Steel, Carlos. 1997. "Iamblichus and the theological interpretation of the Parmenides." Syllecta classica no. 8:15–30.

"The development of Neoplatonism is in many ways interconnected with the history of the interpretation of the Parmenides. The different views about the first principles that were defended in the School since Plotinus often depended upon a particular understanding of the hypotheses of the Parmenides. But one could as well say that a specific reading of the Parmenides started from a particular set of philosophical premisses. This interdependence of hermeneutics and philosophical speculation is particularly manifest in the case of Iamblichus who, in his interpretation of the Platonic texts, always intended "to consider the truth and reality" and was never satisfied with purely philological or literary explanations.1 His important Commentary on the Parmenides is unfortunately lost. However we can reconstruct the basic principles of his interpretation thanks to the information we may gather from Proclus' monumental commentary.2" (p. 15)

(...)

"In this paper, however, I will examine his most controversial interpretation of the first hypothesis, and, subsidiary, of the second. As Proclus says, all interpreters from Plotinus on had agreed "that the first hypothesis concerns the primal God," the One or the Good, the first principle and ultimate end of all things.3 Iamblichus, however, seems to be an exception. For according to Proclus he argued that the first hypothesis is concerned "with God and the gods" (περί θεού και θεών), "for the argument is not only about the One, but about all the divine henads."4 The position of Iamblichus about the first hypothesis is not just an eccentric view of a bizarre philosopher occupied more with theurgy and religion than philosophical questions.

On the contrary, it marks an important step in the history of the interpretation of the Parmenides, as is indirectly evident from the rather extended reaction of Proclus against his position."

(1) On Iamblichus' hermeneutica! method, see the article of H.J. Blumenthal in this volume, pages 1-13.

(2) Although Proclus uses extensively materials from previous commentators, and particularly from Porphyry and Iamblichus, he never explicitly mentions the names of his authorities, except for Syrianus. However, it is possible to identify many anonymous positions with great certainty.(...)

(3) In Platonis Parmenidem Commentarii 6.1053.39-1054.1.

(4) Ibid., 6.1051.37-52.2.

References

Henry J. Blumenthal, Iamblichus as a Commentator, Syllecta Classica, 8, 1997, pp. 1-13.
———. 1999. "« Negatio negationis »: Proclus on the final lemma of the first hypothesis of the « Parmenides »." In Traditions of Platonism: Essays in Honour of John Dillon, edited by Cleary, John J., 351–368. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"Is it then possible that about the One these things are so? It does not seem possible to me (142a6-8) (1)

As Proclus observes in his Commentary, this is a very paradoxical conclusion which gives us much perplexity. For what does Parmenides mean when he suggests that all the preceding negative conclusions about the One are "impossible"? It seems that by this one phrase the whole preceding argument is discredited, and that we must give up the hypothesis of a pure One altogether." (p. 351)

(...)

"As we have seen, the last phrase of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides confronts us with the most difficult questions about the First. Must we abandon an absolute One as an impossibility and accept as first principle the One-Being or Intellect (as did Origen)? And if we admit the existence of a One beyond Being, must we identify it with the First, or accept an Ineffable even beyond the One? And what is the significance of a dialectical method that ends in silence because it asks us to remove even negations?

The expression "negatio negationis" does not as such appear in Proclus' text. We took it from Meister Eckhart who gives it an important role in his theological discourse. According to Eckhart we first have to

remove from God all attributes linked to the creatures. However, ultimately we have to deny even the negations seeing that no negation is possible of God because we cannot deny something of God. Therefore we have to deny all negations, and this is negatio negationis. All this sounds similar to Proclus' arguments and some scholars even assume there has been an influence of Proclus on Eckhart. Apart from the historical implausibility of this thesis, it is evident that Eckhart understands this negation of negation in a quite different sense. For him indeed the negatio negationis is the most pure and most perfect affirmation as is God's self revelation " I am who I am."(32) The combination of negative theology with the affirmation of pure Being is in fact characteristic of all Christian Neoplatonism. In Proclus, however, the negation of negation never can have an affirmative power. It brings us into the absolute silence." (pp. 367-368)

(1) This is a dreadfully literal translation of this question, but needed to understand all the subtleties of Proclus' subsequent interpretation.

(32) In Ex. N.74 [Latin Works II, 77.6-12](...)
———. 2004. "Definitions and ideas. Aristotle, Proclus and the Socrates of the « Parmenides »." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy no. 19:103–121.

"For Aristotle, the doctrine of the Ideas originated because the Platonists gave separate existence to the universals, which are expressed in definitions. Given this interpretation it was not difficult to criticise the doctrine. If we have to posit transcendent Forms for each universal predicate that may be defined, we will end up with Forms of relative or negative terms and other absurdities.(5) But, as Proclus argues, Aristotle

did not understand that there is a radical difference between the universal, which is object of a definition, and the Idea or the transcendent Form, which Socrates and Plato attempt to reach by "their divine impulse."(6) Contrary to what Aristotle thinks, there is no simple correspondence between universals and Ideas. Many of the universal concepts we form by abstraction have no corresponding Idea, existing by itself and separately. There are, for example, no transcendent Ideas of artificial objects.

Moreover, the Ideas themselves escape all attempts to define them and are grasped only through an intuitive thought, which transcends all discursive dialectic.

This position, however, confronts Proclus with an embarrassing problem of interpretation. Plato uses in the text of the Parmenides five times the verb οδιζειν with respect to the Ideas. It is even said that those who refuse to "define" for each particular being its specific form, will destroy the basis for all dialectic.(7) How, then, can Proclus deny the possibility of defining the Ideas? It is this question, on how definitions and ideas are related, not so much the question of the historical Socrates, that will occupy our attention in this paper." (p. 105)

(5) Cf. Metaph. A 9, 990b4-34.

(6) 6 See In Parm. Ill 784.9-10 (Cf. also In Parm. I 634.25; 676.23; V 992.15). See Parm. 135d2-3 [Greek text omitted]

(7) See the following texts: Parm. 133a8-b2: Parm. 135a1-3: Parm.135c7 [Greek text omitted]
———. 2009. "Syrianus' theological interpretation of the « Parmenides »: the time of the divine souls " In Syrianus et la métaphysique de l'Antiquité tardive : actes du colloque international, Université de Genève, 29 septembre-1er octobre 2006, edited by Longo, Angela, 201–229. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

"Proclus calls his master Syrianus «the most theological of all interpreters» of Plato(1) The theological perspective of his reading of Plato is particularly evident in his interpretation of the Parmenides. As Proclus witnesses in the preface of his commentary, it is Syrianus who «has unfolded to us with his own very pure intuitions» «the most sublime (έποπτικωτάτη] )(2) and mystical doctrine that Plato reveals to us in

the Parmenides with a profundity appropriate to its subject»." (p. 201)

(...)

"In this contribution I propose to examine a passage in the Parmenides that seems to offer serious problems for Syrianus' theological reading, namely the last deduction from the One-that-is, which demonstrates that the One partakes of time." [Parmen. 151 E3 - 152 A3] (p. 205)

(1) Cfr. Procl.. in Tim. III, p. 1 4 , 19.

(2) Cfr. Theol. plat. I, 1 0 , p. 44, 5·6 where the Parmenides is called «the most epoptic of Plato's treatises». The term epopteia is used for the highest degree in the initiation rituals.
———. 2016. "A rhetorical reading of Plato’s « Parmenides » " In Philosophus orator: rhetorische Strategien und Strukturen in philosophischer Literatur: Michael Erler zum 60. Geburtstag, edited by Männlein-Robert, Irmgard, Rother, Wolfgang and Schorn, Stefan, 279–296. Basel: Schwabe.

"In the introduction of his commentary on the Parmenides Proclus surveys the interpretation of this dialogue in the Platonic tradition.(1) He distinguishes two types of interpretation, one called logikos, another pragmateiôdês. The latter, which he favours, assumes that the dialogue, and in particular the dialectical discussion on the One, discusses pragmata – realities – whether they be the Forms (as some thought), or the first principles, or the gods. The former type of interpretation is called logikos because it focuses on the literary form and method of the dialogue, rather than on its presumed metaphysical doctrine. In fact, as these interpreters argue, it is not possible to discover a definite doctrine in the Parmenides, since the dialogue ends with a host of contradictions. Within this ‘logical’ genre Proclus distinguishes two distinct approaches to the dialogue which are nevertheless related to one another.(2) In the present contribution, I will focus on the first of these approaches, which – in my view – should be understood as a rhetorical interpretation of the dialogue. This rhetorical reading of the Parmenides, which was adopted by some Platonists before Plotinus, has not been sufficiently noticed by scholars, since it is easily classified – and dismissed – under the heading ‘logical’. My analysis will be based upon Proclus’ summary of this interpretation in 631, 4–633, 9, a summary that he (or already Syrianus) probably took up from an earlier commentary on the Parmenides. There are certain editorial problems affecting the organisation of this text, which I shall discuss in a concluding philological note." (pp. 279-280, a note omitted)

(1) See on this survey Carlos Steel: Une histoire de l’interprétation du Parménide dans l’antiquité, in: Maria Brabanti, Francesco Romano (a cura di): Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione. Atti del III Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo (Catania 2002) 11–40; Luc Brisson: The Reception of the Parmenides before Proclus, in: ZAC [Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum] 12 (2008) 99–113.

(2) On this logical interpretation see Carlos Steel: Proclus et l’interprétation logique du Parménide, in: Linos G. Benakis (éd.): Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale. Actes du Colloque international de Corfou, 6–8 octobre 1995 (Turnhout 1997) 69–92; Luc Brisson: Columns VII–VIII of the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides. Vestiges of a Logical Interpretation, in: Kevin Corrigan, John D. Turner (eds.): Plato’s Parmenides and Its Heritage. Volume 2: Its Reception in Neoplatonic, Jewish and Christian Texts (Atlanta 2011) 111–117.
Steel, Carlos, and Friedrich, Rumbach. 1997. "The Final Section of Proclus' Commentary on the Parmenides. A Greek Retroversion of the Latin Translation." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no. 8:211–267.

With an English Translation by D. Gregory MacIsaac.

"The last section of Proclus' Commentary on the Parmenides has not been preserved in the Greek manuscript tradition, presumably because in the codex on which all of the Greek manuscripts depend, the last quire was lost. Fortunately, William of Moerbeke still had the complete text in his Greek manuscript when he translated the Commentary into Latin between 1280 and 1286. Since the rediscovery of this translation by R. Klibansky in 1929, this final section of the Commentary has aroused much interest. It is, in fact, a most interesting text, one of the major expositions of negative theology, in which Proclus gives reasons why we must ultimately negate all of the negations of the One, and even reject that the One « is » and that it is one. However, the Latin text is often very obscure, and even unintelligible, for readers not used to Moerbeke's method of translation.

When R. Klibansky, together with L. Labowsky, first published the Latin translation of the lost Greek text, they also made an English translation of it.

It is a polished and readable version, but often more a paraphrase than a translation, as whenever the Latin text was obscure, they paraphrased it. In their edition of the Latin text, they introduced some excellent conjectures, but other corrections were superfluous. They also provided a series of explanatory notes quoting many parallel texts in the other works of Proclus that contributed much to the under standing of the Latin section(1). Their translation was integrated in the complete English translation of the Commentary by Morrow and Dillon, with some corrections suggested by L. Westerink(2)." (p. 211)

(...)

"The substrate of the Greek text that is published here is the work of Dr. F. Rumbach. Without his scrupulous preparation, and talented Greek translation skill, I would never have had the courage to undertake this ambitious enterprise." (p. 213)

(1) Parmenides usque ad finem primae Hypothesis nee non Procli Commentarium in Parmenidem pars ultima adhuc inedita interprete Guillelmo de Moerbeka ediderunt praefatione et adnotationibus instruxerunt R. Klibansky et C. Labiwsky (Plato Latinus, Vol.III), London 1953. We will refer to this edition as K-L.

(2) Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, translated by G.R. Morrow and J.M. Dillon, Princeton 1987.
Stella, Aldo, and Ianulardo, Giancarlo. 2020. "Plato and Parmenides' parricide. Some theoretical reflections." In Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Jean-Marc Trigeaud, edited by Zabalza, Alexandre, 203–213. Pompignac: Êditions Bière.

Abstract: "In this article we reconsider Parmenides’ Parricide, which is notoriously thought to have been accomplished by Plato, and show that is not based on strong reasons but on the alleged undeniability of experience. Instead we think that such undeniability is only formal, being based on an extrinsic denial which requires that which is denied.

Moreover we show that those who oppose the unity of being, which is its absoluteness – as Parmenides maintains –, to the multiplicity of entities do not consider that they are not disposed on the same level, so that their opposition is untenable. Since the One

(Being) and the Many (non-being) are on different levels, one can understand the level of being as emerging beyond the universe of determination (finite being), which is that which Parmenides identifies with non-being."
Sternfeld, Robert, and Zyskind, Harold. 1980. "Plato's Parmenides and the Transcendental Conditions for Discourse." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 34:599–609.

"The Parmenides is thought to be Plato's most perplexing dialogue, occasioning much interpretation and controversy (1). This sketchy note presents a unifying thesis about the dialogue. Since our aim is to grasp the dialogue as a whole with the major parts in place in the developing argument, we pass over much of the detail in the total argument. Further, since we concentrate on Plato's terms directly, we do not deal with the vast commentary. We hope this will provide a stronger sense of direct contact with the original intention of the work. The scholarly task of embracing or rejecting ideas expressed elsewhere is thus left to a subsequent study."

(1) (I) We are indebted to Robert S. Brumbaugh's massive scholarly and interpretive study of the Parmenidean hypotheses in his book, Plato on the One (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1961).(...)
———. 1986. "Plato's Parmenides: The Drama and the Problem." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 40:140–156.

"In our account of the Parmenidean hypotheses(1), we noted, but were not there concerned with showing, that the dramatic structure of the dialogue reinforces the logical structure of the argument and we only sketchily listed the issues raised about the Theory of Ideas - these issues providing the occasion for Parmenides' exposition of his hypotheses. In this paper, we wish to show how the dramatic structure reinforces the argument and how the issue raised about the Theory of Ideas by Parmenides prepare for the hypotheses. We are apparently following the old comic routine: after giving the answers, we now specify what is the question appropriate to that answer. Certainly, having specified the answer as a unified argument, we do have a guide for understanding the general setting of the problem. This understanding enables us to refine one point made in our conclusion to our study of the hypotheses. We can now state more precisely the sense in which the Parmenides constitutes a study of the transcendental conditions of discourse." (p. 140)

(1) Robert Sternfled and Harold Zyskind, "Plato's Parmenides and the Transcendental Conditions for Discourse", Revue Internationale de Philosophie, No. 133-34 (1980) pp. 599-609.
———. 1987. Meaning, Relation and Existence in Plato's Parmenides. The Logic of Relational Realism. New York: Peter Lang.

Table of Contents: Preface IX; Acknowledgements XV; Chapter I. Some Interpretations of and Some Themes in the Parmenides 1; Chapter II. The Eighth Hypotheses Schema 21; Chapter III. The Nine Hypotheses Schema: The Tripartite Matrix 35; Chapter IV. The Socratic Theory of Ideas and the Hypotheses 53; Chapter V. Plato’s General Theory of Abstract Relations 77; Chapter VI. Relations in Existence 93; Chapter VII. The Human Dimension 123; Chapter VIII. Conclusion: The Parmenidean Method 161; Index 181-187.

"We have gone through several stages in our coming to understand the Parmenides. The obvious problem is of course understanding the hypotheses. Our first paper(1) combined the schema of repeated pairs of hypotheses (our present chapter II) with the more complex matrix structure of hypotheses (our present chapter III). Our second paper(2) raised questions about the dramatic structure and about the problem of the Parmenides which ultimately led to more penetrating insights now found in chapters VI and VII. Chapters IV, V, and VII present our final theoretical findings about the hypotheses, these also having led us to the new insights of chapters VI and VII. The repeated return in the hypotheses to an apparently identical starting point (or its negation) suggests analogously that some sort of “reading backwards” or “recursive reading” is needed to understand this dialogue. Perhaps, understanding is cumulatively developed by moving from diverse conclusions back to an apparently “common” starting-point." (Preface, pp. IX-X)

(1) “Plato’s Parmenides and the Transcendental Conditions for Discourse,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 133-34, 1980, pp. 599-609.

(2) “Plato’s Parmenides: The Drama and the Problem,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 156-157, 1986, pp. 140-156.
Stough, Charlotte. 1976. "Explanation and the Parmenides." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 6:379–401.

"In what follows I propose to consider the relevance of Plato's early claim that his Forms are explanatory to the structure of, and several of the main arguments of, the Parmenides. The first section of the paper looks into some implications of separate existence, exploring connections between the criticism of separation and the conception of Forms as explanatory principles. I focus attention on what the Forms do not explain, and suggest that the burden of much of Parmenides' criticism centers on that question. Part two deals with Plato's evidently changing stance on the issue of explaining the Forms themselves. The third section takes up passages from the Parmenides in support of the view that Plato came to believe that his Forms stood in need of the same sort of explanation as he had originally thought was required for sensory particulars. The discussion is largely exploratory, and the connections adumbrated are intended as guidelines for further investigation." (p. 379)
Sumi, Atsushi. 2006. "The « species infima » as the infinite: Timaeus 39 E 7-9 ; Parmenides 144 B 4-C 1 ; and Philebus 16 E 1-2 in Plotinus, Ennead VI, 2, 22." In Reading Plato in Antiquity, edited by Tarrant, Harold A. S. and C., Baltzly. Dirk, 73–88. London: Duckworth.

"In this paper I will explicate the ne plus ultra of Plotinus' philosophical reading of Plato in VI.2.22. Here Plotinus treats together Timaeus 31b1 and 39e7-9, Parmenides 144b4-c1 and Philebus 16e1-2, viewing the former two texts as Platonic riddles. This complicated situation makes the interpretation of the key passage in lines 11-23 extremely difficult. Hence translations of that passage differ widely. Then I suggest some necessary modifications to Armstrong's translation, and clarify this extreme case of Plotinus' reading of Platonic enigmas, so that our inquiry must proceed rather like a running commentary. The basic text used in this paper is the minor edition (H-S²) by Henry and Schwyzer. Several translations in European languages are referred to, where 'the German translators' collectively stand for Harder, Beutler and Theiler. Before our careful analysis of the key passage, we must review the related context." (pp. 73-74, a note omitted)

References

Beutler, R. and W. Theiler (1960-7), Plotins Schriften, übersetzt von R. Harder, Neubearbeitung mit griechische Lesetext und Anmerkungen, 6 vols, Hamburg.

Henry P. and R. R. Schwyzer (eds) (1964-82), Plotinus, Enneads, Oxford, cited as HS². (Previous edition HS¹, 1951, Brussels.)
Sweeney, Leo. 1988. "Participation in Plato's Dialogues: Phaedo, Parmenides, Sophist, Timaeus." The New Scholasticism no. 62:125–149.

"The aim of this paper is to give a synthetic and overview interpretation of what Plato intends by "participation" in several dialogues. "Phaedo", 100 sqq.: participation is the effect of the Forms' presence in things and of their having something in common. "Parmenides", 248-249: participation consists of things "being-caused-as-images-of Forms," where "cause" will in later dialogues be disclosed to be the Forms as models and goals and intellects as agents. "Sophist", 219 sqq. and 266a sqq: by productive art intelligent agents -- human and divine -- cause products to participate through contemplation of Forms as models. "Timaeus", 26b-30d and 47e sqq.: working with the receptacle as the participant underlying all participation, the divine craftsman uses the Forms as models and telic causes in producing individual souls and bodies, together with the entire visible universe itself. "Symposium", 210e-211b, "Phaedo", 79d and "Republic", vi, 511d suggest that Plato's philosophy is not a phenomenology."
Szaif, Jan. 2022. "Pseudo-Objects in a World of Seeming (Prm. 164b–165e)." In Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 439–451. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "What place, if any, did illusory and fictitious objects have in Plato’s ontology? If he viewed them as a valid topic for ontological inquiry, did he grant them some minimal level of being (reality) because of their distinguishability, or how else did he account for them?

The aim of this essay is to show that Deduction VII in Plato’s Parmenides yields some hypothetical answers to these questions. The essay describes how the inferences about “the Others,” under the assumption that “the One is not,” construct a world of pseudo-objects whose unity and identity is a matter of mere seeming. They are nevertheless temporarily distinguishable from the subjective standpoint of an observer and hence allow for some form of mental or linguistic reference. Devoid of being, they still stand out against the limiting case of total nothingness evoked in the counterpart to VII, Deduction VIII. I argue that this deduction explores how one could understand reference to illusory or fictitious entities while maintaining that an object cannot have genuine attributes unless it is real.

The essay also discusses how the ontology of the Others as pseudo-objects in Deduction VII compares to the role of the Others as a numerically indeterminate substrate for real objects, introduced Deduction III. It explains why the absence of the One, which in III acts as a generative principle for real objects, leaves room for a world made up of illusory objects. As part of my interpretation, this essay also elucidates the meaning of the central analogy with skiagraphia paintings."
Szlezák, Thomas. 2010. "The Indefinite Dyad in Sextus Empiricus’s Report (Adversus Mathematicos 10.248–283) and Plato’s Parmenides." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 79–91. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"Sextus Empiricus’s report in the tenth book of Adversus mathematicos about a theory of the principles of all things, which the Pythagoreans are supposed to have held, is one of the most problematic texts in the history of ancient philosophy." (p. 79)

(...)

"Thus, we have good reasons for considering Sextus’s report as a “Neopythagorean” version of an older report on Plato’s lecture “On the Good.”

The interpretation of the Platonic Parmenides that we find in Simplicius’s quotation taken from Moderatus, and that seems to contain the key to the Neoplatonic hierarchy of hypostases is also considered to be Neopythagorean. This raises the question of whether one might be able to find a connection between Sextus’s report and the Parmenides, or a certain interpretation of the Parmenides.

Clearly the challenge stems from the fact that there is no clear reference in the one text to the other, nor an easily recognizable concurrence. I intend to determine the position of Sextus’s report relative to Plato and Neoplatonism more precisely by considering the ἀόριστος δυάς in both texts." (p. 82)
Tabak, Mehmet. 2015. Plato's Parmenides Reconsidered. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; 1 Forms in the Middle-Period Dialogues 5; 2 Parmenides, Part I 29; 3 Parmenides, Part II 59; 4 Parmenides in Theaetetus and Sophist 127; Conclusion 163; Notes 167;

Bibliography 215; General Index 221; Index Locorum 225-229.

"I intend to provide an accessible interpretation of Parmenides and— to this end— of five other Platonic dialogues. Chapter 1 basically summarizes the TF [Platonic Theory of Forms] found in three of Plato’s middle-period dialogues: Phaedo, Cratylus, and Republic. The main purpose of Chapter 1 is to supplement the TF Socrates briefly presents and defends in part I of Parmenides. Chapter 2 gives a detailed analysis of part I, with the purpose of illustrating how Parmenides’s criticisms of Socrates are obviously invalid. Chapter 3 offers a close reading of part II. It shows that the Eighth arguments conducted in part II are, in the main, based on the hypotheses of Plato’s Eleatic and sophist opponents. Plato’s aim in part II is to parody the doctrines of his opponents, often with obviously fallacious and absurd deductions. Chapter 4 illustrates how Theaetetus and Sophist confirm my reading of Parmenides." (p. 3)
Tarrant, Harold. 1993. Thrasyllan Platonism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Chapter 6: The Neopythagorean Parmenides, pp. 148-177.

"Here I attempt to understand the work of a man whom I see as an important figure both in the history of attempts to understand the Platonic corpus as a whole and in the development of a specifically Pythagorean approach to Platonic exegesis that had a major role to play among the Neoplatonists. As ever, my purpose is to make people aware and to make them think. I want my conclusions to be given consideration rather than acceptance.

I have included, in the hope that it will be useful for those who take up my challenge to work in this field, those testimonia and fragments of Thrasyllus of which I am aware, arranged according to subject." (Preface, p. IX)

(...)

"This chapter began by asking the question, If Moderatus held a metaphysical progression interpretation of the Parmenides, what was that interpretation? The question now can be answered with surprising confidence: he would have held the interpretation usually associated with Amelius, or a very similar one. The results were sufficiently convincing to justify the claim that Moderatus had indeed interpreted the Parmenides in this fashion. The attribution of such an interpretation to Moderatus makes it seem highly likely that there were other metaphysical progression interpretations before him, probably going back to Posidonius and probably involving Thrasyllus. After him it is likely that Numenius adhered to such an interpretation (though some very different interpretations flourished in the second century A.D.), and it is quite likely that Plotinus (like Amelius) drew upon Moderatus for his own view of the dialogue, possibly via Numenius." (p. 176)
———. 2022. "Apuleian Evidence regarding Pre-Plotinian Interpretation of the Parmenides." In Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 483–489. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "Both Plotinus in Enn. V. 1. 8 and Proclus (Theol. Plat. 2. 4. 31) are reluctant to attribute originality to his very incomplete interpretation of the final part of Prm. As also in Alcinous, it is possible to see from the newly published Expositio that Apuleius saw the dialogue as making contributions not only to logic but also to metaphysics, including first principles.

After restoring the text of de Platone 190, I show how it can be seen to be dependent upon reading the negative epistemology of Prm. 142a4-5 as applied to the first god. Philo de Somniis 1. 67 offers a close comparison. I conclude that before Apuleius, indeed before Philo, there had been an attempt to interpret the first hypothesis of Parmenides as describing a supreme god who is properly thought of as one and is marked by non-possession of the properties that Plato there denies to the one. Eudorus is thus a likelier influence on Apuleius than Moderatus. Like Alcinous and Calcidius, Apuleius thus finds metaphysical, or epoptic, material in Prm., while avoiding the extreme transcendence and causal priority characteristic of the Plotinian One. Apuleius’ position agrees with his picture of Plato as blending both Eleatic and Pythagorean material with the Socratic."
———. 2023. "Soul in the Earliest Multilevel Interpretations of the Parmenides." In Soul Matters: Plato and Platonists on the Nature of the Soul, edited by Ahbel-Rappe, Sara, Layne, Danielle A. and Addey, Crystal, 251–279. Atlanta: SBL Press.

"Those who work on Plotinus are well used to his three hypostases, One, Intellect, and Soul, which he detected in Plato (Enn. 5.1.8), both in the Second Epistle (dubiously ascribed to him) and in the first three hypotheses of the final part of the Parmenides—an exercise in which Parmenides bombards young Aristoteles with strings of questions concerning the existence or nonexistence, and the unity or diversity, of the One. Plotinus’s previous chapter (7) also relates the three hypotheses to the mythical triad of three rulers, Ouranos, Kronos, and Zeus, and perhaps less directly to the passage of Plato’s Cratylus that discusses their names (Crat. 395e–396c);1 however, to the extent that it does not suggest the relevance of numbers and counting, that dialogue will not be central to this contribution." (p. 251)

(...)

"The problem for Plotinus’s interpretation of the hypotheses of the Parmenides is that it cannot satisfy us until it offers a view about the remaining hypotheses. If these do not offer us further levels of the divine, then what lessons do they offer, and what are they supposed to present? And how many other arguments should we be counting, given that Plato has not given us any numbering except at the third level? It was left to Porphyry to sketch out a comprehensive interpretation that Plotinus might perhaps have been satisfied with and to establish the conventional number of nine hypotheses." (pp. 252-253)

(1) The etymologies connect Kronos with pure intellect and Zeus with the cause of life (and so perhaps with soul), and Ouranos perhaps with the source of intellect that may be glimpsed on high.
Taylor, Alfred Edward. 1896. " On the interpretation of Plato's Parmenides. (I)." Mind no. 5:297–326.

"The task I have set before me is a far simpler one, though I venture to think that until it has been performed it is premature to raise these vaster issues. The question I shall attempt in some degree to answer is no more than this. Can we discover under the apparent incoherence of our dialogue any one leading conception by the help of which its puzzles may be reduced to simplicity ? What right I have for thinking that this question can be answered in the affirmative I must leave the reader to judge." (p. 298)
———. 1896. " On the interpretation of Plato's Parmenides. (II)." Mind no. 5:483–507.

"We have thus four questions before us which may be tabulated thus :—

(1) If the unity of the world be affirmed, what judgments can we make about that unity ? (1, 2, 3.)

(2) If the unity of the world be affirmed, what judgments can we make about its multiplicity ? (4, 5.)

(3) If the unity of the world be denied, what judgments can we make about that unity ? (6, 7.)

(4) If the unity of the world be denied, what judgments can we make about its multiplicity ? (8, 9.)

We shall however see directly that this arrangement of the hypotheses is based on the merely superficial characteristics of external form: their real relations of agreement and opposition we shall only be able to formulate at a later stage of our inquiry, after detailed examination of their contents." (p. 485)
———. 1897. " On the interpretation of Plato's Parmenides. (III)." Mind no. 20:9–39.

"The second part of my apology relates to the somewhat free way in which I have at times interpreted Plato in the language of modern philosophy. And on this score I would plead that for the most part these interpretations are intended rather as illustrations for the modern reader than as professed translations. Moreover, if we would form any sort of understanding of ancient thought, some process of this kind seems unavoidable, and the most we can do in order to guard against misrepresentation is to perform the process carefully and conscientiously. And of all the Platonic dialogues there is none in which this kind of interpretation can do less mischief than in the Parmenides. For its main result, as I have tried to show, is to arrive at the conception of the world as a systematic unity or whole, making almost entire abstraction from the concrete character of its contents, and there can be no assignable reason for thinking that this conception of abstract system appeared to Plato any otherwise than it does to us, though, no doubt, his notion of what the system contained was in many respects widely divergent from our own. Hence I can hardly suppose that even the freest of my restatements of Parmenidean arguments seriously vitiates my theory of the general purport of the dialogue ; and the general drift and purport of the whole is all I undertook to explain." (p. 39)
———. 1903. "On the first part of Plato's Parmenides." Mind no. 12:1–20.

"The thesis which I wish to maintain is briefly this. There is no essential difference but a most essential agreement in respect to the position of the Ideas between the Parmenides and the Phaedo, with which dialogue the Republic is universally admitted to be in complete accord. What difference there is is simply due to the fact that the Parmenides expressly recognises and attempts to answer questions of which the earlier dialogue simply presupposed the solution. If this can be established it will follow that the Republic must still possess for us the central position which it has always hitherto held in the exposition of Platonic philosophy, and the various recent theories which see a revision rather than a development of its teaching in the later dialogues will have to be abandoned. My purpose, as far as the Parmenides is concerned, will be accomplished if I can show that both the problems and the results of the dialogue are inevitably presupposed by the view taken in the Phaedo of knowledge and its objects. In arguing this point I desire to confine myself in the main to the earlier portion of the dialogue (pp. 126-136), in which Parmenides states his objections to the doctrine of Ideas as formulated by the youthful Socrates. Of the longer and more perplexing second half of the dialogue I have previously propounded an interpretation,(1) in the main agreeing with that of Zeller, but very different from that suggested by Mr. Benn. From his silence I infer that he does not think the principle of that interpretation worth examination, while I for my part am as strongly convinced as ever of its general rightness; hence controversy on the point would probably be useless. As however the key to the second part, in my judgment, lies in a right understanding of what goes before, it will be enough for my purpose to deal with the introduction, as we may call it, to the dialogue, which was rather too perfunctorily treated in my former papers." (pp. 2-3)

(1) See Mind, N.S., Nos. 19, 20, SI. Subsequent study of the dialogues, and more especially the perusal of M. Milhaud's Les Philosophes-geomètres de la Grèce [1900], has satisfied me that, while the general character of the interpretation there advocated is correct, insufficient attention was given to the mathematical bearings of the dialogue.
———. 1916. "Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes no. 1915-16:234–289.

Reprinted in A. E. Taylor, Philosophical Studies, London: Macmillan 1934, pp. 28-90.

"I cannot, of course, undertake to deal here with so wide a subject as the purpose and argument of the Parmenides considered as a whole. All that I intend is to offer a slight contribution to the history of early Greek logical theory by attempting to throw some light on one or two lines of reasoning which are made prominent in the dialogue, and I shall select for special consideration two topics, the use made by Parmenides of the appeal to an infinite regress, and his attempted refutation of Idealism. Before I can deal with either point in detail it will be necessary to say something in general about the dramatic setting which Plato has provided for the discussion, a subject on which the commentators, so far as I am acquainted with them, have been unduly silent." (pp. 234-235)
Tejera, Victorino. 1995. "The dialogical composition of Plato's Parmenides." In The Third Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies, edited by Gonzalez, Francisco J., 211–221. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

"The Parrmenides shows, in other words, that in composing his dialogues, Plato designed them to be not only interesting, challenging, and amusing, but also to dramatize and teach the need for achieving perspective and observing proportion in intellectual matters. It is a problem for the neoplatonic interpretation of Plato, for the intellectual historian, and for the sociologist of knowledge that the antidialogical tradition has persisted for so long in reading the dialogues literalistically, in abstraction from their allusive irony and wit and as solemn tractates seeking to develop or enforce doctrine. But it is not a problem that dialogical readers of Plato's ever-intelligent, ever-rewarding constructions have to address - except perhaps to help literalist readers see that the burden of proof that what looks, sounds, and reads like a dialogue may be treated as if it was not a dialogue falls on those who make it their practice to treat them so." (p. 221)
Teloh, Henry. 1976. "Parmenides and Plato's Parmenides 131a-132c." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 14:125–130.

"Recent discussions about the arguments of Parmenides 131a-132c suffer, I believe, from a lack of historical perspective. While commentators have seen that Plato casts the middle period Forms in Eleatic language(1) they have not connected this legacy with the Parmenides arguments. There is, however, a connection, and the persistent failure to see it has led to an inadequate appreciation of the arguments. I will argue that Plato inherits from the Eleatics the predicate "one," and applies it to each of the Forms--"Each Form is one." Then I will show that the thrust of "Parmenides' ''~ attacks at Parmenides 131a-132c is that "Socrates" is unable to state how Forms are related to phenomena while at the same time preserving the Eleatic legacy, the oneness of each Form. Finally I will suggest the importance of this interpretation to Plato's later philosophy." (p. 125)

(1) See F. Solmsen, "Parmenides and the Description of Perfect Beauty in Plato's 'Symposium'," American Journal of Philology, XCII (1971), 62-70; R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Cambridge, 1955), p. 84; P. Friedlānder, Plato, An Introduction, trans. H. Meyerhoff (New York, 1958), pp. 23-26; and my "The Isolation and Connection of the Forms in Plato's Middle Dialogues," forthcoming in Apeiron [vol.10, 1976, pp. 20-33]. Also see F. M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides (London, 1939), pp. 80-81, for interesting, but as I will show, inadequate comments on "Parmenides'" objections to the theory of Forms.
Thatcher, Michael. 2023. "Heidegger’s Answer to Plato’s Parmenides." Sophia:1–17.

Abstract: "Plato’s dialogue Parmenides remains one of—if not, the—most perplexing text in the Platonic corpus. Specifically, it examines the difficulties surrounding the concepts of unity, multiplicity, and Being that are required for participation in the Ideas.

One of the problems forced upon the young Socrates by Parmenides and Zeno in the second half of the dialogue concerns the relationship between Being (ὄν) and the One (ἕν), namely, how defensible is the oneness, or the unity, of the Idea if it also partakes of Being? The text culminates in an aporia as to how to articulate the difference between the One (ἕν) and the many (πολλά), since if the one is, it becomes many. How do many beings share in the one mode of Being? Crucially, how are we to articulate the difference between the One and the many, or Being and beings?

Where Plato’s answer invoking the enigmatic concept ‘exaiphnēs’ (ἐξαίφνης), the temporal becoming of the unity and plurality of the One, seems to contradict the privileging of presence that Heidegger charges him with, he nonetheless fails to offer an understanding of difference that has neither Being nor unity. I argue that Heidegger’s engagement with the problem of the ontological difference, and its development into the identification of Being with difference itself, offers solutions to this aporia in Plato’s Parmenides by addressing a difference that is irreducible to the one or the many, the relational or the derivative. This has significant consequences for understanding Heidegger’s critique of Plato as not just consisting of the privileging of presence but also the failure to respond to the problem of difference."
Trabattoni, Franco. 2016. "Socrates' error in the Parmenides." In Essays on Plato’s Epistemology, 189–198. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

"The part of the Parmenides that is regarded as marking a transition from the author’s discussion of the doctrine of the ideas to his analysis of the Eighth (or nine) hypotheses illustrated in the dialogue has chiefly been studied with the aim of understanding the nature of the exercise which Parmenides presents the young Socrates with, sometimes in order to evaluate to what degree the executive part of this project matches the guidelines provided in these pages.(1) What has not been studied as much – at least, judging from the articles and comments I have examined – is the issue of what Socrates’ error precisely consist in. In this paper, I aim to provide an answer to this question by examining some sentences Parmenides addresses to Socrates, partly as a reproach." (p. 189)

(1) See Casertano, [Il nome della cosa. Linguaggio e realtà negli ultimi dialoghi di Platone, Naples] (1996), esp. pp. 48-49 ff.
———. 2016. "On the distinguishing features of Plato's 'metaphysics' (Starting with the Parmenides)." In Essays on Plato’s Epistemology, 199–217. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

"The Parmenides is arguably the most difficult and puzzling dialogue in Plato’s corpus. This may be the reason why interest in the text on the part of philosophers, including ones chiefly engaged on the theoretical level, has not lapsed but has even gathered momentum in recent years. From a historical and exegetical perspective, it is most tempting to approach the many problems the dialogue raises from new points of view and to present what are at least partly original solutions. This repeated work of analysis concerns both the dialectical can of worms of the second and longer part of the dialogue, and the aporetic discussion on the doctrine of the ideas which unfolds in the first section, as well as all the possible interconnections between the two – the aim being to find a common thread running throughout the work (to say nothing of other, equally thorny issues, such as the role played by the setting of the dialogue, the issue of the spokesman chosen, the degree of historical reliability of the characters portrayed, and the relation between Plato’s philosophy and Eleatic thought). In the present study, I set out from the second of the above-mentioned problems, namely the issue of understanding the meaning of Parmenides’ criticism of the doctrine of the ideas in the opening section of the dialogue." (p. 199, a note omitted)
Tuozzo, Thomas. 2021. "Rethinking Deduction Five of Plato’s Parmenides (160b5-163b6)." Plaot Journal no. 21:69–77.

Abstract: "The fifth “deduction” in Plato’s Parmenides (160b5-163b6) concerns the consequences that follow for a (or the) one from the hypothesis that it is not. I argue that the subject of this hypothesis is, effectively, any Form, considered just insofar as it is one Form. The hypothesis, I further argue, does not concern any essential aspect of a Form, but rather posits its contingent non-instantation (“a one is not” = “a Form is not instantiated”). The motion this deduction attributes to its one is a special type of motion: motion into and out of instantiation."
Turnbull, Robert G. 1984. "On R. E. Allen's Plato's Parmenides." Ancient Philosophy no. 4:206–217.
———. 1998. The Parmenides and Plato's Late Philosophy. Toronto: Toronto Studies in Philosophy.

Translation of, and commentary on the Parmenides with interpretative chapters on the Timaeus, the Theaetetus, the Sophist and the Philebus.

"The present book provides a total explanation of the text of the Parmenides and uses that explanation in accounting for the first philosophy of other late dialogues. To undertake careful and appropriate critique of other purported explanations of the text would require greatly complicating an already complicated account and at least doubling the size of the book. I try to take note of other accounts of the text of the Parmenides at various points, undertaking only a relatively brief critique of their lines of interpretation and explanation in an appendix.(2)" (Preface, pp. IX-X)

(...)

"My point has been to show that a great deal of the effort to explain the Parmenides (and the other late dialogues) requires the attempt to understand the sorts of philosophical problems Plato was looking at and the language in whose terms he stated them. Even though in the end the explanations must conform to the text as we have it (unless there is good reason to believe it corrupt), coming up with adequate explanations is at least as much a philosophical task as it is a philological one.

And, in the end, of course, objectivity in the history of philosophy is lost if texts are either patronized or ignored. So let us proceed to the real task of explaining the Parmenides and its connections with several of Plato's late dialogues." Preface, p. XII)

(2 The appendix takes note of, in particular, the work of Neoplatonists P.M. Cornford, Reginald Allen, Kenneth Sayre, Mitchell Miller, and Constance Meinwald.

The effort is not to offer detailed summaries but rather to comment on the use of rather different interpretative clues. The list is not exhaustive of proposed interpretations, but I believe it includes the most plausible lines of interpretation.
Turner, John D. 2006. "The Gnostic Sethians and Middle Platonism: Interpretations of the Timaeus and Parmenides." Vigiliae Christianae no. 60:9–64.

Abstract: "One may construe the Sethian Gnostic picture of the world and its origins as an interpretation of the biblical protology of the book of Genesis in the light of the Platonic distinction between an ideal, exemplary realm of eternal stable being and its more or less deficient earthly and changeable copy, in which the principal Platonic dialogues of reference are the Timaeus and the Parmenides. Various Sethian treatises offer us accounts of the origin and generation of both these realms; while their portrayal of the origin and deployment of the earthly realm is unmistakably influenced by their readings of Plato's Timaeus, their account of the origin and deployment of the ideal realm is noticeably influenced by readings of Plato's Parmenides. This article attempts to show that the shift from the Timaeus as the primary Platonic dialogue of reference for the Middle Platonic thought of the first two centuries to the Parmenides as the primary dialogue of reference for the emerging Neoplatonism of the third century is also visible in the Sethian treatises. In mid- to later second-century Sethian treatises, the cosmology of the Timaeus serves as an exegetical template to interpret the Genesis protology, but with the turn to the third century, the Sethian trestises that circulated in Plotinus' circle have abandoned all interest in the Genesis protology in favor of a theology of transcendental ascent."
———. 2007. "Victorinus, « Parmenides » commentaries and the Platonizing Sethian treatises." In Platonisms: Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern, edited by Corrigan, Kevin and Turner, John D., 55–96. Leiden: Brill.

"Sometime during the first and second centuries, Platonists such as Moderatus and Numenius were attracted by certain Neopythagorean doctrines espoused by such figures as Eudorus and Thrasyllus, aspects of which probably stemmed ultimately from Old Academicians like Speusippus." (p. 58)

(...)

"It is at this time that the Parmenides, with its thoroughgoing exploration of the nature of ultimate Unity, gradually comes to supplement or even supplant the Timaeus as the primary dialogue of reference.(8)

The “hypotheses” occupying its second half could be identified with a Neopythagorean hierarchy of hypostatic principles: 1) a supreme One beyond being; 2) a second One or Monad, paradoxically conceived as a dyad of unity and determinate being identified as a Middle Platonic Intellect containing multiple Forms; 3) a third hypostasis(9) where multiple otherness undergoing change merely participates in unity and thus can account for the motion typical of Soul or the sensible universe, and so on, ending with the realm of pure disordered matter, identifiable with the Timaeus’ receptacle. Such an “episodic” scheme appears to have been adumbrated already in the Old Academic thought of Speusippus.(10) The three highest of these hypostatic entities could also be recognized in the three kings mentioned in the pseudonymous second Platonic Letter (Letter II 312e), perhaps composed in these same Neopythagorean circles during the first century." (pp. 58-59)

(8) See, e.g., Proclus, Theol. Plat. I.7–8.

(9) Taking in Parm. 155e5 (ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν) as designating a third hypothesis rather than as part of the second hypothesis.

(10) Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 12 1090b19–20 (...)
———. 2010. "The Platonizing Sethian Treatises, Marius Victorinus’s Philosophical Sources, and Pre-Plotinian Parmenides Commentaries." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 131–172. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"Coupled with the recent arguments for a pre-Plotinian origin of the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides,(77) Professor Tardieu’s observation that the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides may depend on both the Chaldaean Oracles and the common source presently embedded in Victorinus and Zostrianos makes a strong case indeed that the Commentary is not by Porphyry, but—perhaps together with others like it—is a product of pre-Plotinian Middle Platonic Parmenides interpretation." (p. 155)

(77) See Corrigan 2000, 141–77: all the apparent innovations in the Commentary are already to be found in Plotinus, and there is a remarkable affinity of thought between Plotinus, Amelius, and the anonymous Commentator that stems from a still earlier tradition of commentary (in Vit. Plot. 20, Porphyry apud Longinus mentions Numenius, Cronius, Moderatus, and Thrasyllus) necessitated by the need for an intelligent reading of difficult passages in Plato’s Parmenides. Moreover, the doctrine of participation apparently espoused by the Commentator (12.16–22; 14.17–20; 33–35)—namely, that the Second One receives determinate being by substantivizing its own vision of the “idea” of being that it sees in the “First One”—is exactly the sort of participation that both Syrianus (In metaph. 109,12–14 [Kroll 1902]) and Proclus (In Tim. 3:33,31–34,2 Diehl) specifically deny to Porphyry, but attribute to earlier Plotinian-circle thought that has its root in Middle Platonism and Neopythagoreanism (Numenius, Cronius, and Amelius).(...)
———. 2010. "The Chaldaean Oracles and the Metaphysics of the Sethian Platonizing Treatises." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 213–232. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"In this paper, I would like to discuss the metaphysical structures and functions of the various entities comprising the transcendent realms depicted in the Chaldaean Oracles, the Sethian Platonizing treatises, especially Allogenes, and in the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides, focusing mostly on certain apparent triadic structures featured in each, namely the Father, Power, Intellect triad in the Oracles, the Triple-Powered One in the Sethian treatises, and the Existence, Life, and Intellect triad in the Commentary as well as upon their associated feminine principles, the figures of Barbelo in the Sethian treatises and of Hecate in the Oracles." (p. 213)
Turner, John D., and Corrigan, Kevin, eds. 2010. Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

Contents: Abbreviations VII; Introduction 1;

Section 1: Plato, from the Old Academy to Middle Platonism

1. Kevin Corrigan: The Place of the Parmenides in Plato’s Thought and in the Subsequent Tradition 23; 2. Gerald Bechtle: Speusippus’s Neutral Conception of the One and Plato’s Parmenides 37; 3. Luc Brisson: The Fragment of Speusippus in Column I of the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides 59; 4. John Dillon: Speusippus and the Ontological Interpretation of the Parmenides 67; 5. Thomas Szlezák: The Indefinite Dyad in Sextus Empiricus’s Report (Adversus Mathematicos 10.248–283) and Plato’s Parmenides 79; 6. Zlatko Pleše: Plato and Parmenides in Agreement: Ammonius’s Praise of God as One-Being in Plutarch’s The E At Delphi 93; 7. J. Noel Hubler: Moderatus, E. R. Dodds, and the Development of Neoplatonist Emanation 115;

Section 2: Middle Platonic and Gnostic Texts

8. John D. Turner: The Platonizing Sethian Treatises, Marius Victorinus’s Philosophical Sources, and Pre-Plotinian Parmenides Commentaries 131; 9. Johanna Brankaer: Is There a Gnostic “Henological” Speculation? 173; 10. Volker Henning Drecoll: The Greek Text behind the Parallel Sections in Zostrianos and Marius Victorinus 195; 11. John D. Turner: The Chaldaean Oracles and the Metaphysics of the Sethian Platonizing Treatises 213; 12. Luc Brisson: A Criticism of the Chaldaean Oracles and of the Gnostics in Columns IX and X of the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides 233; 13. Gerald Bechtle: The Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and Aristotle’s Categories: Some Preliminary Remarks 243; 14. Alain Lernould: Negative Theology and Radical Conceptual Purification in the Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 257; 15. Luc Brisson: A Criticism of Numenius in the Last Columns (XI–XIV) of the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides 275;

References 283; Contributors 297; Subject–Name Index 301; Index Locorum 315-333.
———, eds. 2010. Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

Contents: Abbreviations VII; Introduction 1

Section 1: Parmenides Interpretation from Plotinus to Damascius

1. Matthias Vorwerk: Plotinus and the Parmenides: Problems of Interpretation 23; 2. Kevin Corrigan: Plotinus and the Hypotheses of the Second Part of Plato’s Parmenides 35; 3. Luc Brisson: The Reception of the Parmenides before Proclus 49; 4. Volker Henning Drecoll: Is Porphyry the Source Used by Marius Victorinus? 65; 5. Tuomas Rasimus: Porphyry and the Gnostics: Reassessing Pierre Hadot’s Thesis in Light of the Second- and Third-Century Sethian Treatises 81; 6. Luc Brisson: Columns VII–VIII of the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides: Vestiges of a Logical Interpretation 111; 7. John F. Finamore: Iamblichus’s Interpretation of the Parmenides’ Third Hypothesis 119; 8. John M. Dillon: Syrianus’s Exegesis of the Second Hypothesis of the Parmenides: The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe Revealed 133; 9. Sara Ahbel-Rappe: Damascius on the Third Hypothesis of the Parmenides 143; 10. Gerald Bechtle: Metaphysicizing the Aristotelian Categories: Two References to the Parmenides in Simplicius’s Commentary on the Categories (75,6 and 291,2 Kalbfleisch) 157;

Section 2: The Hidden Influence of the Parmenides in Philo, Origen, and Later Patristic Thought 11. David T. Runia: Early Alexandrian Theology and Plato’s Parmenides 175; 12. Mark Edwards: Christians and the Parmenides 189; 13. Mark Edwards: Origen’s Platonism: Questions and Caveats 199; 14. Jean Reynard: Plato’s Parmenides among the Cappadocian Fathers: The Problem of a Possible Influence or the Meaning of a Lack? 217; 15. Kevin Corrigan: The Importance of the Parmenides for Trinitarian Theology in the Third and Fourth Centuries c.e. 237; 16. Andrew Radde-Gallwitz: Pseudo-Dionysius, the Parmenides, and the Problem of Contradiction 243;

References 255; Contributors 269; Subject–Name Index 273; Index Locorum 289-310.
van Campe, Leen. 2009. "Syrianus and Proclus on the attributes of the One in Plato's « Parmenides »." In Syrianus et la métaphysique de l'Antiquité tardive : actes du colloque international, Université de Genève, 29 septembre-1er octobre 2006, edited by Longo, Angela, 247–280. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

"In the present paper, I will instead investigate a question often left unaddressed or not dealt with at any great length: what is the nature of the attributes that are denied or affirmed of the One, and why are

they discussed in this particular sequence?

In particular, the first two hypotheses confront us with an odd dialectical exercise(4), Whatever is denied of the One in the first - viz. that it is many, a whole, in itself, in motion, and so on- is predicated of the One in the next hypothesis. Moreover, the order of the sequence of attributes is the same in the two cases, with one important exception (5). That the same premise leads both to denying and to predicating of the One an identical list of attributes is not the only puzzling thing here. One cannot but wonder why Parmenides predicates and denies of the One these attributes and no others, and why he does so in this particular sequence. Some attributes recall examples of Platonic Forms that were discussed in the first part of the dialogue, such as sameness, likeness, equality, plurality (6). Others, by contrast, are properties of corporeal beings, such as being in place or in time. Could Parmenides have obtained the same results with his dialectical exercise by using other attributes, or by using them in another order? It seems to me that an answer to the preceding questions might help to solve the central enigma of the Parmenides concerning the nature of the "one"." (pp. 247-248)

(4) Cfr. Plat. Parmen. 137 c 4- 142 A 1 and 142 B 5-155 D 1.

(5) Cfr. infra, pp. 275-279.

(6) Cfr. Plat. Parmen. 128 E 6-129 c 2; 129 D 6-E 4; 131 c 12-E 2.
van der Heiden, Gert-Jan. 2014. "Deciding on Plurality? Plato’s Parmenides between Badiou and Agamben." In Phenomenological Perspectives on Plurality, edited by van der Heiden, Gert-Jan, 195–209. Leiden: Brill.

"In this essay, I want to discuss two contemporary approaches to the question of the one and the many in order to get a sense of the options for thought “after” onto-theology or, rather, for thought on the threshold of onto-theological constitution of metaphysics. Does such a thought require the affirmation of the many instead of the one, as some authors claim, or does such a thought require us to leave the question in suspense?(2) To examine these two options, I will discuss the work of Alain Badiou, which represents the first option, and the work of Giorgio Agamben, which represents the second. Rather than straightforwardly interpreting these works, I will bring them into play in relation to the classical text dealing with the question of the one and the many: what types of interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides do Badiou and Agamben offer us? I do so since exploring the differences between these interpretations will provide a clear overview of the differences in the ontology to which these two options open to contemporary thought lead." (pp. 195-196)

(2) As I explain elsewhere, there is also a third option represented by the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, cf. Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Ontology after Ontotheology: Plurality, Event, and Contingency in Contemporary Philosophy (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2014), chapter 2.
Vanni, Leonida. 2023. "Amelius’ Interpretation of the Hypotheses of Plato’s Parmenides." no. 23:27–61.

Abstract: "In book VI of his Parmenides commentary, Proclus surveys the previous Neoplatonic interpretations of the “hypotheses” of Plato's Parmenides, starting with Amelius, a disciple of Plotinus. This paper analyses Amelius’ exegesis of the hypotheses.

After presenting the extant evidence about his Parmenides commentary, I explore three puzzling aspects of his interpretation: 1) unlike most Neoplatonists, Amelius distinguished Eighth hypotheses instead of nine. I argue that he considered the last section (Prm.

165e2-166c2) to be devoid of any positive content and merged it with the previous one – contrary to the modern advocates of an Eighth-fold divisio textus. 2) Amelius assumed that each hypothesis deals with one layer of reality, but the precise meaning of some identifications is elusive: what are the three kinds of matter matched to hypotheses 5-7? I show that these three material layers probably correspond to three entities whose existence is posited on the basis of the Timaeus: the chora/prime matter, the level of the element traces, and the ordered universe. 3) In at least one point, Amelius’ exegesis disrupts the descending hierarchical ordering of the subject-matters of the hypotheses (i.e. from the highest to the lowest-ranked entity), which was an undisputed governing principle of the Neoplatonic interpretations. This irregularity depends, as I argue, on a further interpretative rule: the negative quality of a hypothesis (except for the first one) is taken to indicate some sort of debasement of the corresponding entity. Since, in the second part of the Parmenides, the negative hypotheses alternate with the positive ones, this further principle clashed with the linear downward arrangement implied by the hierarchical principle. In the conclusion of the paper, I sketch how the insights gained by this analysis can shed some light on the subsequent development of the ancient Parmenides exegesis."
Vázquez, Daniel. 2021. "Getting Younger." Rhizomata no. 9:84–95.

Abstract: "I argue that in Plato’s Parmenides 141a6–c4, things in time come to be simultaneously older and younger than themselves because a thing’s past and present selves are both real. As a result, whatever temporal relation is predicated of any of these past and present selves is true of the thing in question. Unlike other interpretations, this reading neither assumes that things in time have to replace their parts, nor that time is circular. I conclude that the passage is committed to a conception of the ongoing present and a rejection of presentism and endurantism in favour of a growing universe theory and perdurantism."
Vorwerk, Matthias. 2010. "Plotinus and the Parmenides: Problems of Interpretation." In Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 23–33. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"The second part of Plato’s Parmenides with its dialectical exercises on the One has received remarkable attention in the history of Platonism.(1) Interestingly, the more-or-less systematic interpretation of the hypotheses seems to have begun only with Plotinus, who understood the hypotheses of the Parmenides ontologically and referred the first three of them to the three hypostases of his own metaphysical system, that is, the One (or Good), Intellect, and Soul.(2) While it is undisputed that Plotinus adapted the first three hypotheses and exploited them for the formulation of his version of Platonic metaphysics, it still remains a matter of discussion whether Plotinus depended on the first hypothesis of the Parmenides to invent, as it were, the absolutely simple One, transcending being and predication, or whether he merely used it as justification for his metaphysical innovation.

I will argue that the answer lies in between: Plotinus was both inspired by the first hypothesis and needed it as evidence for his Platonic orthodoxy. In the following, I will first give a brief survey of the most relevant scholarship on Plotinus’s interpretation of the Parmenides. Then, I will focus mainly on a close analysis of what could be called Plotinus’s “apology,” namely, chapter 8 of Enn. 6.1 [10]: On the Three Primary Hypostases, in which Plotinus explicitly introduces the Parmenides in support of his metaphysics." (p. 23)

(1) Proclus, In Parm. 630,37–643,5 Cousin provides a survey of ancient interpretations of the Parmenides, however, without giving names; in Theol. Plat. 1.10 = 1:42,4–9 Saffrey-Westerink, Plotinus is named as one of the old, i.e., first, interpreters of the Parmenides. See Saffrey and Westerink 1968–1997, 1, lxxv–lxxxix; Brisson 1994, 285–91.

(2) These three hypotheses of the Parmenides are I: 137c3–142a6; II: 142b1–155e2; and III: 155e3–157b4. III is actually a corollary to II, but Plotinus considers it to be a separate hypothesis; see Brisson 1994, 46 with n. 96.

References

Brisson, L. 1994. Platon. Parménide. Translated, with introduction and notes, by Luc Brisson. GF 688. Paris: Flammarion. 2nd rev. ed. 1999.

Saffrey, H. D. and L. G. Westerink 1968–1997. Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne. Texte etabli et traduit par H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink. 6 Vols. Collection des universités de France. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Waddell, W. W. 1896. "The Place of the Parmenides in the Order of the Platonic Dialogues, Further Considered." The Classical Quarterly no. 10:287–291.

"Finally the argument that because of resemblance in matter such works as the Parmenides, Sophistes, and Politicus are closely linked in time, fails to carry conviction.

Plato - to continue our assumption - would hear criticisms upon the Parmenides only after its publication, and might naturally finish the Republic, with any other work already outlined, before resuming that branch of inquiry. One of the clearest indications of sequence, and even of close sequence, supplied by Plato himself is the passage in which the Timaeus seems to be affiliated to the Republic, yet nobody alleges that nothing came between." (p. 291)
Walker, Merle G. 1938. "The One and Many in Plato's Parmenides." The Philosophical Review no. 47:488–516.

"The present essay, therefore, is devoted to the thesis that the antinomies of Parmenides I37c-i66c present Plato's own solution to the problem of the One and Many as it grows out of the processes of his own thinking. The development of his conception of Being in the other dialogues leads to an apparent paradox for which the Parmenides affords the necessary and, indeed, the only possible solution." (pp. 495-498)
Walter, Denis. 2023. "Definitional Structure and the Same, the Different, and Part-Whole Relations in Plato's Parmenides." Ancient Philosophy no. 43:425–440.

Abstract: "This article argues that the second part of the Parmenides (137-166) consists not only of the well-known logical structure that has been widely studied but also of a great variety of definitions of forms. My aim is to show how these definitions depend on a specific group of closely connected primary forms (i.e., same, different, part, whole). The definitions that Parmenides provides help Socrates overcome his failure in attempting to define forms in the first part of the dialogue."
Wear, Sarah Klitenic. 2011. The Teachings of Syrianus on Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides. Leiden: Brill.

"While it is clear that Proclus adopts the bulk of his metaphysics from his teacher, it is difficult to sort through precisely what in his thought is purely Syrianic and what is his own elaboration of Syrianus’ teaching.

First of all, “fragment”, as a term used in this work could better be replaced by the more accurate “testimonium.” The selections of Syrianus given in this collection as numbered fragments are testimonia, or reports,

taken from Proclus’ commentaries on Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides.

The passages from Proclus and Damascius were gathered from sections where they explicitly mention Syrianus with reference to either Plato’s Timaeus or Parmenides. Such a “fragment” collection, thus, poses the

difficulty that the teachings of Syrianus as gathered from Proclus and Damascius are all non-verbatim, and possibly, as we shall see, based on oral teachings, for the most part, rather than written commentaries. It is difficult, thus, to know for certain how much of Proclus’ or Damascius’ own opinions on philosophy are included in their reports of Syrianus." (p. 20)
———. 2011. "The One in Syrianus’ Teachings on the Parmenides: Syrianus on Parm., 137d and 139a." The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition no. 5:58–84.

Abstract: "This article describes Syrianus’ teachings on the One, as found in his testimonia on the Parmenides. In order to preserve the transcendence of the One, while still providing a fluid universe connected to the One, Syrianus shows how the nature of the One is seen in the structure of the Parmenides itself: the first hypothesis of the Parmenides outlines the primal God, while the intelligible universe is the subject of the second hypothesis, in so far as the intelligible universe is a product of the One. Thus, whatever is negated of the One in the first hypothesis contains a positive analogue in the second hypothesis. With this description of the One in the Parmenides, Syrianus is able to create a complete, fluid universe. Readings of two lemmata, in particular, illuminate Syrianus’ manner of interpreting the Parmenides to show how the One is both transcendent and connected to the universe.

In his interpretations of Parmenides 137d and 138a, Syrianus shows how the One is partless with respect to itself, but contains parts with respect to the rest of the universe; and that the One is in itself and in another, again, with respect to itself and with respect to the rest of the universe. With his interpretation of the Parmenides, moreover, one can see how Syrianus differs from the interpretations of Porphyry and Iamblichus, and how he paves the way for Proclus’ reading of the dialogue."
———. 2017. "Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus on Parmenides 137d: On Parts and Wholes." In Proclus and his Legacy, edited by Butorac, David D. and Layne, Danielle A., 219–231. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"Parmenides 137d discusses whether the One has parts and whether or not these parts function as a beginning, middle, and end of the One.(5) In Proclus’ interpretation of this passage, he discusses how something unitary can interact with a universe full of multiplicity while still maintaining its own oneness. Proclus further questions how a uniquely unitary entity, such as the One, could contain parts at all. For, on the one hand, the One seems to be a whole with no parts, but on the other hand, it should contain all the parts of the universe. Moreover, all the parts not only have their beginning in the One, but they remain in the One and proceed from it, and then return to the One, which is the end. Proclus solves this dilemma by speaking of the One and wholes and parts in one way in the second hypothesis of the Parmenides, and another in the first hypothesis. Namely, the negative argument (that the One has no parts) has its positive counterpart (that the One contains parts) in the second hypothesis at 145a4–8, which argues that that One is an unlimited entity which contains wholes and parts in a transcendent fashion. Proclus, relying on Syrianus’ interpretation of this passage,(6) argues that the One contains no beginning, middle, or end because it is aschesis; rather, parts have a relationship (or schesis) with it only. Proclus appropriates the role of “relationship” to the One-Being, which can be said to contain parts and have a beginning, middle, and end." (pp. 219-220)

(5) For a discussion on the history of commentary on this lemma, see Wear [The Teachings of Syrianus on Plato’s Timaeus and Parmenides] (2011), 246–50.

(6) On Syrianus’ contribution to this argument, see Wear (2011) p. 242–270, fragments 4 and 5.
Weingartner, Rudolph H. 1973. The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue: the Cratylus, the Protagoras, the Parmenides. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

"In this book, I take three dialogues—the Cratylus, the Protagoras, and the Parmenides—and attempt to show, in some detail, that each of them can—and therefore should—be understood as a unified whole. The dialogues discussed differ considerably from each other, as do the themes which serve as their principles of unification. On the one hand, this dissimilarity should make whatever success I may have in exhibiting the phHosophic-dramatic structure of each of these dialogues all the more convincing support of my general thesis about the unity of Platonic dialogues; but on the other hand, the fact that our dialogues differ so from one another requires that each be dealt with in a somewhat different fashion." (p. 7)

(...)

"I try, in the final chapter, to show that the Parmenides as a whole performs a complex task to which all its parts contribute.

Plato is here engaged in revising his views on both the method by which knowledge is attained and on the nature of the objects of knowledge themselves. This principle not only holds together the two major parts of the dialogue, but serves as a key, as well, to the puzzle of the first section. In the larger part of the chapter on the Parmenides I propose to show that if the arguments Parmenides makes against the forms are taken cumulatively, that is, in relation to one another and to the purpose of the entire series, a good deal of the mystery that has surrounded them disappears." (pp. 11.12)
Wild, John. 1946. Plato's Theory of Man: An Introduction to the Realistic Philosophy of Culture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chapter 6: Being and its inversion (the Parmenides), pp. 205-241.

"It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the first of the later dialectical dialogues, the Parmenides, is devoted to the task of distinguishing different senses of being and non-being, in conscious opposition to the simple ontology of Parmenides and his disciple Zeno. The inversion which results from the confusion of these different modes or levels of being with one another distorts every act of understanding, corrupting reason at its very source, since the concept of existence is involved in all other concepts. Hence we are here approaching the very root of sophistry, or philosophical misunderstanding, and the primal source of those subordinate distortions to which we have thus far been devoting our attention." (p. 207)

(...)

"Unless they can be distinguished, and philosophy of the upward ascent can be established in the individual intellect, human life, both in its individual and social phases, must be inverted, and the whole cultural hierarchy overturned. Such cultural anatropism has its ultimate root in the ontological inversions so clearly indicated in the exercises of the Parmenides. To misunderstand being is to misunderstand everything. There are no more fundamental misunderstandings than these. This inversion of being, however, is associated with an allied inversion of the apprehensive faculties. Being not only is. It is also known. Hence these ontological inversions are allied with certain inversions of the apprehensive faculties, which always attend them in the complex human phenomenon of sophistry." (p. 241)
Willis, W. H. . 1971. "A New Fragment of Plato's Parmenides on Parchment." Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies no. 12:539–552.

"In Autumn 1969 Perkins Library of Duke University acquired among a group of unrelated texts on papyrus a small palimpsest fragment from an ancient parchment codex containing Plato's Parmenides (PDuk. inv. G 5)." (p. 539)

"If these comparisons are convincing, the Duke Plato joins the rare company of the Berlin leaves from Euripides' Cretans, the London leaf of Demosthenes, and possibly the fragment in Florence of Hesiod's Catalogue (PSI 1383) as sole survivors of the earliest Greek codices on parchment. Only the Plato is written in <Homeric majuscule',' but there is no logical reason why this most splendid bookhand should not have appeared early on parchment. Meantime the Duke Plato becomes the first ancient fragment of the Parmenides to come to light, the earliest manuscript of Plato on parchment, and the earliest Plato in codex form." (pp. 551-552)
Wolfe, C. J. 2012. "Plato's and Aristotle's Answers to the Parmenides Problem." The Review of Metaphysics no. 65:747–764.

"The first section of this paper will summarize the history of pre-Socratic philosophy and explain why Parmenides was a turning-point. The second section will explain the sophist Protagoras' relation to the Parmenides problem. The third part will present Aristotle's complete answer to the Parmenides problem, and in the fourth part I will compare that approach with Plato's solution in the Sophist. Lastly, I will sum up by characterizing how I think Plato and Aristotle would have responded to Protagoras' Parmenidean sophistry in political life." (p. 748)
Wood, Kelsey. 2005. Troubling Play: Meaning and Entity in Plato’s Parmenides. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"To conclude, if the Parmenides is unambiguous, then it is thoroughly contradictory and says nothing. But multiplying distinctions indefinitely to avoid all possible contradiction approaches a limit: there is no unqualified being or unqualified becoming. The alternative left open by the Parmenides is that ideal possibilities of repetition only signify in relation to being; ideal expression derived toward-itself yields no intelligibility. Within these limits, knowing is necessarily goal-oriented and incomplete. By repeating this loss of focus in both directions, the dialogue indicates the instability of the ratio that is reason. Human temporal existence implies the potentiality to remember this chõris. Participatory being is this unified manifold, or opening of identity and difference. The dialogue is an icon of the cosmos: not a collection of entities (or predications) but an organically interconnected whole, a unification of ambiguous disclosures informed by signifying oppositions. The formal structure of the Parmenides, like that of any being, is in itself transcendent: it is evoked throughout in a negative way. If for Plato human being is participatory, nonetheless the ratio that is rationality is an odd juxtaposition, not a harmonious sharing.

The Parmenides discloses this paradox in order to show that the presence of self-identity is not simple. The dialogue shows that chõris is is not a problem to be solved; rather it is an essential feature of logos." (p. 177)
Wyller, Egyl Anders. 1962. "Plato's Parmenides: Another Interpretation." The Review of Metaphysics no. 15:621–640.

"My intention in this paper is to state some main points of an elaborate interpretation of mine of the Platonic Parmenides written in German, which was published in Oslo a while ago.(1) Thus I do not here intend to present and discuss all the separate arguments of the dialogue. All I wish is to state - for readers already acquainted with the Platonic text - the results of my researches in a not too loose and disconnected way. For a full presentation and discussion of Plato's arguments the reader, if interested, should consult my book." (p. 621)

(1) Platons Dialog Parmenides in seinem Zusammenhang mit Symposion und Politeia. lnterpretationen zur Platonischen Henologie. Skrifter utgitt av Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, II. Hist.-Filos. Klasse, 1959.

No. 1. Oslo, 1960.
———. 1995. Henologische Perspektiven I/I-II: Platon - Johannes - Cusanus. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Two recent Interpretations of Plato's Parmenides 89-104.

Review of William F. Lynch, S.J., An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the Parmenides, Georgetown University Press, 1959 and Robert S. Brumbaugh, Plato on the One. The Hypotheses in the Parmenides, Yale University Press, New Haven 1961.

The Parmenides is the "Philosopher", 131-146.

"The thesis I shall defend here is part of a larger thesis which I propounded in the summer of 1965 in a series of lectures at Tiibingen(1) The larger thesis is concerned with the entire group of "late" dialogues which includes the Parmenides and the hypothetical dialogue, the Philosopher, that is the group of dialogues following the Republic. It claims some form of "architectonic" unity for all those dialogues, consisting of two main "paths": a preliminary, upward path towards the Philosopher (comprising the dialogues Craty[us, Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus, Parmenides) and a subsequent downward path to the Academy-State (comprising the dialogues Philebus, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Critias, Laws, Epinomis)

The lesser thesis supports the "architectonic" view by claiming that the extant dialogue Parmenides is identical with the missing Philosopher. It is my intention here to subject this thesis, which on the occasion mentioned could only be very roughly sketched and argued for, to a closer scrutiny and to give it more detailed support." (pp. 131-132)

(1) Published in the book "Der spāte Platon. Tübinger Vorlesungen 1965" (Meiner), Hamburg, 1970. This paper was read to "Klassisk forening", Oslo, Nov. 1965 and made ready for print that winter.

(2) A synopsis of this thesis is given in "The Architectonic of Plato's later dialogues" Classica et Mediaevalia XXVII, Cph. 1968.
Yi, Byeong-uk, and Bae, Eunshil. 1998. "The Problem of Knowing the Forms in Plato's Parmenides." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 15:271–283.

"In the first part of Plato's Parmenides, Parmenides presents several arguments against the theory of forms, propounded by young Socrates as his interlocutor in the dialogue. He puts special significance on one of them. He says that it is of the greatest difficulty to defend the theory against the objection that "it does not even pertain to the forms to be known [by humans] if they are such as we say they must be" (133b5-6), 2 and presents an argument to substantiate the objection (133c3- 134c3).3 In this paper, we shall examine the argument and present a solution of the difficulty on behalf of Socrates. In section I, we shall give an analysis of the argument. In section II, we shall discuss some objections to the argument and argue that they fail to address the central issue. In section III, we shall present our own objection to the argument and

the consequent solution of the difficulty." (p. 271)
Young, J. 1980. "Parmenides 133A-134B." Prudentia no. 12:84–86.
Yu, Jyiuan. 1991. "On Plato's Theory of the "Metheksis" of Ideas." Philosophical Inquiry:25–37.
Zhang, Huaiyuan. 2023. "The Instant between Time and Eternity: Plato's Revision of the Parmenidean Now in the Parmenides." The Review of Metaphysics no. 76:426–446.

"In this article, I will present Plato’s later temporal solution to the problem of participation in his early theory of forms.

To understand Plato’s view of time, it is necessary to look at both his and Parmenides’ conceptions of temporality. Many scholars focus on the Timaeus in discussing the concept of time in Parmenides and Plato, but in fact the analysis of time in the Parmenides is equally fruitful and even more profound. Although some scholars have noticed this, relevant studies are still relatively lacking. Sattler specifically interprets how Plato’s deductions in the Parmenides respond to Parmenides’ deductions in fragment B8 based on formal, linguistic, and conceptual resemblances.(13) I will follow her approach and draw further conclusions regarding what Plato’s response consists in with respect to time." (pp. 427-428, some note omitted)

(13) See Barbara M. Sattler, “Time and Space in Plato’s Parmenides,” Études platoniciennes 15 (2019): 1–69.
Zuckert, Catherine H. 1998. "Plato's Parmenides: A Dramatic Reading." The Review of Metaphysics no. 51:875–906.

"Modern commentators have generally followed the neo-Platonists in treating Parmenides' arguments as a version or stage of Plato's metaphysical teaching, although some continue to treat it primarily as an exercise in logic.(3)

I shall argue, on the contrary, that the conversation related in the Parmenides sets the stage for all the other Socratic dialogues which follow it in terms of their dramatic dating. In the Parmenides Plato shows, first, how the Socratic teaching about the "ideas" responds to certain difficulties in the Eleatic teaching. Second, he has Parmenides bring out difficulties in Socrates' teaching about the ideas, particularly with regard to the connection between the purely intelligible ideas and sensible things. Finally, in an extremely playful demonstration of logical gymnastics, he has Parmenides present a devastating critique-not merely dramatic, but substantive-of the teaching of the poem written by the historical philosopher.(4)" (p. 876)

(3) For example, Constance Meinwald, Plato's Parmenides (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). For an excellent and more complete statement of the history of interpretation of the dialogue see Kenneth M. Sayre, Parmenides' Lesson (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), xi-xix.

(4) See Kenneth M. Sayre, Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 47-50.
———. 2009. Plato’s Philosophers: the Coherence of the Dialogues. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Chapter 2: Plato’s Parmenides. Parmenides’ critique of Socrates and Plato’s critique of Parmenides, pp. 147-179.

"The most important thing we learn from Plato’s Parmenides is, however, the outcome of the long “demonstration.” What Parmenides’ proof and disproof of his own thesis that one is show is that it is not possible to give an account of the whole on the basis of one intelligible unit. Neither the Ionians nor the Italians, whether Pythagorean or Eleatic, could provide an adequate explanation, because they tried to reduce everything to one fundamentally undifferentiated underlying substance, motion, unit, or being.

Nor, Plato’s Parmenides shows, can being be defined simply through negation, as the historical Parmenides seems to have thought. By opposing being to everything it is not, one gets either no attributes or all attributes.

In neither case has one discovered what is distinctive about being in itself.

To explain the whole—and so, presumably, being as a whole—one has to explain the interrelation of things essentially different in kind. Whether Socrates, Timaeus, or the Eleatic Stranger succeeded remains to be seen.

As Plato indicates first in the Laws and then demonstrates dramatically in the Parmenides, this was the task facing the philosophers of the future." (pp. 178-179)

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