes some allusion to the views of the mathematician and astronomer Eudoxus of Cnidus, in particular. I want to reconsider the question. I shall begin by considering the opinions of two recent writers." (p. 1)

(1) Aristotle attacked the views of Plato and of Eudoxus in Περί Ιδεών (for the fragments of this work, see Aristotelis Fragmenta, ed. V. Rose [Leipzig 1886] nos. 185-189). Comprehensive criticisms of Plato's theory are put forward in Metaph. A 9, M 4 and 5; and, of course, Aristotle discusses it more or less incidentally in many other places. The evidence for the views of Speusippus and Xenocrates on Ideas is collected in P. Lang, De Speusippi Academici scriptis (Bonn 1911) nos. 42-43, and in R. Heinze, Xenokrates (Leipzig 1892) nos. 30-34. For the Parmenides as a contribution to a debate, see e.g. D. J. Allan, Aristotle and the Parmenides, in Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth Century, ed. I. During and G. E. L. Owen (Gôteborg 1960) 133-144.

(2) For Aristotle's use of the Parmenides in the Physics, see G. E. L. Owen, ' τι&έναι τά φαινόμενα', in Aristote et les problèmes de méthode (Louvain/Paris 1961) 92-102 ( = Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik [New York 1967] 177-190.
———. 1974. "Plato on Unity and Sameness." The Classical Quarterly no. 24:33–45.

"In my concluding section I first say something about the logic of the argument I attribute to Parmenides in my first section [Parmenides 139 d1-e4], and about the place of the argu- ment within the first deduction of the second part of the dialogue. Then I consider the relevance of the passage to certain characteristic theses of Plato's middle and later metaphysical dialogues. Finally, I compare Plato's treatment of sameness and unity here with Aristotle's in the Metaphysics." (p. 38)

(...)

"We have stumbled into that obscure but central dispute about ἀρχαί which so occupied members of the Academy; and, as so often, the Parmenides and the Philebus, the two dialogues of Plato which might be expected to throw light at least on his own attitudes, give us very little to go on. The forceful argument of the Parmenides that being the same does not entail being one makes it look as though Plato thought sameness was not to be explained in terms of unity, at any rate when he wrote that dialogue. Whether we should press his incidental use of Pythagorean 'columns' similar to Aristotle's in the Philebus as indicating conversion to something like Aristotle's contrary opinion we cannot know.

Even supposing it were right to do so, we should be unable to give any acceptable account of why he changed his mind." (p. 45)
———. 1977. "The Antinomies of Plato's Parmenides." The Classical Quarterly no. 27:139–158.

"In this paper, therefore, I attempt to advance discussion on an absolutely fundamental question concerning the logical character of Part II of the dialogue." (p 139)

(...)

"I side with Ryle in believing the antinomies to be, at least in Plato's intention, genuine antinomies. But there is an evident complexity in Plato's treatment of 'one', and a hardly less obvious variety in his manner of argument, which Cornford's account accommodates much more successfully than Ryle's simple picture. I take as my task the construction of a more sophisticated conception of Platonic antinomy than either Ryle or Cornford envisaged, which will embody both Ryle's central insight and Cornford's sensitivity to the shifting focus and status of Plato's arguments. Perhaps I should speak of application rather than construction. For the idea of antinomy I shall be using is in essence that worked out by Professor Owen in his article on the Parmenides. He himself has used it mainly to diagnose and describe the conflict of specific arguments within a single chain of deductions or in two different chains. I shall employ it and elaborate it with respect to the large-scale structure of antinomies." (p. 140)

References

F.M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1939).

G.E.L. Owen, 'Notes on Ryle's Plato', in Ryle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. O.P. Wood and G. Pitcher (London: Macmillan, 1971) [pp. 341-372].

G. Ryle, 'Plato's Parmenides', Mind N.S. 48 (1939), 129-51, 303-25 (reprinted with an Afterword in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R.E. Allen (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), and without it in G. Ryle, Collected Papers, Vol. 1 (London: Hutchinson, 1971).
Schroeder, Frederic M. 1978. "The Platonic Parmenides and imitation in Plotinus " Dionysius no. 2:51–73.

"The language of imitation is for Plotinus the greatest and most satisfactory mode of metaphysical discourse. With this tool he seeks to show that the many problems which surround his proclamation of transcendence admit of a common solution. These problems, which are very much still with those who would assert a metaphysical dimension in our lives, receive their classical form in the Parmenides of Plato. Of particular interest to the discussion of imitation in Plotinus are the introductory arguments of that dialogue." (p. 51)
Scolnicov, Samuel. 1974. "Philebu.s 15b1-8." Studi Classici e Orientali no. 1:3–13.

"Opinions have been sharply divided over the interpretation of Philebus 15B1-8. The focus of the controversy is in the determination of how many questions there are in this passage, and what they are." (p. 3)

(...)

In short, on the "two questions" interpretation, there is a discrepancy between the statement of the problem at 15B and the solutions proposed to it, either explicit or implicit. Of course, Plato could have failed to provide a solution for his problems. But, as it seems to me, this would be too easy a way out. A viable interpretation should, to my mind, conform to the following criteria:

a. it should read the text in an unforced way;

b. it should provide questions for the answers and answers for the questions;

c. it should show the importance of the passage to the problem under discussion;

d. it would be expected, as well, that such an interpretation would fit well into some overall view of Plato's thought.

I propose, therefore, accepting Burnet's text at 15B1-8, to offer a revised version of the "three questions" approach, which will be relevant to the metaphysical discussions of the Philebus as well as to an understanding of Plato's later philosophy." (p. 4)

"What I am suggesting is that the Philebus picks up not only the problems of the Parmenides as a whole, but also this particular passage at 128E-130A (and the parallel is close enough to be taken seriously into consideration). It comes back to the one-many problem in its Zenonian form, dismisses it as trivial, and then states the real problems, namely problems c. and b. above. The exposition of these problems is certainly very economic, to say the least, but if it is - as I am suggesting - a near quotation from Prm. l28E- 130A, it should be quite clear. The Philebus sets out to give its answer to what the earlier dialogue had considered to be the more fundamental part of the problem: the relation between the one and the many within the conceptual realm. In fact, it would have been pointless to state the problem again if no progress was about to be made beyond what was already discussed in the Parmenides.(4)" (p. 7)

(4) The Parmenides, I should like to maintain in a forthcoming paper, solves part of the problem at the level of the ideas. The Philebus carries it to the level of the "elements of the ideas".
———. 2003. "Things Worth Wondering At: A Response to Sandra Peterson." The Modern Schoolman:279–287.
———. 2005. "The Conditions of Knowledge in Plato's Parmenides." In Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlícek , Ales and Karfík, Filip, 165–180. Prague: Oikoymenh.
Scoon, Robert. 1942. "Plato's Parmenides." Mind no. 51:115–133.

"One significant result of the increasing agreement among scholars on the historical order in which Plato's dialogues were composed has been the tendency to regard each of them as the expression of some philosophical interest in the author's mind at the time of composition; and this tendency has on the whole been strengthened by many fresh and valuable studies of the later dialogues, which, reveal attitudes to some degree new as compared with the earlier works. But the Parmenides is so extraordinarily difficult to interpret that it has not fitted well into any picture of Plato's intellectual development, and to a certain extent has been left as a kind of occasional piece by itself. Accordingly, I wish to explore the possibility of interpreting the dialogue as a documentary expression of Plato's state of mind at the time it was written." (p. 115)
Shorey, Paul. 1931. "Note on Plato, Parmenides 129-30." Classical Philology no. 26:91–93.

"Among the passages of Plato which seem destined to what seems to me repeated and incorrigible misinterpretation, Parmenides 129-30 holds in my opinion a prominent place.(2)

What Socrates there says in substance is that to exhibit the contradictions of the one and the many in concrete material things is no great trick. Zeno's dialectics in that kind, he courteously says, is a valiant piece of work. But it would be much more wonderful and admirable to illustrate the same antinomies(3) in the realm of abstractions, of pure thought, of ideas. And when Parmenides asks him if he himself has made (and makes) this distinction between pure ideas and the things that participate in them, he replies that he does.

What commentators usually make him say is, [1] that he would be surprised (because he thinks it impossible) if anyone should find these contradictions in the ideas themselves; and [2] that he is the inventor of the distinction.

The second point is of comparatively little importance for the interpretation of Plato's philosophy, though it may easily be misused in support of the Burnet-Taylor hypothesis that Plato is virtually Socrates. I will discuss both points." (p. 91)

(2) Cf. AJP, IX, 286-87.

(3) It is an ᾰ̓πορῐ́ᾱ, not an impossibility (130 A).
Silverman, Allan. 2002. The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato's Metaphysics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chapter Four: Refining the Theory of Forms, pp. 104-136.

"My concern here will be with the first two Hypotheses of the second part. These contain seminal insights into the very nature of what it is to be a Form. Before turning to them, however, some brief remarks are in order about the first part of the dialogue. The sequence of arguments in the first part has provoked some of the fiercest and best debates about a cardinal issue in Plato’s metaphysics, the nature of “separation.”

This doctrine is typically viewed in terms of Forms and particulars, although the fact that Forms can participate in other Forms suggests that it cannot be understood wholly in those terms. Besides, reaction to these arguments in large part seems almost to define one’s take on Plato’s later metaphysics.

The fulcrum of interpretations is the two so-called Third Man arguments at 132a1–b2 and 132c12–133a6. Scholars have hotly debated the nature of these One-Over-Many arguments and the peculiar premises about Forms that Plato may or may not have employed in their construction. If thought to be telling objections to the Theory of Forms, these arguments signal a massive change in Plato’s metaphysics. If thought to be objections that Plato knew how to dissolve, then these arguments indicate how Plato hopes to articulate a more elaborate theory of Forms. My view, in brief, is that none of these arguments is effective, and Plato knew it." (pp. 107-108, a note omitted)
Sinaiko, Herman L. 1965. Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in Plato: Dialogue and Dialectic in Phaedrus, Republic, Parmenides. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Chapter 4: Dialectic in the Parmenides: Being and the Reality of Discourse, pp. 191-283.

"Through a detailed analysis of several discussions of dialectic in the dialogues, I hope to articulate an adequate conception of what Plato meant by the term —a conception which will comprehend both views described above and bridge the gap between them. For the nature of dialectic is such that at its lower limits it includes inconclusive and faulty arguments based on hastily conceived opinions such as are found in the Euthyphro and the Jon, and at its upper limit it involves a kind of argumentation and reasoning of which the dialogues provide only the faintest momentary glimpses.

Specifically, I shall discuss dialectic as it is described in the Phaedrus, the Republic, and the Parmenides. The brief statement on dialectic in the second half of the Phaedrus is seemingly straightforward and explicit, and it is illustrated by examples taken from the two speeches which Socrates gives earlier in the dialogue. From this passage and the speeches on which it is based. I shall develop a general account of what dialectic is. Then I shall present a fuller and more rigorous explanation of how dialectic functions through an examination of the somewhat longer description of dialectic near the end of Book VII of the Republic and the earlier simile of light in which this description is grounded. Finally I shall take up the Parmenides. In this, perhaps the most mysterious and difficult of the dialogues, there is only a single explicit remark on dialectic. ‘The understanding of this brief statement, however, requires a summary exploration of the whole dialogue, particularly Parmenides’ critique of the theory of ideas in the first half and his famous Eighth hypotheses on “the one” in the second. Here an attempt will be made to articulate more fully the subject matter of dialectic." (pp. 20-21)
Sprague, Rosamond Kent. 1967. "Parmenides' Sail and Dionysodorus' Ox." Phronesis no. 12:91–98.

"The purpose of this paper is to point out that a brief passage in Plato's Euthydemus 300E3-301 A 7 is an objection to the theory of Forms of the same general type as one of those raised in the first part of the Parmenides, and that this similarity should be taken into account when the meaning of those objections is discussed." (p. 91, a note omitted)

(...)

"The passage in the Parmenides with which I wish to compare the Euthydemus passage runs from 130 E 5 to 131 C 11." (è. 93)

(...)

"My own views on the matter are probably already obvious from the comments I have made on the two passages. I not only see the objections to the theory of Forms made by Dionysodorus in the Euthydemus as those of an Eleatic monist unwilling to concede the duality essential to the theory (and, as a result, unwilling to understand the relationship between Forms and particulars in any way which admits this duality), but I see the objections made by Parmenides in that dialogue as being of the same sort. And, further, as I do not believe Plato to have been shaken by the objections of a Dionysodorus neither do I believe him to have been shaken by those of a Parmenides.° (pp. 97-87, a note omitted)

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