Butorac, David D. 2009. "Proclus' Interpretation of the Parmenides, Dialectic and rhe Wandering of the Soul." Dionysius no. 27:33–54.

"This paper will have six sections. First, we will outline basic epistemological presuppositions in the Neoplatonic system and some of Proclus' developments of it. Second, we will briefly address Plato's use of the word planê. Third, we will discuss in detail the metaphor of plane in Proclus' other works and his transformation of it into an important concept within his system. Fourth, we will return ro a consideracion of the problem of plane relative to the problem of dialectic in the Parmenides and discuss this in light of our examination.

Fifth, we will discuss problems that arise from Proclus' development. Finally, we will make general conclusions about the role planê. plays in Proclus' interpretation of the method in the Parmenides." (p. 35)
———. 2015. "Ἀντιγραφή in Proclus’ « In Parmenidem ». A correction of the Budé edition." The Classical Quarterly no. 65:310–320.

"This article will have the following structure. First, we will introduce the issue of how the ἀντιγραφή interpreters account for the Platonic corpus as a whole so as to understand the principles of their interpretation. Second, we will look at the ἀντιγραφή interpretation of the Parmenides and evaluate the Budé’s interpretation of it. Third, we will show how, in the Budé’s interpretation of the Parmenidean ἀντιγραφή, where Parmenides is presented as imitating Zeno’s refutation, the method that Parmenides outlines operates in exactly the opposite way that Zeno’s does.

Fourth, we will compare the Budé’s account of the relation between Zeno and Parmenides with that presented within the ἀντιγραφή interpretation itself. Then we will show that, in Proclus’ history, the later interpreters represent the ἀντιγραφή interpretation of the Parmenides to be one not of imitation, but of opposition. Fifth, while examining the last account of the ἀντιγραφή interpretation, we will show that the Budé’s interpretation and translation of this last report about the ἀντιγραφή interpretation conflicts with their own reconfiguration of the original ἀντιγραφή account.

The Budé editors’ account of the later presentation of ἀντιγραφή shows that the Parmenidean ἀντιγραφή is not, in fact, Parmenides’ imitation of Zeno and his method, but rather his refutation. Finally, we will make some general observations about their

remarks about the Parmenides itself and the difficulties that any interpreter, ancient or modern, must face when reading this dialogue. They seem to treat, and use as evidence of their reading, the ending of the dialogue (somewhat problematically) as adum-

brating a proof that being is one. The result will be that this edition’s decision to ignore the manuscript tradition in this instance was wrong and should be corrected." (pp. 311-312)
Cālian, Florin George. 2013. ""Ciarifications" of Obscurity: Conditions for Proclus's Allegorical Reading of Plato's Parmenides." In Obscurity in Medieval Texts, edited by Dolezalovà, Lucie, Rider, Je3ff and Zironi, Alessandro, 15–31. Krems: Medium Aevum Quotidianum. Gesellschaft zur Erforschung der materiellen Kultur des Mittelalters.

"Proclus used the allegorical method at length in his philosophical commentaries on Plato's dialogues and developed a substantial allegorical technique, even in his commentary on the Parmenides, a dialogue which would, at first glance, hardly seem likely to inspire an allegorical reading, given its technicalities and aridity. His efforts to charge the text with heavy allegorical meaning challenge both the literary critic and the philosopher to clarify what he was doing. Some tenets of Proclus's commentary on Plato's Parmenides will thus be scrutinized as a case study in the present article, in an attempt to delineate and to discuss the main suppositions of the Proclean allegorical reading. My hypothesis is that allegory is a philosophical rather than a literary mechanism and bears for Proclus philosophical implications as one of his main methodological devices. The main question addressed here is: Why would someone question allegorically a philosophical text? Or, in other words: What are the prerequisites for using allegory as part of a philosophical inquiry? I wish to focus on why one would read a philosophical text allegorically rather than how such a reading was done (discovered, invented, transmitted through a certain tradition, etc.)" (p. 16)
———. 2014. "One, Two, Three… A Discussion on the Generation of Numbers in Plato’s Parmenides." In New Europe College Ştefan Odobleja Program Yearbook 2013-2014, 49–78. Bucharest: New Europe College.

Abstract: "One of the questions regarding the Parmenides is whether Plato was committed to any of the arguments developed in the second part of the dialogue. This paper argues for considering at least one of the arguments from the second part of the Parmenides, namely the argument of the generation of numbers, as being platonically genuine. I argue that the argument at 142b-144b, which discusses the generation of numbers, is not deployed for the sake of dialectical argumentation alone, but it rather demonstrates key platonic features, such as the use of the greatest kinds and the generation principle. The connection between the argument for the generation of numbers and Plato’s philosophy of mathematics is strengthened by the exploration of a possible reference in Aristotle’s Metaphysics A6. Taken as a genuine platonic theory, the argument could have significant impact on how we understand Plato’s philosophy of mathematics in particular, and the ontology of the late dialogues in general – that numbers can be reduced to more basic entities, i.e the greatest kinds, in a way similar to the role the greatest kinds are assigned in the Sophist."
Calvert, Brian. 1982. "A Note on Plato's "Parmenides" 128 e 5-130 a 2." Mnemosyne no. 35:51–59.

"In this paper, I want to re-examine the Parmenides passage, and to offer some new arguments (as well as answer the older objections) in favour of the view that αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά does not refer to the Form. Unlike earlier accounts, however, I shall not take it for granted that the conclusions I shall be reaching will necessarily have implications for the interpretation of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσά. While I do not wish to deny that there are similarities, I do not think that the similarities are quite so close as have been traditionally assumed." (p. 51)
Campbell, Lewis. 1896. "On the Place of the Parmenides in the Chronological Order of the Platonic Dialogues." Classical Philology no. 10:129–136.

"In what remains of this paper I shall assume the general correctness of that arrangement of the dialogues according to which the Sophistes, Politicus and Philebus with the Timaeus Critias and Laws form the latest group, while the Phaedrus and Theaetetus belong to the middle period of which the Republic was the central work: the rest, with some doubtful and unim portant exceptions, such as the Menexenus, being relegated to the earlier time." (p. 130)

(...)

"But, once more, in looking at the Parmenides as a whole, while the style is that of Plato's maturity, the dialogue presents more the effect of a first effort in a new region,-that of pure dialectical abstractions,- than the Theaetetus with its mellow blending of ethical, psychological, logical and metaphysical elements, and its profound analysis (taken up afterwards in the Timaeus) of the nature of perception.

At the same time I am ready to admit that this particular question may be argued in a contrary sense;-that the thorny subtilties of the Parmenides, so remote from the spirit of the Republic, are only approached towards the end of the Theaetetus, that the thorough-going notion of a philosophy which despises nothing however trivial is shared by the Parmenides with the later dialogues (Soph. Phileb.), and that the ελεγκτικός ανήρ of the Theaetetus (a contemporary portrait) may have led Plato back to Zeno and through Zeno to the reexamination of ' the greaat Parmenides.' I have far less of certitude on this point than I have in maintaining that the Theaetetus and Parmenides are sister dialogues and that they are intermediate between the Republic and the Sophistes." (p. 136)
Capra, Andrea, and Martinelli Tempesta, Stefano. 2010. "Riding from Elea to Athens (via Syracuse). The Parmenides and the Early Reception of Eleatism: Epicharmus, Cratinus, Plato." Méthexis no. 24:135–175.

Abstract: "This paper makes the following claims: 1) early playwrights (especially Cratinus and Epicharmus, with a new reading of frr. 23Bl-2 DK = 275-276 PCG) were keen on lampooning Eleatism; 2) through literary and linguistic devices that were obvious for Plato's original public, Plato revived this tradition in the Parmenides; 3) the Parmenides portrays the Eleats as catastrophically counterproductive philosophers.

In sharp contrast with Socratic logoi, Eleatism, far from promoting philosophy (protreptic), eventually alienates all possible disciples (' apotreptic'), thus undermining the very notion of Platonic philo-sophia."
Carpenter, Amber D. 2022. "Separation Anxieties. Parmenides 133a-135c." In Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 245–252. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The greatest difficulty for the defender of Forms, says Parmenides, is laying to rest the objection that Forms of the kind posited would be unknowable. The objection seems to turn on the supposition that if Forms are separate from sensibles, then sensibles must be likewise separate from Forms – and therefore likewise independent of Forms. But since independence might imply separateness without separateness implying independence, it looks as if the objector commits an obvious fallacy, and so Parmenides’ anxiety far outstrips the actual difficulty. Examining the relation between separateness (a symmetrical relation) and independence (a non-symmetrical relation), this paper argues that the task of surmounting the objection is indeed formidable – with respect to sensible objects and forms, and more especially with respect to the relationship between intelligence and intelligibles. Toovercome the objection that distinct and independent forms are unknowable, one must give an account of asymmetrical relations which imply symmetrical relations on which each of the relata (of the symmetrical relation) may be differently affected by this relation; and one must give an account of metaphysical dependence and independence which allows that which is depended upon to retain its independence of that which depends on it. One must in particular offer such an account of the relation between intelligence and the intelligible.

For if the intelligible depends for its being intelligible on the nature of intelligence – our intelligence – then realism is threatened in a serious way, and the hypothesis of an intelligible reality can no longer do the work of operating as a shared and objective standard by which to resolve disputes by reason rather than by force."
Casper, Dennis J. 1977. "Is There A Third "One and Many" Problem in Plato?" Apeiron no. 11:20–26.

"In a recent article (1), M.J. Cresswell points out that the problem of the one and the many "gets a new twist in three of Plato's later dialogues (Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus) where we discover not one problem but apparently two."(2) The first problem (I) concerns particulars, things subject to generation and perishing (Philebus, 14D-15A); it is " the problem of how the same thing can have many characteristics."(3) The second problem (II) concerns forms, things not subject to generation or perishing; it is the problem how a unitary form can be in many things which come into being ( Philebus, 15B). The first problem is "childish and easy", the second serious and difficult.

Cresswell points out that the formal structure of (I) does not require that it concern particulars. In a sense, forms have "characteristics" — each is one, the same as itself, and so on. So a parallel one and many problem (III) might be raised: How can the same form have many characteristics? Here Cresswell remarks, "However, when Plato actually sets out the one and many problem about the forms it doesn't have the structure of (I) at all."

Rather, it is (II) above. So Cresswell believes apparently that Plato does not set out (III) in the passages he mentions or elsewhere in the Philebus, Parmenides, and Sophist. I shall argue, however, that Plato does raise (III) in these works and that he takes it as seriously as he does (II). " (p. 20, some notes omitted)

(1) 1M.J. Cresswell, "Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems in Plato?", The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXII (1972), pp. 149-154.

(2) Ibid., p. 149.

(3) Ibid. In stating (1) in this way, Cresswell takes his cue from Sophist, 251A-B. In the Philebus and at the opening of the Parmenides (127E; 129A-E), the problem concerning particulars is how the same thing can have opposite characteristics.
Celarier, James L. 1960. "Note on Plato's Parmenides 147c." Mind:91.

"I doubt whether anyone would wish to take issue with Mr. Robinson'sobservation that there are rather " crass sophisms " in the second part of the Parmenides.(1) However, in his anxiety to refute Comford, he seems to me to have chosen an unfortunate example of a sophism.(2)

The argument by which Parmenides shows that the one is like the others in 147c not only is valid, but points out an interesting logical consequence which Plato could quite well have seen.(3) The argument is simply that the one is different from the others, and likewise the others from the one; thus, since they are different from each other in the same way, they are alike. The only requirement on like objects is that they have a common property (τὸ ταὐτόν που πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον.139e). Parmenides indicates a common property between the one and the others, and concludes that they are alike." (p. 91)
Charalabopoulos, Nikos G. 2022. "Road to Academy. The implicit protreptics of Plato’s Parmenides." In Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 25–32. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The Parmenides features at least three oddities, three unique features nowhere else to be found in Plato. The first oddity is the demolition of Socrates’ favourite philosophical theory and his subsequent silence. The second one pertains to the formal identity of the text: a narrated dialogue suddenly flows quietly into a dramatic one when all textual markers of narration are suddenly and imperceptibly dropped. The third oddity is the content of the text when it turns dramatic. The bulk of the Parmenides, then, puzzlingly consists in a head-spinning exercise in dialectics, in which the Eleatic sage produces arguments both in favour and against his own thesis that the reality is unity instead of multiplicity."
Chen, Chung-Hwan. 1944. "On the Parmenides of Plato." The Classical Quarterly no. 38:101–114.

"The reader who has grasped the central problem will also be able to appreciate the dramatic setting of the dialogue. No other historical introduction could be more appropriate than the arguments of Zeno against the pluralists. In the attempt to solve the problems, 'Socrates' is made the mouthpiece of a theory of Ideas which is later to be refuted. But it would be most improper for this refutation to be conducted by anyone other than a great philosopher. Again, if Plato were to assign this task to some Pre-Socratic other than Parmenides, this character would have to define his position in regard to Zeno's view also; and that would lead far away from the goal.

Thus, in order to understand the setting of the dialogue, one need look no farther than its main problem; speculation about its occasion can not only afford no help in understanding the dialogue correctly, but will make it harder than ever to appreciate the true sense of this, from an ontological point of view, the most essential of all Plato's writings." (p. 114)
Cherniss, Harold. 1932. "Parmenides and the Parmenides of Plato." American Journal of Philology no. 53:122–138.

Reprinted in: H. Cherniss, Selected Papers, edited by Leonardo Tarán, Leiden: Brill 1977 pp. 281-297.

"The antinomies of the Parmenides were composed for the purpose of showing that the Eleatic dialectic of Zeno when applied to the monistic Being of Parmenides produces the same paradoxes as when used against pluralism. It is demonstrated that the second part of the dialogue is formally an elaborate parody of the poem of Parmenides and methodically a parody of the logic-chopping of Zeno. By this means the psychological purpose of the dialogue is elucidated, the unity of the dialogue is made evident, and its relationship to the Sophist is established." (p. 122)
Chroust, Anton Hermann. 1947. "The Problem of Plato's Parmenides." The New Scholasticism (21):371–418.
Chrysakopoulou, Sylvana, and Castelnérac, Benoît. 2014. "Special Issue: Plato’s Parmenides, Origins and Aporias of a Dialogue on the One. Introduction." Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review no. 53:381–384.

"The papers collected in this volume were presented in Chania, Greece, at the Plato’s Parmenides conference, organised by Sylvana Chrysakopoulou and Benoît Castelnérac."

(...)

"In the Parmenides, Plato begs to reopen the “case of the One”. He devoted enough time and art to complete the “dialectical survey” of one “Form,” the One, and this is either saying goodbye to Parmenides or a late testimony of a late (?) inquiry done following Parmenides’ structures. So much erudition for the moment, be it Parmenides’ One, Plato’s own theory of Oneness, a series of problemata on the notion of unity, or a complex embroidery of all the above and more “knots” unknown to us, it would be hard to maintain that all this attention on Elea, a village located in the South West coast of Italy, is contingent or anecdotic. Plato’s discussion with his predecessors is a thorny issue for every name in case, but it is always surprising to see how little work has been done to understand the linkage from Parmenides to Plato under the light of the history of “dialectic”, to wit “questions about knowledge and argumentation”.

Although the above statements are only endorsed by the editors of this volume, we are confident that the following papers share in some way or others in the project of finding out how much of the historical Parmenides is in Plato’s rendition, and how far Plato’s Parmenides is a significant piece in his intellectual production. Here is a short presentation of what the reader will find in this volume." (pp. 382-383)
Clark, Dennis. 2018. "The Anonymous Commentary on the « Parmenides »." In Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity, edited by Tarrant, Harold, Layne, Danielle A., Baltzly, Dirk and Renaud, François. Leiden: Brill.

"For the Middle Platonists, it was the Timaeus that held pride of place as the source for most of what was considered Plato’s conception of nature, creation, and even theology, although it is possible that some philosophers did not completely ignore the Parmenides, such as Moderatus, and it is hardly likely that it did not figure to some extent already in the thought of Speusippus and Xenocrates. But for the period preceding Plotinus’ direct reference to it in Ennead V.1, there is no strong evidence of a concentrated effort in any surviving text which would indicate that the dialogue was seen as primarily informing Platonism."

(...)

"Thus in this light the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides (hereafter Comm.) likely appears as the earliest extant attempt to practice Platonic philosophy via the means of commenting on the content of the dialogue, which was already hundreds of years old to its commentator. To modern readers and scholars, however, the resultant value of the Comm., as for any other ancient commentary on Plato, is of almost entirely historical value, most useful for inferring the doctrine rather of its author. But it ought to be kept in mind that the later Academic philosophers, such as the Neoplatonists, thought of themselves as true followers and inheritors of Plato, not innovators." (p. 351)
Cleary, John J. 2002. "Proclus' elaborate defense of Platonic ideas." In Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione, edited by Barbanti, Maria and Romano, Francesco, 341–353. Catania: CUECM.
Cornford, Francis MacDonald. 1939. Plato and Parmenides. Parmenides' Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.

Translated, with an introduction and a running commentary by F. M. Cornford.

Reprinted by Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.

"This book was undertaken with the hope that a close study of the whole chain of argument would bring to light some method of interpretation that would give the dialogue a serious significance, worthy of its author and consistent with its position in the history of Greek thought. I could find not the faintest sign of any theological revelation. On the other hand there were innumerable features whose presence could not be accounted for in a mere parody or light-hearted polemic. The conclusion reached was that the second part of the dialogue is an extremely subtle and masterly analysis, dealing with problems of the sort we call logical, which we know to have been much in Plato's mind in his later period.

The assumptions required to yield this conclusion will be set out in the commentary introducing the dialectical exercise." (Preface, p. IX(
Corrigan, Kevin. 2000. "Platonism and Gnosticism: the anonymous « Commentary on the Parmenides » : Middle or Neoplatonic? ." In Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Majercik, Ruth, 141–177. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

"For the past hundred years and more, scholars have supposed that an anonymous commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, originally published by W. Kroll (1892), must be post-Plotinian. Suggestions for authorship have ranged from Porphyry to Plutarch of Athens and Proclus. The present work argues for the first time that the Commentary is pre-Plotinian, quite possibly from the hand of a member of the “school” of Cronius and Numenius, and consequently presents a rather new view of the place of Plotinus in the history of thought and indicates the need for a rethinking of some of the principal features of Middle Platonism and of the relation between the Plotinian circle and Gnosticism." (pp. 141-142, a note omitted)
———. 2010. "The Place of the Parmenides in Plato’s Thought and in the Subsequent Tradition." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 23–36. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"Here I will take up the questions before us from three different perspectives: first, I will indicate what internal evidence there is from the dialogues about the place of the Parmenides and what this may or may not suggest about a supposed train of “thought” from the “middle” to the “later” dialogues; second, I will outline some of the major kinds of interpretation of the Parmenides over the past two and a half thousand years in order briefly to suggest some of the strengths and weaknesses of each; and third, more specifically, I will focus briefly upon the earlier tradition, from Speusippus to Proclus, to see if some provisional conclusions might at least be outlined for the larger project."
———. 2010. "Plotinus and the Hypotheses of the Second Part of Plato’s Parmenides." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 35–48. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"My overall thesis might be summed up as follows: Plotinus, I believe, had an interpretation, however provisional, of the whole of the Parmenides, but he was not directly interested, in his own writings at least, either in spelling out every single detail of what would, in any case, have had to have remained provisional or in allocating a determinative rank to every hypothetical representation in the second part of the Parmenides. This is not to say that he did not take Plato seriously.

He obviously did—however much he was also prepared to leave many details to individual interpretation. What is virtually unthinkable, in my view, is the argument from silence: that a dialogue that either overwhelmed thought or drove it totally crazy, but in either case compelled the reader to think, did not provoke any so-called metaphysical enquiry about its hypotheses for five hundred years or more. Such a failure would not be the tragic–comic outcome of the complex artistic/philosophic and always absent figure of Plato himself, but its entire contradiction. The survival of Plotinus’s writings is one of the most unusual accidents of history, and yet his writings give no interpretation of the second part of the Parmenides. Plotinus is thus—at least for the most part—a paradigmatic example of the silence of the previous five hundred years. Yet it is absurd to suppose that he, like so many before and after him, was unaware of the importance of the trajectories of Platonic representative discourse as also of the potentially fatal ambiguities in any represented discourse, however well-intentioned such discourse may be." (p, 36)
———. 2010. "The Importance of the Parmenides for Trinitarian Theology in the Third and Fourth Centuries C.E." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 237–242. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"On the surface, it seems unlikely that the interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides might have had anything to do with Christian thought of the fourth century. How could a series of hypotheses about the one and the others have been of interest to Christian theologians? The unspoken consensus then has naturally been that there is little reflection of the Parmenides in the Church Fathers. One may argue, however, for a more nuanced view since the Parmenides formed an indirect context for the development of Trinitarian theology(1) and its interpretation was even decisive, we may say, for the formulation of Cappadocian Trinitarian thought." (p. 237)

(1) My approach is in substantial agreement with that of Jean Reynard in this volume.

References

Jeab Reynard, Plato’s Parmenides among the Cappadocian Fathers: The Problem of a Possible Influence or the Meaning of a Lack?, same volume, pp. 217-235.
Coxon, Allan H. 1999. The Philosophy of Forms: An Analytical and Historical Commentary on Plato's Parmenides. With a new English translation. Assen: Van Gorcum.

"n the ensuing discussion of Plato’s Parmenides I have largely abstained from consideration of its strange vicissitudes in ancient, mediaeval, renaissance and even modern times, in favour of simple exegesis, and in this have reverted closely to the state of philosophy prior to its composition, when the thought of Parmenides and Socrates was a living influence and the Stagirite unknown. The book is a sequel to my edition of The Fragments of Parmenides (Van Gorcum, Assen, 1986) to which I have referred by the initials FP. In the use of initial capitals elsewhere I have been more concerned for clarity than for consistency, but have generally written Forms where the word alludes to universals conceived as separate substances, and have generally confined the use of capitals for the names of individual Forms to (the) One and (the) Many. The translation follows Burnet’s text except where noted." (From the Foreword)

Contents: Intrθduction: Forms and Predication in the Fifth Century B.C.

I Forms in the pre-Socratic physicists 3; II The philosophy of Socrates. (i) Socrates’ philosophical autobiography in Plato’s Phaedo 7; (ii) Socrates’ philosophy in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 10; (iii) Socrates’ philosophy according to Aristotle 17; IIIThe linguistic formulation of the theory of Forms: (i) "X" is something" 27; (ii)"What is X ?" 29; (iii) "What X is" 31; IV The interpretation of the copula 33;

Plato's Parmenides

Englis translation 37

Commenary

1 The dramatic setting (126a - 127d) 95; 2 Socrates’ dialogue with Zeno (127e - 130a) 99; 3 Parmenides and Socrates (130a - 131a) 103; 4 Problems in the theory of Forms (131a - 135c) 107; 5 Pamenides’ rescription (135c - 137b) 117;

6 Parmenides’ excerclse exemplified

A The First Hypothesis: If One is

(i) The First Deduction (137c - 142a) 131

(ii) The Second Deduction (142b - 157b) 137

(iii) The Third Deduction (157b - 159b) 155

(iv) The Fourth Deduction (159b - 160b) 157

B The Second Hypothesis: If One is not

(v) The Fifth Deduction (160c - 163b) 158

(vi) The Sixth Deduction (163b - 164b) 161

(vii) The Seventh Deduction (164c - 165e) 162

(viii) The Eighth Deduction (165e - 166b) 164

Epilogue (166c) 165

Appendices

I The idiom ὃ ἔστι 167

II Socrates’ philosophy In the theatre 171

Select Bibliography 173.
Cresswell, Max J. 1972. "Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems in Plato?" The Philosophical Quarterly no. 22:149–154.

"How can one thing be many and many things one? This perennial in Greek philosophy gets a new twist in three of Plato's later dialogues (Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus) where we discover not one problem but apparently two. More interestingly, although one of them is a serious and perplexing problem demanding the full insight of the rigorously disciplined philosopher, the other problem is described in the Philebus (14d, e) as commonplace and one such that " almost everyone agrees nowadays that there is no need to concern oneself with things like that, feeling that they are childish, obvious and a great nuisance to argument ". And in the Sophist (251b) it is relegated to providing a banquet for the young and for " late learners of old men " who are " poorly endowed with intelligence and marvel at such things, thinking themselves to have come upon all wisdom ".

What is the difference between this trivial form and the serious form of the problem of how one thing can be many? In the Philebus (15a) Socrates says that the trivial problem occurs when the one in question is the sort of thing which can come into being and pass away, i.e., is something which belongs to the physical world. The serious problem is when the one is an eternal existent." (p. 149)
Curd, Patricia. 1986. "Parmenides 131c-132b: Unity and Participation." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 3:125–136.

"Briefly, my claims are these. The two passages that prove the plurality of the Forms (131c9-el and 132al-b2) are linked: assumptions made in the first are picked up and subjected to further scrutiny in the second . Both arguments have the same goal, for both show that the model of participation endorsed by Socrates has the consequence that a participated-in Form is many and not one. But why the Forms are twice shown to be many, and why showing this invokes the questions that I have noted above can be explained by an examination of Zeno's treatise and Socrates' response to it that open the main part of the dialogue at 127d-e. In that treatise, Zeno argues against two sorts of pluralities. Parmenides will then show that Socrates' unitary Forms, introduced as an answer to Zeno's argument, are actually pluralities of both sorts. And it is in Parmenides' arguments that we shall find the answers to our questions." (p. 126)
———. 1988. "Parmenidean Clues in the Search for the Sophist." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 5:307–320.

"Does the Parmenides hold clues to a proper understanding of the Sophist? It seems to me that it does; in this paper I shall explore a number of issues that link the two dialogues, arguing that understanding Plato's treatment of these issues in the Parmenides can help us correctly interpret the arguments of the Sophist.

Influential interpretations of Plato's later work hold that there are serious confusions about identity and predication in that work. According to these interpretations some of the arguments in the antinomies of Part II of the Parmenides exhibit this confusion; further, according to these views, it is not until the Sophist that Plato sees his way to distinguish identity and predication adequately, and that it is this that allows him finally to solve the problems of Being and Not Being in that dialogue.(1)

In this paper I want to challenge this view: I shall claim that the arguments of Part II of the Parmenides are not infected with an identity/predication (I/P) confusion. Further, I shall argue that in the second part

of the Parmenides Plato explores and investigates certain ideas that are crucial to his solution of the problem of Not-Being in the Sophist (a solution that does not depend on distinguishing identity and predicative

"senses" or "uses" of the verb "to be"(2). I shall begin with some preliminary remarks about the I/P confusion and the earlier dialogues before turning to the Parmenides and the Sophist." (p. 367)

(1) The interpretations I have in mind are primarily those of G. E. L. Owen (in "Notes on Ryle's Plato," in Logic, Science and Dialectic, ed. G. E. L. Owen and M. C. Nussbaum (Ithaca, 1986), pp. 85-103; hereafter NRP; and in "Plato on Not-Being," in LSD pp. 104-137; hereafter PNB); and Malcolm Schofield (in "The Antinomies of Plato'sParmenides," Classical Quarterly, vol. 21 [1977], pp. 139-158). See also M. Frede, Pradikation und Existenzaussage (Gottingen, 1967).

(2) Here I shall follow the interpretation of the arguments of the Sophist suggested by Jean Roberts in "The Problem about Being in the Sophist," History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 3 (1986), pp. 229-243 (hereafter PBS). What I shall say here about the Sophist is based on an acceptance of Roberts' arguments (which I shall not repeat here) and owes much to her work.
———. 1989. "Some Problems of Unity in the First Hypothesis of the Parmenides." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 27:347–359.

"In this paper I shall, by looking at some of the arguments of the first hypothesis, explore the suggestion that Plato is concerned to examine carefully the nature and limitations of middle period claims about the unity of Forms. In doing so he both continues and expands the attack on the middle period theory that was begun in Part I of the dialogue." (p. 347)
———. 1990. "Parmenides 142b 5-144e 7: the « unity is many » arguments." The Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 28:19–35.

"In the opening passages of the second hypothesis of the Parmenides Plato constructs two sets of arguments to show that the One is many. This paper explores the question of why two different arguments for the same conclusion are given, and suggests that consideration of these arguments can help us to understand some of Plato’s purposes in the second part of the Purmenides.(1) I proceed by looking at the two arguments in some detail and drawing some conclusions from them; I then conclude with some brief comments on Plato’s use of the part-whole relation.

The first hypothesis ends with an expression of dissatisfaction with its results (142a6-8); the second opens with a resolve to go back to the beginning and re-examine the consequences of the assertion that the One is. But despite the fact that in all but two instances the subjects and ordering of the arguments that constitute the two hypotheses are identical, the results are vastly different. The second hypothesis attributes to the One all of the properties and relations that were denied to it by the first." (p. 19, two note omitted)

(1) For a discussion of some of the interpretations of the Parmenides that have accumulated over the years, see P.K. Curd, “Some Problems of Unity in the First Hypothesis of the Parmenides,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, XXVII no. 3 (1989), pp. 347-359; esp. nl, pp. 356-357.
d'Hoine, Pieter. 2021. "Parmenides’ First Attack on the Forms. Proclus and the Logical Structure of Parmenides 130b–e." History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis no. 24:103–121.

Abstract: "This paper provides a case study for the use of syllogistic reconstructions in the commentaries on Plato by the fifth-century commentator Proclus. The paper discusses Proclus’ reconstruction of the argument about the range of the Forms in Plato’s Parmenides (130b–e). In his commentary on this dialogue, Proclus reports a syllogistic reconstruction of the argument proposed by some of his predecessors. In this reconstruction, the argument as a whole is interpreted as a straightforward attack on the existence of Forms, while the different premises of the hypothetical syllogism represent the respective positions of Parmenides and Socrates in the discussion. For Proclus, however, the argument about the range of Forms is not meant to be critical of the Forms, but rather provides a positive instruction about their range of application.

I argue that while Proclus finds the syllogism a useful tool to reconstruct the different positions in the exegetical history of the argument, he does not accept it as an adequate reconstruction on his own account. The argument can be traced back most likely to the so-called ‘logical’ interpretations of the Parmenides that Proclus discusses – and dismisses – in the prologue to his commentary."
de Laurentiis, Allegra. 2005. Subjects in the Ancient and Modern World: On Hegel’s Theory of Subjectivity New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chapter 4: Hegel’s Reading of Plato’s Parmenides, pp. 96-112.

"In interpreting Plato’s Parmenides during the early Jena period, Hegel focuses largely on its methodological value as a radical exercise in negative skepticism—and, as such, as an introduction to proper philosophizing.

In his ‘Relation of Skepticism to Philosophy’ (1801), for example, Hegel characterizes Plato’s dialogue as exhibiting ‘the negative side of the knowledge of the absolute [die negative Seite der Erkenntnis des Absoluten].’(1)" (p. 96)

(...)

"In the following development of Hegel’s thinking, as attested by his commentaries on this and other Platonic dialogues in the Greater and Lesser Logic(6) and in the lectures on ancient philosophy,(7) the Parmenides appears to approximate the status of prima philosophia speculativa. Hegel sees now in the dialectic of the ideas exhibited in it an embryonic form of authentically speculative thinking.(8) Thus, he reads Plato’s text not any more as cathartic training for a future science, but as the first historical incursion into the science of the Absolute itself." (p. 97)

(1) GW 4, 207.

(6) For the Greater Logic, see GW 11 (Doctrine of Essence), 311–12/Miller 466; GW 12 (Doctrine of the Concept), 241–4/Miller 830–2. For the Lesser Logic, see E §§ 92 Addition, 95 Remark, 96 Addition, 121 Addition, 142 Addition, and 214.

(7) See GW 19, Part One: History of Greek Philosophy.

(8) It has been shown convincingly that Hegel’s interpretation (even if considered a projection) is not equivalent to that of the Neoplatonists. See for example K. Duesing’s argument in (1983). It cannot be my task here to clarify the distinction between the Neoplatonic and the Hegelian Plato-interpretation, so I presuppose this difference in what follows.

References

GW = Gesammelte Werke. Edited by the Nordrhein-Westphaelische Akademie der Wissenschaften. 22 vols. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1968–.

Duesing, Klaus. Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ontologie und Dialektik in Antike und Neuzeit. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983.+

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by Arnold V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977
———. 2006. "The Parmenides and De Anima in Hegel's Perspective." Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain no. 53:51–68.

"Hegel's mature interpretation of the Parmenides is consistent with his general theory of the history of philosophy. Since the logical series of the determinations of the Idea consists of the successive sublation of each in the next, so also does the series of Grundbegriffe in the history of philosophy. The principle of Plato's philosophy is the concept of idea. Its defining character consists in its being at once purely intelligible and absolutely real. It is sublated in various principles of medieval and modern systems, including Hegel's. Accordingly, it is reasonable to see in Plato's exposition of dialectical contradiction in the Parmenides a study in the concept of idea. Beyond its consistency with Hegel's theory of philosophy, however, a defence of his mature interpretation of the Parmenides requires us to show that such an interpretation is both textually legitimate and logically advantageous for the solution of problems that plague traditional readings." (p. 55)
de Souza, Saloni. 2024. "Everything in its right place. Zeno's parardox of place in part 2 of the Parmenides." Organon no. 56:65–87.

Abstract: "Part 2 of the Parmenides is an obvious place to examine Plato’s reception of Zeno; after all, it is a demonstration apparently based on Zeno’s method and one of the main characters of the dialogue is Zeno. Nevertheless, it has received little attention as a source for understanding Plato’s engagement with the historical Zeno. Here, I show that Plato engages with Zeno’s paradox of place in the first deduction of Part 2 of the Parmenides—and in sophisticated and interesting ways.

I begin by addressing some methodological issues. I then examine Eudemus’ account of Zeno’s paradox of place as reported by Simplicius and Aristotle’s account in his Physics 4.3 in order to reconstruct it. I proceed to examine the arguments for the one’s being nowhere, if it is, in the first deduction of the Parmenides. I argue that there are good reasons to suppose that Zeno’s paradox of place is at issue there. Finally, I reflect on what these arguments reveal about Plato’s engagement with Zeno’s paradox of place."
de Torres, Olivia. 1995. "The game that looks like work in Plato's Parmenides." Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico no. 30:33–48.

Abstract: "The past ten years have seen an upsurge of interest in Plato's Parmenides among those who study philosophy, and all agree that it is Plato's most riddling dialogue. Chief among the reasons for this enigmatic quality is the exercise which Parmenides calls the "laborious game". And the sorry truth of the matter is that most of the commentaries on the dialogue, some ancient but more modern, are incredibly wearying to read, more than the dialogue itself. As if aware of this, commentators themselves use words like "tedious," "disagreeable," "singularly unappealing" to characterise the game, and simultaneously to apologize for what is to come: much more of the same in their interpretations. But lest there be any misunderstanding, the charge against most modern commentators is not that they make the student of the dialogue work, but simply that they have failed to keep together the two aspects of Parmenides' "game that looks like work", that is to say, the playful and the serious. They have made the game too much like work."
Di Girolamo, Sergio. 2022. "Parmenides’ hypothesis behind Plato’s Parmenides: ‘all the things are collectively called ἓν ὄν’ (Sph. 242d6)." In Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 173–181. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "This paper has two aims. The first and main one is to explain the philosophical meaning of what at Prm. 128d5-6 is presented as Parmenides’ hypothesis, and at 128a8-b1 is introduced by means of the sentence ἓν ... εἶναι τὸ πᾶν. In order to understand such a sentence, it is argued that it is necessary to start from a new interpretation of Plato’s references to Parmenides at Sph. 242c8-245e8, paying careful attention to the passage at 242d6, ἑνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων, and the context within which it occurs. Even though, as far as it has been possible to determine, scholars tend to agree on a typical translation of Sph. 242d6, such as ‘what is called “all things” is one’, the paper maintains that many strong contextual reasons lead to the conclusion that the right translation is ‘all the things are collectively called ἓν ὄν’. This translation is consistent with a new overall interpretation of Sph. 242c8-245e8, according to which the underlying doctrine introduced and examined by the Eleatic Stranger as Parmenides’ one uses two names, ἕν and ὄν, with reference to τὰ πάντα, inasmuch as all the things are collectively regarded as a single entity, τὸ πᾶν, which is one in two senses. On the one hand, it is one in the sense of being a unified whole, because τὰ πάντα are encompassed and united within it, so that the doctrine at issue has mereological implications. On the other hand, it is one in the sense of being unique, as it encompasses everything. Once such an explanation is outlined, the second aim of the paper is just to suggest, given the short space allocated to this publication, how the new interpretation suits the Parmenides, and can address several questions raised by the dialogue."
Dillon, John. 1999. "Plotinus, Speusippus and the Platonic Parmenides." Kairos no. 15:61–74.

Reprinted as Essay II in J. M. Dillon, The Platonic Heritage: Further Studies in the History of Platonism and Early Christianity, Aldershot: Ashghate 2012.

"One of the ways, I think, in which the speculations attributed to Plato's immediate successors in the Academy, Speusippus and Xenocrates, can be most profitably considered is as interpretations (however bizarre or perverse they may sometimes appear) of various of Plato’s later dialogues, and in particular the Timaeus, Philebus, Sophist and Parmenides.(1) My concern on this occasion is to focus on the possibility that certain key elements of Speusippus' metaphysics are based on an ontological interpretation of the second part of the Parmenides. In particular, I am interested in exploring whether he may have based his doctrine of the derivation of number from his first principles of One and Multiplicity on the account of the generation of number at Parm. 142D-144A — and whether, if so, these speculations of his may have left some traces in Plotinus' doctune in his essay On Numbers (VI 6 [34]).! (p. 61)

(1) This is not to suggest, of course, that the dialogues were the sole source of inspiration for these men. We must also assume a vigorous tradition of oral debate within the Academy. But interpretation of these dialogues in particular does seem to ave been important. (,,,)
Dillon, John M. 2002. "Iamblichus' identifications of the subject-matters of the hypotheses." In Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione, edited by Barbanti, Maria and Romano, Francesco, 329–340. Catania: CUECM.

Reprinted as Essay XXI in J. M. Dillon, The Platonic Heritage: Further Studies in the History of Platonism and Early Christianity, Aldershot: Ashghate 2012.

"I am concerned in this paper specifically with the identifications of the subject-matters of the hypotheses proposed by Iamblichus, and in particular with his interesting identifications of the subject-matters of the third and fourth hypotheses — though, as we shall see, all his identifications are of interest. To put his identifications in context, however, we must first consider those proposed by Plotinus’ senior disciple Amelius.

The intriguing thing about Amelius is his proposal to postulate only Eighth hypotheses — as would be the consensus of modern scholarship — rather than the nine identified by all of his successors (except the mysterious ‘philosopher from Rhodes’, who postulated ten!)"

(...)

"It is against the background of the dispositions of his immediate predecessors, then, that the doctrine of Iamblichus must be viewed. The positions which he adopts are certainly bizarre, but they can be seen as arising from the speculations that have gone before, while embodying certain distinctive features of his own philosophy." (pp. 330-331)
———. 2005. "Speusippus and the Ontological Interpretation of the Parmenides." In Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlícek, Ales and Karfík, Filip, 296–311. Prague: Oikoymenh.
———. 2009. "The architecture of the intelligible universe revealed: Syrianus' exegesis of the second hypothesis of the « Parmenides »." In Syrianus et la métaphysique de l'Antiquité tardive : actes du colloque international, Université de Genève, 29 septembre-1er octobre 2006, edited by Longo, Angela, 233–245. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

"Both the origins and the validity of the ontological interpretation of the second half of Plato's Parmenides are issues of great obscurity, on which I have had a certain amount to say myself in recent times(1). As regards its origins, the thesis that I am prepared, albeit tentatively, to defend is that this interpretation, in some form, can be discerned as going back all the way to Plato's nephew Speusippus in the Old Academy, but if so, such a version would obviously not involve the whole panoply of the Neoplatonic metaphysical system, but simply an account of how the One, when combined with the Indefinite Dyad (under the guise of «Being») produces, first the whole set of natural numbers, and then, progressively, the various lower levels of reality, Soul, Nature (or the physical world, animate and inanimate), and ultimately Matter." (p. 233)

(1) E.g. in The Heirs of Plato, Oxford 2003, pp. 56-59, a propos Speusippus.
———. 2010. "Speusippus and the Ontological Interpretation of the Parmenides." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 67–78. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"My concern on this occasion is to focus on the possibility that certain key elements of Speusippus’s metaphysics are based on an ontological interpretation of the hypotheses propounded in the second part of the Parmenides. In particular, I am interested in exploring whether he may have based his doctrine of the derivation of number from his first principles of One and Multiplicity on the account of the generation of number at Parm. 142d–144a—and, if so, whether these speculations of his may have left some traces in Plotinus’s doctrine in his tractate on numbers (Enn. 6.6 [34])." (p. 67)

(...)

"My reconstruction of Speusippus’s position is, I must admit, dependent to some extent, though not by any means entirely, on acceptance of a key piece of evidence which is controversial, that is, the contents of ch. 4 of Iamblichus’s De communi mathematica scientia. That this can (whether directly or indirectly) reflect nothing other than the doctrine of Speusippus is something that I have argued previously (Dillon 1984), in opposition to the scepticism of Leonardo Tarán.(4)" (p. 68)

(4) Expressed most fully in a section of the introduction to ch. 5 (“Speusippus, Aristotle and lamblichus”) of his Speusippus of Athens (1981, 86–107).
———. 2010. "Syrianus’s Exegesis of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides: The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe Revealed." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 133–141. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

Reprinted, with permission, from Syrianus et la métaphysique de l’antiquité tardive. Edited by Angela Longo. Naples: Bibliopolis (© Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e la Storia delle Idee-CNR, 2009, pp. 233-245.

"Both the origins and the validity of the ontological interpretation of the second half of Plato’s Parmenides are obscure, and issues on which I have had a certain amount to say myself in recent times.(1) As regards its origins, the thesis that I am prepared, albeit tentatively, to defend is that this interpretation, in some form, can be discerned as going back all the way to Plato’s nephew Speusippus in the Old Academy, but if so, such a version would obviously not involve the whole panoply of the Neoplatonic metaphysical system, but simply an account of how the One, when combined with the Indefinite Dyad (under the guise of “Being”) produces, first the whole set of natural numbers, and then, progressively, the various lower levels of reality, Soul, Nature (or the physical world, animate and inanimate), and ultimately Matter." (p. 133)

(...)

"This basic issue is not, however, what I am concerned with on this occasion, but something a good deal more exotic. It is a doctrine, indeed, that arises out of the initial insight that the second hypothesis (142B–155D) provides an account of the generation of the cosmos, or at least of the intelligible level of reality, but it is one that develops this insight in a truly remarkable way." (pp. 133-134)

(1) E.g., The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy, 347–274 B.C. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, 56–59, à propos Speusippus.
Dodds, Eric Robertson. 1928. "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One'." The Classical Quarterly no. 22:129–142.

"Small wonder that Plotinus(2) regarded the PIatonic Parmenides as a great improvement on his historical prototype; that Iamblichus(3) considered the Parmenidesand the Timaeus as the only Platonic dialogues indispensable to salvation; that Proclus(4) found in the Parmenides and there only, the complete system of Platonic theology. Read the second part of the Parmenides as Plotinus read it, with the single eye of faith; do not look for satire on the Megarians or on anybody else; and you will find in the first hypothesis a lucid exposition of the famous 'negative theology,' and in the second (especially if you take it in connexion with the fourth) an interesting sketch of the derivation of a universe from the marriage of unity and existence. What you will find in the remaining hypotheses I cannot so easily predict; even within the Neoplatonic

school there were violent differences of opinion about them(5) differences which I must not attempt to discuss here, as they would carry me too far from the main intention of this paper." (pp. 133-134)

(2) V, i. 8 fin.

(3) Procl. in Tim. I. 13. 15 sq , Diehl; Proleg. Plat. Phil. 26.

(4) Theol. Plat. I. 7.

(5) See Proclus in Parm. 1052-64, Cousin.
Dorter, Kenneth. 1989. "The Theory of Forms and Parmenides I." In Essays In Ancient Greek Philosophy III: Plato, edited by Anton, John P. and Preus, Anthony, 183–202. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Conclusion

On the basis of this examination there seems no reason to conclude that Plato intended these arguments to be a refutation or recantation of the theory of forms, and several reasons to believe that he did not.

1. The arguments are easily answered on the basis of features of the theory which were prominent in the middle dialogues and which could plausibly be omitted here only by portraying Socrates as being in the early stages of developing the theory.

2. By having Socrates hesitate precisely at the point where such factors can be brought into play to repel Parmenides’ attack, Plato seems to hint at the inconclusive nature of the arguments.

3. Not only the answers but the problems themselves were anticipated in the middle dialogues: the problem of giving nonmetaphorical accounts of participation and recollection, and the ambiguity of resemblance and predication with regard to forms and things, are clearly present in the Phaedo, where the complete theory was first introduced. Plato evidently recognized these problems from the beginning but felt that the theory was not vitiated by them.

4. The final argument begins and ends with speeches that show Parmenides to be Socrates’ ally in the theory,(13) a devil’s advocate rather than nemesis, which would hardly be possible if the arguments were intended as serious refutations. The motive for exhibiting and even exaggerating these problems may have been partly to remind us that the theory of forms can not be regarded as a dogma or perfected doctrine but only as a valuable (perhaps indispensable) although inexact way of interpreting the world." (pp.199-200)

(13) Thus at 133b Parmenides says, “if [the forms] are such as we say they must be.” The context suggests that Parmenides is using the first person plural earnestly, and not as a patronizing form of the second person singular.
———. 1994. Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues: the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman. Berkeley: University of California Press.

"The four dialogues examined here form a natural group with sequential concerns. Since the aim of the present study is to try to understand the group as a whole, I have sacrificed the advantage of greater detail that book-length commentaries would provide, in order to present a more synoptic picture. But although the treatment of individual dialogues will not be as extensively detailed as in book-length studies, I have tried to pay careful attention both to the conceptual arguments and to the dramatic and literary events, and have tried to ensure that the lessening of detail would not mean a lessening of attentiveness." (Preface, p. IX)

(...)

"Conclusion

To put the results of our examination of the second part of the dialogue as succinctly as possible, the distinctions implicit in the first four hypotheses have led to the conclusion that unless there is something by which the limiting One and the unlimited many can stand in relation to each other, meaningful speech and thought will be impossible. The next four illustrate this point negatively by showing what happens if we try to conceive of the many otherwise than in relation to the One.

(...)

The first part of the Parmenides casts doubt on our ability to give a nonmetaphorical account of the nature of participation by things in forms (i.e., by "becoming" in "being"), while concluding, however, that unless we nevertheless affirm the existence of forms and participation we will not be able to account for the possibility of thought and discourse (135b-c). The second part of the dialogue has now shown, in its dizzying way, that a similar conclusion follows from a consideration of the relationship between our world of becoming and the One that is beyond being. Once we enter into the "gymnastic" dimension of these arguments and respond to their challenge to draw crucial distinctions, we can distinguish between the arguments that reflect genuine paradoxes, and those that are only formulated in a paradoxical manner but can readily be resolved by means of the distinctions with which Plato supplies us. This has led us to conclude that although the relationship between the temporal (becoming) and the timeless (the One) can be hinted at in terms of the concept of the "instant," a fully elaborated account remains recalcitrant, and the third hypothesis is forced to return to the metaphor of participation. But just as the first part of the dialogue concluded by saying that, despite the problems of conceptualizing the relation of participation, to attempt to do away with that relationship would destroy the possibility of thought and discourse; here too the fourth hypothesis shows the impossibility of dispensing with the relation of participation. And the final four hypotheses show that it is impossible to avoid the problems of the first four simply by doing away with the concept of the One (whether applied to the specific forms or to the good), for in that case the resulting paradoxes become wholly intolerable." (pp. 66-67)
Doull, James A. 2001. "The problem of participation in Plato’s Parmenides." Dionysius no. 19:11–26.
———. 2003. "Plato's Parmenides." In Philosophy and Freedom: The Legacy of James Doull, edited by Peddle, David G. and Robertson, Neil G., 83–139. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

"It makes a difficulty in reading Parmenides that in speaking of the good, Plato uses abstract Eleatic concepts - unity and being. What these concepts signify for him is plain from the context, whether one think of

the transition in Phaedo from the intelligence of Anaxagoras which separates extraneously the mixed individuals of a material world to an intelligence which moves 'for the best,' or of the good of Republic toward which are ordered alike the divisions of the state and the soul. Zeno's arguments had for their purpose to show that nature or the material world which humans commonly suppose to be there, and themselves to be in it, is, for a thinking which has just begun to know itself, a nullity. How from this abstract beginning 'the one' came to be 'the good' in which is centred in the sensible and ideal totalities Plato treats only elusively.

From his standpoint it is not possible to write such a history of Presocratic philosophy as one has in Aristotle, which supposes that the substantial unity of the ideal and sensible world, toward which Plato's thought

tends, has been discovered, and with it the division of being into primary genera or categories. The history of philosophy can then be regarded as a history of the discovery of the elements of substance." (p. 86)
Drecoll, Volker Henning. 2010. "The Greek Text behind the Parallel Sections in Zostrianos and Marius Victorinus." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 195–212. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"What I want to offer however, is a new reconsideration of the postulated common source."

(...)

"Later scholars such as John Turner and Kevin Corrigan developed the hypothesis that the common source is very significant for the history of Platonism, especially the reception of Plato’s Parmenides (therefore,

Sethian texts like Zostrianos and Allogenes may depend on the Anonymous Commentary on Parmenides of the Turin Palimpsest being Pre-Plotinian).(3) Pursuing this strategy of research, I want to analyze the common source." (pp.195-196)

(3) For this, see Turner 2000b, 157–210; 2000, 179–224; Corrigan 2000, 141–77

References

Corrigan, K. 2000. Platonism and Gnosticism: The Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides: Middle or Neoplatonic?” in Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts. Edited by J. Turner and R. Majercik. SBLSymS 12. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 141–77.

Turner, J. D. 2000. Commentary. Pages 483–662 in Zostrien (NH VIII,1). BCNH 24. Edited by C. Barry, W.-P. Funk, P.-H. Poirier, and J. D. Turner. Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval; Louvain: Peeters.

Turner, J. D.2000b. The Setting of the Platonizing Sethian Treatises in Middle Platonism. Pages 179–224 in Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts. Edited by J. D. Turner and R. Majerick. SBLSymS 12. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
———. 2010. "Is Porphyry the Source Used by Marius Victorinus?" In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 65–80. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"In my opinion, we have four hypotheses:(4) a) Victorinus and Zostrianos used a common Greek, perhaps Middle Platonic source (Tardieu and followers); b) Victorinus used Christian material whose Gnostic character he did not recognize as such because in Rome such Gnostics were highly assimilated members of Christian circles (Abramowski 2005); and c) Victorinus perhaps used actual texts known in the school of

Plotinus, perhaps even the Greek original of the Zostrianos directly; or d) a Neoplatonic text that was itself dependent on Zostrianos (these possibilities I would like to maintain in discussion). Anyway, it is clear that these passages of Adversus Arium that Hadot ascribed to Porphyry are not Porphyrian, but date back to another, perhaps even pre-Plotinian source. This also raises the question of the origin and provenance of the other passages recognized as Porphyrian by Hadot."

(4) For the details and bibliography see Drecoll, “The Greek Text behind the Parallel Sections in Zostrianos and Marius Victorinus” in vol. 1:195–212 of the present work.

References

Abramowski, L. 2005. Nicänismus und Gnosis im Rom des Bischofs Liberius: Der Fall des Marius Victorinus. Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 8:513–66.
Duncombe, Matthew. 2013. "The Greatest Difficulty at Parmenides 133c-134e and Plato's Relative Terms." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 45:43–61.

"The first part of Plato's Parmenides bombards the theory of Forms with objections. Parmenides singles out one criticism as the 'Greatest Difficulty' (hereafter ' G D ' ) and presents it at Parmenides 133 c-134 E. The argument has received some attention, but scholars generally think that it does not pose a threat to the theory of Forms, either because it is not formally valid or, if it is formally valid, because it begs the question against the Platonist. This paper aims to show that the G D is a serious challenge to the theory of Forms, neither invalid, at least for the reasons usually given, nor question-begging." (p. 43)
Duque, Mateo. 2022. "“Οὐκ ἔστιν” (141e8): The Performative Contradiction of the First Hypothesis." In Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 347–354. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "At the end of the first hypothesis, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that being [οὐσία] must be in time; that is, that being must partake in at least one of the temporal modes: either to have been in the past, to be in the present, or it will be in the future (140e-142a). If this is true, then “the one does not partake in being” (141e7-8), meaning temporal being—to which Aristotle agrees, saying “Apparently not” (141e9). Parmenides then gets Aristotle to agree that “Therefore, ‘the one’ in no way is” (141e9-10). This, however, contradicts the very first premise that begins Parmenides’ entire gymnastic exercise, “if one is” (137c4). The problem with the previous conclusion—that to be is to be in time—is that in professing his assent to it, Aristotle, in fact, gainsays it. He performatively contradicts the very thing he wants to assert. Aristotle answers Parmenides question, “Therefore could something partake of being in anyway other than in one of those ways?” (141e7-8) with a two-word answer in Greek: “οὐκ ἔστιν [It’s not possible].” We can, therefore, ask of the very claim Aristotle is making—that it is impossible for something to be and not be in time—when in time does it hold true? At what time is it “not possible [οὐκ ἔστιν]” for something to not partake of temporal being? Is it not possible only in the present moment, in the past, or in the future? If Aristotle’s assertion is to have any force it must hold always. It has the same tenselessness as mathematical propositions, like ‘1+1=2’ Forms, like mathematical entities, must necessarily have atemporal existence. Accordingly, in atemporally maintaining that anything that is must be in time, Aristotle undermines his own assertion. He performatively contradicts the very thing that he wants to affirm."
Durrant, Michael. 1975. "Parmenides 127e-130e." Philosophical Papers no. 4:105–115.
Edwards, Mark. 2010. "Christians and the Parmenides." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 189–198. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"It may be felt that the present paper achieves too little even for an exercise in negative theology. Not only does it leave a great deal unsaid that was suggested by its title, but it proposes to unsay at least part of what has been said admirably by others. If in addition I seem to be sweeping away with the left hand even the crumbs of positive speculation that are seen falling here and there from my

right—this much, it may be granted, is in the spirit of the Parmenides, though my simile may be more Christian than Platonic. Even without this pretext, it is enough to plead that time and knowledge are finite (as Plato recognized, though not in the Parmenides) to explain my failure to canvass more than two topics in this paper. The first is the use of a formula, ἅρρητος καὶ ἀκατονόμαστος, which I believe to be not so much of a commonplace in Platonic literature as is generally supposed. The second concerns the provenance of the only text, the Anonymus Taurinensis or Commentary on the Parmenides, which contains this phrase but does not belong avowedly to that circle for which the Bible is the sole canon of theological speculation. While my proposals may not agree with those advanced by any other scholar at this meeting, it should be evident that I can scarcely be said to disagree with anyone when my principal thesis is that there is barely a conjecture on either topic that can be proved untenable." (p. 189)
———. 2010. "Origen’s Platonism: Questions and Caveats." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 199–216. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

Reprinted with permission from Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 12 (2008), 20–38.

"In the following paper I hope to show first that borrowing and dependence are inadequate terms to characterize the relation between philosophy and theology in Origen, and then that his reflection on Christian axioms in the light of philosophical disputes concerning the provenance of the soul did not (as is often thought) confirm his adherence to Plato, but on the contrary led him at least far from any Greek norm as from the prevailing canons of orthodoxy in the Church." (p. 200)
Eustacchi, Francsca. 2024. "The Eleatic elements in the metaphysical reflecton and in the physical mentions of the Parmenides." Organon no. 56:35–52.

Abstract: "In the Parmenides, it is possible to identify affirmations that are clearly of Eleatic origin and which are re-elaborated by Plato who includes them ad hoc when developing his arguments. The dialectical contribution on the question of the multiplicity of entities given to the Parmenidean philosophy by Zeno is discussed not only in the first part of the dialogue (see 127d–128d) but also in the second. In the latter, Parmenides adopts an ontological-metaphysical setting through which Plato gives an example of the various uses of Zenonian dialectic. Here all the hypotheses concerning the One are analysed (see 136a–c)."
Evans, David. 1994. "Socrates and Zeno: Plato, Parmenides 129." International Journal of Philosophical Studies no. 2:243–255.

"The first part of the work [the Parmenides] consists of a critical examination of the theory of Forms; and the opening moves in this exercise consist of a dialectical exchange between Socrates and Zeno. This is my topic. The passage raises issues of all the kinds just mentioned - issues relating to the philosophical content, method and purpose of Plato's work. It is one of the rare passages in which Plato presents, clearly and succinctly, the theory of Forms; and it does so in order to resolve a specific philosophical difficulty. As we reflect on the way the theory is outlined in this passage, questions about Plato's position vis-a-vis the debates over realism and idealism, or monism and pluralism, will very naturally occur. Our passage also suggests a number of views concerning the form and purpose of the composition of the Parmenides.

I shall be aiming to say something, at least, about these larger questions.

But a prior task — and my main one — is to determine what is actually said in this passage. Surprisingly, there has not been much earlier discussion of this matter;1 and what there is, provides inadequate analysis. So I shall spend most of my time on the passage itself; but towards the end I hope to say something about the larger issues." (p. 243)
Farndell, Arthur. 2008. Evermore Shall Be So. Ficino on Plato's Parmenides. London: Shepheard-Walwyn (Publishers).

English translation of Marsilio Ficino Commentary to Plato’s Parmenides.

"In all these hypotheses the general intention of Parmenides is to affirm this above all: there is a single principle of all things, and if that is in place everything is in place, but if it be removed everything perishes. Thus in the first five hypotheses he conveys five steps of creation in a single assumed order of creation. However, in the following four hypotheses he examines how many absurdities and errors and evils follow if the One itself be removed.

Of the five earlier hypotheses the first discusses the one supreme God, how He creates and arranges the orders of the divinities that follow. The second discusses the individual orders of the divinities and how they proceed from God Himself. The third discusses divine souls; the fourth discusses those which come into being in the region which surrounds matter and how they are produced by the highest causes.

The fifth discusses primal matter, how it is free from differentiation by its own nature, and how it is dependent on the original One. It should also be noted that when One is mentioned in this dialogue it can, as in the system of the Pythagoreans, indicate any single substance that is totally detached from matter, such as God, mind, and soul. But when the terms other and other things are used, they may be understood both as matter and as those things which come into being within matter.

Having, therefore, stated and heeded these things first, let us move to the dialogue itself." (from the Preface by Marsilio Ficino, p. 5)
Ferrari, Franco. 2010. "Parmenides’ Antiplatonism: Some Observations on Plato's Parmenides." In Philosophy and Dialogue: Studies on Plato's Dialogues II, edited by Bosch-Veciana, Antoni and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, 51–65. Barcelona: Barcelonesa d’Edicions.
Fielder, John H. 1978. "Plotinus' reply to the arguments of Parmenides 130a-131d." Apeiron no. 12:1–5.

"In a well-known passage in the Parmenides (130a-132b) Plato presents a series of objections to the Theory of Forms. The youthful Socrates is unable to reply to these objections and nowhere else in the dialogues do we find a refutation of them. Some of these arguments are taken up by Plotinus.(1) His responses have considerable philosophical merit and provide an additional perspective on the philosophical possibilities of the Theory of Forms. In what follows I set out Plotinus' responses to the arguments of Parmenides 130a-13ld and show how they meet the objections raised there." (p. 1)

(1) Plotinus does not have anything to say about the 'Third Man' argument (Parm. 130a - 132b), and consequently it is omitted from the present discussion. This point is discussed briefly at the end of the article.
Finamore, John F. 2010. "Iamblichus’s Interpretation of the Parmenides’ Third Hypothesis." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 119–132. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"In Iamblichus’s commentary on the Parmenides frg. 2 the philosopher adopts an interpretation of the third hypothesis that no other Platonic philosopher before or after him has done. According to Iamblichus the hypothesis concerned not soul but the so-called superior classes, that is, angels, daemons, and heroes. As Dillon has suggested (Dillon 1973, 389), the reason for this unusual interpretation surely has to do with the importance of these intermediary divinities in Iamblichus’s religious system. I wish to examine this Iamblichean doctrine and consider the reasons behind it.

We of course do not possess Iamblichus’s commentary to Plato’s Parmenides.

Syrianus (In Metaph. 38.36–39.6 = Iamblichus, In Parm. frg. 1) informs us that Iamblichus did write such a commentary, and Damascius refers often to Iamblichus in his own commentary to the Parmenides.(1) We can be certain therefore that Iamblichus did write a commentary, and it seems likely that we can find hints of its contents throughout Proclus’s and Damascius’s commentaries to Plato’s work." (p. 119)

(1) See Dillon 1987, xxx–xxxi, where he says that “we have about ten references to” Iamblichus’s commentary in Damascius’s In Parm. See frgs. 3–14. Cf. Dillon 1973, 22–23.

References

Dillon, J. M. 1973a. Iamblichi Chalcidensis In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta. Philosophia antiqua 23. Leiden: Brill.

———. 1973b. In Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta. With text, translation and commentary. Philosophia antiqua 23. Leiden: Brill.

———. 1987. Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 240 – 325 A.D.). ANRW 36.2:862–909. Part 2. Berlin: de Gruyter
Fine, Gail. 2020. "Knowledge and Truth in the Greatest Difficulty Argument: Parmenides 133b4–134b5." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism no. 10:209–234.

Abstract: "One of Plato’s central tenets is that we can know forms. In Parmenides 133b4–134b5, Plato presents an argument whose sceptical conclusion is that we can’t know forms.

Although he indicates that the argument doesn’t succeed, he also says it’s difficult to explain how it fails. Commentators have suggested a variety of flaws. I argue that the argument can be defended against some, though not all, of the alleged flaws. But I also argue that Plato hints at a crucial distinction that hasn’t been brought to bear in this context, and that indeed he is sometimes thought not to draw: that between the content and object of knowledge. Once we are clear about this distinction, we can see

that the sceptical argument doesn’t imply that we can’t know forms."
Forcignanò, Filippo. 2022. "Anaxagoras in Plato’s Parmenides." In Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 91–99. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "In the following paper I look at two cases that show the relevant presence of Anaxagoras’s lexicon and metaphysics in the Parmenides. The dialogue suggests us to consider Anaxagoras’s philosophy as its theoretical background from the very first lines of the text, where the city of Clazomenae is named three times for no apparent reason. The first case concerns the eponymic relationship between Forms and things. I argue that the opening sentence of column XIX of the Derveni papyrus (1-2) could be an Anaxagorean source of Plato’s eponymy, since the author of the column asserts that the name of the dominant element in the compound is also the name of the whole compound. Plato’s proposal is a response to this way of setting the eponymic relationship. The second case is Plato’s re-use of three relevant Anaxagoras’s locutions: μοῖραν μετέχειν, ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, and χωρισθῆναι (frr. B6 [D25 LM] and B12 [D27 LM]). I claim that in Plato’s opinion if we adopt an Anaxagorean version of participation, we have to assume that the primitive stuffs are literally parts of the compounds and participation is a kind of mixture. This implies that the stuffs mixed together are all of the same ontological type, viz. they are physical entities. In this ontological framework, it is impossible to share a thing without splitting it. The only way to escape from this is to say that Forms are a different kind of object than physical entities and therefore that it can be in many things simultaneously, as the Day Analogy proposed by Socrates against Parmenides clearly shows."
Forrester, James William. 1972. "Plato's Parmenides: The Structure of the First Hypothesis " Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 10:1–14.

"It is my concern in this paper to vindicate the possibility of a positive interpretation of the First Hypothesis. I shall argue that a proper understanding of the final lines of that hypothesis leads one to see those lines as an insuperable obstacle--but an obstacle, not to a Neoplatonist or other positive interpreter, but rather to any commentator who holds that if the First Hypothesis teaches any lesson, it comes by reductio ad absurdum. Such interpretations as those of Cornford, Ryle, and Taylor, which find no positive doctrine straightforwardly expressed in the First Hypothesis, will turn out to be incompatible with a proper understanding of the end of that hypothesis.(7)

I should make it clear at the start that I am not offering an interpretation of the First Hypothesis. To do so, I should have to examine what, if anything, Plato means by 'The One' in that hypothesis. But, so far as my argument in this paper is concerned, the One may be any unity at all (considered as a mere unity), or any of a group of transcendent unities (Forms), a particular important member of such a group (the Form of Unity), or a sole transcendent Neoplatonic principle. All that my argument requires is that Plato believes that the term 'the One' denotes some real entity, some sort of unitary existent. I am thus confining myself in this paper to a prolegomenon to an interpretation of the First Hypothesis: a study of the structure of that hypothesis." (p. 2)

(7) F. M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd., 1939). G. Ryle, "Plato's Parmenides," Mind, n.s. 48 (1939), 129-151, 302-325; reprinted in R. E. Allen, ed., Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 97-147. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1956).
———. 1974. "Arguments and Able Man Could Refute: Parmenides 133b-134e." Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 19:233–237.

"How might Parmenides support the conclusion that we cannot know Forms? I can think of two ways: he might use the mastery-slavery example to support a general principle that Forms are related only to Forms; or else he might hold that a Form cannot be an instance of any Form except itself. Neither of these ways is promising," (p. 236)

(...)

"The able man could indeed show that Parmenides' argument is fallacious. But he would have reason to affirm Parmenides' hint at 133 b 4 that the fallacy is by no means a gross one, easily detected by everybody at first sight." (pp. 236-237, a note omitted)

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